Airbus vs. Boeing.ppt

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    Game Theory

    It is true that life must beunderstood backward, but

    it must be lived forward.

    - Sren Kierkegaard

    Mike ShorLecture 4

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    Review

    Understanding the outcomes of games

    Sometimes easy

    Dominant strategies

    Sometimes more challenging

    I know that you know

    What if a game is sequential?

    Market entry

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy2

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    Very Large Airplanes:Airbus vs. Boeing

    Airbus lacked a jumbo jet: The problem is the monopoly of the 747

    They have a product. We have none. - Airbus Executive

    Initiated plans to build a super-jumbo jet

    Industry feasibility studies: Room for at most one megaseater

    Boeing preemption: Boeing, the worlds top aircraft maker, announced

    it was building a plane with 600 to 800 seats, thebiggest and most expensive airliner ever.

    - BusinessWeek, 1993

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy3

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    Sequential Games

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy4

    The Game

    Airbus

    Boeing $4 billion,

    $4billion

    $0.3 billion,$3 billion

    $1 billion,$1billion

    $0,$0

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    Looking Forward

    Airbus makes the first move:Must consider how Boeing will respond

    If stay out:

    Boeing stays outMike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy5

    Boeing

    $0billion

    $1 billion

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    Looking Forward

    Airbus makes the first move:Must consider how Boeing will respond

    If enter:

    Boeing accommodates, stays outMike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy6

    Boeing

    $3billion

    $4 billion

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    And Reasoning Back

    Now consider the first move:

    Only ( In, Out ) is sequentially rational

    In is not credible (for Boeing)

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy7

    Airbus

    Boeing

    $0,$0

    out $0.3 billion,$3 billion

    out

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    Boeing, the worlds top aircraft maker,announced it was building a plane with 600 to800 seats, the biggest and most expensiveairliner ever.

    - BusinessWeek, 1993

    Airbus vs. BoeingWhat a Difference Seven Years Make

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy8

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    Solving Sequential Games

    Thinking backwards is easy in game trees

    Start at the end and trim the tree to the present

    Thinking backwards is challenging in practice

    Outline:

    Strategic moves in early rounds

    The rule of three (again)

    Seeing the end of the game

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy9

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    Voting Revisited

    Gore v. Bush

    before the U.S. Supreme Court

    Recall member preferences:

    4 (B>G>R) 3 (G>R>B) 2 (R>B>G)

    Majority rule results:

    Bbeats G ; Gbeats R ; Rbeats B

    Voting results (example):

    Rbeats G then winner versus B BMike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy10

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    Voting as a Sequential Game

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy11

    R vs. G

    B vs. R

    B vs. G

    B

    R

    G

    B

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    Looking Forward

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy12

    A majority prefers R to B

    A majority prefers B to G

    B vs. R

    B vs. G

    B

    R

    G

    B

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    And Reasoning Back

    Three judges prefer G to R to B.

    How should they vote in the first round?

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy13

    R vs. G

    B vs. R

    B vs. G

    R

    B

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    What Happened?

    Gore supporters have preferences

    Gore > Remand > Bush

    First round vote between Remand and Gore

    Gore supporters prefer Gore

    But a vote for Gore is in effecta vote for Bush!

    So Gore supporters vote for remand.

    Guarantee themselves second best choice

    Thinking forwardmisses chance for strategic voting

    Thinking forwardleads us to pick the wrong game

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy14

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    Sequential Rationality

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy15

    COMMANDMENT

    Look forward and reason back.

    Anticipate what your rivals will dotomorrow

    in response to your actionstoday

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    Examples of Strategic Voting

    Not necessarily good to vote your true preferences

    Amendments to make bad bills worse

    Crossing over in open primaries

    Centrist voting in primaries

    Outcome is still predetermined: Bbeats G then winner versus R

    Bbeats R then winner versus G

    Gbeats R then winner versus B

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy16

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    Accommodating aPotential Entrant

    Do you enter?

    Do you accommodate entry?

    What if there are fifty potential entrants?

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy17

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    SurvivorImmunity Challenge

    There are 21 flags

    Players alternate removing 1, 2, or 3 flags

    The player to take the last flag wins

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy18

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    Sequential Games

    You have a monopoly market in every state

    There is one potential entrant in each state

    They make their entry decisions sequentially Florida may enter today

    New York may enter tomorrow

    etc.

    Each time, you can accommodate or fight

    What do you do the first year?

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy19

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    The Game

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy20

    E1

    M

    E2

    M

    E3

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    Looking Forward

    In the last period:

    No reason to fight final entrant, thus

    ( In,Accommodate )

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy21

    E

    M

    $0, $100 + previous

    50, 50 + previous

    50, 50 + previous

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    And Reasoning Back

    The Incumbent will not fight the last entrant But then, no reason to fight the previous entrant

    But then, no reason to fight the first entrant

    Only one sequential equilibriumAll entrants play In

    Incumbent playsAccommodate

    But for long games, this is mostly theoretical

    People see the end two to three periods out!

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy22

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    Game Theory

    Example

    Sequential Entry

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    Market Opportunity Analysis

    Assesses the potential of a geographic

    market for a specific set of products,providing a prioritization of market

    coverage voids and recommending

    market entry strategies.

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy24

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    Prioritizationof Market Coverage

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy25

    400SBCs

    700

    SBCs

    Break even point: 300 SBCs

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    Extended Market Analysis

    If enter 400 SBC market: Next entrant, to break even,

    must expect market share of 300/400

    Must expect market share of 75%

    If enter 700 SBC market: Next entrant, to break even,

    must expect market share of 300/700

    Must expect market share of 43%

    Real decision:All of 400 or half of 700

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy26

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    Breakfast Cereals

    A small sampling of the Kelloggs portfolio

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy27

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    Breakfast Cereals

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy28

    product development costs:$1.2M per product

    600

    500

    400

    300

    200

    100

    000

    less

    sweet

    more

    sweet

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

    sales

    (in

    thousa

    nds)

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    First Product Entry

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy29

    Profit = 5(600) 1200 = 300600

    500

    400

    300

    200

    100

    000

    lesssweet

    moresweet

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

    SCENARIO 1

    sales

    (in

    thousa

    nds)

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    Second Product Entry

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy30

    600

    500

    400

    300

    200

    100

    000

    lesssweet

    moresweet

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

    Profit = 2 x 300 = 600SCENARIO 2

    sales

    (in

    thousa

    nds)

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    Third Product Entry

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy31

    600

    500

    400

    300

    200

    100

    000

    lesssweet

    moresweet

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

    Profit = 300 x 3 240 x 2 = 420SCENARIO 3

    sales

    (in

    thousa

    nds)

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    Competitor Enters

    Mike Shor

    Game Theory & Business Strategy32

    600

    500

    400

    300

    200

    100

    000

    lesssweet

    moresweet

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

    Profit = 300 x 2 - 240 = 360SCENARIO 4

    sales

    (in

    thousa

    nds)

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    Summary

    Thinking forwardmisses chancesto make money

    Make sure to see the gamethrough to the logical end

    Dont expect others to seethe end until it is close

    The rule of three stepsMike Shor

    33