The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 14 | Number 8 | Jul 15, 2016

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The 7th Party Congress in North Korea: An Analysis of KimJong Un’s Report

Rüdiger Frank

The single most remarkable feature of the 7thCongress of the Workers’ Party of Korea1

(WPK) was that it took place at all, after ahiatus of no less than 36 years.

Ever since Kim Il Sung decided in the 1950sthat his country needed its own way of doingthings, which is often summarized under theterm of chuch’e, it has been hard to categorizethe DPRK as a typical socialist country. NorthKorea has always been different. It neitherjoined the military alliance of the Warsaw Pactnor was it willing to engage in the Soviet-ledeconomic cooperation of COMECON. Itsideology moved further and further away fromcore premises of Marxism-Leninism. With itsHegelian emphasis on “mind over matter”,which in North Korea is called “man is masterof everything”, Pyongyang’s ideology stooddirectly opposed to the key paradigm of Marx’sDialectical Materialism. Even from theperspective of the Eastern European socialistbrothers, North Korea was therefore a ratherodd and even suspicious member of thesocialist family, as countless documentsunearthed from archival sources reveal.2 Butthe fact that a Communist party in power didnot hold a congress for almost four decades hasnevertheless to be regarded as highly unusual.

The 7th Congress was therefore, without doubt,per se a noteworthy event. It marked thecontinued normalization of the function of theParty that had started in 2010 with conveningthe 4th Party Conference3, during which KimJong Un was officially introduced to the publiconly one year before his father’s passing. KimJong Un wants to use the Party more activelyand routinely as his major instrument of power.

An optimist would even see indications of awillingness to share some of the responsibilityfor governing the increasingly complex NorthKorean society with members of the Politburo.The overall development of the economy, theemergence of a new middle class, andnumerous direct and indirect externalchallenges such as sanctions, but also theWesternization of China and the crumblingstate monopoly on information make it difficultfor one man alone to keep the system undercontrol.

But aside from the symbolic nature of theCongress, truly big events—such as anannouncement of a drastically new economicp o l i c y o r a s w i t c h t o c o l l e c t i v eleadership—were missing. There was no majorpurge either. Looking back at my November2015 preview of the Congress, of the twooptions presented for how it could turn out,Option 1: a “return to a new normal,” cameclosest to reality.4

Gearing up for the Congress

The Congress was announced on October 30,2015. The actual date was only made publicroughly a week before the event. It was held forfive days, from May 6 until May 10, 2016. Theofficial number of participants, as reported byKim Jong Un in his opening speech, was 3,467plus 1,545 observers. The power elite of thecountry was assembled. Leader Kim Jong Ungave two speeches, both of which werepublished in full. The state media also printed40 statements made by other delegates, amongthem Politburo Members Choe Ryong Hae, KimYong Chol, Kim Ki Nam, Ri Su Yong and Prime

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Minister Pak Pong Ju.

I happened to be in North Korea for a few daysuntil May 2 and thus had a chance to see howthe country was gearing up for the event. Theeffects of UN Security Council Resolution 2270issued in early March 2016 were not yetvisible; on the contrary, during the week beforethe Congress, I experienced the most stablesupply of electricity ever since my first visit in1991. There was not a single blackout andthere was running water everywhere wevisited, even outside of the capital. The riversand reservoirs were full, which is crucial forthe many hydroelectric power stations in thecountry. The chimneys of thermal powerstations were smoking continuously, indicatingthe availability of coal. This could be a positivesign of increased production or, more likely, afirst consequence of China’s new importrestrictions: if the Chinese don’t buy the coal,more is left for domestic consumption. On thefields of Hwanghae Province, I countedsignificantly more tractors than oxen, which isalso unusual. Large modern red trucks of aChinese brand filled the streets of Pyongyangand the countryside. This anecdotal evidencepoints at brisk business activities, in particularconstruction, and above all a surprisingly goodavailability of fuel.

“Comrade, have you fulfilled today’s battleplan?”

The very nature of the preparations foretold thelack of major reforms. The Congress started ina stunningly old-fashioned way. As StephanHaggard accurately notes,5 the very idea tohold a 70-day battle right before the Congresswas an early indicator of the neo-orthodox andsocialist-conservative approach that woulddominate the event. So-called speed battles (속도전) have been standard components of NorthKorea’s political economy from the very firstSta l in is t days of i ts ex is tence. 6 Theineffectiveness of these measures should bynow have become more than obvious to thePyongyang leadership. People learn quickly andreact with withholding performance andpretending to work. Exhaustion leads to errorsthat have to be corrected at high cost. Theproductivity increases of the past years arebased on the introduction of elements of amarket economy with its more effectiveincentive system. However, the North Koreanstate has obviously decided to continue relyingon ideological motivation and mass rallies, onkeeping individuals busy, and on attempting toperpetuate the spirit of revolution and a stateof emergency, rather than laying moreemphasis on decentralized, material incentives.

The secretive nature of the preparation, too, isa reminder of old patterns. Classical socialistsocieties were typically obsessed with secrecy,even concerning minor details. When I arrivedin Pyongyang on April 26, 2016, no one I talkedto knew when the Congress would start, howlong it would last or what to expect. Almosteveryone was practicing for the torch march orother mass ceremonies, streets were blockedfor rehearsals and fireworks were prepared atJuche Tower, but it was not clear when theseevents would take place. There wasn’t even anofficial confirmation that the venue would bethe April 25 House of Culture7, though this wasobvious as it was covered with white cloth,party symbols shining through.

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The April 25 House of Culture gettingreadied to serve as the venue for the 7th

Party Congress

An internal affair

No official foreign delegation participated inthe Party Congress. Western press hashighlighted this as an important differencefrom the 6th Party Congress, but we shouldconsider how much sense such a comparisonmakes. 1980 was not just 36 years ago; it was atime when Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in Chinawere in their early infancy, when MikhailGorbachev was f ive years and threepredecessors away from becoming the Sovietleader, when South Korea was a cruel militarydictatorship that had just bloodily suppressedthe Kwangju Uprising, when the socialist campappeared to be rock solid and Germany wasdivided with no sign of any change. In NorthKorea, there had been no Arduous March, nonuclear weapons program, no space program,no succession of the top leadership, nomonetization, no marketization, no inter-Korean summit, no special economic zones, noteven a joint venture law. The term “apples andoranges” could hardly be more fitting. The 7thCongress of the Worker’s Party of Korea was aninternal affair, but this is less a distinction fromthe 6th Congress but more a reflection of thechanged international environment.

North Korea has in past years featuredprominently in Western media. Aside from thecountry’s satirical value, there are substantialand justified concerns over human rights, thenuclear program and the danger of a localconflict evolving into a regional and even globalconfrontation. At the same time, the lack ofinformation on this closed society is oftenlamented. One would thus expect intensereporting, in particular on Kim Jong Un’sprogrammatic speech of May 8. The fact thatabout 130 reporters travelled to Pyongyang tocover the Congress provided hope for deep andanalytical stories that would go beyond theusual stereotypes, nicely summarized by BobCarlin as a “constant repetition of stories fromWestern journalists about how they feelconstrained in their reporting from Pyongyang,alternating with the by-now tired observationthat they suspect everything they see isstaged”.8

The chance to go beyond that was mostlymissed. Western reporting was dominated bytwo issues: the fact that none of the journalistswas granted access to the actual Congressvenue, and the brief arrest of a BBC journalistwho had been in the country on a differentassignment.9 It would be unfair to say thatbased on previous experience, it was naive toexpect anything else. It was indeed rude andignorant of the authorities to invite the press tocover an event and then not allow them accessto it. And the arrest of a journalist on chargesof disrespectful reporting, especially while sucha high-profile event was going on, was not verywise. It did not take a PR expert to foresee thatthis would become a breaking news item thatfurther tarnished the already badly batteredimage of North Korea.

Truly regrettable, however, is that these issueswith their questionable entertainment andsensational value overshadowed what littlethere was of substantial reporting anddiscussion of the Congress. Apart from KimJong Un’s announcement that his country

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would refrain from using nuclear weapons first,Western audiences did not learn much aboutwhat had happened at this once-in-four-decadesevent.

Another possible reason for the relativelyshallow Western media analysis of the mostimportant document of the Congress, Kim JongUn’s report of May 8, might have been itslimited accessibility. The speech was deliveredin Korean. A full version was within hourspublished by the leading newspaper, theRodong Sinmun, both in print and online. Itwas also reproduced by the state news agencyKNCA on their website. An English translation10

was available with little delay. However, thistranslation was only a summary, with about2,000 words. The original Korean version11 had14,000 words, which in a Western languagewould amount to about 30,000 words.

We thus face the embarrassing possibility thata mere lack of Korean language proficiency orthe failure to hire someone with that skill hasprevented professional journalists fromaccessing one of the potentially most importantpublic announcements of the otherwise ratherreclusive leader of a country that is of arelatively high importance to the West. Perhapsnobody really cared because our journalistshave learned not to take what is publicly saidby any politician at face value. Or it wasremembered that specialists on socialistcountries have for decades faced the trap ofKremlinology, or Pyongyangology in this case –that is, over-interpreting official statements forthe simple reason that there is so littleavailable information.

So it could be that our media deliberatelyignored the full version of the speech.Academic analysis typically takes longer toemerge due to the slow review and publicationprocess. With this in mind, and aside from thefact that many results of the Congress will notsurface for weeks or months, I will neverthelesspoint out a few passages from Kim Jong Un’s

May 8 report that I find noteworthy. Toforestall my conclusion: few are encouraging,but some are remarkable.

The Kim Jong Un Speech of May 8

The speech was structured into five chapters.

In the first chapter “Great Victory of Chuch’eIdeology and Sŏn’gun Policy” Kim Jong Unlooked back upon the past 36 years andconcluded that adherence to a socialist massline in economic policy, an active fight againstideological indoctrination and guidance byGreat Leaders in hereditary successionguaranteed North Korea’s survival.

The second chapter “For the Completion of theSocialist Cause” is by far the longest part of thespeech, rich in detail. It outlines Kim Jong Un’splans for the development of his country in thenext years in the fields of ideology, theeconomy, and domestic security. In thischapter, Kim introduces the Five Year Plan2016-2020.

The third chapter is entitled “For theIndependent Unification of the Fatherland” andrepeats the known official position on Koreanunification, along with an appeal to fellowKoreans to join these efforts in the spirit ofpatriotism.

The fourth chapter carries the ambitious title“For Making the World Independent” and ismainly a criticism of American hegemony.Here, Kim Jong Un repeats a position that hasbeen among the most intensively reported inWestern media: that his country will not usenuclear weapons first.

The fifth and final chapter is on “Strengtheningand Developing the Party”. After lauding theachievements of the past decades under theleadership of his grandfather and his father,Kim Jong Un elaborately and in harsh termsexpresses a heavy dose of criticism of thepresent status in his country, focusing on what

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he calls abuse of authority, formalism,bureaucratism, corruption, and decadence.

The next sections highlight a few of the keyelements of the speech in more detail.

Chapter 1: Great Victory of Chuch’eIdeology and Sŏn’gun Policy

This chapter is divided into three sections:“Struggle for Victorious Progress of theSocialist Cause”, “Proud Success in Building aStrong and Prosperous State”, and “ShiningContinuation of the Revolutionary Cause”. Itprovides a comprehensive summary of theofficial view on the history of the past threedecades. It is thus very useful if we want tocomprehend the North Korean and in particularKim Jong Un’s prevailing self-perception. It alsonicely shows the state’s approach to portrayingthe current situation as a successfulachievement despite many past and currenteconomic and other difficulties.

There is a lot of talk about shining victories andendless glory. The term socialism is used veryfrequently, with no sign of giving up this brandimage aside from its actual interpretation. Thecollapse of socialism in the Soviet Union andEastern Europe and its transformation in Chinaand Vietnam are mentioned implicitly byp o i n t i n g a t t h e “ o n s l a u g h t o fcounterrevolution”, “tragic events” and the“renegades of socialism”. North Korea alonewas able to withstand these challenges, as KimJong Un notes proudly.

The dea th o f K im I l Sung in 1994 i sremembered as a shock that struck the countryjust as it was about to make progress on thetask of national unification, which is areference to the planned first inter-Koreansummit in 1994 that was then postponed toJune 2000. According to Kim Jong Un, the lossof the leader inspired the imperialists toredouble their efforts at military and economicpressure upon North Korea. In combinationwith major natural disasters, this led to

“unspeakable trials and challenges”, in otherwords to the mid-1990s famine that iseuphemistically known as the “ArduousMarch”.

In this “darkest hour” of the nation, “iron-willed” Kim Jong Il took the lead in securing thesafety of Korean socialism by adhering to hisMilitary First Policy, which Kim Jong Undescribes as his father’s “main political style ofsocialist leadership”. The North Korean peoplefaced the choice of living “with the dignity ofsovereignty or to once more become slaves ofimperialism”. They of course chose the formerand pooled all their resources to strengthennational defense. As Kim Jong Un notes with akind of frankness that reminds of some of hisgrandfather’s writings: “...our people enjoy apeaceful and stable existence, without knowingwar, even though they do not l ive inprosperity”. 1 2

Criticism of China: Hidden among this pathos isone of the analytical highlights of the report asKim Jong Un suddenly lashed out at his bigneighbor and alleged ally China whose absenceat the Congress was conspicuous: “Despite thefilthy wind of bourgeois liberty and ‘reform’and ‘openness’ blowing in our neighborhood,we let the spirit of military-first rifles fly andadvanced according to the path of socialismthat we had chosen.” By denouncing DengXiaoping’s famous terminology, Kim Jong Undistanced himself from Beijing in the mostundisguised way I have seen in official NorthKorean announcements in a long time.13

Then followed another major shock to thenation, the death of Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Unreproduces the standard image of this event:how sadness and the feeling of deep loss wereturned into determination and strength.

In the first among many critical passages tofollow, Kim Jong Un notes how the Partyembarked upon a struggle to mercilesslyeliminate “abuse of authority, bureaucratism,corruption and decadence”. It created the line

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of parallel development of the economy and ofnuclear weapons, known as byungjin14

(https://apjjf.org/#_ftn14) (병진). The latter is,as Kim emphasized, not a temporary tacticalmeasure but a long-term strategy.

A discouraging passage for those who expectedan expansion of market reforms is Kim’smentioning of the new buzzword “Mallima-Speed” (만리마 = 10,000 Ri horse), which is anupgrade of the 1958 term “Ch’ŏllima” (천리마= 1,000 Ri horse), a typical Stakhanovitemovement15. He explicitly encourages hispeople to accomplish “the tasks of ten yearswithin only one year”. This is a very extremepolicy, a return to pre-reform economic timeswhen decentralized, individual materialincentives were almost completely disregarded.In combination with the 70-day-battle rightbefore the Congress, and the 200-day-battlethat was announced a few days thereafter, weencounter what looks like a deeply neo-orthodox approach. It remains to be seen whatthe actual impact of this measure will be, giventhe previous experience of the population withthese and other campaigns and slogans of thepast years like “Pyongyang Speed”, “KoreanSpeed” or “At One Go” (단숨에).

A possible answer to why the introduction ofmarket elements into the North Koreaneconomy is at least verbally discontinued couldbe found in the next passages of Kim Jong Un’sspeech. Echoing his father’s famous 1995treatise16, he puts strong emphasis on ideologyto stifle the “frantic moves of the imperialists toinfect our society with an alien bourgeoisideology and culture”. This corresponds withdefector reports and observations on theground that the new economic opportunitiescombined with technological advances have ledto a profound change in society. It seems thatthese developments are sufficiently alarming tothe leadership to trigger an attempted returnto pre-reform economic policies.

Kim Jong Un’s lengthy elaboration on the role

of the youth, which he calls a “tricky problem”,could be another hint at ideological difficultiesif we combine it for example with images ofyobbish teenagers in Pyongyang that do notfully correspond with the official ideal. For thepost-famine young generation, observing othersmaking and spending money has been a dailypart of their life. They grow up under verydifferent conditions compared to their parentswho experienced a demonetized, much moreequal society.

Yobbish youth in Pyongyang

The speech then continues with the proudclaim to stand “in the first row of nuclearpowers of the world” after the H-bomb test ofJanuary 2016, and being a producer of“precise, miniaturized, automated andintelligent high-tech weapons”. The possessionof nuclear weapons is promoted as a triumphthat “put an end to the bloody history ofaggression and nuclear threat by the USimperialists”.

Looking back at the development of theeconomy since 1980, Kim Jong Un concludedthat the foundations for becoming a strongeconomic power have been laid – a euphemismfor the fact that much more is left to be done inthis field1 7 . Then follows a long list ofachievements in single sectors, including

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telecommunication and IT.

It should be noted that Kim repeatedlysupported the idea of balanced development(균형적 발전) in the national economy. This isnot a new idea, and the internal debate inNorth Korea has been going back and forth onthis issue, so this might not be the final wordon the topic.18 Nevertheless, we shouldacknowledge that no sector – in particular notheavy industry – has been singled out to serveas a sole magic bullet to save the staggeringeconomy, as this had been done previously.This implies that Kim’s return to orthodoxpositions stops somewhere in the mid-1980s,when a new focus on the prioritization of lightindustry and agriculture was laid.

Kim also repeated his signature credo19 of“improving people’s lives” (인민생활향상) andidentified it as the main target of a number ofspecific economic measures.

In the third and final section of the first chapterof his speech, Kim Jong Un turns towards thefuture, and how he sees his own role: “Victoryor defeat and the future of the country and thenation depend upon being guided by a GreatLeader, and whether... the cause of the Leaderis carried on generation after generation... Aparty without a Great Leader cannot win andwill degenerate... the revolution will fail if thecause of the Leader is not appropriatelycontinued.”

The latter could be interpreted as telling hispeople that the very reason why North Koreastill exists as a socialist country, while thatsystem survived neither in the Soviet Union northe Eastern bloc, is because Pyongyang refusedafter 195620 to opt for collective leadership andrather introduced hereditary succession. Itcould also be a side blow at the Chinese. Thewording of this passage and its position in thetext suggest, however, that the focus is mainlydomestic, with a simple message: without aGreat Leader, who must be a descendant of

Kim Il Sung, North Korea cannot exist.

Chapter 2: For the completion of thesocialist cause

This chapter is divided into five sections: “TheRemodel ing of Society According toKimilsungism-Kimjongilism”, “Building a Statethat is Strong in Science and Technology”,“Strategy to Build an Economically StrongState and to Develop the People’s Economy”,“Building a State that is Strong in Civilization”,and “Reinforcing Political and MilitaryStrength”.

‘Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism’ is a new term thatwas introduced under Kim Jong Un in 2012.Those who hope to find anything in the speechthat comes close to a more detailed explanationof this concept will be disappointed. Paragraphafter paragraph, what Kim Jong Un says soundslike this: “The remodeling of the whole societyaccording to Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism meansthat we must proceed with our revolutioncarrying Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism as the onlyguiding line and rely on Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism to build and improve an idealsociety of the people”.

I s u g g e s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t e r mKimilsungism-Kimjongilism as a way tosubsume more or less all concepts and ideas ofthe two leaders of the past 70 years, including,but not limited to, chuch’e21, sŏn’gun22,kangsŏng taeguk23, and the Three Revolutions24.

After this rather tiring part, Kim Jong Un oncemore mentioned the struggle against “evil-minded ideological and cultural infiltration”and the “economic and technical blockade” bythe imperialists, as well as the “change ofgenerat ion in our revolut ion”. Suchrepetitiveness is noteworthy, since it showswhich issues are regarded as crucial by theleader. The recipe for managing thesechallenges also resembles his earlier remarks:the focus must be laid on ideology and on self-reliance.

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Section 2 is dedicated to advances in scienceand technology. Such a focus was rathercommon for other state socialist countries andcan be understood in the context of a lack ofcapital, in particular hard currency, and limitedaccess to international technology throughlicensing or Foreign Direct Investment. Bothrequire a much more intense indigenousresearch and development effort, since thelatest machines, devices and technologiescannot be imported due to sanctions and lackof funds.

The claim to become a world-leader in all fieldsbelongs to the realm of propaganda.Nevertheless, the state is willing to put moneywhere its mouth is: the new science center onan island in the Taedong River is impressive,and a whole new residential area in Pyongyanghas been built for and named after “futurescientists“. Kim Jong Un explicitly stressed that“the state budget share of expenses for scienceand techno logy has to be expandedsystematically”.

Model of the new science center

The newly built “future Scientist’s Street”by night

As core technologies or, to remain with themilitaristic language of the report, “mainassault targets” for future R&D efforts, KimJong Un identified IT, nanotech, biotech, newmaterials, alternative energy, space technologyand nuclear technology.

A pragmatic and practical approach is reflectedin the demand that science and technologys h o u l d “ o p e n t h e w a y t o e c o n o m i cdevelopment”. Among the concerned sectors,the production of energy is highlighted as themost crucial part. This corresponds withreality. To achieve this and other ambitiousgoals, the number of researchers will be “morethan tripled” in the coming years. To find theneeded talents, local science and technologycenters are to be built around the country andconnected by the intranet to the new centralscience center in Pyongyang.

Reflecting Kim Jong Il’s 2009 slogan: “Puttingyour feet firmly on our own ground, turn youreyes towards the world”, his son demands thatthe nation “introduce the scientific andtechnological successes of other countriesquickly and according to our own specificconditions”. Against this background, largeposters in the new science and technologycenter pointing to the availability of Westernscientific databases need to be understood as

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more than just wall decoration.

A poster in the new science center inPyongyang

Kim Jong Un’s demand that “researchinstitutions and universities should producehigh tech products and thus acquire financialresources for research and development” isinteresting. It implies that the state is eithernot able or not willing to fully finance R&D andrequires related institutions to generate theirown funds. If this works, we will also seefurther competition among high-tech startupswhich is rather untypical for classical socialisteconomies where monopolies were prevailingin the name of economies of scale. Theexistence of different brands of mobile phonesand tablet computers (Arirang, Samjiyŏn,P’yŏngyang, Ullim) produced by differententerprises point into that direction.

Section 3 is dedicated to the economy. It startswith the sober statement that “our country ispolitically and militarily strong, but theeconomy has not yet reached the desired level”.

Kim criticizes the uneven development level inhis economy and calls for the “stronglyaccelerated building of an economic power”.Self-reliance and high-tech are promoted ascore principles. This includes the expanded useof domestic resources, among which he

explicitly mentions crude oil (원유). The latteris particularly noteworthy. The sudden lack ofthis key resource after the sudden end ofpreferential trade agreements with the SovietUnion was one of the major non-systemicreasons for the economic crisis of themid-1990s. Currently, oil is one of the majorimport items of North Korea.25 If the leadermentions the domestic production of crude oilin such a central speech, we must assume thatreserves have been discovered and plans toexploit them have reached a certain stage ofmaturity.

He goes on to identify energy and foodproduction as the key challenges concerningNorth Korea’s economic development. Thiswould be supported by most outside observers;the key and somewhat hopeful issue here isthat the man in charge shares this realisticassessment.

Addressing the ways to achieve that goal, inaddition to the usual focus on hydroelectricpower, Kim Jong Un announced the increase ofnuclear energy production, indicating theconstruction of one or more new nuclear powerstations in addition to the existing facilities atYŏngbyŏn. Needless to say this wouldpotentially also increase the production ofmaterial for nuclear weapons.

The main strategic line in agriculture aspromoted by Kim in his speech is self-sufficiency. The latter is neither new noreconomically feasible, but it is a clear reflectionof political rationality, which thus far does notguarantee a stable food supply through theexport of manufactured products and theimport of food.

A long passage in section 3 of the speech isagain dedicated to the need to improve theliving conditions of the people, Kim Jong Un’scentral political credo. What sounds like thetypical promises of any politician is actually apotentially momentous deviation from thestrategy of his two predecessors. Despite his

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repeated emphasis on ideology, Kim Jong Unvery clearly promises his people a bettermaterial life. The reasons for doing so are hislack of ideological legitimacy as either theliberator of the country or the right hand manof that heroic figure, and the pressure fortangible economic development emanatingfrom the emerging new middle class.

The problem with such an approach is thatfailure to achieve the promises would beimmediately obvious. International isolationcan be displayed as independence, and the lackof systemic reform can be interpreted as a signof superiority of North Korean socialismcompared with the other socialist countries.But once more food, more electricity and moreconsumer goods have been promised, and oncethis promise is taken seriously and turns intopeople’s expectations, it will be difficult to sellthe non-attainment of these goals as a success.This is not to say that the state propagandamachine will not try doing so; the question ishow readily such a message would be received.

Achieving economic development is thuscrucial for Kim Jong Un’s legitimacy and for thestability of the North Korean system. To thatend, a five-year plan (FYP) for economicdevelopment from 2016-2020 was announced,marking another highlight of the May 8 speech.

Publicly announced economic planning was anessential characteristic of North Korea as asocialist country until the early 1990s.26 Thefrequent extensions of the plans betrayed theirambitious nature. But for about a quarter of acentury, except for the vague hint at some long-term ten year state strategic plan for economicdevelopment27 in early 2011, no regular planwas made public. With the introduction of theFYP, Kim Jong Un returns to a new normal inthe field of economic policy, too.

He provides a few details on the targets of theplan, without mentioning numbers. Thepublication of a more fleshed out version of the2016-2020 FYP is among the measures to be

expected in the coming months.

So far, Kim first of all stresses the productionof electricity. This includes the modernizationof existing facilities, the construction of newones, and the upgrading of the grid. The latteris to be gradually converted into a flexiblealternating current system. In addition, theutilization of alternative sources of energy suchas wind, tides, biomass and solar power will bepromoted.2 8 The announcement of theconstruction of one new nuclear power stationwas repeated.

A long list of details on various sectors follows,including coal, metal, transportation, machinebuilding, chemical industry, and construction.The mechanization of agriculture will beexpanded, more fruits, mushrooms and fish willbe produced.

While most of the raised issues are important,again few of them are new or particularlycreative. It is thus easy to overlook a smallpassage on animal husbandry that explicitlyencourages “individual animal husbandry [개인축산] by farm families”. This is remarkable fortwo reasons: it acknowledges a growing privateportion of the agricultural sector, and it pointsat the acceptance of family-based work units.The latter corresponds with the rumors aboutthe so-called June 28 measures of 2012 and theMay 30 measures of 2014, both allowingfarmers to keep more of their harvest and tomake their own production decisions, with anindication that this system could be expandedinto industry.29

A little further down section 3 we find what anoptimist would interpret as a hint at thesechanges, which seem to resemble the basicidea behind what the Chinese and Vietnamesedecades ago called the “dual plan”, that is,allowing enterprises to engage in individualproduction as soon as they had fulfilled a state-set quota: “local areas should carefully planactivities for independent accounting and

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develop their local economy in a unique way”.In the Chinese case, local and townshipenterprises played a crucial role in economicreform after 1978. A pessimist would note thatlocally managed local industries wereestablished already in the late 1950s, and thatthe independent accounting system had beenintroduced back in 1984 and often served as anexcuse for the central government not toprovide any inputs, rather than giving moredecision making power to local units. Whatmatters is thus the way in which all this will beapplied. Think of the Korean script, a brillianttool that was developed in 1442 but not usedwidely until the late 19th century.

In the following passage on foreign trade wefind another side blow at China: “we shouldimprove the one-sidedness of our foreigntrade”. Given the recent sanctions, it seemssomewhat optimistic when Kim Jong Uncontinues: “Export of finished products andtrade in technologies and services should beexpanded, joint ventures... are to be organizedso that they contribute to the introduction ofadvanced technologies”. Tourism is marked asone of the strategic fields in foreign economicrelations without providing further details.

The Cabinet, the country’s “economicheadquarters” (경제사령부), is tasked to end“manipulation, formalism, and defeatism”rigorously, hinting at substantial but notunusual problems of a bureaucratic state, andto draw up plans for economic development“realistically” (현실성있게).

It is a matter of perspective how to interpretthe repeated emphasis on the central role ofthe Cabinet in the economy. It can be seen asthe expression of a typical state-socialistcentrally planned approach, but it also putseconomic management in the hands ofprofessional technocrats. Again, the actualeffect of this measure will have to be awaitedbefore passing judgment. In any case, PrimeMinister Pak Pong Ju was later elected to the

Presidium of the Politburo, which is de factothe highest Party organ.

The economic section of Kim’s speech endswith an appeal to give enough room to thesingle enterprises to fully use the existingrights to management (경영권), which couldjust be a reference to the independentaccounting system established decades ago, orrefer to a more recent measure. The sameapplies to Kim’s call upon enterprises to showinitiative and creativity (주동, 창발) tonormalize their production.

Section 4 deals with “civilization” includingeducation, health care, sports, literature andarts, and socialist morality.

Again, Kim Jong Un does not withhold hiscriticism: “the overall level of education, inparticular high-school education, has not evenreached half of the progress demanded by theParty”. It seems that the 2012 extension ofcompulsory education by one additional yearwith a focus on practical and applicableeducation has not yet produced the desiredresults.

Preventive medicine (예방의학) is identified asa core strategy in health care. The doctor-designated district system (의사담당구역제) isto be strengthened.30 Traditional Korean“koryŏ” medicine is to be used along with thelatest achievements of modern medicine.

The field of sports is covered only vaguely,albeit with the ambition to achieve victories inAsian and global competitions. Given the greatfanfare with which this field has been promotedsince the early days of Kim Jong Un’s rule, thetreatment of this source of soft power in hisParty Congress speech appears to be somewhatsubdued.

Concerning literature and arts, Kim Jong Unstarts his remarks with another critical note:“The field... does not yet produce enoughexcellent masterpieces that let society beam

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with revolutionary enthusiasm... film art shouldquickly liberate itself from stagnation”.

If we combine this with the leader’s strongemphasis on the youth as discussed above, andwith reports about the spread of South Koreanculture in the country, this passage soundsrather dramatic. Given the experience ofEastern European socialist countries, itremains to be seen whether such efforts atcompeting against Western popular culturehave a chance to succeed.

A little later, Kim Jong Un repeats a warningwhich could be observed in official documentsand speeches in particular since the 1990s:“We must stifle the imperialist machinations atideological and cultural infiltration. Thoughtsand culture of imperialism are a dangerouspoison that paralyzes the healthy spirit of ourpeople and destroys the foundations ofsocialism. We must embark on a revolutionaryideological and cultural offensive to counter thepersistent and mean-spirited schemes of theimperialists... We must prevent alien andabnormal habits from creeping into oursociety.”

With this statement, Kim moves to the demandto “establish the right moral order anddiscipline in the whole society”.

Section 5 is dedicated to the strengthening ofpolitical and military power. It appeals to theorgans of people’s power (인민정권기관), thejudiciary, prosecutors, and organs of securityand of protection (안전보위기관) to firmlydefend socialism. The level of detail is muchlower here than in the parts discussed above.

The military is also duly mentioned and taskedto rebuild itself according to the principles ofKimilsungism-Kimjongilism, under the strictleadership of the Party.

People’s security forces (인민내무군) are calledupon to “frustrate the efforts of class enemiesand other hostile forces” and intensify their

struggle against crimes that threaten “theParty, the socialist order, life and property ofthe people”.

The section concludes with an appeal to theworkers in the national defense industry tomodernize existing weaponry and to expandaerial defense, and to civilian armed forces toimprove their readiness to respond to anyarmed attack by the “US-imperialists, our arch-enemy”.

Chapter 3: For the Independent Unificationof the Fatherland

This part is a summary of the widely publicizedNorth Korean view on unification, without anymajor change or addition.

It starts with the great exploits of Kim Il Sungincluding his proposal to create the DemocraticConfederative31 Republic of Koryŏ according tothe principle “one country, one nation, twosystems”. The Joint Declaration of June 15,2000, and the Declaration of October 4, 2007,are promoted as core expressions of theunification idea and as the program for itsimplementation.

Kim Jong Un is very critical of any attempt atinvolving outside forces in the task ofunification. As has been emphasized fordecades, North Korea regards Koreanunification as a strictly Korean affair. Thisdemand makes sense when contrasted with theGerman experience, and demonstrates the fearof an external intervention to the disadvantageof the North. It is also an only thinly veiledcriticism of South Korea which is accused ofunnecessarily involving the United States.

Statements like: “The various political partiesin the North and the South should realizecontacts, exchange and solidarity to create anatmosphere of reconciliation and unity”, aspositive as they sound, are the repetition ofnumerous previous appeals of similar, oftenidentical wording. They deserve support but do

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not constitute any new proposal.

A passionate appeal is directed against SouthKorean efforts to achieve a “unification ofsystems”, which North Korea interprets as anattempt at a German-style absorption. Kimdenounces the hopes for a collapse of NorthKorea and demands an immediate end tovarious propagandistic measures at the DMZincluding loudspeaker announcements orleaflets.

Throughout chapter 3 of the speech, threats ofa devastating war alternate with offers atcooperation and the promise of prosperity as aunified Korean nation.

Chapter 4: Towards Global Sovereignty

In this chapter Kim Jong Un presents his viewon the recent history and the future ofinternational relations. He mentions hiscountry’s successful survival of the collapse ofthe socialist system and the proud achievementof having developed an H-bomb, and notes thatsince 1980, his country opened diplomaticrelations with 66 countries “including capitalistcountries” and entered various internationalorganizations.

Looking at the global situation, Kim identifiesan intensifying conflict between “great powers”without, however, explicitly naming China andthe United States, although the latter isaccused of seeking global dominance andviolating the sovereignty of other nations.

Sovereignty is promoted as the most valuablegood and a vital issue in international relationsthat needs to be defended at all cost againstv i c ious schemes under the l abe l o f“democracy”, “human rights”, “globalization”and “fight against terrorism”. The latter ischaracterized as state-sponsored terrorism bythe United States and its allies againstuncooperative nations. The appeal to theUnited Nations to stop functioning as acompliant subject of such actions deserves

some attention given the recently ongoingUNSC reform movement.

Other core ideas are that peace and humanitymust be protected by arms32, that the collapseof socialist countries does not mean that thesocialist ideal as such has failed, and that non-aligned nations should cooperate.

Pointing at its achievements as a nuclearpower, North Korea claims that it will play amore prominent and leading position ininternational relations. This is not new, exceptfor the justification of such claims by the statusas a nuclear power. The latter shows that KimJong Un sees the benefits of that program verybroadly and far beyond the narrow scope of themilitary realm.

Then comes the passage that has received mostattention in Western media:33 “As a responsiblenuclear power, as already declared, ourRepublic will not use nuclear weapons first.This is under the condition that hostile forcesdo not violate our sovereignty with nuclearweapons. We will also sincerely realize our dutyvis-à-vis the international community not toproliferate nuclear weapons and to strive forthe denuclearization of the world.”

The chapter ends with another frequently madestatement: “Our Party and the government ofour Republic will improve and normalizerelations with countries that respect oursovereignty and treat us benevolently, even ifthey were hostile in the past”. This is mainlydirected at the United States and is yet anotherproposal at diplomatic normalization and theconclusion of a peace treaty to end the KoreanWar. As usual, this proposal was either ignoredor bluntly rejected by Washington pointing tothe demand that North Korea denuclearizesfirst.34

Chapter 5: For the Strengthening andDevelopment of the Party

Looking back at the Party’s history, Kim Jong

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Un notes: “The Party has in time and decisivelyidentified and excluded the modern sectariansfrom its ranks. At a time when our revolutionwas facing the hardest ordeals and challenges,they sought to seize the opportunity andreached for the highest power of the Party andthe state, formed a group inside of our Partyand perfidiously tried to degenerate ourideology and social order.”

This is the strongest reference to Jang SongThaek in this long speech, and the accusationthat he and his followers wanted to secure “thehighest power” weighs very heavily. Afterstating the victory that was achieved againstsuch machinations, Kim again mentions the“youth question” and how the party manages itsuccessfully.

On one occasion, Kim Jong Un talked aboutopen disloyalty against the leaders: “We shouldnot remain silent even against the slightestelements that challenge the authority of Kim IlSung and Kim Jong Il or of the Party... andstifle the attacks and slander of all kinds ofclass enemies against the Party and theleader.” There seem to be serious concerns inthis regard, if we consider the heightenedsecurity around statues of Kim Il Sung and KimJong Il where in the last years security camerashave been installed.

In recent years, security cameras haveemerged at all key monuments like here in

the Mansudae Art Studios

The latter part of the final section contains abattery of critical passages. Despite theirsometimes repetitive nature I quote some ofthem here at length to convey the atmosphereas precisely as possible. The terms “abuse ofauthority, bureaucratism, corruption anddecadence“ (세도와 관료주의, 부정부패) appearno less than eleven times in the speech.

“We should bravely break the old frame offormalism and introduce innovation in Partywork. Our Party has declared a war on abuse ofauthority, bureaucratism, corruption anddecadence but has not yet fully overcome them.If we tolerate abuse of authority andbureaucratism, then corruption and decadencew i l l s p r e a d a n d a r b i t r a r i n e s s a n dhighhandedness will emerge. If theseaccumulate, enmity towards our Party willsprout. The struggle against abuse of authority,bureaucratism, corruption and decadence,which occur among our Party officials, is to bewaged persistently and intensively until thesephenomena are eradicated.”

“The Party organizations do not guideeconomic work comprehensively enough.“

“We must boldly recognize the mistakes madeduring the advance of the revolution andovercome them early, so that we can show thepeople the image of a revolutionary andfighting Party.“

“We shall not look at the documents, but at theliving people.”

“The party organizations must recognize themood of the people early and correctly andsolve the pending problems so that the broadmasses honestly trust and follow the party.”

“The party officials should internalize the viewsof our leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Ilabout the people and make them their

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philosophy, so that in work and in life not theslightest traces of abuse of authority,bureaucratism, corruption and decadenceemerge.“

“The party organizations must take decisivemeasures to analyze the deficiencies that haveemerged among officials of various areas, tofind their source and to eradicate them. Wemust intensify the ideological struggle andorganizational control of the extermination ofthese deficiencies.”

“In particular the deficiencies among partyofficials must be eliminated completely. Partydiscipline is to be strictly applied against thosewho commit these acts.”

“Party organizations should abandonbureaucratic methods and styles, they shouldstop replacing actual Party work by meetingsand documents, and change their course towork on the spot and with the hearts of thepeople.”

“We must eliminate the working style of a firebrigade and... anticipate and prepare for futureissues early on. The officials should give up theworking style in which the initial enthusiasmabates after five minutes, and rather continueall tasks persistently until the end...”

This is not the first time that Kim Jong Uncriticized the behavior of his officials in public.He conspicuously did so in May 2012 during aninspection at the Mangyŏngdae funfair.35 Butthe variations in his criticism and thesignificant space given to such remarks in themost important speech of his career should notgo by unnoticed. North Korea obviously suffersfrom the typical shortcomings of any largebureaucracy, be it a large private corporationor a publicly funded organization. Kim JongUn’s problem is that the entity that is infectedwith this kind of formalism and bureaucraticbehavior is his whole country, and that theresulting inefficiency and ineffectiveness do notjust impact the profit of a company or the

research output of a university. Theseshortcomings threaten his very legitimacy andthe stability of North Korea, hence hisemphasis.

Some hope is offered by the pragmatic passage“We should not judge the people by theirloyalty of yesterday but by their loyalty oftoday. We should follow the principle toeducate and win over the broad masses anddeepen our work with them, with the exceptionof only a handful of hostile elements.” Thiscorresponds with anecdotal reports about thetraditional system of social stratification,Sŏngbun, losing its importance in determiningthe options of an individual’s life.

Summary and Conclusion: InterpretingKim Jong Un’s report

This was not the much-anticipated bold reformspeech. However, it included a number ofnoteworthy passages that shed light on theleader’s self-perception and his blueprint forthe future in the fields of the economy, foreignrelations, and ideology.

Economy

Among the potentially positive signals is thatKim Jong Un refrained from following thetypical socialist fallacy of promoting producergoods over consumer goods. Rather, heemphasized the need for a balanceddevelopment of the sectors of the nationaleconomy. In fact, he even sounded slightlycritical of past economic policies when hestressed that previous investments, which weremainly in the economy’s foundations, need totranslate into actual improvements in people’slives. Developmental economists will bereminded of the debate between supporters ofbalanced and unbalanced growth in the 1960s.Once again, we see that many of North Korea’sproblems are far from unique.

The three fields Kim Jong Un identified asbeing of key importance suggest that he and

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his advisors have a fairly good understanding ofthe country’s actual economic problems: lack ofenergy, lack of food and lack of consumergoods. The strategies he emphasized forsolving these issues were, however, notrevolutionary. Rather than focusing on thecomparative advantages of his country as apotential producer of manufactured goods andprocessed raw materials for export, whichwould generate the necessary funds for theimport of food, he said explicitly: “We mustrealize self-sufficiency in food.” Kim Jong Unobviously prioritizes the strategic position ofhis country over economic rationality, andseems pessimistic about the ability of hiscountry to secure a reliable supply of foodthrough trade. It should be noted that none ofthis is a uniquely North Korean position.

With the strategic goal being food self-sufficiency in mind, the question is how theleader hopes to achieve the necessaryproductivity increase. A further liberalization ofagriculture was not announced. It seems thatfor the time being, the reduction in the size ofwork teams and the increase in the share oftheir harvest that farmers are allowed to keepand sell on the markets are deemed to provideenough such incentives.

Reflecting the World Food Programme’sconcerns36 that North Koreans generally haveenough carbohydrates but lack adequatesupply of fat and protein, Kim Jong Un stressedthe need to dramatically expand animalhusbandry including privately owned livestock.Raising goats had been introduced by his latefather as one key policy after the famine. A fewyears ago, plans to hold large numbers of cattleon a newly cultivated grass land (Sep’otableland)37 made headlines but related newshave been sparse subsequently.

He did not, however, neglect foreign tradealtogether. The leader places high hopes onexport and international economic cooperation.He said explicitly: “We will need to expand and

develop foreign economic relations.” Jointventures are supposed to facilitate the importof advanced technology, and through specialeconomic zones, North Korea wants to activelylobby for investments from abroad. Again, thisis an ambition that needs a reality check giventhe tightened sanctions regime, but at leastthere is no indication of a plan for completedisconnection from international economiccooperation.

Kim Jong Un correctly identified the energyshortage as the central issue for thedevelopment of the national economy. Inaddition to big projects, he also kept up thedecentralized solution through the constructionof a large number of small- and medium-sizedpower stations across the country. This idea isnot new, but it appears realistic given that theweak national power grid could easily beoverstressed by input from large powerstations. In fact, the reduction of transmissionlosses was explicitly mentioned in Kim’sspeech.

What is remarkable is the ambition to developdomestic crude oil reserves. It would be amajor breakthrough for North Korea and asetback for senders of sanctions, if the countryhad indeed found an import substitutingsolution to what so far constitutes one of themost crucial bottlenecks in the economy’ssupply chain.

Signs of pragmatism were visible when KimJong Un called upon enterprises to showinitiative and creativity to normalize theirproduction, to use the management rights theywere granted including the independentaccounting system to the fullest extent, andurged the Cabinet as the headquarters of theeconomy to draw up realistic plans foreconomic development.

The general mood of the speech concerning theeconomy was, however, deeply neo-orthodox.

Kim emphasized central planning and

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announced a Five-Year-Plan. Both Stalin’sSoviet Union and Park Chung Hee’s SouthKorea had such plans. But while the formersuffocated individual economic activity and ledthe country into economic and politicalbankruptcy, the latter pooled the limitedresources of an underdeveloped country andopened the way to its current economicdynamism and prosperity, albeit at a highpolitical and social price. Realistically, we willhave to wait until this autumn or next spring tounderstand whether the plan wi l l beimplemented in the classical socialist-b u r e a u c r a t i c w a y o f e x c e s s i v emicromanagement, or whether it will be moreof a strategic and indicative nature.

So far, there is little indication that Kim willfollow Park’s approach to use large enterprisesas “private agents of public purpose”38. Rather,he revived mass movements like the 70-day andthe 200-day speed battles, and urged hiscitizens to work even faster at the newMallima-Speed.

Foreign Relations

Most notably, Kim Jong Un distanced himselffrom China in a number of ways. He criticizedthe reform and opening policy as “filthy” andurged an end to trade dependency on the bigneighbor. This message was aimed at adomestic audience but will not go unnoticed inBeijing. It remains to be seen whether suchoffensive rhetoric will foment anger in China,or whether the Chinese have long gotten usedto similar broadsides and will just shrug theirshoulders and continue with a pragmatic NorthKorea policy as they did before.

Acknowledging the growing difficulties of anincreasingly complex society in adhering to astrictly autarkic development, Kim supportedan expansion of foreign trade and internationaleconomic cooperation under the condition thatall this is done from a patriotic standpoint. Thelatter is a typical North Korean side condition,in the sense that it is very ambiguous and

subject to interpretation, so that in the finalconsequence only the leader himself candetermine what is appropriate and what is not.

Oscillating between saber rattling anddisplaying the proud responsibility of a nuclearpower, Kim Jong Un repeated his claim that thenuclear program is purely defensive in natureand will only be used in case his country isattacked first. This corresponds with previousstatements and with a realistic assessment ofthe survival chances of North Korea in case itwould launch a missile against the UnitedStates or any of its allies. Appreciation of thisoffer by Washington was, however, notforthcoming. It thus seems that for now, thevicious cycle of tests, condemnation, sanctionsand new tests will continue, and that thedanger of a nuclear arms race in East Asia hasnot been reduced.

Kim Jong Un seems to draw some hope fromthe economic crisis in the West, and growingglobal resistance against US dominance in thefields of economy, military, and culture. Thiscould be a miscalculation if the rise of anincreasingly assertive China would makeAmerican supremacy look like the lesser evil tomany nations in the region. But the recreationof a bipolar world and the outbreak of a ColdWar 2.0 would equally benefit North Koreawhich can thus be expected to support suchtrends.

Considering the closure of the KaesongIndustrial Park by South Korea in February2016,3 9 the tone against the South wasrelatively mild. On the other hand, there wereno new offers, only a repetition of the knownunification principles and formulas.

Ideology

In an obvious attempt at further securing hispower, Kim Jong Un strongly promotedKimilsungism-Kimjongilism as the soledominant ideology in his country. This includesthe Great Leader system and an emphasis on

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hereditary power succession.

The creation of the post of Chairman of theWPK was not a hopeful sign for those who werehoping that the Congress would serve as amilestone towards a reformed North Korea. Itconfirmed the one-person leadership of KimJong Un, rather than broadening the powerbase at the top level.

A minor development of the Congress was theinclusion of Kim Yo Jong, said to be the leader’ssister, as a member of the Central Committee.She continues making her way through theranks of power, like Kim Jong Il’s sister beforeher. It will be interesting to see whom sheeventually marries, considering the 2013 purgeof Kim Kyong Hui’s hapless husband Jang SongThaek. Speaking of Kim Jong Un’s uncle, theabsence of any major purge at the Congressshould also be noted, though this was not verysurprising given the clean sweep that hadalready been underway for years. Anentertaining detail in this regard was the re-emergence of Ri Yong Gil, which embarrassedthe South Koreans who had reported him to bedead in February 2016.40 He became analternate member of the Politburo and amember of the Central Military Commission.

Strengthening the impression that theCongress signals a “return to a new normal,”Kim Jong Un mentioned the next (8th) PartyCongress, implying that it would take placearound the end of the Five Year Plan—i.e., in2020. This is not per se a negative sign, if weconsider that reforms in China, in Vietnam andin the Soviet Union originated from the top, i.e.the Party. Organs like the Politbureau and itsStanding Committee or Presidium can be justsymbolic rubberstamp tools of one-person rule,but they also have the potential to serve asinstitutions of collective leadership. It remainsto be seen which direction will actually bechosen, and how this might change over theyears.

A major concern seems to be foreign influence

in the form of cultural infiltration. Relatedwarnings were issued repeatedly. Kim JongUn’s emphasis on the youth seems to beanother typically socialist feature, but if seenfrom this perspective, it indicates thewillingness of the Party to fight for maintainingits soft power dominance. Criticism of the fieldof literature and art for not producing enoughammunition to fight external cultural influenceon socialist morale will be heard and takenseriously. But if the experience of EasternEurope is a teacher, this will be a futile effort.The frequent use of terms like abuse ofauthority, bureaucratism, corruption,decadence, arbitrariness, formalism,highhandedness, and abnormal habits provideshints at the magnitude of the problem.

Conclusion

Should we therefore conclude that the PartyCongress achieved nothing except anormalization of the Party-based governancestructure, the confirmation of Kim Jong Un asthe und isputed top l eader , and theannouncement of a Five Year Plan for economicdevelopment?

It is difficult to argue against such a position.However hard we search for details in Kim JongUn’s speeches, the Party Congress did notinitiate a new age of reform and opening. Onthe contrary, it explicitly rejected such aprospect in the leader’s rude words towardsthe Chinese, indicating a historical low point inthe bilateral relationship.

A thin ray of hope is offered by the fact thatsolid Party rule formed the foundation for thesuccessful gradual changes in China andVietnam. The explicit mentioning of theupcoming 8th Party Congress points in thedirection of a further normalization. Andalthough there was no big breakthrough, KimJong Un did not undo the changes of the past;he even talked about private economicact iv i t ies and about f lex ib i l i ty anddecentralized responsibil ity.

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Kim Jong Un repeated his four-year-old promiseto improve people’s lives. It will be seenwhether the related expectations of his peoplewere fulfilled or disappointed by the overallrather orthodox and conservative tone of the7th Party Congress. The new leader had madebig promises when he took power in 2011; he isunder great pressure to deliver. At theCongress, Kim Jong Un praised the Party atlength for its closeness to the masses and itsspirit of devoting everything to the people. This

description now, once again, must stand thetest of reality.

This is a greatly extended version of an articlethat was originally published at 38North(http://38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/).

Related article

JJ Suh, Half Full or Half Empty? North Koreaa f t e r t h e 7 t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s(https://apjjf .org/2016/14/Suh.html)

Rüdiger Frank is Chair and Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University ofVienna and Head of its Department of East Asian Studies. He is also an adjunct professor atKorea University and the University of North Korean Studies (Kyungnam University) in Seoul.He holds an M.A. in Korean Studies, Economics and International Relations and a Ph.D. inEconomics. In 1991/1992, he spent one semester as a language student at Kim Il-sungUniversity in P’yŏngyang and has been researching North Korea ever since. Visiting positionshave included Columbia University New York and Korea University, Seoul. He is VicePresident of the Association for Korean Studies in Europe (AKSE) and acting President of theU.S. and Hong Kong-based Asian Politics and History Association (APHA). He is also DeputyChief Editor of the “European Journal of East Asian Studies” and an Associate of “The AsiaPacific Journal”. He is the founding editor of a new book series at Brill titled “Security andInternational Relations in East Asia”. His major research fields are socialist transformation inEast Asia and Europe (with a focus on North Korea), state-business relations in East Asia, andregional integration in East Asia. His most recent books are: (with S. Burghart, eds., 2010):Driving Forces of Socialist Transformation: North Korea and the Experience of Europe andEast Asia (http://www.amazon.com/dp/3706905698/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), Vienna:Praesens, (ed., 2011): Exploring North Korean Arts(http://www.amazon.com/dp/3869842148/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), Nuremberg: Verlag fuerModerne Kunst, (with Heung Chong Kim and Sung-Hoon Park, eds., 2012): Korea and EastAsia in a Changing Regional and Global Environment(http://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/publications/pub02_view.jsp?page=6&no=185776&sCate=&sSubCate=&field=&text=), Seoul: KIEP and (with John Swenson-Wright, eds., 2013): Korea andEast Asia: The Stony Road to Collective Security(http://www.amazon.com/dp/9004229108/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), Leiden and Boston: Brill.

For more information, see http://wirtschaft.ostasien.univie.ac.at.

For publications, see http://univie.academia.edu/RuedigerFrankEmail: ruediger.frank@univie.ac.at (https://apjjf.org/mailto: ruediger.frank@univie.ac.at)

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Notes1 This is the conventional English term used in North Korea. In the West, Korean Worker’sParty (KWP) is the standard. Both are imprecise, however. Following the official Germanversion “Partei der Arbeit”, Labor Party would be the correct translation of 로동당.2 The richest source in this regard is the Washington-based Cold War International HistoryProject (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center (www.wilsoncenter.org). Among scholars whohave published in this field are James Person, Sergey Radchenko, Bernd Schaefer, BalazsSzalontai and Kathryn Weathersby. Inspired by the work done at the CWIHP, I explored EastGerman archives in search of clues on the reconstruction of North Korea’s second largest cityby East Germany. See Rudiger Frank (1996): Die DDR und Nordkorea. Der Wiederaufbau derStadt Hamhŭng 1954-1962, Aachen: Shaker.3 Rudiger Frank, "Power Restructuring in North Korea: Anointing Kim Jong Il’s Successor,"(http://apjjf.org/-R--diger-Frank/3429/article.pdf) The Asia-Pacific Journal, 42-2-10, October18, 2010.4 See here (http://38north.org/2015/11/rfrank111115/).5 See here(https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/kim-jong-un-doubles-down-i-opening-speech-and-central).6 The so-called mass line has even found its way into the constitution (Article 13). On May 12,state media emphasized(http://www.rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-05-12-0010)that North Koreans would endure speed battles of 700 or 7,000 days if necessary. A fewweeks later, it became obvious that this was no empty talk.7 Named after the foundation day of the Army. This symbolism is worth noticing. I interpret itas a sign that the Party is party of the military, as it is part of every other segment of NorthKorea’s society. Declaring a “victory” of the Party over the military would, however, go toofar, since such a fight has never really taken place.8 Robert Carlin: “A Second Look: Media Coverage of the 7th Workers’ Party of KoreaCongress” (http://38north.org/2016/05/rcarlin051716/), 38North, 17.05.2016.9 “Detained and interrogated for 10 hours in North Korea”(http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36200530), BBC, 20.05.2016.10 See here(http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-05-08-0004).11 See here(http://www.rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-05-08-0001).12 Congress of the Korean Worker’s Party], Rodong Sinmun, 08.05.2016.13 The formulation ”we have nothing to ‘reform’ and ‘open’“ has been used in North Koreanpublications before, but usually with reference to Western influence and not at such a high-profile event. See for example: “Let us adhere to line of building independent nationaleconomy” (http://kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9809/news09/17.htm#9), KCNA, 17.09.1998, due togeo-blocking best accessible through a Japanese VPN server or through the archive(http://www.kcnawatch.co) (the latter behind a paywall).14 Or ‘pyŏngjin’ if we use the McCune/Reischauer system.

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15 The rationale is simple: in lieu of capital and technology, the focus of attempts to increaseproductivity inevitably is on the remaining factor, labor. Material incentives areunderdeveloped in non-market systems, hence ideological motivation including the creation ofsymbols, slogans, model workers/work teams/factories etc. dominates.16 Jong Il Kim (1995): Giving Priority to Ideological Work is Essential in Building Socialism(http://www.korea-dpr.info/lib/101.pdf).17 Note that he speaks only about having laid the foundations, not about having attained thisgoal.18 For a detailed analysis of such discussions, see Phillip Park (2016): Rebuilding NorthKorea’s Economy, Seoul: Kyungnam University.19 I noticed that slogan on banners shown prominently during Kim Jong Un’s first publicappearance as the new leader in December 2011. See Rudiger Frank, 'North Korea after KimJong Il: The Kim Jong Un era and its challenges,'(http://apjjf.org/2012/10/2/Rüdiger-Frank/3674/article.pdf) The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 10,Issue 2 No 2, January 9, 2012.20 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union denounced some aspects of Stalinismand called for an end to the cult of personality. For a full version of the speech, see here(https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm).21 Often translated as “self-reliance” in very general terms, including the economy, ideology,and national defense. The concept has experienced additions and reinterpretations over theyears.22 Usually translated as “Military First”.23 This term was popular in the run-up to the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in 2012and has ever since been mentioned much less frequently. It can be translated as “Strong andProsperous Great Country”.24 Referring to revolutions in ideology, technology and culture.25 KOTRA (2015): 북한 대외무역 동향 [Trends in North Korea’s Foreign Trade], Seoul: KoreaTrade and Investment Promotion Agency. Stephan Haggard in his blog discusses a fewirregularities in related trade statistics but agrees that North Korea imports about 500,000tons of oil from China annually. See “North Korean Trade and the Oil Mystery”(https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/north-korean-trade-and-oil-mystery), 09.02.2016.26 North Korea’s official economic plans include: One-Year-Plan 1947, One-Year-Plan 1948,Two-Year-Plan 1949-1950, Three-Year-Plan 1954-1956, Five Year-Plan 1957-1961, Seven-Year-Plan 1961-1970 (extended), Six-Year-Plan 1971-1976, Seven-Year-Plan 1978-1984,Seven-Year-Plan 1987-1993. See Doowon Lee: “Assessing North Korea’s Economic Reform:Historical Trajectory, Opportunities, and Constraints”, Pacific Focus VIII/2, Fall 1993, pp.5-2927 See “State General Bureau for Economic Development to be Established”(http://kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201101/news15/20110115-13ee.html), KCNA, 15.01.2011.28 It is in the eye of the beholder whether the emphasis on alternative sources of energy is theresult of a sustainable and environmentalist approach or just born of necessity. In any case,the leader mentioned the elimination of pollution when, a few sentences later, he discussedthe necessary modernization of the chemical industry. For a detailed study on that topic, see

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Robert Winstanley-Chesters (2015): Environment, Politics, and Ideology in North Korea.Landscape as Political Project, Lanham: Lexington Books29 Andrei Lankov: “Reforming North Korea. It seems that, at long last, North Korea hasdecided to begin Chinese-style reforms”(http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/reforming-north-korea-20141117121917871925.html), Aljazeera, 30.11.2014.30 For a recent study of North Korea’s health care system, see Eun Jeong Soh: ”TheEmergence of an Informal Health-Care Sector in North Korea”(http://apjjf.org/-Eun-Jeong-Soh/4897/article.pdf), The Asia Pacific Journal, 14/11, 2016.31 Occasionally, the English translation of the Korean term련방in North Korean news outletsas “federation” leads to confusion. The North Korean proposal very clearly envisions aconfederation or a commonwealth, i.e. two separate entities (“two systems”) under one jointumbrella.32 Numerous examples of this position exist(ed) outside North Korea, including in EastGermany, to explain why having a large military and an active military program does notcontradict the self-characterization as a peace-loving country. Germans often referred to theWilhelm Busch poem of 1900 “Bewaffneter Friede”(http://www.gedichte.vu/?bewaffneter_friede.html) [Armed Peace]. A fox, pointing at arecently promulgated peace order, sanctimoniously demands that a hedgehog takes off histhorny dress. The hog sees through the fox’s intentions and refuses, thus securing peace bybeing armed.33 Eric Talmadge: “North Korea will not use its nuclear weapons first, Kim Jong-un tellsCongress”(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-will-not-use-its-nuclear-weapons-first-kim-jong-un-tells-congress-a7018906.html), The Guardian, 08.05.2016.34 “U.S. says N. Korea should first demonstrate denuclearization commitment before talks”(http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/05/19/0401000000AEN20160519000500315.html), Yonhap, 19.05.2016.35 “Kim Jong Un tours Mangyongdae funfair”(http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201205/news09/20120509-18ee.html), KCNA, 09.05.2012.36 See here (https://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic).37 The project was for example mentioned prominently in the Prime Minister’s report at theannual parliamentary session in April 2015. “SPA Session Reviews Cabinet Work Last Yearand Advances Its Tasks for This Year “(http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2015/201504/news09/20150409-34ee.html), KCNA.38 Jung-En Woo (1991): Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, NewYork: Columbia University Press39 Rudiger Frank: “The Kaesong Closure: Punishment or Shot in the Foot?”(http://38north.org/2016/02/rfrank021216/), 38North, 12.02.2016.40 Hyung-Jin Kim: “Ex-N. Korea army head, who Seoul said was executed, is alive”(http://bigstory.ap.org/article/46f02a3efbad461797e5c0c323f1466c/ex-n-korea-army-head-who-seoul-said-was-executed-alive), Associated Press, 10.05.2016.