Alfred R. Mele - Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes

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Philosophical Review

Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting AttitudesAuthor(s): Alfred R. MeleSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 387-423Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185634 .

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ThePhilosophicaleview, ol. 104, No. 3 (July 995)

Motivation: EssentiallyMotivation-ConstitutingAttitudes

AlfredR. Mele

The termmotivation' as considerable urrency oth n moralphilosophynd in thephilosophy f mind. t appears n debatesbetween nternalistsnd externalistsbout moraludgments ndmoralreasons,n the related ontroversyvermoralrealism,ndinexplanatorychemes orpurposive ehavior fferednthe phi-losophy of mind. But what is motivation?Myaim in thispaper isto elucidate a notion ofmotivation ssociated witha popular per-spectiveon intentionalconduct, a perspectivethat accords statesof mind an important ausal/explanatorybearingon such behav-ior. My strategys to develop an account of a central species fmotivation. pace constraints nd myown limitations reclude myoffering complete account of motivationhere; however, he ac-count to be developed illuminatesmotivation s a whole.1. What is the Question?Compare thequestions"What s motivation?" nd "What sknowl-edge?" The latter dmits of a reformulation-"What is itforS toknow thatp?"-that makes the structure f propositionalknowl-edge explicit: such knowledge involves a subject,an object, andsome relationshipbetweenthem. s there a similarly evealingre-formulation f the question about motivation? onsider the ques-tion "What is it for S to be motivated to do x?" Here, we findstructure, ut we also findambiguity. eing motivatedto do x issometimesunderstood as requiring motivateddoing fx: there sa success eadingof motivated o do x'. Alternatively,hen we saythat someone is (or was) motivatedto do x we sometimes meanonlythatshe has (or had) some motivation o do x. One mayalsoworry hat thisquestion, in mentioningdoing, s too narrow as areformulation f the originalquestion. People desire such thingsas worldpeace and financial ecurity; ut even thoughsuch thingsare not doings, manysuch desires seem to be motivational tates.

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One may try o recast the original question as "What is a moti-vational state?"But there s ambiguity ere, as well.Ann desires toacquire x and she believesthatshe will acquire it only fshe doesA. She does A,desiring o do A and being motivated o do preciselythat. s the belief itself motivational tate n virtueof the role itplays n Ann's motivateddoing of A? That depends on how 'mo-tivational tate' s tobe read. On a broad reading,anyattitude hatplays a major, typicalrole in producing a motivatedaction maycount as a motivational tate.' Interpretedmore narrowly,motiva-tional states are limited to states that themselves onstitutemoti-vation.Plainly,Ann's belief that she willacquire x only fshe doesA is not itself onstitutive f motivation o A.The question "What is a motivation-constitutingtate?"-or"What is itfora stateto be motivation-constituting?"-avoidsheseambiguities.The metaphysics f constitution eed not be an issuehere: for a readership acking perfect inguistic itch,thequestionmight have been "What is it forsomething to be a motivation?"Assuming hat all motivation-constitutingtemsare representation-al states of mind-or "attitudes,"for short-the question maybephrased in termsof attitudes. ater, will raise and answer morespecificversion of the question-about essentially otivation-con-stitutingttitudes.2. A Perspectiveon ActionOur commonsense notions of motivation nd intentional actionare intertwined.A thoroughdefense of a theoryof motivationwould require a rigorousdefense of a theoryof action. Giventhemagnitude of the latterproject,here I simplyadopt a popularperspectiveon intentional action thatI have defended at lengthelsewhere Mele 1992). At theheartof thisperspective-"perspec-tive P"-is a pair of theses: (1) all intentionalactions are caused(but not necessarilydeterministicallyo);2 (2) among the causes,in all cases, are mental tems (eventsor states), ncluding motiva-tion-constitutingttitudes.PerspectiveP is an alternative o at least three others. In one(P1), intentional ctions,or some of them (e.g., free ctions), are

'For a broad reading of thiskind,see Dancy 1993, 2.2Probabilistic ausationis an option.388



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MOTIVATIONnot caused and are to be given noncausal explanations partly ntermsof mental items (see, e.g., Melden 1961). In another (P2),all intentional ctions may be caused, but explanations n termsofsuch things s beliefs and desires (normally) are noncausal expla-nations (see, e.g., Peters 1958 and Wilson 1989). In yet another(P3), intentional ctions are caused, but mental states and eventsare involvedneitherin the causation nor in the explanation ofintentional ctions (see, e.g., Skinner1953). Obviously, roponentsofthese perspectives re not egalitarian bout them; ively,nstruc-tive debates have been staged over their relative merits.Havingentered the fray lsewhere, steer clear of it here. My aim is toilluminate a notion of motivation s it functions n perspectiveP.Incidentally,n approach to understandingbehavior that featuresmental itemsin causal roles is by no means peculiar to philoso-phers. As psychologist ouglas Mook reports, he contemporary,"cognitive," approach to motivationn his field nvestigates the-ories about internalmental perations as part of the causation fbehavior" (1987, 53; my talics).Each of the four perspectives dentified aces familiar roblems.Those who embrace perspectiveP usually do so as partof a natu-ralistic tand on agency. As they see it, mental items that play acausal/explanatoryrole in intentionalconduct bear some impor-tantrelation to physical tates nd events.Relationsthathave beenexplored include identity both type-typend token-token)andvarious kinds of supervenience.Each kind of relationfaces diffi-culties, and some theoristshave argued that anything ess thantype-typedentity whichencountersfamiliar roblems)will fail toavert an unacceptable epiphenomenalism.3There is a generalproblemabout the causal relevanceofthe mental n a naturalisticframework. his is not to say,however, hatthe problem is insol-uble.4Theoristsattracted o P1 or P2 face the difficultaskof devel-oping an adequate notion of noncausalbelief/desireexplanationof action. Three decades ago, Donald Davidson issued an impor-tantchallenge to proponentsof these perspectives.n a nutshell,it is this:Given thatwhen we act intentionally e act forreasons,

3For a usefulcollection of essays on these themes,see Heil and Mele1993.4For my own attempt t a resolution, ee Mele 1992, chap. 2.389

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ALFRED R. MELEprovide an account of the reasons forwhichwe act that does nottreat our having)those reasonsas figuringn the causation oftherelevantbehavior (Davidson 1963). Applythe challenge to a spe-cificcase. Ann has a pair of reasonsforgivingBob a failinggrade:first, is work merits hat grade, as she knows, nd she desirestogive her students hegrades theydeserve;second, she knowsboththat her failingBob would make him ineligible for a game againsther son's team and that Bob's teamwould probably ose withoutBob, and she would love her son's teamto win.As it happens,AnnfailsBob for exactly ne of thesereasons,R. In virtueof what s ittrue that she failedhim forR, and not forR*, ifnot that R (orher having R), and not R*, played a suitable causal role in herfailinghim?5Although I know of no compelling argumentthatDavidson's challenge cannotbe met, I do know of arguments-arguments regardas compelling-that the most detailed attemptsto meet it have failedin instructive ays Mele 1992, chap. 13).

A major problem forP3, as part of a behavioristerspective, sstandard fare n textbookson motivational sychology. n animalsometimes behaves in quite differentwaysunder exactlysimilarexternal conditions.The link between stimulusand response inthese cases is mediatedbyunobserved nternal tates Mook 1987,58-59). Considerable support maybe found in most recent dis-cussionsof animal learning (e.g., Toates 1986, chaps. 6 and 7) forthe hypothesis hat even in such animals as rats,relevant nternalstates include mental representationsof goals and means. Ofcourse,P3 is not solelya behaviorist erspective.Old-style piphe-nomenalism i.e., epiphenomenalismcombinedwith ubstancedu-alism) mayendorse it as well;but a danglingmental ife,one caus-allyand explanatorilynert withrespectto overtbehavior, s notan attractive rospect.I do notwishto suggest hat theoristmust cceptwithout ual-ification oth of the centralelements of perspective tobe attract-ed by the position on motivation hat I will advance. However,

5One mighturge that there s no factof the matter bout whichreasonthe agent acts for n cases of this kind. But,surely,n at least some caseslike Ann's, we do act for one of our reasons and not for the other.As ithappens, Ann's moralcharacter like mine, hope) is such that hewouldnot fail a studentforthe sake of a victory y her son's team.6A refereefor thisournal observed thatalthough Ginet 1990 advancesan alternative o perspective , it s not clear that nythingGinetsaysthereprecludes his endorsingthe view of motivation o be developed here. For390




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MOTIVATIONlackingthe space here to defendthe perspective favor,nd find-ing it impossibleto tacklecertain mportant uestions about mo-tivation roma neutralperspective, deem it best to laymycardson the table.3. Motivation nd DesireHere are sixpopular theses n thephilosophicaland psychologicalliterature n motivation.

1. Motivation s present in the animal kingdom,but does notextend throughout t.72. Motivated beings have a capacity to represent goals andmeans to goals.3. A motivational ttitudemay have eithera goal or a means toa goal as its object. (In common philosophical terms,thereis both intrinsic nd extrinsicmotivation.)84. Motivationvaries n strength.5. The more stronglymotivated gentsare to do A, in compar-ison to alternative oursesof action, the more likely hey reto do A, otherthingsbeing equal.9

some relevantpointsabout action-explanation n which Ginet and I dis-agree, see Mele 1992,250-55.7For an informative iscussionof how the lines are to be drawn,seeToates 1986,chap. 2. For a statement f the prevailing iew n motivationalpsychology,ee Mook 1987, 104-5.81n the philosophical literature, he distinction etween intrinsic ndextrinsic or instrumental)motivation ypicallys framed n terms of de-siresor wants.An intrinsicesireis a desireof somethingfor ts ownsake,or as an end. A whollyntrinsicesire is a desire of something s an endand not also as a means to, or as a constituent f, or as evidenceof,some-thing else. (S maydesire her happinesswholly ntrinsically hile also de-siring hat he continue to be healthy, oth as an end and as a constituentof,or means to,herhappiness.)An extrinsicesire s a desire for omethingfor tsbelieved conducivenessto somethingelse that one desires,whereconduciveness s not limited to means/end relations and includes part/whole relations.To the extentto whichS desires ivingcourageously s aconstituent f livingvirtuously,he formerdesire is an extrinsic esire, nthe specifiedsense. Of course, S mightalso desire living ourageouslyforits ownsake-that is, ntrinsically.ot all Extrinsic esiresare whollyxtrin-sic.For discussionof variousnotionsof "intrinsicmotivation" nd "intrin-sic behavior" in the psychological iterature,ee Heckhausen 1991, 403-13. Also see Deci and Ryan1985.

9PsychologistJohntkinson legantly rticulates n alleged connectionbetweenmotivational trengthnd behavior:"The act which s performed391



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6. Whenever gents actintentionally,here s something hey remotivated in the "success" sense) to do.'0Divergent onceptions ofmotivationmaybe at work n philosoph-ical thought bout motivationalmatters.My concern in this paperis a notion of motivationconsistentwith (among other things)these six claims.Readerswho accept all six claims are likely o bemore interested n the resultthan thosewho do not; but I conjec-ture thatmost readers do accept all ofthese claims,on some read-

ing or other.R. S. Peters concludes The Concept fMotivation ychidingmoti-vationalpsychologistsor their cientific spirations nd suggestingthat "scrutiny f the conceptuallylluminating tartmade byAris-totle" wouldprovidea morepromising pproach (1958, 157). Oneof the chief faults hatPeters findswith motivational sychologistsis theircommitment o a causal approachto explainingbehavior.suspectthat,when writing is conclusion,Petersforgot strikingclaimin book 6 of Aristotle'sNicomacheanthics"the origin of ac-tion-its efficient,ot its finalcause-is choice, and thatofchoiceis desireand reasoningwith view to an end" (1139a31-32).The term orexis', ranslatedhere as 'desire', also maybe trans-lated as 'motivation'.One reason that desire' is more convenientthan 'motivation' s a standard translation or orexis' s that t al-lowsmore easilyfor the precise specification f the objectf a mo-tivation-constitutingttitude.Another s that the noun 'orexis'hasa cognateverb, orego', nd both can be translated s 'desire', butamong a set of alternativess the act forwhich the resultantmotivationsmost positive.The magnitude ofresponse and the persistence f behaviorare functions f the strength fmotivation o perform he act relative othe strength fmotivation o perform ompetingacts" (1957, 361). Com-pare this to a familiar hesis advanced by Donald Davidson: "If an agentwants to do x more thanhe wantsto do y and he believeshimself reetodo either x or y,then he will intentionally o x if he does eitherx or yintentionally"1980, 23). For criticism f this thesisand a defense of analternative,ee Mele 1992, chap. 3.10Notice hatclaim 6 does not assert that every ntentional ction is amotivated ction. It takes no stand,for nstance, on whethercertain un-wantedactional side-effectsf ntentional ctionsare themselvesntention-al actions. For example,when I playtennis n mytennis hoes, knowinglyshortenthe "life" of my shoes,whilehavingno desire to do that.Claim 6is silenton thequestion whether intentionallyhorten he ifeof my hoes;but it nsists hat ome relevantntentional ctionismotivated t thistime:forexample,my playingtennis,my playing ennis n tennisshoes.

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MOTIVATIONnot, ofcourse, as 'motivation'. etting lassicalGreek aside,relatedpointsmaybe made about philosophicaluses of the terms desire','want',and 'motivation'.We can saythat someone desiresto swimtoday, r,more naturally,hatshewantsto swim oday;and we cansaythat someone has a desire to swimtoday, r, ess naturally,hatshe has a want to swim today.However, the expressions is moti-vated to swim today' and 'has motivation o swim today' are notonlymore awkward han their most elegant counterpart, hey realso lessprecise.Motivation o swim oday ncludes a desire to swimtoday,but it also is provided by other desires that support thatdesire. If Ann wants to swim todaybecause she wants to exercisetoday (as she does everyday) and believes that, given a tendoninjurysustainedin her daily running,swimming urrentlys thebest formofexercise for her,her desire to exercisetodayprovidesher withmotivation o swimtoday.Further, he claim that she ismotivatedo swim today ets in both her desire to swim todayandher desireto exercise todayas statesmotivating er to swim.Partlyfor thisreason, some philosophershave adopted the conventionofusingthe noun 'desire',or 'want',as a synonymor motivation'.This practiceoccasionally roubles ficionadosofordinary sage.'Desire' bringsto mind affective one or appetitivecontent,and'has a want toA' is stilted. hese worries an be quelled. As I notedelsewhere (Mele 1992, 47), distinctions lurredbythis usage canbe recapturedbydifferentiatingmong typesofwants or desires(which termsmaybe used interchangeably s termsof art)-forexample, egoisticversus altruisticdesires,affective ersus non-af-fectivedesires, appetitiveversusnon-appetitive esires (comparemydesire to eat pizza and drinkbeer withyourdesire to continuereading thisessay).However, hereare other,more substantive or-ries,as I willexplain later.Not all desiresforx constitutemotivation ortheagenttopursuex. Someone who desires worldpeace maybe convincedthat thereis nothingshe can do to promoteit. Consequently, he maybe inno way nclined to make efforts imed at promoting t. Still,giventhatshe desires worldpeace, news ofprogresson thatfrontwouldbe expected to bringher some pleasure; and partlybecause shedesires world peace, she maybe inclined to seek out such news,or at least to attendto it when she happens to encounter tin themedia. But then there s somethinghatthe desire forworldpeacemotivates er to do (at least in a sense of motivates' hatdoes not

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require success): namely,to attend to news of progress on thatfront.Not all of our desires are for actions of ours,and not everydesire, D, constitutes r providesmotivation or actions aimed atbringingabout D's object. But desires may motivate ctions thatare not so aimed, as the precedingexample illustrates.The foregoing aisesa problemfor ome attempts o characterizedesirein termsof "directionoffit," n expression round which acottage ndustry as grown."On one notion of satisfactionhat p-plies both to beliefs nd to desires, belief thatp and a desire thatp have the same satisfactionondition: tsbeing the case thatp.'2But whereasmanydesires are functionally it o contribute o theirown satisfaction,n thissense, relatively ewbeliefs re. (Potentiallyself-fulfillingeliefs re the exception,not thenorm.) The pointissometimes xpressed n termsof "directionof fit":"belief aims attruth" Williams1973, 151), it aims to fit heworld;desire aims atgetting heworld to fit t.In thisconnection,Michael Smithwrites:"the difference etweenbeliefs nd desires n terms f direction ffitcomes down to a counterfactual ependence of a belief and adesire thatp, on a perception that notp: roughly, belief thatp isa state thattendsto go out of existence n the presence of a per-ception that notp, whereasa desire thatp is a state that tends toendure,disposingthe subject n thatstateto bring tabout thatp"(1987, 54; cf.Pettit nd Smith1990, 574).

Smith'scharacterizationfdesire sunsuccessful. tanding t theairport,waitingforAngela's plane to arrive, t occursto me thatshould have called fromhome to see whetherher plane departedat the scheduled time. I now desire thatAngela's plane departedon time;but this desire in no way disposes me to bringit aboutthat the plane left on time,since it does not dispose me to en-deavorto change thepast.'3Thisfailing fSmith'scharacterization"There is a usefuldiscussion of the literaturen Humberstone1992.'21t is controversialwhether a belief and a desire can have the samecontent.AlvinGoldman, forexample, takesthe contentsof beliefs to bedeclarativepropositions nd the contentsof desiresto be optativepropo-sitions 1970, 101-2). For relatedviews, ee Castafieda1975,chap. 10; Hare1972, chap. 3; and Kenny 1989, 36-41. The point to be made can be re-formulatedn a wayconsistentwiththese views.13Smith,espondingto thepotentialobjection that"desires not a suit-ably broad category fmental state to encompass all those stateswiththeappropriate direction of fit," ays thatwe mayreplace 'desire' with pro-attitude' 1987, 55). Notice that, tandingat the airport, had a pro-atti-

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MOTIVATIONleaves it open, however, hat all action-desireshat p dispose theiragents to endeavor to bring t about thatp. My action-desires thatp9 are desires "that I A," where A' is an action variable. returnto this ssue shortly.Another problem for Smith's characterization f desire also isproblematic for the idea that the noun 'desire' (or the noun'want') is a synonymor motivation'.Although mydesire thatAn-gela's plane lefton timemightmotivateme to check a video mon-itor at the airport n order to reassure myself bout this, desiresare imaginablethat do not motivate t all, in any egitimate ense.Connie is a fan of the New York Giants. The Giants are playingtheirtraditionalrivals next month and she hopes theywill win.Hoping is a species ofdesiring;'4 ut,as Connie knows, he has nochance of discoveringhow thegame turnsout: for she is about tobegin pilotinga spaceship to a remotegalaxyand she knows thatby game-time he willbe permanentlyut off romEarth'ssportingnews. Robert Audi has claimed that someone who wantsp "tendsto think reflect,muse, or the like) or daydreamabout p at leastoccasionally, nd especially n idle moments" (1973, 4). If this strue,we may plausibly uppose that thiscognitivebehavior s mo-tivatedbythe wantor desire thatp. However,Connie is a specialperson;when she knows thatshe has no chance of learninghowmatters f relativelyminor mportanceto her have turned out,shehas no tendency t all to thinkor daydream about those matters,even thoughshe desires a particularoutcome. Even so, ifduringher flightConnie were,per mpossible,o learn that the Giants hadwon,she would be pleased bythenews-an indication that t con-tinues to be true of her that she desires a Giantsvictory.Appar-ently,Connie's desire for a Giantsvictory s motivationallynert(under her actual circumstances).'5tude towardtheplane's having departedon time;but thatpro-attitudenno way disposed me to bring t about that the plane lefton time.14TheAmerican eritage ictionaryeports, n the usage note on 'expect',that "to hope s to desire,usuallywith onfidence n the likelihood of gain-ing what is desired." (Incidentally, believe that the final clause is toostrong.)'51t may be observed that f, during the flight, onnie's co-pilotwereto ask whether he wantsthe Giants to win the game, she would answer nthe affirmativeother thingsbeing equal). However,her so answering snot motivatedyher desire that the Giants win.When a friend asks mewhether want to complete this paper by the end of the century, nd Itruthfullynsweryes, t is not mydesireto finish hepaper thatmotivates

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Motivationallynert desires are exceptional.Most of our desiresdispose us to do something or other. Many dispose us to trytobringabout what we desire. Some dispose us instead to seek, orattend to, information bout the desired items (e.g., world peace,when we deem ourselves ncapable of promoting t), or to reflector muse about the objectsof our desires. Some desiresdispose usto do all of this and more.A distinctionbetween "standing" and "occurrent" desires orwantsmerits ttention Alston 1967; Goldman 1970, 86-88). As theverb want' is standardly sed, 'She wants her children to do well'maybe true ofa devotedmothereven whileshe iswholly bsorbedin writing metaphysical reatiseor dreamlessly leeping. At suchtimes,the mother is not thinking bout her children;nor needsome representation f her children's doing well be stored in amental desire-bin.Rather, ts being true of the woman, even atthese times, hat she wants her children to do well consists n herbeing disposed to have so-called "occurrent" desiresfor her chil-dren's welfare.Such a disposition s a standingwant or desire.Occurrentdesires are not,as the name may uggest, ccurrencesor events:theyare states. One alleged difference etween occur-rentand standingdesires s thattheformer,nd the former lone,are present to consciousness (Goldman 1970, 86). However,thisidea is doubly mistaken. First,we are conscious of some of ourstanding esires.Ann, a coffeedrinker,s disposed to acquire anoccurrent desire to drink coffee when she smells coffee. Whilereading an article about the presence of thisdisposition n manycoffeedrinkers,t occurs toAnn that she has thisdisposition.Sheis aware or conscious of thisdispositionof hers-that is, of thisstanding desire. Second, part of what the distinction betweenstandingand occurrent desires is supposed to markis the differ-ence between desiresthat nfluencebehavioronly ftheybecome"activated" n someway nd desires thatare already ctive;but notall active desiresare presentto consciousness-at least ifcommonsense and cliniciansmaybe trusted.'6Ann mighthave spoken asmyso answering, ut a desire to speak truthfullyor something of thesort). One may suggest hatdesires thatp, being intentional ttitudes,re,in part,thoughts bout p. However, his uggestionwould not support theclaim that Connie's desire for a Giantsvictorymotivateser "to think . .or daydream bout" a Giantsvictory. ather, he suggestion s simply hata desire thatp isa certain kind of thought bout p.16For discussion of some relevant mpiricalwork, ee Vollmer1993. If

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MOTIVATIONshe did to Bob because she wanted to hurt his feelings, eventhoughshe was not conscious at the time ofher desire to do that.Standing desires for x are dispositions o acquire occurrentde-sires forx. Occurrent desires are "active" desires-desires thatdonot need to be aroused in order to exert an influence on theagent's conduct. The dispositionsthat constitute tanding desireshave no explicit representational ontent. They are accorded acontent-supplying escription n virtue of the content of the oc-currentdesires n which their "activation" consists.Havingno ex-plicit representational ontent, tanding desires are not explicit t-titudes.i7 Rather, heyare dispositionsto have explicitattitudesofa certainkind. They are,we may say,"implicit"motivational tti-tudes-provided that explicit attitudes n which their activationconsists re themselvesmotivational ttitudes, nd not motivation-ally nertdesires. Discussionofmotivational ttitudesn thispapershould be presumed to be about "occurrent" attitudesunless ex-plicitly oted otherwise.)'8there re occurrentdesires that re not presentto consciousness, re therealso occurrent beliefs that are not present to consciousness? leave thisissue open.17Gilbert arman writes, one believes something xplicitlyfone's be-lief n that thing nvolves n explicitmental representationwhose contentis the content of that belief"; later, he speaks of something"explicitlyrepresented n one's mind" as "written own in Mentalese as it were,with-out necessarily eingavailable to consciousness" (1986, 13-14). This is thegeneral pictureI mean to evoke withthe expression explicit attitudes';but I ventureno opinion about how he contentsofattitudes re explicitlyrepresented,nor do I claim that they re all represented n the same way(e.g., in a language of thought). ncidentally,my subsequent use of 'im-plicit' in 'implicitmotivational ttitudes'does not parallel Harman's useof the term n his expression implicitbeliefs' (e.g., 13).'8Suppose I compose a long shopping ist, orget obringthelistto themarket, nd, owing to imperfectmemory, ail to buy one of the items onmy ist-say, yogurt.When I strollthroughthe dairy sectionand pick upbutter ut not yogurt, presumably ave no occurrentdesire to buyyogurt.It has been suggested to me (by one of the editors) that do, however,have at the time a desire to buy yogurt-a standing one. I findthis m-plausible. As I see it, ust as my belief that yogurt s on the list is extin-guished,so is mydesire to buy yogurt.To be sure,when I returnhomeand compare my listwith my groceries, might say-truly-"Shucks, Iwanted to buyyogurt";but,ofcourse,therewas a timeatwhich had thisdesire-a timepriorto my trolling hrough he dairy ection. A thoroughdefense of my way of distinguishing etween occurrent and standingde-sireswould require more space than the ssue meritshere.The main thesesto be defended in thispaper are consistentwithmore traditionalwaysof

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ALFRED R. MELE

4. The Place of Desire in EssentiallyMotivation-Constitutingttitudes

JonathanDancy attributeso "Humeans" about motivationhe the-sis thatdesires"cannot existwithoutmotivating"; theyare essen-tially r necessarilymotivatingtates" (1993, 2).19Althoughthereis a significantlementof truth n this attribution,t is a bit wideof the mark.Obviously,motivating'here is not used in its successsense; Dancy means 'motivation-constituting'.ven so, the thesis sfalse and should be eschewed by good "Humeans": some desires,as I have argued, are not motivation-constitutingt all, much lessessentially o. Here I turn to what may be termed,with Dancy,"essentially" motivation-constitutingttitudes-or "EMC atti-tudes," for short.Essentiallyand contingentlymotivation-constitutingttitudesmaybe distinguished s follows.An attitudeof an agent S is essentiallymotivation-constitutingf and only if it is motivation-constitutingnot only n Ss actual situationbut also in all possible scenarios nwhich S has it. An attitudeof an agent S is contingently otivation-constitutingf and only falthoughit is motivation-constitutingnSs actual situation,t is not so in some possible scenarios n whichS has it.Thus, my urrentdesirefor Giantsvictory ver theEaglesnextmonth s contingentlymotivation-constituting;or t is in factmotivation-constitutingutitwouldnot be so in a possiblescenarioin whichI am like Connie in the pertinentpsychologicalrespectand am co-pilotingher spaceship.Detailed exploration of the nature and range of contingentlymotivation-constitutingttitudes s a project for another paper.Some theorists ave urged that some beliefs-construed as cogni-tivist r "truth-seeking" ttitudes-are, or mightbe, motivation-constituting Dancy 1993,McDowell 1978, McNaughton 1988,Na-gel 1970). The question whetherthere are essentiallymotivation-constitutingeliefs s examined shortly. ut it is worthnotingthatthe existenceof contingentlymotivation-constitutingognitivist e-liefs s compatiblewiththe "Humean" idea thatessentiallymotiva-tion-constitutingttitudes re found only among desires and atti-makingthe distinction, ut some of the traditional etailsare objectiona-ble, forthe reasons I offered.)'9Cf.McNaughton1988, 49, on "essentiallymotivational tates."

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MOTIVATIONtudes havingdesiresas constituents. lthough commentfurtheron thiscompatibilityater,my primary oncern is EMC attitudes.In thissection, motivate trioof thesesabout EMC attitudes.

Ti. Any desire havingthe agent's actingin some wayor otheras a representedobject-any "action-desire"-is an EMC at-titude.T2. All EMC attitudeshave the agent's acting n some wayorother as a representedobject.T3. In human beings as theyactuallyare, anyEMC attitude s,or is partially onstituted y, n action-desire.More specifi-cally lettingA' be an actionvariable), in human beingsasthey ctually re, anyEMC attitudehavingthe agent'sA-ingas a representedobject is, or encompasses,a desire to A.I startwithT1. An "action-desire," n the specifiedsense, is anagent's desireregardinghow she herselfwillact; desires for othersto act in certainwaysare not "action-desires," n this sense. If

desiringtoA,where A' is an actionvariable,were not to precludethepresenceofcertaincognitive tates, ne mightdesire toAwhilehavingno motivation o A. For example, if an agent could desireto A while being convinced thatshe cannot A, she mightnot bethe least bit inclined to try o A. However,desiringto A does pre-clude the presence of cognitivestatesof this kind. If I am con-vinced that cannottravel aster han thespeed of ight, r changethepast,or defeat thecurrentheavyweighthampionoftheworldin a fairfight, hen although I mightwish thatI could do thesethings, do not desireodo them.Achieving herepresented bjectsof action-desiress doxastically pen for the agent: ifshe does notexplicitly elieve thatshe can A, at least she is not convincedthatshe cannotA.20Anydesire toA (A being an actionvariable), by tsverynature, nclines theagent, n some measure,toA intentionally,or to try o A, or to try o put herself n a position to A. This ispartof what t is to be an action-desire.2'n so inclining n agent,

20For an argumentthat when desiringto A we do not alwaysexplicitlybelieve thatwe can A, see Mele 1992, 62.211assume a viewof the attitudes ccordingto which everybeliefthatp is essentially belief thatp, everyntention o A is essentiallyn intentionto A,every ction-desire oA is essentiallyn action-desire oA,and so on.Thus, forexample, Ss belief thatp in Ss actual situation s not somethingother than a belief thatp in any otherpossible scenario,and Ss action-desire to A in his actual situation s not somethingotherthan an action-desire to A in any otherpossible scenario.

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an action-desire onstitutesmotivation o A. Of course, as desiresare commonlyconceived, someone who desires to A may also de-sire to B and recognize that she cannot do both.22 ut being in-clined,in some measure, toA intentionallys compatiblewith lsobeing inclined, in some measure, to B intentionally, ecognizingthat one cannot bothA and B.23Now,for T2. Take anydesire whose representedobject does notinclude the agent's acting:for nstance,Al's desire,D, for the wel-fare of his children.If Al were to believe that he can contribute(in ways acceptable to him) to his children's welfare, hen, givenD's presence, he would have some motivation o try o contributeto it.But hishavingthatmotivation s not ensuredbythepresenceofD itself. n Al,D mightbe accompanied bythe convictionthatthere s nothinghe can do to contribute o his children'swelfare;forexample,Al mightbe on Connie's spaceship,withno hope ofinfluencing is children's ife on Earth. n thatcase, Al would haveno motivation o try to contribute to his children's welfare. Ofcourse,even if Al is convincedthat he can do nothingabout theirwelfare,he maybe motivated i.e., have motivation)to think orwonder about how his children are doing; but the presence ofDitself oes not ensure the presence ofsuch motivation,s the orig-inal spaceship example indicates.Al mightbe psychologicallyoconstituted hathe is not the leastbit inclined to think bout theobject, x, of a desire of his unless he believes that he has somechance of contributing o x, or,at least,of acquiring informationabout x.I have just argued that, among desires, nly those having theagent's acting n somewayas a representedobject (i.e., onlyaction-desires) are EMC attitudes.Should therebe EMC attitudesotherthan desires, my argumentwould leave it open whetherthey-or

22FrankJacksonrejects this (1985). For a replytoJackson,see Mele1992, 48-50.23Although esiring oA entailsbeing inclined (in some measure) toAintentionally, r to try o A, etc., the converse is false. For example, mydesire to run a mile this evening nclines me to run the fourth 20 yardsintentionally,he thirdquarter-mile ntentionally,tc. However,my beingthus nclined to run, say, he fourth 20 yardsdoes not requirethat havea desire specifically o run that egment.Mydesire to runthe mile is desireenough.

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MOTIVATIONsome ofthem-falsifyT2. The question whether uch attitudes x-ist is addressed shortly.Given T1 and the existence of action-desires, t least some MCattitudes re action-desires. hat takes us part of the wayto T3.Whether,n actual humanbeings,all EMC attitudes re, or encom-pass, action-desires emainsto be seen. Do we have EMC attitudestowardA-ing hatare not themselves esirestoA and are not evenpartially omposed of such desires?An argumentfor a negativeanswer mayproceed byelimination.

Various "practical" attitudeshaving the agent's A-ingas a rep-resentedobjectmay be considered.Hoping toA, as I have alreadyindicated, s constitutedn partbydesiringto A. The same is trueofwishingto A. How about intendingto A?Of course, onlyifintentions re motivation-constitutingan theybe a problemforT3; but intentions raditionallyave been placedin theconative phere.On a once-populardesire/belief eduction-ismabout intentions,ntentions re everybit as motivational s thedesires thatpartially onstitute hem.However, uch reductionismhas encountered powerfulobjectionsin recentyears,objections Itake to be persuasive.24ntentions, n myownview, re executiveattitudes owardplans (Mele 1992, chaps. 8-11). Althoughtherep-resentational ontentofintentions s isomorphicwith hatofsomedesires,the intending nd desiringattitudesiffer.ntentions o Aare states ofbeing settlednot necessarilyrrevocably)upon A-ing;but one can desire to A, and even desire to A more stronglyhanone desiresnot to A, withoutbeing settledupon A-ing. Consideran agentwho wants more stronglyo respond in kind to a recentinsult than to refrainfromdoing so, but who, owing to moralqualms, is deliberating bout what to do and is, as yet,unsettledabout whetherto retaliate.)The settlednessfeature of intentionsis an essentialfeature fthe intending ttitude,featurenot essen-tial to the desiring ttitude.But it does not followfromthis differ-ence thatintentiondoes not incorporatedesire. Intending to A,as I view t,encompassesdesiring oA (butwithout eing reducibleto a combination of desire and belief).25Part of what it is to be

241n itssimplest ersion, he viewat issue reduces an intention o A to(i) a desire toA that s stronger hananycompetingdesireand (ii) a beliefthatone willA. For criticismf this nd variousrefined ersions, ee Brand1984, Bratman1987,and Mele 1992, esp. chaps. 8-10.250n a standardview of desire,thepsychological eatures f desirestoA in virtueofwhichthey ontribute o intentionalA-ings re theircontent

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settledpon A-ing s to desireto A; lacking a desire to A, one lacksan element of a psychological ommitment o A-ing hat s intrinsicto being settled upon A-ing, nd therefore o intending to A. Tobe sure, we can coherently aysuch things s "I intendto pay thatunjust trafficine,but I don't desire to pay t." Butherewe retreatto a narrow ense of desire' alluded to earlier.Even if grudginglypay the fine, have an instrumental esire to pay it. If intentionsto A encompass desires to A, intentions re no problem forthethesis T3) that n real humanbeings,anyEMC attitudehavingtheagent's A-ing as a represented object is, or encompasses, desireto A.Do some beliefs ndermine this thesis?A noncognitivistmighturge that to form belief that oughttoA is to issue a commandto myself the command to A), or,more prosaically, o formanintention o A.26One might ontend that n that case, whatwouldsatisfyhe belief s what would satisfy he intention:namely,myA-ing. It is not mypurpose here to close the door on thisoption. (Ihave criticized t elsewhere.)27f intentions re EMC attitudes,theoristwho makes a case for the thesis that to formbeliefs ofcertain kinds is to form ntentionswillhave made a case forthethesisthat some beliefs re EMC attitudes.Notice, however, hat nconstitutingntentions, hese alleged beliefsencompass desires,fam right bout intentions, nd therefore aise no problemforT3.My presentconcern is "ordinary"beliefs-beliefs satisfied ytheirbeing true. hat is, myconcern is beliefon a cognitivistonstrual.28Noncognitivistonstrualsofmybelief that oughttoA as a desireto A, or as an attitude hatencompasses an action-desire e.g., anand theirstrength.n my view of the contribution f intentionso A tointentionalA-ings, he "settledness"feature of intentions s crucial andcannot be captured n terms f desirestrength and content),nor in termsof this plus belief (Mele 1992, 76-77 and chap. 9).26For a putativeconnection between assenting to an ought-judgmentand assenting to a self-command,ee Hare 1963, 79. For the view thatintention s a speciesofjudgment, ee Davidson 1980, 99-102; cf.Davidson1985, 206. (I takeHare's references o self-commandso be metaphoricalreferences o intention-formation.)27Mele1995, chap. 2. For criticism f the idea, in particular, hat nten-tion s a species of evaluativeudgment or belief,see Bratman 1985 andMele 1987, 43-44.28"Cognitivism" bout ought-beliefs laces themamong the truth-val-ued attitudes.Cognitivists eed not hold thatought-beliefsre not moti-vation-constituting.

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MOTIVATIONintention to A), obviouslycannot falsify 3. And noncognitivistsabout such beliefshave no reason to hold thatthey onstitutemo-tivation o A without onstituting r encompassing a desire to A.So are any cognitivist eliefsEMC attitudes?The primary an-didates are cognitivistmoral ught-beliefs-specifically,gents' (cog-nitivist)beliefs that theythemselvesought,morally, o A. Someapparentproblemsfor the thesisthatsuch beliefsare (essentially)motivation-constitutingavebeen explored in detail byopponentsand proponents of internalistmoral realism. The problems ofamoralismand wickedness re cases in point.29Neitherside in thedebate has been bowled overbytheopposition'streatment f thesedeviations rommoralhealth.However, notherapparentdifficultyhas not received the attention tdeserves. call it "the problem oflistlessness.30Consider an unfortunatewoman,Eve, sufferingrom evere ist-lessnessor clinicaldepressionowingto therecenttragicdeaths ofher husband and childrenin a plane crash. It seems conceivablethat he retains ertainof her beliefs boutwhat shemorally ughtto do whilebeing devoid ofmotivation o act accordingly. ve hasaided her ailing uncle foryears,believingherselfto be morallyrequired to do so. Her memory has not been damaged, and shemay deem her circumstancesnot to have changed in such a wayas to alterher moral obligationsto heruncle. So perhapsshe con-tinues to believe that she ought,morally, o help him but now isutterlywithoutmotivation o do so, owingto her depression.Herdepression, tseems,mayconsistartlyn theutter bsence ofmo-tivation o help her uncle, or itmay deprive er of all motivationto help him. Ifthis s possible,people maybelieve thatthey ught,morally, o A while having no motivationto A. Now, surely,noactual human being is essentiallymmune to clinical depression,even in itsmost severe forms.And ifsome possible (i.e., forus)instancesof clinicaldepressionor listlessness re such thatpeoplewho believe thattheyought,morally, o A devoid ofmotivation oA, then moral ought-beliefs re not essentiallymotivation-consti-tutingfor actual human beings. No matter whatwe believe we

29SeeMcNaughton1988, chap. 9; Milo 1984, chaps. 6 and 7. Cf.Brink1989,46-50, 59-60, 83-86; Dancy 1993,3-6. Stocker1979 provides sem-inal critiqueof internalism.30Thisproblem eads Dancy to rejectthethesis hatmoralought-beliefsare essentiallyotivation-constituting1993, 6).

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ALFREDI?.MELEmorallyought to do, we would be devoid of motivation o do itwere we to suffer rom istlessness f thekind at issuewhileholdingthe belief.Perhaps,as Donald Davidsonhas claimed, there s a "ten-dency to saythat f someone really sincerely)believeshe ought,then his beliefmust show itself n his behaviour (and hence, ofcourse, in his inclinationto act, or his desire)" (1980, 27). But ifthe tendencystemsfrommyopic attentionto garden-varietyn-stancesof believingthatone ought, tsexistencecuts littlephilo-sophical ice. Perhaps people normally ry o do what theybelievetheyoughtto do (and hence are inclinedor motivated o to act).However, n normal cases, people do not suffer rom clinical de-pressionor listlessness.Most readers, conjecture,willfindEve's case conceptuallyco-herent. Among readers who do, some maybe willingto counte-nance contingently otivation-constitutingoral ought-beliefs,ndothers maysee this as mistaken.3' n any case, these readers un-derstand (cognitivist) elief in such a waythat whetheran agentwho believes thatshe ought,morally, o A has motivation o A iscontingent upon features of her motivationalcondition (e.g.,whether he suffers rom istlessness f the kind at issue) thatareconceptually ndependent of her so believing.There is nothingradical about this position,of course. It accords with traditional,"Humean," division-of-laboriewaccordingto whichmotivationsconstituted even contingently) nlybydesires,and neverbybe-liefs (see, e.g., Lewis 1988, Smith 1987). And the version of thispositionthat eavesopen thepossibilityfcontingentlymotivation-constituting ognitivist eliefs makes a significant oncession toanti-"Humeans,"as I willexplain shortly.Are readers whodeem Eve's case conceptually oherent beggingthequestionagainstthe thesis hatthereareEMC cognitivistmoralought-beliefs-thesisM? That is an odd question.Theyare merelyreacting o thecase in lightof a familiar nderstanding-theirownunderstanding-of (cognitivist)belief and motivation. urther, tis not as thoughpre-theoreticalntuition avorsM over,for exam-ple, thealternative hesisthat our cogiiitivisteliefsthatwe ought,morally, o A tend, in conjunctionwithrelevantdesires (perhapsstanding, enericdesiresto do whatwemorally ught),togenerateEMC attitudes owardA-ingwithout he beliefsthemselves onsti-

31I take no standhere on the relativemerits f these two reactions.404



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MOTIVATIONtouting otivation.ndeed, to the extentthat a "Humean" view ofbelief and desire-a view according to which (cognitivist)beliefand desire inherently iffern theirrespectivedirectionsoffit-isreflective fpre-theoreticalntuition, uch intuition peaks againstM. And ifthere are pre-theoreticalntuitions bout thesematters,thepopularity fthe "Humean" viewsuggests hat tswayof carv-ing up the mind ismore stronglyupportedbythem thanMs wayis. Proponents of anti-"Humean" theses like M are urginga refor-mativeonceptionof cognitivist elief.

It can be said, in a rough and ready way, hatanyattitude hatessentially onstitutes dispositionof an agent to A intentionally,or to try oA, or to try o putherself n a positiontoA, essentiallyconstitutesmotivation oA.Assuming hatEve continuesto believethatshe ought,morally, o aid her uncle,we can ask whether hatbeliefmust constitute dispositionof thissort.Now,for the pur-poses of defending T3, there is no need to deny thatsome cog-nitivistmoral ought-beliefs re themselves nonessentially)dispo-sitionsto engage in appropriate ntentional onductand that theyneed no supplementationfromdistinct ction-desires.Nor evenneed it be denied that all actual first-personognitivistmoralought-beliefs re (nonessentially)dispositionsof this kind.32Myclaimabout listlessness-cast n terms fdispositions-is thatthereis at least a hypothetical pecies of thismaladyto which humanbeings are not essentiallymmune,such that a human being suf-fering rom tmaybelievethat he ought,morally,oAwithout,nso believing,being at all disposed to engage in corresponding n-tentional action.Again, givena common understanding f cogni-tivist elief,this claim is utterly lausible. Its opponents need toexplain whywe should adopt a reformativeonception of beliefaccording to which some cognitivist eliefs are essentially otiva-tion-constituting,r essentiallyonstitute ppropriateaction-dispo-sitions.I know of tworelevantspecies of argument-arguments frommoral experience and arguments rom hepracticalnature of mo-

321t sworthnoting that ome internalistmoral realists iewfirst-personmoral ought-beliefss being, at once, cognitivist eliefsthat one ought,morally, oA and desires to A. (This,obviously,s consistentwithT3.) SeeMcNaughton1988,106-10. Cf.McDowell 1978.McDowellattributes1978,15-17) a viewof thiskind to Nagel (in Nagel 1970). For an alternativereading ofNagel, see Dancy 1993, 8-9.

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ALFREDRI?MELErality. avid McNaughtonhas advanced a representativergumentof the first ort (1988, 47-50; cf. 1988, 23 and McDowell 1978).He contends (1) thatpartof whatit is to have the (veridical) ex-perience of being morallyrequired to A is to apprehend a reasonto A. On the assumption 2) thatall reasons for action are moti-vation-constituting,e concludes (3) thathavingmotivation o Ais internalto the experience of being morallyrequired to A.Assume,forthe sake ofargument, hat (1) is true.Then itmaybe supposed that in having the experience of being morallyre-quired to assisther uncle, Eve apprehends a reason to do so. Thesupposed reason maysimply e thatshe is morally equired to dothis; or it may be constitutedby considerationson the basis ofwhichshe apprehendsthismoralrequirement.Butpartof what sat issue, on the assumptionthat (1) is true,is preciselywhetherEve's apprehending the pertinentreason suffices orher havingmotivation o continue aiding her uncle. I have argued, in effect,that at least from the perspectiveof a traditional iew of the atti-tudes,Eve's depressionmaybe such thatalthoughshe apprehendsa moral reason (in some sense of 'reason') to continue helpinghim, she is utterly nmotivated ythatreason (and her apprehen-sion of t):moreprecisely,he has no motivation o help him.WhatMcNaughtonneeds in thisconnectionis an argumentthatappre-hending a reason forA-ing-in preciselyhe ense f apprehendinga reason' inwhichhaving n experienceofbeingmorally equiredto A is supposed to include apprehending a reason for A-ing-suffices or havingmotivationto A. He produces no such argu-ment.Even ifsome analysesofreasons for action treatmotivation-constitutingtems as essential constituents f such reasons, thisdoes not providegroundsforconfidence thatreadingsof reason'on which (1) is true are readingson which (2) is trueas well.Evebelieves on some grounds or other that she ought to help heruncle; simply allingthosegrounds"reasons" to help him cannotrender themmotivation-constituting.Now,beliefsthat one ought,morally, o A are practical eliefs-beliefsabout what to do. As R. M. Hare has put it, "moral judg-ments, n theircentraluse, have it as theirfunction o guide con-duct" (1963, 70). It maybe alleged that to reject the idea thatthereare EMC cognitivistmoral ought-beliefss to drivea wedgebetweenmoral udgmentsand intentional onduct,thustaking he

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MOTIVATIONpracticalbite out ofmorality. call this "the argumentfrom ooth-lessness."33The chief problemwith this argument s that the practical biteof a species of attitudemaybe underpinned in ways that do notrequire attitudes f that typeto be essentiallymotivation-constitut-ing. Recall thatT3 is consistentwith he anti-"Humean" thesis hatfirst-personognitivistmoral ought-beliefs ormally re motivation-constitutingnd even with the thesis thatall actual beliefsof thiskind are,infact,motivation-constituting.Our not being essentiallyimmune to listlessness f the sort featured n Eve's case is com-patiblewithour neveractually ufferingrom t,ofcourse.) Thus,T3 is consistentwitha broad range of ways of underpinning thepractical bite of moral ought-beliefs. ome ways may involvetheanti-"Humean" idea that some cognitivist eliefs are (nonessen-tially)motivation-constituting.ut theunderpinningmaybe doneeven from a "Humean" perspective. t maybe argued,for exam-ple, that moral agentstypicallyre possessed of a standinggenericdesire to do whatever heymorally ught.This desire,so as not toput too fine a point on it, s a genericmotivational oncern to actin accordance withone's judgments about whatone morally ughtto do. Even when the concern is not an occurrentone, itmaybeactivatedbya judgment thatone ought, morally, o A, thusgivingrise to occurrent motivation o A. In agentswith such a desire,judgments thattheythemselves ught, morally, o A would natu-rally ssue in occurrent desires to A, whichdesiresmay play a fa-miliar role in motivating onduct.On a traditionalviewof the attitudes, ve's story s utterly o-herent. This is not to say that a theorist annot propose a refor-mativeconception of the attitudes ccording to whichEve's pos-sessinga cognitivisteliefthatshe ought, morally, o aid her uncleis incompatiblewithher sufferingrom istlessness f the kind de-scribed. In attempting o understand and explain intentionalbe-havior,we standardlydvert o a host ofattitudes, ncludingdesiresand cognitivist eliefs. Traditional conceptions of thisbatteryofattitudesundoubtedlyfall short of perfection;but if there is nodefect n theseconceptionsthatwouldbe remediedby altering hebattery o include the pertinentreformative otion of cognitivist

330fcourse,Hare himselfs a noncognitivist;ut theargumentromtoothlessnesss available ononcognitivistsndcognitivistslike.407



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belief, then there is little to recommend the revision. see notheoreticalneed, in moral philosophyor the philosophyof mind,for a conception of cognitivistmoral ought-belief hatwould ren-der Eve's storyncoherent. n thefollowing ection, n accordancewith T3 (the thesis hat, n us, anyEMC attitude s,or encompasses,an action-desire), defenda precise account of EMC attitudes.First, n objection requires attention.34omeone might ontendthat even ifcognitivistmoral ought-beliefsre not EMC attitudes,action-desires re on no firmer round in thisrespect. t maybeclaimed, forexample, thata jogger mightdesire to run anotherlap butbe too tired ven to try, o thatthisdesire snot motivation-constituting. gain, an agentwho takes his A-ingto be physicallyimpossible might hope or wishthathe could A, but he does notdesire o A. However,someone mightbelieve thathe can A anddesire to A although, n fact,even an attempto A is beyond hispower.We can desire to do what,unbeknownto us,we are unableto do, and unable even to tryto do. (To take an extremecase,althoughS desires toA,an irresistible emon will notpermit omeprerequisite of Ss trying o A: for example, Ss acquiring somesuitable intention.) But thispossibility,ather than entailingthepossibility f action-desires hat are not motivation-constituting,l-lustrates hepossibility fcausally mpotentmotivation-constitutingattitudes-or, more precisely, f motivation-constitutingttitudesthat cannot motivate, n the success sense, even a correspondingattempt in the circumstances).This lastpossibilitysmarkedly if-ferentfromthe one highlightedn mydiscussion of listlessness. fmy littlestoryabout Eve is coherent, it is not as though she ispossessed of a motivation-constitutingelief on which, owing toher listlessness, he is unable to act. Rather,her listlessness onsistspartly n the absence of motivation o help her uncle (or, alter-natively,eprivesher of all such motivation), ven though she be-lieves that she ought, morally, o help him.I should emphasize thatI am not making the empirical claimthat n actual humanbeings,depressionsometimes works" n theway imagined in Eve's case. Perhaps ll actual depressed humanbeings who believe thattheyought, morally, o A do have somemotivation o A. Perhaps,when theydo not even tryto A, thatmotivation s overriddenbystrongermotivation hat s explained

340ne of theeditors rticulatedssentiallyhis bjection.408




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MOTIVATIONby-or partly onstitutes-theirdepression (e.g., a desire not toexertoneself); or theirdepressionmight block the formation racquisition of intentionsthataccord withthismoral motivation.Buteven ifdepressiondoes in factwork n some suchway n actualhumanbeings,thatplainly s compatiblewithmyclaimthatactualhuman beings are not essentiallymmuneto depressionor listless-ness ofthekindimagined n Eve's case-hence, withmyclaimthatmoralought-beliefsre not essentiallyotivation-constitutingn ac-tual human beings.Ifthe actualmechanics ofdepression n actualhuman beings leaves no room forcases like Eve's, part ofwhatIhave argued,in effect, s that this s a contingentact-more specif-ically, his upposed truth bout themechanics ofdepression snotgrounded in any essential motivationalpropertiesof cognitivistmoral ought-beliefs, or in anyessentialpsychologicalfeaturesofhuman beings.35 hould depressionwork in an acquaintance ofmine in the way I have imagined it works n Eve's case, that iscompatiblewithmyacquaintance's being a human being; and, Ihave urged, it is compatiblewithanything hatwe have good rea-son to believe about moral ought-beliefs.5. EssentiallyMotivation-ConstitutingttitudesFunctionally haracterizedIntentional attitudesmay be decomposed into a content (e.g.,"The Giantswillwintoday") and a mode (e.g., belief,hope, fear)(Searle 1983, chap. 1). At a familiar evel of description, ction-desireshave three nternalresources forcontributingo behavior:

35I do not claim to have produced a knock-downrgumentfor this.have not demonstrated hat no newargument an establish, orexample,thethesis MA) that henatureofmoralagency tself onceptually equiresthatmoral ought-beliefs e essentiallymotivation-constitutingognitivistbeliefsand, therefore,hatcases like Eve's are conceptually mpossible.believe thatMA, in placing the psychologicaldemands it does on moralagents,would place our moral agency n serious eopardy.For all we nowknow,we are in factpsychologicallyonstituted ike Eve and thusare ca-pable ofpossessing ognitivistmoralought-beliefshat re notmotivation-constitutingt all, much less essentially o. For all we now know abouthumanpsychology,ur actual psychological onstitutions such that,wereMA true,we would be devoid of moral ought-beliefsnd would not bemoralagents.The questionwhetherMAand its lk icenseskepticismboutour moral agencyrequiresa paper of itsown; I cannotdo it ustice here.

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ALFREDI?.MELEtheirmode,theircontent,nd their trength.he mode of an action-desire (i.e., desire), togetherwith tscontent,places it in the mo-tivational rena.36The contentprovides the agentwith target rgoal in that arena. An action-desire's trengths,veryroughly,heforceit exertsupon the agent to try o achieve the goal. (I haveexamined this last resource at lengthelsewhere,arguing,amongother things, hatagentsoften are not helplessvictims fmotiva-tionalforces-that the strengthsfmanydesires are subjectto theagent's control. Unless a desire is irresistiblytrongfor an agent, tis in some sense up to herwhether he acts on it.37 pace does notpermitan examination ofmotivational trength ere.)38Earlier, noted that "S desires toA" ismore precise than"S hasmotivationto A." Can similarprecision be secured in terms of"motivation-constitutingttitudes"?Let us say that an "A-repre-senting"motivation-constitutingttitude s anymotivation-consti-tutingattitudehaving the agent's A-ingas a represented object,where A' (again) is an action variable.Representedobjects ncludeboth "positive"actionsand refrainings. he representedobject ofAl's desire to attendtoday'sGiantsgame ishisattending hatgame;the representedobject of Ann's desire to refrainfromattendingthe game is her so refraining. Negative" motivation-constitutingstates-for instance,Beth's fear offlying-maybe construed as be-ing at least partlycomposed of motivation-constitutingttitudeshavingrefrainingss represented bjects. Beth's fear s constituted,in part, by a motivation-constitutingttitudewhose representedobject is her refraining romflying.

36The relevance of content is illustratedby the observationthat al-thoughsome desires-that is, some attitudeshaving themode desire-aremotivationallynert (as in the spaceship example), all action-desiresremotivation-constituting.37On motivational ontrol, ee Mele 1987,chaps. 2-6; Mele 1992,chap.4; and Mele 1995, chap. 3. For an analysisof irresistible esire,see Mele1992, chap. 5; a principle inkingmotivational trength o intentional c-tionis defended in Mele 1992, chap. 3.38Another ssue that I must set aside is the nature of "motivational"attitudes hat are contingentlymotivation'-constituting.hese include alldesiresthat are neithermotivationallynertnor action-desires. plausiblehypothesiss thata centralfunction fmotivational ttitudes f this ort sto giverise to appropriateEMC attitudes; ut a properexplorationof thehypothesiswould require extensivediscussion.Doing justice to the ques-tionwhether here re, or can be, contingently otivation-constitutingog-nitivist eliefswould require a paper devoted to thattopic.

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MOTIVATIONAll EMC attitudes, s I have argued, have the agent's actingnsomeway s a representedobject (T2). Thus,we can saythateveryEMC attitude s an EMCA attitude,where 'EMC' designates thespecies of attitude nd 'A' is a place-holderfor the pertinent ep-resentedobject. Ti, T3, and the observationthatanyattitudeen-compassing desire to A is itself n EMCA attitude (in virtue ofencompassing an EMCA attitude) ointly mply hefollowing:T4. In human beings as theyactuallyare, an attitude x is an

EMC attitude fand only fx is, or encompasses, an action-desire, and x is an EMCA attitude f and only if x is, orencompasses,a desire to A ('A' being an actionvariable).Althoughthe worddesire' is ofno special interest o me in thisconnection, a certainfunctional ole associatedwith ction-desiresis a pressingconcern. I wantnow to suggest the following s anapproximationof a thesisto be endorsed here:T5. In human beings as theyactuallyare, an attitudex is anEMCA attitude fand onlyif (1) the agent'sA-ing s a rep-resentedobject of x ('A' being an actionvariable) and (2)an essentialfunction fx is to contribute o itsown satisfac-tionbyinducingthe agent to try o bring t about that sheA-s.

This thesisaccords a certain"direction of fit" to EMCA attitudes(in actualhumanagents). They have thefunction fgetting hingsto fit hem (byinducingthe agent to make a suitableattempt).Four notions at work n T5 require briefcomment.First, un-derstandcontributing,n thiscontext, s a causalnotion;I have notabandoned perspectiveP Second, satisfied ttitudes hould notbeconfusedwith atisfied gents.An EMCA attitude s satisfied ytheagent'sA-ing;but the agentherselfmightfind herA-ing uite un-satisfying.hird,an attitudexessentiallyas a function in an agentS only fxhas thatfunctionnot only n Ss actual situationbut alsoin all possible scenarios in which S has x. An attitudex nonessen-tiallyhas a function in S if,forexample, x'shaving thatfunctionin S is contingentupon Ss havingan attitude of typey and Sshavingan attitude fthe latter ort s neitherentailed nor presup-posed by Ss havingx. Fourth,trying,s I understand t, requiresno special ffort.When I intentionallyypethe word 'type', am

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ALFREDI MELEtrying o do thateven ifI encounterno special resistance.39ur-ther, rying o A is one wayof trying o bring tabout thatone A-s: in trying o A one is trying o bringit about thatone A-s.Butthereare otherways. omeone whowants oexercisedailybutfearsthathe willsuccumbto lazinessmaytry o bring t about thatheexercises daily by tellinghis friendsand loved ones thathe hasresolvedto do so. This person triesto bringit about thathe ex-ercises dailyby increasinghis motivation o do so. As he sees it,once he makes the announcement,failing o exercisedailywouldcarry n extracost-his friends nd loved ones would think ess ofhimforbackingout. Inmakingtheannouncement,he is nottryingto exercisedaily;but in makingthe announcement,he is tryingobring t about thathe exercisesdaily.The notionoftryingobringit about thatone A-satwork n T5 includes,but is not limited to,trying o A.40Is T5 true?This question amounts,of course, to the questionwhetherthe following wo claimsare true:T5a. In human beings as they ctually re, if an attitudex is anEMCA attitude,then x has the properties identified nclauses (1) and (2) of T5.T5b. In human beings as theyactuallyare, if an attitudex hastheproperties dentifiedn clauses (1) and (2) of T5, thenx is an EMCA attitude.

StartwithT5a. T4 impliesthat n real humanbeings,an attitudeis an EMCA attitudeonlyifit is, or encompasses,a desire to A. Itakeit to be a conceptual truth hatanyaction-desire as the func-tionofcontributingo its ownsatisfaction.fthis sright, ll action-desires essentiallyave thisfunction.Further, f all action-desireshave thisfunction ssentially,nd T4 is true,then in real humanbeings,all EMCA attitudes ssentially ave the function f contrib-utingto theirown satisfaction. ow,our ordinary onceptof desireaccords action-desires more specificfunction han this.A profes-sor's desire to gain the attention f her fidgeting tudentsmaysodistracther that she unintentionally laces a piece of chalk be-tweenherlipswhilescrawling n theblackboardwithhercigarette.Even though these anticsgain the full attentionof her students,39This onceptionof tryings defended in Adams and Mele 1992.40Thediscussiona bit laterof Ann and Bob also illustrates hispoint.

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MOTIVATIONthedesirehas functioneddefiantlyn theproductionof itssatisfac-tion.Our seeing thisas an instance of deviantcausation indicatesthatwe accord action-desires more precisefunction hanmerelycontributing o theirown satisfaction.We viewdesiresto A as hav-ing,more fully,n essentialfunctionof contributingo theirownsatisfaction ywayof theircontribution o intentionalconduct ofthe agent that is directed owardA-ing.Trying s essentially nten-tional; and anyinstanceof trying o bring t about that one A-s sdirectedtowardA-ing.Hence, a plausiblewayto capturethisfullerfunction s in termsof trying,s in T5.41Cases in which an agent wantsto A unintentionallymayseem toundermine T5a. Ann is promised$10,000 foroffendingBob un-intentionally;nd she knowsthatthere s no rewardfor ntention-allyoffending im.Wanting hemoney,Ann desires to offendBobunintentionally.A straightforward,uccessfulattemptto offendhim willnot gain her the money,as she realizes; forsuch an at-temptwould amount to intentionallyffending ob. Does this m-ply thatAnn has a desire to A-an action-desire-that lacks thefunctionof contributingo itsown satisfaction yinducingher totry o bring tabout that she A-s?Two possibilitiesneed attention.First,Ann's desire to offendBob unintentionallymay not be an action-desiret all (i.e., as I putit earlier, a "desire having one's acting in some way .. as a rep-resentedobject"). Annrealizesthatpeople sometimes akeoffenseat things he saysor does evenwhen she does not at all desire tooffend them. (Sometimes she learns onlymonths ater thattheyhave been offendedby her words or deeds.) Ann mighthope-and, again, hope encompasses desire-merely that this sort ofthingwillhappenin Bob's case; therepresented bjectof herdesiremaybe a mere happeningratherthan a prospective ction.Ann'sattitudetowardher unintentionallyffendingBob maybe on allfourswithcertain of her non-actiondesires: forexample, her de-sire to live to be a hundredyearsold and herdesire to sleep peace-fully onight.T5a is a thesis bout essentiallymotivation-constituting

41A heorist ightryhe lternativeack fmaintaininghat llaction-desires-alldesires oA-are desires oA intentionally.fthisweretrue,theprofessor'sesire ogainherstudents'ttention ouldnot havebeensatisfiedsinceshe did notgain it intentionally).owever,incesomeagentspossessed f action-desiresack theconceptual ophisticatione-quiredfordesiringoA intentionally,his ack ails.

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ALFRED RI?MELEattitudeshaving (prospective) actions f the agent as representedobjects. If Ann's desire to offend Bob unintentionallys not anaction-desire,t fails as a counterexampleto T5a on twocounts.The desire lacksan object ofthe right ort; and given T4, it is notessentially otivation-constituting.Second, Ann's desire to offendBob unintentionallymaybe agenuine action-desire. ut then, n virtueofpossessingthisdesire,Ann willbe inclined, n some measure,to bring t about thatsheoffendsBob unintentionally.n one relevant cenario,she knowsthat he tends to offendBob unintentionally henshe is extremelybusy:when she is preoccupied withher work,for example, shetends,withoutthen realizing it, to speak more tersely han sheordinarily oes to people who phone her at the office; nd, whenBob calls,her tersespeech tendsto offendhim. Knowingthis,Annmay undertakean engrossingproject-say,writing paper on mo-tivation-with the hope that her involvementn it will renderhertelephone conversation t the office ufficientlyersethat, houldBob call (as he frequently oes), she will unintentionally ffendhim. In pursuingthis strategy,nn is trying o bring t about thatshe offends Bob unintentionally. his is a coherent attempt; nparticular, t is not intrinsicallyelf-defeating. n action-desirefAnn's to offendBob unintentionallymay have thefunction f con-tributing o its own satisfaction y inducingher to try o bringitabout thatshe offendshimunintentionally.urther,fa desire ofhersto offendBob unintentionally erenot to have thisfunction,it would plausiblybe regarded as a non-action desire, a desirewhose representedobject is something's merelyhappeningatherthan her performing n action of a particular ype.I turnto T5b. The thesishas intuitive rip.An attitudehavingthe agent'sA-ing s a representedobject and havingthe functionofcontributingo its own satisfaction yinducingthe agentto tryto bringit about thatshe A-scertainly eems to be a prime can-didate for a motivation-constitutingttitude.All tryingsre moti-vated; and, at least at first lance, attitudeshavingthis functionalrelationship o trying pparently onstitutemotivation o try. ur-ther, n attitudehavingthe specifiedfunction ssentiallyeemswellsuited to be essentially otivation-constituting.owever,appear-ances sometimesmislead; potential objections require attention.Are there attitudes hathave the essential functionof contributingto their wnsatisfaction-and,more specifically,f contributing o

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MOTIVATIONthisby inducing the agent to try o bring it about that she A-s-but,nevertheless, re not essentiallymotivation-constituting?Assumingthat such attitudesas hoping to A and wishingto Aencompass desires to A, I have alreadyargued, in effect,hattheyare essentiallymotivation-constituting.f counterexamplesare tobe found to T5b, a naturalplace to look is the "cognitive"sphere,thesphereof beliefs.Some action-regardingognitivisteliefsmayhelp bringabout their own truth-hence, their own satisfaction.They meritconsideration.

Bob is a place-kicker. is kicking oach has informedhim that,regarding nyfieldgoal he attempts, isbelieving hathe willmakethe fieldgoal will ncrease his chances ofmaking t.Bob, who hasheard of the power of positivethinking, ecides to augmenthispreparationfor each kickwith n attempt o get himself o believethat the kickwill succeed. Eventually, e regularly etshimself obelieve this, nd his confidencein the success of his kickssignifi-cantlyboosts his success rate. Bob's beliefs that he will make par-ticularfieldgoals are satisfied yhismaking them;and his believ-ingthathe willmakethemcausally ontributes o hismaking hem.Does Bob's belief that he willmake his next fieldgoal have thefunction pecified n T5b? If so, T5b is false;forthis belief is notmotivation-constituting.Plainly, he pertinentbelief does not have the functionof con-tributing o its own satisfaction yinducingBob to try o bring tabout thathe makes thefieldgoal. Bob is already ettledon tryingto make the fieldgoal prior to acquiring the belief that he willmake it. His havingthe belief increases his chances of makingasuccessfulkick,giventhat he is settledupon trying o do so. Butthe belief is functionallyrrelevant o whetherBob tries to makethe kick.Consider a case designedto avoid thisproblem.An exceptionallyrisk-averseerson, Rex, is particularly verse to making unsuccess-fulattempts.He will not attempt nything nless he believesthat,should he make an attempt, he attemptwould succeed. Rex isconfident bout his chances ofA-ing, omething hathe would likeverymuch to do. He believes that he willA ifhe tries to A. Be-lieving this,he believes,as well, thathe willA; forpossessingtheconditionalbelief,and realizingthat he would like verymuch toA, Rex believesthat he willtry o A. IfRex were to lack the beliefthat he willA, his lacking t would be explained byhis lackingthe

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conditionalbelief-in whichcase, he would not even attempt o Aand wouldnotA. Rex's making n attempt hus s contingent ponhis believingthat he willA: were he to lack the belief,he wouldnot try o A. Does this belief have the functionof contributing oits own satisfaction y inducingRex to try o bring it about thathe A-s?Given Rex's peculiarformof risk versiveness, is trying o A iscontingentupon his believingthathe willA. ButRex's belief thathe will A does not induce himto try oA. It is truethat fhe wereto lack this belief, he would not tryto A and would not A. Butalthough the attitudes hatcontributecausallyto his trying o Ainclude attitudes hatpartly onstitute he basis forthisbelief, heydo not include thisbelief itself.Rex's belief that he will A is epi-phenomenal withrespectto his trying o A.42Consider a third case. Sally, Stoic, is disposed to want to per-formany action that she believes she will perform.She believesthat happiness is found (in part) in discoveringwhatfatehas instoreforone and in desiringo act as one believes oneselfto befated to act; and she desires to be happy. Sallynow believes that

42Rex's cousin, Dex, is psychologicallyo constituted hathe is not theleast bit nclined to try oA unless he is convincedthathe wouldA shouldhe try.Might n agent ike Dex underminemy arlierclaimthat ny desiretoA ('A' being an actionvariable) inclinestheagent, n some measure,toA intentionally,r to try o A, or to try o put himself n a position to A?Suppose thatDex would like toA but thathe does notbelievethat, houldhe try o A, the attemptwould succeed. Then, giventhe kind of personDex is,he is not the least bit inclinedto try o A (nor,we may suppose, ishe at all inclined to try o puthimselfn a position to A). If, nevertheless,he desires to A, my claim is false.Notice,however, hatfromthefactthatsomeone would like to A it does not followthathe desires to A. I wouldlike to sinkthewinningbasket n an NBA championshipgame and to hita home run in a WorldSeriesgame: doing thesethingswouldbe exciting,and I sometimesdaydream bout doing them. But I fully ecognizethat tmyage and withmy thletic alents, heseheroicdeeds will never be opento me. It would be an abuse of language to saythat desirer want o dothem.Similarly, hereasDex would desire toA ifhe believed thathe wouldA should he try to A, in the case as it stands he lacks the desire to Aalthoughhe would liketo A. Dex and I differn thatI occasionallyaminclinedto try o do things believe I willnot succeed in doing (e.g., sinka basket frommid-court r throw dart nto thebull's-eye), nd he neveris. When he lacks the belief thathe wouldA should he try o,his attitudetowardhis A-ing s comparable to myattitude owardmyhitting homerun in a World Series game; he no more desires to do the former han Idesire to do the latter, lthougheach of us would like to do thesethings.

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MOTIVATIONshe willA. As a consequence, she desires to A,whichdesire issuesin a successful ttempt o A. Does her beliefthat she will A havethefunction dentifiedn T5b?Even ifthisbeliefhas, in some sense,thefunction fcontributingto its own satisfaction y inducing Sally to tryto A, it does notessentiallyave thisfunction. he beliefhas thisfunction if tdoes)because Sallyis disposed to want to perform ctions that she be-lievesshe willperform.n theabsence ofthatdisposition, hebeliefwould lack the relevantfunction.However,the presence of thedisposition n Sally s neitherentailed nor presupposedbyher be-lievingthat she will A. Hence, that beliefdoes not essentiallyavethe function t issue.Are there nondoxasticttitudes hat have the essentialfunctionidentifiedn T5bwithoutbeing essentiallymotivation-constituting?One mightsuppose that such attitudes an be found somewherein the animalworld, fnot in us. Consider thefollowing:

The wasp Sphex uilds a burrow .. and seeksout a cricketwhichshestings n such a wayas to paralyzebutnotkill t. She dragsthe cricketinto theburrow, ays her eggs alongside, closes theburrow, henfliesaway.... In due course, the eggs hatch and thewasp grubsfeed offthe paralyzedcricket.... To the human mind, such an elaboratelyorganizedand seemingly urposeful outineconveys convincing la-vor oflogic and thoughtfulness-untilmore details are examined. Forexample, theWasp's routine s to bringthe paralyzedcricketto theburrow, eave it on the threshold,go inside to see that all is well,emerge, and thendrag the cricket n. If the cricket s moved a fewinches awaywhile thewasp is inside makingher preliminary nspec-tion,thewasp,on emergingfromthe burrow,willbringthe cricketback to the threshold,but not inside, and will then repeat the pre-paratoryprocedure of enteringthe burrow to see thateverythingsall right. f again the cricket s removeda few nches while thewaspis inside, once again she willmove the cricket p to thethreshold ndre-enter heburrow or final heck. The waspnever thinks fpullingthe cricket traightn. On one occasion, thisprocedurewas repeatedforty imes, lwayswiththe same result. Wooldridge1963,82-83)

It mightbe suggested that the wasp possesses an attitudethathas theinsect's"checkingtheburrow" as a represented bjectandhas the essentialfunction fcontributingo its own satisfactionyinducingthewaspto try o checktheburrow. tmightbe claimed,further,hat thisattitude s not motivation-

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Alfred R. Mele - Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes