Alfred Deakin Philosophy Seminar Series

8/10/2019 Alfred Deakin Philosophy Seminar Series

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With the support of the Alfred Deakin Research Institute, the Centre for Citizenship and

Globalization and the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, we are pleased to announce

that Deakin University will be hosting a regular philosophy seminar series in 2012. The

seminar series will feature invited presentations from Deakin staff and a mix of local,

national and international scholars. It is open to all and, unless otherwise noted, will take

place on Tuesdays, from 3.30-5.00pm, on the Burwood campus, room C2.05. A map of thecampus can be found here:http://www.deakin.edu.au/campuses/InteractiveMapBurwood.php.

For any inquiries, please contact Sean Bowden at this address:[email protected]

The program for Trimester 2 is as follows. Details can be found below:

Date Speaker Title

10 July Petra Brown Bonhoeffer: Kierkegaards single individual in a

state of exception

17 July Marguerite La Caze A taste of ashes: vengefulness and impossible

reciprocity in Beauvoir

24 July Alexander

Naraniecki

In Poppers Midrash: Is Karl Popper a Jewish

philosopher?

31 July Sean Bowden Expressive Agency in DeleuzesLogic of Sense

7 August Erin Manning Artfulness

14 August Tamas Pataki Divided minds, selves, egos and internal objects

21 August George Duke Eclipse of Practical Reason

28 August TBA

4 Sept Justine McGill Messianic sovereignty: reading Nietzsche with

Benjamin

11 Sept Vanessa Lemm Nietzsches Politics of the Event18 Sept Paul Patton TBA

25 Sept TBA

2 Oct Andrew Inkpin Parody and Truth in Nietzsches Genealogy

9 Oct Geoffrey Boucher Art as the Plenipotentiary of Impulse: A

Reconstruction of Adornos Aesthetic Theory in Light

of His Reading of Freud

16 Oct Warwick Fox General Ethics and the Theory of Responsive Cohesion

30 Oct Peter Harrison What was Philosophicalabout Natural Philosophy?

10 July

Petra Brown

(Deakin)

Bonhoeffer: Kierkegaards single individual in a state of

exception.

Throughout the 1930s, Bonhoeffer protested the influence of National

Socialism on the German church. He also preached pacifism, and

established an illegal seminary to train the leaders of the Confessing

church to resist the authorities using the Sermon on the Mount. Yet,

the same Bonhoeffer became involved in conspiracy only a couple of

years after the closure of the seminary, thereby abandoning the

pacifism he found in the Sermon on the Mount. He became a double

agent in theAbwehrand was killed for this after the failure of the July20thplot, when papers were found implicating Bonhoeffer as a
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conspirator. For many Bonhoeffer scholars and admirers,

Bonhoeffers decision to turn away from pacifism to conspiracy

remains intelligible in the context of Christs self-sacrifice and the

suffering church-community.

Im going to take as a given that Bonhoeffers Christology doesindeed provide the continuing thread between pacifism and

conspiracy. Christ is the unifying figure in Bonhoeffers action, both

as a pacifist and as a conspirator. However, I argue that Bonhoeffers

involvement in conspiracy cannot be understood primarily in the

context of self-sacrifice and the suffering Christian church-

community. I will do this in three parts. First, I will argue that the

relationship of Bonhoeffers Christ to the disciple is not mediated

through community, but is more direct in a way that is closer to

Kierkegaards Abraham inFear and Trembling. Second, through an

analysis of Bonhoeffers concept of the extraordinary in his pacifist

textDiscipleship, and the concept of the extraordinary situation inthe conspirator textEthics, I show that Christ as the unifying figure

may lead to a deity who commands peace in the Sermon on the Mount

but remains free to command killing in an extraordinary situation.

Third, through a comparison with Karl Barths extreme case,

Grenzsituation, and Schmitts state of exception,Ausnahmezustand,

it will become clear that Bonhoeffers disciple in the extraordinary

situation suspends the normal state of affairs, in a way that

disturbingly mirrors Schmitts argument for dictatorship and the right

of the sovereign to suspend the law in a state of exception. I suggest

Bonhoeffers political involvement from pacifism to conspiracy may

be seen as an example of the single individual that enacts a

suspension of ethics in a Schmittian sense.

Finally, I will draw attention to the intellectual source of Bonhoeffers

extraordinary situation and Schmitt state of exception: the Danish

philosopher Kierkegaard and his concept of the teleological

suspension of the ethical in Fear and Trembling. Through the

engagement with both Kierkegaard and Schmitt, I want to show

Bonhoeffers involvement in conspiracy is problematic for anyone

who wants to interpret his involvement in conspiracy as intelligible in

the context of Christs self-sacrifice and the suffering church-community.

Petra Brown is a PhD candidate at Deakin University.

17 July

Dr Marguerite La

Caze (UQ)

A taste of ashes: vengefulness and impossible reciprocity in

Beauvoir

Written just after the liberation of France and during the trials of

collaborators, Beauvoirs little-discussed essay An Eye for an Eye

(1946) describes the worst of crimes as those that reduce the human

being to a thing. She suggests that we can only truly understandreactions of outrage to these crimes, such as vengefulness, in these


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extreme situations when we feel them in their true concreteness. I

argue that the essay works to undermine her own refusal to sign the

petition for clemency for Robert Brasillach, an anti-Semitic writer

tried, convicted and executed for treason. Beauvoir sets out to

understand why what she sees as the need for revenge and a restored

reciprocity in the light of these crimes usually cannot be satisfied.Both private revenge and state punishment fail to bring about the

perpetrators recognition of what they have done, their own

ambiguous existence or an acknowledgement of the perspective of the

victim. Here Beauvoir parallels this impossible reciprocity with that of

love. I show how her position shifts in The Second Sex (1949) and

argue that we must distinguish these emotional reactions of outrage

from reciprocal loving relations. Furthermore, I demonstrate that

Beauvoirs support for capital punishment in this case is in tension

with her developed existential account and her own account of

vengefulness in the essay.

Marguerite La Caze is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University

of Queensland. Her research interests include European philosophy,

feminist philosophy, moral psychology and aesthetics. She is the

author of Wonder and Generosity: Their Role in Ethics and Politics,

(forthcoming with SUNY), and The Analytic Imaginary(Cornell UP,

2002). Marguerite is the current Chair of the Australasian Society for

Continental Philosophy.

24 July

Dr Alexander

Naraniecki

(Deakin)

In Poppers Midrash: Is Karl Popper a Jewish philosopher?

This paper seeks to rewrite our understanding of Popper through an

exploration of his thought in relation to twentieth century Jewish

philosophers particularly Leibowtiz, Levinas and Wittgenstein. As

most Popper scholars have written about Popper from an Anglo-

analytic or philosophy of science perspective, this paper seeks to

reposition Popper within, yet not limited to the continental tradition.

This paper builds upon existing scholarship on Poppers formative

Viennese environment and its Jewish context by Malachi Hacohen

(2000), the Kantian basis for Poppers philosophy (Naraniecki 2010),

as well as new perspectives by Michael Fagenblat on the on the way

Kantianism has helped to reframe fundamental features of Jewishthought such as an opposition to idolatry and theodicy. This paper

argues that the central Kantian and Midrashic aspects that Flagenblat

associates with the thought of Levinas and Leibowitz can also help to

explain key characteristics of Poppers philosophy.

Alex Naraniecki is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for

Citizenship and Globalisation. His current research project is entitled

New Foundations for Multiculturalism and he is currently working

on various publications and research projects focusing on the

development of multiculturalism in Australia as well as the role of

recognition and dialogue in promoting intercultural relations. Alex isalso involved in collaborative research projects within the Migration


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and Intercultural Relations Research Cluster.

31 July

Dr Sean Bowden

(Deakin)

Expressive Agency in DeleuzesLogic of Sense

It is common to differentiate between two kinds of events: actions and

mere occurrences. Whereas the latter are events which are passivelyundergone, the former are things that are actively done. Actions, it is

typically held, are the intentional doings of some agent. In The Logic

of Sense, however, Deleuze appears to collapse the distinction

between actions and mere occurrences, holding that events of both

kinds are ultimately only ever impassive happenings. He asserts an

ontological distinction between the corporeal realm of causes

(including psychological causes) and the realm of events, holding that

events exist only as the expressible of propositions. In relation to the

category of action, this gives rise to the counter-intuitive thought that

what I appear to actively do does not really depend on my prior

willing or conscious intention to do it; it rather depends on the open-ended expression of the sense of what I do. And insofar as my

apparent action does not coincide with my conscious intention or

volition, it appears to me as something for which I am not ultimately

responsible.

At the same time, however, Deleuze does not jettison the idea of

willing the event in The Logic Sense. Nor does he dismiss the ideas

of agency and personal responsibility for what happens. Willing the

event, however, does not consist in directly willing some particular

action. It rather consists in expressively engaging with the pure sense-

event in which all events are determined.

In order to make sense of this position, this paper will offer an outline

of a conception of expressive agency that Deleuze appears to be

working with in The Logic of Sense. This account involves four

claims. The first claim is that while the intentional agent can no longer

be thought to be behind her actions in the traditional sense, she is

certainly out there inher actions such as these are made sense of by

others. The second claim is that while the actions of agents are

multiply interpretable by others, these others are themselves out

there in their multiply interpretable actions. The third claim is that anaction will count as the action of a particular agent insofar as both this

agent and other agents are able to recognize him in that action. The

final claim is that these multiple interpretations and recognitive

processes take place in a shared expressive medium call it

language which is not fixed but always being produced. Taking

these four claims together, we will see that an action will come to

count as mine, not because I directly will it and subsequently achieve

what I intended to do; but because both I and others expressively

produce the conditions in which we are able to recognize a particular

action as expressing something about me as an agent.

Dr Sean Bowden is an Alfred Deakin Postdoctoral Research Fellow at


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Deakin University, Australia. He is the author of The Priority of

Events: Deleuzes Logic of Sense(Edinburgh University Press, 2011),

and the co-editor ofBadiou and Philosophy(EUP, 2012).

7 August

A/Prof. Erin

Manning

(Concordia)

Artfulness

Through a development of the concepts of the art of time and the art

of participation, this paper explores the relationship of intuition and

sympathy in Bergsons work to ask how a concept of artfulness might

be conceived. Artfulness is here defined as the force of the event of

art, a force that is more than human.

Erin Manning holds a University Research Chair in Relational Art and

Philosophy in the Faculty of Fine Arts at Concordia University

(Montreal, Canada). She is also the director of the Sense Lab

(www.senselab.ca), a laboratory that explores the intersections

between art practice and philosophy through the matrix of the sensingbody in movement. In her art practice she works between painting,

dance, fabric and sculpture (http://www.erinmovement.com). Current

iterations of her artwork explore emergent collectivities through

participatory textiles. Her project Stitching Time will be presented at

the 2012 Sydney Biennale and The Knots of Time will open the new

Flax Museum in Kortrijk, Belgium in 2014. Her writing addresses

movement, art, experience and the political through the prism of

process philosophy, with recent work developing a notion of autistic

perception and the more-than human. Publications include

Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT

Press, 2009), Politics of Touch: Sense, Movement, Sovereignty

(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2007) andEphemeral

Territories: Representing Nation, Home and Identity in Canada

(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003). Her forthcoming

manuscript,Always More Than One: Individuations Dance will be

published by Duke University Press in 2012 as will her forthcoming

co-written manuscript (with Brian Massumi), Thought in the Act:

Passages in the Ecology of Experience (Minnesota UP).

14 August

Dr Tamas Pataki

(Melbourne)

Divided minds, selves, egos and internal objects

Partitive conceptions of mind have a long history in philosophy.

Various types have been advanced to resolve certain troublesome

aspects of self-experience and irrationality in belief and action. Some

of these conceptions propose, radically (and roughly), that the mind

(self, ego) splits into parts (sub-systems, component selves, subsidiary

egos), that have perspectives and aims which are not shared with other

parts, and function as independent centres of agency. Platos tripartite

division of mind is of this kind, as is (I believe) Freuds structural

theory. W. R. D. Fairbairns elegant account of the basic endopsychic

situation involving a multiplicity of egos linked to specific internal

objects is emphatically of this kind; indeed, Fairbairn allows thatinternal objects, though not ego structures, may also acquire a


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dynamic independence, which seems to mean, at least, that they too

are independent centres of agency.

Many philosophers, and some psychoanalysts, reject these partitive

conceptions, for a variety of reasons; amongst them: that they are

incoherent; that they fail to provide identity conditions for subsidiaryparts or internal objects; that they are in conflict with the conception

of a substantial unified self inherent in common-sense psychology and

therefore sever the fundamental links between such psychology and

psychoanalytic understanding; that they are unnecessary to answer to

the clinical material. I will examine some of these objections against

the backdrop of Fairbairns conception of endopsychic structure and

attempt to develop a partitive conception of the self which is in many

ways faithful to Fairbairns picture while preserving sufficient

elements of a notion of the mind as a unity to answer some of the

salient objections.

Dr Pataki is honorary senior fellow at the University of Melbourne

and honorary fellow of Deakin University. He studied philosophy at

the University of Melbourne and psychoanalysis at University

College, London University. He has been a lecturer in philosophy at

RMIT, University of Tasmania and University of Melbourne. He co-

edited, with Michael Levine,Racism in Mind(Cornell 2004) and is the

author ofAgainst Religion(Scribe, 2007) as well as of several articles

and book chapters on the philosophy of mind, and numerous popular

pieces and reviews.

21 August

Dr George Duke

(Deakin)

Eclipse of Practical Reason

Contemporary expressions of doubt about the possibility of a

substantive employment of practical reason generally seek historical

support from Hume. Defenders of substantive conceptions of practical

rationality, by contrast, tend to draw inspiration from Aristotle,

Aquinas or Kant. My focus in this paper is upon developments in the

period between 1600 and 1650 for theories of practical rationality. My

claim is that an examination of this period, which is perhaps

associated most readily with the rise of a mechanistic philosophy of

nature, is not only crucial for understanding the motivations forscepticism about practical reason later expressed with particular force

by Hume, it also can also clarify the conditions that would need to be

met for a successful defence of a substantive account. Such an

analysis or at least so I argue also demonstrates that an approach to

practical reason that adopts suitably modified Thomistic assumptions

is better able to meet the relevant conditions than one deriving

inspiration from Kant. The structure of the paper is as follows. In

section one I sketch the distinction between substantive and

procedural conceptions of practical rationality, using the Thomistic

and Humean accounts as ideal-types of such theories. This provides

the background for an analysis of developments in the first half of theseventeenth century, which is the central focus of section 2. Section 3


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closes with some reflections on the lessons of the period between 1600

and 1650 for contemporary debates on the possibility of developing a

substantive account of practical reason.

George Duke lectures in philosophy in the School of Humanities and

Social Sciences at Deakin University. His research interests includethe philosophy of language, the history of analytical philosophy and

political philosophy. He has published on Michael Dummetts theory

of abstract objects, theories of abstract singular terms and the

conceptual presuppositions of analytical philosophy.

28 August TBA

4 September

Dr Justine McGill

(La Trobe)

Messianic sovereignty: reading Nietzsche with Benjamin

Early in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche

introduces the figure of the sovereign individual, bearer of the right

to make promises and the extraordinary privilege of responsibility.

He then promises to reveal the history of human development which

culminates in the emergence of a consciousness which is ripe for such

responsibility. However, by the end of the essay the sovereign

individual has disappeared. Instead, Nietzsche dramatically invokes a

redeemingman of great love and contempt who must come one

day, and then declares that at this point, he must fall silent.

In seeking the origins of responsibility we are thus led to discover a

messianic expectation or promise. What does this mean for

Nietzsches approach to sovereignty and responsibility? Is the

sovereign individual a moral figure, or is his sovereign practice of

responsibility better understood in political or religious terms? This

paper will draw upon Walter Benjamins deployment of a similar

nesting of secular and religious thought to explore these questions. To

read Nietzsche with Benjamin will lead to an interpretation of the

sovereign individual as an allegorical figure of messianic politics,

rather than an image of modern moral achievement or aspiration.

Justine McGill is a lecturer in philosophy, currently teaching at La

Trobe University. She is the co-editor, with sociologist Craig Brown,

of an interdisciplinary collection on Violence in France and Australia:

Disorder in the postcolonial welfare state(Sydney University Press,

2010). She has research interests in Nietzsche studies, continental

philosophy, early modern thought, film theory, feminist philosophy

and Asian philosophy, particularly Buddhist thought. She is also

interested in bringing analytic, continental and Asian philosophical

perspectives into dialogue (for example, in exploring philosophy of

mind and consciousness). She is currently working on a book about

the concept of responsibility in modernity.


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11 September

Prof. Vanessa

Lemm (UNSW)

Nietzsches Politics of the Event

This paper offers an analysis of Nietzsches politics of the event

(Ereignis). In Nietzsches published works as well as in theNachlass,

one can distinguish between several different uses of the term Ereignis

(event). On my hypothesis, Nietzsches conception of the event isinseparable from his conception of the great human being. Therefore

an analysis of the former must come hand in hand with an analysis of

the latter. I argue that Nietzsche provides a politics of the event and

that this politics denotes the task of cultivating great human beings.

On my account, one can distinguish between two different politics of

the event in Nietzsche. On the one hand, there is what Nietzsche refers

to as small politics (kleine Politik) understood as a politics of the

state or of moral and religious institutions which seek to produce

conditions which favor the emergence of great human beings. At the

heart of this politics stands the belief that the rise of great human

beings is inherently contingent and hence requires the task oftransforming contingency into necessity, of turning the occurrence of

great human beings into a necessity. We are here dealing with an

active politics of liberation which seeks to change the course of

history giving it a new direction and a new aim. On the other hand, we

can distinguish in Nietzsche a great politics (grosse Politik) of the

event which is not inscribed into the program of a particular political

or moral institution. Rather it is a politics beyond politics and morality

where the aim is not to change the course of time but rather to affirm

the eternity of the moment. At the center of this politics stands

Nietzsches conception of amor fati. We are here dealing with a

passive-receptive politics situated beyond the historical course of time.

From its perspective, the great human being is a reflection of the

eternal value and worth of the whole of life beyond human measure.

From the perspective of this politics, the challenge is not to turn the

contingent into the necessary but rather to attain knowledge of

necessity for only the latter can truly free up in the human being lifes

potential for culture. Small politics is a human, perhaps all too human

practice which inscribes the event in the historical becoming of

humanity, whereas great politics is a politics of life which inscribes

the event in the eternal return of the same. In what follows, I wish to

show the different elements and entanglements of these two politics ofthe event in three recurrent figures in Nietzsches philosophy: the

historical agent, the genius and the philosopher in both his early and

late work.

Professor Lemm is Head of the School of Humanities, UNSW. She is

the author ofNietzsches Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the

Animality of the Human Being(Fordham, 2009), and has edited books

on Foucault and Hegel. Her research focuses on the philosophy of

Friedrich Nietzsche, contemporary political thought, biopolitics, the

question of theanimal, philosophy of culture and cultures of memory,

and theories of justice and the gift.


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18 September

Prof. Paul Patton

(UNSW)

TBA

Paul Patton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South

Wales and Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. He

has published extensively on contemporary European philosophy and

political philosophy. He is the author of, among other works,Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colinization, Politics(Stanford

University Press, 2010) andDeleuze and the Political(Routledge,

2000).

25 September TBA

2 October

Dr Andrew Inkpin

(Melbourne)

Parody and Truth in Nietzsches Genealogy

In view of its apparently scholarly form the Genealogy of Moralityis

often viewed as a succinct, relatively systematic, and hence canonicalexposition of Nietzsches mature views on morality. However, the

status of this works claims appears to be challenged by Nietzsches

views on the nature and value of truth, particularly through the self-

cancellation of the ascetic ideal with which the work dramatically

closes. In this paper I reconstruct a framework for interpreting the

Genealogys project and argue that Nietzsches overarching intention

was to parody a scholarly work. I then explore whether the intention to

parody undermines the works apparent historical, psychological and

metaethical claims, and whether it results in incoherence (intentional

or otherwise). I attempt to show how successful negotiation of these

difficulties allows the Genealogyto be seen as exemplifying

Nietzsches idea of Gay Science and in supposed contrast to

Wagner blending cheerfulness and profundity.

Andrew Inkpin has first degrees in theoretical physics from the

University of York, and in philosophy, art history and psychology

from the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. His graduate studies in

philosophy were at University College London, where he completed

an MPhil and PhD. His main research interests are in modern

European philosophy, especially phenomenology (in particular

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), Wittgenstein and Nietzsche.

9 October

Dr Geoffrey

Boucher (Deakin)

Art as the Plenipotentiary of Impulse: A Reconstruction of

Adornos Aesthetic Theory in Light of His Reading of Freud

Geoff Boucher is a Senior Lecturer in the Psychoanalytic Studies

Programme and in Literary Studies at Deakin University. He is the

author of several books on critical theory, including The Charmed

Circle of Ideology(2008) andZizek and Politics(2010). His books on

Understanding MarxismandAdorno Reframedare appearing in 2012.

He works on contemporary culture from a perspective influenced by

Lacanian psychoanalysis, publishing in the fields of continentalphilosophy and psychoanalytic studies.


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16 October

Prof. Warwick Fox

(University of

CentralLancashire)

General Ethics and the Theory of Responsive Cohesion

In this talk I will outline the nature of ethics and discuss its expansion

from interhuman ethics to environmental ethics to what I have referred

to as General Ethics. By General Ethics I mean the development of asingle, integrated approach to ethics that encompasses the realms of

interhuman ethics, the ethics of the natural environment, and the ethics

of the human-constructed, or built, environment. I will outline my own

approach to General Ethics, which I refer to as the theory of

responsive cohesion. This approach is both different from and more

expansive than others on offer because it sees the basis of value as

lying in a particular form of organizationor structurethat things can

assume as opposed to particular kinds of higher-order powers or

capacities that some things have, such as autobiographical self-

awareness, rationality, sentience, being alive, or the capacity to

maintain some kind of holistic integrity (all of which themselvesrepresent a subset of the total class of responsively cohesive

structures). A range of significant ethical implications follows from

this approach.

Warwick Fox is Emeritus Professor at the University of Central

Lancashire. He has published widely in environmental philosophy in

particular and, more recently, on the extension of this work into what

he has referred to as General Ethics. He is represented in leading

anthologies and encyclopedias in the area, has served on the editorial

advisory boards of some of the leading journals in the area (including

Environmental Ethics, Organization and Environment, and

Environmental Values), and his books include Toward a

Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for

Environmentalism(State University of New York Press, 1995, and

Green Books, UK, 1995),Ethics and the Built Environment(ed.,

Routledge, 2000), andA Theory of General Ethics: Human

Relationships, Nature, and the Built Environment(The MIT Press,

2006).

30 October

Prof. Peter

Harrison (UQ)

What wasPhilosophicalabout Natural Philosophy?

Historians are agreed upon that fact that science is a relatively recent

conception and that natural philosophy was, roughly speaking, the

pre-nineteenth century equivalent. However, there remains room for

discussion about the exact identity of this early enterprise. In this

paper I survey some common claims about the category natural

philosophy, and propose that we understand this activity better if

think less about disciplines, doctrines, and methods, and a more about

the way in which particular intellectual activities shape the person,

mould behaviour and mental habits, and render the mind susceptible to

the reception of particular truths. Natural philosophy, I will suggest,

can be regarded as a means of intellectual and moral formation, inother words, as contributing in important ways to the classical


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philosophical goal of the good life.

Professor Peter Harrison is Director of the Centre for the History of

European Discourses at the University of Queensland. Prior to taking

up this position, he was for a number of years the Idreos Professor of

Science and Religion at the University of Oxford. At Oxford he was amember of the Faculties of Theology and History, a Fellow of Harris

Manchester College, and Director of the Ian Ramsey Centre where he

continues to hold a Senior Research Fellowship. He has been a

Visiting Fellow at Oxford, Yale, and Princeton, is a founding member

of the International Society for Science and Religion, and a Fellow of

the Australian Academy of the Humanities. In 2011 he delivered the

Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh. His five books

include, most recently, Wrestling with Nature: From Omens to

Science (Chicago, 2011) and The Cambridge Companion to Science

and Religion(Cambridge, 2010). He has published over 60 articles or

book chapters. He is currently editing his Gifford Lectures under theworking title of Science, Religion and Modernity and is also

working on a project concerned with conceptions of progress in

history and the historical sciences.

Documents

Alfred Deakin Philosophy Seminar Series