Alain Cohen - Greek Models for Postmodern Times -- Foucault and Lacan on Ethics and the Arts of Existence

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Greek Models for Postmodern Times: Foucault and Lacan on Ethics and the Arts of ExistenceAuthor(s): Alain J.-J. Cohen

Source: Dalhousie French Studies, Vol. 54, Dominique Desanti: Un Hommage (Spring 2001), pp. 105 -113

Published by: Dalhousie UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40838282Accessed: 03-09-2015 04:23 UTC

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2/10

GreekModels forPostmodern imes:

Foucault

and Lacan

on

Ethics

and

the Artsof Existence

Alain J.-J.Cohen

A

s

Freud id to

Œdipus,

many

French hinkers f the nineteenth nd twentieth

/

I

centuries

moderns

r

postmoderns)

ave

gravitated

o theGreekswhenever

hey

found hemselves

thically

onflicted,

n

the nterest f

reflecting pon

fundamental

questions regarding

morality,

thics and the

sovereign

good.

Did

the

Greeks

exhaust hese

questions?

For

Plato,

to kalon

kat'agathon

led to the

Truth.

Plato's

dramatic nterweave f theproblematics eferringo the True,the Good and the

Beautiful ave

resonated

hroughout

he

history

f

philosophy

and have

challenged

all

subsequent

hinkers o

construct

arallel systems-

r unified ield

theories of

philosophy.

During

he

Enlightenment,

ant

came theclosestto

answering

lato's

challenge

in

a new nterweavehat

ddressed hese

same

questions.

The First

Critique

ddresses

Truth

hrough

ure

Reason. His

Second

Critique

ddresses he

Good

through

ractical

Reason,

while

questions

bout

Estheticsre the

focusof the

Critique

f

Judgment.

n

the

twilight

f the

ndustrial

ge

(or

is it

the dawnof

the

modern/postmodern

ge?)

thinkers

ppeared

o

agonize

about

ethics,

perhaps

aided

by

Nietzsche's

profound

deconstruction f

morals and

ethics. Has

the

Postmodern

Age,

instead,

given up

altogether

pon questions

of

Ethics,

the

Good and the Arts

f

Existence?

Or, if,

as

Lyotard sserts n La conditionpostmoderne, he greataccounts Christ,Marx,

Freud,

t

al.)

have now

been

deconstructednd

delegitimized,

s it

not well

worth

wondering

bout

the new

problematizations

f ethics

that

hold

currency

n

our

postmodern

aradigms?

Sartre

and

the

Metaphysics

of

the

Ethical

Double

Bind

Sartre

an be

situated t

the

hresholdf

the

modern

nd

postmodern

ge.

His

research

on

the

autonomous

thical

ubject

s

riveting

n

the

attentionhat

he focuses

on hard-

edged

hoices,

those

haunted

y

a

double

bind

damned

f

you

do,

damned f

you

don't.

The

end

of

Being

and

Nothingness

s

unforgettable,

s

Sartre

announces

another

pus:

La liberté en se prenant lle-mêmepour fin, échappera--elle à toutesituation ?

Ou,

au

contraire,

emeurera-t-elle

ituée?

Ou

se

situera-t-elle

d'autant

lus précisément

t

individuellement

u'elle

se

projettera

avantage

dans

l'angoisse

comme

liberté

en

condition

et

qu'elle

revendiquera

davantage

sa

responsabilité,

titre

d'existant

par

qui

le

monde

vient

à

l'être?

(1943a:732)

The

above

thrust

makes t

apparent

hat,

until

the

very

nd of

Sartre's

research,

questions

f

ontology

were

hierarchically

rivileged,

while

questions

of

ethics

were,

instead,

derivative rom

is

ontological

concerns

nd

thus

pparently

ostponable,

in

Sartre's

ystem.

artre

eaves it

unstated,

uthe

does

think

hat

n

ethics

could be

logically

deduced

just

as

with

Spinoza)

from n

existential

ntology.

This

silence

may

seem

strange,

iven

that

Existentialism

s a

philosophy

dwells so

much

uponthe nterweave f being nd doing. n theheyday fExistentialism,I amthesum

of

my

choices

became an

intellectual

nd

psychological

paradigm,

long

with

the

notion

f

Sartrean

bad

faith,

r

the

paradoxical

aste for

he

cas-limite

xacerbated

by

dread

vis-à-vis

reedomn

a

world

evoidof

transcendental

alues.

Dalhousie

French

Studies

54

(2001)

-

105-


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3/10

106

Alain J.-J.

ohen

OrestePucciani was wont to suggest that Beauvoir' Pour une morale de

l'ambiguïté might

well have

provided

n inchoative

answerto

Sartre's

explicitly

stated

romise

f an ethics t

the

very

nd

of

Being

nd

Nothingness.

Sartre's

notes

in the

posthumous

ahiers

pour

une

morale make even

more

manifest

is intention

to

complement

n examination

f an

Existentialist

henomenology

with

a treatise

on Existentialist

thics.

Actually,

artre's laboration

upon

ethics does

take

place,

albeit

elsewhere,

n the

stage,

another

f

his favorite

errains,

hrough

dramatic

fictionrather

han

in

philosophical

writings.

The theatre

ransforms

deas

into

persons,

and demonstrates

oncretely

hat existence

must ndeed

precede

ssence,

underscored

ucciani

320).

Ethical

conflicts re

envisioned

n

systematic

mises-en-scène

t

the heart

of

many

of Sartre's

egendary lays.

In Les

mouches,1

for

nstance,

Sartre's

Orestes

faces an Existentialist double bind, illustrated

by

his incapacity to avoid

choices

ultimatelyempered

y

remorse

nd

guilt

emblematized

y

the

antique

nd

modern)

ggressively

nd

annoyingly

adistic

liesor Eumenides.

here s

no

way

out

of thisdouble

bind.

There s no

catharsisfor he

Existentialist

ero/antihero

Cohen

1999).

Besides

showcasing

Orestes as its

morally

conflicted

nd

psychologically

fragmented

haracter,

es

mouches s a

play

about man's

freedom

n conflict

with he

impotence

nd

omnipotence

f

the

gods

(Pucciani 320).

The

play

also

manifests

several

postmodern

eatures

n its combination

f reduxversions

f Homeric

egends,

such as

iEschylus's

umenides nd

Euripides'

Iphigenia

mong

heTauri.

The virtuosoExistentialist

ramaturgyeplays

fragments

f Greek

egend

and

tragedy,

t the

core of which rests the case

of Electra's

passivity

and Orestes's

hesitantmurderofClytemnestrand her over Egysthus)nrevenge or hemurder f

Orestes'sfather

Agamemnon).

hus,

the

haunting

Greek

maginary mpowers

artre

to focus new

uponquestions

f conflict nd

moral

choice,

in

an

interweave

etween

a

priori

freedom nd

contingent

acticity

nd, moreover,

n

a

necessarily

hermetic

reference

o

the German

ccupation

f France

in

itself

compelling

ituation).

In

thus

focusing,

Sartre esorts o an

illustration,

hrough

dramatic

fiction,

of the

unavoidable moral

questions,

albeit

posed contemporaneously

n

philosophical

terms.

Therein ies Sartre's ecret f

creativity.

n

a Moebius

flow

accompanied

by

suspensions

nd

parentheses, hilosophical questions

need

the

exemplum

f

fiction

while fiction eads back to

philosophical nquiry.

Foucault: /Esthetics of Ethics

It is fascinating o note that both Lacan and Foucault,among other intellectual

figures

f

the econd

half f the wentieth

entury,

esorted

s well to the

Greeks when

addressing uestions

f a modern

or

post/modern)

thics,

lthough

heir hoices

were

varied

nd

divergently

motivated.

n

L'usage

des

plaisirs,

Foucault

acknowledges

thathe

is

not

Hellenist,

ut

he marvels t

the

Greeks,

t

the fact hat

exuality

was

so

homogeneous

hat erms uch as

hetero-, omo-,

or

bisexuality

were bsent

from

their

vocabulary

187-89),

and that he

appetite

draws

o those who are

beautiful,

whatever heir ex

(192-95).

Foucault

s

impressed

y

a culture hat

stylizes

the

aesthetic

ttitude f

existence,

n

thatGreek

rotics

re interwovenwith

an ethics

defined s an art nd

technè f

existence,

nstead

f

being

defined

y

prowess

derived

from exual

repression.

As a

result,

rotics

do

not need to

produce

ny

prescriptive

codification f sexual

acts and

practices92-93,

138).

Foucault

electsfrom he

moral

elaborationsnd treatises andeddownby theGreek raditionnd revisits specially

Plato's

Symposiumalong

with few

other

exts,

s we

shall

discuss).

1. The

play

was

originally roduced

by

Charles

Dullin,

June

3,

1943.




4/10

Foucault

and Lacan

1

07

Sexualitys at the heart f Foucault' discussionaboutethics, n the sameway

that he

nescapable

dilemmas

nd

paradoxes

oncerning

hoice,

and the constitutive

double bindfor consciousness-in-the-world

emained

t the heart

f Sartre's thical

paradigms.

n

L'usage

des

plaisirs,

Foucault ntertwines

masterfully)

reek rotics

and ethics.

This

consequential

move

has to be

perceived

n the

larger

context

of

Foucault'

philosophy.

Earlier,

n

Discipline

and

Punish,

Foucault

suggests

vast

studies

n the

micro-physics

f

power,

hus

perhaps alteringprevious

models

of

power

hat had

currency

rom

Aristotle o Marx. We

may

recall Foucault'

earlier

memorable econstruction

f

power:

The

study

of the

micro-physics

f

power presupposes

that

the

power

exercised n

the

body

s

conceivednot s a

property,

ut as

a

strategy,

...]

that ne shoulddeciphernita network f relations, onstantlyn tension,

in

activity,

rather han a

privilege

that one

might possess.

[...] [T]his

power

s

exercised ather han

possessed;

t is not a

privilege, cquired

r

preserved,

f the dominant

lass,

but

the overall

effect

f

its

strategic

positions.

(1979:26-27)

This shift in

the definition and elaboration of

power

has

far-reaching

consequences.

Foucault'

(postmodern)

otion of

power

s that of an interdefined

network f

unstable

relations,

wherein

power

s

exercisedrather han

possessed

(26-27).

Relations

of

power,

Foucault

laborates,

re not

localized,

nor are

they

univocal. As

Foucault's remarkable

nterpreter,

eleuze,

highlights punctually,

Foucault'

original concepts

deconstruct he traditional

ostulates

concerning

he

philosophy of power which had theretoforeeen held postulatesof property,

localization,

subordination,

ssence or

attribute,

nd

modality

(power-in-action

through

he

use of

violence or

ideology)

(25-29).

It

is

upon

Foucault's formidable

thesis

about

the

micro-physics

f

power,

and

power's

capillarity

not

unlike

Deleuze' s

rhizomatic

etworks)

hat oucault s

able to

question exuality

fter he

fact.

Thus,

nstead

of

dealing

with

general

macro-theoriesbout

power,

or those

of

political

power

nd the

state,

Foucault

s

able to

research

hreemicro-domains f

everyday

life

dietetics,

economics

(in

the

etymological

sense of home

economics ),

and erotics

from

which much

more

precise

theories

of

power

are

subsequently

xtrapolated.

It

s in this

frame

f mind

hatwe

may

apprehend

oucault's

turning

o the

study

of

Greek

erotics.

Foucault

focuses

upon

a

single

question:

how did

sexuality

problematizetself ntheGreek andtheGreco-Romanpisteme,n contradistinction

to the

way

sexuality

roblematized

tself

n

the Christian

pistemel

In

other

words,

what

re the

genealogy

and

prehistory

hat

account for such

profound

thical

and

epistemic

shifts,

given

that the

traditional hristian

oncerns for

sin,

the

flesh,

renunciation,

nd

purity

ame

to be

dominant

thical

paradigms,

whereas those

concernswere

not

present

n the

preceding

Greek/Greco-Roman

pistemel)

Foucault

deconstructs he

traditional

pposition

of

a Greek

exteriority

ersus

a

Christian

interiority:

What

s called

Christian

nteriority

s a

particular

mode

of

relationship

with

oneself,

comprising precise

forms

of

attention,

concern,

decipherment,

verbalization,

onfession.

...]

[T]he

exteriority

f

the

ancient

morality

mplies

the

elaboration f

self,

lbeit n

a

differentorm

63).

Attheextreme, oucault haracterizes reekmorality s a stylizationof theaesthetic ttitude f existence

(106).

Highlighting,

although

not

exclusively,

Diotima's

well-known

uestions

bout

the

ontology

f

love

itself n

Plato's

Republic

(or

the

winged

charioteer

ominating

his

rebel steeds

as

metaphor

or

the

soul's

struggle

with

tself n

the

Phaedrus),

Foucault

chisels

his

vision of

the

recursive

dominant

moral

and ethical

tension

for the

Greeks:

the

opposition

between




5/10

108

Alain J.-J. ohen

aphrodisia (thedangerousppetites hatmakeus run ut of control) nd enkrateia

(mastery,

nd the

necessity

thereof)

236).

This

ubiquitous

ension is sometimes

delicate,

sometimes

hard-edged

nd

inexorable. Since

aphrodisia

are

always

dangerous,

he

ttempts

f

enkrateia o

dominate

leasures

nd wishes mustnever

be

allowed to

stop.

With

respect

o

erotics nd

power,

here

s

a

striking nalogy

with

Foucault*

earliermemorable

econstructionf inter-defined

ower

s the terrain f

constantly

enegotiated

nterrelations.

Nevertheless,

he

similarity

n

the

struggle

etween nkrateia

nd

aphrodisia

as

an

unstable nterrelationn

perpetual enegotiation,

s

well,

ed Foucault nto

another

directionn The

Use

of

Pleasure.

In

that

work,

he studies he

Greek rotic

courtship

between

the erastes and the

eromenos the

object

of love

at

an

age

of

transition so

desirable,yet

whose honor is so

fragile 196),

and who

should

neither e effeminateordebauched.Meanwhile,he overknows thatthe

mastery

f

aphrodisia

derives

rom he

mastery

f the

elf,

nd,

furthermore,

hat he

mastery

f

others

erives rom his

ame

mastery

f

the self.

Ethics

nd

politics

re

intertwinedor

hemoral

ubject

t times

reconfigured

nd

overlayed

s a

political ubject

s well. The

various

possible

interweaves f

mastery

and

appetites

fashion

vast

spectrum

f

ethics

proposals throughout

he immense

Greek

nd

Greco-Roman

pisteme.

o

sketch

n

broad

strokes,

t

may

be said that

for

Plato

(427-347 B.C.),

the

search for

truth,

hrough

o kalon

kat'agathon,

is a

perpetual

light,

higher

and

higher,

towards

dealities,

whereas for his

disciple

Aristotle

384-322

B.C.)

it is a

question

f

precision

cquired

s a result

of

a

long

practice,

o hit

he

right arget,

he

middle

path,

he fabled

golden

mean.

Aristotleroposes mixture frisk nd cautionregardinghe nterweave f this

constant

tension

(the

virtue

of

courage

between

the

extremes of

temerity

nd

cowardice).

Epicurus

c.

341-270

B.C.),

along

with

his

(Epicurean)

successors,

stresses

he ame

precision

when

peaking

bout

geometry

f

pleasure

nd

pain,

the

art f a

balancebetween

hem,

nd the

searchfor

he

right

dosage

of

aphrodisia.

By

contrast,

heother

Greek

toics

e.g.

Diogenes

Laertius,

lutarch)

nd the ater

Greco-

Roman

Stoics

(e.g.

Cicero,

Seneca,

Marcus

Aurelius)

dvocate

greater

aution and

prefer

self-removal from

the theatre

of

passions

because

aphrodisia

are

acknowledged

s

too

dangerous,

nd

mastery

means

earning

o

shelter neself from

them.

Several

extensions f

Foucault's

research n ethics

may

be

presented.

We shall

limit

urselves o

a brief

ketch

f four uch

prolongations.1. Foucault'selaboration ouldbe questioned orprivilegingPlato rather han

Aristotle

mong

his

Greek

models. If

the

reversiblefears

those

of

excess versus

passivity)

lead to a

lifelong

struggle

of our

enkrateia,

through

emperance

nd

moderation,

oucault

may

have

paid

more

attention o

the

specifics

of

Aristotle's

Nichomachean

thics,

wherehe

would

have found

more

ffinity

or

philosophy

of

desire

nd

action,

f

prudence

phronesis)

nd

moderation

sophrosune),

of

character

and

wisdom.

Lacan

paraphrases

uperbly:

Ethics for

Aristotle s a

science of

character,

he

building

of

character,

he

dynamics

f

habits and of

action with

relation o

habits,

raining,

ducation

10).

2.

As

suggested

bove,

Foucault's allusions to

Epicurus

ould also be

probed

o

shed more

ight

upon

the

complexity

f

Epicurus'

lassification f

desires,

and the

complexdosageofpassionsinvolved n theregulationnd thedistribution f vicesandvirtuesnthe

geometry

f

pleasure.

Passions

would

only

be studied

gain

n

their

geometry

n

Descartes'

masterpiece,

raitédes

passions,

of

1646.)

To

extensions

1

and 2 it

may

be

responded

hat

preserved

exts

of

Epicurus

re

very

imited

nd,

moreover,

hat

Foucault s

less interestedn

the

complexity

of

Greek

hought

bout ethics

than he is in

the

genealogy

of

a

certain

ouci de

soi

and




6/10

Foucault and Lacan

1

09

inquiétudeabout erotics ndsexuality and thequestionof its transposition ome

the Christian

pistemic

hift.

3.

The reference

o Kant

s

an

equallydisturbing

acuna

n

Foucault*

debate

on

ethical models

n his work n ethics. It is of course a

question

of the Kant

of the

second

Kritikwherein he

practical

moral

udgment

s delineated

s

synthetic

priori

not

transcendent,

ot

hardwired,

ut

lso not

ust

derived rom

xperience),

in

a

problematization

f moral

maxims

in

interrelationwith

the

categorical

imperative.

ivenFoucault'

ease of references

o

Kant

elsewhere,

t

may

be that

he

did not want

o be drawn nto

the mmenseKantian

pparatus

nd

ose

sight

of the

other

ebate,

mentioned

bove. This

response

n itself s not

satisfactory,

nsofar s

Kant's

problematics

have

definitively econfigured

he

question

of

ethics in the

Western radition.4. Another

rolongued

xtensionof Foucault' researchwould be

particularly

enriching

ithreference

o

psychoanalysis.

he same

response

as

in 3

that,

albeit

not s in a full

dialogue

with

psychoanalysis,

ome of these

questions

re

present

n

volume of

The

History f Sexuality,

r

thatFoucault

may

have

preferred

ot

being

drawn

nto he

mmense

sychoanalytic

ield,

method nd

apparatus,

he

better

o deal

directly

with the Greeks

may

not stand as well as the

objection regarding

he

Kantian acuna. Far from

eing

anachronistic,

detour

hrough sychoanalysis

may

complement

he

Greek models. We cannot

read the Greeks

with

transparency,

pretending

hat he

psychoanalyticpparatus

which lluminates

he twentieth

entury

has not

reconfigured

ll our

conceptual

pprehensions.

If

we take it

as axiomatic that the

moral

subject enjoys

a

moral

autonomy,

without hich thicaldebates are no longer pertinent,tmayno longerbe possible

to

engage

he

question

f

ethicswithout full

measure f

the debate bout ntentions.

Intentions,

oreover,

re now

haunted

overdetermined)

y

unconsciousmotivation.

Such

a debate

annot e

short-circuited.

Lacan.

Ethics,

and

Affect

Between

Eschylus

and

Euripides,

acan

proposes

a shrewd

eading

of

Sophocles'

s

Antigone

c

441

B.C.)

in

L'éthique

de la

psychanalyse,

his

legendary

1959-60

seminar

published

a

quarter-century

ater).

The

title

may

be

understood

s

an

illuminating

hiasma for

he

ethics f

psychoanalysis

s

just

as much t

stake s the

psychoanalysis

of

ethics in

pointing

out the

mmense

uestions

ddressed

herein

by

Lacan

through

Antigone.

Already

in

1905,

almost

at the

origins

of

psychoanalysis,Freud iscusseshis owndoublebind, n the ntroductiono Dora's

case

history.

He

is

equally

conflicted

y

the

need to

respect

his

patient's

secrets,

conveyed

uring

he sessions'

privacy,

nd

by

the demands f

science,

inasmuch s

an

account f

Dora's

case

wouldbe

helpful

o others n

their

uffering.

As we

know,

reud

esolves his

dilemma or

psychoanalytic

istory y

altering

the

patient's

ircumstanceso that

hecase

history

otbe

read as a

roman-à-clef.

or

the

psychoanalyst

ho has

to

suspend

moral

udgment

and

disbelief)

oncerning

he

analysand's

accounts,

questions

of

ethics are

paramount

n

myriad

ways.

The

patient's

account

does not

preclude

he

analyst

from

feeling

all

the

gamut

of

emotions,

ranging

from

pity

and fear

and

its

possible

subsequent

atharsis)

in

reaction

o such

accounts, ut, ather,

uch

udgments

nd

reactions

re to be

occulted,

and

anamorposed,

the

better

to

become

therapeutic

o the

patient when thepsychoanalystater ntervenes t a

propitious

moment. n

striving

orthe difficult

suspension

of

(moral)

judgment,

the

psychoanalyst's

well-known

floating

attention

s of

extreme

pertinence.

Streams of

writings

bout the

analyst's

a-

symmetric

counter-transference,

pposed

to the

analysand's

transference,

ave




7/10

110

Alain

J.-J.

ohen

called attention o this delicate operation not to mention the analyst's own

possibility

f

attack

y

the

Eumenides'

fury

or

are

they

his

own

Eumenides?).

Lacan too

drawsfrom

he Greeks

and

Kant

(as

well as

Goethe and

Hegel).

However,

he

means to

highlight

he

specificity

f

psychoanalytic

heory

with

regard

to

ethical

reflection. iven

thatdesire

nd

action,

desire nd

fantasy,

esire nd the

ideal,

desire

nd the

aw,

desire

nd the

unconscious,

re all

by

definition nterwoven

with

thics,

acan thus

nterrogates

n

Antigone

he

significant

etaphor

t the heart

of the

representation

f

that enowned

ragedy,

where he antinomies f

pleasure

nd

the

sovereigngood

seem

exponentially

xpressed.

Or,

we

might ay,

he

privileges

Antigone

s the

tragedy

hatmakes

manifest,

eyond

he traditional

quilibrium

f

the

pleasure

principle

with the

reality

principle,

theirown

triangulation

with the

Death

drive.

Lacan points t first o thetraditional iews ofethical onflictn

tragedy,

hatof

a conflict

between

qually

valorized

sovereign

goods,

and the

ensuing

paralyzing

position,

r double

bind,

bothfor he

tragic

nteractant

nd for he

spectator.

On

the

one

handCreon

refuses o

permit

funeral or he

dead

Polynices,

because

Polynices

was a traitor o the

aws of his

city,

while

Antigone

does want o

bury

her brother

because he is

her brother. acan

even refines

upon

the

lacuna

in

the

scholarly

interpretation

f the

play:

Creon

represents

he aws

of the

city

nd dentifies

hemwith he decrees

f

the

gods, yet]

t

cannot e

denied that

Antigone

s after

ll concernedwith

the

chthonian

aws,

the aws of

the earth.

...] [I]t

is for the sake of

her

brotherwho

has

descended nto

the

subterranean orld that she resists

Creon' order,nthenameofthemostradically hthonian f relations hat

are

blood relations.n

brief,

he is in

the

position

to

place

the Dike of

the

gods

on her

ide.

(276-77)

However,

sychoanalysis

oes not

need to

repeat

new the

formidableessons

of

the

classics.

Lacan's

lesson

reconfiguresltogether

he

reading

f

the

play.

In

his

final

mad

abandonment

confronted

y

the

deathsof his

son,

his

wife,

and that of

Antigone),

reon's

tragic

estinymay

elicitthe

expected ity

for

the

other)

nd fear

(for

oneself).

But

Antigone

licits neither

ity

nor

fear,

acan

states

categorically.

From

the

beginning,

ntigone

nowsno

hesitation.

he wants o

die,

condemned o

a

cruel

punishment,

hat f

being

buried live in

a tomb.

he is relentlessn

the desire

for

death,

which

unfolds rom

he

beginning

o theend of

the

play.

This is not theùbris characteristicfCreon),butrather ntigone'sate (tragic

flaw).

The

splendor

l'éclat)

of

Antigonemay

be beholden

o the effect f

beauty

on

desire : it

reverses all

tragic

expectations

and

assumptions.

For

Lacan's

redefinition

f

catharsis,

catharsis s

the

beauty

effect. What

the

spectator's

catharsis

waits

n

her

ong

defiance f

the

aws,

her

ought-after

ondemnation

n

full

recognition

of the

criminality

of her

act,

and her

magnificent

final

lamentation,

s

that he

does not

yield

about)

her

desire.Lacan

alludes to one of his

earlier

writings

boutSade and

Sadean

crime,

o remind s: It is

not for

nothing

that

crime s

one

boundary

f

our

exploration

f

desire,

r

that

t s

on thebasis of a

crime

that

reud

ttempted

o reconstruct

he

genealogy

f the aw

(260).

Lacan

is,

of

course,

referring

o the

Œdipal

structure,

o the

dialectics of

the

castration

principle,

and to the murder f Laios in

this

Œdipal

structure. acan's

legendaryR Schema givesa glimpse f thepostmoderneconstructedubject, plit

and

fragmented

nto

decentered-effect.n

my

nalysis

f

the

R

Schema,

pointed

out how for

Lacan the

complex quadrangle

f

the

Real, i.e.,

the

Moebius

strip

(formed

y

linking

M

to

m,

and to

I),

provides

he means for

figuring

he

axis of

desire,M-i,

i.e.,

signifiers

f

mother

n

relation

o

signifiers

f

image )

and the




8/10

Foucault and Lacan

111

axis of identity,-m, i.e., the Ideal of the moi in relation o moi ) (1996). The

flow

of the Moebius

strip

consists

in

this circulation f desire

nto

identity

nd

identity

nto desire.

The

R

Schema

may

be

complex,

but t

helps figure

he relation

of affect nd

identity.

Whom-I-desireransformsho-I-am

ust

as much s who-I-am

ffectswhom-

I-desire. n its

origin,

he

nfant's esirefor mother s

thwarted

y

the

aw,

by

the

interventionf the

symbolic

third,

r the

Œdipus

and the

symbolic

order.

Thus,

all

future esires recathect

omething

r other from his

original transgression.

The

crime

n

the

symbolic

order

i.e.,

gainst

Laios)

constructs nd

structures

he

law

of

desire. For

Lacan,

the

psychoanalytic heory

f

jouissance

accounts for the fact

that

we are not

only

dealing

with he

question

of a

given pleasure

principle

nd its

equilibrium

ith another

given realityprinciplebut,instead,with sex and death.There s thereforen element hat s

transgressive

nd criminal t the root of all

desire.This s

thedesire

which s made

hyperbolic

n

dramatic

iction,

nd a

fortiori

in

tragedy.

t is

this

systematically

ustained

ransgressive ower

hat

ccounts for

the

éclat of

Antigone's

character. She

pushes

to

the

limit

the realization of

something

hat

might

e called the

pure

nd

simple

desire f death

s such

282).

The

lessons for

psychoanalysis

hatLacan

extrapolates

rom

he

play Antigone

interrelatehe notion

f desire

nd

betrayal.They

wereknown

by every

Lacanian of

my

generation.

hey

took the form f

three

propositions

nd

an addendum

orollary

which

merit

uoting

t

length:

First,

the

only

thing

one can

be

guilty

of is

giving ground

elative to

one's

desire.

Second,

the

definition

f a

hero:

someone who

may

be

betrayedwith mpunity. hird, his is something hat not everyonecan

achieve;

t

constituteshe

difference

etween he

ordinary

man and a

hero,

and

it

is,

therefore,

ore

mysterious

han one

might

hink.

The

betrayal

that

almost

always

occurs

for the

ordinary

man

sends him

back to

the

service f

the

goods,

but with

he

proviso

thathe will

never

gain

find

that

actor

which

estores

sense

of

direction o

that

ervice.

...]

[F]ourth:

There s

no

other

good

than

that

which

may

serve to

pay

the

price

for

access to

desire

given

that

desire s

understood ere s

the

metonymy

f

our

being.

321)

Antigone

s the

heroine.

She is

betrayed,

f

course,

by everyone,

because

she

never

yields

n

her

desire o

die.

Greek

heroes

re all

betrayed.

ther

betrayals

nclude

Moses's dyingbefore ettingothePromised and,Socrates'sbeinggivenhemlock;

Christ's

crucifixion.

erhaps

we

need

such

heroes

to

give

us a

taste of

ideality,

inasmuch s

these

heroes

emind s

of

how

muchwe

have

compromised

nd

yielded

n

our

own

desire,

ll

for he

sake

of

goods.

Perhaps

that

deality

corresponds

o

the

inestimable

rice

of

access

to

(the

to-be-betrayed)

esire. n

reinterpreting

he

fabled

cathartic

ffect,

acan'

s

virtuoso

eading

f

Antigone

istills an

apprehension

f

the

formidable

nd

contagious

beauty

of

Antigone

herself

as

a

transsubstantiated

reminder

f the

art

of

existence.

Note on

the

Postmodern

The

place

of

psychoanalysis

in

modernism

a

modernism

onceived as

both

a

historical

ccurrencen

early

twentieth

entury,

nd a

conceptual

onstruct

hat still

sought systems, great accounts or T. O. E's (theories of

everything)--is

interrelated

ith

he

avatars

of

the

postmodern

ffect.

sychoanalysis,

one of

the

most

ophisticated

nd

comprehensive

odels

ever

offeredn

the

fieldsof

cognition

(epistemology),

affect

emotion

system),

action

and

motivation

pragmatics)

and

aesthetics,

may

very

well

be

the last

creation

of

modernism.

However,




9/10

112

Alain J.-J. ohen

psychoanalysiss not ust another peculative ystemwherewe wouldoppose Freud

to

Spinoza

or

Kant).

Freud

quotes liberally

from he

history

of

philosophical

systems,

ut his is

not

another

peculative hilosophical

ystem.

His is of a different

type.

The

psychoanalytic

ebates re anchored

n

a

bipolarity:

hat f the clinical

(the

narrativesf

pain

and

suffering)

nd that

of

the theoretical. reud'sfamous

narrative

case

studies,

on

hysteria,

phobia,

obsession,

paranoia,

narcissism and

depression

and Lacan'

exegesis

of them interrelate ith the construction

f a

sophisticated

odelof themind.

This model

of

the mind onstitutes ne

of the

most

complex

yntheses

f

modernity:

he

trichotomy

f

the

id/ego/superego

upon

which

Lacan

superimposes

heReal/the

maginary/theymbolic,

nd the

language-model

s

an

alternative for the

biology-model),

and

is intertwinedwith a rhetoric of

conflicting

rives, r with ts

highlighting

f the Unconscious.n fact, t is thisvery

complexity

hat makes it so

powerful

n

the discourse of

a

fragmenting

post-

modernity.

yotardmay

be

right

bout

he

nd

of

the

great

ccounts,

but the

split

and

fragmented

ostmodern

ubjectrepresented

s an

algorithm,

n

the

complexity

addressed

y

Lacan'

R

Schema,

may

well

correspond

o whatBaudrillard escribes

as the

Age

of theSimulacral.

I

suggest

hat

acan'

reading

f

the effect

f

the beautiful

n

Antigone

may

be

considered s an

inquiry egarding othing

ess thanthe

place

of affect

n

ethics.

In

what mounts o a

treatise

n

aesthetics,

amisch

n

Le

jugement

e

Pans,

also

returns

to

the

Greeks nd examines ll the

myriad spects,

motivations nd

consequences

f

Paris'

judgment,aught

etween he hree

oddesses,

s well as

caught

etween

reud

(and desire) ndKant thesublime nd thebeautiful). rappedn a truedouble bind

(perhaps

n

a

triple

bind?),

his

ultimate hoice of

Aphrodite

in

her

éclat,

in

her

terrifying

eauty,

utwas it a

choice ?)

provoked

he modelof all

wars. Was it not

the

modelfor ll

futurethics nd aesthetics?

Postface

For

Dominique

Desanti,

nd

n

memory

f

Oreste

.

Pucciani,

le

Fennec :

Je

ne me

souviens

pas

(affectivement)

'un

autrefois

où

je

ne

connaissais

as

Dominique

Desanti,

même i

je

sais

objectivement ue

déjà

en

1968,

c'est Oreste

Pucciani

qui

nous avait

présentés

à

Hollywood,

t

que

nous nous sommesrevus en

compagnie

de

Michel

Foucault,

e

FrançoiseGilot,

de

Jonas

alk à

La

Jolla,

de bien

d'autres,à Paris tailleurs. e même

u'avec

OrestePucciani,

'ai toujours

oûté

avec

Dominique

au

plaisir

esthético-éthique

e

«

refaire e monde

»

dans

chacune de nos conversations. Parisienne mais

globe-trotter,

intellectuelle t

écrivain, nclassable,

Dominiqueprise

e détail hic

et

nunc de la

chronique

autant

que

les envolées

philosophiques.

Dominique

t Jean-Toussaint

Touky),

es

«

Chats

»

de Saint-Germain

ou de la rue

Clauzel,

configurent

n vaste bestiaire

qui

auraitfait es

délicesde La Fontaine

selon

Louis

Marin,

e

plus

brillant es

penseurs

de

l'Âge Classique).

Dans

l'entregent

ù

rayonnent

es

«

Chats

»,

Oreste tait

e

«

Fennec

»,

Jacques

e

«

Cheval

»,

et ainsi

de

suite

pour

maints

amis,

dans une

rigoureuse

ndexicalité

qui

excluait

l'arbitraire. ourmoi-même n avait essayé « Hérisson», mais sans

trop

de conviction. Au Grand

iècle,

La

Fontaine, Descartes,

Pascal,

inter lio

s,

auraient té les aficionadosdu

salon des Chats. De

même,

Diderot t les

Encyclopédistes

uraient

ompté parmi

es habitués

au

siècle

des Lumières. ant

de ce

que

«

le

siècle

nous aura

appris

»

est




10/10

Foucault

and Lacan 113

passé par 'éthiquedudialogueet par e dialoguede l'éthique dont

nous rendons i

hommage

Dominique

Desanti.

University

f California,

an

Diego

WORKS CITED

Baudrillard,

ean. imulations.New York:

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imone de. Pour une moralede

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Cohen,

Alain J.-J.

996. Freud's Paradoxof

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Michel.

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Discipline

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Alain Cohen - Greek Models for Postmodern Times -- Foucault and Lacan on Ethics and the Arts of Existence