Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 17-96-The Deep Battle against the West

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 17-96-The Deep Battle against the West

[Hot Issue] Recent Attacks Illuminate the Islamic State’s Europe Attack NetworkPublication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0April 27, 2016 03:12 PM Age: 20 hrsBy: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr

Social network analysis of the Zerkani Network (source: authors). Please see the bottom of the page for high-resolution graphics to accompany the article.The recent major terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels represent a watershed moment not just for the Islamic State (IS), but for the entire jihadist movement. The attacks mark the first time that a single jihadist network has succeeded in carrying out two separate mass casualty attacks in Europe. In the past, when jihadist networks struck in Europe, they were pursued with the full weight of European security and intelligence services and all relevant perpetrators were neutralized before they could mount a second attack.IS’s successes are the result of a complex strategy executed by officials in the Amn al-Kharji, a shadowy wing of IS’s bureaucracy responsible for selecting and training external operatives and for planning terrorist attacks in areas outside of IS’s core territory, including those within European borders. This article delves into the structure of IS’s external operations branch and explores this branch’s strategy and on-the-ground network in Europe.The Amn al-KharjiAlthough IS’s attacks and plots in Europe have received a great deal of media attention, the Amn al-Kharji has largely stayed out of the spotlight. This aversion to publicity is deliberate, and demonstrates the Amn al-Kharji’s strategic importance to IS. While IS’s military branches in Syria

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 14

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and Iraq readily advertise their exploits, the Amn al-Kharji is shrouded in secrecy, sometimes employing disinformation to mislead intelligence agencies. Nonetheless, enough information now has emerged in open-source reporting to paint a picture—however incomplete—of the Amn al-Kharji.The most detailed information on the Amn al-Kharji comes from an interview that an IS defector, known only as “Abu Khaled” (The Daily Beast, November 15, 2015). According to Abu Khaled, the Amn al-Kharji is one of four agencies that fall under IS’s amniyat, or security apparatus. The other three agencies are the Amn al-Dawla, which is responsible for internal security within IS’s territory; the Amn al-Dakhili, which is akin to an interior ministry; and the Amn al-Askari, or the military intelligence wing. Abu Khaled, a former member of the Amn al-Dawla, explained that the Amn al-Kharji was responsible for conducting espionage and terrorist attacks in enemy territory, and that the agency had developed intricate tactics enabling its operatives’ infiltration. Indeed, long before the Amn al-Kharji put its attack plans for Brussels and Paris into motion, the branch spearheaded operations behind enemy lines in Syria and Iraq. By the time IS began investing serious resources in European operations, the Amn al-Kharji had already refined its tradecraft for attacks outside IS-controlled territory.Abu Khaled’s testimony sheds light on key players within the Amn al-Kharji’s opaque structure. According to Abu Khaled, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, IS’s chief spokesman and one of the organization’s top officials, appoints the commanders of each of the amniyat’s (security services) four branches. Other reports have identified the Syria-born Adnani as the operational commander of the Amn al-Kharji (The Hindu, February 9). However, given Adnani’s role in managing multiple agencies within IS, it is highly likely that his position in the Amn al-Kharji is largely bureaucratic in nature. That is, Adnani likely signs off on external operations, but is not involved in operational planning.Rather, responsibility for directing IS’s external operations falls to an elusive figure known only by his kunya (nom de guerre), Abu Sulayman al-Faransi. Despite his prominent role in IS, little personal information about al-Faransi is available. It is believed that—as his kunya suggests—Faransi is a French national. According to French sources, he now resides in northern Syria with his wife—also a French national—and two children (TTU, April 18). Reports allege that al-Faransi was promoted to external operations chief following the Paris attacks, suggesting that the Frenchman was rewarded for overseeing one of IS’s most high-profile attacks. Al-Faransi’s name also surfaced in investigations into the Brussels attacks. Belgian authorities investigating the contents of a computer owned by Ibrahim El Bakraoui, one of the two suicide bombers who struck the Zaventem airport, concluded that Bakraoui had been in contact with al-Faransi, and that other cell members may have been, as well. Bakraoui had submitted attack plans to the Frenchman (TTU, April 18).Below al-Faransi in the Amn al-Kharji are the theater commanders, responsible for planning operations in various regions that IS wants to target. Theater commanders are perhaps the most pivotal actors in IS’s external operations structure, as they serve as a bridge between strategic planners and tactical operators. Several individuals have emerged as possible theater commanders—though it is not clear how many such positions exist within the Amn al-Kharji—and it appears that IS appoints theater commanders who originate from the regions over which they are given authority.For instance, IS’s external operations in Southeast Asia are likely led by Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian militant now based in Syria who was responsible for coordinating the January 2016 attacks in Jakarta (The Sun Daily, April 3). IS has also likely appointed theater commanders for external operations in both Turkey and North Africa, though it is not clear who currently holds these positions. [1]The theater commander for Europe is believed to be Salim Benghalem, another French national whose involvement in jihadism predates IS’s emergence. Benghalem became radicalized in a French prison when serving an earlier sentence for attempted murder. He soon fell in with a network commonly known as the Buttes-Chaumont group, a Paris-based jihadist network involved in recruiting


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individuals to fight against U.S. forces in Iraq in the mid-2000s. This group also included Cherif and Said Kouachi, the brothers who carried out the Charlie Hebdo massacre in January 2015. In 2011, Benghalem and Cherif Kouachi traveled to Yemen, where they received training from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Agence France Presse, October 18, 2015).Soon after traveling to Syria to join IS in early 2013, Benghalem was tapped to serve as a prison guard for several French hostages whom IS had kidnapped (Agence France Presse, October 18, 2015). Several former prison guards from this group have emerged as key actors in IS’s European external operations efforts. For instance, Mehdi Nemmouche, a fellow French national who guarded French hostages alongside Benghalem, returned to Europe and carried out an attack on the Brussels Jewish Museum in May 2014 that killed four. Naajim Laachraoui, a Belgian national who served as one of the suicide bombers at the Zaventem airport, had also been a guard (Le Point, April 25, 2016. Benghalem now outranks all of his former prison guard colleagues; indeed, he has become so influential that in October 2015, French planes conducted a rare targeted airstrike specifically aimed at Benghalem (The Irish Times, October 20, 2015).As the theater commander for IS’s European operations, Benghalem oversees several commanders responsible for training operatives, and planning and coordinating operations at the ground level. These tactical commanders play a hands-on role in IS’s Europe operations, and sometimes even participate in attacks themselves. Given their more public role, these commanders often attract greater media scrutiny than their more discrete superiors.Such was the case for Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was killed by French authorities several days after the Paris attacks. In January 2015, Abaaoud deployed to Athens, where he directed a cell based in the Belgian city of Verviers that was disrupted when Belgian authorities intercepted telephone calls between Abaaoud and the plotters (Times of Change, November 16, 2015). Though the Verviers plot failed, Abaaoud may have learned a valuable lesson: relying on telephone communications to manage Europe-based cells was too risky. A woman who spoke with Abaaoud after the Paris attacks said that he had explained he traveled to Europe to “avoid the failure” of previous operations (The Irish Times, March 20).Between the Verviers plot and the Paris attacks, Abaaoud spent his time training operatives and planning unsophisticated, low-cost operations in Europe. In the summer of 2015, Abaaoud trained Paris native Reda Hame and at least one other operative to carry out mass casualty attacks on soft targets in France and Spain. This plan was disrupted when authorities arrested Hame’s counterpart in Spain (Le Monde), November 16, 2015). Abaaoud was also in contact with Ayoub El Khazzani, who was tackled by passengers when he tried to open fire during an August 2015 train ride from Amsterdam to Paris. Khazzani never traveled to Syria, suggesting that, in addition to training operatives already in IS-controlled territory, Abbaoud sought to inspire radicalized individuals based in Europe to carry out attacks on their own.While these small-scale plots distracted authorities, Abaaoud was planning the Paris attacks, his jihadist magnum opus. In a move uncharacteristic of a commander of his stature, Abaaoud traveled to Paris to oversee and coordinate the operation. Though there is little information on Abaaoud’s activities in Europe in the months and weeks before the Paris attacks, multiple news outlets reported that he traveled to the United Kingdom in the summer of 2015, possibly to case potential targets or to coordinate with other militants (France 24, January 11). Abaaoud then personally coordinated and participated in the Paris operations, dropping off one of the suicide bombers, opening fire on civilians in several different locations, and later driving to an area near the Bataclan and contacting militants inside the concert hall (BFMTV, November 25, 2015). Unlike the Verviers plot, Abaaoud was committed to personally seeing the Paris attacks through to completion.Abaaoud seemingly planned additional attacks after the Paris massacre, but French authorities caught and killed him in a raid on an apartment in a Paris suburb. Though Abaaoud’s death eliminated one of


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IS’s most skilled external operatives, it is believed that IS quickly replaced him with Fabien Clain, a French convert whose voice was featured in the audio message in which IS claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks.Clain boasts his own jihadist pedigree. He was deeply involved in French jihadist networks in the early 2000s, and in 2009 was sentenced to five years in prison for his role in recruiting French nationals to fight in Iraq (Le Monde, November 18, 2015). He traveled to Syria in early 2014, and even before he was promoted to fill Abaaoud’s position, Clain was involved in coordinating attacks in Europe. Clain likely served as the primary point of contact for Sid Ahmed Ghlam, a French Algerian who tried to carry out an April 2015 attack on a church in a Paris suburb, but instead made the humiliating decision to call police after he shot himself in the leg (Agence France Presse, November 23, 2015). Clain may also have played a minor role in the Paris attacks: in 2009, French authorities learned that Clain and several other French militants had discussed attacking the Bataclan, whose owners at the time were Jewish supporters of Israel (Le Monde, November 18, 2015). Clain may have suggested the Bataclan as a target for the Paris attacks.The fact that IS was able to replace Abaaoud with a jihadist of Clain’s caliber indicates that the group possesses a deep and capable bench of experienced militants from Europe. But IS’s strengths extend beyond its experienced personnel. IS’s investment in external operations has allowed the group to build a robust infrastructure dedicated to training, planning, and conducting complex attacks outside of its own territory.The Paris and Brussels NetworksA look at the networks involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks provides further evidence of the sophistication of IS’s external operations. IS utilized a networked approach in executing the two attacks. That is, the group built a vast network in Europe to prepare for the Paris attacks, with some militants serving in an operational capacity while others played a support and logistics role. That IS was able to sustain such a vast support infrastructure in Europe is itself striking, considering the challenges of evading European intelligence agencies. Even more remarkable is the fact that IS was able to keep its support network largely intact following the Paris attacks, and subsequently mobilize this network to strike again in Brussels just months later amid a heightened security atmosphere in Europe. This feat reflects both the magnitude of IS’s European network and the quality of its tradecraft.The graphic above reveals the scope of the networks involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks. Abaaoud sits at the center of the network, attesting to his role as the overall coordinator of the Paris attacks. Another key actor is Khalid Zerkani, whom Guy Van Vlierden previously pinpointed as an integral jihadist player in the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek, a hotbed of militancy that has served as a safe haven for IS operatives (Jamestown Foundation Hot Issue, April 12). Though Zerkani—who has been sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role as a jihadist recruiter—was not involved in either the Paris or Brussels attacks, the foreign fighter recruitment networks he established from 2012 to 2014 have been at the center of IS’s ongoing operations in Europe. Several key individuals involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks, including Abaaoud, Naajim Laachraoui and Salah Abdeslam, are directly linked to Zerkani, as was Reda Kriket, who had amassed an “unprecedented” weapons arsenal and was in the final stages of operational planning when French authorities arrested him shortly after the Brussels attacks (Le Parisien, April 3, 2016 ).IS operatives in Europe linked with Zerkani have also relied on other members of the Zerkani network as they sought to evade European authorities and plan future attacks. After the Paris attacks, Salah Abdeslam contacted Abid Aberkan, the nephew of Fatima Aberkan, who has been described as the “mother” of the Zerkani network (RTL, March 20, 2016). Abdeslam hid at the house of Aberkan’s mother, where he was eventually discovered and arrested (RTL, March 20).The graphic also reveals the extensive overlap between the Paris and Brussels attack networks. Key


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individuals involved in providing logistical support for the Paris attacks rapidly transitioned to an operational role in Brussels. For instance, Naajim Laachraoui helped construct explosives for the Paris attacks before donning his own suicide vest in Brussels (Le Monde, April 23, 2016). Mohamed Belkaid, who was believed to have been in contact with several of the Paris attackers via phone, housed Salah Abdeslam while Abdeslam was on the run from Belgian authorities. Belkaid was likely involved in planning attacks with Abdeslam when Belkaid was killed by Belgian forces in a raid several days before the Brussels attacks (Le Monde, March 19). Mohamed Abrini is yet another individual who played a support role in Paris before mobilizing in Brussels; he rented an apartment that was used by several Paris attackers and later tried to plant a bomb at the Zaventem airport, though he failed to detonate his explosives (Brussels Times, April 22). This pattern suggests that IS’s strategy in Europe involves building dual-purpose cells that can be converted from a support to attack role in order to maximize the utility of its network.A Professional OperationThe structure of IS’s Amn al-Kharji and the group’s tactics in the Paris and Brussels attacks make immediately clear that IS has fully professionalized its external operations. IS militants operating in Europe are well-trained and are commanded by veteran jihadists with years of experience. Indeed, IS’s activities in Europe are more akin to those of a state sponsor of terrorism than to those of a non-state actor.Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a D.C.-based consulting firm that focuses on the threats posed by violent non-state actors. Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global.The authors would like to thank Daniel Scarnecchia and Alan Gordon for producing the graphics for this article.Notes:[1] While it appears that most theater commanders are based in Syria, it is possible that IS’s North African operations are directed out of Libya, which has become the group’s command hub in Africa.

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The Zerkani Network: Belgium's Most Dangerous Jihadist GroupPublication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0April 12, 2016 02:13 PM Age: 16 daysBy: Guy Van VlierdenIn recent months, there have been key developments and insights regarding the notable number of Belgians fighting in Syria and Iraq. A recruitment organization whose existence was unearthed during a series of trials turned out to be one of the most active; the direct implication of the so-called Zerkani network in the Brussels and Paris attacks also makes it the most dangerous one. This analysis serves as an update to my May 2015 article in Terrorism Monitor "How Belgium Became a Top Exporter of Jihad,” and points out significant differences with other Belgian jihadist networks, as well as uncovers the nuances of their links with one another (Terrorism Monitor, May 29, 2015).About a year ago, the neo-Islamist movement Shariah4Belgium was invariably named as the most significant factor behind the tremendous number of Belgian fighters in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict (Terrorism Monitor, May 29, 2015). According to the latest estimates, that figure can be as high as 589 by now. With 80 of the militants clearly linked to Shariah4Belgium, the network’s importance remains. The Zerkani network comes close, however. Hardly known twelve months ago, the Zerkani network appears to have sent at least 59 people to the jihad in Syria and Iraq (Pieter Van Ostaeyen,


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April 3). Three of these Zerkani jihadists have played a direct role in Europe's latest terrorist attacks: Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Chakib Akrouh were perpetrators in Paris, while Najim Laachraoui participated in Brussels and is also suspected of being the bomb maker for both plots (Emmejihad, March 22).The Zerkani Network’s OriginsThe Zerkani network is named after Khalid Zerkani, a 42-year-old Moroccan who was living in the Brussels municipality of Molenbeek. Before sentencing him to twelve years’ imprisonment on July 29 of last year, the judge described him as a "cynical guru." According to the written judgment of the trial, Zerkani not only indoctrinated very young people up to the point where they were willing to sacrifice themselves, but also encouraged them to commit a slew of petty crimes in order to pay for their journey to death. [1] Though practicing Muslims are not allowed to steal from another, theft among the Zerkani network was whitewashed as taking “ghanima”— the spoils of war. That principle is said to have been introduced into the network by Reda Kriket, a Frenchman living in Belgium who was arrested shortly after the Brussels attacks on suspicion of yet another terrorist plot (Marianne, March 25).It is not entirely clear whether Zerkani himself has ever been part of the terrorist plots in which his recruits had a role. It is possible that he only aimed at recruiting for a war abroad. The Belgian terrorists responsible for attacking the West after he recruited them may well have been selected and groomed for their deadly European missions behind Zerkani's back. There are strong indications however, that Zerkani also plotted for that kind of action. As early as 2012, conversations about the need of attacks in the West were overheard by Belgian security services during a meeting in which he took part (Emmejihad, January 26). Moreover, Zerkani did not only recruit for the Syrian jihad; prior, he was linked to at least seven people convicted in Belgium for their cooperation with al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization based in Somalia. [2]Zerkani’s Key Social TiesFatima Aberkan, a 55-year-old mother who has sent four of her own sons to the Syrian jihad, was convicted at the same trial as Zerkani. The judge described her as the “pasionaria of the jihad,” highlighting her enormous role in both the indoctrination of recruits and in organizing the logistics of their departure to war. Fatima Aberkan used to be the closest friend of Malika El Aroud, Europe's most notorious female terror convict to date (Marie Claire, May 15, 2009). It was Aberkan who served as a go-between (with her e-mail address [email protected], to be more precise) for El Aroud and the latter's second husband, Moez Garsallaoui, after his departure from Belgium in 2007 to become a high ranking member of al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistani border zone. Aberkan was also responsible for providing Nizar Trabelsi—who was convicted for plotting against the U.S. Air Force base in the Belgian town of Kleine Brogel and later rendered to the U.S.—with a mobile phone in prison, adding to existing suspicions of a plot to set him free. [3]Aberkan's brother Abdelhouaid, was also convicted as a member of Zerkani's network, notably for his role in the 2001 assassination of the Afghan anti-Taliban commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud. He was responsible for driving El Aroud's first husband, Dahmane Abd al-Satter, to the airport for the assassination, which was a suicide mission, and was considered to be preparation for the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. (LeMonde, April 19, 2005).While Abdelhouaid Aberkan was convicted in Belgium for his part in the assassination of Commander Massoud, another person linked to the Zerkani network was tried in France for the same charge. Abderrahmane Ameuroud, 38, was arrested at a tram stop in the Brussels municipality of Schaarbeek on March 25 of this year, and was then shot in the leg. He is suspected of being part of a terrorist plot for which fellow Zerkani network member, Reda Kriket, had amassed an unprecedented amount of arms and explosives (Libération, March 30). According to the French-Algerian journalist Mohamed Sifaoui, Ameuroud is the youngest of three brothers who all have escalated their lawbreaking habits


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from petty crimes to Islamic terrorism (Twitter, March 26). Abderrahmane's brother Reda was expulsed by France for radical sermons he held in a Paris mosque, while Abderrahmane is said to be a veteran of al-Qaeda's training camps and was named a recruiter for the previous Iraqi jihad more than ten years ago (LeParisien, July 29, 2005).Zerkani Network vs. Shariah4BelgiumZerkani's modus operandi could hardly differ more from that of Shariah4Belgium. The latter was notorious for its highly visible actions, such as public demonstrations and preaching sessions in crowded shopping streets. Zerkani's organization had no website, no logo, and no distinctive name. Recruiting was done under the guise of offering community sporting activities, while further indoctrination happened in old-fashioned backrooms. While Shariah4Belgium's leader Fouad Belkacem participated in televised debates and disseminated his sermons via YouTube, even the grainiest picture of Zerkani is extremely hard to locate. Zerkani was always sure to use someone else’s phone while calling abroad, and conversely, he had others in his network carry his phone to avoid being traced and geo-located. According to the court judgment mentioned above, Zerkani’s wariness supplemented the belief that he was trained in the famous Afghan-Pakistani terrorist camps, “as unconfirmed reports claim.” [4]While most of the people Shariah4Belgium recruited between 2012 and the first months of 2014 were incorporated in the local militia “Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen” of the Syrian commander Amr al-Absi, Zerkani's early recruits landed within the “Katibat al-Muhajireen,” which was led at the time by the ethnic-Chechen commander Tarkhan Batirashvili, better known as Abu Omar al-Shishani. Both groups were based in the outskirts of Aleppo and cooperated with one another, meaning that Belgian fighters of both networks interacted with each other regularly. Soon after the establishment of the so-called Islamic State (IS), al-Absi and al-Shishani pledged allegiance to the IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. But as was the case with the Shariah4Belgium recruits, several Zerkani members instead joined rival Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as al-Qaeda's branch in Syria. What happened later in terms of individual affiliations is difficult to ascertain, though it appears most of the Zerkani recruits finally joined the Islamic State—similar to the many Shariah4Belgium members who had joined IS before them.A remarkable characteristic of the Antwerp-based and mainly Dutch-speaking Shariah4Belgium is that it ostensibly lacked any link with older networks of the Belgian jihad. Apart from a few links with the remnants of the “Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain” (GICM), Shariah4Belgium does not seem rooted in Belgium's extremist past (Emmejihad, June 7, 2014). This could not be more different from the Zerkani network, which operates almost exclusively in French-speaking circles in Brussels.Although Shariah4Belgium and the Zerkani network have their dissimilarities, they are connected to a certain degree. The recent arrest of Shariah4Belgium convict Bilal El Makhoukhi, 27, in connection to the Brussels attacks, may have resulted from members of both networks having met each other at the Syrian front (De Redactie, April 9) as well as in Belgium. The man at the intersection of the two groups is Jean-Louis Denis, 41. He ran his own recruitment cell for the Syrian jihad, posing as a benefactor distributing food to the homeless near the Brussels “Gare du Nord” railway station. Denis was sentenced to ten years in jail in January 2016 for these charges (Le Soir, January 29). According to the outcome of this trial, he not only publicly declared himself to be the leader of the Brussels chapter of Shariah4Belgium, but even claimed to be in the running to replace its overall leader, Fouad Belkacem, after Belkacem’s arrest in June 2012. [5]Denis was particularly successful as a recruiter, attracting people who wanted to join the jihad from as far as Martinique. However, he lacked the necessary contacts to get his recruits across Syrian borders. Therefore, he often relied on the social network structures that Zerkani had built. Based upon evidence presented at his trial, it was Denis’s lieutenant, Mohamed Khemir, 37, who served as most important go-between. At least once, Khemir accompanied Zerkani when he brought a young French recruit to


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the Brussels airport to travel to Syria. Zerkani, Khemir, and Denis were often present at the same meetings, and little by little, both groups almost seemed to merge. In the end, Denis’s entourage looked more like a chapter of Zerkani's network than as a part of Shariah4Belgium, but left behind a significant number of jihadists who were influenced by both. [6]ConclusionHardly known a year ago, Belgium's Zerkani network has now been revealed to be the country's most dangerous jihadist group. Led by the enigmatic Moroccan, Khalid Zerkani, it has sent at least 59 recruits to Syria and Iraq. Most of them have ended up within the terrorist group Islamic State, and at least three have returned to Western Europe to commit the deadly Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks. The modus operandi of the network differs greatly from that of Shariah4Belgium, the more renowned and equally as significant group fueling the high number of Belgian jihadists, though connections between the groups—both in Belgium and in the battlefield—are undoubtedly present.Guy Van Vlierden is a journalist for the Belgian newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, specializing in issues relating to terrorist and extremism.Notes:[1] Judgment of the 'Tribunal de Première Instance Francophone de Bruxelles' issued on July 29, 2015 - in the possession of the author.[2] Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 - cfr. Supra[3] Mentioned in Italian court papers in the possession of the author; Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 - cfr. Supra.[4] Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 - cfr. Supra.[5] Judgment of the Tribunal de Première Instance Francophone de Bruxelles issued at January 29, 2016 - in the possession of the author.[6] All details mentioned in the judgment of January 29, 2016 - cfr. Supra.

Spain In The Crosshairs Of IslamismBy: Alberto M. Fernandez*

Spain, or at least the Spain of Islamic conquest and primacy, Al-Andalus, looms large in the Islamist psyche, particularly so in the context of Islamist supremacists like Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Spanish speaking world today – Spain, Latin America and beyond – which has in many ways moved on from what seems a distant historic past, is often blissfully unaware of the power of symbols and of history which can and do affect us.We may recall the artistic beauties of Islamic Spain and the idealized vision of convivencia

(coexistence). We have drummed into us the politically correct pabulum of the evils of Western culture and civilization and the superiority of all cultures but our own.[1] We swallow whole the "myth of the Andalusian paradise"[2] and naturally and understandably forget a sustained foreign military invasion that swallowed up most of Iberia and only seemed to ebb at the Spanish Muslim defeat at Tours, central France, in 732.For the Arab world, Spain, or at least the romanticized and nostalgic image of Al-Andalus, is still a concept to conjure with.


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[3] The great liberal Syrian writer Abdel Salam Al-Ujayli (ironically, from a prominent family in the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa) dealt with this theme in his evocative and sympathetic story "The Lanterns of Seville" (1954).[4] Much of the narrative is about an idealized past being lost and this as part of a larger decline. In this sense, the lament is as much or more about "the Muslims" than about Spain itself. This is a common theme. In 2014, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Qasim Suleimani, listed the decline of the Muslim world as beginning with the fall of Muslim Spain.[5]Other echoes of Al-Andalus are more subtle or diplomatic. In 1997, the Saudi ruling family built a massive white mosque at the foot of the great cliff of Gibraltar (Gibraltar is named, of course, for the conqueror of Al-Andalus, Tariq Ibn Ziyad, and so Gibraltar is "Tariq's Mountain") in the British Overseas Territory of the same name. The December 22, 1997 account in Al-'Alam Al-Islami, published by the Muslim World League and translated by MEMRI, is surprisingly straightforward. It is mostly a historical account of the struggle for supremacy of the site between the Muslims, the Spanish and later, the English, but noting that "the flag of Islam waved high in the Iberian Peninsula, for eight centuries of glory, culture, thought and science." There is little or no whining, special pleading, or loaded language.But much more common is the idea that the loss of Spain is an historic wrong that must be erased by violence. Salafi-jihadis from Osama bin Ladin to ISIS fighters in North Africa have frequently made this point. "Let the whole world know that we will never accept that the tragedy of Al-Andalus would be repeated," was a sentence used by bin Ladin in October 2001 in a video message after the September 11 attacks.[6] In 2013, the Taliban called for reconquering Spain, accusing the infidel West of having "alienated Muslims from their glorious history."[7] Urdu-speaking jihadis compared the loss of Kashmir to that of Al-Andalus.[8]The official media arm of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) official media arm is called Al-Andalus.[9] Launched in 2009, the name was intentionally chosen "because it is the Muslims' lost paradise." AQIM justified the name by quoting seminal jihadist activist and founder of Al-Qaeda, Dr. Abdullah Al-Azzam, as saying, "Jihad has been an individual obligation since 1492, when Granada fell to the infidels – the Christians – and is to this day. And jihad will remain an individual obligation until we restore every bit of land that was once Islamic to the lands of Islam and to the Muslims."[10] In another dispatch from 2007, AQIM called Spain "the stolen land."[11]Al-Andalus is also the name of a pro-Al-Shabaab radio station in Somalia.[12] One ISIS spokesman recently spoke of using Libya as a launch point for the conquest of both Rome and Spain. In still another, chilling ISIS video from March 2016, child soldiers in Syria are indoctrinated to strive to reclaim both the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and Al-Andalus.[13]The bloody thirst for conquest amplified through social media is often paralleled by an aggressive, usually Salafi-inspired broadcast media effort to convert Latin Christians to Islam. What cannot be won by the sword can, perhaps, be won by preaching, especially if Westerners are unsure in their own beliefs and ripe for conversion.The Saudi-funded Cordoba International TV, broadcasting in Spanish since 2012 from studios in Madrid, talks of building bridges to other cultures and religions but is actually a barely disguised effort at proselytization aimed at both Spain and Latin America.[14] As a former Saudi ambassador says in an article on the channel's website titled "The Pains of Al-Andalus," "Al-Andalus could have led to all of Europe becoming Muslim land."[15]According to Cordoba TV's manager, the name was chosen because it "responds properly to our vision as a channel serving as bridges of understanding between culture and religions, such as Al-Andalus, a multi-cultural country at peace, harmony, flourishing... a city that we are very proud was the capital of the world."[16] Here the young manager, Yasin Puertas, touches on all the shopworn buzzwords of our Western post-modern society – "understanding," bridges," "multi-cultural,"


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"harmony" – to gild what is obviously a Saudi Wahhabi project aimed at the West. Cordoba was, of course, certainly a flourishing "multi-cultural" place, but it was also the seat of a powerful and confident military state made rich by yearly raids for treasure and slaves into Christian territory.While Salafi-jihadis' interest in reversing the expulsion of Muslim invaders from Spain is perhaps not so surprising, the concept of the fall of Islamic Spain as a cautionary tale for Arab Muslims everywhere is more widespread. In 2011, the leading pan-Arab broadcaster Al-Jazeera featured a remarkable four-part Arabic language documentary series titled "Story of How the Muslims Lost Al-Andalus."[17]It was produced by Dubai-based Hot Spot Films, a frequent content provider for the Doha-based broadcaster that presents itself as using the documentary format as "a tool for resistance."[18] Featuring token Spanish participation, the tale is told mostly through the words of modern Arab scholars from Egypt and Morocco, presenting an idealized image of Islamic Spain where there was coexistence "even with the Jews" and where Al-Andalus fell because of Arab Muslim infighting, disunity after the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate, and plotting by the Christians waging a "crusade."The Arabic-speaking viewer is clearly meant to draw a connection between the fall of Spain and the situation of the Arab Muslims of today. In this cautionary tale, the ills that affected the Arab Muslims in Iberia then and those affecting the Arab Muslims of today are essentially the same.Helwan University Professor Zubeida Muhammad Atta notes that the bickering of 20 petty Muslim kings, after the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba, facilitated the task of the Spanish "Crusaders." The petty kings now had to pay jizya (poll tax demanded of "protected" minorities) to the Christian northerners rather than the other way around. The Christians also learned to play the ambitions of one Muslim prince against another, and while the Muslims became more and more divided, the Christians united against them.Part two of the series, dealing with the fall of the last Moorish kingdom at Granada, reads like a compendium of very contemporary grievance language used in today's Islamist discourse.[19] The Spanish kings "occupy" Muslim cities, the Muslim opposition to them is "resistance." A rising against the Spanish in Granada is an "intifada, similar to that of the Palestinian Intifada." What the Spanish call "piracy" is described as "seagoing jihad." The fall of Granada itself is basically portrayed as due to scheming Christians and divided, bickering Muslims.The third and fourth parts of the series, dealing with the Moriscos (Spanish Muslims converted to Christianity), after the fall of Granada, also presents historical events in a plaintive language and form sure to be deeply evocative for Al-Jazeera's audience. Here the story is also one that is often found on the broadcaster, of Muslims unjustly oppressed, of Muslims as victims, expelled from their lands.The work of the Spanish Inquisition is dealt with at great length in the documentary, although at least some of the woodcut images used are of the Inquisition torture of Protestants, not Muslims, taken from English sources propagating the "Black Legend."[20] Echoing still another popular contemporary theme, one Moroccan expert expounds on the "betrayal" of the Moriscos, "who never got any promised help from Morocco or any Muslim country."[21] Actually, in the convoluted power politics of the period, there were all sorts of plots from French Protestants and Ottomans to try to work with the rebellious Moriscos.[22] Bizarrely but tellingly, the documentary concludes by noting that King Juan Carlos of Spain apologized for the 1492 expulsion of the Jews from Spain, but not for the expulsion of the Muslims. However, the Spanish Cortes, or Parliament, had indeed apologized for this. A Saudi daily described the descendants of these expelled Spanish Muslims as "marking every year in anguish" and in dire need of an apology.[23]One of the Moroccan consultants for the program says that this "symbolic apology" by Spain's parliament is not sufficient, and that it needs to be translated into concrete action in the religious,


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political and economic fields.[24] In other words, there should be reparations.One wonders where the Iberians should go to get an apology for the Muslim invasion of their peninsula in the 8th century. Ironically, the program refers to its appearance 13 centuries exactly after the Muslim conquest of Spain (711 A.D.) but the content is, of course, mostly about the victimization of Muslims by Spain.Bizarrely, as recently as 2013, a small demonstration gathered in Cairo to condemn the "Spanish occupation" of Al-Andalus: "No matter how long the Spanish occupation of Al-Andalus continues, the day will come, Allah willing, when we liberate it and Islam will return."[25] The influential group behind it, the Ahrar Movement, began as soccer hooligans but has been recreated as youthful "revolutionary Salafists" who seek to "use the power of mass mobilization to fight a long battle of attrition against the West and local leaders."[26] There is even a feature-length Arabic-language animated feature (later also dubbed into Urdu) on the "Conquest of Al-Andalus," instructing young minds all about jihad against the "Kuffar" within the context of the invasion of Visigothic Spain.[27] One suspects that European youth today are not very much inculcated with the values and stories of the Reconquista or of Charles Martel.

Interestingly, one rather significant jihadi public figure had a Spanish connection. Abu Musab Al-Suri (Mustafa Setmiriam Nasr) was one of the most consequential thinkers in the jihadist movement over the past few years.[28] He also lived in Spain for more a decade, married a Spanish woman, and had Spanish citizenship.Abu Musab has long been wanted for a 1985 bombing at El Descanso restaurant outside Madrid, the first successful Islamist terrorist attack in Spain.[29] He also had some connection with the Al-Qaeda cell that years late carried out the worst terrorist attack in Spanish history on March 11, 2004 and was also tangentially connected to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. Despite all his activism, he is best known for producing a massive and influential tome promoting the concept of constant small terrorist attacks against the West.[30] Excerpts of his work were even reprinted in the infamous AQAP online magazine Inspire."[31] Supposedly released from prison by the Assad regime in 2012 (the regime released many hardcore jihadis to influence the development of the opposition to the regime), Al-Suri has never been seen since.[32]But more dangerous than the distant historic connections of prominent figures are continued Iberian connections to actual terrorist plots. Repeated conspiracies have been exposed since the Atocha


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Station train bombings of 2004, many involving persons of North African origin or with connections to the Spanish North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla.[33] The phenomenon has been well documented by Spanish scholars Fernando Reinares and Carola Garcia-Calvo.[34]The thwarted August 2015 attack on a Paris-bound train was carried out by Moroccan Ayyub Al-Khazzani, who had spent years in Spain as a teenager.[35] One terrorist cell dismantled by Morocco in 2008 actually had the name "Fateh al-Andalus" (Conquest of Al-Andalus) and a couple arrested in Granada in February 2009 for terrorism charges was also producing videos calling for "the recovery of Al-Andalus."[36]

Less violent than the work of terrorism, the idea that Spain should be reclaimed by Islam continues to periodically reappear, in Arabic or even in Spanish. One recent mysterious social media campaign invited Muslims worldwide to "return to Al-Andalus" and "restore its sanctity." The February 2016 announcement on Instagram actually linked with official Spanish government sites, which naturally denied any knowledge of the publicity stunt.[37] A Facebook page in Spanish and Arabic linked to the campaign had to date 33,000 "likes."[38]The threat to Spain must be split between the aspirational and the actual. There is little doubt that the idea that the loss of Al-Andalus was a disaster for Muslims and should ideally be reversed is probably widespread among Muslim populations in a general, vague sense. It resonates in a way that the retaking of Muslim Sicily (1091 A.D.) or of the Muslim-ruled Balkans (which ended much more recently, in 1913) does not. But this does not seem to be an immediate burning issue among the masses, nor is there any Muslim state with the intention and ability to actually do anything about it. The actual challenge comes from various strands of global Salafi Jihadism, activism, and Salafi proselytism. The terrorism and the feverish vision of many of these groups are very real, and as long as they exist and have safe haven, they will continue to plot and to dream.As a Dean at the Islamic University of Gaza noted in 2012, the conquest of Spain is "an old dream" but "something Muslims proudly hope for and will continue to hope for in the future," being certain that it will be accomplished, along with raising the flag of a restored Caliphate over the Vatican and Palestine.[39] Given the romanticization of an idealized, if not imaginary, Islamic past, a deep sense of grievance and loss, and the disastrous crisis of authority and fascination with revolutionary violence that exists in much of the Muslim world, Islamic Spain as a symbol, a warning, and a rallying cry will endure, along with those other places of power, such as Jerusalem and Rome, drawn from history, faith and legend.

*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice-President of MEMRI.


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Endnotes:[1] Sevilla.abc.es/sevilla/sevi-rafael-sanchez-saus-idealizado-al-andalus-pesar-humillacion-sufrieron-cristianos-201603071304_noticia.html, March 7, 2016. t[2] Mmisi.org/ir/41_02/fernandez-morera.pdf, Fall 2006.[3] The New York Times, "Was the Islam Of Old Spain Truly Tolerant?" September 27, 2003.[4] Talinedv.com/2015/09/07/a-syrian-writers-eulogy-for-seville, September 7, 2015.[5] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5716, IRGC Qods Force Commander Soleimani: 'War Is A Grand School For Love, Morals, [And] Loyalty,' April 20, 2014.[6] Aarchive.indianexpress.com/oldStory/43116/, March 17, 2004.[7] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5313, Taliban Magazine 'Azan' Calls For Jihad To Retake Andalus, May 27, 2013.[8] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 3367, Pakistani Jihadist Weekly Examines the Islamic Status of Kashmir, Says: "Kudos to the Muslims of Kashmir that in Contrast to the Muslim Conquerors, They Never Welcomed Infidels on the Land of Kashmir," November 10, 2010.[9] Ctc.usma.edu/posts/imagery/0237.[10] MEMRI JTTM report Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Launches "Al-Andalus" Media Productions, Says Jihad Obligatory Until Spain is Restored to the Muslims, October 8, 2009.[11] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1543, Islamist Websites Monitor No. 82: The Comprehensive Security Encyclopedia, April 13, 2007.[12] Radioandalus24.com/?p=4657, June 26, 2015.[13] The Irish Times, "Islamic State schools army of child soldiers in terrorism," March 8, 2016.[14] Elpais.com, December 20, 2011.[15] Cordobainternacional.com/los-dolores-de-al-andalus/.[16] Diariocordoba.com/noticias/cordobalocal/tele-saudi-mira-cordoba_764507.html , November 11, 2012.[17] Youtube.com/watch?v=PGQlsCoizqY.[18] Hotspotfilms.com/Arabic/.[19] Youtube.com/watch?v=dTDUBK1nV7A.[20] Ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/the-spanish-century/friedrich-edelmayer-the-leyenda-negra-and-the-circulation-of-anti-catholic-and-anti-spanish-prejudices, June 29, 2011.[21] Youtube.com/watch?v=y6QQr54_Pog.[22] Lea, Henry Charles, The Moriscos of Spain: Their Conversion and Expulsion (Philadelphia: 1901) p. 281.[23] Special Dispatch No. 873, Saudi Daily: Andalusian Muslims Recall Mass Exodus, March 4, 2005.[24] Youtube.com/watch?v=DTwPIBsbZ5I.[25] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5131, Egyptians Protest The Fall Of Islamic Andalusia And Vow To Liberate It, January 11, 2013.[26] Hudson.org/research/12310-revolutionary-salafism-the-case-of-ahrar-movement, March 15, 2016.[27] Youtube.com/watch?v=GFXxTuUAj0k.[28] The Wall Street Journal, "The New Mastermind of Jihad," April 6, 2012.[29] Elpais.com/diario/2010/04/18/domingo/1271562760_850215.html, April 18, 2010.[30] The Wall Street Journal, "The New Mastermind of Jihad," April 6, 2012.[31] MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 698, Al-Qaeda Military Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri's Teachings on Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW), Individual Jihad and the Future of Al-Qaeda, June 22, 2011.[32] Longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/abu_musab_al_suri_re.php, February 6, 2012.


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[33] Seguridadinternacional.es/revista/?q=content/%C2%BFenclaves-yihadistas-un-estudio-sobre-la-presencia-y-el-riesgo-extremistas-en-ceuta-y.[34] Realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/dt17-2015-reinares-garciacalvo-terroristas-redes-organizaciones-facetas-actual-movilizacion-yihadista-espana, November 16, 2011.[35] Telegraph.co.uk, September 1, 2015.[36] Politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/08/02/actualidad/1343917576_213927.html, April 23, 2013.[37] Elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/02/19/56c7446d22601d8a5e8b45e5.html, February 19, 2016.[38] "Restituir la santidad en Al-Ándalus" Facebook page[39] MEMRI TV Clip No. 3450, Dr. Subhi Al-Yaziji, Dean of Koranic Studies at the Islamic University of Gaza: We Hope to Conquer Andalusia and the Vatican, May 25, 2012.


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Documents

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 17-96-The Deep Battle against the West