Airbus A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

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Airbus A320 ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q3 & Q4 2019

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 INTRODUCTION

2 A320 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

3 A320 UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MORS

4 SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETINS

5 PROCEDURES REVIEW

1: Introduction

This module covers aspects identified in the periods Q3 & Q4 2019 and includes all engine types. This edition and future editions will also include the A320 NEO. The A320 approval is still currently inactive. Presently there are no other A320 approvals. However, in order to maintain knowledge of the type, the following information has been formulated and presented for this purpose.

2: A320 Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the A320 AD’s issued from July 1st 2019 to December 31st 2019. If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website (http://ad.easa.europa.eu) or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change.

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

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AD No: 2019-0167 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 57

Wings – Main Landing Gear Side Stay Attachment – Inspection

Manufacturer/s: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A320-214, A320-232, A320-271N, A321-231 aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers 6954, 6955, 6961, 6962, 6970, 6974, 6976, 6985, 7051, 7089, 7091 and 7096.

Reason: During an inspection on the Airbus production line, damage was observed on an affected part. Investigation results determined that the detected damage had been caused by using incorrect tooling and identified a batch of affected parts that may have received the same treatment, and the aeroplanes on which these were installed during production. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the attachment of the MLG to the wing. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus published the applicable SB to provide inspection instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a detailed inspection (DET) of the affected parts, both LH and RH sides.

AD No: 2019-0173 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 53

Fuselage – Cockpit Lateral Window Frames – Inspection


Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except: - A318 aeroplanes on which Airbus modification (mod) 39195 was embodied in production, or Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-00-



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1219 was embodied in service, and - A319 aeroplanes on which Airbus mod 28238, mod 28162 and mod 28342 were embodied in production, and - All aeroplanes on which Airbus mod 161230 was embodied.

Reason: Several During an inspection in accordance with Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) 531133 task, the RH side sliding window frame was found cracked. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the fuselage. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the applicable inspection SB to provide special detailed inspection (SDI) instructions with updated compliance time for the affected part. For the reason described above, this AD requires repetitive SDI of affected parts.


Fuel Level Sensor Support Bracket – Replacement


Applicability Airbus A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A320-251N, and A320-271N aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) except those having Airbus modification (mod) 158133 embodied in production.

Reason: Lo Inspection in production lines of aeroplanes having embodied Airbus mod 160001 (modified wing provisions for sharklet installation) identified marginal clearance between the fuel sensor cover installed by Airbus mod 160029 (wiring provisions) on rib 24 and the crown of stringer 15 on both left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) wings. The same condition could exist on aeroplanes in service that have been modified with Airbus SB A320-28-1216 original issue combined with sharklet retrofit Airbus SB A320-57-1193. A possible contact between the shield and the stringer, and/or the possible motion between the stringer and the shield can make the gap more susceptible to sparking in case of lightning strike. This condition, if not corrected, could create a source of ignition in a fuel tank vapour space, possibly resulting in a fire or explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. To address this


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unsafe condition, Airbus issued SB A320-28-1238 and SB A320-28-1239, and revised SB A320-28-1216, providing instructions to replace fuel level sensor brackets with different parts, originally designed for installation on A321 aeroplanes, which provide sufficient clearance between the cover and the wing structure. For the reason described above, this AD requires replacing the affected fuel level sensor brackets, and prohibits their (re-)installation.


Fuselage – Cabin, Cargo Compartment and Airframe Parts – Inspection / Replacement [Improper Heat Treatment]


Applicability Airbus A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-115, A319-132, A319-133, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232, A320-233, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 4895, 4903, 4911, 4919, 4929, 4938, 4942, 4944, 4946, 4948, 4951, 4956 to 5541 inclusive, 5544, 5547, 5550, 5551, 5553, 5556, 5559, 5561, 5562, 5563, 5565, 5566, 5570, 5572, 5576 and 5578.

Reason: Following a quality control review on Airbus final assembly line, it was discovered that aluminium alloy with inadequate heat treatment had been delivered by a supplier for several structural parts. The results of the investigations highlighted that 1% of the stock could be impacted by this wrong material. Structural investigations demonstrated the capability to sustain the static limits loads, and sufficient fatigue life up to a certain inspection threshold. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the aeroplane structural integrity following fatigue load. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued SB A320-53-1292, SB A320-53-1293 and SB A320-53-1294 (all original issue) to provide inspection instructions, and EASA issued AD 2015-0219, requiring a one-time Special Detailed Inspection (SDI) of certain cabin, cargo compartment and airframe parts and, depending on findings, replacement with serviceable parts. Since that AD was issued, parts


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have been identified as affected by the same potential unsafe condition, which were not addressed by the original issue inspection SBs, and Airbus accordingly issued the applicable inspection SB. For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2015-0219, which is superseded, expanding the list of affected parts.

AD No: 2019-0067R1 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 53 Fuselage – Lateral Cockpit Window Frame

Upper Stiffener – Inspection


Applicability: A320 Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except: - A318 aeroplanes on which Airbus modification (mod) 39195 was embodied in production, or Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-00-1219 was embodied in service; and - A319 aeroplanes on which Airbus mod 28162, mod 28238 and mod 28342 were embodied in production.

Reason: Crack Several occurrences were reported where, during a maintenance check, cracks were found at the lateral sliding window of the fuselage FR4 upper attachment on both RH and LH sides. This condition if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the fuselage. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus developed Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) task 531105, providing instructions for a detailed inspection (DET), or a special detailed inspection (SDI) using high frequency eddy current (HFEC) method. Following further analysis of the reported events, Airbus published the applicable inspection SB, providing instructions to accomplish the SDI, with updated threshold and intervals, and not allowing accomplishment of the DET as alternative to the SDI. For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD 2019-0067 to require repetitive SDI of the affected parts and, depending on findings, accomplishment of


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applicable corrective action(s). Since that AD was issued, it has been determined that some A318 and A319 configurations can be removed from the Applicability of the AD, as the compliance time for the initial inspection is beyond the Maintenance Programme Publication Trigger (MPPT) for those configurations. This AD is revised accordingly


Electric and Electronic Common Installation – Electrical Wiring – Modification


Applicability Airbus A319-112, A319-115, A319-132, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232 and A320-233 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, as listed in Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-92-1127, except those on which Airbus modification 159114 has been embodied in production.

Reason: During During installation process, a possible interference was identified between 1M and 2M wiring harnesses and the tapping units. It was determined that the root cause for this interference was caused by a modified optional tapping unit design, reducing the clearance between the wire harnesses and the tapping unit. Further investigation determined that interference could potentially occur on the lavatory smoke detection system and/or on the passenger oxygen system. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss of the lavatory smoke detection and/or the passenger oxygen system commands, thus preventing the delivery of passenger oxygen during an emergency and possibly resulting in injury to aeroplane occupants. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the SB to identify the affected population and to provide instructions for re-routing of the 1M and 2M harnesses. For the reason described above, this AD requires modification of the 1M and 2M harness routing.


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Hydraulic Power – Hydraulic Reservoir Pressurisation Lines – Modification


Applicability: Airbus Airbus A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-131, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: An occurrence was reported of rupture of a hydraulic reservoir air pressurization hose on an in-service aeroplane, leading to air leakage which was undetectable in normal operation, until subsequent zonal inspection. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to exposure of the wing structure to high temperatures (possibly above 200°C), possibly resulting in reduced structural integrity of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus developed mod 160901, introducing bleed air hoses with an additional restrictor, limiting the mass flow in case of rupture of the hose, and published the SB providing instructions for retrofit installation. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a modification of the hydraulic pressurization lines, replacing the affected part with a modification kit, as defined in this AD. This AD also prohibits (re)installation of affected parts.


Wings – Overwing Panel – Inspection Manufacturer/s: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus Airbus A319-115, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232, A320-251N, A320-271N, A321-211, A321-231, A321-251N, A321-251NX, A321-253N, A321-271N, A321-271NX and A321-272N aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 7181, 7530, 7544, 7548, 7598, 7610, 7634, 7669, 7757, 7811, 7849, 7851, 7853, 7858, 7862, 7871, 7875, 7895, 7918, 7920, 7934, 7936, 7941, 7945, 7952, 7963, 7964, 7968, 7977, 7980, 7986, 7987, 7992, 7995, 7996, 8000, 8008, 8014-8017 inclusive, 8023, 8026-8029 inclusive, 8031, 8032, 8034, 8036, 8038-8047 inclusive, 8049-8058 inclusive, 8060-8063 inclusive, 8065, 8067-8069 inclusive, 8071-8090 inclusive, 8092-8139 inclusive, 8141-8171



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inclusive, 8173-8221 inclusive, 8223-8256 inclusive, 8258-8270 inclusive, 8272-8276 inclusive, 8278-8288 inclusive, 8290-8378 inclusive, 8380-8420 inclusive, 8422-8438 inclusive, 8440-8444 inclusive, 8446-8468 inclusive, 8470-8482 inclusive, 8484-8494 inclusive, 8496-8500 inclusive, 8502-8507 inclusive, 8509-8530 inclusive, 8532-8546 inclusive, 8548-8582 inclusive, 8584-8586 inclusive, 8589-8592 inclusive, 8594, 8595, 8598-8601 inclusive, 8604-8609 inclusive, 8611, 8613-8617 inclusive, 8619-8628 inclusive, 8630, 8632, 8634, 8636, 8639-8643 inclusive, 8646, 8648, 8650, 8652, 8654, 8656-8659 inclusive, 8661-8665 inclusive, 8667-8673 inclusive, 8675-8677 inclusive, 8679-8682 inclusive, 8684-8690 inclusive, 8692, 8694, 8695, 8700, 8702, 8705, 8717 and 8726.

Reason: During Incomplete installations of the over wing panel lug attachments were identified in production assembly line. Investigation results identified that a process change had been implemented in the production line, which led to erratic installations, and a list of potentially affected aeroplanes was established. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the wing. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued AOT A57N012-19 providing inspection and correction instructions, later revised to amend the affected MSN population. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time detailed inspection (DET) of the affected areas, and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). This AD is republished to correct the header.

AD No: 2019-0189 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA AFM Aircraft Flight Manual Section Limitations –

Amendment


Applicability: Airbus A320-251N, A320-253N, A320-271N and A320-273N aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: Sever Analysis and laboratory testing of the behaviour of the flight control laws of the A320neo identified a reduced efficiency of the angle of attack protection when the aeroplane is set in certain flight configurations and in combination with specific manoeuvres commanded by the flight crew, as


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described through Section 2 of Airbus Flight Operations Transmission 999.0059/19. This condition, although never encountered during operations, if not corrected, could lead to excessive pitch attitude, possibly resulting in increased flight crew workload. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the AFM TR, limiting the centre of gravity envelope, which prevents the aforementioned condition, and the Flight Operations Transmission 999.0059/19, providing aeroplane loading recommendations. For the reason described above, this AD requires amendment of the applicable AFM by incorporating the applicable AFM TR. This AD is considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow. The potential unsafe condition addressed by this AD and related required actions are different from those addressed by EASA AD 2019-0171R1 for A321neo aeroplanes.

AD No: 2019-0035R1 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 92 Electric and Electronic Common Installation –

Electrical Harness – Inspection / Repair / Modification


Applicability Airbus A320-251N, A320-271N and A321-253N aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which Airbus modification (mod) 159981 has been embodied in production, and those on which Airbus mod 159975 and mod 159999 have been embodied in production

Reason: Insufficient clearance was detected between the electrical harness and nearby hydraulic pipes in the inboard trailing edge of some aeroplanes. This could lead to chafing of the electrical harness on hydraulic pipes. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could create an ignition source in the flammable fluid leakage zone area, possibly resulting in fire or an explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the AOT, providing instructions to accomplish a detailed inspection (DET) for clearance and damage, and published the modification SB, providing instructions to modify the electrical harness routing,


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increasing the clearance between electrical harness and hydraulic pipes. Consequently, EASA issued AD 2019-0035, requiring repetitive DET of the electrical harness and hydraulic pipes, and modification of the aeroplane. Since that AD was issued, it has been determined that only aeroplanes on which a new damper for the yellow main hydraulic system is installed in the right-hand wing (introduced with Airbus mod 159299 or SB A320-29-1171) and/or a new damper bulkhead fitting for the green hydraulic system is installed in the left-hand wing (introduced with Airbus mod 159303 or SB A320-29-1172) can be affected by the unsafe condition. This AD is revised accordingly, clarifying that for Group 2 aeroplanes, accomplishment of the modification SB is only required if either Airbus SB A320-29-1171 or SB A320-29-1172 has been embodied in service.

AD No: 2019-0279 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 26 Fire Protection – Cargo Compartment Fire

Extinguishing Pipes – Inspection / Modification


Applicability A320-214, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A320-251N and A320-271N aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) listed in the effectivity of any Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) at the revision as listed in Table 1 of this AD. Affected MSN are also listed in the Appendix 1 of this AD.

Reason: Following the installation of a second cargo fire extinguishing bottle, insufficient clearance between the cargo fire extinguishing pipes has been reported. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to wear/chafing of the cargo fire extinguishing pipes, possibly resulting in reduced fire extinguishing capability in case of fire in a cargo compartment. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus revised the instructions of the SBs installing a second cargo fire extinguishing bottle. Airbus also determined which aeroplanes embodied the second cargo fire extinguishing bottle modification, and provided instructions to inspect and, depending on findings, to modify the installation of the fire extinguisher pipes to ensure sufficient clearance. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection for clearance and, depending on findings, installation of spacers between cargo fire extinguishing pipes.


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This AD also prohibits further installation of a second cargo fire extinguishing bottle, unless in accordance with updated (revised Airbus SB) instructions.

AD No: 2019-0304R1 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 72 Engine – Operational Restrictions


Applicability: Airbus A320-271N, A320-272N, A320-273N, A321-271N, A321-272N, A321-271NX and A321-272NX aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) as listed in Appendix 1 of this AD.

Reason: Occurrences have been reported of finding damaged LPT third stage blades on Airbus A320 ‘NEO‘ aeroplanes which have affected engines installed. Investigation results determined that the affected parts have limited damage tolerance, and that, following impact at critical regions by foreign (originating from outside of the engine) or domestic (originating from inside of the engine) objects, instantaneous blade fracture may occur. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to dual engine in-flight shut-down, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. To address this potentially unsafe condition, IAE developed improved LPT third stage blades and the SB was published to provide engine modification instructions, replacing the LPT 3rd stage disk, blades, locking plates, and shroud segments. Consequently, EASA issued AD 2019-0304 to require de-pairing of affected engines. Since that AD was issued, it was determined that MSN of certain aeroplanes with CFM International LEAP-1A engines installed had inadvertently been included in the Applicability. This AD is revised to remove those aeroplanes and provide a correct Appendix 1 of this AD. This AD is still considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.


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AD No: 2019-0316 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings – Emergency Escape

Slide / Raft Inflation Reservoir – Pressure Check


Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A319-151N, A319-153N, A319-171N, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A320-251N, A320-252N, A320-253N, A320-271N, A320-272N, A320-273N, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231, A321-232, A321-251N, A321-251NX, A321-252N, A321-252NX, A321-253N, A321-253NX, A321-271N, A321-271NX, A321-272N and A321-272NX aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason: An occurrence was reported of hearing a loud bang during aeroplane boarding. During a subsequent inspection, one slide raft was found with zero reservoir pressure. Further investigations revealed that the rupture disk assembly of the reservoir had burst, the probable cause being a manufacturing defect on a batch of rupture disk assemblies. This condition, if not detected and corrected, would prevent the deployment of the escape slide/raft when required in case of emergency, possibly resulting in injury to aeroplane occupants. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the AOT to provide inspection instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive checks of the pressure gauge on (the inflation reservoir of) each affected part and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). This AD is considered interim action and further AD action may follow


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U.S. AD No: 2019-18-01 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 72 Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code

7250, Turbine Section

Manufacturer/s: International Aero Engines AG

Applicability This AD applies to International Aero Engines AG V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527EA5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 model turbofan engines with the following engine serial numbers: V10631, V12329, V12494, V13107, V18679, V18681, V18684, and V18690.

Reason: This AD was prompted by an inspection that determined that material anomalies exist in certain low-pressure turbine (LPT) stage 6 disks. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent failure of the LPT stage 6 disk. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in uncontained release of the LPT stage 6 disk, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.

U.S. AD No: 2019-16-01 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 72 Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code

7250, Turbine section.

Manufacturer/s: International Aero Engines AG

Applicability This AD applies to all International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2525-D5 and V2528-D5 model turbofan engines.

Reason: This AD was prompted by reports of a cracked turbine exhaust case (TEC). The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent failure of the TEC. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in engine separation and loss of the airplane.



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3: A320 UK Maintenance Related MOR’s The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. “No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of the organization without the express permission in writing of the Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office.” A320-200-232, ATA 21, 02/07/2019: Fumes on Approach: "Fumes smelt in flight deck at 4000ft until touchdown, smelly socks. Cabin reported smell of cheesy feet on approach after landing, both front and rear. Smell dissipated on taxi in after APU was started and APU bleed used for conditioning. I developed a headache shortly afterwards. Supplementary 04/07/19: As the landing gear came down and we were upon approach there was a strong smell of smelly feet in the cabin. The smell was very strong and both myself and the crew member at the front covered our noses initially thinking someone had taken their shoes off. The smell got worse and we realised it was fumes. I checked down the cabin and couldn’t see any visual evidence, but the smell was there, and it lasted for a few moments. We discussed getting the smoke hoods, but it was not safe to unbuckle. The smell was there momentarily. I called the rear and they had smelt it and not gone into the drill for the same reasons as myself. Called flight crew and asked if they had, they had smelt it but not used their masks. All crew were ok, but captain filled out an ASR and engineers in attendance. No customers noticed. Supplementary 05/07/19: On approach to ILS09L, descending through 4000’ both flight crew became aware of a sweaty sock smell in the cockpit, a brief discussion ensued as to the intensity and source of the smell, during which the approach was continued. Passing 2000’ the smell reduced in intensity and by 1000’ the smell was no longer perceptible. A normal landing and taxi to the gate followed. After parking and during pax disembarkation flight crew checked with cabin crew as to whether they had smelt anything unusual in the cabin. They had not."

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A320-200-232, ATA 23, 03/07/2019; Forward Attendant Panel Unusable: FAP at **** on ****** was inoperative. Crew could not use any of the functions. Flight crew was informed and attempted a CIDS reset, which was unsuccessful. Only Evacuation alarm (used in familiarisation) was working. No control of lights, nor audio were available. More crucially, indicator of “doors locked” and “slides armed” did not illuminate. As CSM, I had to rely solely on visual checks from the crew to confirm door mode. I also had concerns about the “Smoke Lav” indicator not working on the FAP should we have a smoke event inflight. The captain was satisfied that the indication of such event on the flight deck systems would be sufficient. He was also satisfied that we could rely of the door mode indications on the flight deck instruments. The flight crew later attempted a CIDS reset later during the flight. This was also unsuccessful. A320-200-232, ATA 22, 34, 72, 07/07/2019; Rejected Take-off Owing to Asymmetric Thrust: Normal Start-up with normal parameters. Lined up full length for rolling T/O with CP as PF T/O Abandoned due to asymmetric thrust. Look at figures for standing T/O from intersection. (Not possible) Authorities requested return to stand. Had to de-board passengers due to re-fuelling Engineer ran idle engine run tests. (Parameters normal) Continued to LTN. A320-200-232, ATA 25, 19/07/2109; Door 2L Slide Fitted Incorrectly: . Cabin crew noticed door armed girt bar disc not visible. Reported in aml. Engineer investigation discovered slide fitted upside down, risking slide failure or inadvertent deployment. A320-200-232, ATA 29, 07/07/2019; Hydraulic Fluid Loss: Before take-off ATC reported that hydraulic fluid had been found on the stand after pushback. Fluid levels were checked on the system pages. All were normal. After departure with the gear up, fluid levels lower than normal in the green system. Flight crew continued flight but briefed the possibility of losing the hydraulic system. Rest of flight uneventful. Engineers in Naples discovered pools of fluid in the landing gear bay along with a cloth around the hydraulic hoses suspected of leaking.

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A320-200-232, ATA 05, 08/07/2019; Low Speed RTO owing to a Panel being Open: ATC cleared us for TO on the roll full length 35L, as thrust levers spooling up ATC called our call sign. PM responded before TO thrust applied. Told to stop due a report from ‘ground staff’ that a panel has been seen open. PF retarded thrust levers & ground speed never over 30KTS. A320-200-214, ATA 32, 07/07/2019; Aircraft Damage. Bypass Lever found Broken during Walkaround: Upon walkaround check TRC noticed that a part of the bypass lever that the pin locks on was broken. PIC informed and advised TRC that he will insert it on the techlog. Pictures taken. A320-200-233, ATA 77, 27/07/2019; Engine No2 Intake EPR Plug Indication During Flight. Aircraft Returned. "EGSS-LDZD. After departure from EGSS climbing through FL220 ECAM (ENG2) EPR MODE FAULT (N1 DEGRADED MODE). ECAM actions and DODAR used IAW SOPs. MEL consulted and discovered with this fault code unable to dispatch after landing without maintenance action. Having SAT PHONE on board spoke to OPS and TECH control whether to continue to destination or return to base. Joint decision made to return to EGSS. NITS given to SCCM and PA to PAX to inform of intentions. Uneventful landing at EGSS and return to stand where engineering met us. Fault repaired by engineering and flight dispatched to destination. Supplementary: During the night shift of Friday 26th July, the #2 engine intake was replaced. The following morning the aircraft took off and then had to return to STN due to a ENG 2 EPR MODE FAULT. Over the Satcom with the crew, they were also in N1 degraded mode. Not dispatchable iaw the MEL. On invest at STN, one of the 3 plugs for the #2 intake was found not quite fully connected (Tight but needed more). TSM followed, EGR C/O and EPR message had gone." A320-200-232, ATA 23, 12/07/2019; Loss of Communication: There had been several issues with the P2 audio during the day ( first 2 sectors) resulting in a suspected headset fault and change ref ******8 and a tech log entry regarding an ACP change ref ******. During the departure the boom mic was intermittent on both the inter phone and using VHF1. This led to P2 using P3 headset and ACP to transmit after intermittent transmissions from P2 on VHF1 and INT. Culminated in loss of VHF1 for both P1 and P2. A320-200-232, ATA 22, 18/07/2019; Uncommanded Turn

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Executed by Aircraft on Approach: We were direct TETIS on the SARGO3B star for runway 01 at Mahon. On reaching TETIS the aircraft deviated off the NAV track and began a turn to the left approximately by 40 degrees. AP1 was still engaged and NAV green. A320, ATA 29, 20/07/2019; Hydraulic Loss. Aircraft Returned: "***** departed EGKK and shortly after departure informed Gatwick Radar that they had experienced a hydraulic loss on retraction of the landing gear. They immediately diverted to ***** to hold and run through QRH checks. Whilst in the ******* hold they informed ATC that they would be burning off fuel for approximately 60 minutes and would be manually extending the landing gear before making an approach to Gatwick and would not be able to vacate the runway. At approximately 1518 they left the TIMBA stack and made an approach to EGKK. Emergency services were put on response. The aircraft landed at 1527 and rolled out on the runway. It was static for 15 minutes before being towed clear of the runway. Supplementary 21/07/2019: **********, a EGKK departure reported to TC a hydraulic failure. After dumping fuel the aircraft returned to EGKK as an Emergency. Gatwick initiated appropriate emergency call out iaw ANS Gatwick MATS Pts 2 and GAL Emergency Orders. In accordance with EU Directive 376, any declared Emergency is required to be filed as an MOR, in this instance the event was duly recorded in **** and the record kept for statistical purposes." On landing both thrust reverser were selected as per SOP, however Engine 2 Reverser did not deploy. A320-200-251N, ATA 80, 05/08/2019; No2 Engine Shut-down due to Starter Failure: On starting number 2 engine we noticed N2 winding down during fuel flow and ignition. We then got an ECAM stating relight initiate. Ground guy then told us we had sparks coming from the engine. ECAM told us to shut the engine down ( which we were going to do based on external evidence ) Phoned MOC and returned to stand. Swapped aircraft. A320-200-232, ATA 22, 18/08/2019; Aircraft Degraded to Direct Law Shortly Before Landing: During the flare PF (FO) commented on unusual handling, with associated large pitch up moment after main gear touchdown requiring firm fwd. s/s pressure to get nosewheel down, and “man pitch trim” displayed on PFD. PF also felt that lateral control feedback was unusual (perhaps sluggish?) in last 100k. After vacating rwy on RET, an ECAM caution “F/Ctl Alt Law” was received. A/C taxied to stand, and caution disappeared after engines shutdown. A320-200, ATA 27, 24/08/2019; Flight Control, Aileron Servo

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Fault: "ACARS received for Flt Control ail servo fault. A/c engaged upon arrival And defect traced to ELAC 2. Engineer elected to change ELAC rather Than lock out 2 x servo on either wing aileron as quicker option. Identical P/No spare retrieved from tba stores and installed on a/c. However, upon installation it was identified that software installed Was not compatible with ELAC 1 even though they were of identical P/No. TSG consulted and confirmed this. Alternative compatible P/No was Ordered and retrieved from EAA. ELAC installed and a/c dispatched. Software issue was major contributor to delay. Original P/No requested was ***. On fit it had software Incompatibility, new item p/n: ** was compatible." A320-200-232, ATA 33, 07/09/2019; Left Hand Landing Light Missing: We were called by the captain, who was inbound from TIA that the L/H landing light was missing, and wires were hanging down. We sent an Engineer to investigate who promptly confirmed the L/H landing light was indeed missing as described. Airfield ops were informed to complete an airfield check. Damage noticed on Left Hand side of the fuselage where the shattered filaments small shards impacted the aircraft skin. A320-200-214, ATA 23, 18/09/2019; H.F. Communication Difficulty: Successful SELCAL check made with Stockholm Radio on previous sector (LTN-BFS) during cruise flight over Manchester, readability was poor but acceptable. HF considered operative and serviceable for next sector BFS-AGP via T9 airway. Oceanic clearance requested and received via Shanwick Radio on VHF. Position report attempted on HF at LASNO and SELCAL check was successful however Shanwick reported readability 2 and gave an alternative primary HF freq. Although HF reception was readable, transmission on 3 different HF frequencies was finally reported as unreadable. HF issue and position report communicated to Shanwick via VHF as still within range. NAT HLA loss of comms procedure referenced, and flight proceeded in accordance with oceanic clearance. Contacted Madrid at BEGAS on VHF and flight concluded without further incident. During next sector (MAD-LTN) further HF radio check attempted with STO RADIO in the vicinity of Bordeaux and failed on 3 separate HF frequencies. HF failure reported as defect in technical log. A320-200-214, ATA 34, 23/09/2019; Loose Screw Found on Upper Weather Radar Connector/Equipment Rack: During T/S of GPWS fault and GPWS TERR DET fault under W/O, work step 2 required replacement of the weather transceiver. On removal x 2 screws were found missing from the upper weather radar connector. They were found nearby (still in the area of the weather tray) after further inspection of connector and no additional findings x2 screws reinstalled. MOC informed of findings.

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A320-200-214, ATA 23, 29/09/2019; H.F. Communications Virtually Impossible During T9 Ops: We operated the MAN-TFS-MAN pairing with T9 routing on second sector. We successfully checked SELCAL operation on sector one although reception readability was 2/5. On sector two, we obtained our oceanic clearance before BEGAS, but reception was poor with readability 2-3/5. At BEGAS, we transmitted our position report, but we were unable to understand the reply, readability 1/5. We arranged with a Madrid on VHF to relay the report to Shanwick which they did, and we proceeded along T9. From LASNO, our flight continued as normal with Shannon on VHF. We asked Shannon if other aircraft had encountered HF communication difficulties on T9 and Shannon advised no other aircraft had experienced difficulties. Accordingly, we reported HF1 as faulty in the tech log. A320-200-214, ATA 22, 29/09/2019; Incorrect FMGC Software Installed Three Times: ***** dated 16 Sept 2019 issued for repeated FMGC 1 failures. Event ******* dated 29 Sept 2019 raised for NO MODE `S` ATC CALL-SIGNS BEING RECEIVED Investigation by ****** Avionics FTM into ASR ******** found that three incorrect FMGC software loads before the correct software standard was installed. Engineers investigating Event ******** for incorrect FMGC software installed. ******** Avionics FTM recorded the following for following for ******. *********, s/n ******** installed at Standard ****** installed (part number ***********, s/n ******** installed at Standard ******* installed (part number ********* s/n ******* installed at Standard ******* installed (part number *********, s/n ******** installed at Standard******* installed (part number **********) ****** had both FMGC upgraded to FMGC standard *******part number ****** on the 30 Dec 2018. This was performed under *******. A320-200-223, ATA 21, 01/10/2019; Temperature Control Event: ZONE CONTROLLER. DURING CLB, HOT AIR OUTLET TO FLT DECK WAS - 22', TEMP DROPPED TO 12', ZONE CONTROLLER RESET CONDUCTED WITH NO EFFECT. ENG RECOMMENDED LEAVING ZONE CONT PULLED.THE REAR GALLEY THEN BECAME HOT(>30') BUT THE FLIGHT DECK REMAINED AT @ 12' FO Other Info and/or suggestions: Maintenance engineer's report: ZONE CONT 630KH REPLACED AND FUNCTIONED . Supplementary Report Closing Comments: With maintenance for action. A320-200-232, ATA 56, 06/10/2019; P1 Fixed Window Delamination Out Of Limits:

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Arrived at aircraft EUYP to find delamination of 4 inches. Limit 3 inches. Aircraft had not flown since maintenance input for weekly check. A320-200-232, ATA 24, 06/10/2019; IDG Oil Overheat: ECAM ADV for IDG2 overheat in climb. Galley shed as per QRH but still continued rising to 195 degrees. ECAM for IDG oil overheat. GEN2 and IDG disconnected. Temperature decreased. A320-200-232, ATA 27, 13/10/2019; Rudder Travel Limiter-1 Fault. Go-around Flown: On base leg ECAM generated Rudder Travel Limiter 1 Fault. Initially approach was continued to platform altitude of 2000ft. A bottom line was set to decide whether or not to continue approach further. Decision was made to discontinue the approach, so negotiated level off altitude with ATC and informed them of our intentions. Go around and cancelled approach technique were not used as we were in ALT at the FCU altitude. Standard Missed Approach performed and held at MKN VOR whilst completing T-DODAR. Decision made to fly a second approach into JMK, with sufficient fuel to divert to ATH if subsequently required. Second approach flown to a successful landing. A320-200-251N, ATA 22, 14/10/2019; Dual FMGC Failure on Climb-out: On initial climb-out from GVA at approx. 4000ft (before acceleration as NADP1) the FMA reverted to HDG. CM1 asked CM2 to push for NAV which they did but it didn't work. CM1 then engaged AP 2 and handed control to CM2. It then became apparent that NAV could not be engaged on either side and the MAP function was lost on 1 or both sides and it appeared there was a dual FMGC failure although the AP and ATHR still remained engaged. The crew asked for vectors from ATC to stay on their route to LGW initially while they trouble shot the problem and they selected BACK UP NAV on both sides to improve SA in the mean times. Before attempting a reset CM1 reselected the FMGC on his side to see if it had auto-rest and it had. CM1 then reloaded the flight-plan (which was blank) and then everything worked with no further fault for the remainder of the flight. MOC advised and tech log entry made. A320-200-214, ATA 32, 20/10/2019; Landing Gear NOT Uplocked on Departure:

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On boarding the aircraft, it was noted in the Techlog that LGCIU 1 had been replaced overnight. After a normal take-off run and rotation, the landing gear was raised. There was some movement heard in the system, but the retraction was unsuccessful. L/G NOT UPLOCKED ECAM was displayed on the DU. FNC carried out, with speed selected at around 170kts and AP2 engaged. Failure confirmed by loud rumbling noise from the gear being down, red unlocked indications on the landing gear indicator and amber on the WHEEL SD page. ECAM procedure carried out, with gear lever recycled, resulting in a successful retraction. ECAM procedure stopped as we continued with the departure, then resumed when workload allowed. Other failures showing on the ECAM: ENG1 REVERSER FAULT, ANTI -ICE CAPT PITOT, FUEL INERTING SYSTEM. Relevant actions carried out and ECAM completed. DODAR followed and we decided to continue, bearing in mind A/C would be AOG. Implications of the failures were considered for the next phases of flight. MOC informed by ACARS and they requested we divert to MXP for maintenance action. Diversion was requested with Milan ATC, by ** and ourselves, but MXP was only open for emergencies, presumably related to their higher workload relating to the closure of LIN. MOC then requested we continue to MLA to try a fix, though the aircraft may not be able to be fixed that day, as jacking was not immediately available. PAX were informed of our intention to divert, then informed of our intention to continue to destination. For the approach into MLA, we informed ATC we would be slowing down early on final, intending to come back to flap1, 180kts at around 15 miles for RWY 01. This was to buy time to operate the gear in case of any extension problems. ENG 1 REVERSER fault was also discussed and landing distance performance with failures calculated. All systems performed normally for an uneventful landing. Maintenance actions were carried out on stand and the A/C released for the return flight. Supplementary 20/10/19: Immediately after take-off, the crew witnessed the usual mechanical noises associated with the gear retracting and heard a ‘ding’ to indicate the gear had retracted; however the emergency exit ‘exit’ signs remained illuminated and the mechanical noises continued. The CM and CC4 heard the noise of the nose gear wheels ‘grinding’ as if it was trying to retract but couldn’t. This went on for a good 20-30 seconds, before the CM and CC4 then heard a further ‘ding’. The emergency exit signs remained illuminated during this time. This was confusing and out of the ordinary for the cabin crew. The CM understood what must have been happening (the flight deck were obviously performing a gear cycle, attempting to deploy the gear again and then retract it for a second time) but the other crew members did not understand what was occurring. Upon hearing these noises, the CM used the time wisely to explain to CC4 that there was obviously a problem with gear retracting; and called the aft crew via conference call (INT + ALL) to briefly alert them to the problem and not to be alarmed / expect to possibly hear an alert call (e.g. ‘Attention! Crew at stations’) as we may well be returning back to LGW - and reminded them what to do (remain seated) as the crew were still strapped into their crew seats. Whilst the CM was stating the above on the conference call, the crew heard a further ‘ding’ and the sounds again of the landing gear retracting. This time the ‘exit’ signs went out. The CM promptly ended the call with CC2 and CC3; and said she had to speak to the flight deck and would update the crew as soon as possible. The mood of the cabin was calm, and no passengers appeared aware of the tech issue. After the crew were released, the CM informed CC4 that the flight deck would be very busy (no doubt following check lists and discussing next steps) and made the flight deck breakfast / hot drinks as usual. When appropriate the CM visited the flight deck and ascertained that what she deduced had happened, was indeed correct. The Capt. advised that had the landing gear not retracted after numerous attempts, the aircraft would have indeed returned to LGW. However; as

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the landing gear had retracted (and because the speed indicated that it had successfully retracted) we would continue onto MLA as there was a good engineering team there. The CM explored with the flight deck the possibility that the landing gear issues would reoccur when completing the landing checklist (it was possible) and whether a precautionary emergency landing was necessary (not at this point). The Capt. explained that it wouldn’t be necessary to provide a NITS at that point and that the gear could be manually deployed as they had the ability to use the landing gear gravity extension lever - which was there to ensure the landing gear would deploy. The CM informed the Capt. that no pax appeared to have noticed the landing gear issues; and agreed with the Capt. that the crew would receive the command to secure the cabin 30 minutes prior to landing in case there were any further complications with the landing gear. The CM kept her crew informed of this information and the bistro service began as normal. 20 minutes later, the CM spoke with the Capt. and was advised that he had been in touch with MOC who were assessing whether we could continue to MLA or divert for the necessary maintenance. MOC confirmed via ACARS that as an urgent priority we were indeed, required to divert (to MXP). Photo of the ACARS message is attached. The Capt. worked well with the CM to update her crew regarding what was happening and were positioned visibly throughout the cabin to reassure customers, in advance of the Capt. making an announcement. When the Capt. advised the customers via PA that we were making a mandatory diversion to MXP due to a technical issue, the CM was situated in the forward galley and initially witnessed a lot of anxiety from pax. The CM made a follow-up announcement which reaffirmed the Capt.’s announcement to further reassure the pax, including that they would need to be seated 30 minutes prior to landing (when the crew began to secure the cabin for landing) and this would be in 25 minutes time. Shortly after this announcement had been completed, the Capt. advised that ATC had now denied us into MXP unless it was for an emergency only (due to weather). The customers witnessed the phone call at the front of the cabin and began asking questions regarding what was happening. The CM said she would update them as soon as possible; and decided to enter the flight deck with a guard present as per SOP to help decrease the Capt’s workload. The CM remained in the flight deck whilst the Capt. and FO reduced our speed and worked hard with ATC and MOC to determine next steps. In the absence of a definitive plan of action as MOC was trying to influence ATC to reconsider a diversion to MXP - the CM informed CC3 (guarding the FD door) to begin pre-empting cabin secure by completing a rubbish collection in advance of the command and to ensure the crew in the cabin had tidied the galley’s as best as possible / had a break and something to eat. The FD were advised that we should continue onward to MLA afterall. Pax were kept informed - some were anxious and confused, but ultimately delighted to be reaching their destination - and the crew / flight deck worked to their agreement of receiving cabin secure 30 minutes prior to landing. The CM spoke with the cabin crew to be mindful that, although highly unlikely, there was a very small chance that there could be issues with the landing gear upon touchdown and it was more important than ever to complete their 30 second review and be ready / situationally aware should things change quickly during landing. The landing gear deployed successfully, and the aircraft landed into MLA safely without complication. The crew were fine and in very good spirits. A group photo was taken of the cabin crew by the first officer after all passengers had disembarked; and the crew were all calm and happy to be safely in MLA. * Upon arrival, engineers attended the aircraft and ‘fixed’ the landing gear. During this time; the entire crew compliment, including flight deck, left the aircraft. All 6 crew were escorted to the terminal by the TCO in order to purchase some food and drink, as we

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were advised by the engineers that the problem would take approximately 1.5-2 hours to resolve before the passengers were boarded. Whilst all of the crew were in the terminal, engineers confirmed after 1 hour that they had reused a sensor from a cargo door, run tests and suitably resolved the issue. With this the crew promptly returned to the aircraft. A full security search with 100% life jackets was performed as per SOP, this had been agreed with the Capt. prior to the crew leaving the aircraft unattended. This was a deviation from the search requirements outlined on the crew summaries - for obvious reasons. The return flight, departed 2 hours later than scheduled STD. After take-off from MLA there were again issues with the landing gear retracting and it became apparent the issues experienced during the outbound sector had not been suitably resolved. The CM again recognised there was an issue immediately, however; the mechanical sounds (of the landing gear failing to retract) were less audible this time. Consequently, the other cabin crew didn’t realise that the issue had reoccurred. Thankfully after numerous attempts, the landing gear successfully retracted, and the emergency ‘exit’ signs weren’t alight. The return flight continued without a diversion due to the technical issue and the Capt. / CM agreed once again that the cabin would be secured - for a normal landing - 30 minutes prior to landing. Unfortunately, a cabin crew member (CC2) became unwell shortly after this discussion, and consequently the aircraft diverted to GVA as a result of this medical emergency. The cabin was secured for landing 20-25 minutes prior to landing as a result - as soon as the decision had been made to divert. Further information regarding the medical diversion can be found. Upon landing into GVA the aircraft was declared AOG and towed to the hangar for maintenance. A320-200-232, ATA 32, 13/11/2019; NLG Assembly Damage: During maintenance input revision, nose landing gear (NLG) inner cylinder was removed for scheduled dynamic seal replacement. On removing the cartridge assembly from tube, damage was noted to restrictor assembly lug holes and cam assembly resulting from poor previous maintenance. A320-200-232, ATA 27, 15/11/2019; Incorrect Installation of the Rudder. Height Found Out of Limits: ******** check. Ref *** order ****** - tc ****** - dvi rudder hinge arm 6 & 7. ***** sap order *********. ***** finding report - **** gap between the top surface of the hinge bearing and the inner surface of the hinge arm out off limits. Images to support, see attached. Rigged incorrectly on installation. A320-200-232, ATA 70, 23/11/2019; Fan Cowls Fitted in Wrong Configuration:

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During daily inspection No1 engine inboard fan cowl found to have no strake fitted and No2 engine outboard found to have strake fitted which is incorrect. On investigation fan cowls found to be fitted to wrong engine, SAP showed them fitted in the correct configuration. 4: Safety Information Bulletins Information Bulletins can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ No SIB’s for the A320 fleet during this period

5: Procedures Review

Due to time to print differences between this publication and current published technical matter, it has been decided to no longer reference changes to individual operators’ technical notices and procedures. This information will of course still be readily available via TechCom or the individual operators’ systems. If you are having difficulty in accessing any of this information, please contact your local supervisor or STN tech library


Documents

Airbus A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING