An analysis of self-management

Journal of Behavioral Education, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1993, pp. 405-425

An Analysis of Self-Management

Carolyn Hughes, Ph.D., 1,3 and John W. Lloyd, Ph.D. 2

Accepted: April 30, 1993 Action Editor: Nirbhay N. Singh

We discuss topics related to a theoretical analysis of self-management, including theories of self-management, self-reinforcement and self-management, antecedent stimuli for self-management, teaching of self-management behaviors, and applications of self-management. Our analysis indicates that self-management's roots in behavioral explanations of phenomena are solid, but that there are important issues yet to be examined in developing a thorough understanding of self-management. We argue that self-management behaviors almost certainly must be examined in relation to the contexts in which they occur and the consequences that they produce.

KEY WORDS: self-management; self-control; self-regulation; reinforcement; problem-solving.

Human situations associated with self-control or self-management typically involve behaving in a way that causes one or the other of two competing consequences to occur (Catania, 1984; Rachlin, 1978; Skinner, 1953). Often, for simplicity, people say that an individual chooses between two behaviors having different consequences. For example, spending one's entire weekly paycheck may make inexpensive items such as magazines or cassette tapes available immediately, but may prevent the later purchase of a more expensive commodity such as a new car (Catania, 1984). Simi- larly, the immediate effects of watching television rather than studying may increase the future likelihood of television viewing, but the delayed effects (e.g., poor grades) may be aversive.

1Assistant Professor, Department of Special Education, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.

2professor, Curry School of Education, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. 3Correspondence should be directed to Carolyn Hughes, Department of Special Education, Vanderbilt University, Box 328, Peabody College, Nashville, TN 37203.

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Such situations present challenging dilemmas to an individual because the effects of the two alternative responses occur at different times (Rachlin, 1978). In contrast, if opportunities (e.g., a limitless supply of funds) to buy a car or purchase a video player occurred at the same time, self-control would not be an issue. One simply would choose a purchase based upon personal preference (i.e., a high-probability behavior). The dilemma occurs because a high-probability activity for an individual such as spending one's money provides immediate reinforcement, whereas the effect of not saving funds (e.g., not enough money is accumulated to buy a car) is experienced only after a delay (Bandura, 1969). Good grades (and possible related events such as honor roils, scholarships, or recognition) may not be an effective reinforcer for studying because, as an outcome, grade averages may be "too delayed, too improbable, or too small, and of only cumulative sig- nificance" (Malott, 1984, p. 200). We typically describe an individual's decision to study (a low-probability behavior) rather than watch television (a high-probability behavior) as an instance of self-control or self-management. Studying may be immediately aversive; however, studying may provide access to the long-term benefits of good grades and associated events. Kazdin (1978) and Brigham (1978) contended that self-control occurs when an individual responds in a manner counter to obtaining an immediately reinforcing consequence. Self-control may be the performance of a response that appears to act against the immediate contingencies.

In this paper we discuss theoretical issues related to the concept of self-management. Topics discussed include: (a) theories of self-management, including operant and cognitive explanations, (b) the role of self-reinforcement in the self-management paradigm, (c) the discriminative stimulus for self- management behavior, (d) teaching self-management, (e) contemporary applications of self-management, and (f) recommendations for future research.

WHAT IS SELF-MANAGEMENT?

Despite minor distinctions, responses typically classified under the rubric of self-management include self-control (cf. Kazdin, 1978; Skinner, 1953), self-regulation (cf. Kanfer, 1971), and self-determination (cf. Skinner, 1953). Two theoretical explanations of self-management as a process domi- nate the literature: (a) the operant explanation, including basic investigations of self-control and theories of problem solving (cf. Brigham, 1978; Catania, 1984; Kazdin, 1978; Rachlin, 1978; Skinner, 1953) and the (b) cognitive interpretation (cf. Bandura, 1969; Goldfried & Merbaum, 1973; Kanfer, 1971; Mahoney & Thoresen, 1974). In this section we discuss the literature related to these two major theories.

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Operant View of Self-Management

Skinner (1953) may have been the first theorist to propose an operant view of the self-management paradigm (Jones, Nelson, & Kazdin, 1977). Skinner theorized that individuals control their behavior as they would control the behavior of anyone else: through manipulation of the variables of which their own behavior is a function. For example, to avoid smoking, an individual could make the response less probable by altering functionally- related variables (e.g., by not buying cigarettes). Skinner continued that any behavior that succeeds in decreasing the probability of the response automatically would be negatively reinforced by decreasing aversive stimulation associated with the response (e.g., shortness of breath or fear of heart failure).

Skinner's paradigm involves two separate responses: the controlling response, the behavior that affects variables (e.g., turning off the television) in such a way as to change the probability of the controlled response, the behavior to be increased or decreased (e.g., studying). An individual's behavior ultimately is accounted for by variables external to the individual, but these external events typically are mediated by events accessible to the individual alone (e.g., the "urge" to smoke). Kazdin (1978) suggested that individuals are in the best position to observe their own behavior and that in the case of private events (e.g., thoughts) are the only ones that can detect their occurrence and administer consequences for their control.

Basic Investigations of Self-Control

Basic studies with both animals and humans support Skinner's conceptualization of self-control (Catania, 1984; Rachlin, 1978). Behavior identified as commitment responses have been observed both in pigeons (cf. Fantino, 1966; Rachlin & Green, 1972) and humans (cf. Millar & Navarick, 1984; Ragotzy, Blakely, & Poling, 1988). Specifically, pigeon and human subjects have been observed to make responses that increase the chances of obtaining a large delayed reinforcer (e.g., edible) by making an immediate, smaller reinforcer unavailable. (This commitment response parallels Skinner's controlling response).

In contrast, responses that result in accessing the smaller, more immediate reinforcer instead of the larger, delayed reinforcer are classified as impulsive responses. Because pigeons typically behave more impulsively than human subjects (Rachlin & Green, 1972; Ragotzy et al., 1988), Catania (1984) and Mawhinney (1982) speculated that human instances of self-control involve verbal behavior (cfi Bern, 1967). For example, Rachlin (1978) suggested


that a student may sign (i.e., commit to) a written contract stating a response cost (e.g., loss of privileges or money) for not studying. The contract is signed (a form of verbal behavior) when the student's perceived value of studying is high (e.g., when the possibility of obtaining a scholarship is contingent on maintaining good grades). The verbal commitment (the contract) decreases the student's choice due to the impending response cost during those times when the value of studying may wane (e.g., when there are competing reinforcers).

Theories of Problem Solving

The problem-solving process described by Skinner (1953) and Catania (1984) exemplifies the operant view of self-management. Skinner suggested that a problem situation is one in which "a response exists in strength which cannot be emitted" (1953, p. 246). The strength of the response typically is demonstrated when the response occurs as soon as the opportunity is available. For example, a locked door in a house is a problem if behavior re- quiring the door to be open is strong and a key or other means of opening the door is not available. The strength of the response is inferred from the occurrence of behavior that previously opened the door (e.g., "jimmying" the lock with a knife) or the behavior that occurs as soon as the door is opened (e.g., dashing inside the house). The solution to the problem is simply a response that alters the situation so that the strong response can be emitted (e.g., finding the key or calling a locksmith). Similarly, Catania (1984) suggested that the discriminative features of a situation define the problem, and the solution to the problem serves as the reinforcer.

Skinner (1953) reminded us that:

"Simply emitting a solution, however, is not solving a problem . . . . Problem-solving may be defined as any behavior which, through the manipulation of variables (emphasis added), makes the appearance of a solution more probable . . . . [However], the appearance of a solution does not guarantee that problem-solving has taken place. An accidental change in the environment often brings about a similar r e s u l t - [for example], the key may be found [by chance]" (p. 247-248).

The process by which an individual solves a problem is similar to the exp lana t ion of how o n e man ag es one ' s own behav ior : through the manipulation of variables of which the response is a function.

In the case of self-management, one controls variables (i.e., an example of Skinner's controlling response) to change the probability of a controlled response. For example, people count to ten to prevent making abusive comments or enter a library carrel to increase studying. When solving a problem, one manipulates stimuli (i.e., modifies the environment) to

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make a solution more probable (e.g., by converting a verbal problem into a mathematical equation or looking up a word in a dictionary) (Catania, 1984). Skinner (1953) argued that solving a problem does not mean emitting a response that proves to be a solution, but, rather, manipulating stimuli that control the problem-solving response. For example,

"We increase the chances of a solution when we look a problem over carefully, when we get all the facts, or when we point up relevant stimuli by stating a problem in its clearest terms. A further step is to arrange or rearrange stimuli" (Skinner, 1953, p. 249).

To illustrate, if the problem is to isolate the cause of a airplane crash, one may classify relevant variables according to common characteristics (e.g., weather conditions or physical state of the crew) to identify factors functionally related to the crash. In an operant view, in both the self-management and the problem-solving processes, one responds (i.e., manipulates variables) in ways that change the probability of a future response (i.e., either a controlled response or a problem-solving response).

Cognitive View of Self-Management

Skinner, Rachlin, and others who base self-management on operant principles typically focus their analyses on individuals' controlling and con- comitant controlled responses. In contrast, the cognitive explanation of self- management suggests the occurrence of two steps: (a) first, the assessment of and decision to control one's behavior followed by (b) the actual self- controlling response (Brigham, 1978). Emphasis is placed upon the first step which is assumed to begin when individuals evaluate their own behavior and subsequently decide to change that behavior (cf. Bandura, 1969; Goldfried & Merbaum, 1973; Kanfer, 1971; Mahoney & Thoresen, 1974; Premack, 1970). For example, Premack (1970) argued that individuals' ob- servations of deficiencies in their own performance and their resulting decision to address these deficiencies are the critical components of self-management. Other writers (Bandura, 1971; Kanfer, 1971; Mahoney & Thoresen, 1974) concurred that self-management is a process that begins with monitoring and evaluating one's behavior followed by reinforcing im- provements in one's performance. For example, a student may infer from a survey of her recently deteriorating grades that her study behavior is in- effective, prompting her to modify her performance which is reinforced ultimately by improved test scores. Similarly, Mahoney and Thoresen (1974) claimed that self-awareness or sensitivity to one's actions is a requisite to self-management.


According to the cognitive view of self-management, discrimination of one's behavior is followed by a decision to control or change one's performance to achieve a self-determined outcome. Kanfer (1971) claimed that this decision resulted from individuals' observation of a discrepancy between their behavior and their self-established standard of performance. Similarly, Bandura (1969) argued that the:

" s e l e c t i o n o f w e l l - d e f i n e d o b j e c t i v e s . . . is an essential aspect of any self-directed program of change. The goals that individuals choose for themselves must be specified sufficiently . . . to provide adequate guidance for the actions that must be taken daily to attain desired outcomes" (p. 255).

Goldfried and Merbaum (1973) concurred that self-management "represents a personal decision arrived at through conscious deliberation for the purpose of integrating action which is designed to achieve certain desired outcomes or goals as determined by the individual himself" (p. 12). These authors acknowledged that their viewpoint as well as those of Bandura and Kanfer stresses:

"the importance of mediating variables in dealing with the process of self-control. All of these [cognitive] conceptions lean heavily on the importance of thought and language in delaying impulsive action, and for introducing a competing cognitive alternative into the self-regulatory sequence" (p. 12).

Differences and Similarities Between Operant and Cognitive Perspectives on Self-Management

Rachlin (1978) and other operant researchers also referred to delaying impulsive responses within the context of basic investigations of self- control. These researchers, however, focused on the individual's controlling or commitment response in which variables are manipulated to make an impulsive response less probable. In contrast, the cognitive viewpoint stressed the mediation of variables through thought processes in order to delay impulsive action. To illustrate, Kanfer (1971) argued that "at the psychological level, some verbal, perceptual or physiological feedback for activation of the self-regulation sequence is needed as a trigger" (p. 43).

Although there are differences between the operant and cognitive perspectives on self-management, they share characteristics. Indeed, both views arose from a behavioral perspective, not from a psychoanalytic or other non-empirical tradition. Furthermore, according to both views, self- management is not a trait. Whereas people on the street might refer to concepts such as will power or other psychological qualities, neither the cognitive nor the operant views of self-management require recourse to personality attributes. Another similarity is that according to both views,

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individuals can acquire greater facility in exercising self-management. In a later section, we discuss some examples of applications of self-management and how it can be taught. Before turning to that topic, however, we examine the events that surround self-management of behavior, asking what causes and supports self-management.

WHY DO PEOPLE MANAGE THEIR OWN BEHAVIOR?

Because both human and infrahuman subjects have been observed to manage their own behavior (i.e., to avoid immediate consequences in favor of delayed reinforcement), an analysis of the self-management paradigm should consider environmental events that prompt and maintain that behavior. The issue is particularly intriguing when we consider that the individual has the opportunity to obtain reinforcement at any time, but behaves in a manner that does not result in the immediately available reinforcer (Kazdin, 1978; Skinner, 1953; Thoreson & Mahoney, 1974). To describe why individuals manage their own behavior in this way, we discuss perspectives on the antecedents and consequences of self-management, respectively.

What Prompts Self-Management?

Because television watching or doodling at one's desk or remaining quiet on a controversial topic at a meeting may provide more immediate reinforcement for an individual than paying bills or solving algebraic equa- tions or publicly presenting an opposing view, the question remains why anyone would ever engage in a behavior that provides delayed rather than immediate benefits. If we observed a young man who was guffawing loudly while watching television suddenly get up, turn off the television, sit down at his desk, and begin figuring his income tax in mid-January, we may be curious to know what prompted his change in behavior. An interpretation of the young man's actions is complex because of the influence of multiple schedules of reinforcement. For example, the television show may provide immediate positive reinforcement because of its relaxing and entertaining effects. At the same time, the young man may be nagged by the thought that his income tax isn't finished and he knows that early filing typically results in early refunds. He, therefore, may receive (a) immediate negative reinforcement by avoiding nagging thoughts as he begins his income tax, (b) delayed positive reinforcement for early filing when he receives an early return, and (c) delayed negative reinforcement by preventing the aversive


consequences of not filing (e.g., a fine). To be sure, the benefits of these contingencies must be strong enough to overcome the aversive consequences that are familiar to most people who complete tax forms.

Competing Contingencies

This scenario provides bases for speculation about why an individual may act in a way that leads to access to immediate, prepotent consequences (i.e., why he exerts self-control). According to our scenario, however, the young man could reinforce himself at any time (i.e., he could turn the television back on without finishing his income tax). The fact that he does not requires an explanation.

One explanation concerns the relative strength of competing contingencies. For example, Herrnstein (1970) suggested that at any given time an individual may choose to behave in any of several ways, each associated with a unique contingency. The proportion or strength of any one of the several behaviors to the total behavior available to the individual matches the ratio between the contingency for that behavior and the total behavior. Therefore, if several contingencies are in effect at a given time (e.g., the young man in our example could either watch television or do his taxes, each of which has multiple consequences), the proportion of the individual's responses corresponds to the relative strength of the contingency. The consequences associated with completing his income tax may have been more powerful to the young man than those associated with television viewing.

Further analysis would lead us to question what influences the relative strength of competing contingencies. Several explanations appear plausible, including (a) an individual's reinforcement history (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Kanfer, 1971; Rachlin, 1978), (b) rule-governed behavior (Catania, 1984; Malott, 1984), (c) the perceived value or probability of occurrence of a potential reinforcer (Brigham, 1978; Rotter, 1954), (d) discrimination of one's own performance (Mahoney & Thoresen, 1974), (e) an individual's motivation to obtain a particular reinforcer (Brigham, 1978), and (f) the operating environmental context (Nelson & Hayes, 198I; Rachlin, 1978).

Cues

We now have an explanation for the young man's behavior: He turns off the television and works on his taxes because of the relative strength of competing contingencies that influence his behavior. The probability of an early refund of his taxes, the avoidance of penalties such as a fine, and

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other consequences are more powerful influences than the enjoyment he currently is experiencing watching television. We still do not know, however, what prompts him to turn off the television suddenly and begin working on the aversive tax forms.

Several theories have been proposed regarding the discriminative stimulus for self-managing behavior. Although the ultimate incentive to manage one's own behavior may be accounted for by referring to environmental variables (Skinner, 1953), events that prompt self-management typically are presumed to be accessible to the individual alone. For example, Rachlin (1978) and Catania (1984) described an individual's commitment response. According to this perspective, during a period in which the value of a particular response (e.g., exercising) is high, an individual makes a commitment (typically considered a verbal response) to perform the desired behavior with a particular frequency. The commitment decreases the individual's choice and prompts the performance of the behavior when competing contingencies are prepotent (e.g., when one would rather watch TV than complete tax forms or rather stay in bed than get up early and run). Nelson and Hayes (1981) extended this analysis, suggesting that the entire controlling response (self-management behavior) may serve as a prompt for delayed consequences.

Premack (1970), Kanfer (1971), Kanfer and Karoly (1972), and Brigham (1983) referred to an individual's attending to his or her own behavior or private events as the stimulus for self-management to occur. Kanfer suggested that:

"this self-monitoring system may go into effect only under those conditions in which the normal chains of behavior are not run off smoothly or when other external or internal events provide cues for which no highly trained response is available" (p. 41).

That is, the individual assesses his or her behavior and, in finding it unsatisfactory, makes a decision to change that performance. Self- monitoring, therefore, is viewed as the stimulus for self-management; however, the process is influenced by feedback from environmental events.

What Reinforces Self-Management?

Let's return to observe the young man doing his income tax. The television is still off and he sits working at his desk which is covered with forms, receipts, legal tablets, writing utensils, and a calculator. We've speculated on why he went to work on his taxes, but what keeps him working for hours? Explanations related to the maintenance of self-management behavior typically involve either self-reinforcement or external reinforcement.


Self-Reinforcement

Self-reinforcement often has been proposed as the consequence that maintains self-management behavior (Bandura, 1974; Kazdin, 1978; Thoresen & Mahoney, 1974). Bandura noted that self-management behavior may be hard to maintain because it is supported by delayed reinforcement which conflicts with immediate, competing contingencies. Individuals, therefore, often are taught to provide their own reinforcement for self-managing until natural consequences are operational. For example, the young man whom we observed completing his income tax may reward himself by eating a pizza after he has completed two hours of work. We assume that eating the pizza reinforces completing the income tax return if time-spent-working increases for the young man in the future (Bandura, 1969, 1974; Kanfer, 1971; Kazdin, 1978).

This explanation of the self-reinforcement of self-management behavior appears both logical and parsimonious. However, its verity has been questioned by several investigators. Skinner (1953) proposed that:

"The ultimate question is whether the consequence has any strengthening effect upon the behavior which precedes it. Is the individual more likely to do a similar piece of work in the future? It would not be surprising if he were not, although we must agree that he has arranged a sequence of events in which.certain behavior has been followed by a reinforcing event" (p. 238).

To return to the income tax scenario, does eating a pizza increase future sessions working on his income tax for the young man? Conversely, would future work sessions be maintained if income tax refunds were withdrawn or if penalties were no longer levied for failure to file returns?

Rachlin (1978) and Catania (1984) argued that self-administered reinforcement is not what maintains self-management behavior. Instead, the operant involved is a commitment response. In our example, Rachlin and Catania would argue that the young man has made a commitment to eat a pizza only if he has worked on his income tax for two hours because completing his return has become important for other reasons (e.g., a potential refund). Whatever originally brought the young man to make the commitment to reinforce his own working in the first place probably by itself would make completing the income tax in the future more likely (Catania, 1984).

Perhaps self-reinforcement operates more as a mediator than a reinforcer of behavior. Eating the pizza might have increased working on the income tax because of its stimulus properties rather than its reinforcing properties (Rachlin, 1978). Rachlin argued that:

"This hypothesis could be tested by substituting neutral but strong stimuli for self-reinforcers. For instance, a student who rewards himself by eating a peanut

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after each 10 min of studying ought to study as well if, instead of eating it, he simply transfers the peanut from one dish to another as a way of counting 10 rain study periods" (p. 253).

Self-reinforcement may simply serve as feedback that says "I did it" to the individual in the same way that a feedback click informs a pigeon that it has just pecked a key. Similarly, Baer (1984) referred to marker stimuli such as tokens in a container or numbers on a wrist counter whose

"Function is to serve as mediators of the long-term outcomes that cannot readily be made direct and immediate outcomes of the behavior changes that are being programmed . . . . They are direct and immediate consequences of a necessary initial performance; they mark the correct completion of that initial performance and set the occasion for a subsequent performance that now can lead to the reinforcers or avoid the punishers in those rearranged contingencies that the self-controlling person is attempting to use" (p. 212).

External Reinforcement

Is self-reinforcement sufficient to maintain a self-controlling response? Bandura (1974), Kanfer (1971), Kanfer and Karoly (1972), and Thoresen and Mahoney (1974) proposed that much of human behavior is maintained in the absence of immediate environmental support or feedback. Jones et al. (1977) argued that although theorists acknowledge the role of the environment in the self-management paradigm, "self-reinforcement investigations strongly imply that the self-delivery of consequences is responsible for behavior change rather than specific external contingencies operating in the experiment" (p. 151). Bandura conceded that self-reinforcing responses are partly sustained by periodic external reinforcement, but he claimed that the process is relatively independent of environmental influence.

Other investigators place more weight on the role of the environment (Brigham, 1978; Kazdin, 1978; Skinner, 1953). Kazdin argued that research suggests that self-management contingencies depend upon environmental surroundings to maintain their support and "although theoretical concepts of self-control vary in the role accorded external contingencies, it is generally agreed that [the] environment is crucial in the execution of self- control in therapeutic applications" (p. 335). Skinner contended that individuals control their own behavior by manipulating variables of which their behavior is a function, but that ultimately control must be accounted for with variables lying outside individuals themselves. Skinner concluded that:

"A mere survey of the techniques of self-control does not explain why the individual puts them into effect. This shortcoming is all too apparent when we undertake to engender self-control . . . . We make controlling behavior more probable by arranging special contingencies of reinforcement . . . . Some of these additional consequences are supplied by nature, but in general they are arranged by the


community . . . . It appears, therefore, that society is responsible for the larger part of the behavior of self-control" (p. 240).

One way to conceptualize environmental influences on self-managed behaviors is to consider the concept of trapping. According to the idea of trapping (Baer & Wolf, 1970), it is possible that the levels of a given behavior are not high (or low) enough to come into contact with reinforcement contingencies. For example, children may not read at a fast enough rate to meet a criterion. However, when an ind iv idua l - perhaps because she exercises a self-management t e c h n i q u e - begins to respond at higher levels, she comes into contact with reinforcement contingencies; at the same time, her behavior may be trapped at a higher level because it also comes into contact with other naturally occurring contingencies such as understanding what she read, keeping peers from chiding her for reading without inflection, or other positive or negative reinforcers. Thus, the self- management technique provides a means to gain access to naturally occurring reinforcers.

Another way to conceptualize environmental influences on self- management is to consider self-management as a behavior itself. That is, if self-management or controlling responses are a functional response class, then as a group they are likely to be influenced by consequences. Perhaps the environment differentially provides more and stronger positive consequences for behaviors that bring people in contact with longer-term contingencies. In this way, we can reconsider self-management behaviors as less discrete and more similar to an operant; as a group, self-management behaviors operate on the environment to bring the behavior into contact with more powerful reinforcers.

Both of the alternatives we discussed in the previous paragraphs also correspond to an alternative conceptualization of the relationship between self-managed behavior and the environment. According to this view, people may exhibit self-control not just because such behavior re- suits in greater reinforcement, but because it obtains reinforcement more effectively. Furthermore, there may be some reinforcement value in how one's behavior affects one's world; as Skinner noted, "The human organ- ism is reinforced simply by being effective" (Evans, 1968, p. 62). Thus, one potential reinforcer for self-management is that the controlling behaviors of an individual exercising self-control are reinforced not so much by their specific effects on the environment, but that they have effects. Given the idea of multiple schedules operating at essentially the same time on behavior, perhaps self-managing behavior produces multiple changes in the environment that are, in sum, reinforcing. For example, perhaps exercising what we are calling self-management reduces the value of certain, short-term negative consequences as well as making certain

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longer-term consequences more accessible. We suggested this in the example of the person preparing tax returns: As a consequence of turning off the television and completing tax forms, he may have (a) reduced the "nagging" associated with not having completed his taxes, (b) made his return arrive earlier, (c) provided himself with a means for soliciting social reinforcement from his associates ("Wow! You've done it already? I'm dreading it."), and (e) operated on his environment in other ways, as well as simply causing effects or changes in his environment. Perhaps all of these consequences may have been reinforcing, more reinforcing than those associated with watching television. Perhaps the individual has learned that his behavior has effects on the environment in these sorts of ways, that self-management behavior has simply acquired the effects that are characteristic of secondary reinforcers.

The view of the environment as the ultimate source of behavioral control may seem to limit one's personal responsibility with respect to behavior management, a point consistent with radical behaviorism (Skinner, 1971). A focus on the environmental influences on self-management processes, however, has the benefit of making these processes more amenable to educational inf luences--we can manipulate environmental variables. In the next section, we turn to discussing strategies for teaching self-management.

HOW TO TEACH SELF-MANAGEMENT

According to the paradigm we have advocated in this paper, self- management refers to instances in which the individual forgoes immediate reinforcement in favor of highly valued, tong-term benefits. The process appears simple enough for anyone to follow, yet there is ample evidence that many people may not practice efficient self-management skills. For example, individuals engage in excessive consummatory behavior despite harmful effects such as obesity, heart disease, alcoholism, listlessness, and general ill health. Or they engage in inappropriate social interactions regardless of loss of friends or business colleagues. Conversely, people fail to speak up when it comes time for annual pay raises despite dissatisfaction with their current salary, or they may fail to study torts well enough to pass a bar exam for a law degree. Communities pollute streams and drinking water despite threats to health and loss of wildlife and nations engage in warfare and fail to negotiate settlements in the face of loss of life and natural resources. Assuming that these cases represent examples of long-term benefits that are sacrificed for short-term rewards, it would appear that the need to learn self-management skills is pervasive.


Rachlin (1978) suggested that environmental events that can generate self-management by shifting the locus of behavioral control from short- to long-term events have not been examined systematically. Since investigators have analyzed the variables of which behavior is a function, however, it should be possible to teach individuals to manipulate variables that influence their own behavior (cf. Skinner, 1953). Rachlin (1978) and Baer (1984) suggested that it is possible to make people more aware of the contingencies that are in effect in their lives by increasing the saliency of the antecedents and consequences of environmental events. Through the use of direct instructional principles such as prompting, modeling, practice, and corrective feedback, people have been taught to observe instances of their undesired behavior and the environmental events affecting their behavior. The use of recording devices may help to make these events and their consequences more salient to the individual. Additionally, an individual's behavior initially may be brought into conformity with long-term consequences by employing techniques such as (a) commitment strategies (e.g., arranging to have a wake-up call in order to arrive at an appointment on time) (Rachlin, 1978), (b) rules and verbal behavior (e.g., raising one's hand before speaking in class to avoid loss of privileges) (Catania, 1984; Malott, 1984), or (c) stimulus control (e.g., eating only when sitting at a table to avoid snacking between meals) (Kazdin, 1978; Skinner, 1953).

Goldiamond (1965), Mahoney and Thoresen (1974), and Brigham (1978) proposed that through direct instruction individuals can be taught to analyze their environments to identify functional variables that influence their behavior. The next step, therefore, is to teach people to modify the variables that control the behavior they wish to charge. Skinner (1953) and Brigham (1978) suggested that because any of the variables of which the target behavior is a function may be manipulated, many self-management procedures are available and one may be chosen that is appropriate for a particular environmental context. The next section discusses effective applications of self-management strategies.

CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

As we developed in an earlier section, self-management establishes a relationship between controlling and controlled responses (Skinner, 1953). This contrast aligns with a distinction between techniques (or self-management behaviors) and the problem behaviors that those techniques have been used to change. In this section, we examine that distinction with reference to interventions.

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Controlling Responses

People may manage their own behavior in myriad ways. For example, when one is writing while sitting next to an open window on a pleasant afternoon, she may manage her behavior of looking out the window rather than looking at what she is writing by altering her environment (e.g., closing curtains or turning her back to the window). Similarly, a person may act in a way that is incompatible with acting in another way, as exemplified in the song, "Whistle a Happy Tune."

Skinner discussed techniques of self-management. He catalogued and gave examples including (a) physical restraint and physical aid, (b) changing the stimulus, (c) depriving and satiating, (d) manipulating emotional conditions, (e) using aversive stimulation, (f) drugs, (g) operant conditioning, (h) punishment, and (i) "doing something else" (see Skinner, 1953, pp. 231-240). Kazdin (1984) provided a slightly different catalog. He included (a) stimulus control, (b) self-monitoring, (c) self-reinforcement and self-punishment, and (d) alternate response training. Models proposed by others (e.g., Bandura & Perloff, 1967: Glynn, Thomas, & Shee, 1973; Kanfer, 1970) included (a) self- assessment, (b) self-evaluation, (c) self-recording, and (d) self-reinforcement. The last examples have a more substantial theoretical basis: the behaviors described by Kazdin (1978) and Skinner (1953) comprise more of an un- structured collection. But these lists are not exhaustive; other techniques that have been tested under the general rubric of self-management include goal-setting and self-instruction.

As is apparent, there are many different ways to classify self-management techniques. A thorough examination of these taxonomies would reveal both similarities and differences among categories of techniques. But, at present, we do not think that there is a comprehensive, unifying means of classifying these techniques.

Controlled Responses

An exhaustive list of the different behaviors that have been changed using any of these various techniques would be tedious, in part because self-management procedures have been used to address many responses generally outside of the realm of education. These response range from ceasing smoking (Abueg, Colletti, & Kopel, 1985; McConnell, Biglan, & Severson, 1984; Singh & Leung, 1988) to losing weight (e.g., Horton, 1981; Israel, Silverman, & Solotar, 1987), and from reducing depression (e.g., Singer, Irvin, & Hawkins, 1988; Stark, Reynolds, & Kaslow, 1987) to managing diabetes (Wing, Epstein, Nowalk, & Scott, 1988).


Examples of controlled responses within education are abundant, also. Some studies have examined the effects of controlling responses on social behavior in schools; for example, Martella, Leonard, Marchand- Martella, and Agran (1993) used self-monitoring to reduce a student's negative statements. Other controlled responses have been academic; for example, Laird and Winton (1993) examined the effects of different self- evaluation procedures on students' mistakes on mathematics problems. Still other studies have examined effects on combinations of controlled responses; for example, Maag, Reid, and DiGangi (1993) used self-recording to address these controlled responses: (a) attending to math work sheets, (b) answering math problems, and (c) answering those problems correctly. Controlled responses may vary in complexity, too; whereas attending is a relatively simple response, answering questions correctly is more complex (i.e., it requires multiple separate responses).

The controlled educational responses do not have to be limited to school settings, however. Rusch, McKee, Chadsey-Rusch, and Renzaglia (1988) used self-instruction to address a conceptually simple response, seek- ing assistance, in a job setting. Similarly, Lagomarcino and Rusch (1989) used self-instruction techniques to increase the relatively complex work responses performed by a person with profound retardation in a community work setting.

This brief set of examples illustrates that diverse self-management techniques have been applied in diverse settings with diverse responses by members of diverse groups. Apparently, techniques, settings, responses, and group membership do not impose obvious limitations on the useful- ness of self-management. Rather, they primarily test the capability of the people w, ho are teaching self-management: Can we determine how to teach pretty much anyone how to manage her own behavior under given circumstances?

Because of the extent of the literature on self-control, readers who are new to it and are interested in examining studies of self-management should read research reviews as a first step. Both earlier reviews (e.g., Kazdin, 1984; McLaughlin, 1976) and more recent works addressing particular topics in self-management (e.g., Hughes, 1991; Mace & Kratochwill, 1988) provide informative introductions.

CONCLUSION

Despite the extensive literature on self-management, including both theoretical and applied papers, there is much about self-management that is unknown. Our discussion has hinted at some areas of potentially fruitful

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research. In this section, we suggest a few areas as illustrations of the range of topics that may be studied. Although we have an abiding interest in the study of procedures for teaching self-management behaviors, in these comments we focus on issues relevant to understanding the phenomenon self- management.

�9 We think it would be particularly valuable to examine the consequences of self-management. For example, we wonder whether the idea of trapping (Baer & Wolf, 1970) is operating in self- management. Does managing one's own behavior permit access to other environmental reinforcers?

�9 We wonder about whether various self-management behaviors or techniques might form a response class. Does exercising various self-management behaviors produce a higher probability of using those behaviors in other settings?

�9 We think that the question of why self-management techniques work remains unanswered. Although there are substantial data that bear on the question, we would like to know what are the key ingredients in self-management and how do they interact with other variables to enhance or inhibit effects.

�9 Similarly, we wonder how successful educators may be in teaching the use of self-management techniques to change an individual's behavior when the individual herself does not want to change it. For example, teachers may want students to work harder to improve their grades, employers may desire employees to decrease absences, or parents may wish that their children more consistently completed their household chores. Self-management techniques may be appropriate in each case; however, if an individual does not want to change a targeted behavior, will self-management be effective in promoting behavior change? We believe that in such a case, individuals need to learn what contingencies are operating in their environments. This learning is facilitated by making the consequences of one's actions more salient. For example, students could be instructed that the results of continued poor grades will be academic probation and eventual dismissal from school. Smokers could be shown x-rays of lungs that have been damaged by the effects of long-term smoke inhalation. It may be that reluctance to change a behavior that is potentially damaging to an individual is due in part to a failure of the individual to associate delayed aversive consequences with an immediate response. A prerequisite for teaching self-management may be to cause the individual to attend

422 ltughes and Lloyd

to potential consequences by making these consequences more salient. Empirical testing of this hypothesis in addit ion to investigation of the most effective methods for increasing the saliency of delayed consequences under various conditions should be conducted.

�9 We think that the wealth of techniques considered under the rubric of self-management is both a benefit and a liability. Although it indicates that there are many different possible techniques (controlling behaviors) that we can teach, we fear this wealth also indicates a lack of conceptual clarity. How are self-monitoring and self-recording the same and different? To what extent is goal-setting implicit in self-evaluation? We need a rigorous examination and classification of these procedures. Such an examination should also propel us toward a more complete understanding of the phenomenon we call self-management.

�9 We also expect that there is much to be gained by studying self- management behaviors in a broader context. Self-management behavior occurs within a context in which some antecedent and consequent events influence it. We have too little understanding of how the various factors in the environment promote or inhibit self-management and how self-management, itself, affects those environmental variables. To gain greater understanding of the interactions between self-management and the environments within which it occurs, we probably must adopt an ecobehavioral approach to studying these phenomena (e.g., Greenwood, Carta, Arreaga-Mayer, & Rager, 1991).

�9 We think that some of the problems and issues we have identified are the result of having no fully specified and extensively tested theory of self-management. Although cognitive views of self- management have offered working models of self-control (e.g., Kanfer & Karoly, 1972), there are difficulties with them. Likewise, it is not clear that more operant models are sufficient (Nelson & Hayes, 1981). But, we doubt that we shall be able to resolve many of the more difficult issues in self-management (e.g., what's needed to make it work?) until we have a well-developed model to critique, test, and revise.

Despite these questions about self-management, we think that the area has much to offer education. Self-management techniques appear to appeal to teachers and other educators; to be applicable in diverse settings, with diverse populations, and to diverse controlled responses; and to be

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robust. Likewise, they have advantages for individuals because they offer a potential means of changing behaviors important (and therefore socially valid) to individuals themselves.

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An analysis of self-management