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Agnia Baranauskaite Grigas, University of Oxford, MPhil Thesis, Spring 2006
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Explaining Lithuania’s Policy on EU Accession,1991-2002
Agnia BaranauskaiteSt. Antony’s College University of Oxford
April 2006
Supervisor: Dr. Alex Pravda
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master ofPhilosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and InternationalRelations at the University of Oxford. The work in this thesis is all my own except
where otherwise indicated.
30,033 words
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
To my mother
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
A number of people have contributed to this thesis. First of all, I am very grateful tomy supervisor, Dr. Alex Pravda, for his many useful comments during the writing ofthis thesis. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Walter Mattli, Dr. Kalypso Nicolaidis andDr. Jan Zielonka for their suggestions and assistance during various stages of thisproject. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge Prof. Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Prof.Vytautas Landsbergis and Prof. Egidijus Vareikis for sharing their insights on theLithuanian accession process.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Explaining Lithuania’s Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002
Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..1Literature Review…………………………………………………………..….4Analytical Framework…………………………………………...………...…11Argument and Project …………………………………………………….….17Methods………………………………………………………………...…….22Structure of Study………………………………………………………….....25
Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy ……………………..….27The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns…………………27Rational Utility Considerations………………………………………………30Domestic Politics……………………………………………………………..42Ideational Considerations………………………………………………….....45Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..49
Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy…………….52The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns…………………...53Hard Security Needs and Concerns………………………………………...57Soft Security Benefits……………………………………………………...62 Political Voice………………………………………………………………..64Domestic Politics……………………………………………………………..66Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..75
Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000………………………..…….77
Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000………….78Economic Factors…………………………………………………………….79Security Factors…………………………………………...………………….84Domestic Factors………………………………………………...…………...89Ideational Factors………………………………………….…………………93Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..97
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..99
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….109Books and Articles………………………………………………………….109Interviews…………………………………………………………………...111
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Introduction
In little more than a decade after a difficult secession from the Soviet Union,
Lithuania gained membership into the European Union (EU) in May of 2004. The EU
membership was seen domestically and abroad as validation of Lithuania’s success in
establishing a democratic state, transitioning to a market economy and permanently
leaving the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, it was seen as a means to ensure positive
economic, political, and social developments in the future. Yet it was lamented by
some as a giving up of hard-fought sovereignty from the USSR to yet another Union.
At first glance one might reasonably conclude that Lithuania’s bid for membership
was bound to succeed since Lithuania appears to be a textbook example of rational
motivation for integration. Furthermore, Lithuania’s accession story can be told in an
over-determined way given the complementary economic, security, and ideational
motivations for membership. However, Lithuania’s policies towards EU membership
were much more complex. Lithuania's EU accession process was animated at all times
by tension between material and ideational factors, between the perceived gains of
integration and sovereignty concerns. In the face of seemingly ample arguments in
favour of EU membership, it has often been overlooked that for Lithuania there were
also potent arguments and sentiment against membership in the spheres of economics,
sovereignty, cultural identity; and there was the paradox of joining a new union after
recent secession from another. Nor should one overlook the fact that the population
at large did not embrace the prospect of EU membership immediately. Lithuanian
public opinion over the years was rather fickle regarding the EU despite the
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
seemingly apparent economic and security benefits, the compatibility of European
and Lithuanian identities, and the consensus within the political elite on EU
membership.1 There were shifts in the way EU membership was perceived by the
government even though the official national policy of seeking EU membership never
veered. For instance, the 1992 parliamentary election and the 1993 presidential
election brought to power elites cautious of integration to Western structures and
interested in a ‘national’ path for development. The 2000 elections were dominated by
parties that opposed Lithuania’s early entry to the EU. Yet once in power, elected
officials maintained the EU trajectory of foreign policy in 2000 as in 1993 and 1992.
Thus, the Lithuanian accession process was not a straightforward affair of continuous
support for EU membership due to complementary material and ideational
motivations. In fact, in addition to material costs and benefits of membership there
were perceived sovereignty losses to the EU and sovereignty gains due to escaping
the Russian sphere of influence, both of which were often articulated in ideational
terms by the Lithuanian elites.
This thesis explores the various tensions involved in the Lithuanian accession process
in seeking to address the general question: What was the interplay between the
material and ideational factors that shaped Lithuania’s EU policy? More specifically,
to what extent was the Lithuanian accession process driven by material motivations?
If material motivations were not the decisive determinant, to what extent did
ideational aspects play a part in Lithuania’s EU policy? We are also interested in
1 For Baltic public opinion shifts see Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes ‘Central and East Europeanviews on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back toEurope: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999,p. 186
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
assessing how domestic conditions came into play and in particular how they related
to the role of material and ideational factors.
Lithuania, a state of less than four million people, may not seem like a very
significant case study of EU enlargement and perhaps for this reason it has not
received much attention from students of EU eastern enlargement. However, as a
former Soviet-occupied Republic and one of the most eastern states geographically
among the new accession countries, Lithuania has its own peculiarities that are
noteworthy and that should be placed in the general context of the recent EU
enlargement. The Lithuanian case can shed light on Baltic states’ accession in general
due to a number of similar characteristics. Moreover, a study of a single case rather
than a regional analysis of the Baltics allows for an in-depth examination of the key
episodes, motives, and discourse that a broader study could not capture. The
Lithuanian case, can not only shed light on the Baltics but also on the recent accession
process of many Central and Eastern European post-communist states, which all
shared a common experience of transitioning to market economies and democratic
governments while seeking EU membership in the 1990s. With three additional
former communist and Eastern European states of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria on
the timetable for EU accession, it is important to examine former cases of integration
that seem to defy some integrationist logic and assumptions. The accession of post-
Soviet Lithuania may be of comparable use when examining the potential candidature
of Ukraine and Belarus. The case also sheds light on the drivers of EU integration and
enlargement overall and offers the perspective of a small state on regional integration
in general.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Literature Review
The conventional analysis of the Lithuanian and the Baltic accession process states
that the impetus to EU accession was rationally and materially driven. The principal
rational motivations of Lithuania, and the Baltic states in general, to join the EU can
be combined in three main categories: economic, security, and reform-driven
considerations. The economic calculus was such that EU accession was attractive due
to the opportunities of the common market as it was for Britain or Denmark and
because of growth and development prospects as for Ireland. Security concerns were
an important factor due to Russia’s proximity. Meanwhile, there was a recognised
need for reform for which the EU was seen to be an anchor as was the case for Spain,
Portugal, and Greece.
A competing constructivist perspective holds that Lithuania sought EU membership
due to its European identity and historical legacy. In the sparse literature on the Baltic
accession, a comprehensive analysis on Lithuania’s, or even the Baltic, accession
from all four angles of economics, politics, domestic reforms, and identity is lacking.
Most authors stress either one or the other factor or are limited by the exclusive focus
on either the rationalist or constructivist perspective. Furthermore, most studies
present a linear account of the accession policies and perspectives and do not explain
how motivations changed and evolved over time or manifested themselves in
particular episodes.
Literature on Economic Motivations
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Interestingly, despite the seeming evidence for economic gain from the Union and the
final package that Lithuania received from the accession negotiations in 2002, most
literature on the Baltic accessions holds that in the decade leading up to the
negotiations EU membership was not driven exclusively or even primarily by
economic considerations. Heather Grabbe states that ‘hope for money from Brussels
is not in fact a key motivation for membership’2 She and Kirsty Hughes argue that in
the Baltics ‘benefits through access to markets, trade, investment and transfers … are
secondary motives’.3 Zaneta Ozolina considers Baltic states’ economic motivations
for membership, but focuses on the EU’s transformative power on the Baltic
economies rather than on transfers, capital market integration, or an increase in FDI.4
Ramunas Vilpisauskas, a prominent Lithuanian political economist and current
advisor to President, is the most convinced of the importance of economic factors as
an impetus for raising EU membership to the top of the Baltic state’s foreign policy
goals stating that the EU was viewed ‘as a source of economic opportunities and
resources.’5 Yet Vilpisauskas like Ozolina underlines the economic costs of EU
integration. The two most widely cited concerns of Lithuania related to EU
membership are agricultural reforms and the EU request that the Ignalina nuclear
power plant be closed. In light of these and other costs associated with EU norms and
regulations, Vilpisauskas has noted that it may be economically more advantageous to
be an Associate of the EU rather than a full member. According to Vilpišauskas, EU
becomes advantageous when you consider not only the economic aspects of
2 Heather Grabbe ‘Challenges of EU Enlargement’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 693 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 1894 Zaneta Ozolina ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Lieven and Trenin, p. 205-95 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, ‘Regional Integration in Europe: Analysing Intra-Baltic EconomicCooperation in the Context of European Integration’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Roadto the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press,Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
accession, but also politic and security considerations.6 In summary, the economic
literature surprisingly places little importance on economic motivations on integration
for Lithuania and the Baltic states. The elements that arise from the literature such as
economic opportunities and costs, the EU’s transformative power on the economy and
Lithuania’s perceptions of the EU as centre of wealth warrant more attention and will
be explored in this thesis.
In contrast to the Baltics, most rationalist literature on Central and Eastern European
(CEE) enlargement stress the motivations of benefits such as access to the EU market,
transfers from the EU budget, increased investment and growth, and increased
entrepreneurship and skills.7 Milada Vachudova in her book Europe Undivided:
Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism builds on political economy
theories and international institution theories and applies them to CEE (with the
exception of the Baltics). Throughout her analysis, Vachudova primarily focuses on
the economic stimulus for integration, particularly the economic costs of exclusion
due to the EU’s harsh treatment of non-members as well as the costs of exclusion that
are created when neighbouring states are joining.8 To what extent Lithuania was
influenced by the potential costs of exclusion has yet to be examined in depth. This
6 Ramunas Vilpisauskas ‘Derybos del Narystes ES : Procesas, Veikejai, ir Rezultatai’ in KlaudijusManiokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias I Europos Sajunga – EuroposSusivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes Europos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 66. Anumber of studies on the Central and Eastern European states’ accession have questioned the presumedeconomic benefits of membership. Vachudova notes small transfer payments and costs of buildinginstitutions and social policy directives to implement the acquis in Milada Anna Vachudova, EuropeUndivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford,2005, p.231-3. For a critique of the agricultural policy towards the new entrants see Grabbe in Lievenand Trenin, p. 69, 76. David Ellison and Mustally Hussain have proposed that the Easter Europeanstates ‘may have experienced higher levels of economic growth if they stayed out of the EU, inparticular given the meagre financial assistance that they are receiving upon accession.’ Source:Vachudova, p. 231.7 Vachudova, p. 658 Ibid., p. 65
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
thesis will inquire into the material as well as the ideational perceptions of negative
externalities of non-membership.
Literature on Security Concerns
Despite the potential tangible economic gains of EU membership for Lithuania and
the Baltics, most authors have stressed the importance of security concerns for the
Baltic states as one of, if not the primary motivation for seeking membership in the
Union.9 For the Baltic states, these security concerns consist of the desire to maintain
full independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia. For
Lithuania, there are also the concerns of bordering the highly militarized Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad. Graeme Herd in his article, ‘The Baltic States and EU
Enlargement,’ argued that for the Baltics, the EU had become ‘securitized’ meaning
that ‘the security environment that characterized the Baltic region in the early 1990’s
had both a defining impact upon the ways in which EU membership was to be sought
and upon the expectation of benefits EU membership would provide.’10 According to
Herd, security concerns were so vital to the Baltic states that in fact EU was
considered only a ‘medium-term security generator’ until NATO membership was
secured as NATO was ‘the only viable security panacea for the Baltic states.’11 Yet,
the committed and simultaneous pursuit of both EU and NATO membership by the
Lithuanian elites cannot be fully explained by the view that the EU only represented a
second choice solution to Lithuania’s security concerns.
9 Authors such as Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, andVilpisauskas have emphasized the primacy of security motivations in Lithuania’s EU policy.10 Graeme Herd, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 26111 Ibid., p. 259, 260.
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Baltic security considerations in the context of the EU are not traditional conceptions
of security advantages, a fact that is recognized but not sufficiently analysed by Herd
and other authors. While the EU could not provide Lithuania with security guarantees
like NATO’s Article V, the Union is considered a provider of soft security since
membership can indirectly deter aggression.12 As Grabbe and Hughes point out, for
the Baltics the security benefit of EU membership is ‘seen more in terms of the EU
being a community of states rather than because of any hopes for the development of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy.’ 13 However, Lithuania’s perceptions of its
security needs and particularly the belief that the EU could address some of these
needs can be better understood by examining Lithuania’s national identity and
historical legacy. Grazina Miniotaite in her article ‘The Baltic States: In Search of
Security and Identity’ addresses this issue by interpreting the security and foreign
policy of the Baltic states as the embodiment of their developing political identity. 14
However her focus is on the broader structures of Euro-Atlantic community,
particularly NATO. She does not address the relationship between the perceived
security benefits of NATO versus EU membership, which is an important point to
differentiate in order to ascertain the claim that Lithuania’s accession was primarily
driven by security concerns.
Literature on Ideational Considerations
Though less common than the rationalist security-driven explanation, an ideational
based argument has also been used to explain Lithuania’s and the Baltics’ EU policy.
The constructivist literature on the Baltics, very similar to that on CEE accession,
12 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20913 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 19014 Grazina Miniotaite ‘The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity’ in Charles Krupnick, ed.,Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London, 2003, p. 263-288
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
emphasizes ideational and historical considerations understood as a desire to ‘return
to Europe’ as the driving force in EU enlargement. For example, Pettai argues that the
‘intuitive sense of belonging to this geopolitical region [of Europe] was never in
doubt, and it was largely this belief which propelled the Baltics’ in their quest for EU
membership.15 However, the ideational motivations to join EU viewed as a desire to
be part of Europe captures only part of the story and the literature often misses the
complexities of the Baltic national identity - a weakness that this analysis will seek to
rectify.
Some scholars viewing the seeming ideational compatibility between Baltic states’
national vision and EU integration have concluded that ‘the “integration dilemma” –
the inherent tension between integration gains and sovereignty losses – appears to be
completely lacking in the Baltic region.’16 However, this perspective misses many of
the ideational complexities of the Baltics such as the significance of the anti-Soviet
and sovereignty-focused discourse. Furthermore it underestimates the facts on the
ground such as the Lithuanian Euro-sceptic movement - the National Democratic
Movement. This movement opposed EU admission because it is perceived to
undermine independence and argued that EU membership was not necessarily
beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and sovereignty.
Pavlovaite has suggested that there may be an integration dilemma in Lithuania where
sovereignty discourse has been particularly potent since 1990.17 However she does not
address why despite the scepticism among some political parties, a rather fluctuating
public opinion regarding the EU, and the sovereignty dilemma, the Lithuanian
15 Pettai and Zielonka, p. 316 Herd in Henderson, p. 27017 Inga Pavlovaite, ‘Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate’ inMarko Lehti and David J. Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experience,Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 207
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
government was firmly committed to seeking EU membership throughout the post-
Soviet years.
In the literature on Lithuania’s and the Baltic accession, the importance of EU as a
facilitator of reforms has not been emphasized but only mentioned in passing.
However, in the general literature on Eastern Enlargement, it has been recognized that
for the CEE states which emerged from planned economies and non-democratic
systems, EU accession offered the benefit of building and strengthening a candidate’s
social, judicial, political and economic institutions (like the independent Central Bank
act) as well as a chance to implement key structural reforms during the chapter by
chapter acceptance of the acquis. 18 Yet what has rarely been noted is that the reform-
anchoring role of the EU can be analyzed from an ideational perspective since the EU
has served as a model for reforms due to its magnetic appeal - the promise of
progress, prosperity and efficiency. As Pavlovaite has argued, Europe ‘has acquired a
near-mystic, taken-for-granted status in the Lithuanian discourse on economic,
political and social transformation.’19
In summary, the literature on the Baltic accession is rather sparse and lacks a
comprehensive study of the economic, security, and ideational motives for
membership. The aim of this study is to provide such a comprehensive analysis and
one that takes into account the evolution of motives over time. The reviewed studies
still leave a number of questions to be answered and room for contribution, thus, the
study will analyze Lithuania’s ideational perspective on soft security to reconcile
Lithuania’s simultaneous pursuit of EU and NATO membership. Furthermore, the
18 Vachudova, p. 181-21919 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 212
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
additional components of national identity - from anti-Russian sentiments to
‘outsider’ complex - will be addressed. Insights from more general literature from
CEE enlargement and regional integration such as appeal of EU reforms and the costs
of non-membership will be applied to enrich the understanding the Lithuanian and
Baltic case. Furthermore, broader theoretical approaches of constructivism and
liberalism will contribute to the field that is largely rationalist in its orientation and
will help to assess the ideational and domestic influences on EU policy.
Analytical Framework
When considering Lithuania’s accession policy, this study will use additional
international relations approaches to regional integration, then the ones common to
the current literature on the Baltic accession. The analytical framework of this thesis
will not rely on a single theoretic approach but rather combine rationalist,
constructivist, and liberal schools of thought which will enable a comprehensive study
of material, ideational, and domestic factors of EU policy.
Rationalist Approaches
The analytical framework of this thesis will rely greatly on the rationalist analyses
from Walter Mattli’s book ‘The Logic of Regional Integration’ and Milada
Vachudova’s book ‘Europe Undivided.’20 Mattli presents a rationalist approach that
views European integration, and regional integration in general, as driven by market
forces and enforced by institutional factors. Though Mattli notes the EU is a ‘unique
confluence of security, political, and economic motives,’ his theory focuses almost
exclusively on the economic motives for integration and enlargement.
20 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1999 and Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, &Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
The economic motives for integration are a good starting point to analyze Lithuania’s
and the Baltic states accession. Mattli points out that integration is generally sought
by ‘outsider’ states with lower growth rates than ‘insider’ states in cases where there
is little difference in economic development between the ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders.’ In
the recent EU enlargement, there was a gap in wealth between the old and new
members, but most CEE states such as Lithuania had higher growth rates than the
existing members of the EU. However, Mattli’s perspective could still be useful in
analysing the case of Lithuania since he argues that for ‘poor states’ such as Spain,
Portugal, and now the CEE countries, the motivation lies in ‘reducing the glaring per
capita income gap between themselves and the Union’21 potentially through gains
from EU’s Regional Development & Structural Re-adjustment Funds.
Mattli argues that the supply of integration depends on the willingness of the leaders
to integrate which in turn depends on the payoffs and costs of integration to political
leaders. The Lithuanian government elite and their interests or costs to integrate in
terms of re-election will be examined using Mattli’s insights. Did Lithuania’s political
leaders step up their efforts for membership in anticipation of the next presidential
election of 1998 or parliamentary elections of 2000? Were the political elites mindful
of the costs of integration – the rising Euro-scepticism of the Lithuanian public during
the late 1990s? Mattli’s insight that economically successful leaders are a lot less
likely to pursue deep integration than economically unsuccessful leaders will also be
tested in the case of Lithuania. The economic downturn of 1998 and 1999 after the
Russian crises followed by the accelerated efforts for EU integration seem to support
this hypothesis.21 Mattli, p. 95
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Mattli and Vachudova both note that the costs of non-integration influences elites
seeking EU membership. According to Mattli, ‘a country seeks to integrate its
economy only when there is a significant positive cost of maintaining its present
governance structure in terms of foregone growth.’22 The analysts’ opinion varies on
whether Lithuania would forego growth if it was not admitted to the EU, with some
analysts predicting higher economic performance through Associate status of EU
rather than full membership, but recent government studies argue that membership
will increase GDP growth.23 The thesis will consider if foregone growth and potential
negative externalities of integration on ‘outsiders’ such as trade diversion, investment
diversion, and aid diversion influenced Lithuania elites thinking particularly as the
prospect of being left out of enlargement emerged after the Commissions decision of
1997.
Vachudova, in considering rational material motivations of EU membership,
addresses the political benefits of integration in addition to the economic ones. She
argues that the EU exerted passive leverage over candidate countries due to the
potential benefits associated with EU membership which included: 1) political
benefits such as the protection of EU rules and a voice in EU decision-making, 2)
economic benefits such as access to EU markets, transfers from the EU budget,
increased investment and growth, increased entrepreneurship and skills, and 3)
conditionality which acts as a catalyst for domestic reforms.24 The political and reform
benefits have been underemphasized in the literature on the Baltics and will be22 Ibid., p. 8123 Vilpisauskas in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 66. See also Edmundas Piesarskas,Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, ir Socialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize,Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai,Vilnius, 2002.24 Vachudova, p. 65
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
considered in this thesis. Vachudova also analyzes how ‘membership (or courtship) of
an international organization transforms state strategies and preferences.’25 Vachudova
employs this concept of active leverage of the EU to explain how the EU had an
impact on domestic outcomes of Visegrad states and argues that organizations such as
NATO did not have the same leverage. 26 EU’s active leverage will be used to consider
Lithuania’s policies towards EU and NATO membership in the key episode post-
Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiation in
1997.
Constructivist Approaches
The rationalist approach is often incomplete to fully explain EU integration or
enlargement and thus, the constructivist school of international relations can shed new
insight into the same studies. Alexander Wendt in ‘Social Theory of International
Relations’ proposes that ‘the structures of human association,’ or international
organizations, ‘are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces’
and ‘the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared
ideas rather than given by nature.’27 While the rationalist approach views the
enlargement on the part of the entrants as a ‘product of a cost-benefit calculation,’
constructivist approaches focus on the appeal of Western European norms and values,
the commonality of European identities, and the legacy of history.28 As Jan Zielonka
highlights ‘We belong to Europe’ was the repeated cry of Eastern Europeans since the
late 80s. ‘In their view, Europe possesses a special kind of identity which is based on
certain cultural and legal traditions, on common principles of democracy and the25 Ibid., p. 726 Ibid., p. 134-13727 Alex Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1999, p. 128 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement,’ Journal of EuropeanPublic Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2002.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
common religious roots of Christianity and Judaism,’ an identity that the Eastern
Europeans feel that they share.29
In this thesis, constructivist approaches will be used to complement the rationalist
perspective and thus, consider the importance of ideational factors in Lithuania’s
interest formation regarding EU membership and their effect on EU policy. As
Tiilikainen argues, state policies have been a reflection of state’s national identities in
the Baltic states:
“As a basis for foreign policy, national identities express themselves asworldviews, that is as subjective interpretations concerning the internationalenvironment and one’s own position in it. These worldviews furthermoreexpress a set of values functioning as the value basis for a given policy.” 30
An analysis of the Lithuanian ‘worldview’ will be useful to understand more clearly
Lithuania’s political, security, and even economic interests in seeking EU
membership. Lithuania’s and EU’s ‘cultural match’ which according to constructivist
institutionalists is the compatibility between outsiders and insiders regarding
collective identity and fundamental beliefs will be examined in this thesis to consider
Lithuania’s pursuit and resistance to the integration process.
Liberal Approach
The liberal approach could bring additional insight into the analysis of Lithuania’s
policy towards EU by opening the ‘black box’ of the state and analysing Lithuania’s
domestic politics. The politics of EU enlargement is an area that has been
underemphasized in the studies of Baltic accession and the liberal approach enables
an analysis of the role played by government elites, interests groups, and public
29 Jan Zielonka, ‘The Assertion of Democracy’ in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielonka, eds., RestructuringEastern Europe :Towards a New European Order, Aldershot, Hants, 1990, p. 4630 Teija Tiilikainen, The Political Implications of the EU Enlargement to the Baltic States, RobertSchumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence 2001, p. 15
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
opinion. In Lithuania, in particular, there has been a notable divide between the
steadfast government commitment to the EU and the sceptical public. In this thesis,
the liberal/domestic approach is instrumental in explaining to what extent Lithuanian
elites sought EU membership so they could introduce domestic reforms, for political
gains, or due to their desire to compete. Also it allows us to consider to what extent
fluctuating public opinion played a role in EU policy formulation and if it changed the
strategic direction or just the tactics of EU policy.31
Of these perspectives on EU enlargement, the rationalist lens will be one of the two
main approaches of this thesis, especially for examination of the economic factors to
Lithuania’s EU policy and to some extent the political factors. Complementary
explanatory power will be sought from the constructivist approach by considering to
what extent and when Lithuanian policy and choices were a reflection of national
identity. Political, security, and economic motivations for EU membership will be
considered in the light of Lithuania’s worldview. Lastly, a liberal domestic approach
will examine the role of actors below the state level to understand the complexities of
domestic politics and its influence on EU accession. However, this approach will be
complementary to rather than constitutive of the analysis since throughout the 1991-
2002 period, despite the changes in political parties, leadership, and public opinion,
national policy on EU remained consistent.
Argument and Project
31 The liberal approach could also be used to examine to what extent domestic interests groupsinfluenced EU policy, but this line of inquiry will not be attempted in the thesis due to lack ofsupporting evidence that interests groups played a significant role in the Lithuanian accession process.See Vilpisauskas in Pettai and Zielonka, p. 160-73
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Relying on rationalist and constructivist approaches, this thesis will advance the main
argument that ideational factors made material considerations more salient during key
episodes of decision making process and the interaction of the two thus determined
Lithuania’s EU policy. On a stand-alone basis, neither the material nor the ideational
factors played a decisive role in motivating Lithuania to seek EU membership but
when a correlation between material considerations and ideational factors occurred,
integration was accelerated. On the other hand, when only material factors were at
play, integration momentum slowed.32
Furthermore, the thesis holds that Lithuania’s accession strategy was motivated by
different factors in the pre-application and post-application phase.33 Material political
and security motivations were of great importance to Lithuania in the years leading up
to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. Furthermore, political and security
motivations were decisive for EU membership because they were made more salient
by complementary ideational factors. Calculations of the economic benefits of EU
membership were not central in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in
1995 but came to play an increasingly important role in the late 1990s and particularly
in the early 2000 to 2002. After 1995 ideational factors maintained the salience of
political and security factors, which, if based solely on rationalist considerations, may
have lost relevance. 32 This inquiry greatly utilizes the dichotomy between material and ideational factors, which admittedlyare generally difficult to separate into two distinct categories and in the case of Lithuania’s accessionpolicy. For the purpose of this thesis, material considerations will be understood to include rationaleconomic costs and benefits of EU membership such as transfer payments, FDI, reformimplementation. Political gains such as representation in the European Council and to some extentsecurity benefits are analyzed as material factors. Ideational aspects include the sovereignty concerns,perception of the EU as an ideal model for emulation, soft security gains from being part of Europe,escaping Europe’s periphery and a dangerous sphere of Russia’s influence.33 The application process itself did not significantly alter national motivations. But because Lithuania’snational motivations evolved from 1991 to 2002, the application date is a useful marker which enablesto evaluate on which set of motivations Lithuania’s application was based. Other studies do not makethis distinction and generalize about motivations as whole from 1991 to 2002 providing an imprecisepicture.
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The argument is that ideational factors influenced Lithuania’s perceptions of national
interests and thus, the accession process. Lithuanian ideational motivations for EU
membership are more complex than a sense of common European heritage even
though this is how the literature often interprets the ideational pull of Europe. The
thesis will employ an understanding of the Lithuanian national identity that is not
simply European, but one that is also decisively anti-Russian/Eastern, historically an
‘outsider’ and one that prizes national sovereignty.34 Ideational motivations are based
as much on the ‘pull’ force of the EU as on the ‘push’ force away from the post-Soviet
space. This ‘push’ force is also a ‘protest vote’ demonstrating a desire to escape the
Soviet Union’s legacy rather than simply joining Europe. In line with Pavlovaite’s
argument, for Lithuania the ‘return to Europe’ then takes on a meaning not of
becoming a member of the European community but rather ‘a legitimate, reliable and
safe way of distancing Lithuania from Russia and of overcoming Lithuania’s most
recent communist past’35. I argue that this desire to establish distance from Russia
coupled with the sense of being a historical ‘outsider’ greatly influenced the ultimate
success of the pro-European case in Lithuania since integration particularly after 1997
was driven by a fear that Lithuania would be left out in the process of European
development and thus relegated again to the Russian sphere of influence, in a type of
geopolitical ‘ghetto’ between the EU and the East. This thesis, while utilizing a
rationalist perspective on Vilnius’ economic and security motivations for EU
membership, also relies on ideational factors to elucidate how Lithuanian elites
34 This description of the national identity is formulated from insights from several sources: Miniotaitein Krupnick, p. 263-288; Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 199-213; Egidijus Vareikis,Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 291-303; Inga Vinogradnaite, ‘Kelias Europon:Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas,’ in Darius Staliunas, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija irDabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 180-189.35 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 200
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perceived the economic and security variables. For instance, Lithuania certainly had
some potent economic and security arguments to join the EU but because ‘the West…
[is] associated with prosperity, security, and democracy, whereas the East is linked
with poverty, unpredictability, and insecurity’36 the EU integration policy was often
perceived as the only viable solution for Lithuania. The idealized perception of the
West and a desire to escape the Soviet past was illustrated by President Adamkus’
statement that the EU ‘is the guarantee of progress and future prosperity…The only
way to escape the backwardness of the province is to board the fast Europe train.’37
Similarly security motivations to join the EU were meaningful only to the extent that
Lithuanian political elites perceived insecurity in their geopolitical position and to the
extent that EU was thought to be able to provide any security solutions. In summary,
if the Lithuanian elites would have had a different national identity and different
perceptions, the EU accession process could have proceeded considerably differently.
Most probably, Lithuania would have still sought EU membership since there were
economic and structural improvements to be gained from membership but it would
have done so without the same fervour and dedication. Also it is arguable that
Lithuania would have sought membership in the case where there was no economic
benefit to be gained from membership and done so motivated by security, ideational,
and reform factors.
This thesis also emphasizes the importance of external events and factors in
cementing Lithuania’s resolve to seek EU membership. For instance the rising
nationalist rhetoric in Russian politics in the mid-1990s, as exemplified by
Zhirinovsky performance in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, greatly stirred
36 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 27837 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 44
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Lithuania and the other Baltic states to seek security through integration into Western
Structures. The most important external events occurred in the brief time period
between 1997 and 1999: 1) in 1997 the EU Commission made a decision to exclude
Lithuania from the first round of negotiations process for membership; 2) the Russian
financial crisis of 1998 caused a recession for the Lithuanian economy; 3) NATO did
not include any of the Baltic states in its first round of enlargement in 1999. These
three seemingly discouraging events only intensified Lithuania’s elite consensus on
the necessity of EU membership because they were fed on the fears of being left out
of the European structures and left behind in Russia’s unstable backyard. The external
factor of regional competition among the Baltic states pushed all three states towards
integration rather than exploring the option of creating a regional alternative to
integration.
Lastly, this thesis will approach Lithuania’s economic, security, and ideational
motivations in a non-linear fashion arguing that certain motivations were important
during some time periods and not in others, and that the strength of certain
motivations evolved over time. Lithuania’s policy towards the EU cannot be
understood as a static and unchanging set of preferences between the years of 1991
and 2002 as most of the aforementioned literature had attempted. Until 1995, when
Lithuania submitted an official application to the EU, economic considerations for
membership were overshadowed by Lithuania’s security concerns due to the presence
of the Russian army, its geopolitical location, and its new and fragile independence.
From Lithuania’s 1995 application until 1997, the country pursued a mixed strategy of
both officially seeking EU membership while simultaneously pursuing trade
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opportunities with Russia and the CIS and lagging in the implementation of necessary
reforms for EU accession. The security aspects of EU membership remained salient
but pragmatic economic considerations compelled the Lithuanian elites to maintain
trade with Russia. The coupled external events of EU and NATO exclusion and the
Russian crisis in the late 1990s rekindled some of the greatest ideationally-based fears
of Lithuanian elites - the economic and political consequences of being ‘left out of
Europe’ in a ‘Baltic ghetto.’
From 2000 to 2002 EU policy became increasingly driven by economic motivations
for membership. Though the EU was still regarded in symbolic terms of wealth,
progress and modernity, increasingly a rationalist utility maximizing perspective of
the costs and benefits of EU membership appeared. However, the rationalist
perspective was used more for the negotiation strategy and ensuring that Lithuania
gets the ‘best deal’ in its accession package than for making the decision of whether
or not to seek membership which was already decided in 1995.
The argument is thus that ideational factors mattered as much if not more than
material considerations in determining Lithuanian elites' drive for EU by influencing
Lithuanian elite perceptions of the economic, security, and political costs and benefits
of membership, which came to prominence at different points of the accession
process. In order to demonstrate this I will use discourse analysis and key episode
study methods described in the next section.
Methods
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
This thesis combines the historical explanatory and theory-testing categories of Van
Evera’s typology of political science dissertations.38 Consistent with the explanatory
approach, I seek to ‘explain the causes… [and] consequences of [a] historical case.’
The historical case I seek to explain is Lithuania’s accession to the EU. My thesis will
also incorporate elements of the theory-testing approach, applying and testing the
noted elements of rationalist, constructivist and liberal approaches on the case of
Lithuania EU accession. However, the primary purpose of the thesis is not to prove or
disprove any particular theory but rather to explain the historical case of Lithuania’s
accession by using some relevant theoretical tools.
In this thesis, discourse analysis is an important tool for explaining the Lithuanian
case because discourse demonstrates how the EU was perceived and what benefits
and costs were anticipated by the Lithuanian governing elites. Discourse is understood
as a common understanding of self and the world that legitimates and motivates
collection action.39 Discourse analysis will rely primarily on official statements and
speeches on EU and Lithuanian foreign policy by high-level government officials.
Published compilations of speeches such as President Adamkus’ Trys Metiniai
Pranešimai and Penkeri Darbo Metai, Landsbergis’ Lietuvos Kelias Į NATO will be
cited most extensively.40 Noteworthy strands of discourse will be highlighted from the
Lithuanian Constitution as well as the National Law on Defence. Government
38 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press,Ithaca, NY, 1997, p. 90-239 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Feelings, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1996, p. 6. See also Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations:a Critique of Research and Methods, European Journal of Internaltional Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2 1999.40 Trys Metiniai Pranešimai is a collection of the President’ national addresses from 1999 to 2001.Penkeri Darbo Metai is a collection of the President’s speeches and interviews from 1998 to 2003.Lietuvos Kelias Į NATO is a collection of Landsbergis speeches, interviews, foreign policyformulations, and articles from 1990 to 2004 and though focused on NATO membership givesnumerous insights on EU membership and the general Western orientation of foreign policy.
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sponsored studies on the effects of integration41 will be considered. Academic articles
from high-level bureaucrats and influential political scientists who serve as advisors
to the government will be useful not only for the information that they provide but
also because they reveal the perspectives of the inner circle. Interviews with key
officials will fill gaps in the literature and breathe life into the analysis. The discourse
analysis will not focus on public statements or journalistic comments, as the emphasis
of this thesis is on government elites’ consensus. Despite the focus on policy actors,
the divergence between public opinion and pro-EU elite consensus will be considered
when relevant.42
My proposed discourse analysis poses some challenges but also enables me to make
some useful contributions. Admittedly, assessing the impact of discourse on policy
formation is difficult, thus the thesis will not claim to explain policy actions but rather
the thinking behind these actions. The analysis will assume a correlation but not
causality between thinking/discourse and policy. For instance, I am not arguing that
the discourse on ‘the Baltic ghetto’ or ‘periphery’ encouraged Lithuanian government
elites to accelerate the integration process but rather reflected the perceptions of the
elites who steeped in this thinking pursued EU membership.
The thesis will contribute in both theoretical and practical terms to the study of EU
enlargement and the Lithuanian accession case. Theoretically, the in-depth study of
the Lithuanian case can enhance the understanding of the complexities of elite
motivations for EU enlargement and decision-making processes for candidate
countries. Practically, by working with primary materials and conducting interviews,
41 Lietuvos Integracijos Į ES Finansinių, Ekonominių Ir Socialinių Pasekmių Susisteminimas ir Analizé42 Statistics from the Euro-barometer will be used for public opinion analysis.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
the thesis will gather and process a large amount of data that is still absent from
secondary sources in either Lithuanian or English.
The selected time frame for study is from August 1991 when the EU recognized
Lithuania’s independence to December 2002 when Lithuania successfully concluded
accession negotiations at the Copenhagen European Council.43 Though the thesis is
not structured in a historical or chronological fashion, the two general phases of pre-
and post-decision to submit an EU membership application in 1995 will be
considered. The pre-1995 years demonstrate what initial motivations shaped
Lithuanian EU policy and the decision to submit the EU application. After 1995,
though Lithuania was in the process of deliberation, preparation, and negotiation for
EU membership, the country had already to a great extent the set its trajectory in
foreign policy and was only implementing it.
A key episode between 1997 and 2000 demonstrated that Lithuania’s EU policy was
not predetermined even after the application submission and highlights the importance
of external events in shaping it. This particular episode will be analysed in a
subsequent chapter as a key case which contained an interplay of various elements
such as economic pressures, public scepticism, historical fears, the European
Commission’s (EC) decisions and the Russian financial crisis. This episode is also
worthy of examination because it emphasizes the distinct conditions in Lithuania from
1997 to 2000 in comparison to the other Baltic states. Lithuania was the only state
among its neighbours that experienced the double disappointment of EU and NATO
43 The analysis does not extend to up to when Lithuania officially became a member of the EU in May2004, because after the negotiations were completed in December 2002 Lithuania’s membership wascertain and the nature of Lithuania’s policy motivations could not be analyzed in the same manner as inthe pre-2002 period.
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exclusion when Estonia was invited to start negotiations with the EU and Latvia had
less reason to expect an invitation from NATO. In addition, Lithuania was the most
affected by the Russian financial crisis. Thus, the years from 1997 to 2000 in
Lithuania were marked by trials and tribulations for its EU and Western-oriented
policy more so than for the other Baltic states and most Central and Eastern European
states. The years from 1997 to 2000 will demonstrate to what extent Lithuania’s
pivotal decision-making episodes were driven by material or ideation factors such as
negative economic externalities or the fear of being left out of European
developments. The case study will prove the main argument of the thesis that
ideational factors made material considerations decisive in Lithuania’s EU policy.
Structure of Study
Following this introduction, the thesis consists of three core chapters. The second
chapter, entitled ‘Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy,’ examines the changing
salience of economic factors in Lithuania’s EU policy from 1991 to 2002. The
analysis will proceed thematically rather than chronologically, focusing on the role of
rational utility, domestic politics and ideational factors in economic considerations.
The third chapter, entitled ‘Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy,’
examines the evolution of political and security concerns in Lithuania’s EU policy
from 1991 to 2002. The analysis proceeds thematically focusing on hard and soft
security concerns and political voice. The impact of domestic politics and ideational
factors in the sphere of political and security concerns is also examined.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
The fourth chapter, ‘The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in
Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000,’ will consider a crucial period in Lithuania’s
accession process to demonstrate how economic, political, and security considerations
were made more salient by ideational factors. The analysis will reveal the important
role of external conditions for Lithuania’s foreign policy while concluding that
domestic political conditions have played a more modest role.
Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the findings and consider what insights from
the Lithuanian EU accession policy can be applied to Lithuania’s general foreign
policy as well as the Baltic and CEE accession.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy
The following chapter will elucidate the main hypothesis that ideational factors
complemented material considerations and so made them more salient during key
episodes of Lithuanian policy on EU membership. The following analysis will
emphasize the tension in Lithuania’s EU accession process between economic and
ideational factors, between the perceived losses and gains of integration. This chapter
will demonstrate that calculations of economic benefits of EU membership were not
significant in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in 1995 and came to
play an increasingly important but still not decisive role from the late 1990’s onwards
and especially from 2000 to 2002.
First the evolution of Lithuania’s EU policy will be examined to demonstrate the ways
in which economic cost-benefit analysis figured in elite thinking. Second, a thematic
explanation using rational utility considerations, domestic politics and ideational
factors, will be used to identify how ideational factors influenced material
considerations and ultimately ensured the success of Lithuania’s EU policy.
The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns
Lithuania’s relationship with the EU started at the same time as Lithuania was
establishing its independence and renewing its statehood. The first ‘point of contact’
was political not economic when in August of 1991, the EU recognized the
independence of Lithuania. The economic relationship began only a year later in May
1992 when Lithuania and the European Community signed the Agreement on Trade
and Commercial and Economic Co-operation which came into force in 1993 and
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provided Most Favoured Nation trade status. The first economically significant
accords were the Agreements on Trade and Trade Related Matters, signed by all of
the Baltic states in July of 1994 and activated in the beginning of 1995. In June of
1995, Lithuania, along with the other Baltic states signed the Association (Europe)
Agreement, which explicitly recognized its wish to become an EU member.
In the years leading up to Lithuania’s submission of the EU application, economic
factors and particularly rationalist cost-benefit calculations did not figure significantly
in Lithuania’s policy towards the EU for two main reasons. First, in the early 1990s,
Lithuania had pressing priorities other than economic development. The primary
policy goals at the time were political: the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces,
securing full independence despite being in the Russian sphere of influence, and
establishing relationships with various international organizations.44 Secondly, in the
early 1990s, EU membership was still an abstract and to some extent unattainable
goal, thus, calculations of transfer payments, increased FDI and trade volumes would
have been premature. Throughout most of the 1990s, when economic considerations
were mentioned in political or social discourse they were expressed in vague and
general terms. The EU was often understood as synonymous with Europe and the
West, representing a successful economic model, wealth and efficiency which
Lithuania hoped to emulate and be part of.45 But, before the application for
membership was submitted in 1995, the government had not fully considered the
economic consequences of EU membership: studies on the implications of EU
membership on the Lithuanian economy had not entered the elite or public discourse
44 These factors will be addressed in depth in the following chapter on political and securityconsiderations for EU membership.45 Zaneta Ozolina ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., AmbivalentNeighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208
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and the government continued to pursue an economic relationship with Russia and the
CIS. Thus the Lithuanian EU application was submitted before economic arguments
gained salience or traction among the political class.
The years between 1997 and 2000 marked a significant shift in Lithuania’s
perceptions of EU which were reshaped by two important external economic events.
The first event was the decision of the EU Commission in 1997 to exclude Lithuania
from the first round of negotiations for membership. The second event was the
Russian financial crisis of 1998, which resulted in difficult economic conditions for
the year of 1999. These two events brought about a shift in perceptions of EU policy
and benefits by the public and the government. Estonia’s inclusion in the negotiations,
arguably due to Estonia’s better economic performance, highlighted the weakness of
some aspects of Lithuania’s economic policy and highlighted the need for greater
economic reforms. Between these turning-point years of 1997 and 2000, the policies
of trying to exploit the economic opportunities offered by Russia and the CIS were
fully abandoned in favour of a clear orientation toward the EU. The need for reforms
and EU membership was emphasized by the effects of the Russian crisis on the
Lithuanian and the Baltic economy. Elite discourse centred on the need to escape a
dependency on unstable Russian markets and a fear of being left out of EU
enlargement, which would position Lithuania in a vulnerable ‘grey zone’ between the
East and the West. However, the public reacted to economic uncertainty of the late
1990s, evincing a Euro-scepticism that was mostly ignored by political forces in
economic policy formulation but at times addressed or exploited in the domestic
political sphere.
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From the time that Lithuania started its negotiations with the EU in 2000 and until the
completion of negotiations in 2002, a rationalist utility approach towards EU
membership began appearing more frequently in government discourse and policy. In
general, the rationalist analysis that appeared in the late 1990s and gained force from
2000 to 2002, demonstrates the thinking behind Lithuania’s negotiation strategy
rather than thinking behind EU membership policy. Government studies such as the
‘Analysis of Financial, Economic, and Social Implications of Lithuania’s Integration
to the EU’ were carried out so the policy class could better understand the economic
dimensions of EU integration and its effects on the Lithuanian economy and society
as EU negotiations commenced in February of 2000. Still, ideational factors remained
influential in elite calculations. Some of the rationalist concerns such as the
downsizing effects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Lithuanian
agriculture, which employes 20 percent of the labour force, were were coloured by
Lithuanian national identity as an agrarian nation. The EU-stipulated closure of the
old Soviet Ignalina nuclear plant, which was an important source of energy for the
state, was ideationally appealing due to historical antagonism towards Soviet
enviromental damage.
Rational Utility Considerations
Lithuania’s negotiated EU package was deemed very good by the government. In the
words of Purlys, the Negotiations Delegations First Secretary and head of the
Integration Politics department, Lithuania secured one of the best financial packets for
infrastructure, agriculture and social investments.46 In direct transfers alone, Lithuania
46 Vidmantas Purlys ‘Derybu del Lietuvos Narystees ES Apzvalga (2000 m vasario 15d – 2002gruodzio 13d )’ in Klaudijus Maniokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, and Darius Zeruolis, eds., LietuvosKelias I Europos Sajunga – Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes EuroposSajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 127
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
negotiated a sizable assistance package from the EU - around EUR 200 million in pre-
accession assistance during 2003, including assistance for nuclear decommissioning
of its Ignalina plant. After accession, Lithuania was poised to be one of the countries
with the highest rate per capita of EU funds (EUR 769 for 2004-2006, out of which
EUR 208 were devoted to agriculture). In terms of EU allocations, Lithuania was to
be a net beneficiary: its per capita contribution to the EU budget totalling EUR 147,
while receipts were EUR 535. 47 In hindsight it seems that Lithuania was certain to
gain economically from EU membership. At first glance one might therefore conclude
that the Lithuanian membership was over-determined. However, the Lithuanian elites
and public were not privileged with this hindsight and the realities in the pre-
accession decade often differed from the final package. Furthermore, perceptions of
costs and benefits of EU membership were not based solely on numbers.
This section will: 1) outline the changing rationalist and ideational assumptions
surrounding trade with Russia, 2) provide a costs and benefits summary of the ‘final
package’ as it was presented by key Lithuanian studies, and 3) offer an in-depth
analysis of Lithuania’s key issues of accession – agriculture and the closure of the
Ignalina nuclear power plant, which demonstrate that the perceptions of strategic
benefits and costs were significantly coloured by ideational factors.
The Costs of Benefits of Lithuania’s Russian Trade
Lithuania’s geographic location and historical legacy have positioned the state to
benefit from trade and contacts with both Western Europe and Russia. Though
Lithuania has continuously maintained ties with both camps, different rational
calculations and ideational considerations have influenced Lithuania’s trade47 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/lithuania/
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
orientation at different times. Comparing and contrasting Lithuania’s trade with
Russia and its trade with the EU is instructive when considering rational and
ideational influences in Lithuania’s economic policies.
Although the official commitment to EU membership was firm after 1995, in the mid-
1990s the governments of the Baltic states still had not given serious consideration to
the economic implications of EU membership. This is evident from government
policies which ‘tried to pursue an economic strategy which sought a balance between
a re-orientation towards the stable market in the West and the continued exploitation
of the opportunities offered by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) – a market which was well known and which had a potential for development.
Initially, Russia and the CIS represented 95 percent of all Baltic foreign trade. In the
years immediately after the Soviet collapse, some aspects of this trade greatly
increased.’48 Economic ties with CIS can be understood as a ‘pragmatic approach of
the new Lithuanian government [LDDP] of maintaining and fostering old commercial
ties with the CIS.’ Latvia took a similar approach while Estonia was the only Baltic
state that made considerable strides to reorient its trade to the West.49 The benefits of
trade with the former Soviet Union were enticing all the way until the Russian
financial crises of 1998.50 The fact that Lithuania actively pursued trade with Russia
in the early 1990s weakens the argument that Lithuania’s EU membership was over-
determined from an economic standpoint and demonstrates that Lithuanian elites were
not fully convinced of the economic benefits of EU membership. This supports my
48 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20849 Misiunas J. Romuald, “National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States,” in S. Fredrick Starr,ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York andLondon, 1994, p. 10650 Kazys Bobelis, Member of Parliament, confirmed that trade with the East was ‘natural’ and offered a‘guaranteed market’ for Lithuanian products before the Russian crisis. Interview by author 11 April2006.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
view that cost-benefit calculations did not determine Lithuania’s early EU policy as
membership was still pursued even without rational economic conviction.
The Russian financial crisis51 rippled through the Baltic economies due to significant
economic ties between the two regions. 1999 was a culmination of economic decline
with a contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL13
billion. The dangers of a close economic relationship with Russia and the CIS became
clear and Lithuanian elites accelerated the accession process with the EU. After 1998,
trade with the CIS declined rapidly and shifted toward EU markets. By 1999,
Lithuania exported considerably more to the EU than to the CIS (EUR 1,616 million
versus EUR 1,164 million) while Lithuania’s imports from EU increased to EUR
2,095 million and from Russia decreased to EUR 534 million in 1999. 52 As these
rationalist motivations reinvigorated Lithuania’s relationship with the EU, the
‘economic chaos to the east’ increasingly became an ideational motivating factor for
the government elites to reform the Lithuanian economy so it could become a part of
the ‘stable and secure economic environment’ of the EU.53 The Lithuanian historical
experience with an unstable Russia further reinforced this ideational motive to escape
economic dependency on the ‘chaotic East.’
Economic Opportunities and Costs of Lithuania’s EU Package
Though Lithuania was due to be a net beneficiary from the EU budget and received
sizable transfers, there were broader economic costs and benefits of integration that
should be considered to understand Lithuania’s EU package. Factors of EU
51 The effects of the Russian financial crisis on Lithuania’s economic and EU policy will be analysed ingreater depth in Chapter Four.52 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20853 Ibid., p. 208
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integration that had a significant impact on the Lithuanian economy were: ‘the
removal of barriers to trade in goods and services; the removal of barriers to the
circulation of capital; the removal of barriers to movement of labour; regulatory
measures in line with the EU acquis in the area of the internal market; and common
rules in selected sectors including agriculture, the EMU, and external trade policy.’54
It was estimated that due to integration Lithuania’s exports alone will be about 1.9
times higher in 2002-2009 than they would have otherwise been under the
hypothetical scenario of non-integration. However, it was noted in several studies that
it is difficult to isolate the potential effects of EU integration from those that would
have occurred anyway due to globalisation or the transformative process for a
transitional economy.55 Thus some of perceived costs and benefits of EU integration
may have occurred anyway even if Lithuanian had not sought EU membership.
A government sponsored study anticipated that integration to the EU will have a
positive impact on the GDP of Lithuania. Lithuania’s GDP in the period of 2002-2009
would be higher by about LTL 65.9 billion (LTL 11.4 billion in 2009 alone) than it
would have been under the non-integration scenario.56 Furthermore, Lithuania’s
economy will experience net growth even when accounting for the costs of integration
from 2002-2009 of about 1.14 percentage points faster than under the hypothetical
scenario of non-integration. The government study expected that due to the effects of
the accession process from 2002 to 2009 investments in the Lithuanian economy will
54 Ramunas Vilpisauskas and Guoda Steponaviciute ‘The Baltic States: The Economic Dimension’ inHelena Tang, ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: Policy Issues for Central and EasternEurope, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, p. 5555 Ibid., p. 53. See also Edmundas Piesarskas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, irSocialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos RespublikosVyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai, 2002(a)56 Edmundas Piesarskas, Summary: Systemisation and Analysis of Fianncial, Economic and SocialImplications of Lithuania’s Integration to the EU, The European Committee under the Government ofthe Republic of Lithuania, 2002(b), p. 1-11
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amount to LTL 23 billion, which will include LTL 9 billion from the EU funds, LTL
4.5 billion of public investments, and the remainder from the private sector. Grants
from EU and donor countries will amount to LTL 15 billion for 2002-2009.
According to this government study the costs associated with integration will amount
to LTL 16 billion from 2002-2009. A significant part of these costs – LTL 4.3 billion -
are payments made by Lithuania to the EU budget. For the years of 2004-2006 it has
been estimated that Lithuanian payments to the EU budget will account for 1.2
percent of GDP annually. However, as previously noted, Lithuania’s receipts from the
EU budget will be higher than its payments to the EU budget, and this positive
difference will gradually increase in the first few years of membership. Excluding the
costs of decommissioning of the Ignalina plant, the net positive difference between
budgetary transfers amounted to EUR 258 million (about LTL 890 million) in 2004,
EUR 392 million (about LTL 1353 million) in 2005, and EUR 525 million (about LTL
1813 million) in 2006.
In addition, many individual sectors in the Lithuanian economy required sizable
capital investments in order to meet EU standards. It was estimated that for
‘agriculture and industries, the total need for investments in approximation to the EU
requirements in the period of 2002-2009 almost seven times exceeds the total amount
of payments to be received from the EU over the same period’. However, it must be
taken into account that ‘a large portion of the investments would have been made
even if Lithuania had not decided to join the EU. The investments would, in any case,
have been necessitated by the globalisation processes, by the goal to achieve
international competitiveness, and by the geographical position.’57
57 Piesarskas, 2002(b), p. 6
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In summary, Lithuania was poised to gain from the effects of EU integration, though
it was difficult to ascertain to what extent the noted gains were from EU accession
and would not have been achieved through the process of transitioning to a market
economy and opening to globalization. However the fact that these studies were
completed and entered the academic and political debate only in 2000 or 2002,
demonstrates that rationalist cost-benefit calculations became salient only in the
period of negotiations but not at the time of application for EU membership.
Furthermore, the numbers often do not tell the story of how each of these benefits and
costs were perceived by the Lithuanian political elites in the years leading up to
accession and if they impacted Lithuania’s EU policy. A closer look at two key
economic issues of accession will fill in the details for the rationalist framework.
Agriculture and Ignalina: Lithuania’s Sensitive Issue Areas
The two main economic concerns that arose specifically for Lithuania regarding EU
membership were agriculture and the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant
(NPP). By examining these most sensitive issues, it is possible to get a clearer picture
of the extent to which material and ideational considerations played a role in
Lithuania’s economic aims regarding EU membership. The two cases also reveal how
ideational and material factors interacted.
According to recent official studies the agricultural sector will experience benefits
from integration and the CAP. It was estimated that between 2002 and 2009, there will
be LTL 6 billion investments into the agricultural sector, of which LTL 0.4 billion will
be invested by the Lithuanian government. From 2002 to 2009, the total transfers and
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support from EU funds for agriculture will be LTL 7 billion. In addition, there will be
LTL 4.5 billion benefits from the increased agricultural product prices and the
increased production capabilities.58 However, the rational EU benefits for the
agricultural sector were rarely mentioned in the Lithuanian political and public
discourse. Instead, concerns were voiced about the social costs of restructuring the
sector and ideational considerations arose due to the agrarian character of Lithuania.
The agricultural sector has traditionally represented a larger share of the Baltic
economies, Lithuania in particular, than is usual in industrial countries. For example,
in 1990, agriculture made up 28 percent of GDP in Lithuania. While agricultural GDP
input decreased to 9 percent by 1999, 20 percent of the Lithuanian population was
still employed in the agricultural sector.59 In fact the agricultural labour force
increased since it absorbed workers made redundant in other sectors. For example in
1990, the agricultural sector accounted for 17.8 percent of labour while in 1997 it rose
to 20.8 percent.60 Due to the disproportional segment of the population living and
working in the Lithuanian countryside, there were thorny issues to be considered
when restructuring the agricultural sector that were not apparent from the positive
statistics of CAP investments and transfer payments. President Adamkus discussed
some of these considerations in 2000:
‘In my opinion, the most difficult challenges lie for our agriculture. Today 30percent of the Lithuanian population lives in the countryside. As you know, inindustrial states like Germany about 2 percent of the population work in theagricultural sector and they feed a population of over 50 million. In Lithuaniathere are 30 percent farmers, while the nation’s population is 3.7 million.Lithuania was traditionally a farming country, but we will have to reduce theworkers in this sector to 10 percent.’61
58 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 1659 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 21960 Hilary Ingham and Mike Ingham, EU Expansion to the East, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, p. 3361 Adamkus, Valdas, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 309
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Reducing the number of workers in the agricultural sector created social costs and
was difficult to accomplish politically. Farmers, making up a large portion of the
population and one that was politically organized with the Farmers Party (Valstiečiu
Partija) opposed EU membership despite the predicted overall benefits for the sector
from integration. Throughout the late 1990s, Lithuanian farmers – the largest lobby
groups in the country – have managed to receive import protection from the
government, even when such protection contradicted international obligations of
Lithuania in its accession process.62
While for the economists the transformation and reduction of the agricultural sector
may seem like an efficient development, it is important to note that in Lithuania
agriculture retains a certain special and sentimental place in the minds of the public
that stems from the Lithuanian agrarian national identity that was formulated in the
nineteenth century.63 Thus, social and ideational issues have coloured the perception
and policies on Lithuanian agriculture in the face of EU integration. Public discourse
has been filled with calls for protection of farmers against the EU agenda: if farmers
are not protected than ‘agriculture will die in Lithuania’ which will threaten the
foundations of the state since the Lithuanians ‘do not have anything else but land.’64
In summary, though according to rational utility analysis EU integration is beneficial
for the Lithuanian agricultural sector, ideational factors have prevented CAP from
being seen in a positive light in elite and public discourse. From the social and
identity perspective, CAP threatens to destroy the social fabric of the Lithuanian
countryside and jeopardize the Lithuanian national identity.
62 Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 5963 Writers and activists such as Donelaitis, Baranauskas, and others idealized Lithuania as a nation ofsmall farmers living close to their land and avoiding foreign influences. 64 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 51
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The EU’s request to close the Ignalina NPP due to safety reasons was the other main
concern for Lithuania. The Ignalina Protocol for the Accession Treaty stipulated that
Lithuania is committed, at EU request, to close Unit 1 of Ignalina before 2005 and
Unit 2 by 2009. For Lithuania this was no easy choice since in 1995, the year it
submitted its application to the EU, Lithuania was ranked the world’s most nuclear
dependent country with 85 percent dependency.65 In contrast to the case of agriculture,
in terms of rational utility the closure appeared costly for the Lithuanian state.
However, the public and the government were generally more receptive to this cost of
EU membership than the perceived costs of agricultural reform.
The costs of decommissioning the Ignalina plant were estimated at around LTL 1.8
billion for the period of 2002-2009, excluding investments in construction of new
power plants, modernisation of the existing power plants, and implementation of
environmental measures. In total, due to EU integration the energy sector from 2002
to 2009 would require an investment of LTL 3.7 billion and would experience losses
of LTL 2.2 billion. Most of these investments and costs stem from the closure of
Ignalina and implementation of environmental projects in the energy sector. The
government would experience costs of 655 million, which would be used to finance
the closure of Ignalina and investments into structural funds. 66
Despite the high anticipated costs, the EU was quite parsimonious with regard to
compensation and assistance causing a considerable amount of resentment in
Lithuania during the years of negotiations. In the end, Lithuania negotiated a
65 Mel Huang, Electricity in the Air: The Real Power Politics in the Baltics, Defence Academy of theUK, London, UK 2002, p. 2 66 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 4
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decommissioning package of EUR 285 million for 2004-2006 from the EU, who
initially only offered EUR 210 millions, and continuous support for Lithuania's
decommissioning efforts after 2007.67 In total, Lithuania anticipated receiving funds
of over LTL 2 billion during 2002-2009 from various sources such as EU, donor
countries, and structural funds. 68
However, the above numbers should not be taken at face value and, to a degree, risk
being misleading. In the case of the Ignalina power plant, for instance, EU
subventions covered the cost of closure of the plant and perhaps some social spending
for the unemployed members of the sector while, in the end leaving Lithuania with a
need to find an alternative source of energy and deprived the country of a potential
source of revenue in power export. For instance, in 1998 the Ignalina plant generated
77 percent of Lithuania’s electricity. Also in the 1990’s, Lithuania’s electricity output
doubled between 1994 and 1996 as residential energy consumption increased. In
addition to meeting its growing internal demand of energy, the state had been
generating income from exporting energy to its neighbours such as Latvia,
Kaliningrad, and Belarus.69 Lastly, Ignalina had strategic importance for Lithuania: it
provided electricity even when Russian oil flows were reduced or interrupted.
According to Clemens, ‘many Lithuanians who had wanted after the 1986 Chernobyl
meltdown to close down Ignalina had changed their minds in the 1990s, when Russia
showed it could stop oil deliveries to Lithuania.’70
67 Purlys in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 12468 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 1669 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 14070 Ibid., p. 141
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Thus, it is unsurprising that initially some Lithuanian elites were cautious in
complying with EU requests and shutting down the power plant. In 1998, the
government of Prime Minister Vagnorius had second thoughts. The head of the
Nuclear Energy Division in Lithuania’s Economic Ministry, citing an international
study, argued that there were no safety reasons to close the Ignalina plant.71 Rather
than searching for alternative sources of energy, the Vagnorius government wanted to
export electrical energy across Poland to Western Europe and looked for ways to
extend Ignalina’s life to 2015. Opponents said that shutting down Ignalina would spell
economic suicide for Lithuania and said that total costs from the shutdown would run
into billion of dollars – far more than any aid tendered by the EU.72
Yet by 1999, Lithuania’s parliament, led by Western-oriented politicians such as
Landbergis and President Adamkus, agreed to close one of Ignalina’s two reactors by
2005. In 2002 President Adamkus explained the logic behind Lithuania’s willingness
to close the plant by saying ‘our nuclear reactors are not permanent. We will be able
to avoid shutting them down in the future. Perhaps it will be rational to replace them
with newer more modern ones. [The] European Commission is offering us support.
Thus, it is necessary now for Lithuania to negotiate the most beneficial terms.’73
Yet it was not just a ‘rational’ choice to dismantle the reactors. It can be argued that
ideational factors played a role in Lithuania’s decision. Significantly, the
independence movement in the Baltics was greatly associated with the
environmentalist movement against the rampant pollution of the Soviet years. In
71 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma,’ LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 3272 Clemens, p. 140-173 Adamkus 2002, p. 246
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Lithuania, in the late 1980s, there was a strong public movement against the building
of the third nuclear reactor in Ignalina by the Soviets, and many of current
government elites had participated in that movement. It is possible that the general
unpopularity of these Soviet-imposed nuclear reactors made the decision to close
Ignalina easier.
In summary, the sums and differences of rational costs and benefits of EU
membership do not appear to have been decisive in Lithuania’s two key issue areas.
Despite calculated benefits from CAP, the transformation of the agricultural sector
was perceived to be one of the main drawbacks of EU membership for Lithuania. On
the other hand, the seemingly costly closure of Ignalina did not preclude membership.
Domestic Politics
By the mid- to late 1990s, economic factors of EU membership entered the Lithuanian
domestic politics. As has been noted in the previous section, the perceived negative
effects of CAP resulted in the Farmers Party opposing EU membership. However,
from the economic sphere, it was the EU reforms that became one of the most salient
issues of domestic politics. Lithuanian political elites used EU reforms instrumentally:
at some stages using the EU to justify the needed reforms to the public while at other
stages emphasizing the stand-alone necessity of reforms when Euro-scepticism rose
among the Lithuanian public. The elites realized that economic, political, and societal
reforms must be completed for Lithuania to transform itself after fifty years of
planned economy and non-democratic government even without the prospect of EU
membership. However, there was a hope among the policy class that EU membership
and the accession process would accelerate reform implementation through the
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expertise and pressure of the EU. There was also a tactical use of EU policy to
implement reforms in order to make them politically less costly for the governing
elites. Government officials often presented their reform agendas by stating that this is
a direct request from Brussels. With high public support for EU membership in the
early years of the transition (1990-1993) 74, the government elites sought to gain from
such tactics.
In spite of this instrumental reliance on the EU to speed reforms, the Lithuanian elites
often dragged their feet on implementation. By the mid-‘90s , the Baltic states had
started implementing pre-accession strategies of the Association Agreements and the
White Paper75 which in effect meant implementing costly reforms. The costs of the
acquis were already beginning to be felt in the first years of seeking EU membership,
while the potential benefits still lay far ahead and were still intangible.76 By 1997,
when the Commission made its recommendations, Lithuania and Latvia had
completed fewer reforms than Estonia and because of this some argue, they were not
invited to the first round of negotiations.
The decision of the EU Commission was both a wake up call to the government elites
and a new opportunity to use the EU as an anchor to push through the needed but
costly economic reforms. The discourse on the necessity of economic reforms became
very prominent by the end of 1998. In his Annual Address for the start of 1999,
President Adamkus implied that Lithuania’s rejection from the first round of
negotiations was due to the slow reforms and emphasized the need to speed up74 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes ‘Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement: PoliticalDebates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europeand the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester, 1999, p. 18675 Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 5776 With the exception of the PHARE program which provided funding for the Baltic states and had beenoperating in Lithuania since 1992
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domestic reforms in the annual address.77 Adamkus emphasized not only the
economic aspects of domestic reform such as improving the tax collection system,
private investment, and the structure of the agricultural sector but also called for a
modernization of the state and its governing, issuance of new laws, improving the
judicial system, fighting corruption, and reforming education.78 Adamkus explained
the poor economic performance of 1999 as – ‘nothing less but the price of non-
implemented reforms. The price of politics biased towards the inertia of the past and
the fear of change.’79 Adamkus’ emphasis on non-implemented reforms as the greatest
ill for the Lithuanian economy and only a brief mention of the Russian financial crisis
during this Annual Address highlights the instrumental usage of the EU reforms in
domestic politics. By 2000, at a high point of Euro-scepticism, there was also a
noticeable change in elite tactics regarding EU reforms. In another Annual Address,
Adamkus addressed the public backlash against EU-driven reforms and the tendency
of politicians to blame the costs of reforms on the integration process. Adamkus
stated:
‘Today I want to emphasize once more what I have said many times: allreforms, which we planned to fulfil before joining the EU, are beingimplemented for our own benefit, not because the EU demands it. Theargument that “Brussels wants this” should be eliminated from the politicalvocabulary – by taking any political decision, first we must answer what weourselves need.’80
While Lithuanian elites adjusted their discourse on reforms to changes in public
opinion on the EU (from high public support in the early 1990s to Euro-scepticism of
the late 1990s), one should not conclude that the Lithuanian elites based their reform
agenda on public opinion. Despite, the high public support for the EU in the early
77 Adamkus 2001, p. 3478 Ibid., p. 7-3479 Ibid., p. 4080 Adamkus 2001, p. 73
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years of transition (1990-93) 81 elites were slow to implement reforms. The lowest
point in terms of public opinion on EU membership for Lithuania was in the end of
1999 and beginning of 2000, when those ‘against’ exceeded those ‘for’ EU
membership (35 percent versus 29 percent and the remainder voting neutral). Yet this
was also the time when the Lithuanian government reiterated its EU membership goal
and accelerated reform efforts. The following chapters on security factors and the key
episode study will demonstrate that public opinion did not generally play a major role
in Lithuania’s EU policy decisions. In fact, throughout the decade of seeking EU
membership public opinion and elite EU views often clashed. For example, as this
chapter revealed, an opportunistic policy of close economic relationship with Russia
was pursued at times of greatest Euro-enthusiasm among the public.
Ideational Considerations
The ideational factors that underscored economic considerations regarding EU
membership were centred on two complementary constructs: projections of the EU as
a model to be emulated and the fear of being ‘left out of Europe’. From the days pre-
dating Lithuania’s independence movement to 2002, the EU was perceived as a model
of wealth, economic growth, efficiency and social progress. The discourse of the
government elites continuously emphasized the economic benefits of EU in symbolic
ways - viewing the EU as an ideal to be achieved. This hope of emulation stemmed
from the understanding of the EU as an anchor for reforms and Lithuania’s sole
instrument for progress. For example, Adamkus stated in 2000:
‘Today, we could, without the support of others, try to remedy the decades offalling behind the Western worlds’ progress. But let us not forget that the Westdoes not stand still. In many cases it is transforming much faster than us.
81 Grabbe and Hughes, p. 186
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Thus, the only real chance for Lithuania to escape provincial backwardness isto get on the fast Europe train.’82
Auštrevičius, the Lithuanian EU negotiation team’s second man, called the EU ‘one of
the main drivers of our internal reforms’ and said that ‘no one has come up with
anything better than EU membership. For Lithuania EU means political stability, state
security, economic growth, and social welfare. More than half of Lithuanian people
associate a better life with EU’.83 In 2000, the Foreign minister of Lithuania,
Saudargas clearly linked the foreign policy goal of EU membership to domestic
aspirations and policies by stating that ‘EU membership is an essential means for
Lithuanian economic and societal modernization’.84 The view that EU membership
presented the best available path for Lithuania’s development heavily influenced
foreign and domestic policies. Alternatives to EU membership were never seriously
considered, as ideational considerations made the case for EU membership appear
demonstrably more persuasive than any other options.
Though ideational factors continued to play an important role in the elite thinking, by
2002, a more practical approach started appearing in the discourse of the government
that sought to understand in rational, material terms the potential economic benefits of
EU membership. Auštrevičius, wrote in 2002 that ‘Integration euphoria has been
replaced with a practical concern – how to best prepare for membership, what
membership means and how it is beneficial to us.’85 Yet while the government elites
started considering EU membership in practical terms in addition to ideational ones,
the public and the media continued in their overwhelmingly symbolic interpretation of
82 Italics added. Adamkus 2001, p.4483 Petras Auštrevičius, ‘Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida,’ in Darius Staliunas, EuroposIdeja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, 2002, p. 17284 Purlys in Maniokas,Vilpisauskas and Zeruolis, p. 98. 85 Auštrevičius in Staliunas, p. 172
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the Union. The persistence of the euphoric rhetoric presenting the EU as the answer to
all of Lithuania’s economic problems is highlighted by the dialogue between
newspaper Obzor and President Adamkus in 2002:
Obzor: ‘The media from morning to evening announces that our future isthe integration to NATO and EU. All of this is presented as panacea from allillnesses. Can it be that as soon as we have joined these organizations allproblems will be solved? Can it be that ‘uncle foreigner’ will solve ourdifficulties?’
Adamkus – ‘I want to say it clearly – neither NATO nor EU is the kite thatwill bring us fortunes. Everything depends on us. Organizations about whichwe are taking are only a means to create wellbeing and security. For example,the Irish have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the EU andtoday are one of the economic leaders of EU.86
Even though elites started to analyze EU policies from a rational perspective, not
solely from an ideational one, the importance of ideational factors cannot be
underestimated in Lithuania’s EU policy. The rationalist analysis gained force only in
2002, when Lithuania had already concluded EU accession negotiations and
Lithuania’s EU policy was unlikely to be reversed.
The second important ideational aspect that influenced elites’ understanding of the
economic benefits of EU membership was the perceived political, economic, and
cultural insecurity of Lithuania as a newly independent state on the cross roads of
greater geopolitical divisions and the consequent fear of being left out of the EU. The
ideational arguments were often intertwined with the fear of negative economic
repercussions of non-membership but were often disproportionate in comparison to
the material dangers. Vinogradnaite, in a study of policy class discourse, notes that in
Lithuania Europe was understood as a closed entity and that a state remaining outside
the borders of the EU cannot be called a European state. Thus discourse on the
possibility of staying out of EU utilized phrases such as ‘Lithuania will become the
86 Adamkus 2002, p. 247
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province of Europe,’ ‘on the outskirts of Europe.’87 At the same time, even before
Lithuania was offered membership, the perception of belonging to an exclusive
European club was to some extent already present at the pre-accession stage when
Lithuania was an associate member. In the words of Landsbergis, Association
membership in the EU, was celebrated almost as membership itself, since it implied
proximity to Europe – ‘we were no longer in the backyard [of Europe] surrounded by
vicious dogs.’88
While this fear of being left out of Europe was pervasive from 1991 to 2002 it became
most marked in the few years from 1997 to 2000. During this episode the gap between
ideational fears and real material losses increased. The possibility of being left out of
the EU while another Baltic State – Estonia was invited to start negotiations marked a
psychological blow to the government elites of Lithuania. Political discourse became
centred on visions of Lithuania as a non-EU member being stuck in a ‘Baltic ghetto’
or a ‘grey zone’ between enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.89 Lithuania’s Prime
Minister Vagnorius warned a meeting of the European Parliament’s Christian
Democrats that barring his country and Latvia from the first wave of enlargement
could stoke security tensions in the Baltic region and create ‘new dividing lines in
Europe.’90 Though Lithuania was only being left out from the first round of the
negotiation process, and its application was being reviewed in just a year’s time, the
EU’s decision was interpreted as monumental and irreversibly detrimental to national
interests. This key episode and the accompanying ideational aspects will be discussed
at length in the last chapter.
87 Inga Vinogradnaite, ‘Kelias Europon: Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas,’ in Staliunas, p. 18788 Vytautas Landsbergis, interviewed by author, 11 April 2006.89 Herd Graeme, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 262, 26790 Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield AcademicPress, 1999, p. 123
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In summary, ideational aspects were closely intertwined with the perceived benefits
and costs of EU membership. Since ideational constructs of the EU as a model and the
dangers of non-membership complemented the rationalist motivations for reforms and
the fears of negative economic externalities of non-membership, the ideational factors
we have noted were particularly salient in Lithuania’s EU policy. To be sure, it is
difficult to isolate ideational strands that only influenced economic considerations
since fears such as being left out of Europe came to influence security, political, and
cultural considerations as will be seen in the subsequent chapters.
Conclusions
It has been shown that rational utility considerations were not salient for most of
Lithuania’s decision process of seeking EU membership. Transfer payments and FDI
opportunities were hardly motivating factors in the early 1990s as Lithuania was
trying to establish its independence and was seeking a relationship with the EU for
political recognition and from a desire to move out the Russian sphere of influence.
When economic motivations for EU membership did enter elite calculations, they
were always highly connected to perceptions. As Vilpisauskas notes in his analysis of
Lithuania’s economic motivations for seeking EU membership: the ‘EU has been
perceived as a centre of economic prosperity…Its importance as a source of economic
opportunities and resources…has provided a strong impetus for raising EU
membership to the top of the Baltic state’s foreign policy goals.’91 By the mid-1990s,
the prospects of transforming the Lithuanian economy along the model proposed by
91 Italics added. Ramunas Vilpisauskas, ‘Regional integration in Europe: Analysing intra-Balticeconomic cooperation in the context of European integration,’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds.,The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester UniversityPress, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172
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the EU was highly appealing, but may not have been enough to keep Lithuania on the
fast track on EU accession. Yet the fear of being left out, a sense of competition with
its Baltic neighbours as well as the consequences of the Russian financial crisis
cemented Lithuanian elites’ resolve for membership.
Even though a mathematical calculation of costs and benefits of EU membership
probably did result in a ‘yes’ vote on EU membership, these calculations were not
completed in Lithuania until 2000 or even 2002. By this point the policies of seeking
EU membership were already a decade old, and thus were motivated by other factors
than a rationalist utility analysis. The rationalist utility arguments for the EU were
more a tool for a negotiation strategy rather than a deciding factor for seeking EU
membership. Furthermore, during the time that rationalist analysis were being
completed Lithuania was already negotiating for EU membership and thus EU-geared
policies were unlikely to be reversed by the government even in the face of potential
costs of membership such as the closure of the Ignalina plant. In addition to the elite
consensus on the necessity of EU membership it seems that there was a phenomenon
of ‘path dependency’ for Lithuanian in its EU policy. Even in 2000 when Euro-
scepticism was high and some politicians questioned the benefits of EU membership,
the existing EU policy prevailed. The perceived lack of alternatives for Lithuanian
development, highlighted by the Russian financial crisis, was the primary reason for
Lithuania’s dependency on the EU path.
Economic considerations lacked salience for most of Lithuania’s EU membership
strategy and process. However, it is not because there were not valid economic
benefits to be gained from membership. The Lithuanian accession package and the
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economists’ projections demonstrate that Lithuania was poised to experience further
growth and development from membership, despite some costs of integration. The
primary reason that economic considerations by themselves lacked decisive weight is
that Lithuanian identity seems to be a dominant factor in its EU policy. This identity
stems from Lithuania’s geopolitical and economic vulnerability as a new state in
transition and is responsible for the two main ideational drivers: an idealized view of
the EU as a model for Lithuania’s development, and the fear of being left out of
Europe.
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Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy
Most analyses of the Baltic accession stress political and particularly security
motivations for membership.92 Security however is a complex dimension that
stretches from hard to soft security encompassing factors such as military defence
considerations, entering or exiting certain spheres of influence, economic and social
security, political voice and political access. While security can be analyzed as an
objective condition from a rationalist standpoint, in this case greater insight is gained
from considering its subjective dimension since Lithuanian cultural perceptions and
identity figured greatly in all of the noted security dimensions.
The following chapter will explain Lithuania’s EU policy by focusing on the tension
and concord between ideational and material factors in Lithuanian elite considerations
of EU policy. In examining political and security motivations it is particularly difficult
to separate ideational from material concerns as the two are often intertwined and, in
the case of Lithuania, reinforce each other. The subsequent analysis will not attempt
to separate the political and security motivations into rational and ideational
categories as was done in the chapter on economic motivations but in this case proves
to be rather artificial. Rather the analysis will emphasize throughout the chapter when
ideational factors were at the forefront of security and political considerations. This
chapter will demonstrate that political and security motivations were of great
importance in Lithuania’s aspiration to join Europe, particularly in the years leading
up to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. It will also argue that political and
92 The work of Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, andVilpisauskas cited throughout this thesis emphasizes the primacy of security motivations in Lithuania’sEU policy.
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security motivations were decisive in creating an EU membership strategy when they
were reinforced by complementary ideational factors.
First the chapter will document the way security concerns evolved from 1991 to 2002:
becoming less salient after 1995 but at the same time expanding from primarily
military concerns to a preoccupation with the broad benefits of soft security and
political access. Then, an analysis of hard security, soft security, political voice, and
domestic political factors using rationalist and ideational perspectives will follow.
The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns
Almost immediately following independence in 1991, Lithuania was concerned about
its political and economic security as well as cultural autonomy. While the reasons
for, and intensity of, these concerns fluctuated with time, security remained at the
forefront of Vilnius’ EU policy considerations especially in the years leading up to the
submission of the application for EU membership in 1995.
Lithuania’s political relationship with the EU began in 1991 when the EU recognized
Lithuania’s independence from the USSR. While this represented a significant
political gain for the country, it did little to alleviate the county’s immediate security
concerns. Recognising that the country continued to face material risks, particularly
from Russia who still had troops stationed on Lithuanian soil, Lithuania’s leaders
embarked on a course to gain full EU membership as one means of enhancing its
security. At the onset, however, the country’s top foreign and domestic policy
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objective was to convince Russia to remove its troops which it eventually did in
1993.93
Once Russia withdrew its troops, Lithuania sought and gained entry to the Council of
Europe. Membership in the Council was effectively Lithuania’s first political step
towards EU membership since even though the Council is distinct from the EU no
country has ever joined the Union without being a member of the Council. While
membership had numerous benefits, the Lithuanian government presented Council
membership as an act of security-seeking. According to Landsbergis, the head of
Lithuanian state at the time, Lithuanian membership in the Council of Europe meant
‘western political direction, incorporation in and recognition by European structures,
thus, political security.’94 EU membership, like membership of the Council, was
understood primarily and almost exclusively through the prism of political security
concerns by Lithuania’s policy elites until the application for membership was
submitted. Yet these security concerns were driven often not by an imminent Russian
threat on the ground but rather by Lithuanian historical experience and by Lithuania’s
perception of Russia and itself.
After Russian troops left Lithuania in 1993 and Yeltsin’s brief love affair with the
West ended, Russian bellicose rhetoric returned, giving no end of unease to the
Lithuanians. In 1996, for example, the Russian Duma decided to recall the agreement
regarding the dissolution of the USSR and announced as valid the 1991 referendum
93 See Vytautas Landsbergis , Kryzkele, Lietuvos Aidas, Vilnius 1995 and Vytautas Landsbergis,Lithuania: Independent Again, University of Wales Press, Wales, 2000. The other Baltic states hadsimilar foreign policy priorities. See Romuald, J. Misiunas, “National Identity and Foreign Policy inthe Baltic States,” in Fredrick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London, 1994, p. 10694 Landsbergis, 1995, p. 78
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results safeguarding the USSR.95 In another instance, the Russian Defence Research
Institute supported by the Ministry of Defence produced a report in 1996 warning that
Russia might need to fight in the Baltics in the near future. Anton Surikov, a
researcher at the institute, explained that Russia would reoccupy the pribaltika region
if the Baltic states joined NATO or tried to expel Russian speakers and that they did
not expect the world to respond. On a similar note, Zhirinovsky declared in 1996 ‘I
am doing everything to liquidate the Baltic states.’96 While this rhetoric represented
the opinions of a marginal section of Russian ultranationalist elites rather than official
Russian policy, it still caused alarm for the Lithuanians who were all too familiar with
the danger of ignoring Russian antagonism. Bellicose Russian rhetoric was not,
however, all hot air. In fact, Russia made several moves beginning in the late 1990s
that were viewed as decidedly pugnacious by Lithuanian leaders. For instance, in the
summer of 1999, Russian military manoeuvres took place on land and sea near to
Latvia and Estonia. Landsbergis called the 1999 manoeuvres ‘a gesture of
psychological cold war against the Baltic states.’97 In 2000, US satellite photos
showed that Russia had moved short-range nuclear weapons from St. Petersburg to a
storage facility in Kaliningrad.98
While the Russian tactics and rhetoric could have been ignored as posturing by many
Western states, the history of Russian aggression in the Baltics led the Lithuanians to
conclude that they still faced potential danger from the East. President Adamkus’
words as late as year 2000 highlighted the security concerns of Lithuania stemming
95 Klaudijus Maniokas and Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos Integracija I ES : Bukles, Perspektyviu irPasekmiu Studija, Eugrimas, Vilnius 1997, p. 5396 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 18897 Ibid., p. 19098 Ibid., p. 196
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from its historical experience and the perception that EU and NATO could provide a
solution to these concerns:
‘Can we take risks today regarding NATO and EU issues? I believe, thatneither the Lithuania’s tragic twentieth century experience, nor presentrealities allows us to naively speak about national security without alliances.Let’s not forget Balys Sruoga’s [national poet] warning: history destined us to“build our home on Vesuvius.” …The historical responsibility of allLithuanian citizens is to guarantee a secure future for the nation.’99
Furthermore, Russian rhetoric and actions were often magnified by the local media
and some political parties to emphasize to the Lithuanian public and at times to the
international community the Lithuanian need for international security guarantees
against Russia. Thus, due to a genuine fear of Russian threat and due to tactical
reasons aimed at the international community, Lithuanian elites still viewed EU
membership greatly in security terms and sought security guarantees through
membership in NATO throughout the accession decade.
Yet by the late 1990s, Lithuanian and Baltic leaders were becoming less concerned
about a military Russian threat in the near future as a clear gap existed between
Russia’s capabilities, resolve, and rhetoric. As such, security in a narrow military
sense was less often used to describe the benefits of EU membership. Instead, soft
security conceptions consisting of political, economic, environmental and social
aspects seemed to sway Vilnius towards EU membership in the years after the
submission of the EU membership application. In the late 1990s, another
consideration gained salience - the prospect of having a political voice in European
affairs and participation in the world community through EU membership. Political
voice was seen as both an ideational and rational benefit that was increasingly cited as
the negotiation process drew closer. Along with growing awareness of the political
99 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 43
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benefits of EU membership by 2000, there was a growing concern about the political
costs of joining the EU such as limitations on state sovereignty. By 2000, when
Lithuania entered into membership negotiations with the Union, the hard security
motivations of the early 1990s had greatly given way to broader considerations of the
political benefits and costs of membership.
Hard Security Needs and Concerns
While Lithuanians elites had deep concerns over national security, their fears may
well have exceeded actual security needs. Furthermore, the hard security concerns of
Lithuania often diverged from the EU’s capacity to address them. While Lithuania’s
concerns have been driven by ideational factors, Lithuania’s needs are a result of its
material factors. In this sense, the preoccupation with security concerns in Lithuania’s
motives for membership suggests that ideational factors were more important than
material factors in Lithuania’s accession policy.
The primary hard security objective of Lithuania following 1991 was the desire to
maintain its independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia
as noted above. As Misiunas argued in 1994, fear of Russia and of Russians continued
to constitute the dominant leitmotif in the foreign and internal policies of all three
Baltic nations.100 Since the ‘Balts generally tend to consider most Russians
incorrigible imperialists who would if circumstances once again proved favourable, as
in 1939-40, move to reincorporate their countries into a greater Russia,’101 Lithuanian
foreign policy priorities focused on securing themselves against such circumstances,
particularly in the early to mid-1990s.
100 Misiunas in Starr, p. 95101 Ibid., p. 107
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Initially, there were several possible security policy options available for Lithuania
and the Baltic states. Neutrality was the first option, a popular idea in the political
discourse in 1989-91 and one that remained an active option until 1994; it was
seriously raised as late as 1996. However, it was considered a potentially dangerous
strategy especially when the Russian Duma elections of 1995 reflected the ideology of
‘return to the empire.’ Neutrality was also seen as an increasingly outdated policy in a
post-Cold War Europe when other neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden
joined the EU 1995.102 Another policy option was to create an alliance of the Baltic
states but though this idea attracted popular support in Lithuania it did not take root
with the political elites.103 As Landsbergis stated, it was ‘impossible to be neither there
[West] nor elsewhere [East].’104 Thus the last viable option and the one Lithuania
chose to pursue was membership in multilateral alliances such as NATO and the EU.
Though Lithuanian elites evoked hard security concerns throughout the 1990s it is
questionable to what extent these concerns were justified. On one hand there were
some valid fears in the mid-1990s when nationalist and imperialist rhetoric and
actions gained popularity in Russia. Thus in 1997, leading Lithuanian political
scholars, Maniokas and Vitkus, argued that despite the current stable relations with
Russia ‘Today it is difficult to contradict that Russia and the uncertainty of its future
developments constitutes one of the greatest possible threats to the security of the
Baltic region and all of Europe.’105 Yet, foreign analysts deemed an imminent threat
from Russia to be unlikely. Kamp has emphasized that ‘given the decrepitude of the
102 Grazina Miniotaite, ‘The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity’ in Charles Krupnick, ed.,Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 275103 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 277104 Vytautas Landsbergis interviewed by author, April 11, 2006.105 Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 63
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Russian armed forces, an invasion of the Baltic states was and is probably not even
possible militarily, quite apart from the disaster for Russia’s international position
which would result.’106
Lithuanian security concerns were not generally based on rational calculations of
imminent or probable Russian aggression and thus, often diverged from Lithuania’s
material security needs. Rather, these concerns stemmed from broader historical
perceptions of self and other, national identities and a general feeling of geopolitical
weakness. The role of Lithuanian national identity is best conceptualized as both
European and at the same time anti-Russian – identifying with Europe and seeking
EU integration while at the same actively trying to escape the Russian sphere of
influence. Formal and informal evocations of the Lithuanian European identity are
frequent in Lithuanian security conceptions and policies. For example, the law on the
Basics of National Security of Lithuania (1996) includes a guiding principle: ‘the
Lithuanian State, established many centuries ago and resting on the Christian cultural
foundation unifying Europe, is an integral part of the community of European
nations.’107 An understanding of the ‘other’ as the East or Russia is formalized at the
level of Lithuanian constitutional law with the act ‘On the Non-Alignment of the
Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances’ (1992), which explicitly
prohibits the Lithuanian state from entering into any alliance with countries in the
post-Soviet space.108 The dualistic Lithuanian identity particularly in the sphere of
security, demonstrates that the Lithuanian accession case was more complex than the
106 Karl-Heinz Kamp ‘The Dynamics of NATO Enlargement’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 197107 Inga Pavlovaite, ‘Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate’ inMarko Lehti, and David J. Smith, eds., Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and BalticExperience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 202108 Ibid., p. 201
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‘back to Europe’ motive, and that the fear of Russia was as much of a driving force as
the lure of the EU. In fact, the choice to pursue EU membership can be seen as a type
of ‘protest vote’ against Lithuania’s historical relegation to the Russian sphere of
influence.
Lithuanian hard security concerns – whether based on real needs or perceptions –
could only be met by NATO as the EU does not offer any guarantees against
aggression on state integrity and sovereignty. However in the early 1990s the EU was
often presented in policy and discourse as an additional security guarantee to NATO.
According to Pavlovaite, ‘Although the EU is conceptualized as providing security
guarantees against potential aggression from Russia, NATO membership is seen as the
ultimate and more relevant goal in hard security terms.’109 Thus, both EU and NATO
membership were formally a part of Lithuania’s security strategy as expounded in the
Basics of National Security of Lithuania law of 1996. The law cites membership in
NATO, WEU, and the EU as the primary means of ‘ensuring Lithuanian security and
the country’s habitation in the zone of peace.’110 Broadly then, in the early 1990s, EU
membership was conceptualized and presented in the political discourse as a potential
security guarantee against military aggression from Russia.
Although EU and NATO membership were often understood as complementary tools
to achieve hard security, Lithuania developed an increasingly broader understanding
of the benefits of the two organizations as the 1990s progressed. By the late 1990s and
early 2000s, NATO and the EU were less frequently evoked as guarantors against
Russia. In his 2001 Annual Address, President Adamkus stated that Euro-Atlantic
109 Ibid., p. 202110 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 269
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
integration ‘is not a balance against Russia. Euro-Atlantic integration means being in
a common values space. It is not directed against anyone.’ President Adamkus
highlighted the economic and social aspects of EU security, which was a noticeable
shift from the discourse on the Russian threat in the early and mid 1990s. He stated
that ‘I am convinced that its not foreign military threats that gives rise to the greatest
danger to Lithuania’s security, but our potential economic and social
backwardness.’111 Landsbergis also broadened the perceived benefits of NATO stating
that it ‘enhances the protection of the market, trust, encourages investment in the safe
space and speeds up the preparations for EU membership.’112 The cited remarks reveal
a change in the articulations of EU and NATO and seem to reflect Lithuania’s
changing security notions.113 However, though the discourse on the Russian threat had
changed, perceptions may not have changed fully. Furthermore, the change in
discourse may have been tactical and aimed at the international community rather
than a result of altered perceptions. Vareikis writes, ‘For Central Europe, Russia and
its allies remain, as it they were, a natural threat’ but continues to say that ‘to speak
about Russia’s threat is old fashioned and simply uncouth. No matter how it really is,
today candidate states say they are seeking NATO membership to increase European
security and stability, not because of any Russian threat. All of this may not matter,
but NATO accession is so difficult particularly because of Russia.’ 114
In summary, Lithuania’s EU membership was motivated to some extent by material
security concerns such as the presence of Russian troops until 1993, and bellicose
rhetoric and provocative military tactics from Russia. However, these concerns were111 Adamkus 2001, p. 69112 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 202113 The new security outlook was articulated in Lithuania’s new concept of national defence of 2000which based more on a cooperative conception of international relations, less sovereignty focused andless securitized. Ibid., p. 202114 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 228-245
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made more salient and thus, lasting and decisive due to the ideational considerations
stemming from Lithuania’s historical legacy and national identity.
Soft Security Benefits
Increasingly in the mid-1990s Lithuanian government elites began to broaden the
discussion of the potential security benefits of EU membership beyond the
geopolitical and military. Vilnius recognised that the EU acted as a link between
Lithuania and other European states creating a level of soft security as a complement
to the hard security requirements of the country. In the words of Maniokas and Vitkus
in 1997, ‘the EU like other alliances is not ambivalent about the security of member
states though it does not provide guarantees and does not take responsibility to protect
its members from aggression as does NATO.’115
EU membership was also seen to provide soft political security to Lithuania since it
was a means for Lithuania to move out the Russian sphere of influence. In the early
1990s, Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Landsbergis called for true
independence not Russian satellite status for Lithuania.116 The primary instrument for
Lithuania and the Baltic states to achieve this was to underscore their European
orientation and to build up their Western ties.117 EU membership, as well as
membership to NATO and various other international organizations, helped build up
Western ties and reduce ties to the East. According to Misiunas, ‘In view of the their
desire to distance themselves from the CIS as much as possible, the focus of the
foreign policy activity of the Baltic states has concentrated on seeking as wide and as
rapid an integration as possible into the formal structure of the international115 Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 49116 Landsbergis 1995, p. 77, 80.117 Misiunas p. 102
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community.’118 A member of the Lithuanian parliament, Vareikis, confirmed that
political elites sought membership in all possible organizations during the early 1990s
in order to maximize Lithuanian soft security and that EU was only one of the means
to do so.119 Thus, seeking EU membership was driven greatly by ideational factors
such as the perceived need to enter the international community, decrease Lithuania’s
geopolitical isolation and leave the Russian sphere of influence.
While in the early 1990s both the EU and NATO were invoked simultaneously with
regard to Lithuanian hard security concerns, by the late 1990s both organizations were
also seen as complementary tools to social and economic security. For example in
1998, President Adamkus stated ‘EU and NATO are these mechanisms, which ensure
the life and continuation of our principles…Membership in EU and NATO are the
guarantees of our independence and democracy not any less than they are the signs of
our independence and democracy.’120 He expanded this point by saying, ‘Membership
in the EU and NATO for Lithuania and other Central European states means security,
economic growth guarantees, as well as participation in a common values space.’121
In summary, Lithuania’s soft security motivations for EU membership evolved from
1991 to 2002, increasingly broadening to encompass political, social and economic
security. Furthermore, these soft security motivations stemmed from ideational as well
as material factors. Since the EU could not provide hard security guarantees, as
Lithuania moved closer to membership and increasingly analyzed the EU in more
118 Ibid., 103119Vareikis interviewed by author, August 10, 2005.120 Valdas Adamkus, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 272121 Ibid., p. 273
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detailed and rational terms, previous hard security discourse in relation to the EU was
slowly abandoned.
Political Voice
Another benefit of EU membership was political voice or what has been termed ‘a
seat at the table’ of decision making for member states through the forum of the
Union. In Lithuania, this aspect of EU membership was not highlighted in the early
1990s when hard security motives were at the forefront of the EU policy agenda.
However by the late 1990s and early 2000s political voice and access to EU decision
making was increasingly mentioned in the discourse. To some extent political voice
was a rational benefit and its emphasis coincided with a rationalist discussion of the
economic costs and benefits of EU membership. In 2002, the Senior Lithuanian
Negotiator with EU, Auštrevičius, expressed the political empowerment which would
accompany EU membership by stating ‘In reality today we are European but we are
not a part of Europe. We are not yet represented in all main European institutions,
which would guarantee that our word would be important in decisive moments.’122
Vareikis, in making his pro-EU argument also emphasized political voice benefits by
noting that Lithuania will have a high number of votes in the EU based on the Nice
agreement and thus, will be able to use its ‘voice power’ in a globalizing world.123 The
importance of decision making privileges associated with the EU is also apparent
from Lithuania’s negotiation strategy for membership. Auštrevičius and other
Lithuanian government elites had clearly expressed the Lithuanian position against
any form of second-class membership. He stated in 2002, ‘We are prepared to accept
122 Petras Auštrevičius, ‘Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida’ in Darius Staliunas, ed.,Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 177123 Vareikis, p. 302
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all membership responsibilities, but at the same time we demand all membership
rights.’124
However, Lithuania’s motivations regarding political voice were not simply a matter
of number of votes, representatives, and capacity to provide input into the Union’s
decision making process, but were greatly driven by ideational factors. Lithuania’s
and Baltics states’ understanding of political benefits of EU membership was closely
related to their historical perspectives on their nation’s role in Europe. Lithuania and
the Baltics have been greatly excluded from the political developments in Europe over
the past several hundred years. This has resulted in a sense of peripheral and
‘outsider’ status. The inability to participate in decision making process and being on
receiving end of the pre-formulated decisions of the great powers such as the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Secret Protocol of 1939 resulted in losses of sovereignty and a
real sense of historical victimhood.
The political voice associated with EU membership offered the ideational means to
mitigate the past injustices by finally leaving the ‘periphery’ and gaining more power
over the national fate. According to Vareikis, ‘if Lithuania will actually become a
developed Western democracy, it will be in the West so powerfully, so close to the
West, as it had never been before.’125 Thus it will finally become an ‘insider.’ Being an
insider of this most exclusive European club was seen as increasing ‘Lithuania’s
influence and prestige in the world’ according to Maniokas.126 As a member, Lithuania
will have greater capacity to address its primary concerns regarding EU relations with
124 Auštrevičius in Staliunas, p. 177125 Vareikis, p. 302126 Klaudijus Maniokas, ‘Lietuva ir Europos Sajungos Bendroji Uzsienio ir Saugumo Politika,’ inManiokas and Vitkus, p. 329
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Russia and neighbouring states such as Belarus and Ukraine which were part of the
historical Lithuanian Grand Duchy.127
In conclusion, Lithuanian recognition of the EU political voice benefits came rather
late in the accession process. Though rationalist benefits such as number of votes
were noted, political voice was greatly an ideational motivation due to Lithuanian
historical experiences and perceptions.
Domestic Politics
Domestic politics also played a role in influencing the political and security
dimension of Lithuania’s policy on EU membership. Party politics and the debate on
state sovereignty constraints due to EU membership subtly influenced Lithuania’s EU
policy though the main course of policy remained unchanged. Thus, domestic factors
had a secondary effect on policy by impacting not why EU membership was sought
but how it was sought.
The Sovereignty Debate
The previous sections outlined the security and political benefits of EU membership
as perceived by the elites in their policy considerations, but there were also political
costs of integration which became voiced primarily in the domestic public debate.
Public Euro-scepticism that centred greatly on the sovereignty debate became
increasingly noticeable in the 1990s. A similar contradiction between wanting the
benefits and security of EU membership but at the same time being cautious about
surrendering newly achieved sovereignty has been characterized as ‘the integration
127 Vareikis, p. 299
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dilemma’128 and was a factor in other Central and Eastern European accession process.
As Inotai has noted, ‘On the one hand, they know that their economic modernization
anchor is the EU. On the other hand, they would like to keep their full political
sovereignty. This is mainly the case in those countries which have a very difficult
historical past, where national sovereignty has been questioned several times or even
abolished.’129 In the Baltics, and particularly in Lithuania, the sovereignty debate and
Euro-scepticism was particularly pronounced due to the legacy of Soviet and Russian
imperial occupation. Thus, the Russian legacy had a dual effect on Lithuania. In
security considerations, fears of Russia motivated Lithuania to seek EU membership.
In the sovereignty debate, the legacy of the Soviet experience and the struggle for
independence caused Lithuania to be cautious in giving up its sovereignty to Brussels.
Thus, in contrast to the other applicants, in the Baltics there was a marked
deterioration of the image of the EU from 1991 until 1996 with positive views falling
27 percentage points in Lithuania, and 14 percent and 19 percent in Estonia and Latvia
respectively.130 In 1999, the Lithuanian public was even against membership, when
those ‘against’ exceeded those ‘for’ EU membership (39 percent versus 28 percent
with the remainder declaring neutrality on the matter). 131 In fact, in Lithuania, unlike
in the other two Baltic states, a Euro-sceptic National Democratic Movement emerged
arguing that EU admission undermines independence. Rimantas Sapronas, leader of
this movement and a member of parliament, argued that EU membership was not
necessarily beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and
128 Morten Kelstrup, ‘Small States and European Political Integration’ in Teija Tiilikainen and IbDamgaard Petersen, eds., The Nordic Countries and EC, Copenhagen Political Studies Press,Copenhagen, 1991, p. 136-162.129 Andras Inotai ‘The “Eastern Enlargements’ of the European Union’ in Marise Cremona, ed., TheEnlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 88130 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, ‘Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement:Political Debates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and EasternEurope and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999,’ p. 187131 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma,’ LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31
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sovereignty and instead proposed creating an alternative union that would encompass
states from the Baltic to the Black Sea.132
The Euro-sceptic movement found various and seemingly incompatible partisans:
ethnic nationalists and sympathisers of the old Soviet regime. The result was a type of
unholy alliance of far left and far right of the political spectrum in their protest against
EU membership. On a more moderate side were the self-proclaimed ‘Euro-realists’
who were critical of the perceived unfavourable terms of membership and argued that
Lithuania should strengthen its economy and governance and join EU later as an
equal partner.133 However, one should not consider the Lithuanian public as generally
anti-integrationist but rather as exhibiting a considerable dose of reserve and
scepticism regarding membership.134
The government elites responded to the Euro-sceptics and the sovereignty discourse
by emphasizing the benefits of political voice as well as the EU’s role in safeguarding
Lithuanian sovereignty. President Adamkus emphasized that Lithuanian sovereignty
can be safeguarded rather than threatened by EU saying ‘Lithuanian sovereignty in
the twenty first century is possible only by actively participating in the creation on a
common future. Integrating to Euro-Atlantic structures, we don’t limit but expand our
freedom of choice.’ He addressed the Euro-realist position of postponing membership
132 Graeme Herd, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 265 133 Zaneta Ozolina, ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Lieven and Trenin, p. 226134 Interestingly, while between 1991-1996 the Lithuanian public was least responsive to the EU incomparison with the other Baltic states and the rest of CEE candidates, by the 2003 referendum,Lithuanians were much more in favour of joining the EU than Estonia and Latvia. In the May 2003referendum, despite previous public scepticisms, 91 percent of Lithuanians voted for joining the EU, 9percent against, with the turnout being 63 percent. In Latvia and Estonia 67 percent of the voters werein favour. Thus from 1996 to 2003, Lithuanian public went from being one of the greatest sceptics ofEU membership among the CEE candidates to being one of the greatest supporters. Landsbergisexplained the referendum results saying that ‘the people did not want to be deported to Siberia onceagain in their lifetime.’ Interviewed by author on April 11, 2006.
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by noting that ‘If we are late [to integrate] we will have to accept more and more
standards, which we did not create.’135 In response to the presumed reduction of
Lithuanian economic and social autonomy within the EU structure, advisor to the
President, Vilpisauskas argued that ‘because Lithuania is a small and open state, EU’s
decisions will powerfully affect Lithuanian economy and its distinct spheres even if
Lithuania is not a member of the EU.’ 136 From these comments it appears that the
Lithuanian elites viewed sovereignty questions differently than the public. The
Lithuanian elites did not think that Lithuania would be able to maintain full
sovereignty on its own due to either Russian interference, EU’s influence or
globalization. Thus, EU membership was argued to be the best guarantee of
sovereignty despite the sovereignty losses the public feared.
Party Politics and Elite Consensus
Despite the episodic public scepticism and the attempt by some marginal parties such
as the National Democratic Movement to exploit populist sentiments, government
elites remained committed and consistent in their pro-EU policies. As Grabbe and
Hughes note, there was a ‘surprisingly high level of consensus among political parties
in the Baltic states on preparation for EU accession given popular scepticism revealed
in opinion polls’ of 1993-1996.137 However, Lithuanian political parties used EU
accession strategy instrumentally in domestic politics to increase their popularity. At
times some politicians such as the New Union of Social Liberals (Social Liberals)
would take advantage of the public scepticism using populist anti-EU rhetoric. At
other times politicians such as the Homeland Union would critique their opponents
135 Adamkus 2001, p. 33136Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, ‘Lietuvos Narystes ES Kastai ir Nauda’ in Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 202 137 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 189
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such as the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP138) for not pursuing EU
membership with enough gusto and efficiency. Often, unwilling to bear the political
costs of implementing harsh but necessary reforms for Lithuania’s transition from
planned to market economy, politicians would present reforms as a EU requirement.
Table 3.1: Party Politics in Lithuania
1992-1996 LDDP, formed from former Communist Party of Lithuania, won the elections and shared power
with the Social Democratic Party to create a left-of-centre government.
1996-2000 Homeland Union, a right party supporting market reforms and integration, carried the victory
and formed a conservative coalition government with the Christian Democratic Party. The Homeland
Union actively sought Lithuania’s membership in NATO and EU.2000-2004 New Union of Social Liberals created a centrist coalition with the Liberal Union.
Throughout the decade from 1991 to 2002, EU membership remained Lithuania’s
foreign policy objective despite the changes in parties in power (see Table 3.1 above).
A particularly interesting case was in 1992 when the LDDP won the Parliamentary
election. Though in their election programme they had expressed a desire for state
neutrality, once in power the party continued the EU integration path.139 Furthermore,
in 1993 the presidency was taken over by an ex-communist turned Social Democrat,
Algirdas Brazauskas, who according to his election platform was not a great activist
of integration to European or Transatlantic structures. Thus, it is quite surprising that
during the time period from 1992 to 1996 when political forces ambivalent to EU
membership were in power, the goal of EU membership was not only pursued but that
the application for EU membership was submitted in 1995.
138 Lietuvos Demokratu Darbo Partija139 Lina Peceliuniene, ‘Sunkus kelias I NATO’, in Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO,Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 645
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There are six reasons why this policy was maintained, which will be outlined in order
of importance below. While it is difficult to decisively isolate the most important
reasons, the cumulative effect of all five was a consistent EU policy.140 First, the
‘opposition’ was persistent in its efforts of keeping the EU and NATO on the top of
the agenda. Landsbergis who was the leader of the opposition political forces from
1992 to 1996 stated that Lithuania ‘after the 1992 Parliamentary elections maintained
to some extent foreign policy continuation… EU and NATO became a foreign policy
priority only after the opposition’s pressure.’141 However, the opposition’s influence,
as Landsbergis admits, was not powerful enough to have perfect control over foreign
policy and thus, ‘During LDDP governance years much time was wasted due to
several post-communist questioning and double meanings, but the main decision was
maintained.’142 It can be argued that even though Lithuania submitted its application
for EU membership in 1995 under the LDDP government, not much actual progress
towards completing necessary reforms and meeting the acquis was made. The second
reason is that LDDP could not suggest any better alternatives than integration into
Western structures as a path for Lithuania’s development and because the Constitution
of the state explicitly forbids any form of integration with any states of the CIS. Third,
the LDDP, being former communists were always haunted by claims that they will
lead Lithuania ‘back to Moscow.’ Opposing Western integration would have enabled
their opponents to add further fuel to the flames. Fourth, public opinion, though
increasingly critical after 1993, was still marked by high support for the EU strategy.
Lastly, the domestic politics and foreign policies of the other Baltic states may have
140 Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEU from 1996to 2000, agreed with these six reasons and their ordering, particularly emphasizing the role of theopposition in an interview with author on March 27, 2006. Egidijus Vareikis agreed with this reasoningand emphasized the cumulative effect of all six factors. Interviewed by author on March 15, 2006.Vytautas Landsbergis also noted that except LDDP all other factions in the Parliament were in favourof EU and NATO membership in an interview with author on April 11, 2006.141 Landsbergis 2004, p. 187142 Ibid., p. 187
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also had an influence on Lithuania. During this time period in Estonia and Latvia
reformers and pro-EU parties were in power and sought EU membership consistently.
Pursuing a diverging path for Lithuania would have been difficult to justify.
The consistency of EU policy despite the change in domestic politics was attributable
to the confluence of the six factors outlined above. However, without most of the six
factors, the EU policy may have been varied. For instance, if anti-EU parties had been
in power and the pro-EU opposition led by Landsbergis marginalized in Parliament as
in the 2000 election, the public highly sceptical as in 1999 and 2000 and the other
Baltic states less resolute on membership, then the EU application might not have
been filed or its filling might have been delayed. As if to secure against such future
threats to the stability of Lithuania’s foreign policy, the pro-EU political forces
included a clause to guarantee against ‘backward gravitation’ in the law on the Basics
of National Security of Lithuania in 1996. The clause safeguarded Lithuanian foreign
policy priorities of EU and NATO.143 Not only would the anti-EU forces have to push
through the change of the law through Parliament but propose an alternative path for
Lithuanian development.
In 1996 the Homeland Union led by Landsbergis won the election and secured the
majority in the Parliament by a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party. In
1998, a Western oriented, non-partisan Adamkus took over the Presidency. From 1996
and 1998 onwards when parties and leaders favourable to Western institutions
presided, a major push towards membership occurred despite the noted increase in
public Euro-scepticism. After great efforts of the elites, in December of 1999
Lithuania was invited to start negotiations at the Helsinki European Council. Yet in143 Landsbergis 2004, p. 319
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1999 and 2000, due to the poor economic conditions related to the 1998 Russian
financial crises and the increasing burden of EU stipulated reforms, the public and
political discourse was increasingly Euro-sceptic. In the 2000 municipal elections
several small populist parties tried to exploit the public’s sentiments in a discreet way.
For example, the National Democrats stated ‘we bowed to Moscow, now we bow to
Brussels’ invoking an image of a new type of imperial control.144
The 2000 new parliamentary elections again brought a sceptical leadership to power –
a coalition of Liberals and Social Liberals. Yet, similarly to the LDDP, once in power
Social Liberals maintained the EU geared trajectory of foreign policy. The Social
Liberals’ continuation of the EU accession process is puzzling given that Euro-
scepticism was at its highest levels. The reasons for the persistent commitment to EU
integration will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four but some domestic
political reasons will be outlined below. First, it must be recognized that Lithuania
was already on the way to membership. In February of 2000, Lithuania started the
negotiation process and the reversal of this would have been a very radical move, one
apparently that parties like the Social Liberals were not prepared to push for.
Furthermore, President Adamkus was an avid supporter of Lithuania’s integration to
European and trans-Atlantic structures and increasingly sought to address the public
scepticism and misconceptions about membership. Lastly, it seems that the anti-
integrationist election platform was simply a populist move to gain more votes in the
election and that the Social Liberals had no serious intention of staying true to it.145
144 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 211145 Vareikis supports this opinion in an interview with the author on March 15, 2006 as does Kuzmickasin an interview with the author on March 27, 2006.
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Lithuanian domestic politics did not play a role in altering EU policy though it
influenced it subtly. For instance, political parties and elites took notice of the public’s
scepticism and concerns by changing their rhetoric but not their course of action.
Some, such as the LDDP, Social Liberals, or National Democrats, critiqued EU
membership or suggested neutrality but in the end maintained the EU integration
strategy, even if it was half-hearted. Others, such as President Adamkus, sought to
address some of the major criticisms, change discourse on EU, and thus, ease the
scepticism. In the end, the Lithuanian elites’ re-marketing campaign of the EU worked
– the Lithuanian public voted overwhelmingly in favour of membership in the
referendum of 2003. The Lithuanian case suggests that elite convictions and goals
superseded public opinions and outweighed public and some elites’ sovereignty
concerns. Furthermore, the findings seem to support the ‘path dependency’ theory that
once a trajectory for EU membership is drawn it is hard to reverse the process even if
as in the case of Lithuania political parties change and public opinion fluctuates.
However, one should be cautious in drawing such a conclusion since the cases of
Rumania and Bulgaria demonstrate that hurdles in the reform and negotiation process
can greatly prolong the endpoint of membership.146
Conclusions
Our analysis of the political and security factors has shown that ideational
considerations were prominent in Lithuania’s EU policy because they were often as
important as the material factors and because they added salience to material
motivations. From this chapter it is clear that Lithuania’s motivations for membership
and thus, EU policy were highly securitized. However while other analysts have
146 Romania and Bulgaria had applied for EU membership in 1995 along with Lithuania, but wereunable to fully commit to reforms and the EU path and are slotted for membership in 2007.
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concluded that Lithuania and the other Baltic states sought EU membership for
security reasons stemming from a fear of Russia, this chapter has shown that security
motivations evolved over time. Soft security considerations, political voice benefits,
and sovereignty concerns all entered the Lithuanian EU policy decision making but
not all in a complementary manner. While soft security and political voice were
conceived as benefits of integration and thus worked in favour of Lithuania’s pro-EU
policy consensus, sovereignty concerns created mixed effects. Sovereignty was
evoked by both pro-EU politicians and Euro-sceptics, as EU membership was seen as
a guarantor of Lithuania’s security in the face of the Russian threat and globalization
and as a restraint on Lithuania’s full national sovereignty due to Brussels’ rules and
regulations. The sovereignty concerns created perhaps not a full-fledged integration
dilemma for Lithuania’s EU policy but certainly integration tensions. Yet despite
these tensions EU policy remained consistent primarily since broad security
considerations remained on the forefront of Lithuania’s agenda. Soft security concerns
and political voice motives maintained their salience in the decade from 1991 to 2002
due to the complementary ideational and rational security factors. Lithuania’s national
identity as a European ‘outsider’ and historical sense of victimhood made security
considerations still potent even when the threat from Russia was not likely. An
understanding of Lithuania’s national identity as simultaneously European and anti-
Russian demonstrates that Lithuania’s drive to EU membership was driven by a desire
to escape Russia in addition to the ‘back to Europe’ motive.
The analysis of this chapter revealed the persistence of elite consensus on the
necessity of EU membership, which resulted in the ultimate success of EU policy.
Furthermore, the case of Lithuania has demonstrated that once in motion the EU
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integration process gains self-momentum for the applicant states. Lithuanian foreign
policy of seeking Western integration has been consistent not only due to elite
consensus on integration but also due to elite ‘path dependency.’ The EU trajectory of
foreign policy had become difficult to alter even when Euro-scepticism was high
because there was a perceived lack of alternative options. Furthermore, build-in
security measures against changes in foreign policy and thus, guarantees of staying on
the EU path were present in the Constitution and the Law on National Security of
1996. While, ‘rhetorical entrapment’ of enlarging the EU has already been noted by
scholars,147 this same element may exist on the side of the applicant states. The
Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership may be understood in
part by a reverse ‘rhetorical entrapment.’ As had been demonstrated it became very
difficult for elites to suggest staying out of the EU when this had been proclaimed as
Lithuania’s primary goal since the early 1990s.
Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in
Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000
The years from 1997 to 2000 were crucial for Lithuania’s EU policy. Lithuania went
from lagging behind in its accession strategy to renewing its efforts for a determined
campaign for membership and starting EU negotiations at the end of 1999. The
circumstances in Lithuania between the years of 1997 to 2000, though seemingly
similar to the other Baltic states, were quite unique and help account for the apparent
turnaround on the EU question. Lithuania was the only Baltic state that experienced
the double disappointment of being disqualified from starting negotiations for EU
membership in 1997, and being excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement
147 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the EasternEnlargement of the European Union’, International Organization vol.55, no.1.
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of 1999. Estonia started negotiations for EU membership in 1997, while Latvia
though equally disappointed with EU negotiations’ exclusion had not expected an
invitation from NATO. Lithuania, feeling best prepared for NATO membership and
feeling as qualified as Estonia to start EU negotiations had its expectations shattered.
Furthermore, Lithuania was more exposed than the other Baltic states to the Russian
financial crisis and experienced the greatest decline in public support for EU
membership in the late 1990s. Thus, Lithuania in the period from 1997 to 2000 was
marked by external shocks that reverberated in foreign policy and domestic politics.
In this key episode, economic, security, and ideational factors came to reinforce elite
consensus on EU policy. This key episode demonstrates that ideational factors as well
as external events complemented and made material considerations more salient,
ultimately contributing to the success of Lithuania’s EU policy.
First, a summary of the domestic and external events during this key period will be
provided. Then economic, security and ideational considerations in Lithuania’s EU
policy will be analysed thematically.
Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000
During these three years many events transpired that impacted Lithuania’s policy on
the EU. These events can be divided into domestic events and external events for
greater clarity. Though domestic developments set a background for policy making
worth examining, the external developments were the key determinants in Lithuania’s
EU policy. Domestically, in the Presidential elections of January 1998, Adamkus,
supported by the Centre coalition, replaced incumbent Brazauskas of the leftist
coalition. The domestic political constant throughout most of the period was the
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parties in power in parliament. Landsbergis was the Speaker of the Parliament and his
Homeland Union party had a majority of seats since the elections of 1996. However,
the municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000 shook up the incumbents. The
municipal election in March saw the victory of left-leaning parties – New Union of
Social Liberals (Social Liberals) and the Peasants Party, both of which resisted
Lithuania’s early entry into the EU and NATO. The Parliamentary election in October
was marked by similar tendencies and resulted in the victory of centre-right alliance
of the Liberal Union and the Social Liberals. The Homeland Union was marginalized.
Nevertheless, in a surprise turn-around, the dominating alliance agreed on the need to
seek EU and NATO membership once they came into power.
There were three key external events that impacted Lithuania’s EU policy making: the
Commission’s decision in 1997 to delay accession negotiations for Lithuania, the
Russian financial crisis of 1998 and exclusion from NATO’s enlargement round of
1999. The cumulative effect of all three events occurring in the short space of time
added significantly to their importance in impacting Lithuania’s EU policy. By May
of 1997, it had become clear to Vilnius that none of the Baltic states will be invited to
the Washington round of NATO enlargement of March of 1999. Lithuania had placed
high hopes of being the one Baltic state to be invited along with Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic. The government elites, led by Landsbergis, had lobbied hard for
membership and had received a somewhat encouraging response from the US though
less so from the European leaders. Then a few months after the bad news from NATO,
the second blow came in July of 1997: the EU Commission excluded Lithuania from
the list of accession candidates that were deemed ready to start the negotiations at the
Luxembourg round of 1998. The Commission’s decision to invite Estonia to
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negotiations made this disqualification particularly acute due to the endemic regional
competition among the Baltic states. Estonia’s inclusion had a multiplier effect on
Lithuania’s disappointment due to exclusion. The two consecutive failures with
NATO and EU could have had caused government elites to question Lithuania’s
foreign policy of Western orientation, yet Lithuanian EU policy remained consistent.
The third external shock came in August 1998 with the Russian financial crisis. The
negative effects of the Russian financial crisis on the Lithuanian economy drove home
the argument that the Lithuania should seek integration with the West rather than with
the East.
Economic Factors
As demonstrated in the second chapter, economic cost and benefit calculations on EU
membership were not of primary importance to Lithuania before 2000. However, in
the 1997-2000 period, several economic arguments came to the forefront. The first
was related to the Commission’s decision to exclude Vilnius from the first round of
enlargement; the second was related to the reconsideration of national economic
strategy after the Russian financial crisis. After Estonia was invited to negotiate and
Lithuania and Latvia were deemed unready, arguments appeared in both states that
being ‘left out’ would be detrimental to their economies. Lithuanian leaders worried
that investments would be directed away from Lithuania towards Estonia and to its
western neighbour, Poland, which was also starting negotiations. These concerns over
the economic ramifications of being left out of the negotiation process are reminiscent
of the Visegrad countries’ concerns over being kept out of the EU. However, as
Vachudova argues, the Visegrad countries were most concerned about access to EU
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markets and EU protectionism towards non-members.148 Lithuanian rhetoric regarding
the redirection of investments demonstrates that economic motivations for seeking
membership stemmed not only from potential benefits of membership but the potential
costs of exclusion, an insight that has often not been recognized in the literature.
The second economic argument during this time period was a reconsideration of
economic and foreign policy strategy due to the Russian financial crisis of August
1998. As noted in Chapter Two, from the mid-1990s until the crisis, not all Lithuanian
elites had fully recognized the benefits of EU membership and were still pursuing an
opportunistic and dualistic economic strategy of maintaining a high level of
commerce with Russia and increasing ties with Western economies. However the
Russian crisis exposed the dangers of economic interdependence with the East. While
1997 had been a year of high economic growth for Lithuania, 1998 resulted in a
slowdown of GDP growth. 1999 was a very difficult year economically with a
contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL 13 billion.149
The Russian economic downturn affected Lithuania more than Latvia or Estonia since
Lithuania traded far more with Russia than did its neighbours. A fourth of all
Lithuanian meat and dairy production went to Russia in the late 1990s, but these
exports were suspended on 1 September 1998 because Russian consumers could not
pay.150 The dismal state of affairs in 1999 was highlighted in President Adamkus’
Annual Address: ‘the highest in a decade level of unemployment, half a billion debt
by Sodra,151 13 billion LTL state debt, more than one thousand bankrupt companies,
148 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration afterCommunism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 71-2149 Zaneta Ozolina, ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208150 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 166151 Lithuanian National Social Insurance Fund
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the unfinished land reforms, millions of LTL debt to farmers, the unreformed energy
sector, unpaid debt from Belarus for electric energy, a half-empty fund for the closure
of nuclear station, etc.’152 Still the consequences of the Russian economic crisis could
have been even more severe if Lithuania had not reoriented some of its trade to the
West in the years leading up to 1998 and if investors had not assumed the Baltics to
be outside the Russian economic sphere and therefore not pulled out their investment
to the degree they did in Russia and the CIS.153 Thus, the Russian crisis clearly
demonstrated the costs of trade with the East and the benefits of being perceived by
investors as part of the ‘West.’
The Russian crisis was an unexpected external event that made a major impact on
Lithuanian elite and public perspectives on Lithuania’s economic and foreign policy.
While the elites became more convinced on the necessity EU membership and
integration to the West, the public was increasingly sceptical of the existing
government policies and particularly of EU membership. However, Lithuanian elites
did not heed public opinion and accelerated the EU accession process.
Lithuanian elites’ reinvigorated drive for EU membership in response to the economic
downturn of 1999 could be explained in terms of rationalist enlargement theories.
According to Mattli, economically unsuccessful national leaders are much more likely
to pursue integrationist strategies and integration is generally sought by ‘outsider’
states with lower growth rates than ‘insider’ states. 154 In the mid-90s, while Lithuania
was benefiting from trade with Russia and increasingly with the West and thus
152 Adamkus, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba, Vilnius, 2001, p. 65153 Jan Zielonka, Europe as an Empire, Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter Two; Ozolina in Lievenand Trenin, p. 208154 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1999, p. 95
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experiencing high growth rates, EU membership from an economic perspective was
not on the top of the elites’ agenda. However, when growth rates dropped to negative
digits, Lithuanian elites started actively pursuing EU membership. However, the
correlation between economic decline and re-invigoration of EU policy does not
necessarily imply causation. The decision to accelerate integrationist efforts was made
in 1997 immediately after the Commission’s decision, before the Crisis and economic
downturn. The Russian crisis served to reinforce EU policy but was not the original
cause of renewed efforts for membership.
Lithuanian political elites interpreted the Russian financial crisis and its lessons for
Lithuania not only in economic but also in strategic and ideational terms. The crisis
was used to confirm that Lithuania chose the right strategy of distancing itself from
Russia and choosing the EU as its model and economic partner. Ideologically, the
crisis reinforced the perspective of Russia as unstable and dangerous. Landsbergis,
speaking about the Russian crisis, stated, ‘our national political goal and the goal of
all parties is to finally exit the post-Soviet undefined and threatening space.’155 The
‘economic chaos to the east’ was presented as much of a threat to Lithuania as the
Russian armies had been in the early 1990s. President Adamkus described the
previous dualistic and inconsistent policy of economic relations with the West and the
East as a ‘destructive path’ which demonstrated ‘the powerlessness of our state in the
face of the Russian crisis.’156 Though the EU policy may have cost the ruling
government elites such as Landsbergis and his Homeland Union party re-election in
2000, the EU policy was pursued or at a minimum presented in ideological terms as
well as rational terms. Furthermore, the ideational view of Russia as an unstable and
155 Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 348156 Adamkus 2001, p. 100
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dangerous ally made the economic effects of the Russian crisis even more salient in
the Lithuanian elite calculations on EU policy.
To summarize, the downturn in the Lithuanian economy following the Russian crisis
coupled with the Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of
negotiations, strengthened the resolve of the Lithuanian elites to seek EU
membership. Though both external events posed material costs for Lithuania, elite
discourse was mostly framed in ideational rather than material terms.
Security Factors
Though Lithuania was considerably more secure in 1997 than in the early 1990s,
security objectives continued to figure to some extent in justifying EU membership.
During these key years Lithuania’s security concerns, though not based on material
threats, were reinforced by the economic insecurity of the period and the ideational
fears of being left out of EU and NATO expansion.
Speaking on the improvement of Lithuania’s security conditions in 1997 in relation to
four years ago, Landsbergis stated optimistically that the ‘International situation is
calmer and more stabilized. Lithuania secured its position in European and world
perceptions as a rebuilt state, which has a right to exist. Just this already provides
more security, as does Lithuanian participation in international structures. From these
the most important to us is our association membership in the EU.’157 Thus by 1997,
Lithuania was perceived to be more secure due to the web of participation in157 Landsbergis, p. 246
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international organizations. The Association Agreement with the EU was considered
to be a source of security and stability for Lithuania in the present and full EU and
NATO membership were to provide security in the future.
This positive articulation of Lithuania’s security coincided with Lithuania’s campaign
to be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. In early to mid-1997, before it
was apparent that Lithuania would not be included in the first round of NATO
enlargement, Lithuania’s rhetoric on security was decidedly changed. As noted in the
previous chapter, Lithuanian political elites, particularly Landsbergis, in their
discourse on the East started diminishing the formerly emphasized Russian threat and
questioning Western perceptions that the Baltics are ‘un-defendable.’ Addressing the
perceived threat from Russia to the Baltics, Landsbergis stated in 1997, ‘We do not
think that far ahead and that negatively, as in the West, about a concrete aggressor to
the Baltic states. All neighbours are a gift from God [!] We only want stability and
reliability from different investors, different cooperation, and do not want that
someone would threaten us or dictate to us.’158 While the efforts to downplay the
Russian threat seem tactical in Lithuania’s quest for NATO membership and geared
towards the West, they still demonstrate the importance of the ‘Russia factor’ in the
discourse. However, the cited remarks also reveal a focus on the emerging concept of
broader stability (rather than security) constituted by investments and relations with
the West.
Vilnius’ instrumental use of the Russian factor to emphasise or de-emphasise the
Russian threat depending on the situation or audience is particularly noticeable in
another episode. In May of 1997, when Lithuania realized that it would not be158 Speaking to Estonian parliament in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 213
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included in the first round of NATO enlargement it again vocalized its concerns about
Russia. Discussing the consequences of being left out of NATO, Landsbergis stated, ‘I
do not think that currently there is a threat of direct Russian aggression. Nevertheless,
we could be pressured by Russia by various ultimatums. We could be forced to make
concessions and to limit our sovereignty,’ as did Cold War Finland, which had to
make concessions to Russia in economic, military, and political spheres.159 Here
Landsbergis was asking for security guarantees for Lithuania from the broader
potential pressures from Russia. These guarantees came in January 1998 when the
Four State Charter was signed between the Baltics and the US, providing Baltic states
with greater international stability and security prospects. The Charter sweetened the
bitter first enlargement of NATO in March of 1999 when only the Visegrad countries
were accepted.
Lithuania’s security considerations for EU membership can be better understood by
examining the relationship between the goals of EU and NATO membership, which
became particularly apparent during this time period. Scholars such as Herd have
argued that Lithuania’s primary foreign policy goal had been NATO membership
rather than EU until a shift in policy occurred in 1997 after the EU Commission made
a recommendation to exclude Lithuania from the negotiation process. Herd stated that
‘This recommendation caused a dramatic foreign policy reorientation within
Lithuania. Lithuania reiterated that it would attempt to join the first stage of European
eastern enlargement; this was to become the new primary priority of Lithuanian
domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, the central tenet of Lithuanian foreign
policy – NATO membership – was now to be officially down-graded as a priority.’160
159 May 1997 Interview with Danish newspaper in Ibid., p. 277160 Graeme P. Herd ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement’ in Karen Henderson,, ed., Back to Europe:Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999, p. 267
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However, a closer examination of the discourse of Lithuanian elites, the political
decisions at the time, and interviews with key participants161 does not support Herd’s
argument that a dramatic foreign policy reorientation favouring EU to NATO occurred
in 1997. In the years prior to and after the Commission’s decision, elite discourse
demonstrates the equal importance of EU and NATO membership as Lithuanian
foreign policy goals. Before and after 1997 Landsbergis stated on a number of
occasions that EU and NATO membership should not be viewed as alternative
priorities – ‘they are equal national political goals, ones that do not interfere with one
another, ones that are complementary to each other.’ 162 This policy of giving equal
priority to EU and NATO membership was confirmed in a Foreign Policy
coordination meeting with the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence
minister, Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman in early 1997 before the
EU Commission’s decision.
The perception that NATO membership had been of primary importance could have
arisen due to the fact that for a few years up to mid-1997 Lithuanian elites, seeing a
window of opportunity, invested significant efforts to be in the first round of NATO
enlargement of 1999.163 After the realisation that NATO membership will not be
possible in the near future and that Lithuania was not included in the first round of EU
negotiations, the pressing goal for Lithuanian elites was to make sure that Lithuania
would be invited to the next round of EU negotiations at the Helsinki Summit
161 Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Speaker of Parliament from 1996 to 2000, on April 11, 2006.Interview with Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEUfrom 1996 to 2000, on March 27, 2006. Interview with Egidijus Vareikis, member of ParliamentCommittees on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs, on March 15, 2006.162 Stated in a speech in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 214, see also p. 423163 Vytautas Landsbergis revealed that his optimal strategy aimed to link Lithuania with the Visegradstates and thus, enter NATO and perhaps the EU at an earlier date along with Czeck Republic, Hungaryand Poland. Interviewed by author April 11, 2006.
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scheduled for 1999. Thus, what Herd interpreted to be a ‘dramatic reorientation’ in
Lithuania’s EU and NATO policies was in fact a shift in emphasis that responded to
external constraints and opportunities. NATO’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the
first round of enlargement was viewed by Lithuanian elites as a political move to
appease Russia. There was not much Lithuania could do in the meantime as the next
enlargement was years away (in fact the next enlargement occurred only in 2004) and
NATO did not have a sole document listing the criteria for membership that Lithuania
could try to implement. The EU, unlike NATO, operated with sticks and carrots,
rewarding compliance to its numerous requirements by invitations to candidates to
begin membership negotiations on an annual basis. Even though Lithuania was not
chosen to start negotiations it was given the incentive to step up its reforms because
the EU was going to reconsider the Lithuanian application within a year. Another
incentive was the known possibility that if Lithuania made progress it could join the
EU at the same time as Estonia and the other Central European states despite a late
start in negotiations. Lithuania’s reinvigorated efforts for EU membership after the
Commission’s negative decision supports Vachudova’s EU’s ‘active leverage’
theory164 and is comparable to Slovakia’s response to being left out of the first round
of enlargement. The contrasting short term Lithuanian response to NATO exclusion
could be elucidated by Vachudova’s argument that NATO, without a meritocracy or
enforcement system, did not have the same active leverage on applicant countries as
EU.165 Thus, Lithuania’s differing tactical approaches to NATO and EU membership
could be explained not by assuming a shift in national priorities but by Lithuania’s
response to NATO and the EU’s differing incentives structures. However, as
explained in the above paragraph, the EU and NATO always remained equally
164 Vachudova, p. 105-139 165 Ibid., p. 134-137
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important strategic foreign policy goals though the short term foreign policy tactics
varied in 1997 to 2000.
Analyzing EU and NATO membership together also demonstrates that both
organisations were considered to be complementary tools to achieve similar goals of
not only security but economic well-being. Increasingly throughout the late 1990s,
economics and security, and thus the EU and NATO, were viewed as indivisible goals
by Vilnius. For instance in December of 1998 Landsbergis argues that both EU and
NATO membership are necessary since in order ‘to increase economic and living
standards we need cooperation and trade; for trade we need investments, for
investments we need security.’166 In February of 1999, Landsbergis emphasized the
indivisibility of security and economics stating that ‘national security is necessary for
various reasons – even purely economic reasons.’167 This perspective helps explain
Lithuania’s simultaneous policy commitment to join both NATO and EU and gives
further evidence against Herd’s argument.
In summary, Lithuania’s pursuit of EU and NATO membership simultaneously can be
understood by the elites’ view that both organizations were complementary in their
capacity to increase Lithuanian security and economic well-being. Furthermore,
Lithuania’s policy on EU and NATO demonstrates that ideational perspectives of EU
as a source of not only economic prosperity but security and NATO as a tool not only
for national security but economic wellbeing, coloured Lithuanian elite considerations
of the material benefits of these two organizations.
166 Ibid., p. 365 167 Landsbergis, p. 378
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Domestic Factors
The analysis of domestic factors that influenced Lithuania’s policy towards the EU in
the period from 1997 to 2000 brings three questions to mind. First, to what extent did
domestic political parties influence Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000?
Second, was political leaders’ willingness to integrate based on calculations on re-
election in the presidential elections of 1998, and municipal and parliamentary
elections of 2000? Lastly, was EU membership used instrumentally by domestic
elites? In general, Lithuania’s major political parties accepted the elite policy
consensus which viewed EU membership as the only way forward for Lithuania’s
future development.
There appears to be a link between Lithuania’s domestic political parties and EU
policy during the years of 1997 to 2000. With the Parliament dominated by a pro-EU
Homeland Union from 1996 to 2000, and with a pro-Western integration President
Adamkus from 1998 onwards, Lithuania’s push for EU membership might appear
predictable. However, as the previous chapter argued, domestic politics was not the
decisive factor in Lithuania’s policy on EU. For instance, in 1995, a decision to
submit the EU application was made under Euro-sceptic LDDP leadership. And in
2000, the Parliamentary parties that had won on anti-integration platforms, once in
power maintained their predecessors’ pro-EU and pro-NATO foreign policy. Thus the
success of Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000 cannot be explicable solely by
the Homeland Union’s and Adamkus’ support for EU membership.
Mattli has argued that political leaders’ willingness to integrate is motivated by the
political payoffs of re-election. The case of Lithuania, particularly from 1997 to 2000,
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demonstrates that political incumbents and newcomers took a different approach to
the EU policy political payoffs. In light of rising public Euro-scepticism from the late
1990s to 2000, the incumbent government elites, by accelerating integration, were not
acting in the hope of appealing to the public. On the contrary, the 2000 elections
brought new parties to power who with populist slogans had opposed EU and NATO
membership in their platforms. Thus re-election ambitions did not influence the
incumbents’ willingness to integrate but electoral considerations played a tactical role
for the new political entrants who exploited the rising Euro-scepticism. However,
once voted into office, the political newcomers would revert to elite policy consensus
of seeking EU membership. For instance, in the 1998 presidential elections some new
candidates ran on a Euro-sceptic platform.168 However this strategy did not pay off in
1998 with a pro-West Adamkus winning the presidency. But the municipal and
parliamentary elections of 2000 favoured the Euro-sceptics since the end of 1999 and
beginning of 2000 was the lowest point in terms of public opinion on EU
membership, when Euro-sceptics exceeded EU supporters (with a vote of 39 percent
‘against’ versus 28 percent ‘in favour’ of integration).169 On the other hand, the
incumbent government elites such as the Homeland Union party were seeking EU
integration despite the political losses in re-elections which they suffered in 2000.
Landsbergis explained his own and his party’s position by stating that ‘Europhobia or
isolationist tendencies are unreal and without prospects’170 even though his party was
marginalized by the 2000 elections.171
168 Incumbent President Brazauskas chose not to run in the 1998 presidential elections.169 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma’, LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31170 Landsbergis, p. 311171 However, the EU was not the only or most important issue to the voters. The elections brought innew political forces to power because most voters were disappointed by the poor economic conditionsand governance of the preceding years.
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The Lithuanian elites used the prospect EU membership instrumentally for domestic
political gains and this tendency is most evident from the episode following the
Commission’s decision of 1997 to exclude Lithuania from negotiations. Lithuania’s
exclusion, while another Baltic State was included, ‘triggered a frenzy of defensive
posturing and finger pointing throughout the Lithuanian political class.’172 In
December of 1997, several months after the Commission decision and a year after his
party gained power in the Parliament, Landsbergis stated that ‘in the last year through
hard work more was accomplished [towards EU membership] than during the several
years prior.’173 The newly elect President Adamkus also critiqued the poor state of
affairs and economy in Lithuania and blamed it on the uncompleted reforms by his
predecessors, which not only hurt the Lithuanian state but also precluded it from
starting negotiations.174
The instrumental usage by the Lithuanian elites of EU membership failures to critique
their opponents and find support for their policies was influenced by an important
regional factor. Miniotaite has argued that since the withdrawal of Russian troops
from the region, the Baltic states, despite their common initiatives, have engaged in
mutual competition in their pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening
of respective state’s sovereignty.175 Regional competition among the Baltic states,
similar to the competition among the Visegrad countries, came to a high point after
the Commission decision in 1997. For Lithuania’s political elites, the Commission’s
move to include Estonia but not Lithuania highlighted their failure to manage the
172 Vitalis Nakrosis, ‘Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: The Case ofLithuania’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latviaand Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 103173 Landsbergis, p. 313174 See details in Chapter 2.175 Miniotaite 1999, p. 24
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accession process as well as their counterparts in Estonia. For example, Landsbergis
blamed LDDP’s years in power from 1992 to 1996 for squandering ‘Lithuania’s
political capital’ since in his view from 1990 to 1992 Lithuania was a leader in the
Baltics.176 The potential beneficial aspects of Estonia’s success was also mentioned -
Estonia was ‘breaking the ice’ for Lithuanian and Latvian membership.177 Still there
was a general atmosphere of failure in Lithuania in the light of Estonia’s success
which stimulated the Lithuanian government elites to catch up with Estonia and enter
the Union at the same time.178
In summary, Lithuania’s EU policy was not altered radically despite the changing
domestic political climate or public opinion. But EU policy did figure in the elections
and was used instrumentally by the elites in power and by the challengers. However,
even Euro-sceptic opponents once in power accepted the pro-EU elite consensus,
most likely due to the perceived lack of alternative options. Regional elite competition
had a multiplier effect on the Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the
first round of negotiations and further cemented elite resolve to seek membership.
Ideational Factors
While each of the previously discussed factors of economy, security and domestic
politics contained ideational elements and were made more potent by Lithuanian elite
perceptions, the following section will specifically elaborate on the ideational forces
at work in Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000.
176 Landsbergis’ Statement ran in major Lithuanian newspaper ‘Lietuvos aidas’ after the Commission’sdecision. Landsbergis, p. 289177 Ibid., p. 311178 Interview with Egidijus Vareikis on March 15, 2006.
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After the Commission announced its decision in 1997, elite discourse on Lithuania’s
vulnerable position as a non-EU member gained force. Significantly, despite the
potential negative economic externalities that could result from the exclusion from the
EU, most of the rhetoric was posed in ideational terms. An ideational fear of being
left out of the EU became a greater motivator for membership than the perceived
ideational or material benefits of EU membership had ever been. Political discourse
became centred on visions of Lithuania being stuck in a ‘Baltic ghetto’ or a ‘grey
zone’ between an enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.179 The sense of periphery and
being in the ‘grey zone’ of Europe was only intensified by the double exclusion of
Lithuania from NATO enlargement as well. As its neighbours, Poland and Estonia,
were already in the negotiation process with the EU, Poland – a future NATO
member, Lithuania was left in the regional company of Latvia, Kaliningrad, and
Belarus. This sense of frustration and isolation was all the more emphasized by the
fact that Estonia had managed to ‘escape’ this ‘Baltic ghetto’ and start negotiations
with the EU.
During these years it is interesting to examine how Lithuania was perceived and
presented by its political elites. In the rhetoric, one discerns the aforementioned focus
on the unfortunate geopolitical situation that the Baltic states share. With the former
Warsaw Pact states integrating securely into Western organisations and CIS forming
another bloc, the Baltic states, prevented from early entry into the EU or NATO, were
left out as some sort of ‘special case’ as the Baltic leaders critically noted. But by the
late 1990s, there was also a sense that the Baltic states were in the process of escaping
this inferior position through integration into Western institutions. For example,
Landsbergis speaking in 1998 stated, ‘Our state has left in the past its isolated position179 Herd in Henderson p. 262, 267
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in the Baltic periphery, where we were locked up along with Latvia and Estonia as a
small specific European region…This artificially created isolation problem, created
due to the old Yalta line, is in a way resolved.’180 Recognizing Lithuania’s historically
difficult international position, the elites struggled to present Lithuania as a ‘normal
state’ rather than some ‘special case’ or even more colourfully as a ‘Baltic mushroom
in a basket.’181 A struggle for labels and rhetoric appeared repeatedly during this time
which called for conceptualizing Lithuania as part of ‘Central Europe’182 not ‘Eastern
Europe where we would be in the same basket as Ukraine, Caucasus, and something
else.’183
From 1997 to 2000, ideational considerations also coloured Lithuania’s perception of
the integration process. The idea gained strength that it was Lithuania’s right to
exercise its political voice as an independent state and thus choose integration into
Western organizations. In the discourse, the pursuit of national goals - ‘a fight for a
right to choose to integrate to NATO and EU’ was compared to the fight for
independence.184 In a similar vein, Landsbergis stated that ‘Independence works are
unfinished until Lithuania is able to use Western organizations,’ such as NATO and
EU.185 This perception of integration as a sign of Lithuania’s independent status can
be explained as a stance against the continuous Russian resistance to Baltic
integration into Western organizations, particularly NATO. Thus, Lithuanian political
motivations for membership in EU and NATO can be understood as Lithuania’s
expression of its political voice despite Russia’s resistance. Russia’s hostility and
180 Landsbergis, p. 336181 Speech to Lithuanian Ambassador Conference in 1997. Ibid., p. 217182 Vytautas Lansbergis hoped that Lithuania would join the Visegrad group. Interviewed by author onApril 11, 2006.183 Landsbergis, p. 217184 Ibid., p. 302185 Ibid., p. 248
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resistance, because it was interpreted as a threat to Lithuania’s security and wellbeing,
only further cemented Lithuania’s resolve.
Right after the Commission’s decision, elite discourse was centred on the perceived
lack of alternatives for Lithuania’s future development other than integration into
Western structures. In response to a view that Lithuania could balance between the
East and the West and maintain its political and economic sovereignty Landsbergis
stated that this option was unrealistic: ‘We do not have an alternative other than to
join and integrate to democratic Western states’ trans-Atlantic structures.186 The
argument that Lithuania lacked alternatives to integration was coloured by emotional
perspectives of being in a ‘Baltic ghetto’ and being again a ‘European outsider.’
Furthermore, the elites repeatedly used dramatic comparisons of Lithuania to Albania.
According to Lithuanian parliamentarian and political scientist, Vareikis, ‘a non-
integrated Lithuania would become a “chaotic Albania”, whose identity today is most
problematically definable and which is one of the least wanted nations in Europe.’187
Similarly, Landsbergis, discussing the option of staying out of the Union, stated: ‘Of
course it is possible to become some isolated, hidden state, which would strangely
think that it could survive by avoiding competition and progress, like some new
Albania.’188
In summary, ideational factors came to figure prominently in the discourse of
Lithuanian political elites in the period from 1997 to 2000. They stemmed primarily
from three factors: Lithuania’s perceived geopolitical insecurity, from economic
dependence on an unstable Russia, and from the fear of being ‘left out’ of Europe. All
186 Ibid., p. 412187 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Strofa, Vilnius, 2002, p. 294188 Landsbergis, p. 311
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three of these factors flowed from Lithuania’s recent and distant historical
experiences. Ideational fears related to non-membership outweighed in importance the
potential economic costs of non-membership as well as sovereignty concerns in the
calculations of Lithuanian elites.
Conclusions
The years from 1997 to 2000 were filled with numerous events and elements that
seemed to influence Lithuania’s policy on the EU. These included poor economic
conditions, disappointments and successes in seeking security alliances, regional
competition, domestic political shifts and fluctuations in public opinion. The most
important and constant factor throughout this rather turbulent period was Lithuanian
elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership. The stability of this elite
consensus can be explained by the co-variance between Lithuanian economic and
security interest and broader factors of identity, culture and historical legacy. In fact,
ideational factors not only mattered more than material factors in their own right
during this period, but they made material considerations more salient. The result of
the concord of these ideational and ideationally-enhanced material factors contributed
to the ultimate success of Lithuania’s EU policy. While Lithuania’s EU policy lacked
momentum during much of the 1990s, after 1997, Lithuanian elites emerged with new
resolve for entering the Union in the first round of enlargement.
Another crucial aspect to the elite consensus in this period, besides the co-variance in
economic, political, and ideational interests, was the impact on policy by external
factors. The cumulative effect of exclusion in the first wave of EU accession
negotiations, the Russian economic crisis and exclusion from the first round of NATO
enlargement, all occurring during the brief period from 1997 to 1999, hardened the
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elite resolve for EU membership. The fear of being left out of Europe and of being
marginalized in a Baltic periphery on the border on an unstable Russia were more
invoked by the Lithuanian elites during these years than the material benefits of EU
membership. Furthermore, these ideational fears overrode the sovereignty tensions of
EU membership that increasingly entered the public debate during this time period.
Lastly, the elections of 2000 demonstrated that Lithuanian political elites were unable
or unwilling to alter the Lithuanian foreign policy course. There was a noticeable
element of ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ in Lithuania’s EU policy as
the closer Lithuania got to membership the more difficult it was to change the course
of action. Though sovereignty tensions were high and public Euro-scepticism at its
peak, political parties such as Social Liberals continued the foreign policy agenda of
their predecessors. The reasons were numerous: a perceived lack of alternatives,
negotiations with the EU had already commenced earlier in the year, and it was
difficult to renege on a decade worth of statements and actions to the effect that EU
membership is Lithuania’s primary foreign policy goal.
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Conclusion
Lithuania’s rapid accession to the EU in its first decade of independence might at first
sight give the mistaken impression of a clear and materially over-determined story of
integration. Our detailed analysis has demonstrated that Lithuania's EU accession
process was animated at all times by tension and concord between material and
ideational factors. The latter mattered as much if not more than material
considerations in determining Lithuanian policy elites' drive for EU membership for
two reasons. First, ideational factors were often crucial because of their impact on
elite perceptions of the EU. Second, and more importantly, ideational factors made
material considerations more salient in elite decision making on EU policy. The
correlation between ideational factors and ideationally-enhanced material factors
accounted for the success of Lithuania’s EU policy in key episodes such as in the
years between 1997 and 2000.
This study has demonstrated that in addition to the potent correlation between
material and ideational factors, Lithuanian EU policy succeeded because of the
confluence of a number of elements. The most important of these, such as Lithuanian
elite consensus on foreign policy, inverse ‘rhetorical entrapment,’ ‘path dependency,’
foreign policy independence from domestic politics, Lithuanian national identity and
regional competition, are outlined below.
Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of integration to Western structures
through membership in the EU and NATO was one of the dominating features of the
story of Lithuania’s accession. Despite some tactical shifts in the way EU membership
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was sought and articulated, and despite the fact that Euro-scepticism entered the
election platforms of some major political parties, Lithuanian foreign policy never
officially deviated from its goal of entering the EU in the first wave of enlargement.
This elite consensus on foreign policy can be attributed to rational motivations such as
security and political benefits of membership, the potential of economic growth and
development within the Union, the fear of negative economic externalities of non-
membership and the necessity of EU expertise and advice to implement the necessary
reforms for a state in transition to market economy and democracy. However, it is the
ideational motivations of soft security benefits, the desire to emulate the idealized
European model, the fear of being left out of European developments and of being
relegated to a permanent ‘periphery’ and ‘ghetto’ that often proven decisive.
Ideational motivations often had an exponential impact on Lithuania’s material
considerations during key policy decision periods.
Lithuanian elite consensus can be best understood by acknowledging its converses –
elite ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ in EU policy formulation.
Lithuanian elites not only chose to pursue EU membership because of its perceived
benefits but during some key episodes were pushed to do so: they increasingly
became dependent on the path of EU membership for Lithuania’s national vision and
increasingly entrapped by their statements that EU membership is Lithuania’s key
foreign policy goal. For instance Lithuania’s EU application was submitted in 1995
under the EU-cautious LDDP leadership and when economic relations with Russia
were still bearing fruit. This was done because of the perceived lack of security
alternatives to Western integration and of already having expressed the desire and
made progress to enter the Union in 1994 when the negotiations of the Europe
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Agreement were started. Indeed, the rejection of Lithuania from the first round of
negotiations for membership in 1997, far from dampening Lithuanian enthusiasm for
membership, had the effect of reinforcing it. This was due partly to the ‘active
leverage’ of the EU, which kept Lithuania on its path to membership with annual
reviews and evaluations. In 2000, when the Euro-sceptic Social Liberals won the
Parliamentary elections, they were bound by the actions and rhetoric of their
predecessors – the clauses in the Constitution and national security conceptions as
well as the negotiations with the EU which had commenced earlier that year. Thus,
Lithuanian elites not only seemed to agree on the necessity of EU membership but
often found themselves in self-propelling motion towards membership.
Lithuanian foreign policy consensus lasted for more than a decade and was impacted
by the forces of ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ due to foreign policy
independence from domestic politics. While Lithuanian domestic politics experienced
shifts in presidents and political parties over this decade – ranging from left to right to
centrist forces, foreign policy remained consistent. Furthermore, despite the shifts in
Lithuanian public opinion from Euro-enthusiasm in the early 1990s to peaking Euro-
scepticism by 1999 to 2000, domestic political parties did not strategically alter
foreign policy by seeking electoral payoffs. Though some political forces such as the
Social Liberals and politicians such as Adamkus changed their tactics and rhetoric
regarding the EU, the former hoping to appeal to the public with a EU-sceptic
platform and the later seeking to frame the EU in a new light to the public in order to
dispel their concerns, the trajectory of foreign policy remained consistent. The
independence of foreign policy from domestic politics ultimately contributed to the
success of Lithuania’s EU policy.
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Another explanatory factor for the consistency and success of Lithuania’s EU policy
was the nature of the Lithuanian national identity which can be identified
simultaneously as European, anti-Russian, and as a historical European outsider.
While Central and Eastern European accession has often been conceived from a
constructivist perspective as a ‘return to Europe,’ the case of Lithuanian national
identity demonstrated that the realities were often significantly more complex. A
desire to be a part of the European community of states as well as a member of the
West was a motivating factor for Lithuania. However, it seems that equally or
possibly even more important, was the desire to escape the Russian sphere of
influence and the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, a fear of being ‘left out of Europe’
once again as many times before in Lithuanian history in a ‘ghetto’ between
Kaliningrad and Belarus was a key motivation for Lithuania particularly in the years
from 1997 to 2000. This sense of being left out was reinforced by that fact that
neighbouring states of Poland and Estonia seemed poised to join the Union. Taken
together these three strands of Lithuanian national identity were all active drivers to
EU membership, though individually they may not have been salient enough.
Regional competition among the Baltic states was another aspect that was
instrumental to the ultimate success of Lithuania’s EU policy. As our analysis of
1997- 2000 highlighted, Lithuania was determined to enter the Union at the same time
as Estonia due to material and ideational concerns. Materially, there were concerns
that FDI invest would flow out of Lithuania to Estonia, while ideationally, the
prospect of being left out fed fears of remaining alone with Latvia in a Baltic
‘ghetto.’
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In addition to identifying the key factors in the success of Lithuanian EU policy, this
study has drawn attention to some significant impediments to EU membership. These
included fluctuating public support for EU membership, the high costs of EU
stipulated reforms and diverging national interests as the case of the agricultural
policy and the closure of Ignalina nuclear power plant demonstrated. But the most
important impediment was the tension created by the sovereignty debate and the
integration dilemma. Lithuania, as a newly independent state, was very concerned
about infringements on its hard-fought sovereignty from Brussels which was often
critically called ‘the new Moscow.’ The public and some politicians considered an
alternative ‘national’ path for Lithuania without EU membership. However, in the
end, the sovereignty debate was not decisive in precluding Lithuania’s EU
membership because the EU was perceived to be a guarantor of Lithuania’s
sovereignty against greater threats than Brussels – Russia and, to some extent,
globalization.
Another important finding of this study is the non-linear account of Lithuania’s
motives for EU membership. Though it may appear that Lithuania was primarily
motivated to join the EU by security concerns we have demonstrated that this was far
from being the case. Lithuanian security concerns reinforced by ideational factors
played an important role in the initial determination to seek EU membership in the
years up to the submission of the application when rational economic motivations
were marginal. However, in the mid- 1990s, Lithuania increasingly looked towards
the broader benefits of soft security, political voice and access of membership. By
2000, when Lithuania started its accession negotiations, rational calculations about the
economic package and the number of votes in the European Parliament played an
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important role as Vilnius tried to secure the best deal for membership. This finding
may be a useful insight into the pre-application and post-application motives of
accession states in general. It seems that in the initial stages of accession states are
guided by broader motives that may include ideational aspects or general
understandings of economic and political opportunities. However, the closer states get
to negotiations and membership the more concerned they get about the specific
implications of membership on their economy and sovereignty.
There are a number of insights from this study of Lithuanian EU policy that can be
applied to Lithuania’s foreign policy in general. Lithuanian foreign policy, as can be
expected for a small and newly independent state, is influenced by its external
environment and external events. This was demonstrated in Lithuania’s EU policy
when the EU Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of
negotiations, the Russian financial crisis and NATO’s decision to exclude Lithuania
from the first round of enlargement proved decisive in cementing Lithuania’s resolve
to pursue EU membership. However, the influence of external parties should not be
overestimated in Lithuania’s foreign policy since NATO membership was achieved
despite the vocal opposition of Moscow and scepticism in many European capitals.
Another inference that can be drawn from this study is that there seems to be a lack of
relationship between domestic politics, public opinion and foreign policy. Foreign
policy is formulated by elites, affected little by changes in the political parties in
power or by shifts in public opinion.
Though the thesis focuses on Lithuania’s EU accession many inferences can be drawn
about Lithuania’s policy towards Euro-Atlantic structures in general. In the
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Lithuanian political discourse EU and NATO were often addressed together and
viewed as inseparable and complementary goals. Furthermore, the public often did
not greatly differentiate between them and thus, public opinion shifts on the EU were
similar to public opinion shifts on NATO. For instance, during the 1999 dip in public
approval for EU membership, those who were ‘against NATO’ outnumbered those
who were ‘for NATO’ in a public opinion survey (32 percent and 31 percent)
accordingly.189 Though NATO membership was driven more by material security
benefits such as Article V, both organizations were initially perceived as doorways to
Western European community of states and to escaping Lithuania’s peripheral
geopolitical position. However, in the later years as Lithuania was completing a
detailed cost-benefit analysis of EU membership it was also weighing the costs and
benefits of NATO membership – particularly the expenditure of 2 percent of its GDP
on defence. The defence spending came under fire from critics in the 2000
Parliamentary elections who felt that this money could be better spent on social
programs. Thus, NATO and EU membership throughout the 1990s and early 2000s
were perceived in many similar ways by the Lithuanian elites.
Insights into the Baltic, Central and Eastern European accession can also be derived
from the Lithuanian case. Viewing the Baltic accession as a whole has been common
in the integration literature due to their many similarities. The Baltic states shared a
similar history during the inter-war and Soviet era, took a common path to
independence and spent the 1990s trying to integrate into Western structures such as
the EU and NATO. Many of the findings in the case of Lithuania such as evolving
motives, the importance of ideational factors, the divide between the public and the
189 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma’, LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31
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elites on integration, the consistency of foreign policy are present in fellow Baltic
states. As this study has highlighted, a number of ideational and material
considerations that might have been be common to the Baltic states were heightened
in sensitivity in the case of Lithuania due to the unique conditions that emerged from
1997 and 2000. The high level of fear of being ‘left out’ and subjugated to a ‘ghetto’
of Europe may have been unique to Lithuania as Latvia did not have the double
disappointment from NATO and the EU and Estonia achieved one of its goals in
1997. It would be interesting to examine if in the case of Estonia, its success to start
EU negotiations in 1997 may have alleviated some of its material and ideational
concerns to prevent the scenario of non-membership.
The assumption that Central and Eastern European accession was driven by a ‘back to
Europe’ argument has to be re-examined in the light of the findings from the
Lithuanian case. It is likely that Poland was similarly driven to pursue EU
membership from broad notions of security in light of proximity to Russia and the
Kaliningrad enclave. A desire to escape the Russian sphere of influence may have
been less of a factor for states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia which are geographically and geopolitically further removed than the Baltics
or Poland from Russia. However, it is likely that these states like Lithuania had
ideationally tainted fears of being left out of Europe and becoming the new
‘Albanias.’ Yugoslavia’s impact on Slovenia is worth exploring since it is comparable
in some respects to the USSR’s legacy on the Baltic states, both in terms of fuelling a
desire to integrate into Western structures and prompting hesitation due to sovereignty
infringements upon newly won independence. Slovakia may be fruitfully compared to
Lithuania in its accession policy particularly in the years of 1997 to 2000. Both states
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
experienced the double disappointment of being excluded from the first round of
negotiations for EU membership in 1997 and from the first round of NATO
enlargement of 1999. Furthermore, just like Lithuania, which was motivated by
Estonia’s achievement, Slovakia’s failure was magnified by the success of its
neighbour, Czech Republic, which started EU negotiations earlier and entered NATO
in the first round of enlargement. Just like Lithuania, Slovakia, intensified its efforts
to seek EU membership and entered the Union in 2004 along with the first-wave of
applicants. Thus, the insights from the Lithuanian case study reveal a number of
aspects worthy of further exploration in the Central and Eastern European accession
states; it demonstrates that the Lithuanian and Baltic states’ accession was not the
‘special case’ some have assumed it to have been.
The findings of this study may provide insight into the ongoing accession process of
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania as well as the potential accession of Belarus and
Ukraine. After excluding Bulgaria and Romania from the first round of negotiations
for membership in 1997, the Commission opened accession negotiations with these
two states in December of 1999 along with Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Malta.
However Bulgaria and Romania lagged behind in accepting chapters of the acquis. It
would be interesting to examine if the tensions between ideational aspects and
material considerations have caused a slowdown in the EU policies of these two
states. Furthermore, did domestic politics190, public opinion, and/or regional
competition played a role in their foreign policy? Since Bulgaria and Romania joined
NATO in 2004, it is possible to infer that their membership will be less driven by
190 Vachudova has argued Bulgaria and Romania’s slow progress towards EU membership was a resultof illiberal government elites in non-competitive political systems. Milada Anna Vachudova, EuropeUndivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford,2005, p. 25-29; p. 198-217.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
security considerations than the Baltic states which simultaneously pursued EU and
NATO membership throughout the 1990s. Croatia may demonstrate a number of
similarities with the Lithuanian accession process since it is a newly independent state
having emerged from union with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, just like the Baltic
competition stimulated Lithuania and Latvia to catch up to Estonia’s progress in EU
accession, so may Slovenia’s success motivate Croatia. Furthermore, Croatia may
prove to be as or even more motivated than the Baltic states by security benefits of
EU membership due to its recent experience of war. Lithuania’s EU accession
experience may also shed some light on the potential candidatures of Belarus and
Ukraine. The Soviet legacy certainly played a role in Lithuania’s EU policy and will
probably do so for these post-Soviet states.
Another fruitful comparison between the Lithuanian or the Baltic accession as a
whole may be made with the accession process of the Nordic states. There are
certainly some key differences between Nordic and Baltic countries since the Nordic
states are not new states, do not have significant security concerns other than Finland
and are not transition states or post-communist economies. However, the Nordic
states, similarly to the Baltics, experienced a divide between public and elite on
integration. While government elites pitched membership as a precondition for
political influence and continued economic growth, public scepticism was centred on
‘cultural nationalism’ and desire to preserve the welfare state.191 Moreover,
comparative analysis of these two regional sets of states may shed interesting light on
the wider questions of the dynamics animating EU enlargement and regional
integration processes.
191 Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of theNordic States, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 5
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Bibliography
This bibliography has been compiled on selective basis and refers only to the workscited in the thesis. All the works mentioned in the thesis are listed below. Thebibliography includes a books and articles section, which consists of secondary andprimary materials, as well as an interviews section.
Books and Articles
Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu LankuLeidyba,Vilnius, 2001
Adamkus, Valdas, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002
Avery, Graham and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union,Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1999
Clemens, Walter C., The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and EuropeanSecurity, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002
Cremona, Marise, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 2003
Hansen, Lene and Ole Wæver, European Integration and National Identity: TheChallenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, London and New York, 2002
Henderson, Karen, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and theEuropean Union, University of Leicester, Leicester, 1999
Hill, Ronald J., and Jan Zielonka, eds., Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a NewEuropean Order, Aldershot, Hants, 1990
Huang, Mel, Electricity in the Air: The Real Power Politics in the Baltics, DefenceAcademy of the UK, London, 2002
Ingham, Hilary and Mike Ingham, EU Expansion to the East, Edward Elgar,Cheltenham, 2002
Krupnick, Charles, ed., Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London,2003
Landsbergis, Vytautas, Kryzkele, Lietuvos Aidas, Vilnius, 1995
Landsbergis, Vytautas, Lithuania: Independent Again, University of Wales Press,Wales, 2000
Landsbergis, Vytautas, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004
112
Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Lieven, Anatol and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO andthe Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington D.C, 2003
Lehti, Marko and David J. Smith, eds., Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern andBaltic Experience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003
Maniokas Klaudijus, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias IEuropos Sajunga – Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del NarystesEuropos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004
Maniokas, Klaudijus and Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos Integracija I ES: Bukles,Perspektyviu ir Pasekmiu Studija, Eugrimas,Vilnius, 1997
Mattli, Walter, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1999
McAdam, Doug and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives onSocial Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, andCultural Feelings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996
Milliken, Jennifer, ‘The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods,’ European Journal of InternationalRelations, 5, no 2, 1999
Miniotaite, Grazina, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma,’Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999
Pettai, Vello and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester &New York, 2003
Piesarskas, Edmundas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, irSocialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prieLietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai,Vilnius, 2002
Piesarskas, Edmundas, Summary: Systemisation and Analysis of Fianncial, Economicand Social Implications of Lithuania’s Integration to the EU, The EuropeanCommittee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, 2002
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement,’Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2002
Schimmelfennig, Frank, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actionand the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, InternationalOrganization, vol.55, no.1.
Staliunas, Darius, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla,Vilnius, 2002
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
Starr, S. Fredrick, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1994
Tang, Helena, ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: Policy Issues for Centraland Eastern Europe, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000
Tiilikainen, Teija, The Political Implications of the EU Enlargement to the BalticStates, Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence,2001
Tiilikainen, Teija and Ib Damgaard Petersen, eds., The Nordic Countries and EC,Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1991
Vachudova, Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integrationafter Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005
Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997
Vareikis, Egidijus, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002
Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, and Vitalis Nakrosis, Politikos Igyvendinimas Lietuvoje irEuropos Sajungos Itaka, Eugrimas,Vilnius, 2003
Wendt, Alex, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1999
Zielonka, Jan, Europe as an Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006
Interviews by Author
Bobelis, Kazys. Member of Lithuanian Parliament and Parliament’s Committees onEuropean Affairs and Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2006.
Kuzmickas, Bronislovas. Former Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Head ofLithuania’s delegation to WEU. March 27, 2006.
Landsbergis, Vytautas. Speaker of Lithuanian Parliament 1996 to 2000, Leader ofHomeland Union party, European Parliament Member. April 12, 2006.
Vareikis, Egidijus. Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Vice-Chairman of Parliament’sEuropean Affairs Committee. August 10, 2005 and March 15, 2006.
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