Amr shehab Amin 37-20200 Abdelrahman Taha 31-2796 Yahia ...eee.guc.edu.eg/Courses/Communications/COMM1003... · Amr shehab Amin 37-20200 Abdelrahman Taha 31-2796 Yahia Mobasher 28-11691

A lightweight and flexible encryptionscheme to protect sensitive data in

Smart Building scenarios

Amr shehab Amin 37-20200Abdelrahman Taha 31-2796Yahia Mobasher 28-11691

German University in CairoMarch 1 , 2018

Outline❦ Introduction

❦ Overview

❦ A Smart Building Use Case

❦ Interactions

❦ Performance analysis

❦ Security analysis

❦ Conclusion

2 Information Theory Presentation.nb

Introduction❦ Internet of Things (IoT)

❦ We spend over 90% of our time in buildings

❦ we create 2.5 billion bytes of data each day

Information Theory Presentation.nb 3

❦ Smart Cities

❦ Smart buildings represent a heterogeneous ecosystem where different types of devices, such as

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) readers, Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

(HVAC) systems

❦ Privacy Issue due to data aggregation and correlation techniques can help to infer users’ daily

habits or track them without their explicit consent


❦ Overcoming the privacy issue

❦ The use of a lightweight and flexible encryption scheme intended to protect sensitive data

❦ Combine the Symmetric and CP‐ABE words to call the proposed scheme as SymCpAbe


❦ Encryption roles

❦ Data are encrypted by using the AES algorithm with ephemeral symmetric keys

❦ These keys are protected through the CP‐ABE scheme

❦ Use of JSON Web Key (JWK)to represent the required cryptographic keys, and JSON Web

Algorithm (JWA) to identify the corresponding algorithms


❦ OverView

❦ CP‐ABE Delegator: This entity delegates CP‐ABE encryption operations to the CP‐ABE

Assistant in order to protect symmetric keys. Such keys are employed to protect data that are

included in events to be used by external services.

❦ CP‐ABEAssistant:It performs the CP‐ABE encryption process to protect symmetric keys, which

are stored in the KSS.


❦ Key Storage Service (KSS): This service stores the CPABE encrypted symmetric keys,in such a

way that they can be obtained by Applications interested on different types of data.

❦ Event Storage Service: (ESS) This service is in charge of storing events containing encrypted

data from the CPABE Delegator to be provided to Applications.

❦ Applications: They represent entities interested on receiving events, in order to provide data‐

driven services.


❦ The first phase (Symmetric key establishment - step 1)

❦ Is focused on setting up a new symmetric key that will be used by the CP‐ABE Delegator to

protect certain data


❦ The second phase (Symmetric key encryption and storage - steps 2.1 and 2.2)

❦ CP-ABE Delegator is intended to maintain the control on how data is disseminated.

❦ Selecting the CP-ABE policy that will be used for encrypting the symmetric key, as well as to provide such policy to the CP-ABE Assistant.


❦ The third phase (Encrypted data event publication - step 3)

❦ CP-ABE Delegator directly publishes encrypted data events on the ESS. Thisway, data are end-to-end protected


❦ The last phase (Encrypted data event retrieval - steps 4.1 and 4.2)

❦ This way, encrypted data are only accessible to those Applications whose CPABE key satisfies the CP-ABE policy that was used for encrypting the corresponding symmetric key associated to such data.


❦ A SMART BUILDING USE CASE

❦ a Gateway receives data from

Data Sources (step 0.1)

❦ Smart Meters

❦ Fire Detectors

❦ RFID readers


❦ The Gateway contacts the ABE Service (ABES)

to establish a symmetric key so that the Gateway will use it to protect incoming

data of the same type (step1) then we will have 2 cases

❦ case 1 : This key lifetime expires and a new symmetric key needs to be established

❦ case 2: The key established is new

❦ For case 1 , the Gateway acts as CP‐ABE Delegator

and provides a CP‐ABE access policy (POL) to the ABES (playing

the CP‐ABE Assistant role) (step 2.1)

(role=“building_administrator“ or role=“smart_service”}


❦ when the ABES receives the corresponding access policy (POL), it encrypts the

symmetric key by the CP‐ABE scheme and stores it on the Symmetric Key

Database, acting as the KSS (step 2.2).

❦ For case 2,the symmetric key that was generated by the ABE will be stored in the

Symmetric key database which also acts as a KSS


❦ After storing the symmetric key in the KSS that will be used later for decryption

The Gateway encrypts incoming data by using the established symmetric key, and

generates a new event including such encrypted information

❦ The Gateway obtains the RFID

reader’s location from Resource directory (step 0.2)

❦ The Gateway obtains the user’s identifier

and mobility condition from the Identity Manager (step 0.3)


❦ Then, the Gateway only encrypts the user’s identifier and the user mobility

❦ Once the event has been generated,

it is published on the Publish/Subscribe Broker (as

ESS (step 3))

❦ Then the ESS forwards it to the Services previously

subscribed on such type of events (step 4.1).


❦ Then, Services request the CP‐ABE encrypted symmetric key from the Symmetric

Key Database (step 4.2) and try to decrypt it with their CP‐ABE private keys

❦ If the decryption process is successful,

the corresponding service will be able to retrieve data by using the decrypted

symmetric key


❦ Interactions

❦ Interactions performed by the entities of the use case previously described

❦ Interactions are divided by 4 phases

❦ PHASE 0. Initial Configurations

❦ PHASE 1. Symmetric key Establishment

❦ PHASE 2. Symmetric key Encryption and Storage

❦ PHASE 3. Encrypted Data Event Publication

❦ PHASE 4. Encrypted Data Event Retrieval


❦ PHASE 0. Initial Configurations

❦ The ABES obtain the CP‐ABE public parameters(PP),inorder to perform the

cryptographic operations defined by the CPABE scheme

❦ Services get their corresponding CP‐ABE private keys (SKs), associated with their

set of attributes


❦ PHASE 1. Symmetric key Establishment

❦ The Gateway and the ABES establish a symmetric key (SYMK)

❦ the Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) algorithm is used to increase the

untraceability of the encrypted data flow

❦ Firstly the gateway generates a key using a specific elliptic curve

❦ Then it includes the selected curve and the public key into a GWEPK structure

{

“alg” : “ECDH-ES” ,

“enc” : “A128GCM” ,

“apu” : “QWxpY2U” ,

“apv” : “Qm9i” ,

“epk” :

{

“kty” : “EC” ,

“crv” : “P-256”,

“x” : “gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0” ,

“y” : “SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps”

}

}


❦ PHASE 2. Symmetric key Encryption and Storage

❦ This phase focuses on protecting the computed SYMK by using CP‐ABE policy

❦ the Gateway includes the access policy (POL) into a Encryption_Info structure

{

“time stamp “ : “2017-04-03T16 : 18 : 02Z” ,

“device id“ : “ http://Smart Building/Gateway01 “ ,

“policy“:

{

“specs“ : “ building _ administrator or emergencies“ ,

“metadata“ : [

{

“name“ : “Creation Date“ ,

“value“: “2017-03-24T12 : 34 : 32Z” ,

“ type“: “http:// sensorml.com/ont/swe/property/

DateTimeStamp “

}

]

}

}

❦ this Encryption_Info is also encrypted using AES algorithm

❦ Then the ABE executes the CPABE encryption operation with the provided policy to protect the

SYMK


❦ the ABES stores the protected SYMK on the Symmetric Key Database

❦ For safety the Gateway establishes a limited lifetime for the SYMK

❦ in case it is obtained by an attacker, it will only be able to recover the data encrypted with

such specific key


❦ PHASE 3. Encrypted Data Event Publication

❦ The Gateway uses the encrypted SYMK to encrypt the data coming from the sensor readers

❦ The Gateway creates a new event including the protected data along with the SYMK used

{

“ device_id “ : “ http : // SmartBuilding / Gateway01” ,

“symmetric_key_id” : “541594b1-2f8d-431a-a5a4-666393 e4adc4” ,

“ encrypted_data “ : “Ewhbw9e2cpyGaa5XDdOUoA==”,

“metadata” : [

{ “name” : “ Description “ ,

“value” : “ Fire alarm” ,

“type” : “urn : org-emergencies : fire “ }

]

}


❦ PHASE 4. Encrypted Data Event Retrieval

❦ Service receives events from the Publish/Subscribe Broker

❦ it performs a request to theSymmetricKeyDatabases with the SYMK used for this event

❦ the Service tries to decrypt such SYMK using its SK previously obtained

❦ If its SK satisfies the policy that was used to encrypt the SYMK, this Service will be able to

decrypt it


❦ PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS






Security Analysis❦ The ABES has the keys that are used by gate ways to encrypt data.Consequently, it could access

the data from the Publish/Subscribe Broker in case they are required.This fact represents an

inherent aspect to be considered for the adoption of ABE‐based schemes since the end users’

privacy could be threatened. In this sense, we have considered the ABES as a semi‐trusted

service (i.e. honest but curious), so it does not confabulate with other entities to use such data

with malicious intent.

❦ SymCpAbe is independent of the length of the cryptographic keys that are to be employed.

While we have considered the P‐256 curve (i.e. a 128‐bit security level) for the ECDHE

algorithm, other curves providing more security level can be used (e.g. P‐384 or P‐521).


❦ Conclusion❦ Smart buildings are been established as the evolution of residential and industrial buildings

already existing. In these nascent environments, produced data can be obtained,

communicated, and processed to allow services to make decisions accordingly.

❦ SymCpAbe has been compared to a pure CP‐ABE approach adopted in other current proposals,

by deploying both scheme on a real smart building scenario in order to evaluate the

performance of our proposal. Thus, evaluation results demonstrate SymCpAbe provides a

more efficient and flexible solution to ensure the protection of sensitive data while scalability

is preserved


Documents

Amr shehab Amin 37-20200 Abdelrahman Taha 31-2796 Yahia ...eee.guc.edu.eg/Courses/Communications/COMM1003... · Amr shehab Amin 37-20200 Abdelrahman Taha 31-2796 Yahia Mobasher 28-11691