I GUTMANN. I D E N T I T Y AND DSMOCEACY 1 543 , ,

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AMY GUTMANN !

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ries of justice ever do (Rawls 1971, 1999L; Carens 2000). In every existing nonideal democracy, individuals identify themselves and are identified by

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others, especially for public purposes, with voluntary and involuntary

Identity and Democracy: '!' A Synthetic Perspective

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groups defined by social markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, race, age, disability, and political ideology. Even if none of these group identities-nor all of them taken together-conipletely defines any indi-

, vidual, group identities both constrain and liberate individuals, depending on the identitv. the,individual. and the context fA~o iah 1996. 97-991.

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' Tile ever-growing attention to group identities and identity groups in nor- mative political theory parallels their saliency in contemporav.democntic

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politics. c~~~~~ of individuals l,ound together by a shared social identity ' such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, color, class, disability, or pb , litical ideology make political claims that range from exempting them. , ; selr,es from disproportionately burdensome laws to exercising sovereign^. A large literature has developed over the past three decades centering ; around the claims of identity groups in democratic politics, often begin; ning with the premise that individual identities are socially constnlcted ., (rather than essentialist) and then pursuing the political implications of srr ' c.al construction. ~h~ idea ofthe social conshct ion ofidentity is so open ended, however, that it has no political implications, leaving us with the

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question of whether the use of identity in political analysis is at all mean- ingful (Bmbaker and Cooper 2000). ,

wllat is identity group politics7 is it reducible to interest group polis ,,: tics? Are there any political implications of a shared group identity, for ex- amp]e, for exemption from othewise valid laws or for group criti& of identity group politics often it to tile free association of individ. uals. Free association is thought to enable people to develop their identities , as they see lit, not as any group detemlines for them. Yet associational free- ' dom permits group exclusivity, and exclusions based on ascriptive group

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identity perpetuate a negative identity group politics, which leaves many people-simply by virtue of their group identity-with less than equal free/ dam, and civic standing. should democratic governnlenh , therefore constrain civic associations to discriminate against on , the basis of their group identities?

A growing and wide-ranging scholarship on group identity and associ. . ational freedom in nonideal democracies addresses this question. It sug- , gests that 'Who should decide what and how in democratic politics?" . cannot, be answered witllout taking more of the political role of group identities and civic associations in nonideal contexts than ideal the@

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Group identities also play a central role in democratic politics, for better ,

' and for worse, because most individuals can be politically influential only in groups and some groups are far more justice friendlythan others.

, , , , . The scholarship.on identity and democracy is internally divided over : . :whether voluntary or involuntary group identities generally operate for the , better or the wane in democratic politics. The "school of culture" emplia-

sizes the essential contribution that cultural groups make to the lives of in- ,

dividuals in providing a sense of secure belonging and a set of scripts that , ,

give meaning to individual lives. The school of culture therefore warns against treating the ideal of the free and equal person as if actual individu-

, , . als could be conceived independently of any and all cultural contexts. By contrast, the "school of choice" emphasizes the value of individual free-

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doln from involuntary groups, the freedom to criticize and revise culturally given identities, and a correlative. right of free association. The school of clloice therefore issues precisely the opposite warning from the school of

, cultu": Do not heat cu~tural groups as if they were primordial, sovereign authorities over individuals who should be accorded the civic standing of

, free and equal Persons indemocraticsocieties.

: ' 1" this essay, J propose a synthesis that avoids the temptation, on the one hand, to elevate cultural groups over the individual, and, on the other

h: hand, to conceive of individuals free from socially given identities. I build this synthesis on the insights offered by the schools of culture and choice at

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.tl~eir strongest, and I therefore criticize those claims that rest on a concep- ' ; Lion of democratic societies as mere aggregations of either comprehensive

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cultural groups or free and equal individuals. A synthetic penpecfive sib- ,; ates the humanist ideals of freedom, opport~lnity, and civic equality for all

persons within nonideal democratic contexts and, by so doing, offen a per- spective on identity politics that is absent from ideal theories of justice. In

. the context of a society still suffering from a legacy of racial and gender dip , .

crimination, for example, racial minorities and women often have no bet- ter political alternative than to engage in collective action with the aid of identity groups and the aim of achieving greater civic equality and justice.

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For members of subordinated groups to eschew all identity associations .

would be counterproductive to justice. Yet not all identity grot~ps are jug ,

tice friendly, and therefore a synthetic perspective needs to distinguish : among different kinds of asciiptive identity politics. Without the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for exam- .

pie, Nrican Americans would be worse off than they are today, whereas not prisoners of, their genes, their physiognomies, and their histories in set- without the Klu Kluv Klan (KKK) they would be better off, yet both are as- tling on their own identities. And ifpowerful social forces motivate idelltity criptively based associations. To tell African America~ls that they should exploration-as they seem to do in our age-it is the constructivist face of not identify as a grollp for the purposes of democratic politics is to tell identity that seems the lhore real" (Laitin 1998a, 21). Almost everytl~ing them to ignore both history and contemporary reality; to tell them that they that informs our social identities-such as race, gender (as distinct from bi- should only identify as an ascriptive group would be similarly misleadin8 ological sex), etlinicity, and nationality-can be called social conshc-

Many commentators on identity politics condemn it without qualifi- tions. To say that racial, gender, ethnic, and national identities are social while many others uncritically applaud i t To understand and evalu- constmctions is not to say that they are any easier to change than our ge-

ate different kinds of identity groups and how they function in nonideal netic inheritance or physiognomy. Most African Americans, women, and delnocratic contexts, 1 begin by recognizing the irreducible tension'be- deafpeople cannot '!passn for white, men, or hearing individuals; they can tween individual freedom and. the shaping of i~~dividual identities and reinterpret. these ascriptive identities but they cannot give them up. For democratic politics by groups. When we recognize this irreducible tension, Some people, ethnic identities that are connected to a native language may we are in a better position to.understand the re1ationship:among group he somewhat easier to change, by a decisionto speak a second language identities, democratic politics, and the ideals of individual freedom, oppor! and give up certain customary ways of acting, but even an ethnic identity tunity, and civic equality The first section asks what identity groups are; can be difficult to alter except by generational change. and what is the relationship between identity and interest group politics, 1 . Yet many people do change their ascriptive identities over time, some- Can identity group politics be reduced to interest group Is interest limes quite deliberately and strategically. Tlle social conshuction of iden- group politics, as commentators suggest, "an inherent part of the governing tity is most evident when identities are "constructed and reconstructed fiocess ?f ademocracy" while identity group ~olitics "is antithetical to the as'social opportunities change" (Laitin 1998a, :20). To account for such basic principle of one indivisible nation" (Connerly 1997)7 The next two uhange, especially among ethnic minorities, political scientists propose a sections examine two opposing schools of thought on the role of group raltibnal-choice theory about the social constmction of identity. A rational- identity in democratic politics: the schools of culture and of choice. The f i ~ hoice theory posits that people retain or change their social identities ac- nal section develops the implicatipns of a more synthetic perspectiveby r b ording to what best satisfies their interests,~and what best satisfies their visiting the divisive issue of group rights and by raising the question of liow interests depends in turn on the payoffs people predict from the alternate missing identities might alter democratic landscapes. identities that are available to them. According torational-choice theory, in

I any given social context, people choose the available identity that they pre- dict will best serve their interests. When identity change is possible, on this theory, it is interest driven. Even ascriptive identity, wlien it is not simply a

1 Identifying Identity Group and Interest social given, is one among many tools in the arsenal of interest-based poli- G r o u p Politics ' tics. But this does not mean that identity politics is reducible to interest pdlitics; what it meansis that identities and interests interact, and the twb

An identity group, as the name suggests, is bound up with who people are1 kihds of politics work together. Both need to be understood for what each not merely with what they want, The distinctive and definingfeature oflan qontributesto understanding politics. identity group is the identification of its members as a certain kind of pet- i l l ' , A rationalchoice theory that admits all kinds of actions as interest son, and therefore its members' muti~al identification with people of that based (by positing interests that conform to all the revealed preferences of kind, where the kind is a consequential social category (Fearon 1999). This beople) is a hollow shell into which all actions can be fit and said to con- mutual identification around a social category is independent of-yet alsa ford to its premise: people act in ways that reveal (and therefore reflect) clearly compatible with-the pursoih of instrumental ends by the group1 '?interests. Actions reveal people's preferences, and their interests are When a group of people who mutually identify around a social c to be their revealed preferences. All political action can be placed act in politics on the basis of a group identity-whether for the sak such a rational-cl~oice framework before it is analyzed. Used as an gaining recognition for the group or furthering the interests of the group lsifiable framework of analysis, a rationalchoice theory cannot claim they are part of identity group politics. ,identity.politics is reducible to interest group politics in any substan-

Identities and therefore identity groups are socially constructed. .meaningful sense. If we stipulate that all human behavior is interest this, however, is not to say much more than that genes and physiognolnie t h e n everything is redircible to interest group politics, but not in a do not determine our social identities. "People are limited by, but they~arb hy that informs our understanding of how democratic politics works. To

say that human behavior is interest driven is to say nothing, for example!, identity matters so much, in democratic politics. Group identifica- understand actions that reflect group identification or moral commihn whether it be around gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, eth- on the part of people and those that reflect notliing more than a . ,nationality, age, disability, or i d e o I ~ ~ ~ - ~ r o v i d e s no less "real" a set welfare goal. T h e most plausible alternative to reducing all identity pa ns for people to organize politically than purely material incen- to interest politics does not deny that changes in identity areinteres a. As important, the two kinds of reasons-identity and interest-are of- driven. Nor does it claim that identity politics conflicts with a politibs en mutually reinforcing. based on interests. Rather it suggests that identities inform people's int I : , . Once we recognize the reality of identity group politics and its inter- ests. Because identity often informs interest, identity cannot be reduced, 'ction with interest group politics, along with its social constniction, we interest. Interests do not always, or even generally, precede identily inlb oid reification, which is the single most common charge of academic way that would pennit an insightful observer to explain people's beha ltics who suggest that analyzing identity politics as a real phenomenon by their prior interests, without knowing their identities. hntails approving o f " 'groupness' itself" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 31).

How then is an identity group analytically.different from an interes uite the contrary, we are now in a better position to consider two serious group? The ideal typeof interest group organizes around a shared instrul alleliges that identity politics presents in democratic politics. First, i l l ib mental interest of individuals (Olson 1971). T h e ideal type of iden ' al iden t i ty 'g i~u~s erect obstacles to the civic equality ofsome members, group organizes around mutual identification among its members. In oftin women and disadvantaged minorities, who do not want to choose be- litical practice, most organized groups are both identity and interest tween their cultural group identity and their recognition as equal.citizens. groups. Members are drawn to the group because of their mutual ident Must members of illiberal cultural groups be forced to choose? Second, cation and because they share an instrumental interest pursued by Juluntary groups claim the right to associate as their members see fit and group. David Truman subsumes identity and interest groups, and eve therefore the right to exclude those they deem unfit for membership. thing Madison called a "faction," into his definition ofinterest groups: "ad hould civic associations that preiudicially exclude people associated with group that . . :. makes certain claims upon other groups . . . for the est

~istorically disadvantaged identity groups be permitted to discriminate lishment, maintenance or enhancement offorrns of behavior that are I eden at the cost of civic equality, equal liberty or opportunity for those who plied by the[ir] shared attitudes" (1971, 33). More analytical definitions or t excluded? In examining how the schools of culture and choice address identity and interest groups that are not so broad as to verge o ese challenges, I develop a more synthetic perspective on identity and meaningless are preferable. emocracy, which is consistent with furthering the ideals of civic equality,

The defining features of identity and interest groups-the mutual 'c liberty, and opportunib for all persons, regardless of their group iden-

identification of people with one another, on the one hand, and the see ing together of a shared inshumental goal, on the other-are often mu allv reinforcing. Most identiw nrouvs pursue instrumental interests of the1

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members and thereby encourage more people to see their identities ,a$ ' . bound up with a group. Many interest groups encourage people to join'bx :' W' 1 The School o f Cul tu re : Q u e s t i o n i n g C l a i m s a b o u t J j , . , . orienting themselves around some mutual identification that is broadei. ! I . Comprehensiveness than the specific interests that they are pursuing at any given time. Some interest group theorists call these solidary.incentives (Cigler.and Loomis 'ocietal culture, or culture for s h o ~ as Will Kymlicka (1995b) describes 1995.9). T h e greater the role that identity plays illattracting and retainin ally co;lsists of a common language, history, institutions of social- members, the more a group is an interest group. The greater the role tha range of occupations, lifestyles, and custom^.^ As commonly un- the pl~rstlit of shared instrumental interests ulavs in atiractine: and retain d by the school of culture, culture isnot a "continuously contested,

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ing members, the more a group is an interest group. Most groups that.adt in democratic politics are a combination of both, and for two good reasons First, people's identification with one another influences their sense what they .want, and people's sense of what they want influences whom they identify. Second, individuals who identify with others are b able to organize politically, and organized groups can be far more p cally effective than an equal number of ~~nilllied citizens (Moe.1980). Th observation provides the single most salient answer to the question olwl~y

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i?'See Kymlicka 1995a, 18. What Kymlicka calls a societal cblture, Joseph Raz and bUhii Margalit call a pervasive culture. A pe~vasive culture "defines or marks a va- riety of forms or styles oflife, types ofactivity, occupation, pursuit, and relationship; \J(ith national groups we expect to find national cuisines, distinctive architectural siyles, a common language, distinctive literary and artistic traditions, national mu- sic, customs, clress, ceremonies and holidays, etc. None of these is necessary:' Peo- plecwlla share-or come close to sharing-a peniasive culture and whose "identiiy lodetermined a t least in part by their culture" are "~erions candidates for the right to self-determination" in the account offered by Margalit and Raz (1994, 114).

I I . i , 1 ; .. , 548 1 Set. 3 CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITI, AND POLITICAL P A R T I C I P A T I D ~ CUTMANN . I D E N T ~ T Y AND DSMOCRICI 1 549 $,', " !.,

imagined and reimagined melange" of disparate influences ( T U ~ ~ Y 199 ,neutral societal culture would not even be desirable, were it possible. 11; Waldron 1995, 105-8). Rather it is a coherent set that both informs ople reasonably-and passionately-want to be reciprocally recognized limits ,,,hat it is feasible for people to be and to imagine! Culhlre P Itheir cultural particularity, not only as (culturally naked) human beings. a con$haining context for meaningful choice, and an "anchor fo Ihey want to feel at home in their society, not like foreign visitors. The bias identification and the safety of effortless, secure belonging" (Margalitan societal culture solves this problem but creates another: i t disadvan- Raz 1994.114). to others and unfairly so because the disadvan-

~l~~ societal cultures of modern democratic soc is of ascriptive characteristics, not by virtue of and s ~ c t u r e choices; they also shape people's desires an hing the person has voluntarily done. T h e more systematic and severe for sdcia] recognition. T h e 'bolitjcs of recognition" refers to the isadvantages that accrue,to individuals whose identities are tied to a need for individual identities to be politically recognized. People nt culture, the less able democracies are to secure basic liberty, op- e m sooiety, Charles Taylor famously argues, following Rouss ct for all their citizens by a uniform set of indi- Hegel, "can flourish only to the extentthat [they] are recogniz consciousness seeks recognition in another, and this is not a sign a societal culture unfairly advantage or disadvantage differ- of virtue" (1994, 50). Axel Honnetli, another theorist of culture, ost democratic societies today Contain subordinate identity with Taylor that peopleliave basic rights to living membeis are identified with a different culture from the means not being imposed on by an external autllority. Honne Because the dominant culture is poblic, i t affects the life guts, without any obvious ambivalence, that peopleneed to be ryone who inhabits the society. Government conducts its recognized by government for their deepest particularity (1 schools teach, and the mass media broadcast i n the domi- 255-56).. nd in conformity with a culturally distinctive calendar.

There is, as Taylor realizes, an unresolved anomaly in.th rms to the dominant culture. Established business enter- recognition. People want to be recognized not only as generi ssociations favor people who identify with the dominant but also as culturally distinctive, and this laces seemingly i from the dominant culturecarries with it economic, ed- mands on democratic governments that contain more than a singlediSi Btitional, and social disadvantages, which originate not in voluntary tinctive culture within them. A democratic politics of recognition nedrli 1811oices but in inherited identities. At the same time, democracies publicly both to respect deep cultural differences-by way o -deeply rooted in democratic thought (al- and also protect the basic rights of individuals that includ y violated in practice)-that individuals should not be press, religion, suffrage, political participation, equal prote nchosen attributes, such as an ascriptive group identity. process (Taylor 1994, 5940) . T h e group rights must lea s most acute with regard to what Kymlicka calls a "na- tecting basic individ~lal rights, and vice versa. A defe ouplike the QuBbBcois who have their own societal respect for individual and group rights makes it p ':b~lture but who live within a larger democracy (1995b, 1&12). But the whether associated with a majority or minority cult "'pkoblem also applies to members of any ascriptive group who are disadvai- civic equal. :tdkedby the societal culture o f a democracy where they,settled in order to

Why, theorists of choice ask, are group rights n 'live a minimally decent life rather than because they considered it the best individual rights suffice for recognieing people as civic e Jofiseveral good choices. Immigration cannot be considered voluntary set- cultural identities? If everyone living within the prritori vantages as if by the immigrants' consent. T h e democracy identified equally kith the dominant socie im of theschool of culture is that in die absence of Geated as a civic equal by it, then individual rights wo embers of societal cultures will have unequal free- ual rights are problematic because of a contingent fact make matters worse, a democratic government's democratic sokie6 not every person identifies eql~al I measures is also reasonably perceived as disre- civic equal by the dominant societal culture. The cannot b e r 4 1 The school of culture therefore defends some solved by finding a neutral societal culture, becaus of otherwise disadvantaged cultural groups.

, Group rights present a prospect and a problem for democracy. The rights may he able to provide a legitimate 2. "Familiarity with a culture determines the boundari

ing in a culhrre, being part of it, determines the limits a dual rights and popular,rule-to pursue jus- Raz 1994, 119). ps who are otherwise unfairly disadvantaged.

Group rights that exempt members of some groups from pllblic pol idua) rights. By contrast, other group rights- that impose unfairburdens and special aid to overco -violate basic individual rights. No democratic vantages illustrate this prospect. The problem is.that other group pective that takes the interests of individuals seriously can defend cul- may violate basic individual rights. Group rights that 1 practices that violate basic individual rights, whether of members or of individuals in order to protect an endangered cult onmetnberi of a cultural group.5 Because the moral value of the group fend absolute sovereignty for the cultural group il es from the way it supports the interests of individuals over time, ~h~ cllallenge is therefore to distinguish behveen taining a customary practice of the group at the expense of the basic mate group rights (Levy 1997; Lukes 1997; William ies and opporlunities of individuals is morally indefensible (Blake

The cotinby that is the theoretical home ofgr example of the defensibility of special exemptions ands the right of self-governance over its customary unfair burdens on members of an identity group (because of their. se practices include extensive discrimination. in identity). Such special exemptions are meaningfully considered a k sic rights of some of its members (often women group right, since they apply toindividuals only by virtue o f t (children), its demands are suspect to the extent that the larger society identity.' In 1990, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police decided to ex IdothenCise protect those rights. The group may still have eaensive a group from $ long-standing rule. They exempted ts' of self-govemment, but self-governing rights-like all rights-can wide-brimmed hat that has long been part of their required ~m mpeting rights. Even when groups cannot have exemption made it Possible for Sikhs to join the Mounties wi emment, they may be justifiably guaranteed r ep up their identity as Sikhs. One might consider this decision i tion within a legislature that would otllenuise routinely pass dis- the rule is far from earthshaking in its significance-but it is quite t the group, which the courts would uphold of many rules that have raised public controv teed representation f0r.a group is inore prob- Mounties' decision met with six years of protests, democratic the group is and the more its. mem- to parliament signed by 210,000 Canadians and de edoms for their votes to be counted as part of the antiturban badges and antiSikh slogans and'ending with an ap emerge that call for a far more nuanced view of to the Canadian Supreme Court,which refused to hear tlie chal lly offered: '(1) group rights of self-government (Winsor 1996). : i , all or,nothing, and (2) group rights should be

The Mounties'example illustrates hvo important but o ssedon the basis of how well they protect the.basic interests-includ- points: ( I ) no controversial claim about identity is needed to def ividuals compared to the available institutional empting members of a group even from some rules that reflect no in I , I . , discriminate; and (2) somegroup rights can provideeffect y do theorists of culture argue as if group rights of self-govemment specting individual rights, which classical~liberal defender 'or nothing? A starting premise of the school of culk~re is that socie- rights have neglected but need not oppose. On a Lockea the identity of their members and povide i nlent, thegovemment is not required to exempt minoriti The authority of a group togovern itself is neutral laws that unequally burdentheir religious beliefs, but neithe t to follow from the idea that the self-governing group represents the prohibited.from doing so as long as the exemption does not violate s a culture to which its members belong. But thii idea presumes that

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one else's rights.! A. crucial feature of this exemption is that it li burdens (borne by members oTa group through no faultof their o rle,c!ription of the practice of clitaridectomp on

misrepresented as analagous tb male circumcision, ... . ,

e aesthetic value of cultural practices is a different issue, which I cannot ad- nmthis essay. Charles Taylor attributes to individualsan interest in their cul-

urviving over time, since people want to be assured that their descendants will the same culture as they do. This raises the difficult question ofwhat the ba- rests (and therefore the basic rights) of individuals are and how they should rmined (Taylor 1994, 51-7j); and folio sense of how heated the debate over

re can be, see David Biomwich, Michael Walzer, and Taylor in Dissent . .

a single societal culture is comprehensive in constituting people:s identl as oppression. Many of .the group rights that are prominently de- ties, which no major theorist of culhlre explicitly defends (because in contemporary politics-and also in political theory-threaten to

indefensible). When a single culture is assumed to constitut ate the subordination of half the world's population, namely shared identity of members of a minority group, it is easy to conclud en. The cultural relativist view is that the cultural identity of women any degree of government by the larger society-even when in defe s attached to these practices, which are not identified as oppressive the basic rights of women, half the members of the minori cause this interpretation is itself identified as foreign to the indigenous stitutes imposition by a "foreign" power. This conclusion is tice. To try to obliterate the practices is viewed as tantamount to trying leading because it assumes what it sets out to argue and its assum rate these women, to do away with their cultural identities, with indefensible. The assumption is that a single societal culture so are. The relativizing move here allows a cultural identity to go hensively constitutes the identities of individuals as to iustilj granting. 1 and lets it block any vindication of the basic rights of group comprehensive sovereign authority-to rule its "own" member@ n. O n this analysis,, cultural identity precludes the vindication of at the price of violating their basic rights., n's equal righti with men, but this is as much of an im-

Grant that some cultures are far more co~nprehensive t11an.otH tlieoretical construct as any. A cc~lhtral identity is assumed-al- shaping people'; lives, and it is still not credible to assume that.on ever actually shown-to comprehend the entirety of a person's only one societal culture exclusively encompasses the cultura nd a cultural identity is allowed to become morally imperial and citizens of contemporary democracies? When this assr~mption is a to deny basic rights to women. Group rights to enforce child Native American women, for example, the effect is to force wo iriage,, forced marriage, polygamy (or, more accurately, polygyny), cli- not men) to choose behveen membership in their Native Americariitribe ctomy, discriminato~y divorce, unequal schooling of girls and boys, and equal democratic citizenship. Theoris$ of culture analogize inte~eri : , nequal property rights threaten the basic rights of women in a way tion by a democratic government to vindicate the rights of Native..Anreri+';,, ument from cultural identity alone has ever been able to bvef can women with foreign intervention into the affairs of anothe ?ere any reason that the dominant members of cultural groups (Kymlicka 1995a, 167). Kymlicka recognizes that the Santa Cla ranted the right to resbict the basic rights of women? wrongly violated women's rights, but lie defends its authority to I within the school of culture explicitly defends a broad cul- grounds that'no coulitry has any right to intervene in the affairs thin liberal democracies to restrict the basic rights of women. country in order to vindicate the rights of women. , ,. alit and Moshe Halbertal argue that, "Protecting cultures out

The problem with this perspective is that it asst~mes~withbut right toculture may'take the form ofan obligation [ofliberal that the analogy with foreign countries supports the case for no vernments] to support cultures that flout.the rights of the in- tion. But should a national goverliment be assumed to have suc iberal society" (1994,491). This defense of the right to cul- hensive sovereign authority that it may violate individual rights goes s i far as to claim that liberal democracies have an established legal tribunal could prevent it from so doing without anpin* ibligation to support cultures in their midst that Rout the rights of women, lenbe7 If not, then even when no established hibunal exists, political thdd' ndividnals. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture in 1srael;accoid- rists should explore the case for establishing one. A nationalism ment, must be suppoited by the state in its totality, which writ large or.smal1-that unnecessarily alithorizes the systemati g the rights ofwomen in schooling, divorce law, and inhei- of individual rights is not a nationalism.worthy ofdefense. Theo ecting Ulha-Orthodox men as the guardians of the author- lure like Kymlicka who agree that cultyres derive their moral value from, a publicly supported cultural community (493). One aiding individuals,, not vice versa, have theresources to correct tlieir,oq is treated as independent ofany particular culture and that tendency to grant more sovereign authority to minority culture it a culh~ral c o m m u n i t y ? ~ ~ i s is the right that undermines would grant a similarly oppressive majority culture when peac ral relativism. If individrlal identities are so comprehen- overcoming the oppression are available. , .

0ther theor iG of culture take arelativist view about what oppressidh I ' ' fi,,. , , ' entails; they argue that the cultural identity of people determines, !hii ,~,For,~an eltended discussion, see Okin, Moller, et al. 1999, Nussbaum and 1 . 1 , Clover 1994, and Nussbaum 1997b. e right of exit to a free market society is also the only right of individuals rec-

7. To consider the single societal culture of a pluralistic democrat? to b ed by Chandran Kukathas who clefends the right of minority groups-no mas gregate of all the cultures within it would simply further confuse ma ow~illiheral-to be left aldne (1992, ,105-39). Wr a critiqueof Kukathas on the "prove" the case by a misleading definition. gl~t~ofexit;see.Kymlicka, 199Sa; 190,.234-35, n. 18.

sively tied to a particl~lar culture; then theorists of culture cannot co s,and so co~nmonly excused or even iusti- tent]y defend even:this minimalist.right ofindividuals-to exitan OPPre community. 1f.individual identities are not so comprehensivel~ tied iy isn't the formal right of exit an adequate antidote to granting cul- particular culture, then far more than a.right to exit is needed to pr tuihl groups the authority to.heat their members in illiberal ways? Once the basic interests of individuals in living the lives of free and equal citlz t to exit from cultural groups, they are im- in the context of a multicultural democratic society. . . of individual consent and respect for per-

~h~ failureof the "nomore than a right toexit:' argument off@ ntly justify subordinating individuals in sobering reminder of the dangers of tying individual i tura1,groups that deprive them of the necessary conditions for mak- prehensively to a single societal culture. Margalit an al right of exit can he an adequate olaiming thateach culture creates a person's "personality!id ich truly voluntary associations treat tity." TIley then claini that "every person has an ove present societal cultures-by the very personality identity-that is, in preserving his way of life and the re not voluntary associations. When are central identity components for him and the other membersof 1l;s:c ~iasi-com~rehensive cultural groups violate rights wi ththe support of mral group" (505). ~f we accept this overriding interest of individua1s:i tic governments, they greatly reduce the basicliberties and o p p o ~ theoretical room remains for an individual right t o exit. Ri hat their members would otherwise have to live a life oftheir own basic interests of individuals. An individual cannot-have a basic in sing either inside or outside t h e communily. An Ultra-Orthodox in freeing herself from her identity if her basic (an an in Israel is not educated to support herself or her children outride interest. is defined as, preserving her personality identity. B e'ultra-Orthodox community. She is not taught the legitimacy of of course begs the crucial question: Is there any.good reason to ass tioning her tightly circumscribed place in the Ulha-Orthodox com; that the basic and overriding interest, of all women lies in p r claim that she has an overriding interest in preserving a cultur- pers~nal i t~~ident i ty as defined by the other members of im that her overriding interest is to group?10 , : ive set of laws over which she has no

The basic tenets of the view that an,individualSj ovenidi reting or altering."This is not a claim thatanyond can make in preserving the entirety of her personality identity, where . . given by her culture, are misleading. Many women8.(and,men'al claiming the subordination of women is jus- course) reasonably think that they do not have a basic intere interest lies in being subordinated. For any- the cultural identity that has been imposed.on them se, women, like men, must be given equal doubt that.a c~lture.creates-rather thaninfluences want to live within therange of "personality identity," Some womenreasonably think that. om in the first place cannot validate culh~ral community unjustifiably subordinates them tome want or need this freedom. No theoretical nates against them by denying them basic liberties and o~portuniti nation ofwomen within~cultures thdt deny . ' able to men: They are thereby denied the equal civic and p al right of exit. For women to,Ilave that is due them. As long as any woman reasonably thinks t ler they want to remain within a culhra] culture" argument fails1,as a defense of the authority of a to exit thatgroup, a democraticsociety nity topreserve itself by denying women their basic liberty and opportv~i~: ht to exit, an education for equal citizen. rights and their status as civic equals, (The same argument applies:ta~to~:: r basic rights as well. An effective right to person; the example of women is so striking because the violations!bf,Jlieir ns at minimum being able to exit and still support oneself and

I . ' ildren. Securing women these rights means not ceding cultural 10. One might revise the perspective to say thata person has s within a democracy the authority to control schooling and family only in her personaliv identity asshe defines it, not as defined by other m as to effectively deny women the same basic liberties and opportuni- her cultural group. Tliis starting point would svpport many more col ,. .. . . ! : . pendent rights of individuals than the right h exit. In'dividtrals wbuld era1 conflation of what a person's fight to resist having a cultural group impose laws and rules their personality iden6Hes:Buf this is not the view of personality identi r a critique of this conflation, see --I;+ ...A U..IL+-~ A-F~nrl T h ~ r view

556 1 sac. 3 CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITI, AND POL~T~CAL PAI~.IICIPATION, : W l l l

ties as men. Democratic states may need to tolerate some violations of1 ,person is "living as one likes, associating on one's own terms, engaging sic rig\lts when political intervention would make matters worse. bd oluntary relationships of all sorts, finding or trying to find pleasure in pragmatic argument of this kind denies any obligation on , and also finding in them opportunities for many kinds of experi- democratic state to support cultural groups at the expense of vi ' (Kateb 1998, 37-39). Free people tolerate "being regulated only basic rights of individuals. rdeep constitutional regret."" They need to be politically recognized

Taken at its strongest, the school of culture recognizes that ther tlfor their particular group identities but rather as bearers of equal group right to subordinate individuals to a societal culture by via Htr." Among these rights are those that protect equal citizenship and their basic rig&. At its weakest, it erects indefensible obstacles to vin dom of association (Kateb 1994, 1998). jng the basic rights of members and nonmembers of cultural groups, E e freedom of individuals is limited by socialization and social if the societal culture of the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communi he school of choice at-its strongest recognizes this. Cultural self-contained for members of that community, its effects on nonm ocialization. I did not choose to be a Jewish- would still be morally and politically relevant. The ~ol i t ics of cultura d in India and born in the United States to a norities rarely can be isolated from a broader politics, which to extendt nuJewish refugee father and Jewishamerican mother. This causally ~sraeli example, profoundly affects the liberty and opportunity of Palesti ined cultural identity (scientists may soon be able to add a detailed ans, Israeli Arabs, and non-Orthodox Israeli Jews. @ion of my genetic determination) is compatible with my freedom

The politics of cultural identity groups also shapes the identities entify as something more than a Jewish-American woman (with deter- ture generations in ways that the school of culture assumes to be le te genetic markers). I could also choose to identify as other than what extensions of a group right to self-determination. Cultural groups w tified as, but not without a far greater struggle than were I born democratic societies are an intricately interdependent part of the er. Although I in fact identify as a Jewish-American woman, I also iden- ety. They must be able to interact politically and often economicall ore than that, and more than the aggregation of all my ascriptive with people outside their groups, and people outside their groups wi put together. It is of course quite possible that my freedom to This interdependence, moreover, affects the liberty, opporh~ni as something more than my ascriptive identities is causally deter- standing of both outsiders and insiders to these groups since each-dep the interaction between genetic capacities and social context. on the other to ensure the equal protection of rights. If some membe nd of causal determination is compatible with the value that the cultural groups identify only with a single group, i t is therefore not be I of choice places on freedom of association. the comprehensive conditions of their lives are independent of the lar i e balue of free association depends not on whether human identity ciety. (Ultra-Orthodox Jewsin Israel depend heavily on support fro ependent of causality but rather on whether individuals are accorded of society for their schools, police protection, and national securi eedom within a democratic context to identify as they themselves see ben of culh~ral groups also influence the larger politics of democra otus government-or a similarly powerful a g o t in society-determines eties as much as many other citizens, sometimes even more s o ( ' hem. This freedom in turn depends on whether individuals are free to example also illustrates.) Members of distinctive cultural grou rtadd exit associations at their own will, rather than someone elseS, ten more dependent on the larger society tosupport their distin prospects and problems for the school of choice, and for anyone This is not an argument against the dependency of cultural groups o ation as a legitimate source of identity forma- influence on the larger society Quite the contrary, it is an argument ?, sociation can create a democratic culture of a politics or political theory that posits the comprehensiveness of societ ry associations that are appropriate sites for recognizing a wide tures and therefore depends on denying the interdependence of cultur f group identities. Voluntary associations, precisely because they are cultural communities within democratic societies. tary, are places where a democratic culture of recognition as distinct

h .politics of recognition can flourish. A democratic culture is com-

is more general critique of a politics of recognition, see Kateb 1994, 1 The School of Choice : Quest ioning the Condi t i

of Voluntar iness Honneth, a theorist of culture, diverges from theorists of choice pn this oint. Althouglr Honneth agrees that freedom means not being imposed on

The basic premise of the school of choice is the freedom of individ emal authority, he argues tl~at people need to be politically recognized by identify and live as they like, not as anyone else determines. The ma ment lor their deeput particularity (Honneth 1995. 255-56, 1996).

posed of many uncoordinated sites of recognition consisting of volunh luntary associatio~is cannot prevent their members from leaving and still associations where people identify with one another in a multitude ofwars etonsidered voluntary or the basis of free affirmation of identity by indi-

A,, uncoordinated landscape of volontaty associations is also a uals. Democratic governments therefore must guarantee that all people of many misrecognitions. Associations that prejudicially exclude peep eflectively free to exit any association that they are permitted to enter. the basis of their race, gender, ethnicity, and other ascriptive character1 h:i!lUnder what conditions do individtlals have an effective right of exit7I5 are a source of negative identity politics. Negative identity politics pas ci question is not easy to answer in some cases because the freedom to

to theorists of choice who claim that unregulated freedom of1 teran association that demands great commitment over time is prima fa- sociation liberates people from the social typecasting of their identities8 part of what freedom ofassociation includes. This is especially evident lives. unreylated civic associations in the United States simplistic heh~we consider the freedom of identity formation that civic associations stereotped women and men; homosexuals and heterosexuals; Cllri ir~best can protect. Religious associations, to take a central set of ex- lews, and Muslims; African Americans and whites; and many more es,,.may be attractive to many people precisely because they make categories of people. Before examining the challenge that thi si-comprehensive demands on their identity and therefore not only on prejudice presents for the scliool of choice, we should also appreciate !ha r lives today but also into the future. But freedom of religious associa- theorisb ofchoice view as the virtue in tolerating misrecognition. Any tiincludes the right of individuals to change their religious association at ture that is free to be changed by the (necessarily imperfect) peoplejw mocratic government therefore must, protect individuals against lives it shapes is also bound to mischaracterize and misunderstand ped$ ciations that effectively deprive their members of those condi- Some degree of misrecognition-not every degree or the degree of thee make the right to exit effective. O n e of those conditions is eco- tus quo-is a price worth paying for freedom of associatioil and.fon dependence, which is missing when the price of exiting a civic recopition that people are more than what public recognition n is to be bereft of any property (Hofer v. Hofer, S.C.R. 958-92 ety of human beings makes possible. This sometimes painrul reali 1.tHow high can barriers to exit be and still be legitimate? From the perhaps the hardest won insight of human freedom and the sc ' tive:of choice, barriers to exiting an association are more suspect to thought that prizes freedom above all else. t that they resemble thebarriers to exiting a society, which cannot

Freedom of association still carries with it the prospect that all peo 'dered a voluntary association precisely because the barriers to exit- can be publicly (but not authoritatively) recognized for some of theit1 ohigh (for most people). Although drawing precise lines behveen ticularities if they so desire. To be publicly recognized in all of onds* Ate and illegitimate barriers to exit will be difficult, the school of ticularity, friendship and love would become public projects. Tl~isliS I I( upplies the grounds for saying tl~atfreedom of association is ab- politics of recopition taken to its logical extreme. Love is n ncompatible with preventing people who want to exit a group shives to make itself public in all its particolarities; it is at best the manifestation of love, which is a pale packaged imitation (as televisio 1 of choice also needs to address the issue of blocked entry. shows all too vividly reveal). A civic society that shives without patholo hfreedom of association entails the freedom of groups to prevent satisfy the desire for public recognition cannot aspire to create a ople who want to join them from doing so, the riglit to exclude is^ ture of authenticity. Only people themselves, acting freely thro Ute. To insist that associations include everyone who wan$ to join sociational choices, can recognize each other for who they are a their members' freedom to associate as they so choose. But to thhn only imperfectly. nlimited freedom to exclude women and negatively stereo-

Yet some rnisrecognitions are houbling on the grounds o orities on prejudicial grounds entails limiting the effective free- self; they reflect the failure of a delilocratic society to secure the co omen and minorities, preventing them from associating and t~nder which memben of uniustlv subordinated groups have as inun a:bs tliev wish.I6 If exclusions were more or less random. falline . . fective freedom as their peers. T h e school of cioice cannot avoid - fronting the question of the social conditions under which some people osenblum 1998a, lplff; Kymlicka 1995a, 234, n. 18. My discussion of the prevented from affirming their identities through their a choice refen more generally to Rosenblum's book, which is the most

sive statement b date of the relationship between identity, associational choices. Conditions olexit out of associations and entry into th d democracy by a theorist of choice. ical to assessing whether they support individual freedom. Let's the issue of exit since it is the more shaiglitfonuard. ~ o l u n t a j i a s they can form another group with pebple who want to associate with !this is their second-bertscenario. The same also holds for the people who can be so called only ifpeople who choose to join them are not co dding them: if farced to include, the excluders canleave the association to remain members (Barry 2001, 155-93). It is almost as simp1 m a new one.

on everyone more or less equally, and having no other signihcallt cividbF fects, then absolute freedom of association might not be problematio fronl a democratic perspective. Equal freedom and civic eq~~ality could still plrei vail. But the discriminatory policies of civic associations are problematid when they deprive individuals associated with l~istorically disadvantaged identity groups of valuable civic opportunities through no fault of th8?, own. Accompanying this problem is another, lesscommonly notedolie u h i ~ h rlirectlv challenpes the claim that unregulated freedom of assqd&

. . individuals to express themselve8 and pursue their particular identities by free. association. All can also agree that to exempt all civic associations would place an uniustifiable burden on members of groups who are sys- t.41natically discriminated against in society, effectively eviscerating their $equal freedom to identify as they see fit rather than as dominant groups in .&cietymtypecast them. Second-class membership does not automatically dntail second-class citizenship, but when the two are mutually reinforcing, tlie school of choice can defend opening up prejudicially blocked entries

..... - ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~

ti,,,, -,tnnorts the free &lic affirmation of ind;vidt~al identity. Prejudiiiil , 1 : t o civic associations through the enforcement of nondiscrimination laws." .. - . . - rr- - - ~. exc]usions of women and negatively stereotyped minoriti membership in civic assbciations are yet another public expression.0 involuntary typecasting of identity to which tlie school of choice St

, 1 , Toward a Humanis t Synthesis: Revisiting G r o u p , . opposed. Rights a n d Considering Missing Identities

The same perspective of choice that affirms the right of free a tion also opposes the invpluntary typecasting of individualidentities e the two schools of thought, but far less than either the same reasons and on tlie same grounds. Civic associatiails con . The school of choice explicitly rejects group rights. But to a negative identity politics when they exclude entire groups ba , as we have seen with the Sikh exemption from Moun- their ascriptive identities or relegate them to second-class mem port rather than impede the equal freedom and opportunity The question thereforearises: What limits may be placed by de eorists of choice can defend group rights that i t their governments on which civic associations not to exclude people on t on donot inhere in groups but rather inhere in individuals sis of their race, gender, or other involuntary identities? Not all excl of their group identity. Theorists of choice can therefore view from all associatipns are equal from the perspective of choice. Le roup exemptions as a way of fairly applying various individual sition of membership on expressive associations-such as church uch as religious freedom. Theorists of culture can view the same vocacy groups-would undermine their expressive purpose. M ons as a way of respecting cultural differences, which cannot be impositions on intimate associations of family and friendship wo s ood purely on an individual level or as simply a manifestation of in- mine the very meaning of intimacy. A blanket imposition of lib m. The two scl~ools therefore can converge inpolitical s u b cratic norms on all associations would violate the most basic continue to dispute in political theory what counts as a expression and intimate association, and therefore are consiste we leave the terminological dispute behind and instead by theorists of choice. nsights of the two schools, we can see that both penpec-

Associations that provide publid goods and are not primarily eupresdk eir shongest, depend on valuing individual freedom in the or intimate do not need to discriminate to cany out their prim cultural differences that are not themselves simply a matter of A strong case can be made for opening up their prejudic e. We also see that both perspectives tend to neglect the enhies on grounds of freedom, opportunity, and civic eq democratic processes, instihitions, and ideals play in ie- pre-judicial exclusion contributes to treating women and disadvd nd mobilizing some group identities rather than others. minorities as secondclass citizens on any of these grounds (free gas people are free agents, culh~res cannot be completely com- opportunity, or civic equality), then nondiscriminatioll laws are in, in constituting their identities, and as long as societies socialize [Rosenblum 1998b, 158-90). They can help equalize the effectiv lar ways, they cannot be completely voluntaristic agents dom and opportunity of women and minorities, express their civic st g their identities. Democratic processes and institutions add an equals, and thereby also support their equal ability to identify as the set of variables and values into any perspective that accepts the through association. e tension between individual and group. This synthesis raises a

When do exclusions from civic assoilations riinforce skc nestions for further research, which are both empirical zenship? The school of choice is divided over particular case ature. What group identities get selected by demdcratic idea of second-class citizenship is not self-interpreting and roomre for reasonable disagreement A ~ I can agree that to require all associa he nondiscriminatory would place unjustifiable limits on the free Nancy Rosenblum argues (199Ra, 172-76).

citizens for political action, and why7 What role do democratic proceis otive when they neglect these values. T h e school of culture is at its and institutions ,,lay in making organization'and mobilization oftso akest therefore when it falls back on the authority of cultural groups group identities more or less likely? How do different democratic s w c t their members, as if a selfcontained societal culture constitutes the ofgovernance affect the mobilization and effectiveness of subordinated. of its members with a corresponding claim to sovereign nation- nor,ties7 under different democratic conditions, what exemptionsfrq ven limited democratic governance by the larger society in defense facially nelltral laws are permissible or even necessary? What iden ~dividual rights then becomes equivalent to foreign intervention into are unfairly disadvantaged by different democratic processes and inst in of a ~ e l f d e t e n n i n i n ~ nation. T h e school of choice at its weakest tinnr nna how riehts or exemptions help address.differenb political rights of equal citizenship, which are amone the basic "-..", ...~~ o~~ - " grees and typesof Llnfairness~ w h a t are tile.a~ternatives to group righ6,dti 'iijg!ltS.of individuals that can only be ,exercised in groups. Equal rights of exemptions? 1 ~ ~ : ~ 1

' '

citiqensliip fail to be respected when more-powerful governments routinely ~~~i~~ the nor~native tables, we also need to ask: When are group'!',,' intkpene in theaffairs of less-powerful governments without due regard for

rights nothing more than an unjustifiable assertion of the power o f a groyp , 1tlf;equal political as well as civic rights of all penons. The basic rights of over its members (or over outsiders to the When is identity politics , ; ' ,equal ;,:,I,,. citizei~ship ,. can be exercised by individuals only, in selfgoverning noteven a second hest in nonideal democraiies because broad-based issde: {youps, and thesovereignty of all self-governing groups (not only the least

are effective in moving in the direction of greater ius!,i$!! powerful) must be limited to make room for recognition of basic civil as Synthesizing the two sets of questions, we can ask: What broad-baseg $:R ,, , 'eL(/:!l' ;S political rights (Habemas 1998a, 129-53, 203-36, 239-64; Rawls networks are mobilized independently or in cooperation with ide,dQk, , ' ,'1/71,228-30, 1996, 334-71, 381-96). groups, why, and to effect for the liberty, opportunity, and civic.e~$g)$' ' ' :,lil:lrhhen they avoid some characteristic missteps from their basic prem- ity of persons? , 1 : , , ~i~ks:'both ..., I;. schools can agree that the purpose of right$-whether individual

,A,~ tilese questions indicate, a synthetic perspective is not m~rally;n$/~ , , , , ,

logroup-is to protect the basic interests and respect the dignity of indi- hal and does not thereFore claim to resolve all differences between thy.%k b>i'dhlals a8 civic equals. Group rights can meanin&lly refer to those rights sc~lools of thought, which are partly attributable to conflicting wejghl!' , < which protect those basic interests of individuals which are (voluntarily or given to the of cultural belonging and individual freedom. AI$7$ , , lln%oluntarily) attached to a particular. group identity. T h e interests ulti- hetic penpective defends the idea that individual freedom is alwayf,gx? qately to be sewedby group rights are therefore individual interests. A syn- cised within social constraints but those conshmints are not a statiq g\y$fi' tl~etic perspective avoids conflating the identity of a community with that the constrainh can change over time with the exercise of indi~idua!~ft,e$ , ~~df~thaiindividuals who are part of that community, but it also refuses to iso- dam ofassociation, and this freedomin turn depends on interaction,ril!l: ' .Iafe~;individuals from their social contexts, to rednce their interests to self-

processes and institutions to be fully effective. A s~nt)::t/L;i,' welfare, (as opposed to an interest in or commitment to the well-being of perspective therefore not only criticizes some undefended mov?s.of,')]l)$ ~bthers), or to assume that facially neutral laws suffice to protect the basic schools from their starting premises, it also merges the remaining (rflq(l! ' ;'iihts-and civic equality of individuals. Democratic governments therefore and empirical) insights into a more nuanced and dynamic view of thej[$?; , ' lfebdto take into account particular group identities and exempt some cit- tionship between group identity, democracy, and individual freedon!,,q~di ,ize'ns~ because of their group identities from some facially neutral policies. civic equality. More members of both schools move in the,di j~~; ,,,;!flthe , .. Same time, they must not grant groups rights-or assume group tion of this synthesis. Taylor, for example, defends only those grouP!$l)!: , , I rights tl~e~nselves-that threaten the basic liberty, opportunity, or civic

do not threaten the basic freedom and opportunity of individ~als: Cq~iality of persons. and Rosenblpm defends those prejudicial exclusions from vo!u~[ai~ , llriiluDeyond the issue of group rights, other implications of a humanistsyn-

which do not threaten the civic equality of members.ofilgn; Ibe8is:are worth exploring in far greater detail than is possible here. What I fairly disadvantaged groups. Taken at their strongest, both schools congrfi~ ' . ' ca!t$he challenge of missing identities follows from recognizing the dy- in defending the basic freedom, opportunity, and civic equality of ?!!qi: M m / d interaction between individual freedom, group identity, and demo- sons (Kymlicka 199%; Taylor 1994; Kateb.1998; Rosenblum 1998t));, i:ratib, institutions and ideals. In brief, the challenge is to consider the synthetic perspective that draws on an ideal of realizing basic freedomh# l~iirlanist group identities that are missing from democratic politics, or rel- portunity,.and civic equality for all persolls can be called humqnis\,li atiCly underrepresented, whose addition would help move democracies in cause at its most fundamental level it heats all perso~~s-regardless ofthi llldidirection of greater justice. If group identities change over time in the group identity-with equal concern. iiiterbction between civil society anddemocratic politics, people commit-

The two of thought are at their weakest from a 1cdlt0 humanist values can ill afford to ignore the challenge of missing

564 1 set., C E N S ~ ~ p , I D E N T ~ T I , AND POLITICAI. PA GUTMANN . IDENTITY A N D DEMOCRACY 1 565 !

identities. fie grolln,jwork for the challenge is laid in the foil P. The Pueblo's quashsovereign status was the basis onwhich sional conclusions from our previous analysis: prerne Court concluded that the hibe had the authority to viw

a1 protection of women. Only Justice Byron .White, in dissent, 'people are greater than any single culture can compre connection beheen being a quasi-sovereign nation and havl

sovereign authority can represent. rity to violate basic rights. Did Julia Martinez not have a basic i ated as a civic equal to her Pueblo male counterparti No one

. fiere is no principle or even presumption against cult arguing the Martinez case challenged her basic right to civic eqi~ality. i

change (clifford 1988,338). Such changes do not nec ! r standing as a U.S. citizen to vindicate her moral loss (or evencultural loss, except by ta

timacy of the ICRA that explicitly grants her the negative stereotyping of the group identiti i justly suhordjnated minorities, for example, W 1

that the Pueblo has the sovereign authority to violate the from a humanist perspective, and possibly a cul men? It cannot be because the Pueblo are in fact sover-

. ~ ~ , ! , , ~ ~ ~ a t i ~ governments may facilitate identi6 cha eikn over.their own laws, since they are not. As we argued above, it cannot for the better or worse. Citizens should be effective1 herbecause societal cultures are self-contained and therefore have abso. i !

. . I

pret, and reject the group identities into whi their members. The factual premise.of self- . , ,,ialized, partly through the procedural mechanism

ulty and, even. if true, the conclusion of absolute governance.

-sequitur. The Martinez case vivifies the lack ofself- m ~ b ~ ~ l ~ t ~ sovereignty claims of cultural groups 1939 General Allotment Act that

along prejudicial exclusions from powerful civic as Pueblo women and men, far from tiolls are among the injustices that ca1l:on the colle quired the approval of the U.S. govem- ! democratic citizens to vindicate their rights to equ

."seems to have been supported, if not influenced and I I tunity; and civic equality. of the United States" (Resnik 1989,725). It is j i I

m Because collective action in demooratic politics is a con : 'Why is it seen as a matter of cultural survival when moving in the direction of greater justice, iustic n:gUarantee exclusive access to Indian women as a requirement of hibal ;i i are indispensable, and one way of buililingt dian woman attempts to claim that her family 1 i

; of a shared humanist identity, which partially constitutes the choose who to make a family with, it's called a threat : j conception of people muhlally identify with the. causelo acKinnon 1987, 67)? creasing injustice and defending the basic rights of individua hanging identities is to search for ways in which :'i

d institutions can aid unjustly subordinated i d - ! fie cllallenge of missing identities is neglected in ways that 1s in vindicating their basic rights, rather than taking established iden- of the.mjssteps taken by the school of culture when i hite's dissent in the Martinez case illustrates one change to what sovereignty over subordinated en could have been aided in their just cause of !I

hip rules in an ascriptive group. White argued possible. fie charge of discrimination against women brotlght b ti^^^, a of thesanta Clara Pueblo hibe and U.S. citi ire the tribal government itself to revise the 1 lushates the challenge of missing identities. The Pue at respects the equal rights of women. In so refused to vindicate Martinez's right to equa! protection eblo women whose identities had civil ~ i g h t ~ of 1968 (ICRA), which says that "no In authorities, the Court would have

!

cising powen of self-government shall:. . .:deny to any p tities in the direction of greater justice as had risdiction the equal protection of its laws.'!r8 A 1939 CRA. Instead the Court helped to further en- tribe ind U.S. federal government, excludes interma ntities that established the discriminatory their b l ~ t not intermarrying men and their chi1 : and thereforefrom the righb to hold tribal properv, vote in tribal. shates, rather than taking group identities as tions, hold tribal office, and claim welfare benefits th ds to the dynamic interaction between pw

identities. Taking the interaction behveen I 18. U.S. Code, val. 25, sec. 1302 (8). . . hoaracyand identity seriously means not assuming that the best way of

. j I

our cllerishe,j values is to repress challenges to them, rather than to find ways of bringing those who disagree with us into a more equdl ' and potentially conshuctive relationship (Hollinger 1995,84-85). A11 illusl . . haeve case in point is the Rench government's policy of permitting MU^. ' lil,, to immigrate ~ i t h their multiple wives. Feminists ]lave criticized .:''

for being too permissi+e on the issue of polygamy and iPori% ; nthb burdens that this practice imposes on women and thgwamings d i ~ i , , serninated by from the relevant cultures" (Okin et a!. 1999, 9-1"?P polygyny (which permits men but not women to have multiple spousesj" , pub important values of gender equality at risk. :!II~'

~ , , t it does not follow that a democratic government should close i t s ' borders to polygynous men and women from culti~res where the practic?;si' legal. A lllorally and relevant question is how alternative Publj? policies are likely.to affect the equal freedom of PolYgYnous women ?$ ' ' tlleir female cllildren over time. Prohibiting their entry into France ~ 0 ; ; ~ almost certainly have made matters considerably worse from the Perspec*

,

tive of those Muslim women and their female children who want to find'a:, ' way ofmovingtoward a condition of more equal freedom. An immigratihn policy that a d n i b polygynous Muslims and tllen gives women the effekiih freedom to exit from their marriages, providing a social support ' ' them and their children, takes the interplay of identity and democracy'& riously by recognizing democracy's potential to change identities for'Ihe better. . , 1 ' '

ne converse of the capacity of democratic politics to influencegropp ' identities over time is the capacity of group identities to influence!demi cratic over time. Democratic society can benefit from the additiai ' of some group identities t l~a t are now missing or relatively underfep'iii senfed. The presence of some missing identities would push democdtY'l1 , the direction of greater justice. Many critics of identity politics arerohi: : grjned at the ,'the decline of speciexentered discourse" (Hollinger'lQ'Ji 66). But a reversal of the decline of a certain discourse al~ne-hoi"e~