An action for (serious) Professor Barbara McDonald, Law ......The members of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd4 were express and deliberate in explaining this transformation

Draft only; not for publication or citation without the express permission of the author

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Anactionfor(serious)invasionofprivacy

ProfessorBarbaraMcDonald,SydneyLawSchool

CurrentLegalIssuesSeminarSeries2012

BancoCourt,SupremeCourtofQueensland

Thursday7June2012

Outline

Introduction

Whydopeoplefeeltheneedforanactionforinvasionofprivacy?

Misconceptionsabouttheexistinglaw

Gapsintheprotectiongivenbytheexistinglaw

Whataretheperceivedbenefitsanddisadvantagesofastatutoryaction?

TheviewsofAustralianlawreformcommissions

Viewsandapproachesfromotherjurisdictions;UK,Canada,HK,California

Whatissuesremaintobesettledastothecontentofastatutoryaction?

Whatisthescopeforthecommonlawtodevelop,intheabsenceofastatutoryaction?

Conclusion


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Introduction

Thereisnodoubtthatprivacyisahottopic.Everyweekassomenewrevelationiscommunicatedtotheworldaboutthepersonallife,therelationships,thebankaccounts,themovementsorthehealthofacelebrity,politician,actor,singer,artist,memberofaroyalfamilyormerelyofsomeother,otherwiseunremarkable,person,callsgooutforgreaterlegalprotectionofprivacy.InAustralia,wehaverecentlyhadthreelawreformcommissions,oneIndependentEnquiryintotheMediaandMediaRegulationandanotherConvergenceReview,allofwhichhavelookedattheissueofprotectionofprivacy,eithersquarelyorincidentallytosomeotherfocusoftheirenquiry.IntheUnitedKingdom,theLevesonenquiryintothephonehackingsagawhichbroughtanabruptendtothescandal‐gatheringcareerof“TheNewsoftheWorld”newspaperanditsstaff,continuesasthispaperiswritten.NewsInternationalLtd,anditsparentcompanyNewsCorp,isstilltryingtocontainthefallout,butthecompanieshavepaidoutmillionsofdollarsinsettlementofclaimsbyvictimsofillegalphonetappingbyjournalistsandinvestigatorsbriefedortoleratedbythenewspaper.Theenquiryisnowasconcernedwithallegedlinksandalliancesbetweenthepolice,themediaandmembersofgovernment,asitisaboutthegovernanceofmediacompanies,andgettingtotheheartofwhatseniorexecutivesknewortoleratedaboutthephonehackingpracticesthatprovokedtheenquiry.Muchoftheconcernaboutprotectionofprivacyisboundupwithabroaderconcernaboutthequalityofjournalismandnewsreporting,inaneconomic,technologicalandsocialcontextwherecorporatemediaownersstruggletosatisfytheirshareholders’desireforprofit,andastheInternetunderminesthepowerofadvertisinginprint,ontelevisionorradioandthusthesourcesofrevenuethatwouldtraditionallysubsidiseboththequantityandqualityofnewsreportingandcommentary.Thetwoissuesmustofcoursebekeptseparate,eventhoughtoavictimofajournalist’soramediaentity’smisconduct,andtothebroadercommunity,theyareinterlinked.Thelawcanonlyregulatequalityinanindirectwaybydeterringorcompensatingformisconduct.Thelawcanhowever,ifitissoinclined,protectprivacybothindirectlyanddirectly,bycommonlawprinciplesorstatutoryfiat.Thequestionforusishow,andevenif,itshoulddoso.Whileit’sthemediathatisinthepoliticalspotlightatthemoment,thereisnoproposalthatanystatutoryrightofprivacywouldbeconfinedtomediadefendants:asprivatecitizens,asfriends,asmembersoffamiliesandassociations,oraspeopleoccupyingemploymentorprofessionalpositionswherewecomeintopossessionofprivateinformation,wemustbecarefulwhatwewishfor.And,ifthisstatutoryactioncomestopass,evenmorecarefulwhensomeonesaystous:“doyouwanttoknowasecret?”Protectionoftheirprivacyisattheheartofpeople’sconcernaboutthewaysinwhichpersonalinformationaboutthemiscollected,retained,stored,shared,used,orcommunicated.Sometimesthisinformationisgatheredwithouttheperson’sknowledge,butincreasinglyithasbeenvolunteeredforonepurpose,forvariousinternet“apps”orforpostingonsocialnetworks,withoutanawarenessofhowthe


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informationcanbeused,misusedorshared,andwithout,perhaps,properconsiderationofwhetheritcaneverbe“forgotten”orerased.Australia’sfederalPrivacyAct,1988,hasbeenfrequentlyupdatedandtheAttorneyGeneralNicolaRoxonhasjustannouncedtheintroductionofaBilltobroadenregulationandincreaserestrictionsonvariousentitiesandtostrengthenfurthertheregulatorypowersofgovernmentagenciessuchastheofficeoftheprivacycommissioner.1Whilesuchdataprotectionisclearlyacentralaspectofprivacyprotection,itdoesseemtobeoneaspectwhere,generally,governmentsarepro‐activeaboutkeepingupwithtechnologicaldevelopmentsandbroadeningregulationandprotections.Dataprotectionisnotthefocusofthispaper.However,whileitcanbeassumedthatexistinglegislationgivespeoplesomerightsandsomemeanstocontrolinformationthatisheldaboutthemandsomeremediesforitsmisuse,itwouldbeamatterofexpressprovisionandinterpretationastowhetheranynewbroadstatutoryremedyfor“invasionofprivacy”wouldsupplementormerelycomplementthatexistinglegislation.Thefocusofthispaperisonthedesirabilityofeitherastatutoryoracommonlaw,broad‐basedactionforinvasionofprivacy.

Whydopeoplefeeltheneedforanactionforinvasionofprivacy?

Misconceptionsabouttheexistinglaw:itisnotasbereftofprotectionasmanyassume.Itisfrequentlysaidthatourlawdoesnothavearemedyforinvasionofprivacy.I'vecomeacrossexamplesofthisfrequently,andIhavetoadmit,somewhattomyfrustration.Wecannothaveaproperdebateontheneedforlegislationandtheformandcontentofanystatutoryactionunlesswehaveacorrectunderstandingofthecurrentposition.Forexample,arecentarticleintheSunHeraldreportedacaseaboutajiltedboyfriendwhohadpostedpicturesofhisnudeformerloveronFacebookandwhohadbeengivenasuspendedsentenceof6monthsjailbyJusticeRegBlanch,ChiefJudgeoftheDistrictCourtofNewSouthWales.Aprivacyexpertfromaleadinglawfirmwasquotedassayingthatthevictim"shouldbeabletotakeactionfortheinvasionofherprivacybutshecan'tatthemoment."2Yettherearenumerousexamplesofcourtsgivingaremedywhereapersonwhohasbeensubjecttoarelationshipofconfidencehasmisusedordiscloseconfidentialinformation.ThecauseofactiondatesbacktoQueenVictoria'stime,eventhoughthesubjectmatteroftheetchingsinacasebroughtbyPrinceAlbert3mayhavebeenalittlemoretamethanwhatwasthesubjectofthecomplaintinthiscase.Itcanmakenodifferencethatthedisclosuretodayisusuallyonlineratherthanbyhardcopy,inpersonorbyletter,asinformerdays. 1 http://www.ag.gov.au/Privacy/Pages/Privacy‐Reforms.aspx 2 H Aston, “Status Update: facebook offenders now face jail”, The Sun Herald, April 22, 2012 at 7. 3 Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652; 64 ER 293


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Describingarecent,verytacky,ambushingofAustralianwriterandpoetCliveJamesguyisasoapclaimedformerloverfilmedandbroadcaston"acurrentaffair",acommentatorintheSydneyMorningHeraldbemoanedtheinvasionofJames'sprivacy,writing:“Thislittlekiss‐and‐tellwasbroadcastinAustralia,soJamesreallycan'tsueforbreachofprivacy,ashecouldiftheshowhadgonetoairinBritain.”Yetagain,the"telling"isusuallyinbreachofarelationshipofconfidence,andathirdpartysuchasthetelevisioncompanythatbroadcasttheambushandthedisclosure,are,inequity,treatedasboundbytheobligationofconfidencewhichitknowstoexist.EventheAustralianLawReformCommission,initsReport108,ForYourInformation:PrivacyLawandPractice,setsout,at74.139,anumberofcircumstancesasjustifyingastatutoryactionfortheprotectionofprivacy,mostofwhichdoinfactalreadyattractsomelegalprotection.Theywere:

“ExamplesofmattersintendedtofallwithintheALRC’srecommendedstatutorycauseofactionforseriousinvasionofprivacy

1.Followingthebreak‐upoftheirrelationship,MrAsendscopiesofaDVDofhimselfandhisformergirlfriend(B)engagedinsexualactivitytoMsB’sparents,friends,neighboursandemployer.

2.Csetsupatinyhiddencamerainthewomen’stoiletathisworkplace,capturingimagesofhiscolleaguesthathedownloadstohisowncomputerandtransmitstoawebsitehostedoverseas,whichfeaturessimilarimages.

3.Dworksinahospitalandaccessesthemedicalrecordsofafamoussportsman,whoisbeingtreatedfordrugaddiction.Dmakesacopyofthefileandsellsittoanewspaper,whichpublishestheinformationinafrontpagestory.

4.ErunsasmallbusinessandusesF&CoFinancialAdviserstohandlehertaxaffairsandfinancialadvice.StaffatF&Codecidetodoabitof‘springcleaning’,andanumberoffilesareputoutinarecyclingbinonthefootpath—includingE’sfile,whichcontainsherpersonalandcontactdetails,taxfileandABNnumbers,andcreditcarddetails.Apasserbygrabsthefileand,unbeknowntoE,beginstoengageinidentitytheft:removingmoneyfromE’sbankaccount,usinghercreditcardsandapplyingforadditionalcreditcardsinE’sname.“(footnotesomitted)

Thereislittledoubt,now,thatexamples1,2and3wouldallprovidethebasisofactionforbreachofconfidenceinitsmodernform,atleastinrespectofthedisclosureoftheinformation.Thefourthexampleisclearlyfraudulentandcriminalconductbythe“passer‐by”,andremediableonthatbasisalready,whiletheconductofthefinancialadvisersisatleastprofessionalnegligenceintortandcontract,andcompensableonthatbasis,iftheclientsustainsarecognisedheadofdamage.


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ItistruethattheequitableactionforbreachofconfidenceinAustraliahasnotyetbeensubjecttothesustainedanddeliberatetransformationintoanactionforbreachofprivacythatithasreceivedinUnitedKingdomsincethepassageoftheHumanRightsAct1998inthatcountry.ThemembersoftheHouseofLordsinCampbellvMGNLtd4wereexpressanddeliberateinexplainingthistransformation.LordHoffmann:

AsSedleyLJobservedinaperceptivepassageinhisjudgmentinDouglasvHello!

Ltd [2001] QB 967, 1001, the new approach takes a different view of the

underlying value which the law protects. Instead of the cause of action [ for

breach of confidence] being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to

confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the

protection of human autonomy and dignity—the right to control the

disseminationofinformationaboutone'sprivatelifeandtherighttotheesteem

andrespectofotherpeople.

These changes have implications for the future development of the law. They

must influence the approach of the courts to the kind of informationwhich is

regarded as entitled to protection, the extent and form of publication which

attractsaremedyandthecircumstancesinwhichpublicationcanbejustified.

SinceCampbellvMGN,numerouscasesinUnitedKingdomhavegrantedremediesforthedisclosureofprivateinformation,bothagainstapartytoaformerorpriorrelationshiporagainstthirdpartiessuchasmediacompaniesandagenciesdealinginphotographsofcelebrities.Remedieshaveincludedbothinjunctionstorestraininitialorfurtherpublicationanddamagesforthe“harm”,usuallydistress,causedbythepublication.InAustralia,whilewedonothavethenationalequivalentoftheHumanRightsAct1998(UK)orthebindingforceofaconventionsuchastheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,andwhilewehavenothadanythinglikesuchacollectionofcasesashasoccurredintheUnitedKingdominthelastdecade,therecanequallybenodoubtthattheequitablecauseofactionforbreachofconfidencewillusuallybeasourceofprotectionagainstthewrongfuldisclosureoruseofconfidentialorprivateinformation,whetherintheformoffactsorwritingorimages,atleastasfarasinjunctiverightsareconcerned.

4 [2004] 2 AC 457 at 473 [51]


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TheHighCourtofAustralia,inAustralianBroadcastingCorporationvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtd5,indicatedthattheequitableactionofbreachofconfidencewouldbeaverylikelysourceforthedevelopmentofgreaterprotectionofprivacyundertheAustraliancommonlaw.GleesonCJseemedtoseemorescopeforthisactiontobeusedthanforabroadtorttobefashioned:

TherespondentinvitedthisCourttodepartfromoldauthority135;declarethatAustralianlawnowrecognisesatortofinvasionofprivacy;holdthatitisavailabletoberelieduponbycorporationsaswellasindividuals;andconcludethatthisisthemissingcauseofactionforwhicheveryoneinthecasehassofarbeensearching.

Iftheactivitiesfilmedwereprivate,thenthelawofbreachofconfidenceisadequatetocoverthecase.Iwouldregardimagesandsoundsofprivateactivities,recordedbythemethodsemployedinthepresentcase,asconfidential.Therewouldbeanobligationofconfidenceuponthepersonswhoobtainedthem,anduponthoseintowhosepossessiontheycame,iftheyknew,oroughttohaveknown,themannerinwhichtheywereobtained.

…Butthelackofprecisionoftheconceptofprivacyisareasonforcautionindeclaringanewtortofthekindforwhichtherespondentcontends.6

ThedecisionoftheVictorianCourtofAppealinGillervProcopets7illustratesthattheequitableactionforbreachofconfidencecaneven,apparently,providearemedywheretortlawcannot.Inthatcase,thedefendant,theestrangeddefactopartneroftheplaintiff,hadmaliciouslypassedaroundtotheplaintiff’sfamilyandfriends,copiesofavideoofconsensualsexualactivitiesthecouplehadenjoyedinearlier,happier,times.TheVictorianCourtofAppealrejectedtheplaintiff'sclaimfordamagesbasedonthetortactionundertheprinciplesofWilkinsonvDownton8forwilfulinflictionofpsychiatricinjury,becausetheplaintiffhadmerelysufferedemotionaldistressandnotthedamagethatsuchanactiononthecaserequires,intheformofphysicaldamageorarecognisedpsychiatricillness.Yet,thecourtwaspreparedtoawardtheplaintiff“damages”(eitherasdamagesunderthemodifiedversionofLordCairnsActinVictoria)orequitablecompensation,byanalogywithtortlaw,forthementaldistressshehadsuffered,asaremedyforthedefendant’sbreachoftheequitabledutyofconfidence,including“aggravateddamages”fortheintendedhumiliationhehadwreakeduponher.TheHighCourtrejectedanapplicationforspecialleavetoappealfromthisjudgment9.Itneverthelessprovidesaprecedentataseniorappellantleveloftheequitableactionforbreachofconfidencefulfillingapowerfulroleinredressingwhatmostpeoplewouldregardasaflagrantbreachofprivacy.Itwould,onewouldimagine,providearemedyto

5 (2001) 208 CLR 199 6 Ibid, at 205 [38] – [41] 7 (2008) 24 VR 1 8 [1897] 2 QB 57 (QBD) 9 Procopets v Giller [2009] HCASL 187: the application was dismissed on the ground that it raised no question of law on which an appeal could enjoy any prospect of success. See further M Rivette, “Litigating Privacy Cases in the wake of Giller v Procopets” (2010) 15 Media and Arts Law Review 283 at footnote2.


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MrCliveJamesifheweretobebotheredtoprotestagainstthe“showandtell”on“ACurrentAffair”.Whiletheequitableactionforbreachofconfidencemayoncehavebeenrestricted,ratherlikeacontractremedy,tothepartiestoapre‐existingrelationshipofconfidence,thatlimitationorrequirement,wasdiscardedbytheHouseofLordsinAttorneyGeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2]in1998,whenLordGriffithsandLordGoffsetoutabroaderreachoftheequitableaction10.LordHoffmanninCampbellattributedthetransformationoftheequitableactionintoaneffectivemeanstoprotectprivacynotonlytothepassingoftheHumanRightsAct1998,butalsotothe“acknowledgementoftheartificialityofdistinguishingbetweenconfidentialinformationobtainedthroughtheviolationofaconfidentialrelationshipandsimilarinformationobtainedinsomeotherway”11,anacknowledgementgenerallyassociatedwithLordGoff’sspeechinAttorneyGeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2]:LordGoff:

…inthevastmajorityofcases,inparticularthoseconcernedwithtradesecrets,thedutyofconfidencewillarisefromatransactionorrelationshipbetweentheparties‐oftenacontract,inwhicheventthedutymayarisebyreasonofeitheranexpressoranimpliedtermofthatcontract.Itisinsuchcasesasthesethattheexpressions"confider"and"confidant"areperhapsmostaptlyemployed.Butitiswellsettledthatadutyofconfidencemayariseinequityindependentlyofsuchcases;andIhaveexpressedthecircumstancesinwhichthedutyarisesinbroadterms,notmerelytoembracethosecaseswhereathirdpartyreceivesinformationfromapersonwhoisunderadutyofconfidenceinrespectofit,knowingthatithasbeendisclosedbythatpersontohiminbreachofhisdutyofconfidence,butalsotoincludecertainsituations,belovedoflawteachers‐whereanobviouslyconfidentialdocumentiswaftedbyanelectricfanoutofawindowintoacrowdedstreet,orwhereanobviouslyconfidentialdocument,suchasaprivatediary,isdroppedinapublicplace,andisthenpickedupbyapasser‐by12

SeealsoLordGriffithsinthesamecase:

Thedutyofconfidenceis,asageneralrule,alsoimposedonathirdpartywhoisin possession of information which he knows is subject to an obligation ofconfidence: seePrinceAlbert v. Strange (1849) 1Mac. & G. 25 andDuchess ofArgyllv.DukeofArgyll[1967]Ch.302.Ifthiswasnotthelawtherightwouldbeoflittlepracticalvalue:therewouldbenopointinimposingadutyofconfidencein respectof the secretsof themaritalbed ifnewspaperswere free topublishthosesecretswhenbetrayedtothembytheunfaithfulpartner inthemarriage.Whentradesecretsarebetrayedbyaconfidanttoathirdpartyitisusuallythe

10 Attorney‐GeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2][1990]1AC109at260,268,281 11 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 472[46]. 12 Attorney‐GeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2][1990]1AC109at260,281.SeealsoSedleyLJinDouglasvHello!Ltd[2000]QB967at[125]‐[126]


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third partywho is to exploit the information and it is the activity of the thirdpartythatmustbestoppedinordertoprotecttheownerofthetradesecret.13

InABCvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtd,GleesonCJcitedbothLordGoff’sjudgmentinAttorneyGeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2]andthatofLawsJinHellewellvChiefConstableofDerbyshire14withapproval,saying:

Butequitymayimposeobligationsofconfidentialityeventhoughthereisnoimpartingofinformationincircumstancesoftrustandconfidence.…Thenatureoftheinformationmustbesuchthatitiscapableofbeingregardedasconfidential.Aphotographicimage,illegallyorimproperlyorsurreptitiouslyobtained,wherewhatisdepictedisprivate,mayconstituteconfidentialinformation.15…

NodoubtthisprinciplewasatplaywhentheAustralianBroadcastingCorporationrecentlycametoasettlementwithindividualswhohadbeenidentifiedas“highrollers”atthelocalcasinobyaSydneynewspaper,afactthenrelayedonairbytheABC,informationthathad,Iassume,beenleakedbysomeoneattheCasino,inbreachoftheCasino’sconfidentialityrules.16SoifAustraliancommonlawalreadyprovidesaremedyformisuseordisclosureofprivateinformation,notjustagainstapersonwhowassubjecttoarelationshipofconfidencebutalsoagainstathirdpartysuchasajournalistormediaentitywhocomesintopossessionoftheinformation,whyisastatutoryactionnecessaryinsuchcases?TheresponseoftheALRCtothevariousexamplesithadgivenwas:“Whilesomeoftheexamplesabovealsomaygiverisetocriminalsanctions,[192]afederalstatutorycauseofactionwouldgivecomplainantsaccesstoabroaderrangeofcivilremediestoredresstheinvasionoftheirprivacy”,andwentontocitethefirstinstancedecisioninGillervProcopets17inwhichtheplaintiffhadfailed.ThattheALRCReport’sanswertothisquestionisalreadyoutdatedbytheVictorianCourtofAppeal’sdecisionintheplaintiff’sfavourshowshowquicklythecommonlawcanchangeiftherightcaseispursued.Assetoutabove,thatcourtprovidedamonetaryremedytotheplaintiffforheremotionaldistressonthebasisoftheequitableaction.Assumingthecorrectnessofthatdecision18,onehastoaskwhatadditionalremedythestatutewouldorcouldprovidethattheplaintiffcouldnotalreadyobtainfromthecourt.

13 Attorney‐GeneralvGuardianNewspapersLtd[No2][1990]1AC109at268 14 [1995] 1 WLR 804 at 807: ‘‘Ifsomeonewithatelephotolensweretotakefromadistanceandwithnoauthorityapictureofanotherengagedinsomeprivateact,hissubsequentdisclosureofthephotographwould,inmyjudgment,assurelyamounttoabreachofconfidenceasifhehadfoundorstolenaletterordiaryinwhichtheactwasrecountedandproceededtopublishit.Insuchacase,thelawwouldprotectwhatmightreasonablybecalledarightofprivacy,althoughthenameaccordedtothecauseofactionwouldbebreachofconfidence.Itis,ofcourse,elementarythat,inallsuchcases,adefencebasedonthepublicinterestwouldbeavailable.’’ 15 (2001) 208 CLR 199 at 222[30] 16 L Hall, “ABC ordered to pay $190,000 after identifying the Star’s high rollers”, Sydney Morning Herald, Friday, May 25, 2012. 17 (2008) 24 VR 1 18 An application for special leave to appeal was rejected: see n 9 above.


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GapsintheprotectiongivenbytheexistinglawThereisnodoubt,thatthecommonlaw,includingboththelawoftortandequitableprinciples,togetherwithpiecemeallegislationprohibitingtheuseandmisuseofvarioustechnologicaldevices,19providesmoreprotectionofprivacythanthemisconceptionsaboveallow.WritingofProfessorProsser‘swide,fourfoldclassificationoftheprivacytortsintheUnitedStates,GummowandHayneJJinABCvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtd,said:

InAustralia,oneormoreofthefourinvasionsofprivacy,towhichreferencehasbeenmade,inmanyinstanceswouldbeactionableatgenerallawunderrecognisedcausesofaction.Injuriousfalsehood,defamation(particularlyinthosejurisdictionswhere,bystatute,truthofitselfisnotacompletedefence),confidentialinformationandtradesecrets(inparticular,asextendedtoinformationrespectingthepersonalaffairsandprivatelifeoftheplaintiff,andtheactivitiesofeavesdroppersandthelike),passing‐off(asextendedtoincludefalserepresentationsofsponsorshiporendorsement),thetortofconspiracy,theintentionalinflictionofharmtotheindividualbasedinWilkinsonvDowntonandwhatmaybeadevelopingtortofharassment,andtheactiononthecasefornuisanceconstitutedbywatchingorbesettingtheplaintiff'spremises,cometomind.Puttingthespecialpositionrespectingdefamationtooneside,thesewrongsmayattractinterlocutoryandfinalinjunctiverelief.20(footnotesomitted)

Nevertheless,therearesignificantgapsinthatprotection,particularlyinprotectingpeoplefromintrusionsintophysicalprivacy,whetheronprivatepropertyorinpublicspaces.ItwasjustsuchagapwhichledtheCourtofAppealinKayevRobertsontobemoanthelackofprotectionthatthecommonlawcouldthenprovidetoMrKaye,in1991,againsttheexcessesofthemediaatthattime.LordJusticeGlidewell:

“Thiscase…highlightsyetagain,thefailureofboththecommonlawofEnglandandstatutetoprotectinaneffectivewaythepersonalprivacyofindividualcitizens…Ifeverapersonhasarighttobeleftalonebystrangerswithnopublicinteresttopursue,itmustsurelybewhenheliesinahospitalbedrecoveringfrombrainsurgeryandwithnomorethanpartialcommandofhisfaculties.Itisthisinvasionofprivacywhichunderliestheplaintiff'scomplaint.Yetitalone,howevergross,doesnotentitlehimtoreliefinEnglishlaw.…WecannotgivetheplaintiffthebreadthofprotectionwhichIaward,formypart,wish.”21

19 For a list of the various statutes, see D Butler and S Rodrick, Australian Media Law, 4th ed, 2012 at p 20 At [123] 21 Kaye v Robertson and Sports Newspapers Limited (1991) 18 FSR 62 at 71


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ItseemstomethattherearetwoprimarygapsintheprotectionwhichcurrentAustralianlawprovidesagainstwrongfulinvasionsofprivacy.22First,inrelationtoinvasionofprivacyintoaperson’s“personalspace”,thereistheproblemofintrusionswhichfallshortoftheprotectionwhichthelawoftrespasstotheperson,trespasstolandandnuisanceprovide.Trespasstothepersonandnuisancehavestrictrequirementsastotitletosue,confiningthetorttothepersonwhoistheexclusiveoccupierofthelandinquestion,andnotextendingtosomeonewhowouldbecharacterisedasalicensee,suchasMrKayewhowasoccupyingaroomorbedinahospital.Thetortsalsoofcourserequiretheinvasionofprivacytointerferewiththeoccupier’suseoroccupationoftheland.Thustheyhavenooperationoutsidetheareaofoccupation,andnooperationtopeopleotherthanoccupiers.Outsideprivateland,theplaintiffmustrelyontrespasstotheperson.Trespasstothepersonrequireseitherphysicalcontact(intheformofbattery)orathreatorthedeliberatecausingofanapprehensionofunauthorisedphysicalcontact(intheformofanassault).AstheCourtofAppealnotedinKayevRobertson,ithaslongbeenthelawthatitisnotortofitselftotakeaphotographordigitalimageofanotherpersonwithouttheirpermission.Inthisageofmobilephoneswithcameras,anysuchtortwouldbecommittedinnumerabletimeseveryday.Conductwhichisinvasiveofprivacybutismerelyannoyingorevenmoreseriouslyharassing,willnotbecaughtifitdoesnotinvolvingeitherathreatofcontactoractualcontact.Secondly,inrelationtodisclosuresofprivateinformation,themostimportantgapinthecommonlawistherestrictionondamagesforemotionaldistress.ThisgapmayhavebeenclosedbythedecisioninGillervProcopets,butuntilthereisabodyofauthorityonthepointaroundthecountry,theavailabilityofdamagesforsuchlossremainssomewhatuncertain.Arelatedpointisthatcourtsarecircumscribedbyprecedentandjudicialpowersastowhatremediestheycanprovide:theycannotforexample,orderapologiesorretractionsorcorrectionswithoutlegislativeauthority.Bearinginmindthentheexistingprotectionandthegapsthathavebeenidentifiedsofar,Iturntothebenefitsanddisadvantagesofastatutoryactionforbreachofprivacy.

Whatistheperceivedbenefitofastatutoryaction?

TheviewsoftheAustralianLawReformCommissionTherehavebeenaseriesoflawreformcommissionreportsoverthelast40yearsdealingwithprivacy.Apartfromrecommendationsforlegislationdealingwithdataprotection,notallhaverecommendedabroadbasedactionforinvasionofprivacy.

22 I consider tort law’s role and these gaps in detail in “Tort’s role in protecting Privacy: Current and Future Directions”, ch 4 in Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp (eds), Torts in Commercial Law, Thomson Reuters, 2011.


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ThefirstfederalreportwasfromtheALRCunderthechairmanshipofMichaelKirby.Report11:UnfairPublication:DefamationandPrivacyin1979recommendedthatlegislationbeenactedto“affordsomeprotectionagainstprivacy–invadingpublications”butthat“thelegislationshouldspecifytheprotectedarearatherthancreateamoregeneralrighttoprivacy.”23Therecommendationswerelimitedtothepublicationofsensitiveprivatefactsaboutthe“bedrockarearelatingtoindividuals’relationships,home,familyandprivatelife”andthepublicationwouldhavetobesuchastocausedistress,embarrassmentorannoyance,judgedobjectively.24ItwouldalsoextendtowhatinAmericanjurisprudenceiscalledtheappropriationaspectsofprivacy:appropriationofone’sname,identityorimageforcommercialpurposes,whatweinAustraliawouldregardasthesubjectofthetortofpassingoff,andwhich,inthelightofactionsformisleadingordeceptiveconductunderthe1974TradePracticesActorstateandterritoryFairTradingActs,isnolongerasnecessaryasitmightoncehavebeen.Perhapsbecauseofthiswiderapplication,theactionwouldbeatortof‘unfairpublication’.

ThesecondwasALRCReport22:Privacy,in1983.ItsrecommendationsledtotheenactmentofthePrivacyAct1988(Cth),thecreationofthePrivacyCommissionandpositionofPrivacyCommissioner,withparticularemphasisoncollection,storage,useandmisuseofprivateinformation.Itdidnotincludearecommendationastoarightofactionforinvasionofprivacy,statingthatageneraltortofinvasionofprivacy“wouldbetoovagueandnebulous”25.

Threerecentreportshaveeachrecommendedastatutoryaction:ALRCReport108ForYourInformation:AustralianPrivacyLawandPractice(2008),theNSWLRCReport120:InvasionofPrivacy,andtheVictorianLawReformCommissionFinalReport18:SurveillanceinPublicPlaces.However,despitethisseemingconsensusonthedesirabilityofastatutoryaction,thereisaconsiderabledivergenceofviewsbetweenthereportsastoimportantelementsofanysuchaction,includingdisagreementsastotheformoftheaction,astothewayinwhichfreedomofspeechandpublicinterestwillbeconsidered,andastothefaultelement.Untilclarityandconsensusonsuchmattersisreached,itisdifficulttoseehowastatutoryactioncanorwillbesupported.

Particularmattersofdifference,aboutwhichconsensusisstilltobereached,arediscussedbelow.Atthispoint,weareinterestedinwhythevariouscommissionsfavouredastatutoryactionratherthanonedevelopmentbythecommonlaw.TheALRCgavethefollowingreasons26,expressedbyreferencetotheproblemsofthecommonlawthanthepositivesofastatute:

23 ALRC Report 11 at #235 24 at #236 25 ALRC Report 22: Privacy (1983) at [1081], cited in ALRC Report 108: For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (2006) at 74.10. 26 at #74.2


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Commonlawdevelopmentcanbepiecemealandfragmented,withvariationsbetweenjurisdictionsuntiltheHighCourthasruledonanissue.Thisisparticularlytruewherethestatecourtsoperateunderdifferentenablinglegislation.Implicitinthispointistheassumptionthatlegislationonprivacyprotectionwouldbeuniformacrossthecountry,anassumptionthat,aswenotebelow,maybeatbestover‐confidentandatworstunrealistic.

Thecontinuinguncertaintythatthisfragmentationofthecommonlawcauseswillmakeitharderformediaandotherorganisationsandindividualstoorganisetheirrespectiveoperationsandpolicies.Again,thisassumesthat,bycontrast,stateandterritorylegislationwillbeuniform.

“Somecourtsalsomaychoosetoadoptthe‘breachofconfidence’approachbasedoncaselawintheUK,whichwouldresultinfurtherinconsistency”.Thefearedinconsistencyisnotexplained.However,ifwhatismeanthereisinconsistencybetweena“privacy”approachanda“breachofconfidence”approach,thedevelopmentofthelawintheUKwouldnotseemtoindicatesuchinconsistency.

ViewsfromtheUnitedKingdom:

InMarch2012,theJointCommitteeonPrivacyandInjunctionsoftheHouseofLordsandHouseofCommonsreleaseditsreport.IthadbeenaskedinJuly2011toconsiderandreportonthistopic.Itreceivedbothoralandwrittenevidencefromawiderangeofpeople,includinglawyersspecialisinginmedialaw,editorsandproprietorsofnewspapers,magazines,networksandonlinemediainterests,litigantsanddefendants,judges,academics,thePressComplaintsCommission,theAttorneyGeneral,andotherpoliticians.27Thereportmakesinterestingreading,ifonlyforitsconclusion,perhapsunusualforaparliamentarycommitteeinthisageofstatutes,thatlegislationisnottheanswerandthattheissuesarebetterlefttothecourtstodevelop.

Thereportfirstsetsoutwhysomewitnessessupportedastatutoryaction.First,vehementlyarguedbysomestridentsectionsofthemediainBritain(andwecanhearanechooftheirclaimsinsomesectionsoftheAustralianmedia)isthe“anti‐judicialactivism”lineofargument:anewprivacylawfashionedbyjudgesisanti‐democratic

27ItwasassistedbyProfessorEricBarendt,EmeritusProfessorofMediaLawatUniversityCollegeLondon,bySirCharlesGray,aformerHighCourtjudge,andbyaformerchiefexecutiveofthePressAssociation.


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becausejudgesarenotelected.AstheCommitteepointsout28,thislineofargumentoverlooksthefactthatthe“new”lawofprivacythathasdevelopedintheUnitedKingdomisbasedontheHumanRightAct,1998,passedbyademocraticallyelectedparliament,andrequiringthecourtstogiveeffecttoArticle8oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightstowhichtheUnitedkingdomisasignatoryasamemberoftheEuropeanUnion.

Thesecondkeyargumentmadeinsupportofastatutoryactionisthatitissaidthatitwouldclarifythelawonprivacy,theimplicationbeingthattheexistingcommonlawprotectionistoouncertainandunpredictableinoperation.

Interestingly,thecommittee’sreportdoesnotrefertoanyargumentsthattheexistingcommonlawprotectionintheUnitedKingdomprovidesinadequateprotectionofprivacy,inthesensethatitdoesnotcaptureallconductthatamountstoanindefensibleinvasionofprivacy.Rather,thecomplaintswereinrelationtoproceduralorremedialmatters:thelackofalegalrightofpriornotificationbeforepublicdisclosureofprivatematters29,theprohibitivecostsofbringinganaction,multijurisdictionaldifficulties,andthelowlevelofdamages,includingareluctancetoawardexemplarydamages,inprivacyactions.Afurtherdifficulty,foradisclosureassalaciousasthatofMaxMosley’sprivateactivities,isthattheinternetmakesitwellnighimpossible,evenwiththeco‐operationofthelargerinternetplayerslikeGoogle,FacebookandTwitter,forapersontocontaininformationonceitisoutincyberspace.Fordefendants,therewasparticularconcernwiththechillingeffectofthecurrentlyallowedconditionalfeearrangements,butthisagainismoreproceduralthansubstantiveandisnotlimitedtoprivacyactions,andisinanyeventsubjecttoseparateparliamentaryscrutiny.

TheseargumentswerenotacceptedbytheCommitteeanditconcludedagainsttheintroductionofastatutoryactionforprivacy.Therewereanumberoffactorsreliedontosupportthisconclusion,butthekeyreasontheCommitteegavewasthat“aprivacystatutewouldnotclarifythelaw.”Thiswasbecausesomanyconceptsinherentintheactionareessentiallymattersofjudgment30,sothatjudgeswouldstillberequired,astheyalreadyare,tobalancetheevidenceandmakeajudgmentonacase‐by‐casebasis.

‐ Definingprivacy:Whilesomearguedthatpublishersandlitigantswouldbothfindastatutorydefinitionofwhatisprivatemorehelpfulthanthecurrentdescriptionsorholdingstobefoundinthecaselaw,andthatadetailedlistofwhatistobeconsideredprivateinformationwouldsavethecostofaskingacourttodecidetheissue,andremedyanyexistingdefectsinwhatisconsideredprivate31thecommitteewasunconvinced.Anexhaustivelistwouldbeinflexibleandbecomeoutdatedandagenerallistwouldbesubjecttothecourt’s

28 # 41 29 Mosley action to ECHR 30 #50, 31 although the report does not give an example of such a defect in what is currently accepted by the courts.


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interpretation,andinanyevent,decidingthatinformationisprivateisonlyonestepintheprocess,andstillleavesthebalancingwithpublicinteresttobedone.

‐ Definingpublicinterest:Anystatutewouldneedtosetoutthatarightofprivacyissubjecttothecompetingdemandsofpublicinterest,yetanyattempttodefinewhatismeantby“publicinterest”isfraughtwithdifficulty.Iftheconceptweredefined,anydefinition,itwasarguedbymany,wouldhavetobe“eithersorigidthatitcouldnotkeeppacewithsocialmoresorsolooseastomakeitalmostmeaningless”32.Further,anyinterpretationofadetaileddefinitionwouldbesubjecttocontinualchallengeinthecourts.ThoseinfavourofastatutorydefinitionpointedtoexistingcodessuchasinBBCEditorialGuidelinesandthePCC’sEditorsCodeofPractice.Ontheotherhand,theconceptofpublicinterestisonethatarisesinmanyothercontextsandalthoughsometimesreferredtoinlegislation,suchascopyrightlegislation,itisusuallynotdefinedwithspecificitybutisleftasabroadconcept.Itisaconceptwhichhasbeendescribedbutnotexhaustivelydefinedinmanyjudgments:forexample,inCampbellvMGNLtd,BaronessHaleattemptedtolistahierarchyofmattersofpublicinterest:

Topof the list is political speech. The free exchangeof information and

ideasonmattersrelevanttotheorganisationoftheeconomic,socialand

politicallifeofthecountryiscrucialtoanydemocracy.Withoutthis,itcan

scarcelybecalledademocracyatall.Thisincludesrevealinginformation

about public figures, especially those in elective office, which would

otherwise be private but is relevant to their participation in public life.

Intellectualandeducationalspeechandexpressionarealsoimportantina

democracy,notleastbecausetheyenablethedevelopmentofindividuals'

potential toplaya fullpart insocietyandinourdemocratic life.Artistic

speechandexpressionisimportantforsimilarreasons,infosteringboth

individual originality and creativity and the free‐thinking and dynamic

societywesomuchvalue.Nodoubtthereareotherkindsofspeechand

expressionforwhichsimilarclaimscanbemade.33

TheJointCommitteereferredtoalistofexamplesofmattersofpublicinterestcitedbywitnesses.34Apartfromtheproblemofcapturingallrelevantmatters,therewasalsoconcernattheriskthatlegislationcanbecomeoutdated,withno

32 #48, citing the submission by Berrymans Lace Mawer LLP 33 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 499 [148] 34 #42 and see also #79 a scale on freedom of expression.


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guaranteesthatparliamentwillacttoupdateitasoftenasnecessary.Overall,theCommitteeconcludedagainstastatutorydefinition,arguingthat“wherethepublicinterestliesinaparticularcaseisamatterofjudgmentandbesttakenbythecourts”35.Nevertheless,thecommitteerecommendedthepublicationofguidelinesbyamediaregulator,whichcouldbereadilyupdatedasnecessary.36

‐ Balancingfreedomofexpressionandprivacyininjunctionapplications.ItwasclearthatoneofthekeyrationalesforconveningthisjointparliamentarycommitteetoconsiderprivacyandinjunctionswasthecontroversyintheUnitedKingdomabouttheavailabilityornon‐availabilityofinjunctionsandso‐called“super‐injunctions”(injunctionsagainstpublicationwhichincludedanorderthatthefactoftheinjunctionnotbepublished).Thereisnodoubt,thatunlikeadefamatorypublication,astowhicharemedyofdamagescan,atleastintheory,vindicatetheperson’sdamagedreputationandrestorehisorherhonourandstandinginsociety,apublicationwhichrevealstrueprivateinformationcannotbeadequatelycompensatedinmoney.Thegeniecannotbeputbackinthebottle,theharmfromdisclosurecannotbeundone,thetruthwillbeout,forever,atleastamongtheoriginalrecipients,evenifeffortsmaybesuccessfultorestrainfurtherorfuturerevelations37.Exceptinrelationtopecuniarylosses,andfewvictimsofinvasionsofprivacycanpointtopecuniaryloss38,anyorderofdamagesbywayofcompensationwillintruthbebywayofsolaceforinjurytofeelingsorasamarkofretributivejustice,ratherthantoachieverestorationoftheclaimanttohisorherpre‐tortposition,whichisactuallyasimpossibleasundoingthepainandsufferingofaphysicalinjury.Itisequallytrue,fromthedefendant’spointofview,thatasuppressionorderornon‐publicationordercurtailsfreedomofexpression.Thus,theprinciplesonwhichinjunctionsmaybegrantedareofparamountimportancetobothvictimsofdisclosuresanddefendantpublishers.TheHumanRightsAct1998(UK)makesspecificprovisionforthepotentialimpactofinjunctionsontherightoffreedomofexpressionunderarticle10oftheEuropeanconventiononHumanRightsinsection12.Ineffect,itrequiresthecourtconsideringthegrantofaninjunctiontobesatisfiedthatdefendantsarenotifiedoftheapplicationunlesstherearecompellingreasonswhyheorsheshouldnotbenotified.Bysubsection(4),“thecourtmusthaveparticularregard”totheimportanceoftherighttofreedomofexpression,andinteralia,to“anyrelevantprivacycode”.TheCommitteewaslobbiedbysomewitnessestorecommendaclarificationoranalterationofthisprovision:clarificationbecause

35 #50 36 #50 37 Whether there is a right to have private information forgotten is an interesting one. 38 Although as in defamation cases, one can imagine cancellation of contracts or loss of custom or perhaps just the cost of hiring a PR person to contain the reputational damage.


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therehasbeendisagreementastowhetherthewords“particularregard”insubsection4requirescourtstogivemoreweighttofreedomofexpressionrightsthantoprivacyinterestsorwhethertheymerelyrequirecourtstoconsider,expressly,freedomofexpressionrights.And,arguedbythoseonthe“side”ofthepress,alterationtoentrenchthesupremacyoffreedomofexpressionrights.TheCommitteewaseven‐handedhere,notacceptingtheargumentthattheprovisionprivilegedfreedomofexpressionoverotherrights(thiswouldbeinconsistentwiththebalancingprocessthatiswell–entrenchedinrespectofConventionrights)butupholdingtheimportanceofexpressconsiderationoftheimpactonfreedomofexpressionininjunctioncases.Whileprovidingalessonforusonhowlegislationcanbedraftedtoachieveabalancingofinterests,thedebateovertheinterpretationofessentiallyoneword‐“particular”‐showshowlegislationmaynotnecessarilyprovidetheinarguableorunambiguousclaritythatmanyexpectlegislationtoprovideandthatinterpretationoflegislationcanitselfspawnlitigationanddebate.

TheJointCommitteedidnothoweverrecommendthatnothingbedone.Rather,theysuggestedanumberofalternativestotheintroductionofstatutoryright,whichareasrelevantinAustraliaasintheUnitedKingdom:

‐ ThattheAttorneyGeneralconsiderbringingproceedingsforcontemptofcourtmorereadilythantherarecasesatpresent;thiscouldbeparticularlyeffectiveagainstcompaniescontrollingonlinesitesiftheydonottakeeffectivestepstorespondtocourtorders.

‐ Thatcosts‐cappingbeintroducedtomakebothbringinganddefendingclaimsmoreaffordable.

‐ Thattherebeenhancedregulation,ifnoteffectivelydonebyanindustrybodythenbyanindependentregulator:theserecommendationsmaybecomparedtothoseoftheFinkelsteinEnquirybutarebeyondthescopeofthispaper.

‐ Thattherebealternativedisputeresolutionproceduresavailabletomakeprivacyprotectionmorewithinreachofordinary,non‐wealthy,non‐celebrities.

‐ Thattherebeconsiderationofnewrulesgoverningparliamentaryprivilegetorestrictparliamentbeingused/misusedtodiscloseprivateinformationofindividualswithoutredress.

‐ Thatthemediahaveclearqualifiedprivilegetoreportparliamentaryproceedings.

TwoothermattersdiscussedbytheJointCommitteeareworthyofnote.Onerelatedtotheissueofhowprivacyandpublicinterestisbalancedinrelationtocelebritiesandpublicfigures.Therewaslittlediscussionofthepositionofpoliticians,perhapsbecauseofwidespreadacceptancethatofallpublicfigures,theymustbetheleastthin‐skinned,andthattheiractivitieswouldmostoftencomewithinthelimitsoflegitimatepublicinterest.Thecommentsappearmoredirectedtocelebritiesofallkindsandthedegree


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towhichtheirpriorconductinseekingofpublicitymayaffecttheirlaterrightstoprivacy.Thecommitteeconcludedthatpriorexposurewouldberelevantbutthateveryonehastherighttosomeprivacy.Ofparticularinterestistheissueofwhetherpriorexposureofachildbyitscelebrityparentsshouldaffectthechild’srighttoprivacy.ThejudgeinBrownevAssociatedNewspapershadplacedgreatemphasisonthefactthattheclaimant’sparents,JKRowlingandherhusband,hadpreviouslyshieldedtheirsonfrompublicityandphotographs,thusleavingaquestionmarkovertherighttoprivacyofachildwhohadbeendeliberatelyexposedtopublicitybyhisorherparentspreviously.Examplesofthevariationinparentalattitudesareplenty:rangingfromextremevigilance(CarlaBruni)tocautiousandlimitedexposure(NicoleKidman)toaveryopenattitudetopublicityaboutachild(perhapsthepromotionofthelateSteveIrwin’sdaughterBindiissuchanexample?).TheCommitteeappearedtorejectthenotionthatthechild’sfundamentalhumanrightstoprivacyshouldbesoaffected.Thiswillbeacomforttothosechildrenwhogrowuptorejecttheirparents’fameandwanttobeforgotten,suchastheoncefamouschildprodigywhofailedinhisactionagainstTheNewYorkermagazinetoprotecthisadultanonymityintheUnitedStatescaseofSidisvFRPublishingCorpin1940.39

Theothernoteworthy,ifsomewhatoutlandish,argumentmadebysomemediaoutletstotheJointCommitteewasthat,eveniffornootherreason,thepublicationofgossipor“tittletattle’aboutpeople’sprivatelivesisitselfinthepublicinterestbecauseitsubsidisestheseriousandvitalsocialfunctionofthepressofinformingthepublicaboutmattersofgenuinepublicinterest.Itwasarguedthat,withtheviabilityandsurvivalofthepressandorganisedmediaunderthreatfromtheinternet,theonlycommercialwaytheycansurviveistogivepeoplewhattheywantandwhatwillsellnewspapers:anendlessstreamofgossip.Ofcourse,thisargument,withitssacrificeoftherightsofafewforthebenefitofmany,wasnotaccepted.NodoubtMrMosleyforonewasunimpressedwiththisargument.

2.JurisdictionswithstatutoryactionsforbreachofprivacyAsmallnumberofcommonlawjurisdictionshaveintroducedastatutoryremedyforinvasionofprivacy.Timedoesnotpermitmetoconsideratthisstagetheextenttowhichthosestatutoryactionshaveactuallygivengreaterguidanceonthekeyissuesinprivacylitigation‐whatdoesthepublicinterestencompass,whatinformationisprivate,andwhenapre‐publicationinjunctionshouldbeavailable‐orwhethertheyhaveprovidedclaimantswithareadierremedyoramoreeffectiveremedy.Inanyevent,thosestatutoryrightstoprivacymustbeassessedintheirconstitutionalcontext,whichmayentrenchbroadfreespeechrightsaswellasrightstoprivacy.InIreland,a2006PrivacyBilltointroduceastatutoryrightofprivacywasabandonedbytheIrishGovernmentin2007afteroppositionfromthemediaandothers. 39 113 F 2d 806 at 809 (2d Cir 1940).


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Whatissuesremaintobesettledastothecontentofastatutoryaction? ThethreemostrecentlawreformcommissionreportsinAustraliaallfavourtheintroductionofastatutoryaction.Therearesomemattersofagreement,but,asmentionedabove,however,thereisasignificantdivergenceofviewsonanumberofimportantmatters.40Notonlythat,buttheALRCReportidentifiesthat,becauseoftheconstitutionallimitationsonthepowerofthefederalgovernmenttoenactlegislationofthewidestpossibleapplication,thepreferableroutewouldbefortheStatesandTerritoriestoagreeonuniformlegislationtobeenactedwithintheirrespectivejurisdictions.41AnyonewhoisoldenoughtohavewitnessedthedifficultyofgettingtheStatestoagreeonuniformdefamationlaws,finallyachievedin2005,andanytortlawyerwhoisgrapplingwithsignificantvariationsbetweenStatecivilliabilitylegislationonarangeofissues,willbeinstantlyscepticaloftheprospectofreadilyachievingnationalconsistencyinlegislation.Allproposethatthenewactionbeastatutorycauseofaction,ratherthanthatthestatuteshouldcreateanewtortofinvasionofprivacy.Thereasonforthisistofreetheremediesavailableunderthestatutoryactionfromthetraditionalrestrictionsthatthecommonlawplacesonrecoveryintort,forexample,inrelationtorecoveryofdamagesformeredistressorinjurytofeelingswithoutphysicalorpsychologicalinjury,andalsofromthosethatresultfromthedistinction42thatAustralianlawmaintainsbetweenremediesavailableforequitablewrongsandthosethatareavailableforcommonlawwrongs.Pointsofagreementinclude:Allproposethataprivacyactionbebaseduponaperson’s“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”withoutseekingeithertodefine“privacy”ortosetoutalistofcircumstancesthatwouldbetreatedasattractingareasonableexpectationofprivacy.Whilesomemaythinkitdesirabletohaveabroadconceptthatcanbedevelopedanddefinedovertime,thisverygeneralityandflexibilityisoneoftheleadingcausesforconcernabouthavingastatutoryactionatall.Thereisconcernthatitmightbeusedtoforgelegalprotectionandrightstocompensationincircumstancesthatwereneverintendedbythelegislaturetobecovered.Italsoshowsthefallacythatunderliestheargumentthatastatutoryactionismorecertainormore“democratic”thancommonlawdevelopment:itwillbethejudgeswhowillbefashioningtheprotectionanyway,asnoParliamentcanlegislatefortheprecisecombinationoffactsuponwhichcourtsmustadjudicate.OnlytheVictorianproposalmakesthecauseofactionmorespecificthangeneral:theadvantagesofthisapproacharediscussedbelowunder“differences”. 40 Here I would like to acknowledge the great assistance of an article by N Witzleb in highlighting differences and points in common between the reports: “A statutory cause of action for privacy? A critical appraisal of three recent Australian law reform proposals”, (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104 at 108. 41 ALRC at # 42 A distinction that would most probably be described as “arcane” by some, such as M Tilbury: see “Remedies for breach of confidence in privacy contexts” (2010) 15 MALR 290 at 291, a view that would undoubtedly not be shared by at least two current members of the High Court of Australia.


19

Allproposalsprovideforawiderangeofcompensatorydamagesforharm,whichmayincludesimplyemotionaldistressorinjurytofeelings.Allrecommendthatexemplarydamagesnotbeawarded,butthataggravateddamagesmaybe.Itwouldbepreferablethatfactorswhichaggravateormitigatedamages(provenmaliceorreadyapologyrespectively)shouldsimplybefactorstobetakenintoaccountintheprimaryassessmentofdamagesratherthankeepingaggravateddamagesasaseparatetypeofdamages,asinthecommonlaw.Thereareotherpointsofconsensustoo,admirablysummarisedbyDrNormannWitzlebofMonashUniversity,alongwithhisanalysisofthepointsofdifference.43Pointsofdifferenceinclude:

Abroadlydefinedactionoramorespecificaction(s)?

TheALRCandNSWLRCproposeasinglecauseofaction‐foraseriousinvasionofprivacy‐whereastheVictorianproposalisfortwocausesofaction:oneactioninrespectofmisuseofprivateinformationandanotherinrespectofintrusionuponseclusion.Thisisacriticallyimportantdifferenceofopinion.TheVictorianreportreflectsthewidespreadunease,feltbymanycommentators,academic,judicialandprofessional,withtheintroductionofabroadcivilactionfortheinvasionofarightoraconcept,thebordersandcontentofwhichhaveprovedsohardtodefinewithprecision.Inadditiontotheconcernsnotedaboveinrespectofthelackofdefinitionoftheterm“privacy”intheproposedlegislation,thereistheaddedconcernthatabroadcivilactionforbreachofprivacywouldbeusedasanadd‐oncauseofactionandsourceofremedy,wherethelaw,eitherbystatuteorcommonlaw,alreadyprovidesaremedyorhasalreadydevelopedlimitsofremediesasamatterofestablishedlegalpolicyandprinciples.Thiswouldbeparticularlysoifabroadbasedactionweretobeusedtoarguethat“privacy”shouldextend,asithastraditionallybeendefinedintheUnitedStatestoinclude,appropriationofpersonalityorimageforcommercialpurposesormerelytheportrayingofapersoninafalselight.TheformerconductisalreadythesubjectinAustralianlawofthetortofpassingofforwouldleadtostatutoryliabilityformisleadingordeceptiveconduct.Thelattermaynotreallybeaboutprivacyatall.Quiteoften,itisthejournalistswhoendupwitheggontheirfacesiftheygetastorywrong,ratherthanthe“victim”:therecentdebacleinvolvingphotographsofaclaimed“youngPaulineHanson”inscantyclothing,whichturnedouttobeofnothingofthesortbutofsomeoneelsealtogether,ismoreanexampleofbadjournalismthanofinvasionofMsHanson’sprivacy.Inmysubmission,itisamatterthatusuallycanbemoreappropriately

43 “A statutory cause of action for privacy? A critical appraisal of three recent Australian law reform proposals”, (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104 at 108


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dealtwith,eitherbydefamationlaw,withitswell‐developeddefences,iftheuntruthisdefamatory,or,ifnotdefamatory,bycomplainttobodiessetuptohandlepressormediaerrorsinreporting.Ifonthehand,itispartofanexposeofotherwiseprivateinformation,suchasthedetailsofaperson’sprivaterelationshipwithanother,thenthefactthatsomedetailsareuntrue(butnevertheless,notdefamatory)shouldnotpreventtheclaimantfromsuingforbreachofconfidenceorprivacy.ThecaseofMcKennittvAsh44,discussedbyWitzleb45,issuchanexample:aformerfriendpublishedbothtrueanduntruedetailsoffolksingerLorettaMcKennitt’sprivaterelationships,andwasheldliable.ItisworthsettingoutinfullwhytheVictorianLawReformCommission46favouredtwoseparateandexplicitcausesofaction:

7.123Thecommissionbelievesitisnotdesirablefortheretobeonestatutorycauseofactionforallseriousinvasionsofprivacybecausetheconceptofprivacyistoobroadandimprecisetobeofusewhencreatinglegalrightsandobligations.Manyappellatecourtjudgesandacademiccommentatorshavewarnedofthedifficultyindevisingaworkablelegaldefinitionofprivacy.InLenahGameMeatsGleesonCJsaidthat‘thelackofprecisionoftheconceptofprivacyisareasonforcautionindeclaringanewtort’,231whileJusticesGummowandHaynereferredtothe‘difficultiesinobtaininginthisfieldsomethingapproachingdefinitionratherthanabstractedgeneralisation’.232MembersoftheHouseofLords233andtheNewZealandCourtofAppeal234madesimilarcommentswhenrejectinginvitationstodeviseabroadtortofinvasionofprivacy.7.124Twointernationallyrecognisedacademiccommentatorsonprivacylaw,DanielSoloveandRaymondWacks,makesimilarpoints.Solovesuggeststhatwhile‘privacyisanissueofprofoundimportancearoundtheworld’,235itis‘aconceptindisarray’because‘nobodycanarticulatewhatitmeans’.236Hearguesthatbecause‘weshouldunderstandprivacyasasetofprotectionsagainstapluralityofdistinctbutrelatedproblems’237itisadvisabletoidentifyparticulartypesofprivacyproblemswhenconsideringregulation.TwoofSolove’sprivacyproblemareas—informationdisseminationandinvasion—areofparticularrelevancewhenconsideringnewstatutorycausesofactioninvolvingmisuseofsurveillancedevices.AccordingtoSolove,‘informationdisseminationinvolvesthetransferandpublicizingofpersonaldata’and‘invasioninvolvesinterferencewithone’spersonallife’.2387.125WackssuggeststhatoneofthereasonswhyatortofprivacyhasnotevolvedaspartoftheEnglishcommonlawisthelackofacoherentandconsistentmeaningofthenotionofprivacy.239Hearguesthatitismoreconstructivetoidentifythespecificintereststhelawoughttoprotectandsuggeststhat‘atthecoreofthepreoccupationwiththe“righttoprivacy”isprotectionagainstthemisuseofpersonal,sensitiveinformation’.2407.126Thecommissionbelievesthereshouldbetwooverlappingstatutorycausesofactionconcerningtheprivacyinterestsmostlikelytobeadversely

44 [2008] QB 73; [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 45 at 112 46 Report


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affectedbythemisuseofpublicplacesurveillance.Thosecausesofactionshoulddealwithmisuseofprivateinformationandwhatisoftenreferredtoasintrusionuponseclusion,orunwarrantedinterferencewithspatialprivacy.Legislatingtoprotectthesebroadlyrecognisedsub‐categoriesofprivacyislikelytopromotegreaterclarityabouttheprecisenatureofthelegalrightsandobligationsthathavebeencreatedthanbycreatingabroadcivillyenforceablerighttoprivacy.(footnotesomitted)

Second,shouldactionabilitydependontheinvasionofprivacybeingabovealevelofgravityorseriousnessandifso,howisthatthresholdbestincorporatedinthelegislation?

Inmyview,therewouldbeageneralcommunityconsensusthat,asamatterofprinciple,anystatutoryrightofactionforbreachofprivacyshouldnotextendtowhatpeoplewouldgenerallyregardastrivial.Thedifficultyofcourseisdetermining,onanobjectivebasis,preciselywhatistrivialtoareasonableperson.TheALRCandVLRCreportsgofurtherthanjustdrawingthelineatthetrivial:theyrequire,expresslyorimplicitly,thatthecauseofactionbelimitedtoseriousinvasionsofprivacy.ThiselementofseriousnessreflectsthethresholdtestsetoutbyGleesonCJinABCvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtd:

Thereisnobrightlinewhichcanbedrawnbetweenwhatisprivateandwhatisnot.Useoftheterm"public"isoftenaconvenientmethodofcontrast,butthereisalargeareainbetweenwhatisnecessarilypublicandwhatisnecessarilyprivate.Anactivityisnotprivatesimplybecauseitisnotdoneinpublic.Itdoesnotsufficetomakeanactprivatethat,becauseitoccursonprivateproperty,ithassuchmeasureofprotectionfromthepublicgazeasthecharacteristicsoftheproperty,thenatureoftheactivity,thelocality,andthedispositionofthepropertyownercombinetoafford.Certainkindsofinformationaboutaperson,suchasinformationrelatingtohealth,personalrelationships,orfinances,maybeeasytoidentifyasprivate;asmaycertainkindsofactivity,whichareasonableperson,applyingcontemporarystandardsofmoralsandbehaviour,wouldunderstandtobemeanttobeunobserved.Therequirementthatdisclosureorobservationofinformationorconductwouldbehighlyoffensivetoareasonablepersonofordinarysensibilitiesisinmanycircumstancesausefulpracticaltestofwhatisprivate.(emphasisadded)

Therehasbeensomediscussionsincethisjudgmentastowhethertherequirementthatthedisclosurebeoffensivetoareasonablepersonofordinarysensibilitiesispartoftheissueofwhatistoberegardedasprivate,asGleesonCJstates,orwhetherthisrequirementisratherpartofthebalancingprocessthatthecourtmustgothroughwhendecidingwhetherthedisclosureisjustifiedbytheplaintiff’sfreedomofspeech.47Eitherway,itsincorporationintothedecisionsuggeststhatonlyseriousinvasionsofprivacy–thosethatwouldbehighlyoffensive‐willbeprotected.

47 See for example, Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 479 at [21].


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UnlikethefederalandVictorianreports,theNSWLRCreportanddraftlegislationdoesnotrequirethatpublicationbeoffensivetoareasonableperson,nordoesithavearequirement,expressorimplicit,thattheinvasionbe“serious”.Attheheartofthisdifferenceisthequestionofwhethertherequirementof“areasonableexpectationofprivacy”inrespectoftheinformationbeingdisclosed,whichisarequirementcommontoallcommonlawapproachesandalloftheseAustralianreports,alreadyencompassesorincludestheelementthatdisclosurewouldbehighlyoffensivetoareasonableperson.Itishardtoseehowitcanlogicallydoso.Indeed,theviewreflectedintheNewSouthWalesreportthatoffensivenessisonlyonefactortobetakenintoaccountwhendecidingwhethertherehasbeenaninvasionofprivacy,impliesthatoffensivenessisnotathresholdtest,andthataninvasioncouldbefoundwheretheoffensivenessrequirementisnotmet.48

Thefaultelement:shouldliabilitybestrict,orrequirefault;ifthelatter,shouldnegligencebesufficient?

Ihavetosaythatthediscussionsonthisaspectoftheproposedlegislationgivemecauseforsomealarm.Itseemstomethatifwearegoingtohaveastatutoryactionforinvasionofprivacy,which,withoutarequirementofactualdamage,willbeactionableperseandleadtoanentitlementastodamagesformeredistressoroffence,theinvasionofprivacyofthevictimmusthavebeenactuallyintendedbytheactor,ortheactor’sconductmusthaveinvolvedadegreeofrecklessnessastowhetheraninvasionofprivacywouldoccur.Inotherwords,Ithinktheactionshouldrequireanelementoffaultthatgoesbeyondamereintentiontodotheactwhichinlawamountstoaninvasion;thatmerenegligenceshouldnotbesufficientfaulttogroundtheaction;andthattheliabilityshouldcertainlynotbestrictliability.Itwouldnotbesufficientmerelytoprovidethattheactor’sconductbeintentional,forexample,thattheactorintendedtopublishtherelevantinformation.Thisistheequivalenttostrictliability,asindefamationlaw.Mereintenttopublishinformationnomoreshowsanintenttodefameorinvadeprivacythanintenttopullatriggerofagunshowsanintenttoshootsomeone.Somethingmoremustberequiredtomaketheshootinganintentionalone.Oneofthehardestconceptsforanewlawstudentstudyingthelawoftortsistounderstandwhatismeantwhenwesaythatatortisintentionalorthatitwasdonenegligentlyorthatliabilityisstrict.Wecanassumethatanordinarymemberofthepublicwillhaveasimilardifficulty,untiltheyhaveconsideredthealternativescarefully.Theterm“intent”isparticularlytroublesome,asitcanbeusedinsomanydifferentways,tomeansomanydifferentthings.Generallyspeaking,atortwillberegardedasintentionalonlyiftheactoreithersubjectivelyintendedtherelevantinterferencewiththevictim’srightsoriftheinterferencewassosubstantiallycertainorobvioustofollow

48 Witzleb, “A statutory action for privacy? A critical appraisal of three recent Australian law reform proposals” (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104 at 113‐114


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thattheactorwillbetakentohaveintendedtheinterference(whatcouldbedescribedas“objectiveintent”or“intentobjectivelymeasured”ifthefirsttermisregardedasanoxymoron).Thereisnorequirementthattheactorappreciatethatheorsheiscommittingatortorthattheactorintendtocommitatort.Inotherwords,theintentneednotbe“guilty”.But,tobeanintentionaltortsuchasbattery,theactormustintendthecontactwiththevictim.Inmyview,anystatutoryactionforbreachofprivacymustgofurther:theactormustintendtobreachtheprivacyofthevictimormustshowadegreeofrecklessnessastowhethertheirprivacywillbebreached.Thiswillinvolveknowledgeofthefactthattheinformationisprivateorconfidentialorrecklessnessastothisfact.Thiswillnotleadtoliabilityuntiltheappropriatebalancingonissuesofpublicinterestiscompleted.Toallowanythinglesstoformthebasisforanactionableinvasionofprivacy,willinmyviewopenupliability,actionableperse,foravastrangeofhumanconductanderrors.Againitmustberememberedthatthereisnoproposaltoconfinetheinvasionofprivacyactiontomediadefendants.Theemail,faxormessageorlettersentinerrortothewrongaddressoraddressee;thefolderofdocumentsleftonatrain;themistakenbeliefinanenquirer’sidentity:allmayinvadeprivacy.Alloftheseexamplesmayamounttoothercivilwrongsalready,e.g.negligencebytheprofessionalconfidante,orbreachofconfidencebyanyone,butnegligencerequiresactualdamagetobeactionableintortorsomedamageincontractfordamagestobemorethannominal,whileanactionforbreachofconfidence,althoughastrictliabilityinequity,againrequiresfinanciallossforequitablecompensation49.Thus,makingliabilityforaninvasionofprivacyastrictliabilityoraliabilityfornegligentinvasionactionablepersewouldunderminethecoherenceofthelawinawaywhichthecourtshaverefusedtodo,asamatterofbothlogicandlegalpolicy.50Theargumentthataninvasionofprivacyisanalogoustodefamation,andthusshouldleadtosimilarremediesandactionability,doesnotholdup.Althoughdefamationlawhastraditionallybeenusedtoprotectprivacy51,andalthoughthereisundoubtedlysomeoverlapinprotectionofreputationandprotectionofprivacy,itisonethingtomakeliabilityforapositivepublicationastrictliability,yetquiteanothertoextendstrictliabilitytothewiderangeofunspecifiedconductthatabroadactionwouldencompass.Further,whiledamagetoreputationisassumedbythelawtoflowfromadefamatorypublication,makingitsactionabilitypersejustifiable,nosuchgeneralisationshouldbemadeaboutabreachofprivacy.Onthefaultaspect,theALRCReportrestrictsliabilitytointentionalorrecklessconduct,whereanactistreatedasintentional“whenthedefendantdeliberatelyorwilfullyinvadestheplaintiff’sprivacy.”,andwhererecklesswouldhaveameaningsimilarto 49 Unless the awarding of equitable compensation for mere distress, as in Giller v Procopets becomes accepted in any breach of confidence action, which is highly unlikely. 50 On coherence between liability in negligence and defamation law, see Sullivan v Moody CITE 51 Especially effective in those states such as NSW and Queensland where public interest or public benefit was required in addition to truth, for the defence of justification.


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thatinsection5.4oftheCriminalCode(Cth)52.Itnotedthatthiswastheviewtakeninthe2007NSWLRCConsultationpaperandalsobytheHongKongLawCommissionwhichrecommendedastatutorycauseofaction.53Yet,asWitzlebpointsout,therequirementofintentorrecklessnessdoesnotappearineitherthefinalreportoftheNSWLRCorintheVLRCreport.TheNSWLRCrecommendsadefenceofinnocentdisseminationsimilartothatfoundindefamationlegislation,butasarguedabove,thereisastrongercaseforstrictliabilityindefamationlawthaninprivacylawanditisonthebasisofthatstrictliabilitythatinnocentdisseminationbecomesanappropriatedefence.Asarguedabove,amoreappropriatewaytoapproachliabilitywouldbetomakeintentorrecklessnessanecessaryelement.

Publicinterest:shoulditbeadefenceforthedefendanttoestablishorabalancingconsiderationfortheclaimanttosatisfy?

ThisisaveryimportantissueandoneonwhichIbelievetheanswershouldbeclearforanyonewhovaluesavigorouspressandmediainanopenanddemocraticsociety:thebalancingofpublicinterestandthelackofanypublicinterestmustbeattheforefrontofthecourt’sdecisionthatthereisanactionableinvasionofprivacy.Thedisclosurewillnotbeactionableunlessitcanbeestablishedbytheclaimanttothesatisfactionofthecourtthatthereisnolegitimatepublicinterestintheinformationtobedisclosed.Furthercommentwillbeincludedinthefinalpaper.

Whatisthescopeforthecommonlawtodevelop,intheabsenceofastatutoryaction?

LordHoffmanninCampbellvMGNLtd54describedthedevelopmentsofthelawofconfidenceinthethenrecentpastoftheUnitedKingdomas“typicalofthecapacityofthecommonlawtoadaptitselftotheneedsofcontemporarylife.”

InNewZealand,thecommonlawhasdevelopeddifferentlytothedevelopmentsintheUnitedKingdom,bythecourtsfashioninganewtortofinvasionofprivacy,anddeliberatelydifferentiatingitfromtheequitableaction.InHoskingvRunting,itwassaidthat“Itwillbeconduciveofcleareranalysistorecognisebreachesofconfidenceandprivacyasseparatecausesofaction.”55Neverthelessitcanbesaidthat,sofar,itdoesnotappearasyettohaveprovidedanygreaterdegreeofprotectionagainstdisclosures

52 Criminal Code 53 Hong Kong Law Reform Commission, Civil Liability for Invasion of Privacy (2004), [6.71], cited by ALRC at #74.162. 54 at p 472 [46 55 [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at 15[46]


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thantheenlargedequitableactioninAustralia,withthepublicinterestinvariousdisclosuresusuallytrumpingtheprivacyrightsoftheplaintiff56.

ProfessorRaymondWackswritingin200657sawsevenstumblingblocksagainstthedevelopmentofabroadcommonlawtortofbreachofprivacy.ItseemstomethatwecouldgrouptheseintofourbroadcategoriesastheyapplyinAustralia:

Thefactorviewthatexistingcommonlawandlegislativeprovisionsmakethedevelopmentofabroadtortunnecessary:theseincludetheequitableactionforbreachofconfidenceandlegislationconcerningdataprotectionanddisseminationandthatconcerningtechnologicalsurveillanceandinterception.

Concernoverthe"incoherenceoftheconceptofprivacy".

Theavailabilityorintroductionofotherformsofmediaregulation,whetherindustry‐ledregulationorimposedgovernmentalregulation.ThisfactorisheightenedinsignificanceasaresultoftherecentFinkelsteinMediaEnquiryandtheConvergenceReview,andindustry‐ledresponsestotheLevesonEnquiry.

Concernwiththeprotectionoffreedomofspeechandfreedomofthepress,particularly,inthiscountry,intheabsenceofaBillofRights,andwithonlylimitedprotectionprovidedforfreedomofspeechbyvirtueofimpliedrightsintheAustralianConstitution.

Wacksaddsanotherfactor,thatis,“judicialpreferenceforlegislation”.TheHighCourtofAustraliahasnotalwaysbeenreluctanttodevelopthecommonlawintheabsenceoflegislativeaction.Therearemanynotableexamplesofwherethecourtshavedoneso,andwheretheyhavenotbeenmetwiththepejorativelabelof“judicialactivism”.Therecanbemanyreasonsforlegislativeinaction:themostobviousonebeingalackofpoliticalwill,eitherbecauseofotherissueswhichareseen,politically,tohavegreaterpriorityforattention,orbecauseofaninabilitytoachieveasufficientlywidespreadconsensusoneitherthecontentortheformoflegislation.Asmentionedabove,thisisparticularlysoinafederationofstates.Neitherofthesereasonsisareasonwhyacourtshouldbereluctanttodevelopthecommonlawwhenanappropriatecasecomesbeforeit.Ifacourtgoestoofar,inthemindsofthepoliticians,theycanthenreactwith 56 Andrews v Television NZ Ltd [2009] 1 NZLR 220; Mafart and Prieur v Television NZ Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 534; Television NZ v Rogers [ 2008] 2 NZLR 277 57 R Wacks, “Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort”, in A T Kenyon and M Richardson (eds) New

Dimensions in Privacy Law, Cambridge UP, 2006. He lists: the advance of the equitable remedy for breach of confidence,

the belief that the law of confidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article 8 of the European Convention on

Human Rights, the dominance of freedom of speech, the impact of data protection statutes, media self‐regulation, the

incoherence of the concept of privacy, and judicial preference for legislation.


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legislation,astheyhavedoneinothercircumstancesofsignificantcommonlawdevelopments,torescindorcontainthecommonlawdevelopment.TwoexamplesofHighCourtjudgmentsthatcausedalegislativereactionaretheabolitionoftheimmunityofhighwayauthoritiesfornegligentnon‐feasanceintheupkeepoftheroadsinBrodievSingletonShireCouncil58,andtheholdingoftheHighCourtinCattanachvMelchior59thatadoctorcouldbeliableforthenormalcostsofupkeepofachildborneasaresultofnegligencebythedoctorintreatingtheparent.

UntilanothercasereachestheHighCourtofAustralia,thedevelopmentofthecommonlawonprivacyprotectioninAustraliadependstoalargeextentonhowothercourtsbelowreacttothejudgmentoftheHighCourtinABCvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtd.ThereisnodoubtthattheHighCourtinthatcaseforeshadowedandgaveitscautiousblessingtotheprincipleddevelopmentofthecommonlaw,ratherthantakingaviewthatanydevelopmentofthelawofprivacywaspurelyamatterfortheparliamentsofthecountry.ApartfromtheinfluentialpartsofthejudgmentofGleesonCJquotedabove,therearesomeothercommentsinthatdecisionthatareworthyofnote:oneisthecommentbyCallinanJthatanycommonlawcauseofactionmustbedevelopedbyreferencetotheAustralianlegalandconstitutionalcontext.Tothatextent,thecaselawanddevelopmentsofothercountrieswithdifferentconstitutionalcontextsmaynotbeofdirectrelevance.WehavenothingliketheFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution,againstwhichanycommonlaworpieceoflegislationmustbetestedandbalanced.CallinanJonthispoint:

TherecognitionofatortofinvasionofprivacyaspartofthecommonlawofAustraliadoesnotinvolveacceptanceofall,orindeedanyofthejurisprudenceoftheUnitedStateswhichiscomplicatedbytheFirstAmendment.ThereisgoodreasonfornotimportingintothiscountryalloftheNorthAmericanlawparticularlybecauseofthesubstantialdifferencesinourpoliticalandconstitutionalhistory.AnyprinciplesforanAustraliantortofprivacywouldneedtobeworkedoutonacasebycasebasisinadistinctlyAustraliancontext.60

GummowandHayneJJalsocommentedonthepossiblefuturedevelopmentofthecommonlaw:

[Asacorporation]Lenah'srelianceuponanemergenttortofinvasionofprivacyismisplaced.Whateverdevelopmentmaytakeplaceinthatfieldwillbetothebenefitofnatural,notartificial,persons.Itmaybethatdevelopmentisbestachievedbylookingacrosstherangeofalreadyestablishedlegalandequitablewrongs.Ontheotherhand,insomerespectsthesemaybeseenasrepresenting

58 (2001) 206 CLR 512 59 (2003) 215 CLR 1

60 Callinan in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd at [332]


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speciesofagenus,beingaprincipleprotectingtheinterestsoftheindividualinleading,tosomereasonableextent,asecludedandprivatelife,inthewordsoftheRestatement,"freefromthepryingeyes,earsandpublicationsofothers".Nothingsaidinthesereasonsshouldbeunderstoodasforeclosinganysuchdebateorasindicatinganyparticularoutcome.

Theirwordscontemplateboththeexpansionofcurrentcausesofaction,andthepossibilityofabroaderaction.

ThefactorsidentifiedbyWacksabove,thewordsofGleesonCJthat“lackofprecisionoftheconceptofprivacyisareasonforcautionindeclaringanewtortofthekindforwhichtherespondentcontends”61,theabsenceofanythingliketheHumanRightsAct1998(UK)toemboldenjudicialcreativity,andtheinherentlimitationofjudicialpowerthatcourtscometoadecisiononlyonthefactsindisputebeforethem,makeslowlyincrementaldevelopmentofexistingcausesofactionamorelikelywayforAustraliancourtstoproceed,intheabsenceofdirectHighCourtauthority.

Evenifwecannotenvisagethedevelopmentofabroadbasedaction,thereisthepossibilityofmorelimiteddevelopmentstofillthegapsinourexistinglaw.TurningtothetwokeygapsthatIhadidentifiedabove,howcouldthecommonlawdeveloptofillthem?

Allowingdamagesformentaldistress

Ifaperson’sprivacyhasbeeninvadedbyadisclosureofprivateorconfidentialinformation,themostlikelyreasonwhyexistinglawmaynotprovideaneffectiveremedyagainstdisclosureisthatitisdifficult,atcommonlaw,torecoverdamagesformereemotionaldistress,whichisnotconsequentialonsomeotherrecognisedtypeofdamageorwhichdoesnotamounttoarecognisedpsychiatricillness.Therearetwopossiblewaysthatthecommonlawcoulddeveloptoallowrecoveryforemotionaldistress.

First,theactionundertheprinciplesofWilkinsonvDowntoncouldbeexpandedtoallowrecoveryofdamagesforemotionaldistress,wherethedefendantisprovedtohaveintendedtocauseemotionaldistresstotheplaintiff,byhisorherinvasionoftheplaintiff'sprivacybyindefensibleconduct.Toallowsuchanextensionoftheseprincipleswouldnotbetomakeanactiononthecaseactionableperse,likethetortoftrespassthatprotectspeoplefrominterferenceswiththeirfundamentalandancientrightsofphysicalsecurity.Suchachangewouldflyinthefaceofcenturiesoflegalprinciple.Norwoulditunderminetheinsistenceofthelaw,bothatcommonlawandunderlegislation62,thatpsychiatricinjurycausedbymerenegligencemustamounttoa

61 At 225‐226 [41] 62 Mt Isa Mines v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 394 per Windeyer J, Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd ; e.g Civil Liability Act 2002(NSW)Part 3, section 31.


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recognisedpsychiatricillness.Adifficultissuewouldbewhether,inallowingsuchanextension,thecommonlawshouldinsistonproofofadefendant'ssubjectiveintentiontocauseemotionaldistresstotheplaintiff,andnotallow"imputedintention"tofulfilthisrequirement.

InWainwrightvtheHomeOffice,LordHoffmannreferredtoremarksthathehadmadeinHuntervCanaryWharfLtdthatthepolicyreasonsrelatingtointentionalinflictionofmeredistress,vexationandinconveniencewerequitedifferenttothosethatunderlaytherequirementofactualpsychiatricillnessorphysicalinjuryinthelawofnegligence.HisLordshipstated:

Ifsomeoneactuallyintendstocauseharmbyawrongfulactdoesso,thereisordinarynoreasonwhyheshouldnothavetopaycompensation.ButIthinkthatifyouadoptsuchaprinciple,youhavetobeverycarefulaboutwhatyoumeanbyintent…

If…Oneisgoingtodrawaprincipledistinctionwhichjustifiesabandoningtherulethatdamagesthemeredistressarenotrecoverable,imputedintentionwillnotdo.Thedefendantmustactuallyhaveactedinawaywhichheknewtobeunjustifiableandeitherintendedtocauseharmoratleastactedwithoutcaringwhetherhecausedharmornot.

InWainwright,theplaintiffsfailedintheiractionbasedonWilkinsonvDowntonbecausetheyhadsufferedonlydistress,notarecognisedpsychiatricillness.Theplaintiffshadbeensubjectedtoademeaningandembarrassingstripsearchbythedefendant'sprisonofficers.Clearly,theplaintiffswerenotabletoprovethatthedefendant’sofficershadasubjectiveintentiontocausedistress,buteveniftheyhadbeenabletodoso,LordHoffmannwasnotprepared,atthattime,tosaythatsuchanactionshouldbemaintainable.Hereservedhisopiniononwhethercompensationshouldberecoverable“onthebasisofagenuineintentiontocausedistress”.63

WhileitisjustifiabletoarguethatanyextensiontotheprincipleinWilkinsonvDowntontoallowrecoveryforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressshouldhave,asarequisiteelement,asubjectiveintentiononthedefendant'spart,therewillsurelybecases,asinWilkinsonvDowntonitselforasinarecentcaseinvolvingbullying,harassmentandracialabuse,NationwideNewsPtyLtdvNaidu64,wherethedefendanthasshownsuchrecklessindifferencetotheplaintifforwhereemotionaldistresswouldbesuchanobviousresultofthedefendant'sconduct,thatanintentiontoinduceemotionaltospreaddistressshouldbeimputed.Asinmanyothersituations,whyshouldadefendantbeabletohidebehindhisorherownmoralobtuseness,whenitcomestoharmingothers?

63 At [46] 64 92007) 71 NSWLR 471


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Inanyevent,theCourtofAppealinGillervProcopetsdidshowthepreferenceforlegislativeaction,identifiedbyWacks,whenitcametoextendingtortlawtoallowrecoveryforintentionalinflictionofmentaldistress,withNeaveJAstating:

Acourtwhichhasthetaskofdecidinganindividualcaseispoorlyequippedtoconsiderthebalancewhichshouldbestruckbetweenprovidingcompensationforintentionallycausedmentaldistress,andrecognisingthattheexigenciesofliferesultinsomepeopleintentionallycausingmentaldistresstoothersfromtimetotime.Iftheintentionalinflictionofmentaldistressistoberecognisedasatort,thelegislatureisinabetterpositiontodeterminehowthatbalanceshouldbestruck.65

ThealternativeroutetoallowingaplaintifftoclaimdamagesformentaldistressinGillervProcopetswastoallowsuchdamagesintheequitableclaimforbreachofconfidence.Thereisundoubtedlyalegitimatequeryraisedhereastohowacourtcoulddothis,otherthanbyadeliberatedevelopmentoftheunderlyingprinciplesoftheequitableactionandofequitableremedies.AshleyJseemstoacknowledgethelackofauthorityforsuchanawardwhenhesaidinthatcasethat“equity,startingwithacleanslate,hasnoreason”toshyawayfrompermittingdamagesfordistressasthecommonlawhasdone66.GiventhattheCourthadrejectedtheplaintiff’stortclaimbasedonWilkinsonvDowntonbecauseshehadnotsufferedapsychiatricillness,itissomewhatofanironythatthiswasdone,itwassaid,byanalogywithtortlaw.Thetortswhichformedthebasisoftheanalogywerethetortsofbattery,assault,falseimprisonment,maliciousprosecutionanddefamation.Inallofthesetorts,damageswouldbeassessedtakingintoaccountthedistressandhumiliationcausedbythetort.Alloftheseareofancientoriginand,notbeingactionsonthecase,allareactionableperse:thatis,theydonotrequireactualdamagetobeactionable.Theunderlying,intangible,interestoftheplaintiffisdeemedsoimportantastobeworthyofbeingprotectedandvindicatedbyanawardofdamages,sometimessubstantial67,evenwherenoactualdamageissuffered,unlesstheinterferenceissotrivialastoattractonlynominaldamages.Byacceptingthisanalogy,then,wemustacceptthattheplaintiff’sinterestintheprivacyorconfidentialityofinformationisonethatmaysimilarlybevindicatedbyanawardofdamages,evenwherenoactualdamageissuffered:thataninvasionofprivacy,will,inequity,beactionableperse.

Thereisnodoubtthatequitywillrestrainabreachofconfidencebyinjunctioninappropriatecases.LeavingasidetheimpactofthelocalequivalentofLordCairn’sAct,whichmayauthoriseanawardofdamagesinawiderrangeofcircumstancesthanthecommonlaw,whereaninjunctionmayhavebeenbutisnotgranted,thequestioncomesdowntowhetheritisnecessarilyinconsistentforthelawtobepreparedtograntan

65 Giller v Procopets (2008)24 VR 1 at [476] 66 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 at [149]‐[153] 67 Plenty v Dillon [1991] 171 CLR 635


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injunctiontorestrainabreachofprivacyorconfidence,butnottograntcompensationforthedistresscausedalreadybyits(unrestrained)disclosure,whenmentaldistressistheobvious,orthenaturalandprobable,resultofthedisclosureofpersonalinformationthatapersonhaschosentokeepprivateorthatisobviouslyprivate.

Developinganactionforharassmentwhichfallsshortoftrespasstotheperson

TheSingaporecourtshaveshownthattheyarenotpreparedtowaitforlegislation68todealwithharassmentinmodernsociety.InMalcomsonNicholasHughBertramvNareshKumarMehta69,in2001LeeSeiuKinJCoftheHighCourtheldthatthetimehadcometorecogniseacommonlawtortofharassmentwhichinthiscasewascomprisedofpersistenttelephonecallsandelectronicmessages.Henotedthreechangesinsocietyinthelasttwentyyearstojustifythischangeinthelaw:increasingurbanisationanddenselypopulatedlivingconditions;increasedleisuretimeforpeopletoindulgetheirfantasiesaboutotherswhethercelebritiesornot;andmobileandinstantcommunicationanywhereanytime.

Itwillmakeforanintenselyuncomfortablelivingenvironmentifthereisnorecourseagainstapersonwhointentionallymakesuseofmoderncommunicationdevicesinamannerthatcausesoffence,fear,distressandannoyancetoanother.Mehtahadembarkedonsuchacourseofconductbymakingthemobilephonecallsalongwithhisotheractsofnuisance.Heoughtreasonablytoknowthatsuchactswouldcauseworry,emotionaldistress,annoyancetoMalcomson.…Surelyinrespectofintentionalactsthatcauseharmintheformofemotionaldistress,thelawisabletoprovidearecourse.Thefactthatinsuchcasesitisdifficulttoquantifydamagesshouldnot,inmyopinion,hinderthecourtfromgivingtheappropriaterelief.Inthepresentcase,asIsuspectwillgenerallybethesituationinmostcasesofthisnature,whattheplaintiffsessentiallywantarenotdamagesbutaninjunctionrestrainingMehtafromcontinuingwithsuchacts.IseenoreasonofpolicyagainstorderingMehtatostopsuchbehaviour.”

InGummowandHayneJJinABCvLenahGameMeatsPtyLtdreferredto“whatmaybeadevelopingtortofharassment”70andinGrossevPurvis71,aDistrictCourtjudgeinQueenslandawardedaplaintiffdamagesforinvasionofprivacyafterthedefendanthadpersistentlyandintentionallystalkedandharassedtheplaintiffforsixyears.ThereismuchtobesaidforthekindofincrementaldevelopmentofwhichthiscaseandMalcomsonNicholasHughBertramvNareshKumarMehtaareexamples.

68 Such as Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) 69 [2001] 4 SLR 454 70(2001) 208 CLR 199 at [123], citing Townshend‐Smith, "Harassment as a Tort in English and American Law: The Boundaries of Wilkinson v Downton", (1995) 24 Anglo‐American Law Review and Todd, "Protection of Privacy", in Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties, (1997) 174 at 200‐204. 71 [2003] QDC 151


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Atortofharassmenthasanumberofadvantages.First,ithasnoterritoriallimitsorquasi‐proprietorial requirements like trespass and nuisance. Second, the concept ofharassmenthasaconnotationofseriousness: it involvesrepeatedvexationratherthanjust a trivial interference.Third, it connotesdeliberate conduct. Fourth, it adequatelyfillsagap intheprotectionof the lawwithoutgoingfurtherthanneededandwithoutthedefinitionalproblemsand lackofprecisionthatseeminherent inageneral tortofinvasionofprivacy.Asanominatetort, itwoulddefinetheconductwhichamountstothewrong,andavoidstootheuncertainboundariesandvaguenessoftheexistingtortactionoftheactiononthecaseforwilful injury,basedontheprinciple inWilkinsonvDownton.72 Its very certaintymight allow it to avoid the important limitation of thataction:theneedforphysicalorrecogniseddamage.

Conclusion

Writingsomeyearsagonow,ProfessorStephenToddofNewZealandwrote:

“Thereremainsanidentifiableneedforprotectionfromharassmenttowhichitisdesirablethatthecourtsrespond.”73

Thatremainstruetoday.Itisprobablyaconcernoflessurgentprioritythangettingthedisclosureactionaseffectiveasitshouldbe,takingintoconsiderationthevariousinterestsatstake,asrestrictingandremedyinginvasiveandindefensibledisclosureswilltakeawaythemarketandincentiveformanyoftheharassingandinappropriateconductthatprecedesthem.

Courtsneedtorespondtotheproblemsofthedaybydevelopingeffectiveremedies.Thiscanonlybeonacase‐by‐casebasis.Itmaynotbeasquickandasbroadaprotectionasmanywouldlike.

“Butthatisthewayofthecommonlaw,thejudgespreferringtogo‘fromcasetocase,liketheancientMediterraneanmariners,huggingthecoastfrompointtopoint,andavoidingthedangersoftheopenseaofsystemorscience’“.74

72 [1897] 2 QB 57 (QBD). 73 “Protection of Privacy”, in N Mullany (ed) Torts in the Nineties, LBC , 1997 at 202 74 McHugh J in Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 216 [93] quoting Lord Wright “The Study of law” (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 185 at 186


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Thatisnotnecessarilyabadthinganditmaybebetterthancreatingamulti‐headedmonsterintheformofanill‐definedstatutoryactionencompassingconceptslike“privacy”thathaveeludeddefinitionordelimitationbymanygreatminds.

BarbaraMcDonald,31May2012.

Documents

An action for (serious) Professor Barbara McDonald, Law ......The members of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd4 were express and deliberate in explaining this transformation