Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War - GPPAC

Agents for Change:

Civil Society Roles in

Preventing War &

Building Peace

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Issue Paper 2 September 2006

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

c/o European Centre for Conflict Prevention

Laan van Meerdervoort 70

2517 AN Den Haag

The Netherlands

Tel.: + 31 70 3110970

Fax: + 31 70 3600194

[email protected]

www.gppac.net

OmslagRapport2Def 27-09-2006 16:47 Pagina 1

Agents for Change:


Preventing War &

Building Peace


Catherine Barnes

European Centre for Conflict Prevention /International Secretariat of the Global Partnership for thePrevention of Armed Conflict. Laan van Meerdervoort 702517 AN Den HaagThe Netherlands

Tel.: +31 70 3110970Fax: +31 70 [email protected]

© 2006 European Centre for Conflict PreventionAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced inany way without full attribution.

Production: Bureau M&O, AmsterdamLayout: MMS Grafisch Werk, Amsterdam Printed by Haasbeek, Alphen a/d RijnCover photo: Peacelinks members performing for their Stop ChildSoldiers campaign. Peacelinks, Sierra Leone.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE PAPER 5

MAIN FINDINGS 7Why should civil society be involved in working with conflict? 7Agents for change: key functions of civil society peacebuilding 8Partnerships for peace 13

I. CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY 15Understanding conflict dynamically 15Compelling reasons to respond to the changing nature of war and violent conflict 15People-centered human security: working proactively for just peace 18

II. CIVIL SOCIETY, CONFLICT AND CHANGE 19What is civil society? 19Civil society as a factor in war as well as a force for peace 20Globalization and civil society: evolving trends 21

III. WHY CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING? 25Multiple channels for CSO engagement in prevention & peacebuilding 26Cumulative effects: roles and functions of CSOs at different stages in the conflict cycle 27

IV. MAKING PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: CIVIL SOCIETY ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 32Waging conflict constructively 32

Mobilizing for change: enacting the power of resistanceBearing witness: the power to exposeSystemic prevention: campaigns addressing the root causes of conflict

Shifting conflict attitudes: the power to re-frame & change perceptions 38Envisioning a better future: power to identify, analyze & propose 40

Developing a vision for a better futureDefining the peace agendaShaping peace policy

Mobilizing constituencies for peace 44Generating public support and applying pressure for peaceInternational solidarity: mobilizing a global response

Power to reduce violence & promote stability 46Power to alert and to act: early warning and early responseCrisis response, de-escalating tensions, creating oasis of stabilityCivilian monitoring Interpositioning, accompaniment and civilian peacekeeping

Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Making peace: helping to reach agreement 52Back-channel communications between opponents Unofficial dialogue processes: ‘Track II’ and ‘Track 1 1/2Mediation / facilitation of peace negotiationsDirect participation in peace negotiations

Pragmatic peace: community-level peacemaking 63Community-based mediation and monitoring structuresLocalized peace agreements

Transformation: addressing the causes & consequences of conflict and creating peaceable & just relationships 68 Addressing the structural causes and consequences of conflictDemilitarizing minds, healing psyches and fostering reconciliationDemobilization, Decommissioning and Reintegration

Shifting values and cultures; educating for peace 73

V. CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY PEACEBUILDING 77Strategic effectiveness: challenges for achieving sustainable peace 77

Peacebuilding, power and politicsInclusion and the challenge of equality of process and outcomesDilemmas of engaging with armed groups and proscribed organizationsScale and linking dynamics: challenge of countering forces of destructionProject-itis’: the challenge of complacency?Need for a holistic approach

Enhancing capacities: resources, skills, and ethics 87Guiding principles and valuesFunding relationshipsKnowledge, learning and communications technologies

Navigating relationships: challenges of engagement 95Partnerships: dilemmas of collaborative relationshipsNetworks and strategic alliancesRelations with governments and inter-governmental organizations

Towards partnerships for peace 100

BIBLIOGRAPHY 103

THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT 109

Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace

This paper is the second in a series of studies into issuesin conflict prevention and peacebuilding by civil societyof the Global Partnership for the Prevention of ArmedConflict (GPPAC). This paper is based on theexperiences and discussions undertaken through the firstthree years of the Global Partnership. It builds on theoutcomes of regional conferences and action agendas,the global conference ‘From Reaction to Prevention:Civil Society Forging Partnerships to Prevent ViolentConflict and Build Peace” that took place at the UnitedNations headquarters in New York in July 2005 and theGlobal Action Agenda. Furthermore it also advances onthe publication People Building- Successful stories ofcivil society that was published in July 2005. Lastly, itbenefits from the insights and practical experiences ofthe regional initiators of the Global Partnership.

The purpose of the study is to provide an in-depthreview of the many roles and functions that can be

undertaken by civil society organizations and it providesan overview of the key challenges facing the wider fieldof civil society working for peace.

This paper is written by Dr. Catherine Barnes. Dr.Barnes is an independent consultant working in supportof peacebuilding initiatives through facilitation,training, and research. She is an advisor to the GlobalPartnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict and anassociate of Conciliation Resources. She holds adoctoral degree in conflict analysis and resolution fromGeorge Mason University and has authored severalpublications on peace processes, minority rights, andspecific conflict situations around the world.

The paper has made been made possible by the financialsupport of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace 5

ABOUT THIS ISSUES PAPER

This study emerges from the experience and discussionsundertaken through the first three years of the GlobalPartnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict(GPPAC). The main focus is to survey many of the waysin which civil society organizations (CSOs) respondconstructively to conflict, with the primary purpose ofraising awareness of this potential. It starts with a briefdescription of the wider context of peace and securityconcerns that GPPAC aims to address. It then gives anoverview of what is ‘civil society’ and why it is relevantin addressing conflict. After presenting a framework ofthe ways in which CSOs respond to conflict, it thenprovides a more in-depth review of the many roles andfunctions that can be undertaken by CSOs, illustratingthese points with numerous examples. It concludes byidentifying some of the key challenges facing the widerfield of civil society peacebuilding if it is to maximizethis potential and effectively catalyze a new way ofresponding to conflict that promotes human security in amore just and peaceful world.

The following summarizes some of the key points thatare made in arguing the case why it is important for civilsociety to be involved in responding to conflict and areview of the eight functional areas of civil societypeacebuilding described in detail in the paper.

Why should civil society be involved in workingwith conflict?

The changing nature of war compels civil society to actThe use of unconventional tactics by warring parties hasdramatically increased the costs of conflict for ordinarypeople. Non-combatant civilians are the main targets ofviolence and civilian deaths are the vast majority of allcasualties. Forcible displacement and massacres; thetargeting of women and children and abduction ofchildren as soldiers; environmental destruction andeconomic collapse creating profound impoverishment;the legacies of crippling bitterness, fear and division.These are some of the many reasons why civil societyactors feel compelled to use their energy and creativityto find alternatives to violence, to end wars, and preventthem from starting or reoccurring. As people becomedirectly affected by armed conflict, they develop a

central interest in contributing to its resolution. Livingalongside the armed actors, they have greater need andgreater potential to take part in peacebuilding.

Civil society as a force for people-centered securityIn a time when the world is divided in its approach topromoting security, the UN has championed a moreholistic approach, as embodied in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s observation that: “The worldmust advance the causes of security, development andhuman rights together, otherwise none will succeed.Humanity will not enjoy security without development,it will not enjoy development without security, and itwill not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”1

People can be agents of this security, not merely passiverecipients. Fulfilling this potential, however,necessitates changing the state’s ‘security monopoly’:the view that governments are solely responsible forproviding security and this can best be achieved throughmilitary capacity and the threat of force. Governmentshave a primary obligation to provide security. Yet in a globalizing world, preventing violent conflictand building sustainable peace requires complexstrategies. These need to address structural causes ofconflict, many of which may be inherent in the globalsystem. To do so effectively requires cooperationbetween civil society actors at the local, national,regional and global levels and with governments, inter-governmental organizations and, in some cases,businesses. Yet the role of civil society organizations(CSOs) in promoting peace and security remainscontested by some, who see them either as irrelevant oras a threat to the sovereign prerogative of states.

Civil society can contribute depth and durability topeacebuilding Even using the methods of power politics and militaryintervention, it is extremely difficult to ‘impose’ peaceon those who remain committed to achieving theirobjectives through violence. Sustainable peace cannotbe achieved through the exercise of force alone;


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1 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All. Report of the Secretary-General. 21 March 2005. A/59/2005.http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.

effective dialogue must be an integral part of anyprocess aimed at truly resolving the conflict. At somepoint, those involved need to agree the basic terms andconditions in which they will co-exist. It is not possibleto make peace without truly engaging with others acrossthe conflict divide. In many cases, the engagement oflarge segments of the wider society in peacebuildingprocesses can give depth and durability to the changesneeded to support sustainable peace.

One of the greatest strengths civil society bring toworking with conflict is their capacity to supportchanges in how people respond to conflict and to directattention to the underlying causes that need to beaddressed if a sustainable and just peace is to emerge.Furthermore, civil society actors have the potential toplay an important role in raising awareness both of thecosts of continued conflict and the opportunities andmeans to seek a way out through constructiveengagement with opponents.

While they can facilitate dialogue between the primaryprotagonists in armed struggle, CSO-led processes areoften focused on enabling ordinary people to articulatewhat they really need and then working to find acommon ground from which they can work to establishpeaceful co-existence. Instead of the use of force, civilsociety actors generally rely on their creativity bystimulating a new sense of what is possible and how itcan be achieved. This capacity is rooted, ultimately, in asense of agency: the ability to act together with others tochange the world.

Agents for change: key functions of civil societypeacebuilding

Civil society responds to conflict in numerous ways.While often part of the forces supporting war, it is alsoone of the powerful forces promoting peace. CSO rolesin humanitarian relief, development and human rightsprotection are well understood. What is less well knownare the myriad ways that they actively build peace. Yetthey play roles at every point in the development ofconflict and its resolution: from surfacing situations ofinjustice to preventing violence, from creating

conditions conducive to peace talks to mediating asettlement and working to ensure it is consolidated,from setting a global policy agenda to healing war-scarred psyches. These roles can be mapped out intoeight main functions of civil society peacebuilding.

Waging conflict constructivelySometimes the prevailing power structures in a societyare deeply oppressive. While there may not be full scalewarfare, life for many is impaired by profoundstructural violence, often combined with actual orthreatened direct violence. Civil society activists canplay crucial roles in changing these situations bysurfacing the conflict and escalating it nonviolently tobring about necessary changes. Often mobilized bysome triggering situation that provokes an ‘enough isenough!’ response, they gather the sparks of resistancethroughout the population into a movement capable ofchallenging the relevant power structures. Sometimesthey use existing institutional and legal systems to holdregimes to account or to address injustices. They oftencombine formal legal strategies with approaches thataim to foster public awareness and the transformation ofconflict attitudes and relationships. CSOs can bearwitness to violations and undermine the moral authorityand legitimacy of abusers. The very act of publicdisclosure and / or denouncing the situation can makethe truth evident in ways that are very difficult to ignoreand may empower people to take action to change thesituation. This exposure sometimes stimulatesconditions that lead to the collapse of regimes over thelong term. They can also dissuade the wider public fromaccepting or participating in acts that enable abuse andoppression.

Conflict is therefore embraced as a way of workingproactively toward social change goals and is a featureof the struggle for justice. Civil society activists canmanifest both the ‘power to resist’ oppressive forces -typically through mobilizing effective mass movementsfor change - and the ‘power to expose’ oppression andthereby de-legitimize the authority of the oppressors.Furthermore, they have the ‘power to persuade’ bothpopular opinion and decision-makers of moreconstructive ways to respond to specific conflict

Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace8

MAIN FINDINGS

situations and to address the structural problems thatgive rise to conflict. This points to the importance ofchanneling conflict through peaceful processes capableof delivering constructive change.

Shifting conflict attitudes: the power to re-frame andchange perceptionsMany grassroots peacebuilders in societies locked inprotracted conflict promote people-to-people dialogueacross the conflict divides to begin to shift entrenchedconflict dynamics. This is often facilitated by establishingdirect communication between people with somecommon attribute: such as a similar occupational role(e.g., teachers, journalists), identity characteristics (e.g.,women, youth), or common experiences of the conflict(e.g., ex-combatants, policy advisors). The experience ofencountering those who have been regarded as enemiesand perceiving them as human beings can shakeperceptions of ‘the other’ and challenge the discourses ofhate. This can shake-up their perceptions of the conflictand ultimately result in personal transformation. They -and those in the circles around them - may begin to seekalternatives to continued war because they now know thatthere are people in the other community who are similarto themselves in seeking a reasonable solution to theconflict.

Envisioning a better future: power to identify, toanalyse and to proposeCivil society actors can help shape peace policy byidentifying overlooked problems and policy gaps,analyzing issues and recommending solutions. In short,they can identify the central agenda of issues that needto be addressed in responding to a conflict situation anddealing with peace and security issues more widely.Civil society groups can analyze the situation, formulaterecommendations, develop policy options and engage inpolicy dialogue to address conflicts. They can alsomobilize advocacy campaigns to generate political willamongst decision-makers and implement strategies toachieve the desired results. Thus civil society efforts atraising public awareness about a particular set ofproblems is intertwined with efforts to motivate politicaldecision-makers to take action to address them.

Sustainable peace processes need to be about more thanfinding ways to end the fighting; attention must also bedirected to supporting societies on the path towards amore equitable and peaceful future. In some conflicts,civil society activists have stimulated widespread publicdeliberation about what kind of society members wantto create. This has resulted not only in a ‘blue print’ ofthe goals for the future but has also helped to reveal thedeeper causes of conflict that must be addressed if thisaspiration is to be fulfilled. In some cases, these ideashave fed directly into the negotiating agenda for peacetalks and proposals for how these issues should best beaddressed.

Mobilizing constituencies for peace: generatingsupport and applying pressureThose involved in armed conflict often justify theiractions on the basis of their authority as governments orby claiming to represent popular causes. Civil societyactors may challenge these assertions by demonstratingthat public opinion rejects military approaches andsupports alternatives. Peace media, art projects,concerts, and other creative methods have all beeneffective in reaching out to the wider public. Sometimesefforts involve mass protests at the use of military forceor demonstrations in favor of peace processes. Byrevealing that there are significant constituencies forpeace, they can be a persuasive force in altering theresponses of governments and armed groups. This canhelp to transform social and political dynamics tosupport atmosphere conducive to peacebuilding and afactor in the viability of a political peace negotiationprocess.

Yet local people are often unable to address all thedimensions and drivers of conflict on their own. Thiscan be especially challenging when there are severepower imbalances; when there are numerous externalparties to the conflict (such as powerful countries alliedto one of the armed groups); or where the conflictparties are largely motivated to sustain the benefitsderived from the ‘war economy’. In these cases,strategies may well require solidarity and collaborationfrom key partners elsewhere in the global system. Thisimplies the need for a more systemized approach to


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collaboration between the civil society actors withgovernments and others who have an interest in orinfluence over the situation. This can be enhancedthrough coordinated lobbying and raising awarenessamong domestic and international audiences.

Promoting security: power to reduce violence andpromote stabilityIt is very difficult for people to engage in and supportpeacemaking when their basic security is threatened.This is one of the reasons why those who want to wrecka peace process escalate violence against civilians.While conventional state security forces can play animportant role in protection; too often they are a part ofthe problem or are simply incapable of fulfilling theirresponsibilities. Military peacekeepers are oftendeployed too late, too few or with a mandate that isinadequate to provide sufficient protection of thecivilian population. Yet state security forces andinternationally-mandated peacekeepers are not the onlyones equipped to respond to violence effectively.Violence-affected communities are not merely victimsof events. In many cases, they have been able to takeaction to prevent violence and ameliorate the effects ofarmed conflict. Community level structures - especiallywhen they work in partnership with authorities andinternational missions - can monitor developments andtake proactive steps to de-escalate violence. In a numberof places torn by violence, one of the most effectiveways to address this problem is for the community tobecome proactively involved in trying to prevent theviolence by resolving localized disputes and preventingthose with specific personal grievances from mobilizingothers in conflict. Furthermore, cooperation in helpingto achieve mutual security can be a powerfulconfidence-building measure. This experience can helpprepare communities for peaceful co-existence in thewider society.

Power to alert and to act: early warning and earlyresponse. People based in a society are often best placedto identify the reasons for a conflict, the motivations ofthose who are driving it, and to suggest specific actionsthat could channel it in a more peaceful direction. Theseinsights can support the development of subtle and

highly targeted strategies that do not require extensiveresources or coercive measures, especially whenaddressed at an early point in a conflict cycle. WhileCSOs can be the source of vital inputs shapinginternational responses to conflict, it is also vital tostimulate local systems for responding to the risk ofviolence.

Civilian monitoring. Civil society monitoring initiativesexplicitly aimed at supporting peace processes littleknown. Yet they can be uniquely influential in creatingsufficient stability and space needed to underpin officialpolitical negotiations and to address the localdimensions of wider conflict contexts. They typicallydraw upon detailed local knowledge of the specificdynamics and developments that can trigger conflictescalation. Utilizing credible (and usually independent)monitors, they can issue information and analysis that isaccepted by the conflict parties and other stakeholders.They often issue recommendations explicitly aimed atfostering confidence building and may work with allinvolved to see them implemented. Their credibilityoften stems from the fact that they are perceived aseither non-partisan or multi-partisan (e.g., comprised ofpeople with links to all the conflict parties), with theinterests and needs of non-combatant civilians theirprimary concern. In addition to monitoring formallyagreed ceasefires, community monitors can becomeinvolved in activities that help to generate publicconfidence, such as monitoring developments in stateinstitutions or relations between communities.

Interpositioning, accompaniment and civilianpeacekeeping. Based on the observation that the merepresence of outside witnesses can help to deter violencein many - if not all - contexts, there has been anemergence of unarmed, civil society efforts to reducepolitical violence and protect civilian noncombatants.Civilian peacekeeping activities include monitoring,protective accompaniment and inter-positioning, i.e.,physically positioning themselves between opposingforces to prevent violent attack. Many initiatives arebased on using a system of international-local contacts,with foreigners linked to locals to provide a symbolicpresence, thereby indicating that the world is watching.


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Success often rests on perception of potential attackersthat the foreigners have international linkages. Thisperception can change their assessment of the ‘costs vsbenefits’ that could be gained by attacking. Theseinitiatives can also provide support for local people’sconflict resolution efforts.

Making peace: helping to reach agreementNegotiations to end armed conflict are often viewed asthe exclusive realm of governments and the leaders ofarmed groups, with concerned governments and IGOsacting as conveners and mediators. The ‘official’ natureof these processes meant that the potential contributionsof civil society were overlooked. Numerous civil societypeacemaking initiatives since the 1990s, however, haverevealed their invaluable potential for supporting theprospects of a sustainable agreement.

Back channel communications and unofficialdialogue. As well as helping to create a climateconducive for talks, civil society actors sometimes havea direct peacemaking role. They can help open channelsof communication between parties in conflict. Usingtheir unofficial and low-key status, they can provideconfidential ‘back channels’ to convey messagesbetween opponents. CSOs can also facilitate unofficialTrack II and Track 1 1/2 dialogue processes, involvingthose close to government leaders and armed oppositiongroups. Both methods provide parties the opportunity toengage in the communication necessary to determinewhether political negotiations may be viable, buildrelationships and deepen understanding of the others’perspectives on the conflict and explore options for itsresolution.

Mediating / facilitating peace negotiations. Unofficialcivil society actors have also served as the mainmediators and facilitators of formal peace negotiations.This role is more typically taken by diplomats fromconcerned governments or by the UN or regionalorganizations. These mediators often offer financialresources and, in many cases, bring political pressure tobear on the negotiations. Yet in some circumstances thevery fact that civil society-based mediators can offeronly their trust-worthiness and skill is a key reason why

they are acceptable when other mediators are rejected.They typically deploy non-coercive and participatoryprocesses to enable those involved to better understandthe reasons for the conflict and what needs to be done toresolve it. Instead of relying upon an external force toexert pressure and inducements for the parties to reachan agreement and then supply the resources to helpimplement it, the parties must instead work jointlythrough the options until they are able to reach mutuallyacceptable arrangements. The agreements are then morelikely to endure because those involved tend tounderstand why the compromises were necessary andwhy the agreement reached is the best one possible.

Public participation in peace negotiations. Yet thereare some peace processes where civil society groupingsparticipate directly in the negotiations. Such processesare usually aimed at reaching comprehensiveagreements on new state structures and other key issuesat the heart of conflict. It is here that civil society can beespecially invaluable because they are typicallymotivated more by the desire to promote sustainablechange than by the quest for governing power

Consolidating peace agreements. Conflicts are nottransformed by agreements alone; they need acommitment to address ongoing problems throughpolitical means. Civil society also plays important rolesin helping to sustain agreements reached by the parties,including through raising awareness and educating thepublic about the agreement itself. They can be crucialfor consolidating support. A sense of public ownershipof the peace process can be crucial to its durability. Ifthe public and organized civil society have beenexcluded from the process or believe that it has notaddressed their real needs, they are less likely to workactively towards its implementation. Without a broadpublic constituency in support, there are few safeguardsagainst those who want to derail the agreement.

‘Pragmatic peace’: community-level peacemakingMany initiatives - especially those undertaken by civilsociety peacebuilders - are aimed at peacebuilding at thelocal community level. Protracted armed conflict withinstates generally penetrates all levels of society. National


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and regional conflicts interconnect with self-sustainingconflict dynamics at the local community level. In somecases, continued violent violence at the community levelgenerates pressure towards greater chaos, underminingefforts at macro-level peacemaking. Conversely,effective conflict prevention and peacemaking locallycan underpin macro-level peace processes by creatingsufficient stability so that wider political processestowards peace can take hold. This is particularly truewhen people in other communities see what is beingachieved and are inspired to launch their own initiatives.

Even when national level peace processes are stalled ornon-existent, local communities can act to address theissues that generate conflict and escalate violencelocally. Sometimes they address volatile local dynamicsthat could escalate into violence and intensify conflictand war in the wider society. Often they are connectedto efforts to make a practical difference in the daily livesof people of the community. Sometimes they are able tofoster ‘islands of peace’ amidst a wider context of war.Local peace agreements rarely have any formal legalstatus. They rely on people keeping the commitmentsthey made - often backed by considerable peer pressureby other community members. Yet it is preciselybecause community members realize that it is in theirown self-interest to find a way to live togetherpeacefully that these outcomes can be so durable.

Transforming the causes and consequences ofconflict

Addressing the structural causes and consequences ofarmed conflict. Agreements on paper mean very little ifpeople are still suffering from the consequences of warand if the inequities that gave rise to it are leftunaddressed. Sustained financial, technical, andpolitical commitments are necessary to transform theseconditions. Determined government efforts combinedwith appropriate international aid is needed to facilitatethe rehabilitation of war-affected communities and helpensure that a ‘peace dividend’ is widely experienced.This can be strengthened through the involvement oflocal and international CSOs in policy analysis as wellas program implementation and service delivery.

Ultimately, however, it requires governmentcommitment to policies that will create structures andconditions that are more capable of equitably meetingthe needs of all. Civil society can play an important rolein generating the political will to shore up thiscommitment. Yet simply recreating pre-conflictstructures - which for many seems the most obviousaction after a war - may contribute to prolonging theconflict (or even restarting the violence) rather thansolving it. Local civil society, often supported by theirinternational partners, can play a crucial role inpromoting this structural transformation over the longerterm and in helping to address ongoing conflicts overdevelopmental priorities through peaceful processes.

Demilitarizing minds, healing psyches and fosteringreconciliation. While addressing the practical needs isimperative for sustainable peace, transforming conflict-impaired relationships can require even more complexprocesses that enable people to reclaim their dignity andfoster empathy across conflict divides. This may involveparties fully acknowledging their responsibility forabuses they committed and taking steps to address pastand continuing injustices. It also requires a shift in theattitudes that enabled and sustained the conflict; a shiftfrom seeing the ‘other’ as enemy -implicitly questioningtheir membership in the human community - toperceiving them as fellow human beings with whom onecan, at a minimum, co-exist. Although suchtransformation may not be necessary to ensure a formalend to war, the failure to do so can mean that underlyingconflict dynamics remain unresolved, potentiallycreating the seeds for future discord. While governmentscan - and should - take a leadership role in fosteringreconciliation, this involves a transformation of the‘hearts and minds’ of those who have been touched bythe conflict and, as such, cannot be engineered. Thesechanges can be triggered by the authentic initiatives ofcivil society actors, who rely essentially on creativity togenerate experiences that allow people to connect acrossdivides and to spark changes in perceptions. This ofteninvolves activating cultural traditions and spiritualresources that touch upon the deepest sources meaningfor those affected by conflict. Civil society groups haveoften found ways of fostering truth-telling processes and


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ensuring that the past is not simply hidden behind a wallof denial. Initiatives can range from documentationprojects and academic studies, to theatre and otherartistic and literary projects, to memorials and symbolicor ritual expressions of grief, atonement and recognitionof those who suffered. All these forms can provideaccess points that enable people to remember and toengage with the past.

Disarmament, demobilization and re-integration.Protracted armed conflict tends to militarize significantsections of the affected population. Societies are oftensaturated with military weapons, as well as with soldiers- sometimes including large numbers of children -whose lives have been shaped by the experience offighting. A significant factor in the success or failure ofDDR processes is the degree to which they are inspiredby and respond to the ideas and needs of those involved.Prospects of success are enhanced if weapons collectionprograms are seen as promoting the interests and needsof community members from which the fighting forcesare drawn. Local civil society actors can serve as a kindof lightening rod to elicit and implement appropriateand sustainable strategies.

Transforming values and cultures: educating forpeace. Many CSOs aim to address sources of structuralviolence and to promote human security. Throughparticipation in political processes, policy dialogue,monitoring, advocacy campaigns, and protests they helpto make governments and state structures moreresponsive to the needs of their citizens. They can alsoplay important roles in helping to alleviate socialtensions and conflict. They challenge racism,xenophobia and discrimination and promote toleranceand a culture of peace. Person-focused methodologies,such as prejudice reduction workshops and inter-faithdialogue, can complement efforts to addressdiscrimination through policy reform and structuralchange. Often these initiatives are focused on youth,who may have greater capacities for change than oldergenerations. Summer camps, integrated schools, andexchange programs can all promote what has becomeknown as ‘next generation work’. People of all ages canbe empowered to address conflicts from the grassroots

upwards. As their knowledge and skills grow, it shouldbecome entrenched in the mainstream consciousness.One of the means of doing this is through changingnorms and supporting constructive responses to conflictby systematizing peace and conflict resolutioneducation.

Partnerships for peace

In sum, civil society initiatives are often the source forinnovative responses to conflict. While civil society as awhole is not necessarily a force for peace, the debatesand initiatives cultivated by CSOs are often the motorfor it. Their contribution to the underlyingtransformation of conflict and building peace extendsfrom efforts to support individual development andcultivate positive norms in communities to tacklingexclusionary policies, systems and structures that giverise to grievances. Ultimately, a widespread, inclusiveand vibrant engagement within civic life can be theincubator for the institutions and habits needed toresolve conflict peacefully and generate moreresponsive and better governance needed to make peacesustainable.

While it is rare for grassroots efforts to transform widersystems of conflict and war; it is also not possible forthese wider systems to be transformed withoutstimulating changes at the community level. Thereforemany analysts and practitioners are agreed with JohnPaul Lederach’s observation that there is a need to buildpeace from the bottom-up, the top-down and themiddle-out.2 Yet the methodologies for crossing thescale barrier, simultaneously and in a coordinatedmanner, are not well developed. Therefore the keyseems to be in negotiating dynamic and strategicpartnerships.

Primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests withnational governments and other local actors. Greaterownership is likely to result in a more legitimate processand sustainable outcomes. The primary role of outsiders


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2 John Paul Lederach. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation inDivided Societies. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

is to create spaces and support inclusive processes thatenable those directly involved to make decisions aboutthe specific arrangements for addressing the causes ofconflict. Outsiders should help to build on the capacitiesthat exist and avoid actions that displace and underminehomegrown initiatives or that promote short-termobjectives at the expense of long-term prevention. Basedon a collaborative understanding of the sources ofconflict and the factors that continue to generate it,people based elsewhere can seek to address some of thecauses that ‘located’ elsewhere in the conflict system(such as arms suppliers in third countries or policiespromoted by foreign governments that further escalatewar).

Partnerships for peace may be the antidote to systemsand networks sustaining war. Yet to achieve thispotential, we need to acknowledge the legitimacy of

CSOs in peace and security matters and to strengthenofficial recognition of their roles in the conflictprevention partnership. This can then be operationalisedthrough stronger mechanisms and resources forinteraction between IGOs, CSOs and governments inorder to institutionalize the capacity for prevention.

It is likely, however, that efforts to shift to a culture ofpeace and to prioritize prevention over crisismanagement will be sustained only when there iswidespread awareness amongst the general publicsaround the world that common security cannot beobtained through the barrel of a gun; instead, we canbest work towards sustainable peace through collectiveefforts at meeting basic human needs and strengtheningsystems for managing differences peacefully.


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Why civil society needs tobe at the center ofstrategies to promote apeople-centered paradigmof human security

Governments have primary responsibility to protectcivilians and prevent violence. Yet the complexity, scaleand diversity of conflict mean that no single entity, onits own, can ensure peace: a comprehensive network ofrelationships and actions is needed. In this process, civilsociety can play a critical role in helping to change theroot causes of conflict, in working to prevent violenceand to protect civilians, in facilitating processes to bringpolitical and social resolution of specific conflicts, andin helping to transform war-torn societies.

Understanding conflict dynamically

Conflict is an inevitable feature of human life and socialchange. It emerges in response to unmet needs andinvolves the attempt to satisfy them. Most broadlyunderstood, conflict occurs when two or more ‘parties’(individuals or groups) have - or believe they have -incompatible goals and when this perception ofincompatibility shapes their attitudes and behaviorstoward each other. Conflicts occurring at the level ofsocieties or amongst countries or with globalmovements are extremely complex. The dynamics playout in the perceptions, attitudes and behaviors of all theconflict-affected individuals and groups, as well as thesenior decision-makers of the different parties.

Many people think of conflict as intrinsically negative.But conflict typically emerges from real issues anddivergent interests, thus revealing underlying problemsthat need to be addressed to keep the system ofrelationships dynamic and strong. Conflict oftenreleases considerable energy that can be channeled inmany directions by those trying to respond to thesituation. The way people respond to conflict makes the

difference between it becoming a force for destructionor being a catalyst for constructive change. Sometimespeople respond to conflict by seeking to avoid it, tosuppress it, or by the use of aggression or violenceagainst those they see as creating the problem orblocking their goals. Yet it is possible to work withconflict in a way that enables people to address thecauses and to repair relationships that have beenweakened by anger, fear and even hatred generated bythe experience of conflict.

As will be discussed in greater detail below, conflict can beembraced as a way of working proactively toward socialchange goals, including through nonviolent direct action.Many development and human rights organizations workto intensify conflict (as distinct from violence) in specificsituations so that necessary social and political changes canbe negotiated. If proactively addressed through peacefulprocesses, conflict can lead to stronger relationships,potentially grounded in more equitable and justarrangements. Too often, however, the use of force isperceived as the only viable means to achieve goals.

When tensions escalate into armed conflict, it almostalways reflects the break down or underdevelopment ofroutine systems for managing competing interests andvalues and the failure to satisfy basic human needs.Efforts to prevent armed conflict therefore necessitatestrengthening these systems and making concerted effortsto address needs. While governments have primaryresponsibility for making these efforts, it is rare that anysingle entity - whether government, international agency,private enterprise or civil society organization - canaddress them fully. Effective responses to conflict requiremultiple entities and actors, including those close to theprimary parties in an armed conflict, are mobilized todevelop constructive and nonviolent approaches to satisfyconflicting interests and needs.

Compelling reasons to respond to the changingnature of war and violent conflict

Recent decades have witnessed profound changes fromthe classical model of warfare fought between thearmies of states, with soldiers the principle protagonists


I. Conflict, peace & security

and causalities. Although civilians have always beencaught up in fighting, non-combatant civilians areincreasingly the primary targets of war. Theoverwhelming majority of armed conflicts are intra-state (although intra-state conflicts often have regionalor international dimensions, thus challenging theclassifications ‘internal’ and ‘external’). Some arecharacterized by multiple armed groups and multiplegrievances. Many are noteworthy for their localizednature, with intense struggles often confined to a regionof the country. (This may be because its people wantindependence and / or because a concentration ofnatural resources sparks competition for control.)3

Furthermore, the use of unconventional tactics bywarring parties has dramatically increased the costs ofconflict for ordinary people. Non-combatant civiliansare the main targets of violence and civilian deaths areestimated to count for approximately 75 percent of allcasualties.4 Forcible displacement and massacres; thetargeting of women and children and abduction ofchildren as soldiers; environmental destruction andeconomic collapse creating profound impoverishment;the legacies of crippling bitterness, fear and division.These are some of the many reasons why civil societyactors are compelled to use their energy and creativity tofind alternatives to violence, to end wars and preventthem from starting or reoccurring. As Celia McKeonexplains:

“The nature of internal conflict in the post-Cold Warera provides the most compelling argument for theparticipation of civil society in peace processes. ...Individual citizens, the family and the community areviolated, coerced and subverted as part of thepolitical, economic, and sociocultural strategies of thearmed actors. This is the frontline of modern warfare.As people become directly affected by armedconflict, they develop a central interest incontributing to its resolution. Living alongside thearmed actors, they have greater need and greaterpotential to take part in peacemaking efforts. ...Certainly the leverage exercised by an acceptablegovernmental or UN representative can have asignificant impact on the prospects for agreement.

However, in situations of protracted internal conflict,violence often penetrates through the social fabric,involving a larger array of armed actors (often withdiffering levels of autonomy and accountability), aswell as a complex tapestry of interconnected and self-sustaining conflict dynamics at the communitylevel.”5

Simultaneous to this localized dimension of armedconflict, modern warfare tends to be intertwined withthe dynamics of globalization. One facet ofglobalization is increasing interdependence, wherebyevents occurring in any part of the world affect otherparts of the global system - either directly or in terms ofperceptions.

According to Mary Kaldor6, the change processesassociated with globalization are breaking up thecultural and socio-economic divisions that definedpolitics in previous periods. New forms of struggle mayappear to resemble traditional nationalism orcommunalism but are rooted in contemporaryconditions - often taking advantage of multipletransnational connections - and display newcharacteristics. Although the ‘new wars’ have a politicalcontent, she observes that they blur the distinctionsbetween war, organized crime (violence undertaken byprivately organized groups for private purposes, usuallyfinancial gain), and large-scale human rights violationsin which non-combatant civilians are often a primarytarget.

At a structural level, globalization has intensified thegrievances that leave societies vulnerable to conflict.Many have observed that economic globalizationsimultaneous brings economic growth in some places



3 SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and InternationalSecurity. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.http://www.sipri.org.

4 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on theProtection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2001/331), availablehttp://www/un/org.

5 Celia McKeon. 2005. “Civil Society: Participating in Peace Processes” invan Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p.567

6 Mary Kaldor. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a GlobalEra. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

while weakening economies and whole states in others.In many cases, pre-existing inequalities have widened,so that those who were already strong in themarketplace have been able to accumulateproportionately more wealth, whereas those who werealready in positions of economic vulnerability haveexperienced intensified exclusion. This widelyunderstood as a significant root cause of conflict,although many observe that the conflict is most likely tobe expressed in violent revolts when people feelfrustrated in their expectations rather than simply by theexperience of grinding poverty.

Another factor contributing to the feasibility of armedinsurgencies is that governments do not have full controlover regulating cross-border economic interactions. The

growing ‘shadow globalization’ of illicit trade givesincreasingly lucrative incentives to criminal networkscapable of transferring whatever goods can be profitablytraded: from timber, to drugs, to weapons, to humanbeings. It has also enabled armed groups to become self-provisioning by linking the local resources they controlto global networks.7 Thus globalization enables ‘wareconomies’ through illicit money flows, smuggled armsand contraband, diaspora communities and informationexchange, thus helping to both sustain the resourcesneeded by fighting groups (whether state or non-stateactors) and providing the incentives that motivate someto engage in armed conflict.

One expression of these dynamics is the fact that armedconflict is increasingly assuming a sub-regionaldimension, what Barnett Rubin terms ‘regional conflictformations’.8 There may be a regional dimension to thecausal factors generating conflict. These can includelong-standing demographic patterns of ethno-nationaland indigenous peoples divided by state borders, as wellas newer structural factors created by the fall-out fromeconomic globalisation and power asymmetries. Thesymptoms of conflict also resonate throughout theregion, with increased trafficking, refugee flows, cross-border military movements that can destabilizeneighboring states. Addressing these factorssystematically requires strategies based on an integratedapproach.

These dynamics present profound challenges for thosein civil society committed to preventing armed conflict.As will be discussed in the next chapter, global civilsociety networks have been effective in mountingcampaigns to address some of the systemic root causesand factors that exacerbate conflict. Yet CSOs are onlyat the beginning of learning how best to address thefactors that enable the ‘war economies’ that can fuelprotracted violence.9 Furthermore, cross-bordernetworks between peacebuilding CSOs have tended tobe weak in most regions prone to conflict. This hasinhibited the potential to cooperate on addressing thecross-border dimensions of conflict and to build moreresilient societies.



7 Mark Duffield observes that during the so-called ‘Cold War’ period, the‘superpowers’ provided significant material and political support togovernments and insurgencies in the global South in ways that maintainedthe balance of power between them. This support mostly dried up betweenthe mid-1980s and the 1990s, which meant that warring parties had tobecome self-provisioning. See: “War as a Network Enterprise: The NewSecurity Terrain and its Implications” Cultural Values, 2002, 6(1&2): 153-165.

8 The Center on International Cooperation at New York University has aproject aiming to explore these dynamics more fully. As they observe:“Regional conflict formations (RCFs) are sets of transnational conflictsthat form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout aregion, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts. ... RCFspresent formidable obstacles to peace efforts by the internationalcommunity, but though a few studies have noted their prevalence, fewhave analyzed their dynamics and challenges for policy. Conventionalapproaches to human rights, based on the responsibility of states or state-territorial jurisdictions, may also encounter obstacles. Regional strategiesare unavoidable, as regional powers are likely to be involved, and globalpowers may have little interest in devoting resources to distant problems.But regional parties to the conflict may be ill suited to take on the leadrole in a peace process (due to lack of capacity or impartiality), andregional organizations may be paralyzed by dissension among theirmembers. This conundrum is reflected in differences between theperspectives of analysts and actors living in these regions and those inglobal organizations or dominant states outside the region. The latter tendto focus on sources of conflict within the states or regions themselves and(if they are globalist liberals rather than nationalist unilateralists) proposeameliorative interventions by external actors. Those in the regions oftenattribute their problems in large measure to the policies of more powerfulstates and institutions and focus on the capacities of their own regions toconfront these problems. Regional actors may lack economic or militarycapacity, but they possess knowledge and political skills that more distantactors may lack. Furthermore they have no ‘exit strategy’ and are thus keyto sustainability.” Quotation from:http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_project6.html

There are also implications for the ways in which stateactors and international institutions are responding andhelping to cause or sustain these wars. These debateshave intensified since the events of 11 September 2001and the subsequent US declaration of a ‘war on terror’.Few, if any, societies have been untouched by thesedevelopments and they have perhaps been particularlyinfluential on those already experiencing armed conflict.This development further underscores the importance ofthe global dimension of conflict - and of itstransformation.

People-centered human security: workingproactively for just peace

Ultimately, the quest for equitable and just humansecurity is at the centre of GPPAC’s motivation and isunderstood as the key to preventing both armed conflictin specific societies as well as transforming the widerconditions that give rise to it globally. The goal is topromote the security of people: their physical safety;their socio-economic well-being; respect for theirdignity and political and cultural identity as individualsand as members of communities; gender equality; andthe protection and promotion of all human rights -including women’s rights - and fundamental freedomsin the home, in the community, in their country and inthe wider world. Accompanying this aspiration is thebelief that the sustainable security of states can only bebased on the security of people. This vision of humansecurity can lead to a shift from a security paradigmbased on the balance of power and military alliances toone based on mutual interdependence and cooperation.It is a re-orientation from a state-centered to a people-centered approach.

In a time when the world appears divided in itsapproach to promoting security, the UN has championed

a more holistic approach, as embodied in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s observation that: “The worldmust advance the causes of security, development andhuman rights together, otherwise none will succeed.Humanity will not enjoy security without development,it will not enjoy development without security, and itwill not enjoy either without respect for humanrights.”10.

GPPAC’s vision for a more secure world is based on theassumption that people - especially when organized -can be agents of this security, not merely passiverecipients. Recognition and fulfillment of this potential,however, necessitates changing the assumption of thestate’s ‘security monopoly’. This is the view thatgovernments are solely responsible for providingsecurity to the state’s inhabitants; and that security canbest be achieved through weapons and institutionslargely reliant on the threat of force. While the provisionof security is a primary obligation of governments,activating people through civil society institutions maywell be key to fulfilling a more cooperatively-basedfoundation for human security that is more sustainableand equitable. Yet the role of CSOs in promoting peaceand security remains highly contested by some, who seethem either as irrelevant or as a threat to the sovereignprerogative of states.



9 For example, the UK-based NGO Global Witness - working in coalitionwith other international and domestic NGOs - has been at the forefront ofcampaigns to expose the exploitation of natural resources and fundingarmed conflict. This has included the exploitation of timber in Cambodia,Liberia, and Burma; the global diamond trade funding conflict in Angola,Sierra Leone and DRC; and the oil industry in Angola. Seehttp://www.globalwitness.org

10 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All. Report of the Secretary-General. 21 March 2005. A/59/2005.http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm A debate of these ideaswas a focus of the High-Level Summit to review the MillenniumDeclaration in September 2005.

What is civil society? 11

‘Civil society’ resists easy definition, especially whendiscussing it as a global development. Every society hasits own distinct forms of social organization, culturaland political traditions, as well as contemporary stateand economic structures - all of which are central to thedevelopment of civil society and shape its specificfeatures. Most broadly understood, however, civilsociety refers to the web of social relations that exist inthe space between the state, the market (activities withthe aim of extracting profit), and the private life offamilies and individuals. Interlinked with the concept of‘civil society’ is the idea of social capital: the values,traditions and networks that enable coordination andcooperation between people. Civil society thereforeinvolves qualities associated with relationships, withvalues, and with organizational forms.

Civil society takes form through various types ofassociation. Ranging from officially constitutedinstitutions to small, informal community groups, theseassociations give expression and direction to the social,political, spiritual and cultural needs of members. Byreflecting diverse interests and values, they enable thearticulation, mobilization and pursuit of the aspirationsof the different constituent elements within a society.

Figure 1 illustrates many - though not all - of the typesof groupings that can potentially comprise civil society,broadly understood. Some would contest the inclusionof some of these groupings as a part of civil society,


II. Civil society, conflict and change

Politicalparties &

movements

Businessassociations

Trade unions& professional

bodies

Cooperatives &self-help initiatives

Privatefoundations &philanthropy

Media:non-profit & state

Artscollectives &

culturalassociations

Religiousinstitutions

& faith-basedassociations

Traditionalstructures &

council of elders

Youth unions,student associations

Women’sgroups &

associations

Educational &researchinstitutes

Social,environmental &

human rightsmovements

NGOs

Voluntary Charities

Community-Based

Organizations

Figure 1: Civil Society - Diverse Sectoral & Organizational Forms

11 The following section is based on Catherine Barnes. 2005. “Weaving theWeb: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace”in Van Tongeren, Paul, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and JulietteVerhoeven, Eds. People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of CivilSociety. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

more narrowly defined. Yet all have played importantroles in responding to conflict. What becomes clear isthat civil society is far more than public benefit non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet NGOs withtechnical-professional skills play an important role inproviding services, promoting change and working withconflict.

There are significant variations in how theorists definecivil society and view its functions.12 Many incorporatea normative quality to their definition and view it as thespace for cultivating ‘civic’ values and practices. It isalso seen as the space for cultivating values of ‘civility’in the ‘public realm’, in which power is mediated byconstitutionalizing relations between different groupswithin society. In this view, civil society can bedistinguished from ‘patrimonialism’ or personalizedpower relations operating through alliances organizedaround patron / client relations that underpin of social,political and economic organization.

Some stress the political role of civil society, viewing itas the space for cultivating ‘civic’ values and processesfor citizens to engage in public life by channeling theirinterests and aspirations through peaceful deliberativeprocesses. In democracies, civil society interfaces withthe state through parliamentary institutions (withparliamentarians often seen as serving a bridging role asthe elected representatives of civil society), throughother forms of policy dialogue, and even through directdisplays of power via protest movements and activism.Furthermore, civil society groups can help to monitorand constrain the arbitrary exercise of state power and,increasingly, the behavior of private businesses and evenmultinational corporations. Therefore civil societyenables different groupings in society to debatedifferences, reach compromise, form priorities, and -sometimes - develop consensus on a higher commonpurpose.

Civil society does not, however, replace the state. At itsworst, an authoritarian government can constrict - oreven crush - the functioning of civil society throughmethods that violate human rights. Yet it is difficult forcivil society to thrive amidst lawlessness and

widespread violence. A flourishing civil societytypically depends upon the security and predictabilityprovided by an effective state run by democraticgovernments that ensures the rule of law. If theseconditions are not present, people - through civil societyorganizing -strive to create the elements of self-governance and security, as has been seen in parts ofSomalia and in some of the ‘zones of peace’communities from the Philippines to Colombia,amongst others. In so doing, they are recreating thebasis for democratic government, which rests on theconsent of the governed. Thus civil society anddemocratic states are highly complementary and eveninterdependent.

Civil society as a factor in war as well as a forcefor peace

Most people, most of the time, do not want to be a partof wide-scale violence. Many will, however, participatewhen they do not see alternatives or are so inflamed witha burning sense of injustice that violence is considered anecessary remedy. In these cases, there are civil societyactors who are central to the mobilization and escalationof war. Intellectuals, traditional authorities and religiousleaders may provide the rationale and moral justificationfor violence; educational institutes and the media canshape perceptions of what is going on and advocate waras the answer; civic associations and political partiesmay mobilize their members for the war effort. Thuscivil society groups can be a factor in war as well as aforce for peace.

A maximalist conception of civil society recognizes thisplurality because it is a manifestation of the range ofopinion, interests and values that exist within a society.In some contexts, there may be deep divisions withinthe society that are, in turn, reflected in and shaped bypolarized CSOs. Some CSOs promote causes that areincompatible with internationally agreed norms andprinciples, such as those promoting exclusionary or



12 See, for example John Burbidge, Ed. 1997. Beyond Prince and Merchant:Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society. (Brussels: Institute ofCultural Affairs International)

other hate-based ideologies or those tolerating (or evenendorsing) tactics based in violence or oppression.There are also dominant elements in society that mayuse various forms of coercive power - often executedthrough civic and state institutions - to maintain theirprivilege and promote their interests at the expense ofother groups, of future generations or of theenvironment as a whole. Most would argue that ‘armedgroups’ are not a part of civil society per se. Yet thesegroups are usually supported by elements in civilsociety that champion the cause and view armedstruggle as legitimate, further indicating the fuzzy linesaround the ‘civility’ of some CSOs.

A diverse and thriving civil society is nevertheless oneof the crucial underpinnings for strengthening thecapacity of societies to manage conflict peacefully. Thisis particularly true when individuals are members ofmultiple groups, each of which addresses differentaspects of their concerns - such as their communalidentity, vocational interests and hobbies, social andpolitical values, and neighborhood environment. Thesecross-cutting memberships across CSOs create‘bridging social capital’: the dense networks that are apowerful force integrating society and minimizing thepotential for polarization along any specific divide.13

Within any society, civil society is a potentiallypowerful force that can mobilize either to escalateconflict or facilitate its resolution. Ultimately, the statebelongs to its people. Civil society engagement inaddressing problems that could generate conflictstrengthens long-term social and political developmentof the country. Conversely, governments that attempt tosuppress the aspirations voiced through civil societytend to provoke a struggle to meet those needs throughother means, including violent resistance. Any long-term strategy for prevention needs to be rooted increating cultures of peace. In the meanwhile, it isimportant to engage antagonist civil society actors indialogue processes capable of working throughdifferences, developing common ground, andtransforming perceptions distorted by fear,misunderstanding and hatred. If the diverse elementswithin a society feel that the ‘solutions’ are legitimate,

they are more likely to take responsibility forimplementing them.

Globalization and civil society: evolving trends

As a concept, civil society rose to prominence globallyduring the 1990s. This was in part as a result of agendasarticulated by international NGOs working ondevelopment. It was also a response to initiatives ofdonor agencies aspiring to support the development ofthis independent space within societies in transitionfrom various forms of authoritarian rule. In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion inCSOs explicitly aimed at working with conflict. Thesignificance of civil society in general and its role inconflict in particular has been recognized by the UnitedNations in recent reports and resolutions.14

Civil society and global governanceThroughout the 1990s, the major UN ‘worldconferences’ on key thematic topics created bothregional and global forums for dialogue and deliberationof important policies and principles. They also openedspace for the development of transnational networksamong CSOs for the exchange of information, ideas,and strategies. This generated opportunities forcampaigning on common concerns. Those involvedlearned how policy gets made at the national andinternational levels and became increasingly confidentparticipating in the process. The net effect of these



13 For example, Varshney argues that a key variable in why some inter-groupconflicts become violent while others do not is the strength or weaknessof inter-communal civil society. If members of different groups haveregular means of interacting with each other and participate in commoninstitutions or other common spaces, the risks of violence are greatlyreduced even if conflict dynamics continue. (Ashutosh Varshney. 2002.Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven &London: Yale University Press.) His observations are consistent withLewis Coser’s earlier ones on the function of cross-cutting ties inameliorating the potential for violent conflict. (Lewis Coser. 1956.TheFunctions of Social Conflict. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.)

14 The Secretary-General in his 2001 report on the Prevention of ArmedConflict (S/2001/574) stressed: “the primary responsibility for conflictprevention rests with national Governments, with civil society playing animportant role.” These principles were supported by both the SecurityCouncil and the General Assembly through resolutions on this theme: UNSecurity Council Resolution 1366 (2001); United Nations GeneralAssembly Resolution 57/337 (2003).

developments in the ‘conference decade’ was animportant factor in creating a public realm at the globallevel, where civil society voices could shape agendasinternationally in much the same way as they had donedomestically in many countries. 15 The UN respondedby expanding opportunities both for traditionalconsultation and new forms of partnership andoperational cooperation.

Finding a voice: civil society and the new mediaThere has been a close relationship between the growthin civil society voices on the global scene and theopening of global media channels - including the ‘newmedia’ enabled by the internet. The media has oftenbeen crucial in providing a channel for the voices andperspectives of CSO actors, thus creating a complex andinterdependent relationship between many CSOcampaigners and the media people who turn to them forinformation, analysis, ideas and stories. The voice ofcivil society campaigners in the media connects to alonger-term shift of communications in the publicsphere away from formal societal institutions as thesource and site for information and discussion to themedia system, with correspondingly importantimplications for governance and democratic politics.

Globalization and regionalizationGlobalization has enabled and been strengthened by theburgeoning growth in international civil society. AsSerbin16 points out, the processes of globalization haveenabled actors at all levels - subnational, national,regional, transnational and international - toincreasingly assert influence globally. At the same time,globalization has triggered ‘regionalization’. This is atrend for governments and civil society to engage atlocal and regional levels to address common sources ofperceived vulnerability by strengthening regionalidentity, regional norms and pragmatic mechanisms forcooperation. This has manifested through increasinglystrong regional organizations, like the European Unionor the Organization of American States and the AfricanUnion.

Serbin argues that this regionalism is crucial topluralism and cultural diversity, by strengthening

distinct perspectives rooted in a regional context.Ideally, regional institutional structures can bemobilized to form policies and practices appropriate tospecific cultural, social and geopolitical needs. At thesame time, the linkages between civil society initiativesat the regional and global levels can create newsynergies with the potential to overcome the‘democratic deficits’ inherent in international processes.Consequently, regional civil society networks areforming both to collaborate on achieving specificchanges through campaigning and other advocacy, aswell as around ongoing shared identity or thematicconcerns.

Promoting an global agenda for changeThe emergence of civil society actors as a significantvoice is considered by many to be one of the major newdevelopments in international relations over the pastcentury. The emergence of ‘global civil society’ hasbeen enabled by the growth of communicationstechnology. Yet many believe that the reason for itsproliferation is a reaction to the failure of governmentsto respond effectively to cross-cutting problems (such asthe environment), a growing sense of concern for thesituation of people elsewhere (as witnessed in thehuman rights movement), and a feeling of solidarity inthe face of common threats (such as concern about theimplications of the concentration of power intransnational corporations). For many, it is a reaction tothe growing inequality of power, as well as adiscrepancy between economics and governance, inwhich increasingly interdependent markets remainunchecked by effective global mechanisms forregulation.

Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles22


15 As Fernando Henrique Cardoso has argued, this has helped to shape theideal of “a world order that is not based on the uncontested will ofsovereign states but on universally agreed principles and norms...[inwhich] individuals were acknowledged as subjects not only of nationallaw but also of cosmopolitan rules, enforceable by transnationalinstitutions.” “Civil Society and Global Governance” Contextual paperprepared by the Panel’s Chairman Fernando Henrique Cardoso for theUnited Nations High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, 2003

16 Serbin, Andrés. 2005. “Effective Regional Networks and Partnerships” invan Tongeren et al, Eds. People Building Peace II: Successful Stories ofCivil Society. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

As many of these issues are related to the structuralcauses of conflict, these developments have intersectedwith the growth of the conflict prevention discourse andhave been taken up by some CSOs with a conflictprevention remit. In a globalizing world, preventingviolent conflict and building sustainable peace requirescomplex strategies. These need to address structuralcauses of conflict, many of which may be inherent in theglobal system. To do so effectively requires cooperationbetween civil society actors at the local, national,regional and global levels and with governments, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and, in some cases,businesses.

The ability of non-state actors to set a compellingagenda - particularly on environmental, social and, to alesser extent, economic and security issues - has been asignificant force in shaping new responses to keystructural problems.17 Although CSOs have not beenable to draw on the legal, political or military power ofstates, they have been able to draw on the power of whatsome theorists refer to as ‘discursive legitimacy’ rootedin their analysis of the problems, the moral ‘voice’ thatthey bring to identifying solutions, and the perceptionthat they have the support of large numbers of peoplewho want change. As will be explored in greater detailin Chapter V, CSOs have been crucial in mobilizingcampaigns for specific policy changes in the conduct ofwar (such as banning landmines) as well as to addressstructural factors in the global system that can generateconflict (such as unfair trade policies and practices) andin protesting the pursuit of war itself.

Yet there are substantive differences within global civilsociety related to political perspectives and strategicchoices. These can be categorized roughly into thosewho (a) promote stability / the status quo, (b) those whopromote reform, and (c) radicals who focus on profoundsystem change, some of whom chose to avoid engagingwith existing institutions and official decision-makingforums. In short, there is scope for considerable levelsof conflict within civil society at all levels - although ithas mostly been addressed through constructive debaterather than debilitating violence.

Whose agenda?: power asymmetries, representationand accountabilityUnsurprisingly, problems have surfaced.18 One seriouscritique relates to the persistent imbalances betweenthose in the ‘centre’ and those in the ‘periphery’ ofaccess to resources and power. This dynamic plays outin terms of who is able to create the ‘agenda’ for what isto be addressed and whose ‘voices’ are heard indecision-making and social change initiatives. Withinsome international NGO coalitions, there is a tendencyfor the Northern / Western partners to assume adominant voice and thus set agendas that respond totheir perceptions of problems in ways that might notreflect the views and goals of Southern / Easternpartners.

Some have also critiqued the ways in which Northern /Western groups have tended to impose demands onSouthern / Eastern governments (e.g., throughadvocating conditionality and sanctions) in ways thatmight compromise sovereignty and paradoxicallyundermine democratic processes and local civil societyin those countries. They worry that externally imposedprescriptions on national policy undermine localcapacities to address central challenges in their societyby both weakening sovereignty and making thegovernment more accountable to external forces(especially international financial institutions andpowerful foreign governments) than to the domesticpopulation. For example, some are concerned that thetendency of Northern-based INGOs to shift debates onstructural issues away from national parliaments (whichcan help to strengthen the accountability ofgovernments) to international forums organized aroundmultilateral agencies and inter-governmental meetings.International forums tend to be inaccessible to lesswealthy CSOs, especially those in the global South andfor those with less experience or language skills foreffective participation. Some feel that focusing onmultilaterals is a ‘soft target’ when the real decision-



17 See, for example, Clark, John D. 2003. Worlds Apart: Civil Society andthe Battle for Ethical Globalisation. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press, Inc.

18 See, for example, John Clark (2003) and Smillie, Ian and Henny Helmich,Eds. 1999. Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships forInternational Development. (London: Earthscan).

making power lies with governments. Furthermore‘internationalizing’ concern on specific issues / projectscan lead to a distortion of the complexities and needs ofthose directly affected as the situation is filtered throughthe lens and linked with the concerns of those in far-away places. This further strengthens the perception ofwell-established Northern CSOs facilitating theinstitutional spread of their own values and goalswithout reference to the values and perceptions of theircounterparts elsewhere in the world.

These dynamics appear to slowly be shifting as CSOsbased in the global South / East increasingly create theirown networks and articulate strong social changeagendas, winning support for their causes. Yet someobserve a parallel dynamic of center-periphery relationsat the domestic level, with elites (often urban and uppermiddle class) speaking ‘on behalf’ of marginalizedsections of the population in their own country. Thesedynamics are not only stemming from centre-peripheryrelations globally, they are also manifest along othersocial divides, such as faith, gender, culture,generation...

In addition to divergence and critiques from within CSOcircles, there have been negative reactions from somegovernments to the growth in CSOs’ influence ininternational affairs. Some have resisted efforts byintergovernmental organizations to more activelyinvolve CSOs in deliberative processes and throughconsultation on policy formation and planning. Somesee engaging ‘unaccountable’ CSOs in policydeliberation as undermining the authority ofparliamentary democracy - particularly in countrieswhere parliaments are not as institutionally strong orwell-rooted. Some associate greater civil societyinfluence with efforts to undermine their sovereignty.(Although this criticism does not appear to have been assharp with regard to consulting private sector actorssuch as business leaders.) There is also concern aboutthe potential to widen the power imbalances in the

global system, given the unequal resources andopportunities amongst CSO actors.

Within the UN system, there is a growing perceptionthat the increased complexity of relations with CSOshas strained the existing arrangements for facilitatinginteraction with non-state actors. This has sparked areview of existing practice in order to recommendreforms that will lead to greater consistency andcoherence in the ‘rules of engagement’ with civilsociety. The radicalization of the ‘anti-globalizationmovement’, which has been manifest in violent protest(usually side-by-side with protestors committed to non-violent direct action) and their tendency to targetintergovernmental / multilateral organizations hasstrengthened the urge to reconsider participation bynon-governmental actors in international policy forums.Thus at the same time as CSOs have become moreeffective in efforts to shape policy and practice, therehas been an increasingly strident challenge to their rightand legitimacy in doing so. However, as argued byFernando Henrique Cardoso:

”In a complex world, the answer to the question ‘whospeaks for whom’ calls for new perspectives. Thelegitimacy of civil society organisations derives fromwhat they do and not from whom they represent orfrom any kind of external mandate. In the finalanalysis, they are what they do. The power of civilsociety is a soft one. It is their capacity to argue, topropose, to experiments, to denounce, to beexemplary. It is not the power to decide. Suchlegitimacy is, by definition, a work in progress. It isnever attained once and for all. It is gained in thearena of public debate and must be continuallyrenewed and revitalized.”19



19 Fernando Henrique Cardoso. “Civil Society and Global Governance”Contextual Paper for UN High-Level Panel on UN-Civil SocietyRelations. Online:www.geneva2003.org/wsis/documents/Cardoso_paper.doc

“Without passion, nothing

happens; but without

compassion, the wrong

things happen.” - Former

UN Secretary-General

Dag Hammarskjöld

Conflict dynamics are generated by the interactingresponses of individuals to the situations they confront.Conflict is therefore shaped fundamentally by humanagency. Because of this quality, conflicts can be moresusceptible to change than other sorts of structural andenvironmental conditions that generate stress in socialsystems - even though change may seem elusive whereconflict has become seemingly intractable. While theuse of force and other coercive strategies can push theprotagonists in a conflict to behave in certain ways for aperiod of time, coercion on its own is unlikely to resolvethe conflict. In fact, it can make violent conflict morelikely and even become endemic in a society.20

To foster conflict transformation, it is important tochange the attitudes and behaviors that perpetuateconflict relationships and to develop mutuallyacceptable strategies to address the main conflict issues.This ultimately involves working to effect changes inpeople - although changes in structural conditions arealso necessary over a longer term for a morecomprehensive ‘positive’ peace that addresses structuralviolence.21 This comment is made in full recognitionthat people and structures interact dynamically overtime - e.g., people change structures and structuralconditions create constraints and opportunities thatshape the people affected by them.

Because the process of changing conflict dynamics isentwined with supporting changes in people, it seemsthat there are several fundamental assumptions that canbe made about working with violent conflict insocieties:

• Sustainable peace cannot be achieved through theexercise of force alone; effective dialogue must be anintegral part of any peace process aimed at trulyresolving the conflict. At some point, those involvedneed to agree the basic terms and conditions throughwhich they will co-exist.

• It is not possible to make peace by peaceful meanswithout truly engaging with others across the conflictdivide. As Nelson Mandela eloquently advised thosein the Northern Ireland peace process: “You cannotmake peace by talking to your friends; you can onlymake peace by talking with your enemies.” 22

• While engagement is essential, the means throughwhich engagement takes place can make thedifference between fostering peaceful change vs.further exacerbating conflict, as well as injustice.Therefore process matters and can shape outcomes.

• In many cases, the engagement of large segments ofthe wider society in peacebuilding processes can give


III. Why civil society involvement inprevention & peacebuilding?

20 For example, empirical research by Gurr and Harff demonstrates thatethnopolitical conflicts are likely when a people identifies strongly withtheir ethnic community and live in an autocratic political system that hasused discrimination and intermittent violence to repress ethnic peoples,particularly if the group has traditional leaders that enjoy support frominternational allies. Their research also shows that in non-democraticpolitical environments, violence is more likely to be used to quell protest -a strategy which in turn increases the likelihood that the challenginggroup will respond with increased violence. They note, however, thatwhen state authorities use extreme force, such as massacres, widespreadtorture, and genocide, they are less likely to be challenged. This is becausethe groups either cannot organize open resistance or fear theconsequences of doing so. Nevertheless, it appears that when the strategicbalance changes again, those oppressed resurface in rebellion withintensified grievances. See Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. 1994.Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press.

21 Galtung articulated the distinction between ‘negative peace’ (the absenceof war) and ‘positive peace’ (based on just relationships, where basicneeds are fulfilled). These ideas are connected to his distinction betweenthree inter-related forms of violence. ‘Direct violence’ refers to directassaults upon bodily integrity through killing, wounding, rape, explicitdenial of physical resources needed for survival, and so on. ‘Structuralviolence’ refers to conditions that both jeopardize bodily integrity - suchas poverty, repression and other forms of exploitation - as well as denial ofother basic human needs for identity and security. ‘Cultural violence’refers to those aspects of our meaning systems - especially those gatheredin religion, political ideologies, science, art, and media more generally -that legitimize direct and structural violence and perpetuates militarism.See: Johan Galtung. 1969. “Violence, peace and peace research” Journalof Peace Research, vol 6 no 3: 167-191)

22 Quoted in Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly, Eds. 1998. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. International IDEA HandbookSeries. Stockholm: International IDEA.

depth and durability to the changes needed to supportsustainable peace.

Even using the methods of power politics and militaryintervention, it is extremely difficult to ‘impose’ peaceon those who remain committed to achieving theirobjectives through violence. Sustainable peaceprocesses are instead driven by the realization of theunsustainability of continued armed conflict.23 Early ina conflict, militants tend to believe that they can prevailin their demands either by using force or by threateningto use force. They do not generally consider the interestsor needs of their opponents or others. Yet as the costs ofconflict become increasingly painful, at least someelements within the leadership and the constituency mayincreasingly realize that they are unlikely to get whatthey want through unilateral action. As they understandthat their future is inter-dependent with their opponents,the disputants are more likely to recognize the need toengage cooperatively with their opponents - even if thismeans that some goals will need to be abandoned. Thiscreates an incentive for cooperation, even at the sametime as competition continues. This combinedawareness of inter-dependence and that the fighting isultimately unsustainable helps to commit leaders ofconflict groups to the process for reaching a negotiatedsettlement and then to fulfill their commitments underthe agreements.

It is clear that civil society actors alone are seldom - ifever - able to transform a wider situation of violentconflict. Yet it also seems that it is very difficult, if notimpossible, for governments and inter-governmentalorganizations to foster a durable ‘positive peace’without the engagement of the wider population in theconflict affected society. As will be describedthroughout the next chapter, one of the greateststrengths civil society organizations bring to workingwith conflict is precisely their capacity to supportchanges in how people respond to conflict and to directattention to the underlying causes of conflict that needto be addressed if a sustainable and just peace is to besupported. Furthermore, civil society actors have thepotential to play an important role in raising awarenessboth of the costs of continued conflict and the

opportunities and means to seek a way out throughconstructive engagement with opponents.

Conflicts are not transformed by agreements alone; theyalso need a commitment to address ongoing problemsthrough political means. A sense of public ownership ofthe peace process can be crucial to its durability. If thepublic and organized civil society have been excludedfrom the process or believe that it has not addressedtheir real needs, they are less likely to work activelytowards its implementation. Without a broad publicconstituency in support, there are few safeguards againstthose who want to derail the agreement.

While they can facilitate dialogue between theprotagonists in armed struggle, CSO-led processes areoften focused on enabling ordinary people to articulatewhat they really need and then working to find acommon ground from which they can work to establishpeaceful co-existence. Instead of the use of force, civilsociety actors generally need to rely on the kind ofgenerative power that stems from creativity throughstimulating a new sense of what is possible and how itcan be achieved. This is rooted, ultimately, in a sense ofagency: the ability to act together with others to changethe world in ways that are more consistent withcherished values and ideals.

Multiple channels for CSO engagement inprevention & peacebuilding

As discussed in the previous chapter, preventing violentconflict and building sustainable peace in a globalizingworld requires strategies that address structural causesof conflict - many of which may be inherent in theglobal system - and enable partnerships between civilsociety actors at the local, national, regional and globallevels and with governments, inter-governmental


III. Why civil society involvement in prevention & peacebuilding?

23 See, for example: Dean G Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 1986. SocialConflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 1st edition. New York:Random House; I. W. Zartman, 1985/1989. Ripe for Resolution, NewYork, Oxford University Press; Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 1991. “The Timing ofRipeness and the Ripeness of Timing,” in Kriesberg & Thorson, Eds.Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse NY:Syracuse University Press.

organizations (IGOs) and potentially businesses. Inaddressing this challenge, there seem to be three basicorientations that motivate civil society groups to workon conflict-related issues, as illustrated in Figure 2.

First, there are pre-existing civil society groups - such aswomen’s organizations or faith-based groups - that donot consider working on conflict as a part of their corefocus but who feel compelled to respond to thechallenge that conflict and war poses for theirconstituents. Their involvement may be motivated inpart to ensure that their core concerns are addressed;they often highlight key issues that should be includedin processes to address the conflict. For example,women’s organizations may aim to ensure that women’sneeds are met and women are represented at thenegotiating table. These sectoral CSOs often call uponothers in their wider networks to extend solidarity, thushelping to mobilize resources and make a powerful

contribution to awareness-raising. Second, as describedin the next subsection, there are CSOs who aim toaddress underlying structural problems that give rise toconflict in general through efforts aimed at policyreform and systems change, yet who are not directlyfocused on efforts to resolve or transform specificsituations of conflict. Third, there are groups who arefocused primarily on responding to specific conflictsituations, as outlined in the following box.

Cumulative effects: roles and functions of CSOs atdifferent stages in the conflict cycle

It can be difficult for civil society-based peacebuildinginitiatives to directly resolve large-scale armed conflict,especially when the macro-political situation remainsunfavorable. In regions such as the Middle East and theCaucasus, conflicts appear deeply entrenched andintractable in part because the parties are in a geo-



3. CSOs focusedon addressing a

specific conflictsituation

(Local CSOs & people +conflict

transformation NGOs)

2. CSO focus onpolicy/structural

changes in national,regional & global

systems

1. Response rootedin a specific civil

society sector(e.g. faith community,

trade union,women’s association)

CSO Orientations to Prevention & Peacebuilding

• Advocates group’s interests& needs; therefore focusedon addressing sources ofconflict.

• Can often mobilise globalnetwork for solidarity,support & resources.

• Can often use uniqueposition & legitimacy tofacilitate change & mediateconflict.

• Addressing root causes, such aseconomic inequities.

• Addressing enabling factors,such as the arms trade.

• Promoting alternatives tomilitarism & building culture ofpeace.

• Can make a difference atevery stage of conflict,using a range ofapproaches & roles

• Local civil society mustbe involved in processesto build sustainable peace& foster conflicttransformation.

Figure 2: Civil Society Orientations to Working on Conflict Issues

political stalemate. Yet as has been seen in parts ofSouthern Africa, Central America and South-easternEurope - all well known for protracted conflict in recenthistory - civil society initiatives have played a crucialrole in bringing about sustained transitions. In all thesecases, the cumulative effects of CSO initiatives helpedby preparing the ground work for peace so that asconditions begin to shift, opportunities for peacefulresolution were not lost. Similarly, they aimed to

transform the deeper causes and consequences conflictare addressed and to support the transition from a shakypolitical agreement out of a negotiated process into amore sustainable peace.

As peacebuilding is a long-term process of social andpolitical change, it is very difficult to assess theinfluence of a specific type of activity, initiative ormethodology in the short term. The macro-processes



Civil society roles in structuralprevention to address the causesof conflict• Addressing structural violence &

promoting human security -through development, humanrights monitoring & promotion,preventing environmentaldegradation...

• Making governments & statestructures more responsive -through participation in politicalprocesses, policy dialogue,monitoring, advocacycampaigns, protests...

• Alleviating social tensions andconflict - through challengingxenophobia and discrimination,facilitating dialogue, promotingtolerance and a culture of peace...

• Strengthening capacities tomediate conflict and managedifferences - through conflictresolution training, mediationservices, education, promotingrule of law

Civil society roles in earlyoperational crisis response andduring violent conflict

• Early warning of emerging crises- monitoring, analysis, andcommunication strategies toraise awareness and generateattention

• Developing options andstrategies for response -formulating recommendations,engaging in policy dialogue,problem-solving workshops

• Mobilizing political will forresponse - lobbying andcampaigning, sensitizingdomestic audiences

• Developing & strengthening‘constituencies for peace’ andpublic awareness work,facilitating social dialogue,public protests...

• Violence reduction and monitoring; creating ‘zones ofpeace’

• Humanitarian relief & support towar-affected communities

Civil society roles inpeacemaking• Facilitating communication and

generating alternatives - Track IIdialogue processes

• Creating a ‘pragmatic peace’ atthe local level, strengtheninglocal CSO capacities for conflicttransformation & peacebuildingthrough public dialogue

• Developing a negotiation agendaand vision for the future thataddresses the causes andconsequences of conflict

• Participating in the politicalnegotiations

• Facilitating / mediating politicalnegotiations process

Preventing reoccurrence andpost-settlement peacebuilding• Public education & awareness-

raising on the peace agreementand consolidating support.

• Facilitating the rehabilitation ofwar-affected relationships &communities; laying thegroundwork for reconciliation.

• Contributing to transitionaljustice processes

• Resumption of initiativescontributing to structuralprevention - encouraging goodgovernance, reconstruction anddevelopment, mediating socialconflict, promoting humanrights...

Some key CSO roles at different stages of theconflict cycle

through which civil society groups can foster longer-term change are not well understood. Low-key civilsociety initiatives often generate changes at a subtle andseemingly subterranean level. This can help to createconditions favorable for more dramatic bursts of changefrom high-profile efforts. In general, multiple effortsaiming at different kinds of outcomes can combine tocreate a climate that is ripe for change - as well as riskundermining it.

Specific CSO initiatives vs. aggregated civil societyinvolvementThe effectiveness of civil society peacebuilding issometimes questioned because it is extremely difficultto determine the effect of specific initiatives on thewider conflict dynamic. There are very valid concernsregarding the evaluation of the quality and effectivenessof specific efforts.24

Therefore, when considering the relevance of civilsociety roles, it is important to distinguish betweenoverall civil society involvement vs. specific CSO-ledpeacebuilding initiatives. In judging the effectiveness ofcivil society peacebuilding, it is necessary to understandhow effects of a single initiative combine with otherinitiatives and contextual factors over time rather thanevaluating them in isolation. This includes efforts byCSOs explicitly focused on working with conflict, aswell as the wider range of agencies working in conflictsituations. Three levels of analysis can be identified:1. Roles of different groups of people (civil society

groupings) within and outside a society in relation toconflict. This can include those who focus onmobilizing strategies to achieve their objectives bysurfacing conflict through peaceful and / or armedmeans.

2. The combined impact of the range of CSO activitiesexplicitly intended to contribute to peacebuilding in aspecific conflict system.

3. The impact of a specific CSO initiative aimed atpeacebuilding.25

Each level of analysis can shed a different light on civilsociety roles in conflict situations. Often people focusprincipally on the third level - the effects of a specific

initiative - outside the wider context in which it isembedded. This can make it difficult to determine itsinfluence on the wider conflict system over time.

The complex and cumulative effects of multiple - andeven competing and seemingly contradictory -initiatives over time can probably only be properlyunderstood retrospectively through historical analysis.These points can be illustrated, for example, by lookingat a few of the many, many civil society-based activitiesthat influenced the transition in South Africa.

Fostering change in South Africa: Cumulative effectsof different types of civil society engagement26

For decades, anti-apartheid and pro-democracy activistsin South Africa sought to challenge the status quothrough both nonviolent direct action (such as protestdemonstrations) and an armed movement. They weretrying to surface the conflict in a situation ofprofound structural violence when the balance ofpower was heavily weighted against them. Theirefforts were supported by solidarity groups aroundthe world and even by some governments (NorthernEuropean, as well as Soviet bloc). They enacted aninternational boycott and disinvestment strategies thatwere important for isolating South African whites andsignificant sections of the business community. Thiscivil society-led campaigning strategy helped providethe incentive for the business community in particularto recognize the need for change and, eventually, tosupport a negotiated transition. Activists continuedtheir movement-based activities throughout the



24 See, for example, Mary Anderson and Lara Olson. 2003. Confronting War:Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Collaborative for DevelopmentAction, Inc. Available online:http://www.cdainc.com/rpp/archives/2003/01/confronting_war.php

25 Most of the evaluation literature pertains to level (c) and the profoundmethodological and practical challenges / limits to assessing the outcomesof specific initiatives. While this is very important, to fully understand theroles of civil society in peacebuilding, it is also necessary to explore theimpacts associated with levels (a) and (b).

26 See for example: Ebrahim, Hassen. 1998. The Soul of a Nation:Constitution-Making in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford UniversityPress; Gastrow, Peter. 1995. Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and theNational Peace Accord. Washington: United States Institute of PeacePress; Lieberfeld, Daniel. 1999. Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation andThreat Perception in South Africa and Israel / Palestine. Westport CT andLondon: Praeger.

negotiations, helping to strengthen the hand of theirrespective parties during the talks.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, there were quietinitiatives undertaken by civil society intermediariesto set up channels of communication and direct talksbetween the ANC leadership and government so theycould begin to understand each other and start tosketch out the parameters of what a negotiationprocess could look like (e.g., facilitating the ‘talksabout talks’). There were also numerous Track IIdialogue processes involving prominent people froma range of other influential groupings - includingchurches, unions, and business leaders.

Some of the white South Africans involved in dialogueprocesses, especially through church groups, began toengage in soul searching about the morality ofapartheid. In 1990, a national conference involving allbut two Christian religious groups marked a historicmoment towards reconciliation. The main church ofthe Afrikaner community, the Dutch ReformedChurch, confessed its guilt and acknowledged its rolein apartheid. Moved by this confession, delegatesformulated the Rustenburg Declaration denouncingapartheid, calling for a democratic constitution andmore equitable distribution of wealth. This changedthe moral climate sustaining the legitimacy ofapartheid for many of the faithful.

As the negotiations began, violence continued toescalate. Trade union, business and church leadersinitiated the National Peace Accord process leading toan agreement between the main political parties toreduce the levels of violence. They establishedstructures that relied very heavily on civil societymediators and monitors at the national, provincial andlocal levels to ameliorate violence. Their efforts werepartially assisted by international partners andmonitoring teams.

During the constitutional negotiations, civil societyactivists formulated policy papers on various agendaitems and sustained public awareness of the issues.They played important roles in the constitutiondrafting and the public participation process thataccompanied it.

Many South African peacebuilders had participated inearlier periods in training and other capacity building

initiatives provided by outsiders. These inputs werethen adapted by South Africans for their own needsand context. In turn, many South Africanpeacebuilders are now valuable resource peopleassisting local peacebuilders in conflict situationselsewhere in the world.

Roles and strategies: contradictions &complementaritiesCivil society actors, whether ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’,are likely to grapple with the dilemmas around the bestapproaches and strategies for fostering change.Sometimes there appears to be a tension betweenapproaches primarily aimed at ‘peace’ versus thoseprimarily oriented toward achieving ‘justice’ or betweeninitiatives promoting ‘reconciliation’ versus efforts to achieve goals by ‘whatever means necessary’.Yet these are not always contradictions; they can bedifferent approaches aiming to get to similar endsthrough different means. Most civil societypeacebuilders would argue that you can only have peacewith justice and would strongly object to the idea thatby working for one they would be working against theother. At the same time, many peacebuilders wouldargue that means matter: strategies to achieve justicethat rely on violent coercion are highly likely toperpetrate further injustice and escalate cycles ofrevenge.

As different groups and different initiatives serve uniquefunctions, it is necessary to better understand: (a) howthey can complement rather than contradict / undermineeach other and (b) challenges and possiblecontradictions in combining roles.

Nevertheless there are important differences betweenthose focused on adversarial advocacy aimed atpressuring decision-makers to change in contrast tothose who undertake impartial mediation / facilitationbetween parties in conflict. For example, a prominenthuman rights defender may not be the person whowould be best suited to facilitate a quiet dialoguebetween representatives of a government and an armedgroup. Yet the dialogue facilitator (who may not havepublicly denounced the government and armed group



for their violations) can work to ensure that both partiesend their violations through a cessation of hostilitiesagreement and get them to agree to human rightsmonitoring mechanisms. And it is possible that thereason why the government and armed group woulddecide to engage in dialogue in the first place is becausethey are embarrassed that their reputation has beenimpaired by the denunciations of the human rightscommunity, which has led their allies in foreigngovernments to put pressure on them to change theirbehavior. Similarly, international solidarity groups areoften important in helping to address imbalances ofpower, as demonstrated in the South African exampleabove. This explicit form of ‘partiality’ is extremely

important in an overall process of conflicttransformation and creating conditions for a just andsustainable peace.

This suggests the need for better understanding thepotential complementarities of these seeminglycontradictory civil society roles. It is also necessary toengage in further examination of the ethicalunderpinnings of certain interventions and to recognizethat peacebuilding is not necessarily always aimed atstabilizing a situation but can - and often is - aimed atradical reform to achieve greater justice, albeit throughpeaceful means.



Exploring specificmethods for working withconflict & building peace

As indicated in previous chapters, civil societyorganizations can undertake a wide range of activities inresponse to conflict and the situations that give rise to it.While the work of CSOs involved in development,humanitarian relief, and human rights promotion - all ofwhich respond to conflict situations in various ways -are comparatively well known, the methods used byCSOs explicitly aimed at addressing conflict can appearmysterious to those not involved. This chapter therefore aims to provide a descriptiveoverview of some of the key roles civil society actorscan play, organized around the function they fulfill andthe methods utilized at different stages in a conflict’sdevelopment. There is a deliberate focus on exploringthe ways in which CSOs have been effective in makinga positive contribution to addressing conflict. The briefcase studies are intended to illustrate these points and,hopefully, help to inspire others facing similar sorts ofchallenges. There is no attempt to provide a morecomprehensive analysis of the difficulties encounteredand shortcomings experienced in these initiatives. Nordo the descriptions identify the many other contextualfactors and preceding or contemporary initiatives thatcontributed to the successful outcomes described inthese cases. Yet it is hoped that the overall effect of thechapter will be to highlight the multiple and distinctiveways in which civil society actors can and do makecrucial contributions to peacebuilding.

Waging conflict constructively

Conflict is typically entwined with processes of change.Conflict can be embraced as a way of workingproactively toward social change goals and is a featureof the struggle for justice. Many activists have sought tosurface conflict so that problems that are beingsuppressed or ignored can be put on the agenda andaddressed. While this is sometimes done through armed

movements and the use of violence, there is a long andwell-developed tradition of peaceful protest and othernonviolent direct action. This distinction points to theimportance of channeling conflict through peacefulprocesses capable of delivering constructive change.Historically, civil society activism has been one of themost powerful resources for these processes, asfamously demonstrated in the nonviolent movementsled by Gandhi in ending colonial rule in South Asia orMartin Luther King’s in the struggle against racism andfor civil rights in the USA.

This activist function of civil society manifests what canbe considered both the ‘power to resist’ oppressiveforces - typically through mobilizing effective massmovements for change - and the ‘power to expose’oppression and thereby de-legitimize the authority ofthe oppressors. Furthermore, they have the ‘power topersuade’ both popular opinion and decision-makers ofmore constructive ways to respond to specific conflictsituations and to address the structural problems thatgive rise to conflict.

Mobilizing for change: enacting the power ofresistanceSometimes the prevailing power structures in a societyare deeply oppressive for a segment of the population oreven for the majority. While there may not be full scalewarfare, life for many is impaired by profoundstructural violence, often combined with actual orthreatened direct violence against those who mightchallenge the status quo. These situations are typicallymaintained by the complicity of those who do notperceive themselves as negatively affected by thesituation and by the pessimistic inertia of those whowant change but see it as impossible.

Civil society activists play crucial roles in changingthese situations by surfacing the conflict and escalatingit nonviolently to bring about necessary changes. Oftenmobilized by some triggering situation that provokes an‘enough is enough!’ response, they gather the sparks ofresistance throughout the population into a movementcapable of challenging the relevant power structures.


IV. Making peace by peaceful means:civil society roles & functions

Mass resistance and regime change: Otpor in Serbia27

In Serbia, civil society activists were able to accomplishwhat NATO bombers could not do: to create sufficientpressure to bring about the downfall of the Milosevicregime. Triggered by new restrictions on academic andmedia freedom, a group of students mobilized ‘Otpor’,a resistance movement. They relied on innovative andelaborate tactics to engage the Serb population andbreak through the fear and hopelessness that hadimmobilized opposition to the Milosovic regime. Theydeliberately chose to form a leaderless movement.They wanted to avoid the infighting that hadcharacterized the political opposition, whose leadershad often seemed more interested in protecting theirown interests and fighting amongst themselves than instruggling against Milosevic. They recognized thatyoung people in particular were less interested inpolitical ‘representation’ and yearned for a way toexpress themselves. Joining Otpor gave them anopportunity to act.

Nonviolent direct action became the hallmark of Otporas they sought to make themselves visible on thestreets. They spray-painted humorous and eye-catching graffiti, disseminated T-shirts and badges,and self-organized demonstrations throughout thecountry, among other actions. They understood thatthe widespread fear of Milosovic and his securityforces could best be transformed through humor. Bymaking him look small and insignificant and byridiculing the government’s stupidity and brutality,they could reveal the true nature of the regime bymaking fun of it.

As the movement gained momentum, popular resistancegathered strength. Opposition parties, theindependent media, NGOs, unions and professionalorganizations among others began to work together.Under mounting pressure, Milosovic announced earlyelections for all levels of government. Otporresponded by launching a campaign around the theme‘Gotov je!’ or ‘He’s finished!’. Activists around thecountry began a door-to-door ‘get out the vote’campaign and disseminated materials encouragingpeople to be active, to get involved and to vote againstMilosovic. Crucially, they produced stickersannouncing ‘He’s finished!’ that were stuck onto

Milosovic’s own campaign posters and on virtuallyany other surface accessible to supporters. The ‘He’sfinished!’ message began to feel real to adisillusioned population who turned out in largenumbers to vote him out of office. AlthoughMilosevic tried to deny the results and hundreds ofthousands people from across the country turned outin Belgrade to prevent him from stealing the election.

Civil society movements like Otpor are not onlyeffective in bringing about change in their own society,they can also inspire people elsewhere to become activein shaping developments around them. Internationalsolidarity between civil society activists has often beencrucial to supporting the effectiveness of local civicresistance movements. For example, Otpor activistsprovided assistance to the youth movements in bothGeorgia and in Ukraine, thus helping to support theircrucial roles in the ‘Rose Revolution’ and the ‘OrangeRevolution’ respectively.

Mass movements are not, however, the only way thatcivil society groups have sparked change. Sometimesthey use existing institutional and legal systems to holdregimes to account or to address injustices. There is,however, often a need to combine formal legal strategieswith approaches that aim to foster public awareness andthe transformation of conflict attitudes andrelationships. This can raise dilemmas around roles: it isnot easy to balance the demands inherent in takingadversarial stance and using advocacy-based strategieswith the qualities of impartiality typically associatedwith facilitating inter-communal dialogue. Sometimesthese different functions are served by different civilsociety groups, which might agree on overall goals butseek to accomplish them through different methods. Inother cases, civil society groups are able to fulfillmultiple roles - although generally taking differentapproaches at different times.


IV. Making peace by peaceful means: civil society roles & functions

27 Based on Milja Jovanovic. 2005. “Rage Against the Regime: The OtporMovement in Serbia” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II,op.cit.

Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji: Fromconstitutional reform to championing democracyFiji remains deeply divided by race. Economic

inequities and ethnic political competition havepolarized the main groups of indigenous Fijians,Fijians of Indian origin and other minorities. Thiscontinues to affect Fiji’s economy and governingsystem. Making a multi-party, multi-ethnicgovernment work remains a major challenge for Fiji’scitizens and leaders alike.

Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) began life in1993 when a multi-ethnic group of concerned citizensdecided to convene national consultations to helpcreate consensus for a democratic and non-racialconstitution. In 1997 the new constitution was hailedas an international hallmark of ethnic conciliation andcivil liberties. CCF then began to educate citizens,political parties and national leaders about the spiritand intent of the constitutional provisions. In the leadup to the first general election under the constitution,CCF held numerous workshops and produced a votereducation kit, posters and pamphlets in Fijian,English and Hindi. Central to the public educationeffort was a popular version of the constitution, “YourConstitution, Your Rights”. The 1999 electionresulted in a coalition comprising the first multiracialgovernment in Fiji’s history. According to the UNSecretary General: “In Fiji, collaboration betweennon-governmental organizations and governmentofficials, aided by quiet diplomacy on the part ofregional States, resulted in the promulgation of a newConstitution and forestalled what many observersbelieved was a real possibility of violent conflict.”28

However in May 2000, a group led by businessmanGeorge Speight burst into the parliament and took thegovernment hostage, demanding the return ofindigenous Fijian supremacy. While the coup leaderswere unsuccessful in seizing power, the electedgovernment fell and the Constitution was suspended.In the vacuum created by the hostage taking, CCFassumed an increasingly public and ‘oppositional’profile. It played a critical role in championing therestoration of the rule of law and continuedrecognition of the democratically-electedgovernment. Although a logical development from its

earlier work on public awareness of human rights andcivil liberties, this outspoken stance carried personalrisks and sacrifices.

CCF and other Fijian pro-democracy groups, withsupport from international partners like ConciliationResources, lobbied for international support touphold Fiji’s Constitution and to freeze ‘non-humanitarian development assistance’. Yet nosignificant action was taken by the internationalcommunity to support a return to democracy and therule of law - revealing the tendency to prioritizestability over rule of law. Domestically, CCF hadmore impact than in the international arena. With noparty-political bias it undertook sustained andextensive media work defending the 1997Constitution and speaking out against the coup.During 2001 and 2002, CCF and the NGO Coalitionon Human Rights supported and initiated several highprofile legal challenges. They provided legal supportfor the landmark case that restored the Constitution,when the Court of Appeal ruled that the Constitutionremained in force. This became the first case in worldhistory where a court ruled that a coup was illegalwhile the regime was still in power and where theregime accepted the ruling.

Much work remains to be done if Fiji is to avoid arelapse into another wave of ethnic violence andconflict. These experiences demonstrate thechallenges and complexity inherent in non-violentstruggles for genuine public participation anddemocratic institutions, which is often at the heart of‘conflict prevention’.

Bearing witness: the power to exposeSometimes civil society initiatives are crucial indirecting attention to a situation that is unacceptable butwhich has been avoided by the wider public, a silencethat effectively underpins the status quo. The very act ofpublic disclosure and / or denouncing the situation canmake the truth evident in ways that are very difficult toignore and may empower people to take action tochange the situation.



28 Report of the UN Secretary General, 54th Session

CSOs can bear witness to violations in powerful waysthat undermine the moral authority and legitimacy ofabusers. This exposure sometimes stimulates conditionsthat lead to the collapse of regimes over the long term.They can also dissuade the wider public from acceptingor participating in acts that enable abuse and oppression.

Most people do not commit violent and / or anti-socialacts if they are being watched by outside observers or ifthe social environment does not tolerate or encouragewhat they are doing. Most people in situations of armedconflict are essentially ‘bystanders’: they are notprimary actors but stand to the side while it ishappening. Social psychologists have long beeninterested in the conditions that enable mass violenceand have identified the passivity of bystanders as onefactor. According to Erwin Staub:

In most societies there are some who are prepared toturn against other groups. It is the population as awhole that provides or denies support for this. Thepeople’s support, opposition, or indifference largelyshapes the course of events. Opposition frombystanders, whether based on moral or other grounds,can change the perspective of perpetrators and otherbystanders, especially if the bystanders act at an earlypoint on the continuum of destruction. They maycause the perpetrators to question the morality oftheir violent acts or become concerned about theconsequences for themselves. Internal oppositionfrom bystanders may require great courage. Othernations are often passive, even though attempts toexert influence may require little courage or realsacrifice from them. 29

Institutionally, CSOs are often in the bystander categoryand have significant capacity to influence their membersand the other people who respect their views. Educatorsinfluence the social learning and knowledge of theirstudents; artists give voice and expression to barelyarticulated feelings and perceptions; unions andadvocacy groups provide form and force for promotingand defending rights; media organizations inform thepublic and shape their response.

Religious communities are particularly powerfulinstitutional bystanders. Widely shared religious beliefs,values, and practices are an expression of the basicworldview of the mainstream in a society. Religiousleaders provide guidance on interpreting these beliefsand traditions and articulate the appropriate values andcorrect moral behavior for living in alignment withthese beliefs. Therefore religious leaders have a specialrole to play in both perpetrating and preventing violentconflict. If religious leaders legitimate policies that leadto mass violence or the dehumanizing ideology thatjustifies it, they directly contribute to creating anenvironment in which the faithful accept mass murderand may even justify it with a sense of self-sacrificingduty to a higher cause. Yet religious leaders can also becritical in preventing it. Because religious leaders aregenerally accorded moral authority, if they dissentpublicly from the conflict leaders and / or their ideology,they can severely undermine the legitimacy of the cause.They can also organize their followers to take actions to‘bear witness’ and engage in initiatives intended to stopthe violence and promote alternatives. An example ofthis principle comes from the time of the NaziHolocaust, where majority of Jews evaded deportationin every state occupied by or allied with Germany inwhich the head of the dominant church spoke outpublicly against deportation before or as soon as itbegan.30 It appears that with this encouragement the‘bystander’ population - who, in other countries, eitherpassively accepted or actively supported the deportationof the Jewish population - were mobilized to criticizethe Nazi policy and actively helped Jews within theircommunity when they were at risk.

Never again!: Restoring memory in Brazil andGuatemala31

During the period of military rule in Brazil, thousandsof civilians were tortured by army officers who keptmeticulous records of their activities. During the



29 Erwin Staub. 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and OtherGroup Violence. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.pp21-22.

30 See Helen Fein. 1993. Genocide: A Sociological Perspective. (NewburyPark, CA: Sage Publications)

31 Based on Chapters 10.4 and 20.1 in van Tongeren, et al., People BuildingPeace II, op.cit.

transition back to civilian rule, the Brazilian militaryoffered an amnesty both to political prisoners and tothe state security agents who had tortured them. Withno impartial investigation of what happened duringthis period, Brazilian society remained divided as tothe ‘truth’ of this difficult period. This led tobitterness amongst those who had suffered andcomplacency amongst those who either denied orwere ignorant of what had happened.

A group of lawyers collaborated with a Presbyterianminister and a Catholic Cardinal in a secret initiativeto document this period, with funding and practicalassistance from the World Council of Churches(WCC). Rules governing procedures for amnestyhearings allowed lawyers brief access to the officialstate files held on their clients. These files weresurreptitiously photocopied, microfiched and sent tothe WCC’s offices in Geneva. Operating in the utmostsecrecy over five years, the organisers photocopiedmore than a million pages in their archive. Thismaterial was then condensed into a 7,000 page reportdetailing the extent of state repression. This reportwas then turned into a more readable narrative thatwas published as “Brasil: Nuca mais” (Brazil: NeverAgain). This vivid account of the ‘who, what, howand why’ of the years of repression became animmediate best seller, sparking public discussion andsoul searching. The 444 torturers named in the book,many of whom held high positions, were nowpublicly known for their crimes. Even though theywere not brought to justice in a court of law, theirsocial status - and often their career - was strippedaway. For those who had risked so much in the NuncaMais project, what was most important was for thememory of the repression to be preserved with asmuch accuracy as possible so as to help prevent itfrom ever happening again.

Guatemala has also been divided by long years of civilwar and repression. In 1995, the Office of HumanRights of the Archbishop of Guatemala launched theProject for the Reconstruction of a HistoricalMemory, REMHI, under the leadership of BishopJuan Gerardi Concerda. It was intended tocomplement the official Commission for HistoricalClarification, whose weak mandate dissatisfied many.

The REMHI process centered on taking testimoniesfrom thousands of citizens affected by the war,mostly as victims but also some perpetrators. Basedon these testimonies, REMHI produced a fourvolume public report documenting the full range ofcrimes committed during the war, predominantly bystate security forces but also by insurgents.

Those who testified believed that the process wouldcontribute to discovering the truth and would dignifythe dead. Many felt that it would restore ‘the power ofspeech’ to those who had been silenced by the terror.They hoped it would provide a record for futuregenerations that it was not possible to erase thememory of a people. When he presented the report,Guatemala: Nunca Más, Bishop Gerardi explainedthat: “When we began this project, we were interestedin discovering the truth in order to share it...inreconstructing the history of pain and death, seeingthe reasons for it, understanding the why and the how.... It’s not enough to just accept the facts. It isnecessary to reflect on them and to recover the valueslost. We are gathering memories of the peoplebecause we want to contribute to the construction of adifferent country.”32 Perhaps indicative of the dangerthat perpetrators felt from REMHI, shortly afterpresenting the report, Bishop Gerardi wasassassinated by three military officers. Yet the reportlives on, a testimony by which to banish amnesia andlay the foundations for long term change.

Systemic prevention: campaigns addressingthe root causes of conflictThere is a long history of people’s movements andcampaigns to challenge and change the status quo. Therole of civic activists in initiating and powering changesummons images of the anti-slavery / abolitionistmovement; struggles against colonialism; movementsfor civil rights; Anti-War; Trade-Justice and to ‘MakePoverty History’. As discussed in Chapter III, the abilityof non-state actors to set a compelling agenda -particularly on environmental, social and, to a lesserextent, economic and security issues - has been a



32 Quoted in Dave Lindstrom. “Putting the Pieces Back Together”Foundation of Human Rights in Guatemala. Online at:http://www.fhrg.org/remhi/pieces.htm

significant force in shaping global responses to keystructural problems.

Although CSOs do not have the legal, political ormilitary power of states, they have the power topersuade: to propose solutions rooted in their analysis ofthe problems and to influence by example and by theintegrity of their moral ‘voice’. Don Hubert points outthat a strength of non-governmental campaigners lies intheir ability to reframe issues as humanitarianimperatives. He gives the example of the crucial turningpoint in the Campaign to Ban Landmines when thediscourse shifted from focusing the issue in the frame ofdisarmament (e.g., focused on the weapon, concernedwith military effectiveness, and therefore the business ofgovernment negotiators concerned with military issues)to the frame of humanitarianism (e.g., focused onvictim, concerned with human impact, and therefore theconcern of human rights and humanitarian experts).Although the ban is a disarmament treaty, thehumanitarian orientation was effective in giving greaterweight to the scale of human suffering they cause and inhelping to depoliticize the issue. As Hubert observes:“Among the greatest assets that campaigners have is theability to frame the issues in ways that make bold newdirections in international action appear self-evident.”33

Global civil society has played a key role in mobilizingcampaigns aimed at policy change. The important rolesplayed by civil society groups and the citizens theymobilized in support of the climate convention, theInternational Campaign to Ban Landmines, themovement for the International Criminal Court, to raiseawareness of HIV/AIDs, and to reduce the debt burdenare a few examples of successful CSO campaigninginitiatives. Some of the campaigns have specificallytargeted factors that enable armed conflict, such as theeffort to ban the trade of ‘conflict diamonds’ that fundedmilitias and ongoing efforts to regulate the trade ofsmall arms and light weapons. In addition to campaignstargeting specific policy matters, there are global protestmovements to address the issues raised by economicglobalization and the challenges raised in the wake of9/11, such as the global peace movement’s massmobilization in 2003 against the war in Iraq. Recently,

there have been efforts to change how the internationalcommunity responds to armed conflict, with the aim ofmaking it more people-centered in it priorities andpractices.

Women Building Peace Campaign & Security CouncilResolution 132534

In the late 1990s, a broad-based coalition ofpeacebuilding activists joined together to address themarginalization of women and girls in official peaceand security matters through the global campaign‘Women Building Peace: From the Village Council tothe Negotiating Table’, launched by InternationalAlert. They aimed to ensure that both the concerns ofwomen and their often overlooked peacebuildingactivities become more central to ‘mainstream’conflict resolution activities. They specificallywanted to address: (1) women’s exclusion fromdecision-making processes; (2) their absence frompost-conflict reconstruction and reconciliationprocesses; (3) insufficient protection for refugee,displaced and other war-affected women; (4) the needfor mechanisms to end impunity for crimescommitted against women in war; and (5) the needfor resources to support women’s peacebuildingwork.

Prior to the launch of the campaign, women from 48conflict areas met to share experiences and to developa common platform. Jordan’s Queen Noor agreed toserve as the campaign’s patron and an advisory bodywas formed of 19 women from different backgroundsin the field. 350 organizations signed onto thecampaign, many of whom served as local, national orregional focal points. Aspiring to influence thepolicies of the United Nations and of the EuropeanUnion, the strategy was based on developingcarefully researched analysis of the full range ofissues related to women in peacebuilding. They usedthis knowledge to generate policy documents and



33 Don Hubert. 2005. “Lessons from Campaigns of the 1990s: Innovationsin Humanitarian Advocacy” in van Tongeren, et al., People BuildingPeace II, op.cit., p560.

34 Based on Ancil Adrian-Paul “Making a Difference: The InternationalWomen Building Peace Campaign” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit.

recommendations for policymakers, parliamentarians,women’s groups, churches, the media and otherrelevant constituencies. They also aimed to raisepublic awareness of the issues and launched a globalpetition addressed to the UN Secretary-General andobtained 100,000 signatures from people around theworld.

Their key campaign goal was to achieve a SecurityCouncil resolution. A coalition, the NGO WorkingGroup on Women, Peace and Security, was formed tospearhead policy advocacy. Realizing that supportfrom UN agencies and key Security Council memberswould be crucial, the campaigners systematicallyinitiated policy dialogue with them on the issues.They provided information and analysis on theimpact of armed conflict on women as well as thepositive roles they can play and the need to includethem directly in peace processes. Namibia agreed toput these issues on the Security Council’s agenda andJamaica and Ireland hosted informal ‘Arria Formula’meetings where Security Council members coulddiscuss the issues with Working Group members.While the campaign received support from manyagencies and individuals at the UN, the DevelopmentFund for Women (UNIFEM) became a key ally.

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimouslyadopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace andSecurity. It explicitly addressed the specific anddisproportionate impact of armed conflict on women,acknowledged the important roles women can playand sought to address their under-representation inofficial peace and security institutions, policies andprocesses. The resolution addressed many of thespecific concerns raised by the campaign. While theresolution is written in relatively cautious languagethat weakens its enforceability, it neverthelessrepresents a landmark agreement. It provides leverageto those advocating women’s increased participationand protection and a rationale for demandingaccountability of states and UN bodies. Furthermore,the overall campaign has raised significant awarenessaround the world on the role of women and providedresources and encouragement for addressing theissues on the ground.

Shifting conflict attitudes: the power to re-frame& change perceptions

People involved in conflict tend to have a complex set offeelings, beliefs and perceptions about themselves andabout their opponents. Especially in protracted conflict,these shape underlying structures of beliefs, values, andthe interpretation of experiences. These ‘conflictattitudes’ play an important role in shaping the way aconflict unfolds and are a significant challenge inprocesses to resolve the situation. These attitudes can beso deeply rooted that they are woven into the basiccognitive frames for perceiving the world.35

In the context of a conflict, we create frames to help usunderstand why the conflict exists, why those involvedact the way they do, and how we should act in response.During the evolution of a conflict, frames act as sievesthrough which information is gathered and analyzed,positions are determined (including judgmentsregarding what are seen as ‘reasonable’ priorities,methods, and solutions), and action plans developed.Opposing parties in a conflict often frame the situationin dramatically different ways. Thus, they are separatednot only by differences in interests, beliefs, and valuesbut also in how they perceive and understand the world,both at a conscious and pre-conscious level. This caneasily lead to mutually incompatible interpretations ofevents.

Yet there are countless examples of experiences thathave radically transformed these frames, fundamentallyshifting perceptions of one’s self and of one’s opponents.At the center of these experiences is often the disclosureof a ‘personal truth’ that has resonance with wider



35 All people ‘frame’ their perceptions of the world around them to helpmake sense of complex information. Frames are cognitive shortcuts toorganize phenomena into coherent, understandable categories that givemeaning to some aspects of what is observed, while discounting otheraspects because they appear irrelevant or counter-intuitive. Depending onthe context, framing may be used to conceptualize and interpret, or tomanipulate and convince. For an overview on framing, see SandraKaufman, Michael Elliott and Deborah Shmueli. “Frames, Framing andReframing” in Beyond Intractability. Ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder,Colorado. Online: http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/framing.jsp

audiences. Often revealed through testimony of a veryhuman story, this can unlock silence from others withshared experience and from those who areuncomfortable with their complicity in violence. Bymaking appeals to the moral consciousness and creatingmovements that empower ordinary people to take actionto change the world around them, civil society actors caninfluence the underlying dynamics of a conflict situation.

The ‘power to expose’, described in the previoussection, reveals the importance of awakening the moralconscience of those involved in conflict. In addition,there are other methods that are intended to cultivate ashift in the dehumanized images of ‘the enemy’ that sooften characterize people’s perceptions of theircounterparts in the conflict relationship. Civil societyinitiatives are often particularly valuable for cultivatingempathy across the conflict divide and thereby helpingto shift conflict attitudes.

People in conflict often assume that their adversaries areand will always be their enemies. Despite assumptionsto the contrary, enemies are not born, but areconstructed out of the conflict situation and its attendantpsychological aspects. Enemies are dehumanized whenmembers of a group perceive members of theiropponent group as not fully human or even inhuman.This mechanism is a psychological precondition toengaging in or sanctioning violent aggression. It is oftenstimulated by propaganda in the mobilization to war. Ifthe enemy is not really human, then it is psychologicallyeasier to suspend the moral inhibitions against senselessdestruction that are present in virtually every culture.

Many grassroots peacebuilders in societies locked inprotracted conflict recognize the importance ofpromoting people-to-people dialogue across the conflictdivides to begin to shift entrenched conflict dynamics.The process of direct engagement with enemies ashuman beings can be crucial and lead to a process of‘rehumanizing relations’ across conflict divides. This isoften facilitated by establishing direct communicationbetween people with some common attribute: such as asimilar occupational role (e.g., teachers, journalists),identity characteristics (e.g., women, youth), or

common experiences of the conflict (e.g., ex-combatants, policy advisors). The experience ofencountering those who have been regarded as enemiesand perceiving them as human beings can shakemonolithic perceptions of ‘the other’ and challenge thediscourses of hate. This can result in personaltransformation through the constructive deployment ofcognitive dissonance that can ultimately shake upperceptions of the conflict: participants may seek tochange perceptions in their own circles that ‘they allwant to destroy us’ because they now know that thereare people in the other community who are similar tothemselves in seeking a reasonable solution to theconflict.

Katarina Kruhonja, of the Centre for Peace,Nonviolence and Human Rights in Osijek, Croatia hasidentified the power of listening as a tool forpeacebuilding. She draws on her experiences with theCentre’s ‘Listening Project’, implemented in ten multi-ethnic communities in eastern Croatia and Bosniaseverely affected by the war during the 1990s.Volunteers interviewed more than 2,000 people abouttheir experiences. They learned that:

”Listening is an exchange in which I give you mytime and undivided attention in a non-judgementalway... instead of solutions, advice or pity, I give youacceptance, trust and support. Listening is a jointjourney in which one learns to better understand one’sown situation; it is a way to let a part of the pain,shame, fear and anger go; it is focusing on the futureand empowerment for taking actions. ... [Many ofthose interviewed reported that] for the first time theyhad a feeling...that their suffering and their opinionwere important to someone.”36

These exchanges were apparently empowering for boththe speakers and for the listeners. Five years after theconclusion of the Listening Project, real change isevident in the region. Independent research hasidentified the experience of this project as helping tosupport this change. Furthermore, some of those who



36 Quoted in GPPAC Conference Report, op.sit., p24.

were involved in the project have gone on to work intheir communities on trust-building and peacebuildingand thereby increasing the resources available to thecommunity over the long-term. The power of this formof direct communication is also evident in the followingexample from the Middle East.

Facilitating empathy across conflict divides: the ‘HelloPeace’ project in Israel & Palestine37

One of the barriers to peacemaking in the Palestine andIsraeli conflict is the popular belief that neither side iswilling to be a true ‘partner for peace’ to the other, aperception that is rooted in a profound lack of trust.The Families Forum - an organization of Palestiniansand Israelis who have lost family members throughthe conflict - operates on the assumption that it isnecessary to promote reconciliation to help bring theself-perpetuating cycle of violence to an end. Theywork to foster empathy for those from the opposingcommunity who have suffered losses, believing that isa key step in the process of reconciliation. They feelthat such empathy can create the emotional changesneeded to transform the views that underpin thecurrent conflict and to build trust.

The Hello Shalom/Hello Salaam (Hello Peace) projectwas set up to stimulate empathy. It began with amisdialed phone call, when an Israeli accidentallycalled a Palestinian in the Gaza Strip. Theconversation that ensued helped each to gain a newperspective on the other’s situation. They passed ontheir telephone numbers to others and soon a smallcircle of strangers were talking with each other byphone. This became the kernel of the Hello Peaceproject, which enables Israelis and Palestinians to calla special number to be automatically connect withsomeone ‘on the other side’ who has expressed awillingness to talk. The initiative was launched with amassive media campaign in both Arabic and Hebrewand met with a wide response. 500,000 telephoneconversations were held in the first two years. Thedirect and intimate nature of the contact helpedparticipants to perceive their counterparts as humanbeings, rather than as nameless members of animpersonal ‘other’ group. In a number of cases, thisexperience has helped participants to understand more

of the complexity of the situation and the difficultiesexperienced by those living on the other side. Bygetting thousands of Israelis and Palestinians to talkdirectly with each other - and by publicizing this fact -Hello Peace hopes to break down the psychological, ifnot physical, barriers between the peoples.

Envisioning a better future: power to identify,analyze & propose

There is an old saying: ‘if you don’t know where youare going, you won’t know how to get there’. Mostpeople aspire for peacebuilding initiatives to create abetter future. Elise Boulding proposes the importance of‘imagining the future’ as a way of enabling people tocreate positive images of desirable scenarios that willinspire them to act creatively in the present.38 Thissuggests the importance of deliberately thinking aboutthe future in order to develop what Lederach calls a‘generational vision’, which involves “articulatingdistant but nonetheless desirable structural, systemicand relationship goals.”39 It is from debates within thepublic sphere of civil society that these visions of adesirable future - and the strategies to achieve them -often emerge.

These processes are significant at both the personallevel and as a wider societal / collective process, asdescribed below. Ultimately, the capacity of people tomake a personal shift in their attitudes and approach canbe highly significant both for their individual level ofmotivation and for the effect they have on othersthrough their actions. For example, John Marks co-founder of Search for Common Ground, describes suchan important shift in his own life: “I realized I wasincreasingly defined by what I opposed. I came to seeanother possibility: namely, that I could live my life and



37 Based on Aaron Barnea and Ofer Shinar “Building Trust, PromotingHope: The Families Forum Hello Peace Project in Israel and Palestine” invan Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

38 See Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project, Conflict ResearchConsortium, University of Colorado, available athttp://www.beyondintractability.org/iweb/audio/boulding-e-3-future-studies1.html

39 John Paul Lederach. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation inDivided Societies. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, p77.

do my work from a place not of being against the oldsystem but of being for a new one.”40 From this heembraced processes that moved away from adversarial,win-lose approaches. This has been an ethos that hasguided much of the work of Search for CommonGround, the international NGO he then formed withconsequences for many lives.

Developing a vision for a better futureSustainable peace processes need to be about more thanfinding ways to end the fighting; attention must also bedirected to supporting societies on the path towards amore equitable and peaceful future. To do this, it isimportant to engage in public deliberation about whatkind of society its members aspire to create. This fostersa process of social imagination. Looking back onsustained peace processes, it is possible to identifymoments where public visioning was facilitated bylarge-scale public initiatives. In some cases, theseprocesses have been aimed primarily at engagingpublics in thinking about how to shift the currentconflict dynamics. These can be aimed at identifying thedeeper causes of conflict and eliciting ideas for waysforward.

Northern Ireland: Initiative ‘92 and the OpshlCommission41

A group of civil activists established Initiative ‘92 toconduct what they called a ‘citizens’ inquiry’ to takeopinions from the community and political parties onhow to move forward in ending the troubles. Itcomprised well-respected individuals from Irelandand Britain and was chaired by Professor TorkelOpsahl from Norway. Its lasting contribution mayhave been its efforts to encourage community groupsand individuals to think and to discuss the options forthe future. As a result, the wider community began tohave greater confidence in putting forward views andengaging with the political process and politiciansfrom whom most had felt alienated for so long. Forexample, the leaders of the seven main coordinatingbodies of industry, business and trade unions formeda loose group, known as the G7, through which theydeveloped opportunities for dialogue with politicians.Two local newspapers, identified with the sectarian

divisions, began to work together, even printing acommon editorial on one occasion.

In another example, South Africa’s Freedom Charterprocess aimed to develop a broadly shared vision aboutthe kind of society South Africans would want to live in.The experience illustrates that it can sometimes takedecades for the significance of a visioning process to befully realized, yet that the vision can be sustaining asguiding principles throughout the long process.

South African Freedom Charter42

Drawing on Mohandas Gandhi’s earlier campaigns topromote the rights of South Africa’s Indian laborers,in 1952 activists organized a mass civil disobediencecampaign that broadened the base of organizedresistance to the apartheid system. In 1955, five yearsbefore it was banned, the African National Congress(ANC) convened a Congress of the People to developa Freedom Charter for all South Africans. The charterarticulated not just what they opposed but also whatthey stood for. It shaped the development of politicalthinking, formed the foundations for a pro-democracymovement and influenced the negotiations in the1990s. It was a unique experience of massparticipation in a political visioning process amidsthostile political circumstances and shaped theimplicit expectation for public participation increating a new South Africa.

Preparations began in 1953 as hundreds of activistsorganized meetings and house-to-house canvasses toalert South Africans to the project. Ordinary citizenswere asked the open-ended question: “what needs tochange in South Africa for you to enjoy full andabundant lives in terms of country, community andindividual?” The organizers learned that if they



40 John Marks. 2005. “Understand the Differences, Act on theCommonalities” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.p185

41 Based on: Clem McCartney. 1999. “The Role of Civil Society” inMcCartney (Ed) Striking A Balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process.Accord 8. London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord

42 From Eldred de Klerk. 2002. “South Africa’s Negotiated Transition:Context, Analysis and Evaluation” in Catherine Barnes, Ed. Owning theProcess: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord 13. London:Conciliation Resources. Online: http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/saneg.shtml

wanted people to participate, they needed to meetthem where they lived, worked and played. Thislesson became a powerful operating principle for thedemocracy movement that emerged in the 1980s. Theorganizers were instructed not to write demands onbehalf of the people but rather to collect and collatethe perspectives they heard; to enable processes thatallowed the dispossessed and disempowered to findtheir own voice rather than see themselves asrepresentatives who could ‘speak for’ the people.Communities also nominated delegates to representtheir group at the mass gathering and collected moneyfor their travel.

The government tried to impede the Congress as itbecame obvious that the process was gatheringmomentum: meetings were banned, gatheringsdisrupted by the police, and materials confiscated ordestroyed. Despite a police cordon on 26 June 1955 inKliptown, Johannesburg, the Freedom Charter waswritten, based on the deliberations of the 2,800delegates who had gathered on a dusty patch ofground to debate the results of the consultations. Itscentral principle was that: “South Africa belongs to allwho live in it, black and white, and no government canjustly claim authority unless it is based on the will ofthe people.” While South Africans had to wait fourpainful decades before this vision could be achieved,it remained a guiding principle for the struggle.

Defining the peace agendaPeace and politics cannot be divorced. The issue is howto involve ordinary people in developing a politicalagenda that guides the negotiations and the agreementsconcerning governance and the structure of stateinstitutions. Those outside the warring parties in civilsociety can develop a public voice that articulates newscenarios for peaceful coexistence by identifyingunderlying substantive issues generating conflict andimpeding human security.

Sometimes a visioning process is launched under thegovernment’s auspices. In the Philippines, for example,President Ramos created a National UnificationCommission that organized public consultations inalmost all the provinces and regions of the country to

identify the underlying causes of conflict. The outcomesof these consultations were compiled in a document, the‘Six Paths to Peace’, which came the basis for thenegotiation agenda and guided the government’s peacestrategy. Not surprisingly, this initiative stirred upcontroversy and some suspicion as to motives.Nevertheless, it was a landmark in generating awarenessof the specific underlying structural causes of theconflicts and the aspiration to address them in additionto settling the ongoing military confrontations.43

In some cases, civil society dialogue has been crucial tofocusing awareness on the underlying issues that need tobe addressed in a negotiation process if it is to lay thefoundations for a durable and just peace.

Defining the negotiating agenda and shaping thesubstantive agreements: the Civil Society Assembly inGuatemala44

The Guatemalan peace accords finalized in December1996 brought a formal end to a war that had lastedintermittently for 36 years. They included almost 200substantive commitments that, if fulfilled, wouldbring significant changes to the structure of theGuatemalan state and society and go some waytowards addressing issues that many believed to bethe underlying source of protracted conflict. Thescope of the accords was due partially to severalmechanisms that enabled representatives of organizedsectors of civil society to engage with the talksprocess. Through these discussions and subsequentlobbying efforts, civil society representatives helpedto shape a negotiating agenda and then contributedproposals on how to address substantive issues.

With the easing of super-power confrontation in the late1980s, efforts were made to address the wars that hadwracked Central America for decades. Esquipules II,



43 See Miriam Coronel Ferrer. 2002. “Philippines National UnificationCommission: National Consultation and the Six Paths to Peace” inCatherine Barnes, Ed. Owning the Process: Public Participation inPeacemaking. Accord 13. London: Conciliation Resources. Online:http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/phi.shtml

44 Adapted from: Enrique Alvarez with Tania Palencia Prado. 2002.“Guatemala feature study” in Catherine Barnes, Ed. Owning the Process:Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord 13. Conciliation Resources.http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/index.shtml

a regional inter-governmental process for promotingpeace, was the catalyst for talks between thegovernment and the insurgents in Guatemala. Theconflict was previously defined by the establishmentin purely Cold War terms (e.g. a fight by ‘freedomdefenders’ against ‘communists’ or by ‘socialistrevolutionaries’ against ‘feudalist and capitalists’).Esquipules II shifted attention to the internaldynamics of conflict. One of the provisions was tocreate a government-sponsored and church-ledNational Reconciliation Commission.

In 1989 the Commission organized the Grand NationalDialogue. It facilitated talks between 47 sectoralorganizations, such as unions, business associations,and agrarian cooperatives. The aim was to identifyand promote consensus on the major topics ofconcern to peacemaking. The participatingorganizations identified the issues they wanteddiscussed. Out of a large initial list, fifteen topicswere accepted and classified into four main areas: (1)support and reinforcement of the democratic system;(2) organization and participation of citizens; (3)quality of life; and (4) economic policies.Representatives of the participating organizationsmade proposals on the topics they considered apriority, which were then discussed in plenary sessionby delegates from all the participating groups. A keysubstantive outcome was the recommendation thatnegotiations should address the structural conditionsgenerating conflict, rather than focus only onarrangements to end the military confrontation.

This process was the first time that the problemsgenerating armed conflict were discussed openly inthe public arena. Although it did not result inconclusive outcomes, the analysis was vitallyimportant several years later when it helped to definethe official negotiating agenda between theinsurgency and the government. Furthermore, it setthe stage for the involvement of civil society groupsand transformed the closed characteristics of thenegotiations. The demands for political negotiationstopped being the exclusive concern of the partiesdirectly involved in the conflict. They, in turn, startedto realize that a solution to the armed confrontationhad to involve civil society.

In 1994, bilateral talks between the government and theURNG - mediated by the UN and supported by keycountries in the ‘Group of Friends’ - resumed again inearnest. Under pressure from civil society, theyagreed to create a Civil Society Assembly (ASC) toaccompany the official negotiations. The ASC wasmandated to discuss the substantive issues addressedin the bilateral negotiations and to formulateconsensus positions on the six of the seven maintopics on the formal negotiating agenda. Thegovernment and URNG alone would discuss thespecific arrangements for ending the militaryconfrontation. The ASC was charged with makingproposals to address the substantive issues on the restof the agenda: (1) strengthening civil society and thefunction of the army in a democratic society; (2) theidentity and rights of indigenous people; (3)constitutional reform and the electoral regime; (4) theresettlement of those displaced by the conflict; (5)socio-economic conditions; and (6) the agrariansituation. The agreement specified that any ASCrecommendations or guidelines on these issues wouldbe considered by the negotiators but were non-binding on them. The ASC would, in turn, review thefinal agreements signed by the parties on substantiveissues and could endorse them but the ASC did nothave the power to veto those it did not endorse. In theend, most of the ASC’s recommendations wereincorporated into the final accords - thus making civilsociety a vital, if non-decision making, presence inthe negotiations.

Shaping peace policyCivil society actors can make an important contributionby identifying overlooked problems and policy gaps,analyzing issues and recommending solutions. In short,they can identify the central agenda of issues that needto be addressed in responding to a conflict situation anddealing with peace and security issues more widely.Civil society groups can analyze the situation, formulaterecommendations, develop policy options and engage inpolicy dialogue to address conflicts. They can alsomobilize advocacy campaigns to generate political willamongst decision-makers and implement strategies toachieve the desired results.



Because they do not have formal decision-making powerand because they often promote causes that are unpopularwith governments and contradict other powerful interests,CSOs have to be skilful to ensure that their voices areheard. Governments and corporations are more likely tolisten when they perceive that CSOs have the support oflarge numbers of people who want change. Thus civilsociety efforts at raising public awareness about aparticular set of problems is intertwined with efforts tomotivate political decision-makers to take action toaddress them. Rebecca Peters explains the distinctionbetween these two levels of strategy:

”Awareness-raising is indirect and aims to mobilizethe power of public opinion in support of a cause. Itaims to change public consciousness and arouseinterest in an issue by providing information on thenature, extent and complexity of a problem, as well aswhat can be done to solve it. Such information canhave an impact on the decisions made by individualson whether to by a particular product...or whether tovote for a parliamentary candidate who supports aparticular cause. Lobbying specifically targets thepolicymakers: the people in society who have thepower to change the laws under which we live.Classic lobbying consists of pressuring politicians totake specific decisions-such as whether to support orreject a certain piece of legislation-that will further aparticular cause.”45

Civil society efforts at public awareness-raising andlobbying have been crucially important in setting theagenda at the global level, as discussed previously, andin addressing more local and national concerns.

Mobilizing constituencies for peace

Generating public support and applyingpressure for peaceThose involved in armed conflict often justify theiractions by claiming to represent popular causes or onthe basis of their authority as governments. Civil societyactors committed to exclusively peaceful means oftenchallenge this assertion by demonstrating that publicopinion rejects military approaches. Through raising

public awareness and education about alternatives, theygenerate public support. Some of the effective methodsfor creating a new atmosphere stem from peace media,art projects, concerts, and other creative ways ofreaching out to the wider public. Sometimes effortsinvolve mass protests at the use of military force ordemonstrations in favor of peace processes. Either way,they can reveal that there are significant constituenciesfor peace, which can be a persuasive force in alteringthe responses of governments and armed groups. Thesecan help to transform social and political dynamics tosupport atmosphere conducive to peacebuilding / peacenegotiations

Women’s Mass Action for Peace: WIPNET in Liberia46

In 2003, Liberia was once again in the grip of armedconflict, with various insurgent groups controllingmost of the countryside and beginning to close in onthe capital. A substantial network of community-based women’s groups decided that they would not siton the sidelines as passive victims of the war butwould aim to bring an end to the fighting. Theinitiative was organized through the Liberian sectionof the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET),a West African women’s network linked withWANEP. According to Thelma Ekiyor: “We knewthat one or two voices could be ignored but decidedthat if we spoke in a large and wide collective, ourown network, the cacophony of our voices, tears,articles and marches would definitely reach the rightears.”47

Women from all parts of Liberian society - includingthose from displaced persons camps, churches,markets, schools and NGOs, and especially thosefrom rural communities - were mobilized in a ‘MassAction for Peace’ around the simple and effectivemessage: “We Want Peace; No More War.” They tookto the streets carrying banners and held a daily inter-



45 Rebecca Peters. 2005. “Campaigning to Create Awareness: How toInfluence People and Change the World” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit., p519.

46 Based on Thelma Aremiebi Ekiyor and Leymah Roberta Gbowee“Women’s Peace Activism in West Africa: The WIPNET Experience” invan Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

47 Quoted in GPPAC Conference Report, op. cit., p25.

faith prayer vigil. Ignored initially, the power of theirmessage spread to become a popular song andunifying theme. As their advocacy campaign becamea serious force for change, they forged links withother civil society sectors, such as church leaders andNGOs. Their persistent presence mobilized publicpressure and shamed the international community.They called for an immediate and unconditionalceasefire, dialogue for a negotiated settlement, and apeacekeeping force. To promote these demands, theylearned how to effectively use the media and to lobbythe international community. Even President CharlesTaylor agreed to meet with the group afterconsiderable pressure had mounted.

When the fighting forces agreed to a peace conference,WIPNET sent a delegation to Ghana to monitor thetalks in Accra. They then mobilized Liberian diasporaand refugee women, with solidarity from GhanaianWIPNET members, to take up the campaign. Theyalso collaborated with other women’s groups whowere delegates at the talks, such as the Mano RiverWomen’s Peace Network. They organized a parallelLiberian Women’s Forum to assess progress in thenegotiations and to advocate issues of importance toLiberian women and citizens more widely. Theyissued joint statements, urging attention to civiliancasualties. They met regularly with delegates from allparties to discuss these issues and makerecommendations. Each morning of the talks, thedelegates and participating Heads of State from theregion were greeted by women sitting on the lawn,holding placards demanding peace.

When the talks stalled, the women felt that Liberianswere being held hostage by the delegates. Theydecided to do something about it. They barricadedthe door to prevent the negotiators from leavinguntil they agreed to take the process seriously andreach an agreement. The chief mediator pleadedwith the women to move but they refused. Thisnonviolent direct action approach was effective.Their demonstration gained press attention, withtelevision coverage of the stand-off. Partly inresponse to the publicity, the talks resumed.WIPNET was asked to participate in meetings todevelop peace strategies, including on the political

and security committee. Their mass action remindedeveryone at the talks and the world more widely thatan entire population was awaiting the outcome andwould not settle for anything less than peace. Theirinvolvement highlighted that the women werestakeholders in the conflict and had a role to play inthe peace process and in discussing basic issuesconcerning the future of their country. It alsorevealed what women can do if they mobilizethemselves in large numbers.

The Liberian experience reveals the significance ofmobilizing public pressure in favor of a peace processleading to a negotiated outcome and the role of CSOs indeveloping this support. Conversely, there are alsoexamples of the risks to a negotiated peace process ifthe wider conflict-affected population is resistant tocompromise. For example, in the conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh, there is very little communication andengagement between Azeris and Armenians andconsiderable hostile rhetoric. This appears to be asignificant obstacle to political negotiations as well asmore general reconciliation. Some argue that the failureof the 2001 Key West talks between the presidents ofArmenia and Azerbaijan was that they were ahead of theown populations in understanding the need forcompromise and unable to take their populations alongwith them in supporting a peace settlement.48 A similardynamic seems to operate in the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, where failure to win acceptance by moreconservative elements of the public in both communitieswas a factor undermining the Oslo Agreement. Theimplication is that developing broad-based publicconstituencies for peace can be an important feature indetermining the viability of a political peace negotiationprocess - a function that is often undertaken bypeacebuilding CSOs.

International solidarity: mobilizing a globalresponseLocal people are often unable to address all thedimensions and drivers of conflict on their own. This



48 See Tom de Waal. 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan throughPeace and War. New York: New York University Press.

can be especially challenging when there are severepower imbalances; when there are numerous externalparties to the conflict (such as powerful countries alliedto one of the armed groups); or where the conflictparties are largely motivated to sustain the benefitsderived from the ‘war economy’. Their strategies maywell require solidarity and collaboration from keypartners elsewhere in the global system. This implies theneed for a more systemized approach to collaborationbetween the civil society actors with governments andothers who have an interest in or influence over thesituation. This can be enhanced through coordinatedlobbying and raising awareness among domestic andinternational audiences.

Much more can be done to strengthen civil societycapacities in this area by fostering networks to mobilizerapid responses. Yet there are cases where it has beendone on an ad hoc basis - such as when a globalcoalition of CSOs mobilized in 1999 to focusinternational attention on the violence in East Timor andhelped to ensure that an international protection forcewas deployed to uphold the results of the referendum onindependence.

From practical protection to policy change: Witnessfor Peace in Nicaragua49

In 1979, the leftist Sandanista insurgency movementoverthrew the dictatorship of the Somoza dynasty inNicaragua. Led by President Ronald Reagan, the U.S.government supported the Contras (‘counter-revolutionaries’) aiming to topple the Sandanistas bywaging attacks in the countryside. They burnedvillages and destroyed convents, schools andhospitals, killing many civilians in the process.

In the 1980s, Witness for Peace organized visits bydelegations of U.S. citizens to the country. Recognizingthat the presence of foreign citizens - particularly thosefrom their patron - deterred attacks by the Contras, thedelegations effectively served as ‘human shields’ for thecommunities where they were stationed. By becomingan organized, nonviolent presence in the war zone, theyoperated as a citizen-led ‘peace force’ for the country. Itseems that their presence reduced the potential extent ofcivilian casualties.

Witness for Peace was a coalition of concerned groupsfrom the U.S., including mainstream churches andsmaller religious communities, such as the Quakersand Mennonites, and were supported by otherorganizations like Peace Brigades International. Theyattracted volunteers from all 50 states. Uponreturning home, the delegates visited localcommunities throughout the country to talk abouttheir experiences and, in most cases, to advocate anend to U.S. assistance for the Contras. Every time theU.S. Congress was due to vote on another round offunding for the Contras, the Witness for Peacenetwork sprung into action for mass lobbying andvigils outside every congressional office. The fact thatthe movement was nonpartisan and drawn mostlyfrom religious people of different demographic andsocioeconomic backgrounds - including older churchwomen, business leaders, and people other than theusual peace movement stereotypes - greatlystrengthened the effectiveness of both their publicawareness raising and policy advocacy efforts.

They were effective in stimulating intense public debateabout the U.S. government’s Central America policy.The strategy contributed to the decision by the U.S.Congress to cut off military aid to the Contras. It mayeven have helped to avert an all-out U.S. invasion ofNicaragua. It also led countless people throughout theU.S. to engage more deeply in concern for theircountry’s actions abroad.

Power to reduce violence & promote stability

It is very difficult for people to engage in and supportpeacemaking when they feel under significant threat totheir basic security. This is one of the reasons why thosewho want to wreck a peace process tend to escalateviolence targeted against civilians. While conventionalstate security forces can play an important role inprotection; too often they are a part of the problem orare simply incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities.Military peacekeepers are often deployed too late, toofew or with a mandate that is inadequate to providesufficient protection of the civilian population.



49 See Chapter 15.3 in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

Yet state security forces and internationally-mandatedpeacekeepers are not the only ones equipped to respondto violence effectively. The violence affectedpopulations are not merely victims of events. In manycases, they have been able to take action to preventviolence and ameliorate the effects of armed conflict.Community level structures - especially when they workin partnership with authorities and internationalmissions - are often well placed to monitordevelopments and take proactive steps to de-escalateviolence. In a number of places torn by violence, one ofthe most effective ways to address this problem is forthe community to become proactively involved in tryingto prevent the violence by resolving localized disputesand preventing those with specific personal grievancesfrom mobilizing others in conflict.

It is rarely enough to try to stop the violence withoutalso addressing the structures of the armed groupsinvolved in waging war. These are usually addressedthrough some sort of negotiation process. Nevertheless,it seems that strong communities that are effective inresolving differences peacefully can be an importantsafeguard against those who would use violence toachieve their goals. Cooperation in helping to achievemutual security can be a powerful confidence-buildingmeasure. The experience can also help to preparecommunities for conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence in the wider society.

Power to alert and to act: early warning andearly responseA key conclusion of the GPPAC process is thatpreventive action needs to be evidence-based, fall withina broad multi-sectoral / multi-actor integrated strategyand be owned by local communities, who are crucial tosustainable transformation of situations giving rise toarmed conflict. The challenge for early warning analysisis not only to recognize the risk of violent conflictemerging or escalating; it also needs to identify whatcan be done, by whom and how in order to preventviolence and encourage processes to address the conflictthrough peaceful means.

Partnership between civil society, governments and

international actors may be crucial for creating aneffective and comprehensive early warning and earlyresponse system. People based in a society and thosespecializing in the country / region are often best placedto identify both the reasons for a conflict, themotivations of those who are driving it, and to suggestspecific actions that can be taken to shift its dynamics ina more peaceful direction. In some cases, their insightscan support the development of subtle and highlytargeted strategies that do not require extensiveresources or coercive measures, especially whenaddressed at an early point in a conflict cycle. CSOs,especially women’s groups, are often particularly well-suited to suggest responses for actions on the ground.Their insight should be maximized when exploringresponse options.

While CSOs can be the source of vital inputs shapinginternational responses to conflict, it is also vital tostimulate local systems for responding to the risk ofviolence.

Early warning and early response among pastoralistcommunities in Kenya50

Pastoralist communities in Kenya have suffered frequentviolent cattle raids by well-trained and heavily armedyoung warriors. These raids sometimes fused withother political and communal interests, leading to anescalation of tension and wider insecurity. TheNational Council of Churches Kenya (NCCK),initially motivated to provide humanitarian relief forthe victims of the violence, realized the need to workproactively to cease the raids and resolve widerconflicts. With support from NPI-Africa, they workedwith local staff and community members to formvillage peace committees and a community-basedearly warning system.

Well in advance of any raid, numerous signs ofmobilization can be identified as indicators to provideadvanced warning of an attack. Many of these signsare found in traditional practices (such as specialrituals and ornaments) or practical arrangements



50 See Peter Juma Gunja and Selline Otieno Korir. 2005. “Working with theLocal Wisdom: The National Council of Churches of Kenya PeaceProgram” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

(such as the presence of firearms and sale ofammunition) undertaken in preparation for a raid. Asit is customary to give advance warning, the intendedtargets of a raid often display signs of apprehension:rumors, deserted marketplaces, and movement offamily members to safer places can all signal animminent attack. Program participants analyzed thesefactors to form a set of indicators that could be usedto systematically detect impending raids. Using thisinformation, they encouraged the village peacecommittees and other community peace structures todevelop appropriate strategies and methodologies forcommunity-based prevention efforts.

This initiative became an important part of NCCK’scomprehensive program to promote peace andreconciliation at the community level and to linkcommunity based-structures with national decision-making processes by lobbying government entities onconflict resolution issues.

Many peacebuilders recognize the need to strengthenthe conflict analysis capacity of local CSOs so that theywill be better able to identify significant developmentsand suggest appropriate responses. Although localpeople are well placed to know what is ‘really going on’at a local level and are highly sensitive to changes on theground, they typically need to work with experiencedCSOs to help them articulate it in ways that make senseto outsiders, and to link local developments to otherdevelopments in the wider context.

John Katunga, from NPI-Africa, suggests that civilsociety actors can play an important role in bothchanneling information to appropriate international and/ or governmental actors and providing reassurance tolocal communities by disseminating accurate andreliable information about what is going on. This laterrole can be crucial in defusing tensions building uparound alarmist rumors. It also can be a significantcontribution to support confidence-building necessary tocreate an atmosphere where peacebuilding initiativescan take root. CSOs, however, seldom have the capacityto put pressure on other actors that are far away fromthem. For example, in a context like the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, where the foreign patrons of local

armed militias have vital influence, local peacebuildersrely on international organizations in hopes they willengage proactively in preventive diplomacy.51

If it is not done well, however, early warning analysishas the potential to be counter productive. For example,in a Central Asian country, local peacebuilding groupsbelieve that an inter-governmental organization with afocus on conflict receives most of its information andinterpretation of local events exclusively from theperspective of the government, which is not seen as an‘impartial’ actor in relation to conflict in the area.52

Thus their conflict analysis and early warning reports donot adequately reflect the perspectives of opposition and/ or ethnic minority groups. In at least one case, theagency’s report itself was the trigger for an escalation inhostilities at the local level. Local peace groups believethat there would be considerable potential in jointmonitoring of conflict situations so as to develop acommon basis of analysis that is seen to be insightful,balanced and fair to all the parties concerned - and thushas credibility and authority in the local communities aswell as for those further a field. Yet there are, as yet, fewexamples of routine collaboration between local CSOsand IGOs in developing early warning analysis. This islargely due to the concerns of officials in IGOs aboutrespecting the concerns governments may have aroundwhat they may perceive as ‘intelligence gathering’ thatmay be seen as linked to early warning analysis - ahighly sensitive area for many.

Crisis response, de-escalating tensions,creating oasis of stabilityIn contemporary forms of armed conflict, social andpolitical violence is typically expressed in localizedincidents with civilians as the main casualties or eventhe primary targets. Such violence often continues aftera ceasefire and even despite a comprehensive peacetreaty negotiated between leaders of the armed factions.



51 Interview with author, 10 August 2004. See also Catherine Barnes. UN-CSO Interaction in Conflict-Affected Communities, GPPAC DiscussionPaper. September 2004. Available onhttp://www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/Research/UN-CS_interaction/Regional_experiences-paperCB_29Sept04.doc

52 Barnes, UN-CSO Interaction, op.cit.

It is especially common during peace negotiations,when opponents of the talks want to destabilize thesituation and wreck the peace process.

Violent conflicts typically infiltrate all levels of society.The state-based international system is often poorlyequipped to engage effectively with people involved inlocalized armed violence and self-sustaining conflictdynamics at the community level. Yet community-basedpeace initiatives can be uniquely well placed to createstrategies to enable people to co-exist with each other,especially when linked with and / or supported by largernational- and international-level processes.

Communicating in crises: the Mobile Phone Networkin Northern Ireland53

In 1996, North Belfast experienced a wave of violenceand the breakdown in lines of communicationbetween and within communities and withgovernment bodies at all levels. Rumors triggeredmistrust and suspicion that fuelled further violence.The rumor of a crowd gathering would encouragepeople onto the street. People on ‘the other side’would then perceive the gathering group of opponentsas a threat and would send out the word forreinforcements from their own community. Too often,this would trigger stone throwing that would thenescalate into further violence. Staff at the localCommunity Development Center decided to dosomething to de-escalate these dynamics by creatinga communication network. They identified keygroups and individuals in each of the maincommunities willing to volunteer to maintaincommunication within and between neighboringcommunities and with the police, housing and otherkey government agencies. They agreed to contactother members of the network whenever rumorsbegan to circulate, crowds gathered or incidentsoccurred that could be warning signs of unrest.

These activists were given mobile phones so they couldremain on the streets to monitor situations.Sometimes the individuals might be within meters ofeach other and even visible across a street, yet thetensions made it impossible for them to have directcontact. Therefore the phones provided the necessary

means for communication to resolve the situation.The phones enabled the activists to ask questions oftheir counterparts from the other community and thento pass this information back to their own community.This often helped them to dispel false rumors and, asneeded, to find ways of diffusing the situationthrough informal mediation and problem solving. Thephones also enabled the activists to maintain contactwith the police so that community workers could begiven the time and space to try to intervene and stoptrouble, as the involvement of the police could beseen as inflammatory by some.

When local police commanders began to recognize thecapacity of the network activists to calm tensions,they increasingly turned to them as their first point ofcall. During the period when the network was inoperation, there was a continuing reduction in thenumber of serious incidents. While there werenumerous factors involved in that trend - withchanges in the wider political context of the peaceprocess a crucial factor - the active participation oflocal community activists in responding appears tohave been an important element in helping tomaintain stability, thereby providing space needed forresolving the wider political conflict.

Civilian monitoring Civil society initiatives for monitoring both humanrights and specific events, such as elections, are widelyknown. Civil society monitoring initiatives explicitlyaimed at supporting peace processes are less wellknown. Yet they can be uniquely influential in creatingsufficient stability and space needed to underpin officialpolitical negotiations and to address the localdimensions of wider conflict contexts. They typicallydraw upon detailed local knowledge of the specificdynamics and developments that can trigger conflictescalation. Utilizing credible (and usually independent)monitors, they can issue information and analysis that isaccepted by the conflict parties and other stakeholders.They often issue recommendations explicitly aimed at



53 Based on Neil Jarman. 2005. “Managing conflicts by phone: The mobilephones network in Northern Ireland” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit.

fostering confidence building and may work with allinvolved to see them implemented. Their credibilityoften stems from the fact that they are perceived aseither non-partisan or multi-partisan (e.g., comprised ofpeople with links to all the conflict parties) and theirmotivation is basically humanitarian, with the interestsand needs of non-combatant civilians their primaryconcern.

Ceasefire monitoring and support: Bantay Ceasefirein the Philippines54

Mindanao has experienced decades of violent conflictbetween the Philippine government and variousinsurgencies struggling for greater self-determination.A network of grassroots and international civilsociety groups formed the Bantay Ceasefire (BC)network in 2003 to monitor a ceasefire agreementbetween the government and the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF). The initiative grew out ofcollaboration between Initiatives for InternationalDialogue, a regional NGO, the ImmaculateConception parish, and Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus, agrassroots group of the main peoples on the island,Muslims, indigenous peoples and Christians. Thesegroups recognized the vulnerability of the ceasefireand the urgent need to do something to support thefragile peace. They then sought cooperation withnational peace groups and groups from abroad,especially from South East Asia but also globally, tobecome a network of around 20 member groupings.This has helped to internationalize the resourcesavailable for responding to the conflict. Regionalsolidarity has also demonstrated that many of thepeoples of South East Asia share similar problemsand can also share solutions.

The BC network forms investigative teams to monitorskirmishes and reports of violations, as well asunderlying systemic issues in the conflict. Beforeembarking, they make contact with the officialmonitoring body and, as relevant, with military unitsin the areas under investigation. Because of itsindependence, credibility and good networking skills,BC is able to work simultaneously through villagepower structures, with the Philippines armed forcesand the MILF, as well as with churches, NGOs, and

government agencies operating in the area. In thefield, BC teams seek the widest range of interviewsand documentary evidence available, paying specialattention to the experiences of civilians and to humanrights violations. Their reports concentrate ondocumenting any violations that may have occurred,as well as making specific recommendations forprotecting the truce. Reports are provided to themedia, support groups, senior army officials, and theMILF. To follow-up, BC often arranges meetingswith these parties to discuss the issues in greaterdepth. Many of their recommendations focus on waysto ameliorate the effect of army and MILF actions oncivilians - such as cases where the location of campsnear villages jeopardizes their security or the effectsof major army campaigns on non-combatants.

With the well-being of people living in conflict areas astheir primary concern, the BC network aimed toensure it contributed to preventing the outbreak ofviolence as well as monitoring violations. They workat the village level to detect localized disputes thatcould escalate into violence. They report thesedevelopments to the official monitoring bodies and toother members of the network in order to facilitate arapid response, including through mediation byappropriate teams from the Catholic churches andMuslim bodies. BC members have also done much to‘popularize’ the ceasefire at the community level byproducing explanatory pamphlets and holdinginformal discussion sessions. They have conducteddialogue in their communities to underpin support forpermanent monitoring outposts and to implementother key recommendations. To enhance thesustainability of the network, BC has begun to traincommunity monitors in early warning analysis andother participatory strategies to prevent the outbreakof hostilities.

In addition to monitoring formally agreed ceasefires,community monitors can become involved in activitiesthat help to generate public confidence. These activities



54 Based on Diomedes Eviota, Jr. 2005.”Grassroots and South-SouthCooperation: Bantay Ceasefire in the Philippines” in van Tongeren, et al.,People Building Peace II, op.cit.

can involve monitoring developments in controversialstate institutions and monitoring relations betweencommunities.

Creating the space for long-term change: Communityconfidence building in GhanaConflicts in Ghana - as in many West African countries -

are expressed as struggles between communities, withthe government often seen as a partisan actorpromoting the interests of their own group against theinterests of others. As a result, the state is not seen asan impartial arbiter, acting on behalf of all the peopleof the country. The new democratic government has,however, taken important strides in trying to addressthe long-term socio-economic and political rootcauses of these problems - partly through cooperationwith international development agencies. Yet it maytake a considerable period of time for these efforts tobear fruit. In the meanwhile, the risk remains of re-escalation to violence that could undermine thepotential for longer-term structural change.According to Emmanuel Bombande, director of theWest Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP):“While the genuine issues are slowly beingaddressed, it is impossible to work on medium- tolong-term issues when communities are up in arms.There is a need to slowly build confidence thatchange is coming and things will get better.” 55

WANEP has worked in local communities to identifystrategies and resources that can be used by local civilsociety groups to sustain the fragile peace. In the past,a significant trigger for unrest was the treatment oflocal people by the police, who are seen as aninstrument of a state they do not trust. To contain thepotential for escalation, well-respected local CSOmembers now volunteer to serve as witnesseswhenever a community member is arrested. Theyaccompany the accused and stay with them while indetention and at their arraignment. This has thedouble effect of deterring any potential for abuse -which helps to increase the confidence of localcommunity members - while simultaneouslydeterring the potential for rumors alleging abuse thatcan spark unrest, a contribution greatly welcomed bythe police. Over time, this is helping to stabilize the

situation in the community so as to provide theneeded space for longer term changes. EmmanuelBombonde suggests that this experience demonstratesthe important role that local people can play incontributing to a multidimensional and sustainedpeacebuilding strategy. They are a crucial element incomplementing the initiatives of a range of otheractors.

The kind of ‘confidence building’ role played bycommunity volunteers in Ghana is one that has beenwitnessed elsewhere. For example in Northern Ireland,the Derry-based Peace and Reconciliation Group(described in more detail below) convinced thegovernment to appoint ordinary citizen ‘lay visitors’with the right to visit police cells at any time of day ornight to ensure that detainees were properly treated. Asaccusations of abuse by the security forces were a majorflash point in the conflict, their role was seen asvaluable both by the police - who came to see that itprotected them against false accusations - and by theparamilitaries, especially the IRA, who understood thatit provided some protection for their members who weredetained.56 This arrangement was one part of a widerinitiative to try to de-escalate tensions that could triggerrenewed violence.

Interpositioning, accompaniment andcivilian peacekeeping Based on the observation that the mere presence ofoutside witnesses can help to deter violence in many - ifnot all - contexts, there has been an emergence ofunarmed, civil society-based initiatives aimed atreducing political violence and protecting civiliannoncombatants. While the term is controversial withsome, these types of initiatives are increasingly referredto as ‘civilian peacekeeping’. As Wallis and Samoyoaexplain:



55 Interview with author, 15 August 2004. See also Catherine Barnes. UN-CSO Interaction in Conflict-Affected Communities, GPPAC DiscussionPaper. September 2004. Available onhttp://www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/Research/UN-CS_interaction/Regional_experiences-paperCB_29Sept04.doc

56 Diana Lampen and John Lampen “Facilitating a Mutual De-escalationProcess: Quakers and the Peace and Reconciliation Group in NorthernIreland” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

The aim of civilian peacekeeping is to establish andmaintain the minimum level of security that enablespeople to feel safe enough to move around, organizeand take effective action to defend human rights andpromote peace. Civilian peacekeeping cannot resolvea conflict or build peace but it can enable otherpeacemaking and peacebuilding activities to takeplace.57

Civilian peacekeeping activities can include monitoring,protective accompaniment and inter-positioning - i.e.,physically positioning themselves between opposingforces to prevent violent attack. Many initiatives arebased on using a system of international-local contacts,with foreigners linked to locals to provide a symbolicpresence indicating that the world is watching. Successoften rests on perception of potential attackers that theforeigners have international linkages and thisperception changes their assessment of ‘cost-benefits’that could be gained by committing a violation.

Sometimes these initiatives can provide support forlocal people’s conflict resolution efforts. For example, aNonviolent Peaceforce (NP) team accompanied a groupof mothers and a local human rights activist seeking therelease of children allegedly abducted as child soldiers.NP team members provided a supportive internationalpresence while negotiations between the mothers andthe insurgency leadership continued. By nightfall of thesecond day, 26 children were released with their busfares home.58 Often their work is aimed at protectinghuman rights defenders.

Protective Accompaniment: Peace BrigadesInternational in Colombia59

Peace Brigades International (PBI) aims to ‘protect theprotectors’ and - by so doing - to enable their ownprotection work to continue and thus contribute toeffectively opening the political space for peace andjustice work to take place. In Colombia, after decadesof armed conflict involving numerous armedformations, political violence is widespread.Unarmed peacemakers, human rights advocates, tradeunion leaders, and community activists - as well asthose from vulnerable communities, such as

indigenous peoples and minority groups - have allbeen targeted by those who find their workthreatening or unacceptable.

PBI was asked to help. Aiming to ameliorate the risk,PBI provides ‘protective accompaniment’ for peopleand communities threatened by violence. Based onthe observation that the presence of foreigners at theside of intended victims can deter potential killers,international volunteers accompany those at risk.PBI’s strategy is to make it known that there will bean international response to any violence witnessedby a volunteer. This requires the PBI team to maintainlinks with influentials at the local, national andinternational levels, including Colombian militaryand government officials, the diplomatic corps, inter-governmental organizations, UN representatives, theCatholic Church and the diplomatic corps.

Internationally, PBI operates through 18 country groupsthat both mobilize resources and activate a supportnetwork of parliamentarians, international NGOs,prominent church leaders and government officials.PBI mobilizes these networks to apply pressure onthe Colombian government to prevent the escalationof violence, in accordance with its obligations underinternational human rights standards. For example,when Gabriel Torres, a human rights worker withCredhos, was detained by the army, PBI immediatelybegan to lobby. They called the Dutch and Spanishambassadors, who in turn called Colombia’s deputydefense minister. A few hours later, Torres wasreleased; as one soldier put it “Let him go or elsewe’ll have those people calling us all day.”

Making peace: helping to reach agreement

Negotiations leading to peace treaties to end armedconflict have traditionally been viewed as the exclusiverealm of governments and the leaders of armed groups,with concerned governments and IGOs acting as



57 Tim Wallis and Claudia Samoyoa. 2005. “Civilian Peacekeepers: Creatinga Safe Environment for Peacebuilding” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit.

58 Global Action Agenda, Available Online: http://www.gppac.net 59 Based on Helen Yuill “Protecting the Protectors: Peace Brigades

International in Colombia” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building PeaceII, op.cit.

conveners and mediators. The ‘official’ nature of theseprocesses meant that the potential contributions of civilsociety and other ‘non-official’ actors were overlooked.Countless civil society peacemaking initiatives since the1990s, however, have revealed their invaluable potentialfor supporting the prospects of a sustainable agreement.

As discussed above, civil society initiatives can besignificant in creating a context where the parties arewilling to come to the table and reach a negotiatedagreement. They can help to transform hostile attitudesamongst supporters that bolster hardliners and positivelydemonstrate that there are, instead, important‘constituencies for peace’. Civil society initiatives cangenerate pressure on the primary protagonists in armedconflict to move forward on a peace agenda and not fallback on military action. As was described in theexample of the Liberian women above, this maysometimes include shaming decision-makers intoengaging in peace negotiations.

Civil society can also play important roles in helping tosustain agreements reached by the parties, includingthrough raising awareness and educating the publicabout the agreement itself. They can be crucial forconsolidating support. In Northern Ireland peaceprocess, for example, the public was asked to vote onwhether to accept the agreement. It was assumed thatthis would basically be a procedure for rubber stampingthe agreement - after all, if the competing politicalparties agreed, would not the public as well? Yet it wassoon apparent that a huge chasm had opened betweenthose who drafted the agreement and the population as awhole. Non-partisan peace activists responded byorganizing a “Yes” campaign. Within six weeks, themajority of the population voted in favor of it. In sodoing, they gave a massive impetus for politicalcompromise, which has helped to sustain the processthrough many years of difficulty.60

As well as helping to create a climate conducive fortalks, civil society actors sometimes have a directpeacemaking role. They are often helpful in openingchannels of communication between parties in conflict.Using their unofficial and low-key status, CSOs can

facilitate dialogue involving those close to governmentleaders and armed opposition groups. They can provideconfidential ‘back channels’ and can facilitate unofficialdialogue processes - both of which provide parties theopportunity to engage in the communication necessary todetermine whether political negotiations may be viable.

Unofficial civil society actors have also served as themain mediators and facilitators of formal peacenegotiations. This role is more typically taken bydiplomats from concerned governments or by the UN orregional organizations, who are able to contributeconsiderable financial resources and, in many cases,political pressure to bear on the negotiations. In certaincircumstances, however, it seems that the very fact thatcivil society-based mediators can offer only their trust-worthiness and skill is a key reason why they areacceptable when other mediators are rejected.

This provides an insight into the reasons why unofficialactors can be especially valuable in peacemaking. Theytypically deploy non-coercive and participatoryprocesses to enable those involved to better understandthe reasons for the conflict and what needs to be done toresolve it. Instead of relying upon an external force toexert pressure and inducements for the parties to reachan agreement and then supply the resources to helpimplement it, the parties must instead jointly workthrough the options until they are able to reach mutuallyacceptable arrangements. The agreements are then morelikely to endure because those involved tend tounderstand why the compromises were necessary andwhy the agreement reached is the best one possible.

CSO roles in peacemaking are usually confined toprocesses that enable the leaders of the fighting forcesto reach an agreement. Yet there are some peaceprocesses where civil society groupings participatedirectly in the negotiations. Such processes are usuallyaimed at reaching comprehensive agreements on newstate structures and other key issues at the heart of



60 Quintin Oliver. 2002. “Developing public capacities for participation inpeacemaking” in Catherine Barnes (Ed.) Owning the Process: PublicParticipation in Peacemaking. Accord 13. London: ConciliationResources. http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/pedev.shtml

conflict. It is here that civil society can be especiallyinvaluable because they are typically motivated more bythe desire to promote sustainable change than by thequest for governing power, as is described below.Furthermore, as the ‘Geneva Initiative’ reveals, it is evenpossible for civil society leaders from across the conflictdivide to come together to jump start a negotiationprocess by creating their own model agreement.

Constructing a road to peace: the Israeli-PalestinianGeneva Initiative61

The Geneva Initiative is a joint Israeli-Palestinian effortto propose a detailed model for a peace agreement toend the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on previousofficial negotiations and international resolutions.Their ‘Geneva Accord’ was negotiated by prominentPalestinian and Israeli individuals from a diverserange of backgrounds - including politics, security,business, academic, and civil society. Over two years,both teams met hundreds of times, seeking toestablish whether it was possible to reconcile thoseissues that had prevented the sides from reachingagreement in the past.

The Geneva Initiative effort rests on 3 pillars: movingIsraeli public opinion and policy, moving Palestinianpublic opinion and policy, and suggesting anegotiated endgame option to international policymakers and civil society. The initiative is based on theassumption that public opinion must be prepared forpeace and that the leaderships must be convinced thatthe publics will support them if they choose theendgame peace option. Operating under the slogan‘there is a partner; there is a plan’, their goal is topromote the prospects for peace by presenting adetailed blueprint for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Theyaim to prepare public opinion and leadership to beaccepting of the real compromises required.

Back-channel communications betweenopponents One of the challenges in beginning a process towardreaching a negotiated settlement is taking the firstmoves to engage with those who have been swornenemies. Sometimes parties recognize the need for anegotiated settlement but have become trapped by the

conflict. They may need assistance to signal theirwillingness to enter into discussions without riskingthemselves. Leaders are often fearful of appearing softor otherwise jeopardizing their position, both towardtheir opponent but also in relation to their own group. Acommon barrier is inherent suspicion of the motivationsof opponents and fear that their engagement may onlybe a trick. These challenges indicate the crucial need todevelop some form of confidence-building measuresthat can enable the parties to negotiate.

Individuals and groups based in civil society aresometimes in a unique position to help antagonistsdevelop a process to de-escalate tensions and generatethe beginnings of confidence in each other’scommitment to a negotiated process. Sometimes this isbecause they have pre-existing relationships with theprimary protagonists in the conflict. Sometimes it isprecisely because they are not operating in an officialcapacity and therefore are not threatening and, at apractical level, can easily be dismissed if their initiativesare not useful. Furthermore, as explained in the GPPACEast and Central Africa Action Agenda:

Many CSO actors are close to the conflicts that theyseek to address. This proximity affords them access toinformation and insights that state actors may not have.... In many instances, CSOs are more acceptable toarmed and opposition groups than representatives ofgovernments, allowing them to play a positive role.62

Civil society actors - such as a religious leader, a wellrespected intellectual, a prominent social activist, orsomeone from a specialist NGO - are often able to act‘below the radar screen’ of public awareness. They cansometimes act as a quiet intermediary and exploreoptions or discretely deliver messages between parties.They may also work with the parties to devise formulasacceptable to all the sides on how to deepen theirengagement in a negotiation process.



61 For more information, see the Geneva Initiative websitehttp://www.geneva-accord.org

62 Regional Conference for Eastern and Central Africa, Nairobi Kenya, 26th-29th October 2004. Available on: http://www.gppac.net

Although this function is most often undertaken bysenior diplomats, civil society actors can contribute toaddressing what is sometimes called the ‘securitydilemma’. In conflict situations, actions often speaklouder than words. Normal channels of communicationhave typically broken down and trust is low. Thereforemembers of a group in conflict generally perceive allactions by their opponents as hostile and therefore feeljustified in responding with counter-actions to defendtheir own interests. These actions are, in turn, perceivedas hostile by the other party. This cycle of response andcounter-response can lead to an escalating spiral ofconflict behavior that further entrenches and escalatesthe conflict. De-escalating moves sometimes take theform of carrying out cooperative acts or of modifyingconduct that might have been viewed as threatening orhostile by the other side. This was well-illustrated by thePeace and Reconciliation Group in Northern Ireland.

A Graduated Reduction in Tensions: The Peace &Reconciliation Group in Northern Ireland63

Peace and Reconciliation Group (PRG) inDerry/Londonderry was created to find practical waysto work towards understanding and reconciliation inNorthern Ireland. Group members included wellconnected community leaders as well as severalformer members of armed groups from different sideswho had committed themselves to work for peace butretained contact with former associates. PRG used avariety of methods to build bridges betweencommunities polarized by the historical and politicalevents in Northern Ireland. In the early 1990s, inaddition to its usual cross community social events,the PRG quietly engaged with leaders of theRepublican and Loyalist paramilitaries and with thepolice and army to reduce tensions and addressmisunderstandings that could escalate violence.

Trust in PRG’s role had grown after it had successfullymediated between the mostly Catholic nationalistcommunity and the police and army over accusationsthat the security forces were abusing their power.With the unique composition of its membership, thegroup also had constructive relations with localparamilitary leaders from both sides and had securedpromises of ‘no first strike’, which had considerably

reduced the amount of inter-paramilitary violence inthe city. Yet hostilities between the Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) and the British security forces remainedthe main source of violence.

After more than a decade of armed struggle, severalleading figures in the Derry branch of Sinn Féin, thepolitical party aligned with the IRA, were seeking away to shift the campaign into a political process.Simultaneously, the commander of the regiment ofBritish army forces stationed in the area was seekinga way to improve relations between his soldiers andthe local people.

PRG members, especially the ex-paramilitaries, beganto advise local army commanders on ways they couldhelp to reduce tensions around public order issues.However, as a shift to ‘softer’ public order tacticsmight make soldiers and police officers easier targetsfor the IRA, there was also a need for the IRA tounderstand and appreciate the changes being made.

Recalling the insights of Charles Osgood on methodsfor a ‘graduated reciprocation in tension reduction’ -otherwise known by its acronym ‘GRIT’ - formulatedin connection to the nuclear weapons arms race64,PRG considered how they could enable both sides tode-escalate the levels of violence without necessarilyneeding to engage directly with each other. Theyrealized that if the IRA implicitly ‘responded’ to theBritish moves by NOT attacking them, then greaterconfidence would be generated. Two PRG members



63 Based on Diana Lampen and John Lampen “Facilitating a Mutual De-escalation Process: Quakers and the Peace and Reconciliation Group inNorthern Ireland” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

64 As the Lampens explain, this is the pattern seen in growing stockpiles ofweapons during an arms race. In 1962, Charles Osgood formulated theidea of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction. Osgood’s insightwas that this escalation process could be put into reverse. While party ‘A’may not unilaterally disarm, they can make a small reduction and wait tosee whether there will be a response. If party ‘B’ reciprocates with aparallel concession, then ‘A’ can make a further move based on this‘graduated reciprocation’. Whereas complete disarmament, for example,requires a huge amount of trust, a GRIT-based process of small butsignificant actions enables trust to grow as each side sees increasingevidence of the other’s peaceful intent. The most famous example of thiskind of process was after decades of fruitless Strategic Arms LimitationTalks, when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev simply made a largereduction in Soviet missiles and then waited for Western governments torespond. (Charles Osgood. 1962. An Alternative to War or Surrender.Champaign: University of Illinois Press.)

discussed this strategy with the British commanderand IRA leaders respectively and found them open tothe idea. They drew up a list of ‘moves’ that eitherside could make as they began to trust the other’sintentions. For example, the army could stopindiscriminate house searches and the IRA could stoptaking over people’s homes as hiding places toambush soldiers. These moves could be made withoutpublicity or in any way engaging in negotiations. Thisfeature was problematic for the IRA leaders, whowere wary of diminishing any strategic advantagegained by the use of violence unless there werecommiserate political gains. PRG representativescountered these concerns by pointing out that itwould be difficult to launch a successful politicalbargaining process without initial trust-buildingmeasures.

In the following period, the city witnessed a reductionby about 60 percent in the levels of violent incidentscommitted by these forces. This was a dramaticchange in a city that had consistently ranked near thetop in the number of bombings and casualties. It wasnevertheless difficult to attribute these changes to thesuccess of the GRIT formula, as neither side hadannounced its intentions or rational. Yet in 1992 asenior Sinn Féin leader told a PRG member that theIRA had been implementing the moves for the past 2years and that the army had been responding. Anotherexplained: “We were looking for a way to movetowards peace; what the PRG did was to show us thenuts and bolts of a possible process.” After the all-party negotiations process that led to the BelfastAgreement had started, a former British Armycommander wrote to PRG saying: “I have thought sooften that the roots of the initiative lay in Derry,which in some part showed the way (I think perhapsfor the IRA as well as for the Army and others) and inthat the PRG were central-in your philosophy andexample and all you did to help us move forward.”

Unofficial dialogue processes: ‘Track II’ and ‘Track 1 1/2 ‘65

Experience from peace processes around the worldreveals the importance of preparing people for change,particularly those in key roles who are involved in the

political negotiations or who influence public opinion.Quiet and unofficial dialogue processes betweeninfluential people across the lines of conflict, whicheither proceed or are parallel to the official negotiations,have often been helpful in supporting the humandimension of peace processes. Unofficial dialogueinitiatives can help to lay solid foundations for politicalnegotiations and contribute to creating a socialenvironment that understands and supports such aprocess.

Transforming the relationship between adversaries isoften necessary before a lasting cooperative relationshipon functional issues can be established. Althoughtypically a long-term and complex process, dialogue-based methods can be a powerful experience forfostering this change. Key figures in processes asdiverse as Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africa,and Tajikistan all look back on their experience inunofficial Track II dialogue processes and in conflictresolution training workshops and claim that thisexperience was a turning point in how they perceivedthe conflict. It helped them to develop ideas for how toaddress the conflict issues and to develop constructiveworking relationships with counterparts previouslyperceived as ‘the enemy’.

Track II Dialogue is often designed accompany andenrich Track I ‘official’ negotiations. Activities throughwhich Track II dialogue can occur include trainings,exchanges, problem-solving workshops, and peacecommissions. Often they involve some element of jointanalysis, in which members of groups in conflict discussthe causes and dynamics of conflict - seeking tounderstand the other’s perspectives - and explorepotential ways of addressing it. These kinds of methods



65 These terms derive from distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1981between official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (track one) andunofficial efforts by non- governmental professionals to resolve conflictswithin and between states (track two). Many began to use the term ‘track11/2’ to describe unofficial processes that involve influential members ofthe conflicting parties acting solely in their personal capacity (e.g., notofficially ‘representing’ their party). Later, Louise Diamond coined thephrase ‘multi-track diplomacy’, recognizing that to lump all track twoactivities under one label did not capture the complexity or breadth ofunofficial diplomacy.

can be designed as one-off events. Increasinglycommon, however, is the recognition that dialogueforums and processes may need to be sustained as alonger-term process.

Dialogue processes often involve participants connectedwith the political negotiations and / or those who caneffect change at the grassroots level and support socialreconciliation. They are typically guided by an external‘third-party’ facilitator. They aim to open channels ofcommunication, address misperceptions, developrelationships among participants, and create a forum toexplore ideas and generate proposals. Unofficialdialogue processes have also contributed to the qualityof negotiated outcomes by helping to identify theprovisions that satisfy the important interests and needsof the parties and contribute to transforming therelationships damaged by conflict so as to lay thefoundation for long-term cooperative relations. It oftentakes time before the ideas, relationships, and personalchanges that develop through these processes manifestinto significant social and political change. Often theseexperiences occurred prior to a sustained politicalnegotiation process and were a factor in why negotiatorscould engage constructively in talks once conditionsbecame ripe.

In some cases, Track II dialogue processes were able to‘map’ the framework for a comprehensive agreement inadvance of the ‘official’ political negotiations, as withthe ‘Grupo Maryland’66 process involving Peruviansand Ecuadorians and as may well prove to be the casewith the ‘Geneva Accord’ agreed between Israeli andPalestinian civil society leaders (see above). In others,such as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, they were also able tohelp develop or test formulas that might be used toovercome obstacles to engaging in productive officialnegations.

Strengthening a Peace Process: the Inter-TajikDialogue67

In comparison with many of the ‘internal’ wars of thelate twentieth century, the inter-Tajik conflict isnotable both for its rapid escalation to war in 1992and for its relatively quick conclusion through a

negotiated settlement reached in June 1997. UN-mediated peace negotiations were complemented bythe Inter-Tajik Dialogue project organized by the US-based Kettering Foundation and facilitated by a jointAmerican and Russian team. Participants in theDialogue, drawn generally from the second or thirdlevel of decision-making authority in their respectivegroupings, helped to start and then maintainedinvolvement with the official negotiations andengaged in activities in the society at large.

The process began in March 1993, when sevenindividuals from different factions in the civil war satdown around a table in Moscow. At that time, theyformed a unique channel of communication acrossfactional lines. Just past the peak of violence in avicious civil war, they could barely look at each other.During the three meetings between March and August1993, participants in the Dialogue discussed theorigins and conduct of the civil war. In the thirdmeeting, someone commented: “What we really needto focus on is how to start a negotiation between thegovernment and the opposition about creatingconditions for refugees to go home.” From this pointonwards, the participants explored approaches to eachkey issue and developed broad conclusions aboutdesirable ways to address problems.

In October 1993, Dialogue participants had astraightforward discussion about how to start anegotiation process. Because the opposition wasideologically diverse and geographically dispersed, itwas unclear who would represent opposition forces atthe negotiating table. Within two months, the leadersof different opposition factions had met in Tehran anddeveloped a common platform that subsequentlybecame the basis for the United Tajik Opposition(UTO) alliance. Pro-government participantsquestioned opposition representatives intensivelyabout the platform at the fifth meeting in January



66 Inés Cevallos Breilh and Sahary Betancourt. 2005. “A Second Way:Grupo Maryland Between Peru and Ecuador” in van Tongeren, et al.,People Building Peace II, op.cit.

67 Based on Randa Slim and Harold Saunders. 2001. “The Inter-TajikDialogue Process: From Civil War Toward Civil Society” in Abdullaevand Barnes, Eds. The Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan PeaceProcess. Accord 10. London: Conciliation Resources. Available online:http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index.shtml

1994. Some of the main points in that exchange wereput in writing. The pro-government participants leftthe meeting with the belief that the basis fornegotiation now existed and promised to report to thegovernment. One month later, the government ofTajikistan accepted an invitation to join UN-mediatedpeace talks.

In their sixth meeting in March 1994 - one month beforethe beginning of UN-mediated negotiations -Dialogue participants wrote their first document, the‘Memorandum on the Negotiating Process inTajikistan’. This was the first of many memorandathey prepared jointly to convey ideas to thenegotiating teams and the larger body politic. Oncethe inter-Tajik negotiations began, the Dialogue’s aimwas redefined as “designing a political process ofnational reconciliation for the country.”

The Dialogue was a factor in the context that shaped theparties’ willingness to engage in official talks andhelped to develop a number of the formulas that werelater included in the formal peace treaties. In complexpolitical situations, it is almost impossible to identifyprecisely which of the many inputs bears mostresponsibility for changes. In this case, thegovernment decision was taken against the backdropof sustained diplomatic pressure to negotiate and itsawareness of the escalating costs of war. Yet as wasremarked by a high Tajikistani official who wasinvolved in the government decision to negotiate:‘After six meetings of the Dialogue, it was no longerpossible to argue credibly that negotiation betweenthe government and the opposition was impossible.’

The Dialogue was an important process to bringtogether, in their personal capacity, people fromopposing factions to discuss the conflict and ways toend it. This initiative provided a channel ofcommunication, helped to address misperceptionsabout opponents, and created a forum to explore andgenerate ideas and proposals. It helped to developrelationships between participants - including thosewho took part in the negotiations and in thesubsequent implementation body - and strengthenedtheir problem-solving skills. Dialogue participantsalso participated in post-conflict peacebuilding andengaged in initiatives to involve the wider public in

developing approaches to address sources of tension.Thus the Dialogue provided a unique bridge betweenthe official process and civil society andcomplemented the more overtly political approachesto ending the war.

Mediation / facilitation of peace negotiationsThe majority of formal peace negotiations are mediatedby teams of third-party diplomats from concernedgovernments or from the UN or a regional organization.Yet there are a number of cases where this role has beenplayed by civil society mediators. In some situations,well-respected figures from prominent local socialinstitutions have used their influence to convenerepresentatives of the conflict parties. For example, InSouth Africa, a group of progressive business leadersfrom a number of large corporations formed theConsultative Business Movement (CBM) to develop aninformed response to the deteriorating situation. After aseries of discreet meetings with key leaders, the CBMgained credibility as a facilitator of the National PeaceAccord and technical support for the constitutionalnegotiations - a role that was often complemented bypartnership with the South African Council of Churches(SACC).68 In Somaliland, the Council of Eldersprovided a forum for open discussion with all partiesand acted as mediators in a broadly-based cross-clanpeace conference process leading to a new politicalorder in the break-away territory.69

In some cases, the services of an external body areaccepted by the principle protagonists in the conflict. Afew NGOs specialize in this role. The Carter Center,founded by former US President Jimmy Carter, uses itsunique access to heads of state and other senior leaders



68 For more information, see: Chris Spies. 2002. “South Africa’s NationalPeace Accord: its structures and functions” in Catherine Barnes (Ed.)Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord 13.London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord. PeterGastrow. 1995. Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the NationalPeace Accord. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. SusanCollin Marks. 2000. Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution During SouthAfrica’s Transition to Democracy. Washington: United States Institute ofPeace.

69 Haroon Yusuf and Robin Le Mare. 2005. “Clan Elders as ConflictMediators: Somaliland” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II,op.cit.

to act as an ‘honest broker’ of peace agreements. It hasnotably played this role in relations between Sudan andUganda and, together with the Organization ofAmerican States, in Venezuela. This case demonstrateda unique partnership that was able to draw upon a mixedset of institutional strengths and resources throughcombining civil society and inter-governmentalorganization capacities.

Preventive mediation: The Carter Center, OAS & UNDPin Venezuela70

Venezuela has experienced intensifying politicalconflict in recent years and seemed at high risk ofescalating into armed conflict. In a unique and high-profile effort to channel these conflicts throughpeaceful processes, the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and The Carter Center - an NGOformed by former US President Jimmy Carter - havebeen serving as a tripartite mediation team betweenthe main political factions. This collaboration marksan innovative experience in blending official ‘Track I’negotiations with the flexibility and reach ofunofficial ‘Track II’ methods to resolve a politicalcrisis.

Since Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’ election in1998 and re-election in 2000, his administration hasbeen criticized by opposition groups for what they seeas its increasingly undemocratic actions. Many in thecountry felt he was undermining democracy throughhis confrontational style and policies. Oppositionparties organized mass protests and a general strike.The government and opposition groups became sopolarized that the political crisis threatenedVenezuela’s stability. At the invitation of thegovernment and several opposition groups, in August2002 The Carter Center joined the OAS and UNDP tobegin a formal process to help resolve Venezuela’spolitical crisis.

The international tripartite working group began talks inearly November 2002 between the government andopposition political and civil society groups. OASSecretary General César Gaviria led the talks, withthe advice of The Carter Center and the technicalsupport of UNDP. President Carter had made a trip to

the country in July 2002, to lay the groundwork fornegotiations. Amid those negotiations in late 2002, atwo-month general strike occurred, shutting down oilproduction and many other businesses.

To keep communications going, the Center initiated a‘third side’ project to identify people affected by theconflict willing to push for a peaceful resolution. TheCenter facilitated different levels of talks andcollaborated with UNDP to hold peacebuildingseminars with civic groups and the media.

After six months of intense negotiations, the OAS andthe Center helped Venezuela’s government andopposition agree on terms for a referendum onwhether embattled President Chávez should stepdown consistent with the country’s constitution. Thenegotiations were highly publicized, with reports ontheir progress aired on the television each night.Before moving on to the steps leading to areferendum, both sides were called upon to respecthuman rights, freedom of expression, and the right topetition for recall referenda of elected officials.Supporters of the government and the oppositionsigned an accord agreeing to these rights in May2003.

After the agreement, the Center and the OAS wereinvited to observe the entire recall effort. Along theway, they worked with both sides and with theelectoral authorities to get consensus on the ‘rules ofthe game’ at each step of the process. After a long andcontentious period of verifying signatures requestinga recall, frustration grew. The delay in announcing thenumber of validated signatures and the preliminarydisqualification of many of the signatures led tomassive protests in Caracas that turned violent inFebruary 2004. Yet sufficient signatures wereeventually verified, triggering a recall vote in August2004. President Chávez won almost 60 percent of thevote, enabling him to complete the remainder of histerm. While the opposition were disgruntled by theoutcomes, the political crisis - and the risk of war -eased.



70 See http://www.cartercenter.org/peaceprograms

Sometimes a non-official mediator is chosen by theparties because of their pre-existing relationships andthe perception that they can be trusted in this role.

Enabling peace in Mozambique: Churches &Communità Sant’ Egidio71

After almost three decades of devastating war, acollaborative effort by Mozambican Protestant andCatholic leaders helped bring about directnegotiations between the Frelimo government and theMozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Thenegotiations were primarily mediated by the Italianlay community Communità Sant’ Egidio and leadeventually to the formal ending of the war in 1992.

The Mozambican churches began to play a constructiverole in promoting peace in the early 1980s. Themostly Protestant Christian Council of Mozambique(CCM) repeatedly called for the government toengage in dialogue leading to reconciliation, for thebenefit of the peoples of the country. After a series ofset-backs on the battlefield, President Chissano gavecautious approval to their effort to initiate contactwith Renamo to explore the possibilities for peace.Recognizing the importance of unified efforts, CCMsought collaboration with the Catholic Church. Asmall committee was formed, comprising twoProtestant and two Catholic leaders. They jointlylinked with Kenyan officials influential with theRenamo and interested in supporting negotiationefforts and sought to engage Renamo directly. Theirefforts eventually enabled the government andRenamo to ‘come to the table’ in a negotiationprocess. Yet the initial attempts by variousgovernments to mediate fell short of an agreement.

The Catholic lay community, Sant’ Egidio, had linkswith Mozambique dating from the 1970s. In 1990,they offered to host direct talks between theMozambican government and Renamo. Due to itsstrong links with leftist Italian politicians, the Italiangovernment and Catholic churchmen trusted byRenamo, its offer was accepted. Sant’ Egidio went onto host all 12 rounds of the Rome talks, with two ofits senior members acting first as observers and thenas official mediators. Its unofficial status and itsability to support itself on voluntary contributions

gave it the freedom of informal diplomatic maneuver,which greatly assisted it role in the search for asettlement of Mozambique’s war.

The talks in Rome were long and difficult. The mainconcern of the mediators was that, while the partiestalked, Mozambicans continued to suffer and die. Thechurches pursued various strategies to help speed upthe talks. They launched petition campaigns andpublic prayers for peace. These helped to drawattention to Mozambique’s troubles and the EuropeanCommunity applied pressure on the parties to quicklyreach an agreement. They also reminded thedelegations that their people’s suffering continued.Church leaders also worked closely with theAmerican ambassadors to Mozambique and the HolySee, as well as with the governments of Kenya andZimbabwe, to keep the parties focused on the difficultissues at hand.

Some were critical of Sant’ Egidio’s rigorously non-judgmental approach and the long delay in reaching acredible ceasefire. In the final analysis, however, themediators provided a genuinely ‘impartial’environment that was essential for the parties to settletheir differences and reach a politicalaccommodation. Sant’ Egidio’s success at the Rometalks stemmed in large part from their close links tothe Mozambican parties, as well as their skill andpatience. This significantly enhanced their ability tokeep the peace process on track, despite the regularbreakdown of talks between the government andRenamo. They understood that the process could notbe accelerated by issuing ultimatums as they had noforce to back them up; similarly they could not offerthe incentive of funds (what has been termed astrategy of ‘buying’ peace) because they were not adonor. Instead , Sant’ Egidio’s modest claim that itoffers no prescriptions but seeks to createopportunities for the negotiators to find solutionsthemselves is perhaps one key reason why the 1992



71 Based on: (1) Dinis S. Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Goncalves. 1998. “Acalling for peace: Christian leaders and the quest for reconciliation inMozambique” in Armon, Hendrickson and Vines, Eds. The MozambicanPeace Process in Perspective. Accord 3. London: Conciliation Resources.Available on: http://www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3/index.shtml; and (2)chapter 21.1 in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

Mozambican peace settlement continues to holdtoday.

Direct participation in peace negotiations The prevalent strategy for negotiations to end internalwars is to bring together the representatives of thecombatant groups (governments and armedinsurgencies) - typically with the assistance of aninternational mediator and often behind closed doors ina foreign location - to reach an agreement that satisfiesat least the minimum demands of the negotiators. Manywars have ended through this approach. Yet it rarelyprovides opportunities for those who did not take uparms - including other political groupings, organizedcivil society or the wider public - to have a voice inshaping the agreements or endorsing them. Nor does theprocess itself help to strengthen democratic forms ofdecision-making or provide space for different socialand political groupings to jointly make agreements toaddress the issues that divide them.

Although the end of hostilities is likely to be met withwidespread feelings of relief, some may feel alienatedfrom an agreement that is not ‘theirs’. This is aparticular concern in situations where the governmentand the armed groups lack a strong support base withinsociety and thus neither is seen as legitimaterepresentatives of public interests. It may also be thecase if ‘enlightened leaders’ reach a deal that goesbeyond the realm of what is acceptable to moreconservative public opinion. Alienation may also beintensified if the agreement is seen as more about‘dividing the spoils’ between those willing to useviolence to access power than about promoting socialinclusion and equitable development. All too often, theimplicit message from the process is that violence pays.

Although groups in civil society may have the insightsand capacities needed to propose ways to address thesechanges, it is rare that they are able to exercise thispotential. Local civil society is typically disempoweredby standard practice in negotiation processes and by theprevalent paradigm that sees governments and leaders ofarmed groups as the only parties relevant to politicalnegotiations. There are alternatives to this ‘elite pack-

making’ paradigm of peacemaking when the processincludes mechanisms for public participation. Suchmechanisms engage people from different sectors andidentity-groups to deliberate the substantive andprocedural issues addressed in the negotiations. Thismay be especially effective if the processes unfold in the‘public sphere’ so that wider audiences are aware of theprocess and have opportunities to contribute.

There are a number of processes, including inGuatemala, Northern Ireland and South Africa, wherecivil society activists have asserted the right of the widerpublic to participate in the negotiated processes to shapetheir country’s future. 72 In so doing, they were able toinfluence the shape of the negotiation process; the issuesaddressed on negotiating agenda; the substantiveagreements reached and their implementation. The talksprocess was brought further into the public sphere. Thisenabled a wider range of people to contributesuggestions and follow the negotiations - includingwomen and those from marginalized groups. TheGuatemalan peace process, described previously,illustrates the constructive influence that civil society-led mechanisms can exert on influencing the negotiationagenda as well as developing formulas for thesubstantive agreements.

With greater transparency of the negotiation process andthe peace agreements, the public may be better able tounderstand and potentially accept the reasons for thecompromises reached. Furthermore, they maypotentially mark a historic moment of change and helpto establish the value of public debate and democraticprocesses as the legitimate response to conflict.

Institutionalizing a political voice & ensuringrepresentation: The Northern Ireland Women’sCoalition73

The modern ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland started in thelate 1960s. By the mid-1990s, it was increasinglyrecognized that the conflict could not be won through



72 For detailed case studies and analysis, see Catherine Barnes (Ed.) Owningthe Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord 13. London:Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/index.shtml

military means. After decades of various peaceinitiatives and growing cooperation between theBritish and Irish governments to sponsor jointnegotiations, a process for all-party talks began inJune 1996. For the first time it was based on theassumption that ‘if you are a part of the problem, thenyou need to be part of the solution’. Representativesto the talks were chosen through public elections inorder to include parties associated with paramilitarygroups in formal political negotiations. Althoughthere were no specific arrangements for otherorganized sectors of society to participate, thiselectoral system allowed a group of women rooted incivil society to gain seats at the table. They became achannel for bi-communal civil society involvement inthe official peacemaking process.

The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) wasinitiated by women with long histories of engagementin civil, workers’ and human rights and includedunionists and nationalists, as well as those who didnot define themselves in either of these categories.They felt it necessary to take the gigantic step fromthe non-governmental sector to the political arenabecause they believed that the incumbent politicalleaders either ignored or refused to take seriously theissue of women’s representation and participation inthe peace negotiations. They first lobbied for theexisting political parties to include women in theircandidate lists. When this action was effectivelyignored, they decided to form a political grouping tocontest the elections.

Not all women’s groups supported this idea. Somebelieved it would be difficult to sustain the bi-communal nature of the coalition on contentiousissues because cooperation would require too manycompromises. Despite these concerns, the NIWCattracted support from most groups. Frequent openmeetings were held in Belfast to debate positions.Equality, human rights and inclusion were adopted asthe NIWC’s three core principles and they committedto use these principles to guide and evaluate theirpolicy positions.

Their strategy was to organize women through all theirvarious networks and contacts to gain the necessarythreshold of votes. Other parties and the media

initially dismissed the NIWC. Yet it gained one percent of the vote and finished as the ninth mostpopular political party. It thus secured two seats in thenegotiations, where its delegates had the status of fullparticipants. At the negotiations, the NIWC wascareful to ensure that both nationalist and unionistwomen were at the table at all times.

The NIWC worked to promote an inclusive process and toprevent delegates getting drawn into a destructive spiralof blame that could harm the general negotiation ethos.They concentrated initially on makingrecommendations for procedural issues. They weresensitive to how these matters linked with processissues and were attentive to the underlying relationshipsbetween participants. They were later able to broadenthe negotiating agenda to include such issues asvictims’ rights and reconciliation. The NIWC producedhigh-quality position papers and tried to model a freshapproach to politics based on cooperation, non-competitiveness and a willingness to share ideas.

They remained true to their NGO roots and kept their feetfirmly in both the world of electoral politics and in theworld of public activism. At monthly meetings of thefull membership, they discussed positions onforthcoming agenda items and provided information tothe membership about developments in the politicalprocess. Members informed the representatives of theirperspectives on the process. Because their membershipwas bi-communal, they provided guidance onapproaches acceptable to either or both communities.NIWC also maintained regular contact with a range ofcommunity and NGO leaders on specific issues underdiscussion. The NIWC gave serious consideration tothe views of those consulted. Inputs from both themembership and these networks meant that the NIWCpositions could command cross-community support. Itbrought solutions to the table that recognized andworked to accommodate difference, instead ofthrowing up obstacles based on those differences.

The NIWC’s involvement ensured that the issue of



73 Extracted from: Kate Fearon. 2002. “Institutionalizing a political voice &ensuring representation: The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition” inCatherine Barnes (Ed.) Owning the Process: Public Participation inPeacemaking. Accord 13. London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/nor.shtml

women’s political participation was placed firmly onthe map of electoral politics. Women delegates fromother political parties began to attain higher profileswithin their parties. The NIWC’s involvement alsodemonstrated the possibility that civil society canparticipate in and influence formal politicalnegotiations. It revealed that politics is not necessarilythe exclusive preserve of customary politicians;groups other than those advocating exclusively anationalist or exclusively a unionist perspective alsohave a place at the decision-making table.

After deliberating for 22 months, the negotiatorsconcluded the Belfast Agreement in April 1998.Before it could take effect, however, it had to beendorsed through a public referendum. Some of theissues the NIWC put on the agenda - such as victims’rights and reconciliation - became touchstone issuesin the referendum campaign. It is arguable that if theagreement had not addressed these concerns, manypeople could have voted against it.

The NIWC played a key role in promoting theAgreement. Few parties were as unequivocal in theirsupport and no other political party worked as closelywith civil society leaders to secure endorsement. TheNIWC was able to speak simultaneously to a numberof constituencies: nationalist and unionist, organizedcivil society and individual members of the public.Members helped prepare a ‘user friendly’ version ofthe Agreement, using plain speech to make it morecomprehensible. NIWC representatives spoke atpublic debates and organized debates amongst theirown members. The NIWC supported the civilsociety-led “Yes” Campaign. As a political party,NIWC was entitled to free postage for sending apiece of literature to every voter. They put their ownmessage on one side and gave the “Yes” Campaignthe other side to print with its own message and logo.The referendum on the Belfast Agreement was passedby 72 per cent of the Northern Ireland electorate - anevent of massive historical and political significance.

While it is not explicitly intended to open the door tocivil society involvement in peace negotiations, UNSecurity Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peaceand Security recognizes the right of women to

participate in a decision-making capacity in peacenegotiations. This has provided an opening for womenbased in civil society organizations to demand a voice.Femmes Africa Solidarité has pointed out however that:

“Although various international declarations andconventions call for increased involvement of womenin peace negotiations, African women continue to besidelined in this area. They have proven they cannegotiate through participation in MARWOPNETand other regional peace processes, but even whenorganized and prepared they find it hard to securenecessary funds to attend negotiations. When they doobtain financial backing, they have trouble receivingaccreditation. When they get accreditation, otherparticipants tend not to take them seriously.”74

As they point out, there are cases where women based incivil society have secured their access to the negotiatingtable through determined advocacy. The NorthernIreland Women’s Coalition provides a prime example ofthe ways that a civil society-based women’s voice canhelp to influence the process and the outcomes ofnegotiations. The fact that these examples are theexception rather than the norm indicates the need toinvest in civil society involvement in peace processesand to take their contributions seriously.

Pragmatic peace: community-level peacemaking

Many initiatives - especially those undertaken by civilsociety peacebuilders - are aimed at peacebuilding at thelocal community level. Protracted armed conflict withinstates generally penetrates all levels of society. Regionaland / or national-level conflict dynamics interconnectwith self-sustaining conflict dynamics at the localcommunity level. In some cases, continued violentconflict at the community level generates centrifugalpressure towards greater chaos, undermining efforts atmacro-level peacemaking. Conversely, effective conflictprevention and peacemaking locally can underpin



74 Femmes Africa Solidarité. 2005. “Engendering the Peace Processes inWest Africa: The Mano River Women’s Peace Network” in van Tongeren,et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p592

macro-level peace processes and pave the way towardssustainable reconciliation by addressing specificgrievances, repairing relationships and creatingsufficient stability so that wider political processestowards peace can take hold.

In this context, the efforts of local people acting at thecommunity level can be crucial for changing thedynamics of the conflict. This is an important arena forfostering a pragmatic peace through arrangements thatenable them to co-exist based on awareness of theirinterdependence, especially if they have nowhere else togo.75 Sometimes they are able to foster ‘islands ofpeace’ amidst a wider context of war. Sometimes theyaddress volatile local dynamics that could escalate intoviolence and intensify conflict and war in the widersociety. Often they are connected to efforts to make apractical difference in the daily lives of people of thecommunity. They help to address manifestations of bothstructural and overt violence by developing peacefulprocesses to deliberate common problems and projectsto promote more equitable development. Theseinitiatives sometimes have a demonstration effect whenpeople in other communities see what is being achievedand are inspired to launch their own initiatives.

Community-based mediation andmonitoring structuresOne of the principle goals of community-basedpeacebuilding is to help prevent violence and promotedevelopment by creating structures and systems forresponding to conflict and building peace at the verylocal level.

Systematic responses to local conflicts: Bo Peace andReconciliation Movement in Sierra Leone76

In a context where discrimination and exclusion arewidespread, where state institutions have been weakto non-existent and arms are plentiful, somethinghappening in a household setting can quickly get outof hand and result in armed violence. SierraLeoneans, with support from international partnerssuch as Conciliation Resources, have organized a‘peace monitoring’ system for community-basedconflict identification, mediation and, in some cases,

adjudication. The peace monitors of the Bo Peace andReconciliation Movement (BPRM) are a community-based group of volunteers who, with the consent ofthe community, approach and engage people involvedin conflict. They respond not only to conflicts thathave already become violent but also ones that arebelow that threshold. They consider nothing too smallor insignificant to merit their attention. Thisinclusiveness has been very important for theeffectiveness of their work and the credibility of theprocess in the eyes of local people. Over eight yearsof practice, the BPRM has evolved a systematicmethodology out of their experience of what works.

After a conflict has come to their attention, BPRMsends in a group of volunteers who are considered tobe peers of those who are involved in the conflict. Forexample, when working on what appears to be adomestic conflict, they send a woman and a man ofan appropriate age, people who might have linksthrough doing the same kind of work, or throughbelonging to the same religious community. Thisenables those involved in the conflict to choose theperson or people with whom they want to build-up alink of confidence. Once relationships have beenestablished with the different parties, the problem isdiscussed in a small group. As the parties move fromtalking about their grievances to discussing theirability to come together in agreement, the discussionis shifted into ever larger groups, until it reaches acritical threshold and becomes a public process. Thissystem works well in a context where people areaccustomed to agreements made publicly, involvingwitnesses from the wider community, rather thanrelying on written contracts.

The composition of the peace monitor teams is animportant factor in their success. It enables them toreach across gender, age and economic divides. It hasalso empowered women and younger people,



75 The phrase ‘pragmatic peace’ and its meaning were first introduced to meby Ibrahim Ag Youssof, one of the main instigators and facilitators of theMalian peace process described below.

76 Based on Michael Hammer, workshop presentation, delivered Committeefor Conflict Transformation Support meeting “Pacification orPeacebuilding? Defence, Foreign Policy and Conflict Transformation”,CCTS Review No.30, March 2006. Available online: http://www.c-r.org/ccts

including teenagers, to play a mediating roletraditionally reserved for elder men. It means youngpeople are involved in the process, rather than feelingthat it is another manifestation of generational powerplay.

Political leaders have increasingly recognized thepossibilities of this approach. For example BPRM hasbeen asked to mediate in conflicts over chieftaincypositions, including that of a paramount chief, and inland conflicts involving vast resources. Politicalactors also seek advice and help to sort out who hasthe right to put up a candidate for the chieftainshipposition and about the appropriate time to go publicabout it. While the dynamics of a political contestremain, there is greater recognition that it shouldresult not in confrontation but in a joint solution. Asthese dynamics were a significant factor in theescalation of war in the 1990s, this shift is importantfor preventing the recurrence of armed conflict. Italso suggests that a system that works successfully atthe small scale can be useful at a wider level, wherethe stakes are often higher. A challenge for the futurewill be to clarify the interface between peacemonitoring and the role of the re-emerging stateinstitutions, so that there is cooperation andcomplementarity rather than rivalry.

The experience of community-based conflict resolutionwas echoed in South Africa. The National PeaceAccord, agreed by all the main parties, provided a seriesof institutional structures aimed at fostering processes toresolve conflicts at the local, regional and nationallevels in ways that complemented the formal politicalnegotiations.

Preventing Violence: South African National PeaceAccord Structures77

When rapidly escalating violence threatened thenegotiations to bring an end to the apartheid regime,the South African political parties engaged in aprocess to reach an agreement on initiatives toinvestigate the causes and seek to end the violence.The National Peace Accord created structures at thenational, regional and local levels. At the nationallevel, there were investigations into allegations of the

involvement of state security forces and politicalparties in the violence - and an agreement on a new‘code of conduct’ to guide their behavior. One of themost striking things was the development of local andregional ‘peace committees’ who tried proactively toprevent the escalation of conflict in their communitiesand regions by mediating conflicts, monitoringdemonstrations and other activities that mightdegenerate into violence, and supporting long-termpeacebuilding. The committees coordinated theirwork with the political parties and with the securityforces and held them accountable for their actions.Tens of thousands of South Africans became involvedin activities at the local and regional levels. In sodoing, they began to learn ways of mediating theirdifferences and resolving conflicts that affect them.

Localized peace agreementsPeacemaking goes far beyond reaching a politicalagreement between the leaders of the main parties; oftenit is valuable to make peace between those who liveside-by-side and experience the conflict first hand buthave nowhere else to go. Even when national levelpeace processes are stalled or non-existent, localcommunities can act to address the issues that generateconflict and escalate violence locally. These agreementsrarely have any formal legal status and are generallyreliant upon those involved to voluntarily implement -often backed by considerable peer pressure by othercommunity members. Yet it is precisely becausecommunity members realize that it is in their own self-interest to find a way to live together peacefully thatthese outcomes can be so durable.



77 For more information, see: Chris Spies. 2002. “South Africa’s NationalPeace Accord: its structures and functions” in Catherine Barnes (Ed.)Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord 13.London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord. PeterGastrow. 1995. Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the NationalPeace Accord. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. SusanCollin Marks. 2000. Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution During SouthAfrica’s Transition to Democracy. Washington: United States Institute ofPeace.

Towards a pragmatic peace: localized peacemaking inNorthern Mali78

From 1990 to 1996, Mali experienced a separatist war inthe north. Initially mobilized through regionalsolidarity amongst northerners, the conflict slowlyfragmented along inter-ethnic lines and violence toreapart inter-dependent communities. Attempts toaddress the overall political conflict began in 1991,with government-sponsored initiatives to reach anacceptable negotiated solution with the armed groups.Yet the negotiated agreements between governmentrepresentatives and the armed factions were unable tobring the conflict to a conclusion. Instead, the initialnegotiations actually exacerbated the conflictdynamics. Although later talks created the politicalterms for peace, without the involvement of localguarantors of the settlement at the community level,implementation floundered and peace remainedelusive on the ground. It was only when thousands ofpeople throughout the north engaged directly in inter-community peacemaking that the path to nationalreconciliation opened. The involvement of those mostaffected by the conflict in open and inclusivedecision-making meetings was able to achieve whatofficial political negotiations could not: atransformation of the conflict and consolidation ofpeace.

This began in late 1994, when the village chief ofBourem initiated the first inter-community meeting.Nomad chiefs from across the area gathered andagreed to contribute to peace by motivating thepeople under their influence. These traditional leaderssucceeded in bringing their constituencies along withthem. This initiative sparked a number of similarmeetings based on activating traditional conflictresolution methods. The main result of these initialmeetings was to create localized ceasefires betweenthe armed movements, ending the organized violenceby late April 1995. Civil society had managed to putan end to the insurgency and succeeded where thearmy, the movement leaders and the government hadall failed. Yet combatants and civilians remainedheavily armed - with some turning to banditry as theirlivelihood - and social and economic life wasdysfunctional. Fear was widespread and

approximately 150,000 refugees remained abroad.Clearly many issues had to be addressed to develop alasting peace.

Despite bringing violence to a halt, local communitieswere unable to proceed to the next phase. Up untilthis point the meetings had been self-initiated. But thetime was ripe for external guidance in order toproceed from an objective of stopping the violence toa more creative goal. A small group of experiencedcivil society leaders formed a facilitation group toprovide guidance for locally-led initiatives. Theyelaborated a strategy for managing the currentsituation based on experiences of adapting traditionalskills for peacemaking. The facilitation groupemerged out of a partnership between local actors andNorwegian Church Aid.

They fostered ‘inter-community meetings’ betweenpeople who shared the same territory, were dependenton the same resources and shared the same marketplace, so that they could discuss the problems causedor aggravated by the war. This organizing principleignored the official administrative subdivisionscreated in the colonial era that were designed todivide and control previously strong and inter-dependent communities. As there was no official orother obvious leadership structure on this level, thefacilitation group selected organizers for each inter-community meeting based on an assessment of thehost’s integrity, position in the area and capacity toconvene such a meeting. This was important becausethe glue that binds society together in Mali ispersonal relations and trust; people do not deal with a‘representative of something’ but rather with a person.

The facilitation group developed a list of problemsstemming from the war and asked the communities todevelop generally accepted solutions so that theireconomic and social life could function again. Theycautioned the communities to avoid discussing issueswhere the solution was not within their control, as itwould divert the discussion from the main issues andled to disempowered frustration.



78 Extracted from Kåre Lode. 2002. Mali Feature Study. in Catherine Barnes(Ed.) Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Accord13. London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord.

Each meeting was attended by between 300 and 1,800people. The meetings were typically opened by aplenary session with formal speeches, a presentationof the outline of the procedures, and selection ofmembers for the topical commissions. Eachcommission consisted of 10-30 members chargedwith formulating proposals on the main topic areas,which would then be subject to approval ormodification at the final plenary meeting.

Although there were variations in the conclusions of thedifferent inter-community meetings, the overallpattern was surprisingly similar. There wasoverwhelming agreement that the authority of thestate should be restored based on the principles ofequality and justice. The process of talking togetherand developing shared proposals helped to breakdown the wall of distrust between groups andindividuals. In most places, there were alsosignificant practical outcomes. Market placesreopened immediately; armed robbery wasdramatically reduced; and numerous combatants wereconvinced that the peace was real and consequentlyjoined the demobilization camps and turned in theirweapons. In many areas, inhabitants began toimplement the new strategies for resolving long-standing community disputes, thus significantlyreducing tensions.

Mali’s experience demonstrates that significantpeacemaking work can take place in localities. Theprocess of engaging local people can at times result insustainable agreements to address popular concerns andhelp to transform social divides. Yet it can be difficult totranslate these developments to the national level.Furthermore, deterioration in national processes cannegatively influence these localized developments. Insome cases, however, it has been possible to develop aspace at the local level for mass participation inpeacemaking. In Colombia, REDEPAZ was formed as anational network of peace initiatives with focus onestablishing local peace communities. In a contextwhere civilian populations are frequently massacred,some localities have chosen to declare ‘neutrality’ andpro-actively resist the activities of both the armedrevolutionaries and the right-wing paramilitaries. These

communities are forming national networks ofresistance to the war.

Local ‘sovereignty’ & local peace: Mogotes,Colombia79

For more the forty years, Colombia has experiencedarmed conflict that has often engulfed localcommunities in violence and generated profoundsocial polarization. In a context where national levelefforts to address the conflict have failed to haltviolence, citizens of the northeastern town ofMogotes sought to address these challenges bydeveloping local-level strategies for publicparticipation in ending violence and creating a newpolitical culture in their town. Their efforts hadimpact far beyond their own immediate surroundings.Amongst the first of the ‘zones of peace’ to beestablished in Colombia, the experience of creatingnew structures of local government in Mogotes hasbeen a source of inspiration to communities who havereplicated similar processes in their ownmunicipalities.

In late 1987, Mogotes was occupied by one of thearmed revolutionary groups, who held the mayorhostage. Residents met subsequently in small groupsto analyze the problems encountered in their town.They identified poverty, violence and administrativecorruption as the main issues. With support from thelocal bishop, they decided to organize a MunicipalConstituent Assembly comprised of 260 delegates,each of whom represented a small zone. Theassembly developed a plan to address key issues andresulted in a greatly empowered citizenry. They firstnegotiated the release of the kidnapped mayor, whowas widely seen as corrupt. They then forced him toresign by applying concerted pressure based on non-violent direct action, such as silent marches, prayervigils, and a popular referendum that revealed almostunanimous agreement that he must step down. Theylater developed a plan to promote integral



79 Based on Monseñor Leonardo Gomez Serna. 2005. “Mogotes MunicipalConstituent Assembly: activating ‘popular sovereignty’ at a local level” inCatherine Barnes (Ed.) Owning the Process: Public Participation inPeacemaking. Accord 13. London: Conciliation Resources. Available onhttp://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/mog.shtml

development and improved public administration.They continue to hold local officials accountable fordelivering on these priorities. They have also helpedto create consensus for peaceful resolution of the warin a community that had been ideologically divided.

The central government was initially suspicious of theiractivities, thinking them inspired by the guerrillas.Many activists were threatened by paramilitaries. Yetafter the bishop met with the president, he condonedtheir efforts. This enabled them to facilitate dialogueat a local level between the army, the insurgents, andlocal officials. Although the people of Mogotes havegone a long ways towards promoting peace locally,they are still surrounded by armed groups and thegovernment has not provided sufficient investment inthe social capital of the community so as to addressthe underlying issues that generate conflict.

Transformation: addressing the causes &consequences of conflict and creating peaceable &just relationships

Addressing the structural causes andconsequences of conflictAgreements on paper mean very little if people are stillsuffering from the consequences of war and if theinequities that gave rise to it are left unaddressed.Sustained financial, technical, and politicalcommitments are necessary to transform theseconditions. Determined government efforts combinedappropriate international aid is needed to facilitate therehabilitation of war-affected communities and helpensure that a ‘peace dividend’ is widely experienced.This can be strengthened through the involvement oflocal and international CSOs in policy analysis as wellas program implementation and service delivery.Ultimately, however, it requires governmentcommitment to policies that will create structures andconditions that are more capable of equitably meetingthe needs of all. Civil society can play an important rolein generating the political will to shore up thiscommitment.

Post-war peacebuilding typically requires more than ‘re-building’, as the former system is likely to have been

marred by structural inequalities and discrimination thatgave rise to the conflict in the first place. As Junne andVerkoren80 make clear, simply recreating pre-conflictstructures - which for many seems the most obviousaction after a war - may contribute to prolonging theconflict (or even restarting the violence) rather thansolving it. Peacebuilding processes need to find ways toalter the balance without estranging those who losefrom it by offering them an alternative. Local civilsociety, often supported by their international partners,can play a crucial role in promoting this structuraltransformation over the longer term and in helping toaddress ongoing conflicts over developmental prioritiesthrough peaceful processes.

Demilitarizing minds, healing psyches andfostering reconciliationWhile addressing the practical needs is imperative forsustainable peace, transforming conflict-impairedrelationships can require even more complex processesthat enable people to reclaim their dignity and fosterempathy across conflict divides. This may involveparties fully acknowledging their responsibility forabuses they committed and taking steps to address pastand continuing injustices. It also requires a shift in theattitudes and cognitive frames that enabled andsustained the conflict; a shift from seeing the ‘other’ asenemy -implicitly questioning their membership in thehuman community - to perceiving them as fellowhuman beings with whom one can, at a minimum, co-exist. Although such transformation may not benecessary to ensure a formal end to war, the failure to doso can mean that underlying conflict dynamics remainunresolved, potentially creating the seeds for futurediscord.

While governments can - and should - take a leadershiprole in fostering reconciliation, this involves atransformation of the ‘hearts and minds’ of those whohave been touched by the conflict and, as such, cannotbe engineered. These changes can be triggered by theauthentic initiatives of civil society actors, who rely



80 Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren. 2004. Post-conflict Development:Meeting New Challenges. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

essentially on creativity to generate experiences thatallow people to connect across divides and to sparkchanges in perceptions.

This often involves activating cultural traditions andspiritual resources that touch upon the deepest sourcesmeaning for those affected by conflict. For example, inpredominantly Buddhist Cambodia, monks have led anannual Dhammayietra (‘pilgrimage of truth’) peacewalk throughout the war ravaged country that hasinvolved tens of thousands of Cambodians who eitherjoin the pilgrims in the walk or greet them along theway. Bearing a message of compassion, they help togenerate critical mass within the population aware ofalternate responses to the violence that has penetratedthe society for decades. Motivated by the teachings andleadership of Maha Ghosananda, the pilgrimage aims tomanifest compassion and so foster reconciliation.According to Ghosananda:

“It is a law of the universe that retaliation, hatred andrevenge only continue the cycle and never stop it. ...Reconciliation does not mean that we surrender rightsand conditions but rather that we use love. Ourwisdom and our compassion must walk together.Having one without the other is like walking on onefoot; you will fall. Balancing the two, you will walkvery well, step by step.”81

A process of reconciliation typically requires an honestreckoning with the past. The preconditions fortransformative reconciliation are within the process ofbearing witness to what has happened: of finding waysto voice that which has been silenced and to reclaimdignity out of humiliation. While civil society groupsare not able to administer formal legally-based justice,they can ensure that abuses are acknowledged and helpto promote other ways of developing restorativejustice.82

As John Paul Lederach points out, reconciliation is not‘to forgive and forget’ but ‘to remember and tochange’.83 This suggests importance ofacknowledgement and the need to understand the past,as well as to bring to justice those who committed

abuses. Civil society groups have often found ways offostering truth-telling processes and ensuring that thepast is not simply hidden behind a wall of denial.Initiatives can range from documentation projects andacademic studies, to theatre and other artistic andliterary projects, to memorials and symbolic or ritualexpressions of grief, atonement and recognition of thosewho suffered. All these forms can provide access pointsthat enable people to remember and to engage with thepast.

Sometimes there is a need to directly address the painfulexperiences of war and to break down the walls ofsilence that can imprison those affected. In addition topsychosocial counseling and practical support forsurvivors, there artistic or spiritual experience canprovide the catalyst for transformation. Lederachdescribes the epiphany that can emerge during - as heputs it - the ‘artistic five minutes’: “When it is givenspace and acknowledged as something far beyondentertainment, [it can accomplish] what most of politicshas been unable to attain: It helps us return tohumanity, a transcendent journey that, like the moralimagination, can build a sense that we are, after all, ahuman community.”84 The following examples fromSierra Leone illustrate these dynamics.



81 Quoted in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p.23482 Restorative justice is a response to crime that focuses on restoring the

losses suffered by victims, holding offenders accountable for the harmthey have caused, and building peace within communities. Restorativejustice takes many different forms, but all systems have some aspects incommon. Victims have an opportunity to express the full impact of thecrime upon their lives, to receive answers to any lingering questions aboutthe incident, and to participate in holding the offender accountable for hisor her actions. Offenders can describe why the crime occurred and how ithas affected their lives. They are given an opportunity to make things rightwith the victim-to the degree possible-through some form ofcompensation. See:http://www.restorativejustice.org/intro/tutorial/definition

83 John Paul Lederach. 2005. “The Arts and Peacebuilding: UsingImagination and Creativity” in van Tongeren, et al., People BuildingPeace II, op.cit., p284.

84 Ibid. p.285

Transforming the legacies of war through arts andmedia: Peacelinks and Operation Fine Girl in SierraLeone85

Over fifty thousand people died during the decade ofcivil war that wracked Sierra Leone from 1992-2002.Civilians were brutalized by massive human rightsviolations that left a widespread legacy of trauma.Thousands of women were abducted, raped and/orforced into slavery by soldiers on both sides ofconflict. As in many societies, women victimized bysexual violence were often blamed for the crime - acrime often ignored both in official political and legalinstitutions and in society. Many survivors feltshamed and silenced by the stigma surrounding theirexperience.

WITNESS, an international human rights NGO,working closely with local activists, set out todocument the war’s impact on young women. Theycreated a film, Operation Fine Girl, centered aroundthe personal stories of four young women and thetestimony of a former child soldier, who explain tothe viewers what happened to them and create apowerful testimony challenging the silence. The filmunderlines how all the individual cases of sexualbrutality combine to cause profound and lastingdamage to society as a whole.

Screened in communities throughout the country -sometimes to audiences of five to six hundred people- the film has sparked discussion and opened space toaddress this painful legacy of war. Seeing people likethemselves share their stories enabled communitymembers to start discussing their own experiences,helping to address some of the isolation and dividescreated by war. In some cases, it has encouragedparticipants to testify before the truth andreconciliation commission or the war crimes specialcourt. The film was used as an advocacy tool topetition officials from these bodies to include theissue of sexual violence in their investigations. It hasbeen used in trainings for prosecution teams andother service professionals to raise awareness of theneed to better address gender issues and the largerpsychosocial impacts of war. It has helped to sensitizetraditional leaders responsible for administeringcustomary law, which too often ostracizes the victims

of sexual violence. The courage of the interviewees tocandidly share their personal stories in a way thatresonated with thousands of others across the country- and the insight of the NGOs to reveal theseexperiences through the vivid and accessible mediumof documentary film - has helped to encourage SierraLeoneans to engage with a painful past and to beginthe process of shifting deeply entrenched attitudestowards sexual violence and the status of women.

Many Sierra Leonean children and youth were caughtup in the war as either forced or naïve recruits for thefighting forces. They became both victims andperpetrators of violence and abuses. A group ofyoung Sierra Leoneans were motivated to draw upontheir society’s rich tradition of artistic expression tohelp themselves and other young people overcometheir trauma, to ‘deglamorize’ warfare and violence,and to foster new skills leading to productive lives forwar affected youth. One of the main outreachmethods has been musical performances and artisticexhibitions. Drawn mainly from ex-child combatantsand children displaced and / or mutilated by war, theyare able to demonstrate the possibility ofreconciliation and renewal. As the Peacelinks’founder explains: “By bringing ex-child combatantsto communities they once terrorized and where theywere now both feared and loathed, the outreachprovided a platform for war-affected children topresent their side of the story. As musicians, dancersand visual artists giving something back to thesecommunities, the children could begin traveling theroad to recovery and acceptance. ... By transformingex-child combatants from agents of destruction tomessengers of peace and by nurturing their talentsand honing their skills, the organization helps changesociety’s negative perception and morbid fear of waraffected children. ... As people came to understandthat these children were as much victims as they wereperpetrators, they slowly let go of theirmisconceptions.”



85The description of Peacelinks is based on Vandy Kanyako “Using Creativearts to Deglamorize War: Peacelinks in Sierra Leone” and the descriptionof Operation Fine Girl is based on Sam Gregory “Operation Fine GirlExposes Sexual Violence: WITNESS in Sierra Leone”, both in vanTongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.

The need for justice in times of transition andhistorically is especially challenging. Until the creationof the International Criminal Court in the late 1990s (initself the product of a productive partnership betweensympathetic governments and human rights NGOs86),there was little recourse to justice for even the mostextreme war crimes and crimes against humanity ifstates were unwilling or unable to prosecute. Sometimesgovernments are unwilling to create an official body toinvestigate the past - or there are concerns that the bodythat has been created will not address crucial issues.Where politicians are unwilling to grapple with thedifficult implications of dealing with the past anddelivering justice, there have been a number of efforts tofill the gap by non-state actors - such as the church-ledinvestigations into the history of abuses in Brazil andGuatemala, as described above. CSOs have also ledcountless campaigns to end what is often called a‘culture of impunity’ in which those who committedviolations have never been called to account for theiractions.

Yet the practical and moral dilemmas involved inadministering transitional justice in situations wherehuge numbers of people are accused of crimes can bedaunting. In some cases, governments have turned totraditional social institutions and practices to helpadminister transitional justice within communities. Forexample, Rwanda’s Gacaca courts are an adapted formof community justice used in the wake of the 1994genocide, when more than 900,000 Rwandans, mostlyTutsi, were killed. The scale of the killings and the largenumber of people implicated in the massacres posed achallenge the humane detention and prosecution of themore than 100,000 accused of genocide and crimesagainst humanity. The Gacaca court system, influencedby the traditional, communal law enforcementtechniques, evolved as a solution. The system, put inplace in 2001, involves both victims and witnesses ininteractive hearings for alleged criminals. The judgesare untrained citizens, elected by their peers. Althoughcontroversial on a number of grounds - including on thepotential for gender bias and consistency withinternational standards for the administration of justice -the procedure is expected to promote community

healing by making the punishment of perpetrators faster,as well as being less expensive to the state.87

Demobilization, Decommissioning andReintegrationProtracted armed conflict tends to militarize significantsections of the affected population. Societies are oftensaturated with military weapons, as well as with soldiers- sometimes including large numbers of children -whose lives have been shaped by the experience offighting. Consequently, there are two inter-relatedchallenges in dealing with security issues at the end of awar. The first is to enable the demilitarization of societyand, most specifically, address the challenge ofdemobilizing, decommissioning and reintegratingcombatants (a process often referred to by the acronym‘DDR’). The second is to increase the security of thepopulation. Ex-combatants not properly demobilizedform a pool of potentially dangerous people who maybe recruited by criminals and / or unscrupulous politicalforces for their own endeavors. The arms andammunition remaining at the end of armed conflict maybe redeployed by opportunists’ intent on securing theirown gains. Even if the former combatants want to returnto peaceful civilian lives, they can often find they do nothave the means and skills to support themselves(especially if much of their young lives have been spentin fighting), are often traumatized by their experiencesin war. Furthermore, they may be rejected by their homecommunity, especially if they were associated withtroops engaged in war crimes. They therefore have verylittle resources for shifting into a new way of life. Thusa well-resourced and planned DDR process is crucialfor the long term future and stability of the society.Faltas and Paes observe that:

“If disarmament is mostly a military function,demobilization is in essence a civilian operation andneeds to be carefully attuned to subsequentreintegration. All too often, the people in charge ofdemobilization promise the ex-combatants benefitsthat the reintegration program is unable to provide. ...[Reintegration] can easily take up to ten years. Its



86 See Coalition For The International Criminal Court, http://iccnow.org 87 People Building Peace, op.cit. pp466-471

length is directly related to the duration and scope ofthe conflict: the longer the fighting took, the moredifficult it will be for combatants to return to civilianlife as a result of severed social ties andtraumatization. ... Unfortunately, the challenges ofthis second phase are often underestimated byprogram planners and inadequately funded.” 89

A significant factor in the success or failure of DDRprocesses is the degree to which they are inspired byand respond to the ideas and needs of those involved.Prospects of success are enhanced if weapons collectionprograms are seen as promoting the interests and needs

of community members from which the fighting forcesare drawn. Local civil society actors can serve as a kindof lightening rod to elicit and implement appropriateand sustainable strategies.



Dealing with the past in war-torn,post-conflict, transition countries isa crucial pre-requisite to achievingsustainable peace and a securefuture. Fundamental to thisendeavor is to recognize andunderstand the significance offacing up to the harsh realities of apainful past. In order to enablecomprehensive integration, suchmodalities as are introduced mustbe fully supported by governments,and fully supportive of all citizensof all ages, in particular victims ofmass atrocities and all other humanrights violations.

We value social reconciliation andthe rebuilding of relationships aspart of our conflict prevention andpeacebuilding work, whilerecognizing the right of everyperson to choose when and ifshe/he will forgive and reconcile.

Based on this need, we shouldestablish multidimensional systems

for reconciliation and trust-buildingby various actors. CSOs play acrucial role in reconciliationprocesses on local and regionallevels. IGOs should supportlegitimate local actors to engage inreconciliation dialogue in goodfaith and offer appropriate,sustained protection and support,including capacity development,including to governmental, civicand media actors.

Historical experiences of violentconflict - particularly whenwidespread atrocities occurred -can leave legacies that continue topoison contemporary relations andincrease the risk of renewedconflict. To promote historicalreconciliation and justice:1. The successor governments of

states involved in these conflictsshould properly recognizeresponsibility for past acts anddemonstrate remorse for them bymaking formal apologies and, as

appropriate, symbolic and / ormaterial reparations.

2. Support initiatives to transmitfacts and memories to futuregenerations in order to prevent arepeat of past crimes. These caninclude memorials, peacemuseums, and commemorativeevents.

3. Joint Commissions of Historiansto research the past and developa common framework offactually-based accounts ofdisputed histories andcontentious issues so as toprovide balanced informationand analysis for educationalmaterial and public debates.

4. Develop education curricula andtextbooks that are sensitive tothese histories and are based onwell-informed and balancedinformation. Where appropriate,collaborate on the developmentof common regional textbooksand materials.

5. Ensure the participation ofyoung people in the peace andreconciliation process.

A GPPAC Approach to Dealing with the Past88

88 GPPAC Preparatory document synthesising the Regional Action Agendasfor preparing the Global Action Agenda.

89 Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes. 2005. “Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration: Not Only a Job for Soldiers” in vanTongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p610

Community-driven disarmament and symbolicreconciliation in Mali90

The inter-community meetings that helped to bringpeace to the war-torn northern region of Mali (seecase study, above) also addressed the challenge ofdisarmament and collected weapons on a large scale.Initially, many northerners insisted that they hadbought the weapons during a time when the statecould not guarantee security and they wanted to berefunded for their purchases. Yet through thesemeetings, they agreed that payment for weaponsexchange would be directed to their community forfinancing development activities, instead of personalpayments. This formula resulted in probably the first‘development for weapons’ initiative and provedlargely successful. It is notable that the formula wasdeveloped through the process of discussion withincommunities, rather than being an externallyconceived and driven program. Nevertheless,international support and funding was critical for itssuccess. Eventually, the UN-supervised disarmamentprogram collected close to 3,000 arms fromdemobilized combatants.

As the process gathered momentum, President Konarérecognized the need to consolidate the transitionpolitically through a powerful symbolic event to marknational reconciliation. It was decided to hold aceremony in Timbuktu, where almost 10,000spectators gathered to watch these weapons burn in agiant bonfire, the Flamme de la Paix (‘Flame ofPeace’). At the ceremony, the president received theannouncement of the dissolution of the five armedmovements, thus marking the decisive end to the war.Although the challenges of building a just and lastingpeace continued, it was a powerful moment inshaping the historic memory of modern Mali. Assuch, it illustrates how the process of addressing theweapons question can be an integral component ofconsolidating a peace process.

Just as the ceremonial burning of arms marked the endto war and the commitment to national reconciliation inMali, the DDR process in Mozambique also combinedefforts to meet the practical needs of people with theless tangible symbolic realm of artistic encounter.

Transforming Arms into Ploughshares: combining theartistic & the pragmatic in Mozambique91

Following on from the signing of the peace agreementin 1995, the Christian Council of Mozambiqueinitiated the Transforming Arms into Ploughsharesproject. Within an overall goal of promoting a‘culture of peace’ in the war-devastated country, theyrecognized the value of tackling weaponsproliferation as key to supporting a peaceful postwartransition. Their specific objectives were to collectand destroy all weapons in circulation by transformthem into ‘ploughshares’. To achieve these ambitiousgoals they devised a series of incentives and tappedinto the desire of people to disarm the society. Inexchange for weapons they offered tools that could beused for income generation. Implements like hoes,building materials, sewing machines, bicycles fortaking produce to market, wheelchairs and otheritems could make a crucial difference to supportindividual, family and community livelihoods. Uponcollection, the weapons were immediately destroyedor made unusable. Yet there was a feeling that moreneeded to be done to mark the significance of theprocess and of the scraps of metal that remained. Insome cases, weapons were destroyed in small publicceremonies at collection points in communities acrossthe country. Innovatively, the TAE organizers askedlocal artists to make pieces of art, public monumentsor practical objects from the scrap. This had a strongresonance with many Mozambicans, who saw themas representing the end of the war and a reminder ofthe need to build peace out of the experience of war.

Shifting values and cultures: educating for peace

“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the mindsof men that the defenses of peace must be constructed” -UNESCO Charter

Efforts to generate a sustainable culture of peace mustbe rooted deeply in the population. A holistic and



90 Based on Kåre Lode, op.cit.91 Albino Forquilha. 2005. “Transforming Arms into Ploughshares: The

Christian Council of Mozambique” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit.

pluralistic approach is required. In addition toaddressing the economic and institutional structures thatgenerate conflict and policy responses to change them,there is a need to transform the deeply embeddedattitudes and patterns of relationships between groups ofpeople that give rise to violence. Countless CSOsthroughout the world, together with governments andinter-governmental organizations, work toward creatingthe longer-term foundations for sustainable peace. Thisincludes a focus on: peace education and conflictresolution life-skills; demilitarization; gender equality;fulfillment of human rights; promoting equitable andsustainable development, as well as human andenvironmental security.

In much the same way as transnational civil societyefforts seek to address key challenges within the globalsystem, CSOs in a particular country are often at theforefront of addressing problems in their own society.Many aim to address sources of structural violence andto promote human security. Through participation inpolitical processes, policy dialogue, monitoring,advocacy campaigns, and protests they help to makegovernments and state structures more responsive to theneeds of their citizens.

CSOs can also play important roles in helping toalleviate social tensions and conflict. They challengeracism, xenophobia and discrimination and promotetolerance and a culture of peace. Person-focusedmethodologies, such as prejudice reduction workshopsand inter-faith dialogue, can complement efforts toaddress discrimination through policy reform andstructural change. Often these initiatives are focused onyouth, who may have greater capacities for change thanolder generations. Summer camps, integrated schools,and exchange programs can all promote what hasbecome known as ‘next generation work’.

Transforming stereotypes & promoting tolerance:Nashe Maalo children’s television in Macedonia92

Macedonia is comprised of an ethnic Macedonianmajority, a sizable ethnic Albanian minority andsmaller percentages of ethnic Turks, Roma, Serbs,Vlach and others. They tend to lead lives separated by

language, residence, and education and interact onlyon a superficial level. With so little contact across theethnic divides, children’s perceptions of their owncountry and its peoples were based on stereotypes,misinformation or simple ignorance. Since thedissolution of Yugoslavia, tensions between ethnicgroups have escalated, fueled by war in neighboringKosovo in 1999 and peaking in 2001 with inter-communal fighting in Macedonia that ended throughpeace talks but reinforced a profound sense ofinsecurity and distrust.

In this climate, Search for Common Ground Macedonia(SCGM) aimed to help break the cycle of mistrustthrough media and education projects. One of themost notable projects has been a children’s televisionshow, Nashe Maalo (“Our Neighborhood”), thatbecame one of the most widely watched programs inthe country. Developed for kids aged 8-12, the goalwas for its young audience to better understand thecountry’s diversity and to foster positive attitudes thatcould potentially lead to more cooperative inter-ethnicrelations. The show features five children of Albanian,Macedonian, Roma and Turkish backgrounds wholive in an imaginary apartment building. They share asecret that binds them together: the building they livein is alive and her name is Karmen. In addition tobeing the kids’ confidante and friend, Karmenpossesses the power to magically transport them intotheir neighbors’ cultural and psychologicalenvironment, thus opening the children to otherpeople’s ways of thinking and living.

Co-produced by Search for Common Ground inassociation with the makers of the US series, SesameStreet, Nashe Maalo was created by experts inchildren’s television production and by research andcontent specialists with extensive experience in theBalkan region. They aimed to create ‘intended-outcomes’ television: to affect positive change in theknowledge, attitudes and behavior of childrenregarding Macedonia as a multi-ethnic society andtheir lives in their society. To do this, they needed to



92 Based on Eran Fraenkel. 2005. “Changing Attitudes Through Children’sTelevision: Nashe Maalo in Macedonia” in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit.

balance clearly researched curricular goals focusedon key challenges in social relations with theelements that make a children’s TV series successful:that it grabs kids’ imaginations and makes the kidswant to see more.

Continual research was required to ensure that theprogram was achieving its ‘intended-outcomes’. Toexamine the impact of the series over the course ofseveral months, researchers interviewed 240 childrenat eight schools in the Skopje region - sixty 10-year-olds from each of the four ethnic groups - before andafter viewing videotaped versions of the series. Thisstudy began before the TV series went on the air.Prior to viewing, many children demonstratednegative, stereotyped perceptions of members ofethnic groups other than their own. After viewing,more children showed positive perceptions and therewas a significant increase among ethnic Macedonianchildren who said they would be willing to invite achild from the ethnic Albanian, Roma, and Turkishgroups to their home. Another finding was that afterviewing, recognition of minority languages hadimproved across all ethnic groups, and mostdramatically among ethnic Macedonian children (theethnic majority group).

An independent audience survey in conducted betweenthe second and third season found that an average of76 percent of children of all ethnicities watchedNashe Maalo regularly. Although intended for 8-12year olds, it had become a ‘family show’. Theaudience in fact ranged in age from five to seventeenand nearly half of the children’s parents also watchedthe program. In the fifth and final season in 2004,these figures had increased to approximately 95percent of children and 75 percent of their parentsand most had watched regularly for at least threeyears. This meant that the program had reached‘saturation’ of the population. It had served as acatalyst for conversation around topics that might nototherwise had been discussed and for presentinginsights into how others lived in their shared country.

Education for peace was identified as a key priority forthrough the GPPAC process, in which it was observedthat people of all ages have to be empowered to become

agents of change to address conflicts from thegrassroots upwards. As their knowledge aboutprevention of violence and of conflict transformationgrows, it should become entrenched in the mainstreamconsciousness. One of the means of doing this isthrough changing norms and supporting constructiveresponses to conflict by systematizing peace andconflict resolution education.

Educating ‘agents for change’: City Montessori Schoolin Lucknow, India93

Founded in 1959, the City Montessori School inLucknow India has worked to implement its coreprinciples of shaping future generations of ‘worldcitizens’. Its educational philosophy is that trueeducation releases capacities, develops analyticalabilities, self-confidence, will power and goal-settingcompetencies and instills the vision that enables oneto become a self-motivated agent of social changeserving the interests of the community. The schoolhas always seen itself as interconnected with thewider community and the wider world. A core beliefis that “a school must act as a lighthouse to society;providing direction, guidance and leadership tostudents, parents, and society and also concern itselfwith the affairs of the age.”

These ideals were put to the test in 1992, when inter-communal violence that claimed thousands of livesthroughout large parts of India, sparked by thedestruction of a mosque by Hindu nationalistextremists in nearby Ayodhya. With about 40 percentof its population Muslim, Lucknow braced itself forviolence. In response the students of City Montessoritook action to prevent further violence. They rodethrough the streets playing unity songs and leading aprocession of thousands of children and their parentscarrying banners with such slogans as ‘We should livein unity’; ‘The name of God is both Muslim andHindu’; ‘God is one, mankind is one’. Encouraged bythe state governor, the school provided a meetingplace for the heads of all the city’s religions. They



93 Based on Priti Barman. 2005. “Committed to Building Peace: CityMontessori School in India” in van Tongeren, et al., People BuildingPeace II, op.cit.

organized daily meetings where the leaders couldpray together for mutual harmony and discussstrategies for keeping the peace. Each evening, theseleaders returned to their communities to maintaincalm. While violence flared nearby, Lucknowremained relatively calm.

One of the reasons why Lucknow may have remainedcalm and the population receptive to their actions isthe legacy of 40-plus years of active engagement inthe community. During this time, more than 250,000children have been students in the school, the vastmajority from Lucknow. They and their families (whoare actively encouraged to be engaged in the school’sprograms) are likely to have been influenced by thecore peace messages inculcated by the school.

The Lucknow City Montessori School provides adramatic example of how schools can engage with thechallenge of preventing large-scale socio-politicalviolence. There are countless initiatives around theworld to strengthen local capacities to mediate conflictand manage differences through conflict resolutiontraining, mediation services, and dialogue facilitation. Inthe state of Ohio USA, for example, schools havebecome the focus for creative approaches for addressingconflict. While supported through programmaticactivities like peer-mediation and anti-bullyinginitiatives, they have also sought to promote a change inthe school culture. Tricia Jones discusses how schoolshave been able to develop a positive and nurturingcommunity. “First the students needed to understandtheir own dynamics of disrespect and agree to disallowthat behavior... When individual students refuse to treatothers with respect, it is the responsibility of othermembers of that community to stand up for them.”94 Sheargues that to truly transform violent responses toconflict, it is necessary to foster social and emotionallearning. “When children develop emotionalcompetence, it is integrally intertwined with thedevelopment of conflict competence and social

competence. If we want our children to be able tomanage conflict effectively, we need to appreciate thatconflict is an inherently emotional experience. Anemotionally traumatized student cannot be an effectivemanager of their own conflict and cannot reasonablyhelp others manage their conflicts.”95

A nurturing educational environment can thereforeaddress the more profound needs of how an individuallearns to respond to their own feelings and to othersaround them. This supports the development ofconstructive approaches to managing difference. Whileeducation may not be sufficient for addressing the manystructural factors that give rise to protracted armedconflict, it is potentially a critical path towardcultivating alternatives to violence. This is a goal wherecooperation between civil society - often the source ofpeace education initiatives - and state educational can befruitful.

As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, civilsociety initiatives are often the source for innovativeresponses to conflict. While civil society as a whole isnot necessarily a force for peace, the debates andinitiatives cultivated within this sphere are often themotor for it. Their contribution to the underlyingtransformation of conflict and building peace extendsfrom efforts to support individual development andcultivate positive norms in communities to tacklingexclusionary policies, systems and structures that giverise to grievances. Ultimately, a widespread, inclusiveand vibrant engagement within civic life can be theincubator for the institutions and habits needed toresolve conflict peacefully and generate moreresponsive and better governance needed to make peacesustainable.



94 Tricia S. Jones. 2005. “Education That Makes a Difference” in vanTongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p.248.

95 Ibid., p.249

An overarching goal for strengthening the prospects forprevention and sustainable peacebuilding is to developthe resource base to underpin the capacity for timely,sustained and effective responses to conflict. Thisrequires strengthening the human and institutionalcapacities of peacebuilding organisations and increasingthe funding base for prevention and peacebuildinginitiatives. Ultimately, these are all likely to be moresuccessful if the geo-political context is conducive forgreater human security and equitable development.Nevertheless, there is always likely to be a role forpeople and institutions skilled in working with conflictand mediating differences.

The previous chapter concentrated on exploring themany invaluable contributions that civil society canmake to transforming conflict. Nevertheless, there arelimits to what they can achieve. CSOs may be anecessary but incomplete resource for working withconflict. Other actors may be decisive. Foreigngovernments and inter-governmental organizations tendto have greater resources at their disposal - including thepower of coercion - and often have institutionalcredibility and capacities to direct towards conflictsituations. Ultimately it is necessary for the belligerentparties in the conflict, typically governments and armedgroups, to decide whether and when to fight and underwhat conditions they will stop. Yet CSOs have thepotential to engage with and complement the efforts ofthese other actors. Their effectiveness is partiallyproportionate to the knowledge, skills and othercapacities they bring to their initiatives and it is possiblethat all of these can be enhanced.

This final chapter explores some of the myriadchallenges and dilemmas encountered in civil society-based peacebuilding, with the aim of directingawareness to address them.

Strategic effectiveness: challenges for achievingsustainable peace

Peacebuilding, power and politicsAs has been discussed throughout, peacebuilding isintegrally entwined with social change. As such, it is

inherently political in the sense that it addresses socialrelations involving authority or power. Yet civil societypeacebuilders are sometimes unclear about the politicalimplications of their work. Within the processes ofpeacebuilding, however, power dynamics and theirpolitical implications operate at a number of levels.

• Key concepts and ideals - such as conflict, peace,democracy, justice, and participation - are inherentlycontested and are open to multiple interpretations.Furthermore, these terms are an essential part ofpolitical discourse and are commonly used topromote and justify action. ‘Peace’ for one could beexperienced as ‘pacification’ to another. The ‘pursuitof justice’ for one can be experienced as ‘war’ toanother. All those engaged with peacebuilding workneed to grapple with these contradictions, as theyhave direct implications not only for the ultimategoals of what they are trying to achieve but alsoinfluence the development of strategy and ongoingpractice in both subtle and dramatic ways.

• Those who identify primarily with conflict resolutionapproaches (in contrast to more explicit social changeactivist or human rights-based approaches) tend tosee themselves - and usually wish to be seen - as‘impartial’, in that they do not aim to promote theinterests of one group over those of others and areunbiased on the contested issues96. This quality isoften welcomed by the parties to a conflict and canhelp to provide a space in which they can addresstheir differences. Yet an impartial approach can


V. Challenges for civil societypeacebuilding

96 Many (though certainly not all) conflict resolution practitioners have theirroots in approaches that are influenced by the ‘neutral mediator’ tradition.They tend to perceive themselves as process advocates who do not have astake in the outcome of the process. While they can be the representativesof a government or organization that has an interest in the peacefulsettlement of the conflict, the practitioner usually derives authorityprimarily from the legitimacy he or she and the process holds in theperspective of the opposing parties. Therefore strategies are not based onthe capacity to exert coercive power over recalcitrant parties but insteadare built on trust and the power of dialogue and persuasion. Impartiality isusually understood as maintaining a non-biased stance with all parties tothe conflict (like ‘non-partisan’) and not promoting in any particularoutcome. Yet some recognize the need to support low-power groups inconflict situations so as to increase the likelihood of their achieving amore ‘just’ outcome. Activism is usually the effort to achieve a particularoutcome (or type of outcome) and is often associated with strengtheningthe non-establishment party to address power asymmetries.

sometimes be implemented by treating all the partiesas formally equal, even though there are extremeasymetries in the actual relationship between theparties. In these cases, procedural equality does notnecessarily lead to effective equality. Such initiativesmay actually lead to a worsening in the conflictdynamics if the ‘weaker’ group feels that its needscannot be secured through dialouge or if the‘stronger’ group believes its hegemony has beenreinforced by the process. To address this challenge,some peacebuilders position themselves as ‘multi-partial’: they actively work to promote the bestinterests of all those with whom they engage in waysthat are consistent with human rights standards. Thisinvolves paying particular attention to ensuring thatdisadvantaged and marginalised groups are providedwith support needed to promote their rights.

• In highly charged and fragile contexts, it is

insufficient at best and irresponsibly negligent atworst to try to ignore the political implications ofprojects. Although conflict involves a contest ofinterests between parties, many CSO initiatives(particularly those undertaken through grant fundedprojects) are depoliticized. They may cultivateinteraction between those who hold moderate stancesand an open mind. Yet in their efforts to restorepeaceful interaction between people, they may fail toengage the hardliners, to address the interests thatdrive the conflict, or to acknowledge the very realdynamics that sustain conflicts as a tug-of-war fordominance over wealth and power political. While theinitiative may ‘do no harm’, it may have little


V. Challenges for civil society peacebuilding

Jonathan Kuttab, a prominentPalestinian human rights lawyer, indialogue with Edy Kauffman, anIsraeli peacebuilder, enumeratessome of the potential risks ofengaging in dialogue processes.These include:97

• A false sense of symmetrybetween the ‘oppressor’ and the‘oppressed’ when the actualrelationship is not that of equals.These can be exacerbated in thedialogue process itself boththrough various technicalobstacles to participation (suchas restrictions on freedom ofmovement, adequacy ofpreparation, levels ofprofessional expertise andlanguage skills, and access toadvice) and through expressionsof power relations (the ability to

exercise pressure, the languageof diktats, and patronage).

• In the effort to reach agreement,a tendency to avoid the mostserious and divisive issues orpostponing them indefinitely.

• The tendency to accept the statusquo and take for granted thepresent constellation of forces;focusing more on bringing anend to violence and less onjustice and its structural causes.

• In the name of pragmatism,parties engaged in dialogue areoften pressurized intocompromising legitimateprinciples and abandoningpositions generally held withintheir own community.

• When meetings includeparticipants closely associatedwith state military or security

forces, there is a fear thatdialogue may be used asintelligence gathering. There isuncertainty as to when themotivation of the powerful is‘know your enemy’ rather than‘understand your neighbor’.

• Labeling those who participatein dialogue as ‘legitimatepartners’ while de-legitimizingthose who do not participate,especially when this is used toavoid negotiating with morerepresentative but problematicopponents.

• The potential to make dialogue asubstitute for action to correctinjustices, especially when theorganizers see dialogue as anend unto itself and are satisfiedto repeat this inconclusiveexperience with other groups.

Power asymmetries and dialogue processes

97 Edward (Edy) Kaufman. 2005. “Dialogue-based Processes: A Vehicle forPeacebuilding” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.,pp474-475

relevance. Conversely, a failure to fully consider thepolitical implications of a project can sometimesallow it to be captured by those who see anopportunity to promote their own interests through it.Inadequate safeguards against abuse or insensitiveimplementation can result in the further deteriorationof the conflict.

Many of these challenges can be addressed through acore awareness of power relations in the conflictsituation, complemented by an ongoing strategicanalysis of conflict interests and how proposedinitiatives and practice interface with these dynamics.

Inattention to the power implications of an initiative isgenerally more common by external actors who are lessacutely aware of the interplay of forces operating in aconflict situation. This may be particularly commonamong NGOs who are not rooted in an explicitly socialchange-oriented paradigm and who position themselvesas implementing agencies. Reimann and Ropersdifferentiate between groups that are primarilymovement-style and advocacy organizations and thosethat are primarily service providers. They suggest thatthe former “concentrate mainly on the input side ofpolitics and try to influence political decision-making”whereas the later “operate chiefly on the output side ofpolitics...insofar as political authorities determine theconditions under which they work and decide onresource allocation.” As such, “there is a danger thattheir agenda is dominated by considerations within therealm of states, probably without a sufficient reflectionof power political implications.”98 This suggests theimportance of NGOs being aware of the reasons whythey are engaged and self-critical about the effects oftheir presence and actions on the conflict dynamics.

Inclusion and the challenge of equality ofprocess and outcomesGovernmental and inter-governmental actors tend towork primarily in the realm of power politics andengage principally with the ‘power brokers’ amongst theconflict parties. While civil society peacebuilders canalso engage with powerbrokers, they tend to have aspecial role in ensuring that a wider range of

stakeholders have an active role in peace initiatives, asillustrated in the previous chapters. The constructiveinvolvement of these stakeholders can become crucialfor changing the dynamics of the conflict, as theseemerging ‘constituencies for peace’ can shift thepowerbase within the conflicting parties and the termson which they engage each other.

Therefore an important challenge addressed by civilsociety is to empower excluded stakeholder groups -often women, youth, and minority and indigenouspeoples -so that the outcomes of peace process willresult in changes that address their needs and promotetheir rights. At the same time, the engagement ofotherwise marginalized groups can contributesubstantively to the peace process and enhance itsbreadth and durability.

Empowerment can occur through the self-organizationof members of these groups to take action in response tothe situation. It can also be encouraged by includingmembers of these groups in wider processes (e.g.,mainstreaming) to ensure they are sufficiently inclusiveof the pluralist nature of the conflict affected society.Each approach can encounter difficulties. In the first, thegroup may still find it struggles to have its voice heard -no matter how well they are organized - if the morepowerfully entrenched groups are determined to ignorethem.99 In the second, marginalized groups may findthemselves at a disadvantage in mainstream processesunless explicit measures are taken to ensure meaningfulparticipation and members are able to skillfully seizeopportunities that are presented.

Providing equal opportunities does not necessarilyresult in equal participation if the strategy treatseveryone the same and does not proactively address theproblems of marginalization experienced by some



98 Cordula Reimann and Norbert Ropers. “Discourses on Peace Practices:Learning to change by Learning from Change?” in van Tongeren, et al.,People Building Peace II, op.cit., pp34-35.

99 It should be noted that such determined exclusion is very typically thecause of intractable conflict. It drives the excluded group to seek evermore extreme measures to try to get their voice heard. In this sense, theuse of violence can be understood as a form of extreme communicationwhen other forms fail to yield results.

sections of each community. For example, feminists andgender activists have long argued for the need toproactively use gender analysis in all aspects of programdevelopment, process design and evaluation.100 Such anapproach may also be crucial for promoting the effectiveinclusion of other groupings.

Attention is needed to ensure that the design and formatof the process does not disadvantage certainparticipants, particularly those who have been excludedpreviously from political processes. Training andstrategic advice can help, as can ensuring that theprocess structure does not mirror exclusionary socialstructures. It is sometimes valuable to create separatespaces, such as women’s forums or youth groups, whererelevant participants can articulate their distinctiveperspectives and needs in order to develop strategies topromote them. Such caucuses are a strategy used inmainstream democratic practice to enable those withspecial interests / special needs to meet together toarticulate platforms and agendas that address their ownand their constituency’s needs. This can support thedevelopment of a confident ‘voice’ necessary to beeffective advocates. They may ultimately strengthen thecapacity to contribute positively to conflicttransformation as these social groups are able toparticipate more actively and effectively in the publiclife of the community.

It may be impossible to ever completely ‘even theplaying field’, in part because parties to conflict aregenerally intensely aware of the balance of powerbetween them and reluctant to cede any advantage thatmight jeopardize their core goals. Nevertheless whenotherwise marginalized stakeholder groups are able toparticipate effectively, the prospects for a sustainableand just peace are often increased - as demonstrated inmany of the case studies in the previous chapter. Inessence, the struggle for effective participation ofdisadvantaged social groups is imperative on multiplegrounds. It is their right (based in international humanrights standards of equality and participation) and anecessity (because they may otherwise direct energies indestructive / unproductive directions) and a valuableresource for the peacebuilding effort.

Dilemmas of engaging with armed groupsand proscribed organizationsAs described in previous chapters, civil society-basedactors have the potential to play a unique role in helpingarmed groups - or those close to them - find constructiveways of engaging in peace processes. In somesituations, CSOs are more acceptable to armed andopposition groups than representatives of governmentsand IGOs, allowing them to play a distinct role. Yetengagement with armed groups presents a number ofpolitical, ethical and practical dilemmas. Althoughgovernments and some mainstream parties will oftenseek to block the participation of militants out ofconcern that it will give them legitimacy, it is difficult todecisively end a war without involving those who arewaging it.

Conciliation Resources101 points out that condemninghuman rights abuses, taking action against perpetratorsand exploring effective ways of ending the conflict areall essential responses to organized violence. Pursuit ofone goal must not happen at the expense of another. Thechallenge for interveners is to manage the tensionsbetween the twin pursuits of peace and justice throughcareful and strategic consideration of timing and roles,including taking into full consideration the views ofaffected communities to determine appropriateresponses to human rights abuses. While engagementwith an armed group is not the same as appeasement orcomplicity, there is a valid concern that engagementmay confer legitimacy on an armed group’s struggle ortactics. However, there are a range of available options



100 The needs of men and women are not always the same, due to theirdifferent roles, responsibilities and resources. The impact of differentinterventions will also vary according to gender. Women and men arelikely to differ also in their capacity, authority or availability toparticipate in specific activities and initiatives, so attention must be paidto overcoming such barriers. Sex disaggregated information providesquantitative data on gender differences and inequalities (e.g. differencesbetween women and men in morbidity and mortality; in access todecision-making; or in voter registration), while gender analysis providesqualitative information. Patterns of gender difference and inequality maybe revealed in sex disaggregated analysis; gender analysis is then theprocess of examining why the disparities are there, whether they are amatter for concern, and how they might be addressed.

101 Conciliation Resources. Accord Programme Policy Briefing. Online:http://www.c-r.org/accord/engage/accord16/policypaper.shtml

for how to engage, including those based in low-keyactivities led by local community groups or NGOs.These may keep the option of dialogue alive withoutappearing to legitimize a group. As ConciliationResources argues:

“Although the case for engagement with armedgroups will always be context-specific and dynamic,the question is more usefully framed as who shouldengage and how, rather than whether to engage or not.The wide variety of possible engagement optionsmeans that engagement of some form, even if it issimple contact, is usually warranted. The challenge isto identify who is best placed to intervene and usingwhat strategy. The different stakeholders in armedconflicts (including local communities, nationalgovernments, international organizations and foreigngovernments) will all have different thresholds atwhich engagement becomes appropriate or effective.They will also have different modalities ofengagement at their disposal. Even duringparticularly ‘hot’ phases in a conflict informalintermediaries can maintain discreet contacts withelements of armed groups who are open to andserious about dialogue.”102

Especially since the events of 11 September 2001 andthe response by many state actors to declare a ‘waragainst terrorism’, it has become increasingly commonfor governments to put armed insurgency groups ontothe ‘proscribed’ list of terrorist organizations. Theseinclude both long-standing armed movements withterritorially- and politically- specific goals (such as theLTTE in Sri Lanka or the FARC in Colombia) andnewer transnational groups such as those affiliated withthe Al Qaeda network. Because the legislation adoptedin many countries makes it illegal for anyone to havecontact with these groups, it has become difficult evenfor well-known peacemaking organizations andindividuals to explore the opportunities for a negotiatedsettlement or to provide the support that could beneeded to foster a durable peacemaking process. Theymay risk being labeled as ‘pro-terrorist’ just by seekingto explore ways of addressing the conflict.

In a global context where the concepts of ‘terror’ and‘terrorist’ are ill defined and highly contested, assigningthe label to a group can have a range of politicalpurposes. While the ‘international community’ hasgenerally ruled out the concept of ‘state terrorism’, inpart because the use of violence by states is regulated ininternational law103, many people around the worldperceive double standards.

Becoming listed as a proscribed terrorist group can haveparadoxical consequences. In some cases, it hasstrengthened the hand of the ‘hardliners’ within anarmed group. They argue that a continued militarystrategy is the only legitimate and viable response totheir exclusion. There are also a number of cases whereit has impeded the progress of ongoing peace talks. Forexample, in 2003 the LTTE was prevented fromattending a donor conference held in Washington todiscuss development aid and reconstruction due to USdomestic legislation. This was a significant contributionto the negative dynamics that led to the deadlock of apreviously dynamic peacemaking process.104

Furthermore, the decision to label a group as a terroristorganization can have considerable implications for howthey will be treated and perceived. George Wachirapoints some of the ironies that may result:

“Labels are not innocent. They assign meaning andpropose or determine actions and practice. If, forexample, the government of Uganda insists that theLord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a terroristorganization, this then suggests that the only way ofdealing with the LRA is to ‘crush’ them. This makesnonsense of the ongoing attempts to resolve theconflict in northern Uganda through dialogue,following the failure of military solutions for the last



102 Ibid.103 See, for example, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Report of the

Secretary-General In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Securityand Human Rights for All. A/59/2005. March 2005.

104 Liz Philipson “Engaging armed groups: The challenge of asymmetries”in Robert Ricigliano, Ed. Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peaceprocesses. Accord: an international review of peace processes. Issue 16.London: Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/accord/engage/accord16/16.shtml

eighteen years. Second, most of the independentAfrican states were born out of ‘liberation struggles’led by parties and movements that at one time oranother were labeled ‘terrorist organizations’. ... For aregion with such a history, it is possible that citizensempathize with those accused of terrorism, especiallyif there appears to be a history of injustices againstthem”105.

There may be very dramatic consequences for civilsociety organizations operating in contexts seen aspivotal in the ‘war against terrorism’. According toBridget Walker, some donors who provide funds forwork in the Middle East have changed the terms andconditions of their grants. 106 Funding support thatpreviously had few strings attached now comes withexplicit political conditions. One institutional donorincludes, in an annex to the funding contract, a list ofwhat it regards as terrorist organizations. They stipulatethat grant recipient organizations, project beneficiariesand their families should not have links with theseorganizations. In addition, all those bodies receivingfunds must receive clearance by the donor, a processwhich involves taking details not only of staff membersbut also their families. In this way, she concludes thatofficial aid is becoming part of the armory ofintelligence gathering.

It is understandable that governments, internationalorganizations and other donors are concerned to preventsources of support for individuals and groups engagedin terrorist activities. Yet, as Kevin Clements concludes:“If civil society groups cannot communicate withwarring parties, provide safe spaces for difficultdiscussion, and help individuals and groups frame andreframe their problems in creative ways, theinternational community loses enormously importantinsights into the ways in which the needs and interests ofterrorists or potential terrorists might be satisfiednonviolently.”107

Scale and linking dynamics: challenge ofcountering forces of destructionOne of the greatest challenges is to generate sufficientmomentum behind essentially constructive peace and

justice initiatives to counter the shear scale of the forcesof oppression and destruction that characterize conflictsituations. This is a challenge of both scale (the size andlocus of the initiative) and of supporting strategiclinkages with the range of other initiatives. It isimportant to bear in mind the cumulative effects ofmultiple initiatives over time in bringing about long-term change as was explored in Chapter —. Yetindividual CSO initiatives are too often too small andtoo isolated to make the kind of difference that isneeded in these urgent life-or-death conditions.

Governmental and intergovernmental agencies alsoencounter this challenge. For example, the influentialJoint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding 108 reviewed thepeacebuilding activities of four major donorgovernments and found a ‘strategic deficit’ resultingfrom the lack of strategic connections (i.e. projects andprograms are not sufficiently connected to, derivedfrom, or integrated in wider peacebuilding policies).This can sometimes result in a lack of connectionbetween what are often micro-level peacebuildingactivities and the macro-political processes.

The challenge of developing more coherent macrostrategies within the international community - and theroles that can be played by CSOs in contributing tothese strategies - is beyond the scope of this paper. Yetthere is much that can be done by CSOs to strengthenthe effectiveness of their efforts. The significance ofpeople from conflict-affected societies engaging in theprocess of developing a vision for their shared futuremay be part of the answer: somewhat like creating thebasis for a ‘blue print’ for the house they intend toinhabit. Yet there is also much to be done to strengthen



105 George Wachira “An East African Perspective” in van Tongeren, et al.,People Building Peace II, op.cit., p79.

106 Bridget Walker, op.cit.107 Kevin Clements “The War on Terror: Effects on Civil Society Actors in

the Field of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” in van Tongeren, etal., People Building Peace II, op.cit., p.78

108 Dan Smith. 2004. Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding:Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study ofPeacebuilding. Oslo: PRIO - International Peace Research Institute.Available on:http://www.prio.no/files/file44563_rapport_1.04_webutgave.pdf

the linkages between their initiatives. It is especiallychallenging to generate effective working linkages bothvertically and horizontally between those operating atdifferent levels of the conflict system, which typicallyhas community, national, regional and internationaldimensions.

A gap in many conflict situations is the weak linkbetween community-level groups, structures andprocesses with mechanisms and strategies deployed bynational, regional and global institutions, whetherofficial or civil society institutions. In general, it seemsthat larger institutions are better placed to addresssystemic factors and root causes of conflict.Community-based groups are better placed to addressspecific dynamics of conflict on the ground - asillustrated in the section on community-levelpeacemaking. Both are needed for comprehensiveprevention and peacebuilding. Engagement amongstpeacebuilders operating across the range of levels mayhelp to ensure that positive outcomes developed at onelevel are not undermined at another level.

Yet the inter-linkages between these levels are complex.There are numerous practical and organizationalchallenges to forging and sustaining these linkages.Greater attention is needed to create the logistical,technological and human resource systems to enabledifferent actors to rapidly mobilize an effective responseand deploy a coherent approach. There are alsosubstantial dilemmas connected to the terms andconditions under which these linkages are cultivated,particularly if the community-based levels are not tooperate simply as ‘implementing partners’ but are tohave genuine ownership of strategies and methods. Theinter-play between actors operating at different levelswill inevitably be challenging, given that they are likelyto have different frames of reference, needs andpriorities, and resources and capacities. Yet the scope ofchange that can be enabled by such interaction is likelyto make multi-level work worthwhile if it is undertakenin a respectful and strategic manner.

There are examples of coherent, multi-levelorganizational systems put in place to respond to

specific conflict situation, such as the National PeaceAccord structures in South Africa described above. Thisreveals the potential for designing an intentionalinfrastructure for sustaining peace nationally, where thepolitical will exists.109 Yet the local and nationalpeacebuilding architecture is seldom connected withwider structures at the regional and international levels.

One option may be through networks operating atdifferent levels for facilitating engagement, particularlywhere they serve as ‘boundary partners’ that bridgemultiple levels. Andrés Serbin explains some of theadvantages of regional CSO networks engaging localgrassroots community-based organizations: “Theselocal organizations have solid knowledge of theenvironment, and they are familiar with the local actorsand cultural norms. The wider CSO networks can helpto establish communication channels and links withmore powerful outside actors, such as governmentalagencies, INGOs or intergovernmental regionalorganizations, and assist in the analysis of any specificmeasure or initiatives.”110 Networks are generally afairly open and fluid arrangement, entailing numerouschallenges to ensure that they operate effectively andreliably - as discussed further below. Yet given theintrinsically autonomous aspirations of most CSOs, theymay offer the best format for supporting thedevelopment of strategic linkages and helping toincrease the overall scale of peacebuilding work.

‘Project-itis’: the challenge of complacency?Many civil society-based peacebuilding initiativesemerge as a spontaneous response of people affected bythe conflict to address the turmoil around them. Theymay also spring from the urge of concerned peopleelsewhere to provide solidarity to those suffering fromarmed conflict. Such initiatives are generally



109 It is important to note that this integrated system of national, regional andlocal level structures was created through a negotiated agreementbetween all the main political parties in South Africa (in a processorganised and mediated by civil society groups), as they recognized thatthe continued escalation of violence jeopardized the politicalnegotiations. This suggests the potential value of reaching similar sortsof agreements to create practical peacebuilding structures early on in apeace process.

110 Serbin, op.cit. p52.

characterized by a quality of urgency combined with theability to mobilize whatever limited resources areavailable to do whatever can be done to make adifference in the situation.

These spontaneous efforts can be complemented andsustained by more professional, planned and fundedNGO-organized projects and programs. Over the pastfifteen years, a professional NGO sector working onpeace and conflict issues has grown with the support ofdonors willing to provide funds for peacebuilding.These resources have greatly strengthened the breadthand depth of peacebuilding and the development of thefield. A set of issues around financial resources will beexplored in greater detail in the next section.

One of the paradoxical outcomes of more funding hasbeen a shift in some of the working modalities ofpeacebuilding NGOs. In particular, the fundingapplication process has created an incentive for NGOsto frame their initiatives as ‘projects’ that can becodified in advance (often a considerable amount oftime in advance, to meet the requirements of donorfunding cycles) with the aim of producing measurableoutputs from the resources granted. The donor’s needfor such frameworks is understandable procedurally andthe requirements can assist in the planning andmonitoring process. Yet the formalization of ‘projects’can inadvertently create a shift in the modis operandi ofpeacebuilding work. A focus on developing fundableprojects can sometimes result in a disconnect betweenthe peacebuilding initiative and conflict context.

• Groups sometimes have opportunistic motives forsetting up peacebuilding initiatives when they are seenas a way to secure funding. Particularly when there isa sudden influx of funds allocated for peacebuilding ina specific conflict, numerous organizations maydevelop projects to obtain those funds - regardless ofthe need for the activity or the capacity of theorganization to conduct it meaningfully. Sometimescynically referred to as ‘grant eaters’, suchorganizations may be motivated more to secure theirown livelihood than to use their skill and courage topromote peace and greater justice.

• NGOs sometimes slip into the de-energizingdynamics of what can be called a ‘project mentality’.Implementing the set of activities takes on its ownrationale that is sometimes fulfilled regardless of thechanging circumstances and opportunities. Moreworryingly, people can loose focus on ‘big picture’strategic thinking as they start to routinely plan forthe next round of project activities or even the nextproject after the funding for the current one iscompleted. Routine project implementation tasks mayabsorb all the energy of those involved and divertresources and momentum away from potentiallymore strategic processes. The initiative may begin toloose dynamism and relevance, as those involvedbecome accustomed to doing things for doing things’sake so as to fulfill pre-formulated project plans.

• Sometimes organisations implement projects simplybecause they are possible or because ‘we areorganization X and this is what we do...’ irregardlessof whether it is among the most needed activities inthat situation. As a result, the project inadequatelyaddresses the issues at the heart of the conflict. Forexample, an organization that customarily facilitatesdialogue may set up a dialogue project, inviting thosewho are willing to talk with each other to participate.They may place little emphasis on trying to ensurethat the process is geared toward achieving some kindof outcome in the conflict dynamic. Dialogueprocesses have the potential to facilitate interactionbetween all stakeholders, allowing them to find waysto address controversial, conflictual issues andrelationships. Yet dialogue is not an end in itself. Atits most banal, dialogue produces merely aninteresting but unfocused, self-perpetuating, circularconversation. This risk may be magnified when‘difficult’ stakeholders are excluded and / or the‘difficult’ issues are avoided. It can also occur whenlittle attention is given to how the participants can usethe experience to support sustained change. Whilesuch dialogue may do no (or little) harm, neither doesit do much good.

Ultimately, these different forms of ‘project-itis’ create acomplacency within the conflict system that does moreto entrench it than to transform it, whether due to



cynical motives or from well-meaning but ill-advisedefforts. It may be possible to avoid supporting thistendency through a sharper focus on the purpose ofinitiatives and the methods used to achieve them. At onelevel, this may involve greater focus on developing andarticulating the larger vision for peace, as discussed inthe previous chapter. Having a blueprint of a desirablefuture provides a basis for determining the strategicpriorities and overall purpose of the work. Another is tobe more explicit in designing and implementinginitiatives that will make a meaningful difference in theconflict dynamic (see box for one set of criteria ofeffectiveness). Both approaches may help to bring agreater sense of purposefulness into peacebuilding workthat can counter the risk of complacency.

Need for a holistic approachThe issues addressed in the previous sections point tothe need to take a more strategic and holistic approachto peacebuilding. While it is impossible for everyinitiative to address all aspects of the challenge, it iscrucial that peacebuilders ground their work in a senseof how their efforts can directly contribute to cultivatingthe wider changes they seek and how their effortscomplement those in the wider system. At the sametime, they need to be savvy about the power politicsinvolved while helping to ensure that their efforts worktowards more inclusive and egalitarian future and do notreinforce exclusionary dynamics and systems.

Strategically, greater emphasis is needed on whatBarnett Rubin terms systemic prevention.112 Yet thisneeds to be artfully combined with approaches thataddress specific national dynamics along withcommunity-based conditions. Both globally and locally,however, there is a tendency to target a few elements ofthe problems as though they can be isolated from thewider system.

While it may not be possible to act on all issuessimultaneously or with equal emphasis, an acuteawareness of the interdependency of a range of



Through a major collaborativelearning initiative, the Reflectingon Peace Practice Project, MaryAnderson and Lara Olson111

identified a number of overarching‘criteria of effectiveness’ that canbe used to assess initiatives:1. The effort causes participants

and communities to developtheir own initiatives for peace.

2. The effort results in the creationor reform of political institutionsto handle grievances that fuelconflict.

3. The effort prompts peopleincreasingly to resist violenceand provocations to violence.

4. The effort results in an increasein people’s security.

They suggest that the significance

of these efforts can be furtherjudged by: (a) the urgency ofchange, i.e. that it comes soonerrather than later; (b) whether it issustained change that is able to lastover time; and (c) theproportionality of change, in that itmatches the scale of violence.

Aiming for outcomes: criteria of effectivenessfor peace practice

111 Mary Anderson and Lara Olson. 2003. Confronting War: CriticalLessons for Peace Practitioners. Collaborative for Development Action,Inc. Available on:http://www.cdainc.com/rpp/archives/2003/01/confronting_war.php

112 Systemic prevention consists of measures to lessen the global prevalenceof violent conflict through measures not targeted at specific states andcan include: decreasing illicit access to capacities for violent conflict byregulation of markets in conflict goods such as diamonds, small arms;changing international legal regimes for prohibited goods such asnarcotics so as to deprive them of their risk premium; creating incentivesfor peaceful behavior (such as access to aid or membership in the EU);blocking activities that create situations prone to conflict (through anti-corruption measures or norms and sanctions against purchase of warbooty futures contracts or use of public funds for ransom); cushioningcountries from the effects of commodity price shocks; imposingsanctions for prohibited behavior through the development ofinternational legality, as through the International Criminal Court.Barnett Rubin. 2005. Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks andChallenges for the UN. GPPAC Discussion Paper. Available:http://www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/Research/UN-CS_interaction/UN_reader.pdf

important factors can help to prevent false dichotomies(i.e., x is not connected to y) and misleading hierarchies(i.e., x is more important than y). A more holisticanalysis may provide greater insight leading to moreeffective strategies. It might also encourage partnershipsbetween actors that are often seen as unconnected orantagonistic. For example, there is a need to betterunderstand how systemic factors - such as global tradeflows and the availability of small arms and lightweapons - interact with and exacerbate the dynamics ofspecific conflict situations. Too often, there is atendency to address them separately. Yet, as thisexample of the complex issues involved in working onsmall arms suggests, there is much to be gained byworking explicitly on the interconnections.

Security, conflict & controlling small arms: insightsfrom GPPAC conference At the GPPAC Conference in July 2005, participants

grappled with formulating a comprehensive responseto the challenges presented by small arms and lightweapons in conflict situations. They recognized thatthe flow, availability and misuse of these weaponscan have a range of impacts in conflict contexts,including: empowering actors with access to weaponsand disempowering those without; enabling spoilers;shifting existing structures, including state authorityand the traditional conflict management structures;changing political and social dynamics; generatingintense grievance; tempting greed; and complicatingalready complex conflicts. The availability andmisuse of these weapons is not simply a symptom ofviolent conflict; they are a contributing factor in thedevelopment of conflict. Yet limiting supply is notenough; the problem of demand must also beaddressed.

Communities can play a crucial role in escalating orreducing the demand-side of this problem. Whensecurity disintegrates, citizens seek mechanisms toprotect themselves against various ‘predators’ fromstate, non-state and criminal forces that thrive whenlaw and order collapses. When people feel the need toprotect themselves, they often acquire a weapon. Yetcommunities could instead develop alternativemethods for their collective security. This requires a

multi-dimensional strategy. Various componentscould include a focus on the attitudes of potentialowners and on society as a whole about thedesirability of guns; on providing security tocommunities so that the perceived need to provide forone’s own security is reduced or eliminated; andcontrolling access to weapons and forcing prices upbeyond the reach of most people. Community-levelinitiatives can be effective in trying to alter viewsabout a ‘gun culture’. Ensuring that women have aneffective voice in organizing society can be crucialfor setting priorities. After all, a secure society is notone where people feel ‘well-protected’ but where‘you don’t need to lock your door.’

In war-torn societies, important elements in acomprehensive program may include focusing onhealing psycho-social wounds, the re-integration ofex-combatants, more general societal reconciliation,training in conflict prevention, and a special focus onyouth programs. Such programs need to focus onthose ‘who have blood on their hands’ as well asvictims. They need to promote the inter-linkagesbetween peace, human rights, and reconciliation. Theconference working group offered three generalrecommendations to GPPAC:• The development of ‘guidance notes’ (do’s and

don’ts) on how best to enable the conflictprevention community to integrate small armsissues into their work.

• The integration of small arms and light weaponsissues into conflict analysis and assessmentframeworks.

• Assisting civil society actors in incorporating smallarms issues into their work with community,government and other actors.

A more holistic approach is important not just torespond to specific conflict situations but also towardssupporting a wider systems change globally. A featureof civil society action over recent decades has been themobilization around specific issues rather than widersocial change ideologies that are manifested incomprehensive political agendas. While this approachhas been successful in leading to specific policychanges, it has often been difficult to conclusively



address the underlying premises of the wider system. AsNobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams notes: “CSOs mustbecome much more actively involved in promoting abroad and cohesive human security framework. ... Everytime we de-link those issues or fail to make theinevitable linkages crystal clear to the general public,we undercut our own efforts to promote a broaderunderstanding and acceptance of a human securityagenda.”113 This is clearly a great challenge, bothconceptually and practically, yet one that may hold greatpotential for promoting systemic change.

Enhancing capacities: resources, skills, and ethics

A key quality found in many of the experiencesdocumented above was the ability of peacebuilders tomobilize the creative capacities inherent within a givenconflict system by leveraging the available social,material and cultural resources. Often these resourcesare integral to the identity of those who are instigatingthe peacebuilding initiative: religious leaders may drawon their moral and spiritual authority; women mayidentify across conflict divides through their sharedexperiences as women; respected elders may provideleadership to convene members of their community;youth may generate innovative responses by engagingtheir creative energy and enthusiasm.

Many civil society initiatives are founded in existingsocial structures or cultural traditions that provide theirprimary source of inspiration and legitimacy. For example,where there is a tradition of community decision-making,this may be activated to create a space for peacemaking.Where there is a tradition of mass movement politics, thiscan become the channel for mobilizing a peaceful yetpowerful counter-response to dictatorship. In many places,religious leaders have been able to draw on theirinstitutional resources and position to support processesleading towards peaceful social change.

The most important ingredient in civil societypeacebuilding is the activation of those involved. Yeteffective initiatives also typically require a range ofsituationally-appropriate technical, financial, logisticaland human resources. It seems that the key to long-term

sustainability is to build on capacities that exist byleveraging the social and cultural resources inherentwithin a society to develop effective responses toconflict. They can be supported by providingappropriate inputs from external sources, such assecurity, financing, technical assistance and politicalsupport.

In many cases, civil society initiatives are assisted byprofessional peacebuilding NGOs based either in thesociety or international NGOs. They provide training,strategic advice, technical assistance / specialist skillsand knowledge, solidarity and other support to localcivil society actors committed to addressing conflicts intheir midst.

Over the past fifteen years, there has been a dramaticgrowth in the number and quality of NGOs thatexplicitly focus on peacebuilding and working withconflict. With this ‘professionalization’ of the field, anumber of new challenges have emerged. NGOssometimes start initiatives that are beyond their skillsand capacities. They may make the situation worse byescalating danger, exacerbating divisions and tensions,and / or through reinforcing prejudice. They may not beable to sustain initiatives that have been started, leadingto missed opportunities and / or disempoweringcynicism because raised expectations are dashed. Acertain degree of learning from trial and error isinevitable. Yet NGOs have a duty of care to ensure theirbasic competence to ensure they ‘do no harm’ and havethe commitment (and necessary resources) to seethrough what they start. This section explores issuesrelated to professional ethics, the dynamics of fundingrelationships, and the knowledge and capacities of thoseundertaking peacebuilding.

Guiding principles and valuesSometimes the legitimacy of CSO peacebuildinginitiatives is questioned, especially when it is unclear towhom they are accountable and what they are trying to



113 Quoted in GPPAC. 2005. “From Reaction to Prevention: Civil SocietyForging Partnerships to Prevent Violent Conflict and Build Peace”Conference Report. European Centre for Conflict Prevention. Availableon http://www.global-conference.net/gppac.asp?action=rubriek&rubr=36

achieve. Sometimes they are criticized for beinginsufficiently linked to real constituencies andresponding to their concerns. In other times, suspicionsare aroused by obscure or untransparent communicationabout what they are doing and why. Even though thesesuspicions may be more due to misunderstanding thanmalfeasance, it can undermine confidence and generatesuspicion in fragile political environments.

GPPAC Working Group on Guidelines, Ethics andAccountability: Key Observations114

“As the peace community grows and matures, and thepolitical context in which we operate changes, it isbecoming increasingly important that thepeacebuilding and conflict prevention communitytake time for self-reflection and set standards andprinciples to which the community as a whole canadhere. The working group participants agreed thatthere is both an internal and an external rationale forestablishing guidelines.

Internally, there is a heightened awareness that CSOsare not immune to the divisions, tensions andconflicts in the societies in which they operate.Sometimes habits or unequal relationships are soingrained that they are automatically maintainedwithin CSOs. In such circumstances, civil society canexacerbate the problems in their communities, byfailing to act impartially and instead campaigning forone or the other side of the divide.

In spite of this, civil society tends to take the moralhigher ground, particularly vis á vis other actors, suchas governments and private business. If it is to do sowith credibility and integrity, however, civil societyhas to be very sure of the ground on which it stands.This does not mean that ... CSOs cannot take sides, orthat there is a ‘right’ or a ‘wrong’ in every givensituation. It does mean however, that civil society as awhole must adhere to principles that create space fordiversity and dialogue, and mechanisms to addressthe diversity of its constituencies.

Furthermore, we need to establish how we seeourselves: are we mere global social workers,accepting the status quo and addressing problems asthey arise and where we can, or do we seek totransform the underlying causes of those problems?

This raises the very question of how we understandsocial change as a process and how we propose toengage with it as a project. ...

The field of conflict prevention and peacebuildingshould make use of the valuable lessons learned inolder, more experienced civil movements, such asthose for human and women’s rights. Particular areasof interest are ensuring participation and maintainingthe dignity of our constituencies, reducing inequalitystep-by-step, taking a rights-based approach, andtaking into account the interdependence of all ouractions. We must remain aware of the linkagesbetween the realm of state and government, and thatof civil society. We work in a political sphere, yetmust maintain a critical distance.”

Some peacebuilding NGOs have articulated guidelinesfor their own practice. For example, Search forCommon Ground has a series of ‘core principles’ anduses them as the basis for articulating a series of‘operating practices’: make long-term commitments;use an integrated approach; become engaged in order tosee the possibilities; be social entrepreneurs; becomeimmersed in local cultures; practice cooperativeaction.115 In a similar manner, International Alert hasarticulated seven criteria that should be met ininternational peacebuilding efforts, including its own.116



114 Conference Report, op.cit., p73.115 Search for Common Ground website:

http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_core.html andhttp://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_operating.html

116 Peacebuilding should be: Tailored - to fit the needs of the situation,requiring a broad palette of adaptable methods rather than an off-the-shelf technique or standard template; Holistic - to address the full rangeof peace and conflict issues, the long-term causes as well as theimmediate symptoms; Inclusive - to engage and benefit the whole ofsociety, since limiting the engagement and benefits to only some sectorswill entrench the conflict problems; Participatory - to involve people notmerely as beneficiaries but as active participants; Respectful - of thequalities of leadership and courage required for peacebuilding and withwillingness to learn from ordinary people’s knowledge andunderstanding of their own society; Sustained - so that the process ofbuilding peace is supported for as long as is necessary, rather than beingsubject to arbitrary political or bureaucratic timetables; Knowledge-based - because peacebuilding has much greater prospects of success if itis based on research and strengthened by continuing monitoring andassessment. In fulfilling these conditions, peacebuilding must alsoaddress the gender dimensions of conflict and peace. International Alertwebsite, Online: http://www.international-alert.org/about_alert/code_of_conduct.php?page=about

Yet in some parts of the world, there seems to be a needfor a more fundamental public debate about what is civilsociety and the roles of CSOs in addressing publicaffairs - as is demonstrated in this example from WestAfrica.

Clarifying NGO Roles: A View from West Africa117

In West Africa, local community initiatives, popularmovements and sustained civil society activities havebeen a highly visible and vital response to the violentconflicts that have convulsed much of the region inthe past fifteen years. Many peace activists and othercitizens long for strong and well-functioning stateinstitutions that can guarantee their security; theywant governments capable of promoting sustainabledevelopment and inclusive societies. Therefore manysee their role as helping to create the pre-conditionsfor good governance and development.

Yet there is considerable confusion about the role ofNGOs. Some governments see NGOs as competitorsfor resources, as well as competing for ‘voice’ andcredibility within their own society and withinternational actors. Some appear to fear that NGOsbecome stronger at the expense of state institutions.Political parties can be similarly suspicious,sometimes accusing prominent NGO activists ofdoing public service work in order to gain a platformand reputation from which they can then run forpolitical office. The wider public can also beconfused and can question the motives of thoseinvolved, as well as wonder about the sources of theirfunding and whose interests are really being servedby their activities.

Emmanuel Bombande, director of the West AfricaNetwork for Peacebuilding (WANEP), believes thatpart of the problem is that there are no clearly definedboundaries around the roles and functions that NGOsplay. In particular, there are few ways to clarifywhether they have the hidden aim of pursuing power.Standards and mechanisms for ensuring transparencyor promoting accountability of NGOs in West Africa(as in much of the rest of the world) are inadequate ornon-existent. He suggests that there is a need for acode of conduct for CSOs working on conflict. Muchas the Hippocratic Oath has shaped the development

of the medical profession, such a code couldcontribute to strengthening a number of differentdimensions of the work.

• It would provide an ethical framework forpractitioners. Through the process of mutuallyagreeing and engaging with a common set ofnormative values and standards, individuals andorganizations can strengthen their own reflexiveawareness of their conduct.

• It would be a tool to communicate clearly the rolesand responsibilities of the CSO peacebuilders to thegeneral public, governments, other CSOs andinternational organizations.

• It could potentially serve as the basis of a peer reviewmechanism. In recognition that, for the most part, noone has given a mandate to civil societypeacebuilders, it is important to have high standardsin such matters. These could include standards for theright conduct of leadership, responsible stewardshipof financial resources and the quality of work aswitnessed in the contribution it makes to constructivepeacebuilding.

One of the important themes explored in thedevelopment of GPPAC’s regional and global actionagendas was the value of articulating and deliberating acore set of guiding principles for the peacebuildingfield. (See box, below.) In a straw poll at the conclusionof the conference, there was overwhelming agreementon the need to develop a code of conduct for the field -possibly with regional variations. Yet participants alsostrongly resonated with awareness that the actualprocess of developing such codes would be cruciallyimportant for its legitimacy and for promoting itsimplementation.

Funding relationshipsMany initiatives are supported by financing from eitherdomestic sources or foreign donors. Yet there arenumerous examples of times when local peoplevoluntarily contribute their own funds or initiatives aredesigned in such a way that financial requirements are



117 Interview with author, 15 August 2004. See also Catherine Barnes. UN-CSO Interaction in Conflict-Affected Communities, op.cit.

minimal and voluntary effort everything. However mostpeacebuilding NGOs are dependent on funding fromdonor agencies or government ministries, with somereceiving support from independent foundations andprivate sources.

From enabling partnerships to constrictive fee-for-service arrangementsRelationships between donors and grantees tend to vary

along a continuum from true enabling partnershipsthrough to fee-for-service contractor relationships. Inthe first, the donor and NGO forge a relationship builton trust and awareness of mutual interdependence inworking toward shared social change goals. This can



More than a thousand organizationsand individuals actively involved inpeacebuilding throughout the worldparticipated in the development ofGPPAC regional action agendasand the Global Action Agenda, inwhich a series of guiding principleswere articulated, deliberated andeventually endorsed.

1. Achieving just peace bypeaceful means. We arecommitted to preventing violentconflict to the fullest extentpossible by all peaceful means.We need to continue tostrengthen our proactive,nonviolent and cooperativemethods of peaceful engagementin response to emerging tensionsand crises. Prevention andpeacebuilding initiatives shouldcontribute to achieving justice inmultiple dimensions, includingrestorative, distributive, gender,social and environmental justice.These values are at the heart ofour ethical and politicalstandards of action. We shouldcontinually engage in critical

examination of how our ownpolicies, practices and programscontribute to fulfilling humanrights and dignity.

2. Primacy of local participationand ownership. Sustainablepeace can emerge when peopleaffected by conflict feel that thepeace process is their own andnot externally imposed. Webelieve that strategies andinitiatives to address conflictshould generally be locallyderived and internationallysupported. Foreign governments,multilateral institutions andinternational NGOs can help bycreating spaces, providingresources and supportinginclusive processes. They shouldbuild on capacities that exist, notduplicate or displace locallydeveloped initiatives. To fullyrealize this goal, we need toaddress disparities in power andresources that affect ourrelationships and peacebuildingwork.

3. Diversity, inclusiveness and

equality. We recognize the valueinherent in diversity andpluralism and believe thatdifferences can be a source ofstrength. We recognize thatwomen’s equality is acornerstone for sustainablepeace and justice. We work tocreate inclusive, diverse andvibrant civil societies-emphasizing the special needsand rights of vulnerable groups-through the promotion of respectand inclusiveness and by takingaction to increase equality ofopportunity and of resources. Weaim for empowerment of allthose who experience political,economic and socialmarginalization by supportingthe development of capacities atthe individual and organizationallevel, including through localand regional civic networks.Through capacity building andparticipation, we aim tostrengthen inclusive societalprocesses for democratizationand equality.

4. Multilateralism. Fulfilling anexpanded vision of humansecurity can only be achieved onthe basis of a truly cooperative

Guiding principles and values: Global ActionAgenda118

118 The Global Action Agenda, as well as action agendas from the 15regional processes and other research and documentation, can beobtained at http://www.gppac.net

sometimes involve developing strategies together, witheach contributing their knowledge, skills and resourcesto achieve desired outcomes. It generally involves a highdegree of flexibility in the implementation of strategiesand a regular and honest dialogue about how projectsare unfolding. The bonds of accountability that bindthem can be complemented by a constructively criticalapproach to assessing the work and revising strategies,plans and projects. Such relationships may be more

common when the donor is a foundation or a largecharity, with greater flexibility to set its ownoverarching priorities and policies. It is less common -but still possible - to have such an enabling partnershipwhen the donor is a government or an IGO because thepolicies they need to implement are formulated throughpolitical processes often outside the individual grant-making official’s authority. On the other end of the continuum, the relationship



endeavor. Major global problemsare often best addressed throughcoordinated efforts and policiesdeveloped collectively throughmultilateral institutions. In manyparts of the world, regionalinstitutions and networks offerexpanded opportunities forstrengthening cooperativeresponses to common concerns.We believe that CSOs have animportant role to play in anexpanded conception ofmultilateralism. We aim tostrengthen the role of CSOs inglobal and regionalorganizations.

5. Sustainability. Addressing thecauses and consequences ofconflict requires sustainedefforts. We commit to the long-term goal of transforming theconditions that give rise toconflict and the relationshipsthat have been damaged by it.Our actions should be rooted instrategies that move towardmedium- to long-term goals. Weaim to ensure that the timeframes implicit in our planningand actions are appropriate. Ourstrategies should help to fostersocial change that addresses

structural and relationshipchallenges generating systemicconflict and to move thesituation toward a desired future.

6. Dialogue. We promote dialogueas a principal method to respondto conflict and prevent violenceat all levels of society, especiallywhen it engages all parties.Dialogue fosters participatoryprocesses for common learningand building of capacity to workwith conflict constructively.Leadership should emerge out ofand operate through dialogue,rather than the capacity to useviolence.

7. Accountability. As the powerand influence of CSOs grows sodoes our obligation to beaccountable, especially to thecommunities in which we work.This is reflected in what we do,how and why we do it, and theways we manage the resourcesthat are entrusted to us. Werecognize the importance ofdeveloping norms ofaccountability at all levels andwithin all institutional settings.

8. Transparency. We arecommitted to workingtransparently, including in our

financial dealings. Unlessotherwise disclosed, we actindependently of politicalparties, donors, or commercialcompanies for the interest ofdeveloping peace within andbetween societies. If we have aspecific set of interests orallegiances, we will declare themand acknowledge how theyaffect our priorities and workingmethods.

9. Learning from practice. Wemust aim to be reflectivepractitioners: aware of our role,mandate and contribution atevery stage. We need to reflectupon and examine the lessonswe are learning from our workand to critically assess how welearn them. We must workclosely with partners to jointlydevelop participatory, inclusiveand just processes for planning,decision-making and evaluatingour initiatives. Evaluation andstrategic learning are essentialfor developing accountability.We have a responsibility to shareour learning with others whomay face similar challenges inthe future.

between donor and grantee is based on an arrangementwhere the NGO is merely a contractor who offers‘value-for-money’ to implement the donor’s agenda. Inthese situations, the donor typically gives very detailedspecifications about how the project must beimplemented, within what timetable and with whatresults. In many cases, the implementer could as easilybe a for-profit company as a civil society group, becausethe relationships, values and ethos cultivated by theNGO are not considered particularly relevant forimplementing the contract. These relationships tend tobe more common with large institutional donoragencies, where subcontracting is seen as a more cost-effective and feasible arrangement than maintainingservice delivery capacities in-house. Thesearrangements have been pioneered for the provision ofclassic humanitarian aid and economic developmentprojects but seem to be increasingly applied topeacebuilding budget lines - with potentiallyproblematic results.

Funding priorities and the power to direct strategyThere is a trend amongst some institutional donorstowards contracting external conflict analysis to shapethe strategic priorities and the programs and projectsthey then sub-contract. Externally conducted analysismay be undertaken in such a way that both the processand the outcomes of the analysis are disconnected fromthe perceptions of those involved and smooth over thecontradictions and dilemmas inherent in conflictsituations. For example, the analyst may argue that theconflict “is really all about [x]”, while one set ofprotagonists considers it to be about [a] and another setto perceive it as really about [b]. While the analyst’sconclusions may have a degree of truth, if the resultingrecommendations do not take into account the issuesheld most important by the primary parties to theconflict, they may not be very effective. Programsfunded on the basis of this analysis may be misdirectedand the assumptions from the analysis may then becarried forward through the frame of evaluationpractices that tend to use the starting assumptions of theproject as the basis of their analysis. Importantly, itleaves little room for peacebuilding NGOs to pursue anindependent agenda - particularly if there is dissonance

between the political and strategic assumptions of thedonor and those of the peacebuilding group.

Funding prevention: insights from the GPPACconferenceIt was noted that donors have indeed been supportive of

a great variety of prevention initiatives since the early1990s. Nonetheless, financial support for conflictprevention is frequently inadequate or too latebecause responses are not driven by context-specificanalyses of what is needed at a particular place at aparticular time, but rather by the mandates of thedonor agencies. It was argued that among donors,there is ‘analytical confusion’ about how and when tosupport conflict prevention, so that funding is toooften misdirected towards, for example, long-termprojects, when urgent situations demand quickresponses (often at much lower levels of funding). Aremedy for these weaknesses in the funding systemwas proposed: supporting country-specific, on-the-ground, multi-actor, collaborative, contextualisedconflict analysis, and the development of appropriateresponse strategies in countries where early warningssuggest a risk of near-term violence.

Another paradox of funding is when NGOs becomediverted away from the work they feel is mostnecessary, as echoed in the frequently heard comment‘We’d really think it is important to work on [ x ] but ourdonors do not agree’. This may be especially difficultfor local peacebuilding NGOs in conflict-affectedcommunities, who often have less leverage than theirinternational counterparts in influencing the agendas ofdonor agencies. Furthermore, as Riemann and Roperspoint out: “Many CSOs are interested in facilitatinglong-term processes of social change. Yet most donorsare thinking in terms of concrete and representableresults in order to satisfy their respective constituencies,to serve their strategic national interests, and to bevisible and influential among the donor community.”119

Riemann and Ropers consider the overarching challengeis for the field to retain its ‘critical edge’ even whilebecoming a ‘professional peace industry’ and, in



119 Cordula Reimann and Norbert Ropers, op.cit. p35.

particular to continue to work toward long-term changewithout being co-opted by short-term donor workpriorities.120

Most conflict situations are extremely fluid and subjectto rapid changes in the context. Sometimes thetimeframe is so long between initially developing aproject for a funding proposal and implementing itwhen the funds finally arrive that the project’s relevancehas diminished or conditions have changed so much thatit is no longer possible to undertake it as designed. Toincrease the likelihood of sustainability, there may be aneed to shift their focus from ‘short-term projectthinking’ to longer-term ‘process thinking’.

Managerialism and accountability challengesOne of the challenges is the growing tendency fordonors to take a more managerial approach in theirfunding relationship, requiring detailed mechanisms forplanning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting fromtheir grant holders. Such measures can help to improvethe professionalism of those working on projects and, inthe best cases, enhance the rigor and effectiveness of thework. Furthermore, donors are themselves accountablefor how funds are allocated and need to be able tojustify that the money they are allocating is working tomake a positive difference.

Yet common management tools and frameworks do notreadily accommodate the dynamism of transformativechange. Over-commitment to the precise forms of thesemechanisms and a disconnected and inflexible approachcan leave an organization ‘so tied up in red tape, wecannot see the forest for the trees...’ Over-emphasis onaccountability to the donor may also undermine thegrantee’s accountability to beneficiaries and otherstakeholders. At the GPPAC conference, it was observedthe lack of mechanisms for ensuring ‘horizontalaccountability’ - i.e., monitoring mechanisms to gaugeif CSO undertakings in fact meet the needs of theconstituencies they are trying to serve. There was asuggestion for greater use of peer review processes andthe creation of appropriate benchmarks to promote suchaccountability. Furthermore, as Bridget Walkerobserves:

“We have seen how difficult it can be to establishmeaningful connections between the body making thegrant and the recipient. There is also a dissonance inthe language used. The vocabulary of management isdifferent from the language of social change. It mayappear to be neutral, objective, depoliticised, but it isa foreign tongue to many practitioners, articulatingalien thought processes and masking uncomfortableand inequitable power relations. Many peacepractitioners use story and anecdote to describeimpacts. Their assessment is subjective and personal....[They can encounter a] moral dilemma of telling ithow it is, when there is pressure from funders todemonstrate rapid and positive results. It is hard tomaintain commitment in the long term when there areno immediate results, and often unrealistic to expectimmediate results. These unrealistic expectations canundermine the hope that sustains so many peacepractitioners in the face of ongoing and intractableconflict.”121

It seems that modalities for efficient service delivery arenot always conductive for catalyzing social change andlong-term transformation. As the previous chaptersillustrated, much of peacebuilding work is heavilyreliant on highly creative, flexible and relationship-based initiatives. They are generally built-uppainstakingly over years so as to be in the right positionat the right time to make the right response and oftendemanding considerable courage and exquisitejudgement to navigate through complex and rapidlymoving conflict dynamics.

Knowledge, learning and communicationstechnologiesOne way to support the competence of those working onpeacebuilding is the through greater knowledge, skillsand professionalism of relevant NGO staff and in theinstitutional capacities of the organization.



120 Ibid. p42.121 Bridget Walker. “Funding Conflict Transformation: Money, Power and

Accountability - A Grant-Seeker’s Perspective” CCTS Review, No 25,November 2004. Available online: http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts25/grant_seeker.htm

Deepening understanding of conflict: disseminatingcomparative learningOne of the crucial challenges is to enhanceunderstanding of the causes and dynamics of conflictand effective strategies for addressing them. This callsfor ongoing investment in research - both theoreticaland applied - to continuously develop greaterunderstanding of the nature of the challenges and howbest to address them. A particularly valuable strand ofthis research agenda is to foster comparative learningfrom different situations around the world. While noconflict is exactly like any other, there is considerableknowledge and inspiration to be derived from howsimilar challenges were addressed elsewhere.

One of the difficulties is ensuring that those who areworking on the frontlines of engaging directly withconflict are able to benefit from the outcomes of thisresearch. In addition to disseminating publications andincreasing the accessibility of written resources, there isa continual need for processes to animate the ideas.Seminars, workshops and trainings can all provideopportunities to both generate and disseminatecomparative learning. This may require:• Systems for information exchange and appropriate

use of information technology• Forums / mechanisms for joint analysis and joint

strategising• Improving practice through systemised learning and

assessment of previous and ongoing initiatives tobetter understand what supported overall change;developing mechanisms to share these insights,perhaps through collaborative approaches toevaluation.

• Developing and supporting relevant research agendas• Long-term development of the field through

mainstreaming conflict prevention studies in generaland specialised education programmes.

Learning from practice: evaluation, efficacy andoutcomesIntegral to these questions are the need for continuallearning and rigorous assessment of the process andoutcomes of previous and unfolding initiatives. Thisincludes paying great attention to assessing ‘what went

wrong’ as well as ‘what went right’ and why.

Ultimately, it may be crucial for professionalpeacebuilding NGOs to develop methods that enablethem to expand the ‘learning horizon’ to betterunderstand the consequences of actions over time on thesystems in which they operate. One of the difficultiesfacing organizations working explicitly onpeacebuilding is to know whether their initiatives areworking and to identify what - if any - changes theyfoster. There are a host of methodological challenges,including the problems of attribution, levels of analysis,connections between theories of change to the design ofinterventions and perception of outcomes. Currently,most evaluation efforts are aimed at assessing a specificinitiative rather than a study of changes in an overallconflict system and the factors that contributed to thatchange (including, to the extent it is ‘knowable’, thelikely effects that can be traced to a specificintervention).

Because peacebuilding initiatives are characterized byexperimentation and marked by both success andfailure, many believe that evaluation practices should -in principle - be both more systematic (e.g., need forbetter documentation and analysis of initiatives) andmore open (so that others can learn from them). Thisindicates the need to build-in collective learning intopeacebuilding practice. Yet many initiatives do not havesufficient resources to undertake serious outcomes-oriented reviews of their work. They may make do withroutine monitoring of outputs, coupled by informal andoften ad hoc self-reflection about process and outcomes.Additionally, the fear of being penalized by admitting to‘failure’ or to a less than effective initiative can tend tostifle systematic assessment. Furthermore, there iscurrently no open access database where evaluationstudies can be reviewed by wider audiences, thusmaking a practical barrier to resources that might helpto cross-fertilize learning.

Communications technologyCivil society organizations have often been the pioneersin using communications technology innovatively inresponse to conflict. There have been a number of



initiatives to enable direct contact across the conflictdivide to help ‘re-humanize’ relations betweenadversaries (as described in the ‘Hello Peace’) and tode-escalate responses to crises (as seen in the BelfastMobile Phone Network).

International campaigning organizations already haveelectronic communications as the backbone of theircommunication strategies for more than a decade. Yetthey are less widely / effectively used by thoseresponding to specific conflict situations. Often there isa need to link very localized community-levelpeacebuilders with wider national and internationalnetworks and institutions to enable two-way / multi-level exchanges. Yet grassroots CSOs in poor parts ofthe world often find internet access prohibitivelyexpensive and / or the conditions created by armedconflict may make it completely inaccessible or onlyaccessible intermittently.

There is clearly vast potential to use communicationstechnologies more innovatively and effectively. Yetwhile the inspiration and ideas for such initiatives exist,they often require financial and technological resourcesbeyond the reach of many CSOs, which can dampen thedrive towards innovation.

Navigating relationships: challenges ofengagement

Partnerships: dilemmas of collaborativerelationshipsCSOs typically join forces to implement peaceinitiatives by bringing together their shared resources,contacts and capacities to achieve their strategies. Manyof the cases described above reveal the significance ofcooperation between different civil society groupswithin a society, between groups in different countriesaround the world to achieve common global or regionalchange objectives, and between domestic NGOs andtheir international NGO partners.

Such cooperation often takes place in the framework of‘partnerships’ between organizations that believe theycan achieve more together than they could operating on

their own. While partnerships can be forged forimplementing a one-off activity, more typically they areongoing relationships operating with various levels ofintensity and closeness and with various degrees offormally structured terms of reference and procedures.

The search for funding can be a powerful motivation forforging partnerships. An extreme example is when arelationship is formed because one partner has access tomoney and the other partner(s) have the capacity toimplement projects. More often, all the partners bringan array of resources into their relationship - includingsuch vitally important but intangible qualities as theirpre-existing relationships with relevant actors, thecredibility to convene sensitive processes, and insightinto the conflict dynamics.

While partnerships have the potential to greatly increasethe effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives, they canbe complex relationships to manage. There are theordinary challenges that all cooperative endeavors canencounter, such as: ensuring effective communicationand developing sufficient trust; learning each other’sworking methods, values and practices; coordinatingcomplex project management arrangements; managingpossible institutional competition for resources andrecognition. Furthermore, there may also be challengesstemming from an unequal and asymmetric institutionalposition of each of the partners. This can manifest inone partner’s dominance of the initiative, allocation ofthe work load, and / or the distribution valuableresources and recognition. The fact that the partnershipis forged in the context of working with conflict canheighten these challenges: the stakes tend to be high; thehighly polarized atmosphere is often characterized bychronic mistrust that can be reflected in the partnership;and there may be severe constraints created by war’saffects on infrastructure and other resources.

These challenges are perhaps especially acute when thepartnership is forged between ‘insiders’ - i.e., thosewhose lives are directly affected by the conflict - and‘outsiders’, i.e., those who chose to get involved andhave the option of walking away from the situation.When one partner is a large, well-established and



comparatively wealthy international NGO and the otheris a small (possibly even ad hoc) group living in themidst of a war zone, the gap to be crossed maysometimes seem insurmountable. Yet if they are able toforge a more-or-less equitable working relationship andto develop and implement well-considered initiatives, itis possible for them to achieve more than either coulddo on their own. Yet if they are locked in a dysfunctionaland highly dependent relationship (particularly whendominated by the ‘outsider’ partner) energy may bediverted away from the most needed activities and thatthe resources and capacities of the ‘insider’ CSO areundermined. This can have the net effect of reducing thesustainable capacity of the society to respond to conflictas an opportunity for development because active

people committed to peacebuilding are preoccupiedwith other tasks.

Some international NGOs specializing in peacebuildinghave developed guiding principles or codes of conductthat articulate how they aim to address these challengesin their role as ‘outsider’ partners. Peace BrigadesInternational has an explicit policy of getting involvedin a conflict zone only after being invited by at least oneparty or stakeholder.123 Similar principles were followedby the Balkan Peace Team (BPT). Comprised ofinternational volunteers - mostly from Western Europe -BPT aimed to support local activists in Croatia and theFormer Republic of Yugoslavia during the conflicts ofthe 1990s. According to Christine Schweitzer, they were



The Reflecting on Peace Practiceproject explored some of the manychallenges of engagement between‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ workingtogether on peace initiatives. Theyconcluded that effectivepartnerships are built through aseries of good practices andprocedures rather than necessarilythrough the selection of anintrinsically ‘right’ partner. Theysuggest that the following can helpwith building partnerships:• At the core of good partnerships

is recognition that each partner’sknowledge and credibility areimportant to the effort and thateach party’s reputation will behurt by failure. Thus, therelationship should be horizontaland based on mutualconsultation. Neither partyshould be seen as simply aservice provider, financial

underwriter, or subcontractor todo a job. Both parties shouldhave equal influence ondecisions. There should be jointprocesses for setting strategies,defining goals and evaluatingresults.

• Experience shows that whenoutsiders consult very broadlywith many insider counterpartsand activists, they maintain awide range of contacts tobalance out and informperspectives. Programs then donot become dependent on thegoodwill of any one interlocutor.This approach is parallel to thatadopted by insiders who avoidmanipulation by a single outsidefunder by consciously raisingfunds from multiple donors sothat no one can dominate.

• The agencies’ roles should notonly be clearly and explicitly

defined; they should also be re-negotiated and re-assessedfrequently. Often peace partnersassume that a common visionand values will be the glue oftheir relationship and they relyonly on verbal, open-endedagreements to this effect.

• Partners should take time toidentify shared criteria by whichto evaluate and improve theirrelationship.

• Partners should take time tounderstand and define wheretheir missions diverge. That is,they should explicitly recognizethat they have differences as wellas a common vision, and theyshould clarify and acknowledgethese as valid.

• Even in a horizontal relationship,the initiative and definition ofneeds must come from insiders.

• Together insiders and outsidersbuild a sustainable strategy forwhen outsider funding andprogramming is phased out.

Principles for working toward effectivepartnerships: suggestions from RPP122

conscious of needing to articulate a set of guidingprinciples for their relations with local peace actors.They focused mainly on civil peacekeeping withoutrigidly limiting themselves to protection services onlybut got involved in a variety of peacebuilding activities.BPT aimed to: “...avoid the trap of ‘peace colonialism’by focusing on strengthening self-reliance. It acted onlyon invitation and tried not to duplicate the work ofothers. It did not want to supplant what it considered tobe the task of local groups, or make them itsimplementing partner for an agenda developedelsewhere.”124 Once again, it seems that self-awarenessand continual assessment of the impacts (and possibleunintended consequences) of involvement is a precursorfor effective engagement.

Networks and strategic alliancesAs discussed previously, the challenge of transformingconflict and preventing violence calls for a holistic andstrategic approach drawing on the unique strengths andresources of multiple groups and individuals. This mightoccur through informal and ad hoc cooperation betweenthose with an interest in the situation. Yet many involvedin peacebuilding perceive the need for greater coherencein their efforts. Networks and other forms of strategicalliances are seen as one way to promote this.

In the peacebuilding field, networks and strategicalliances tend to be formed in response to a specificconflict situation (such as the conflict in Sri Lanka) or toachieve a specific goal (such as to reduce small armsand light weapons). In both cases, they tend to be highlyoutcomes oriented. There are also networks that aim topromote the needs and goals of a specific identity group,such as the Women Building Peace network.Alternately, they may have a thematic focus - such asthe various national and regional ‘platforms’ ofpeacebuilding NGOs or the new international networkand clearinghouse on Conflict Resolution Education andPeace Education.

At the GPPAC global conference, a working group onnetworks explored these issues. They observed that toengage effectively, the locus of the network shouldoptimally be the same as the locus of the conflict (local,

national, regional and/or international). They arguedthat there are a number of advantages that can emergefrom networks of CSOs working together to preventviolent conflict. First, they can provide a diversity offocus and skills through their membership, which can bevaluable in the attempt to address all potential violence-inducing factors in a conflict. Second, civil societynetworks with members already working on the groundin a conflict zone can mobilize local contacts and extendsolidarity. Third, civil society networks have differentcapacities and alliances than international agencies orgovernments. For example, their comparativeinformality can make them less of a threat and canenable greater trust.

Robert Ricigliano posits the importance of what heterms ‘networks for effective action’ (NEAs) based ondeveloping a joint framework that allows actors tocooperate according to a common understanding ofconflict and sharing strategic goals. He argues that thegoal of NEAs is not coordination per se, yet throughNEAs each member of the network can find ways tocollaborate as appropriate to work towards commongoals. As such, NEAs should share a purpose, shareprinciples of conduct, be decentralized, be self-organizing, and flexible in response to memberneeds.125 While many see the value in mobilizingeffective networked responses to specific conflictsituations, including for crisis response, it has oftenbeen difficult to form and manage such networks well.In general, members must feel they have more to gainfrom coming together than from splitting apart.

Some believe that the insufficiently developed sectoralidentity of NGOs working on conflict is a barrier torecognition by outsiders (by governments, IGOs, thegeneral public, and other CSOs) and the credibility



122 Mary Anderson and Lara Olson. 2003. Confronting War, op.cit.123 Helen Yuill “Protecting the Protectors: Peace Brigades International in

Colombia” in van Tongeren, et al., People Building Peace II, op.cit.124 Christine Schweitzer “An Experiment at Mixing Roles: The Balkan

Peace Team in Croatia and Serbia / Kosovo” in van Tongeren, et al.,People Building Peace II, op.cit., p.373.

125 Robert Ricigliano, “Networks of Effective Action: Implementing aHolistic Approach to Peacebuilding.” Peace Studies Program, Universityof Wisconsin at Milwaukee, 2003.

accorded to their work on conflict. This presents anoverall challenge to the ability of this civil society sectorto engage with governments and IGOs on conflict issues.At one of the GPPAC preparatory meetings127, a groupUK-based peacebuilders identified some of the ‘causes’of this challenge as: (a) the field is still young; (b) ‘we’do not know who ‘we’ are (as a group of NGOs workingon conflict); (c) the lack of knowledge about what othergroups are doing and what they stand for / their mission /their values and operating principles; (d) the fact thatdifferent organizations sometimes promote different /contradictory agendas; (e) the identity, strategies andvalues of many NGOs working on conflict preventioncan contradict the identity, strategies and values ofgovernments and multilateral bodies responding toconflict situations (e.g., NATO). Competition for limitedresources has meant that many of these challenges aremade more troublesome by histories of institutionalrivalry / competition, which can reduce effectiveness.

There is ongoing discussion, however, of usefulness ofnetworks for addressing the challenges faced by the

field. Especially on the issue of broad thematicnetworks for peacebuilding in general, the dilemmas ofdiversity and contradictory agendas are held up againstthe benefits of having a ‘common roof’ under which theexternal world can recognize the sector and in thoseinside can engage with each other. They identifiedpossible ways toward addressing this challenge asimproving communication between groups whileaccepting the diversity of different types of groups whoconsider themselves to be working on conflict. Theyalso argued for the importance of communicating toother audiences, beginning by making an effort toarticulate - and communicate - clarifying our language /terms and the key concepts that we mean to convey bythem (otherwise, we may be gliding over verysignificant differences; although we are ‘saying’ thesame thing, we are ‘meaning’ something very different).Having deliberated and clarified these foundational



Networks may be formed forvarious reasons:• To promote cooperation based

on complementary interests andobjectives, especially when thereis a scarcity of means

• To facilitate the exchange ofinformation and experiencewhen the issues or tasks at handare complex

• To realize the benefits ofeconomies of scale throughcollective learning, analysis andimplementation

• To avoid duplication of effortsand identify skills gaps

• To maximize the impact of anintervention, particularly whenengaged in advocacy andlobbying

• To expand outreach and have apresence or impact at variouslevels of society

• To draw on a range of skills,opinions and insights

Some networks exist more to servethe needs of their members than toproject outwardly. Within such‘passive’ networks, the primaryobjectives are likely to be thesharing of information and

experience. Moving along an axis,other activities might includefacilitating dialogue or providingexpertise. ‘Active’ networks arefocused more on the outside world,engaging in advocacy andlobbying, for example, or goingbeyond that to proactiveengagement in early warning, forexample or actual interventions toprevent or resolve conflict. Themore passive the network, the lessthat will be required from themembers in terms of commitmentand the less forma the structure thatwill be required. A highly engaged,proactive network demands highlevels of commitment from itsparticipants and more formalizedstructures.

126 Extracted from ‘Understanding Networks’ in van Tongeren, et al., PeopleBuilding Peace II, op.cit., p55

127 GPPAC London ‘Brainstorming’ Meeting of 3 December 2003

Understanding Networks: Observations from theEuropean Centre for Conflict Prevention126

ideas, it may be possible to engage more effectively inadvocacy and awareness-raising about the role of civilsociety in working on conflict.

Relations with governments and inter-governmental organizationsMapping the dynamics of engagement between civilsociety organizations with governments (their own andothers) and inter-governmental and multilateralorganizations is largely outside the scope of this paper.Nevertheless, constructive engagement can be key. AsUN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has pointed out:

If peacebuilding missions are to be effective, theyshould, as part of a clear political strategy, work withand strengthen those civil society forces that arehelping ordinary people to voice their concerns, andto act on them in peaceful ways. ... The aim must beto create a synergy with those civil society groupsthat are bridge-builders, truth-finders, watchdogs,human rights defenders, and agents of socialprotection and economic revitalisation. . ...thereshould be a two-way dialogue between the UnitedNations and civil society - not so that one can directthe other, but to ensure our efforts complement oneanother. ... Engagement with civil society is not anend in itself, nor is it a panacea. But it is vital to ourefforts to turn the promise of peace agreements into

the reality of peaceful societies and viable states. Thepartnership between the United Nations and civilsociety is therefore not an option; it is a necessity.128

Many CSOs working on conflict would echo thissentiment and would extend it to include the need forlines of communication with other international andregional organizations and relevant governments. Yetthere are considerable obstacles to effectiveengagement.

Some are inherent in the distinctive identities and rolesof NGOs as independent actors. One of the aims ofmany peacebuilders is to mobilize political support forconstructive action to address conflicts and their causes.NGOs have a crucial and ever increasing role incontributing information, arguments and energy toinfluencing decision-making processes. They candirectly address policy makers and address those who,in turn, influence them. Yet there is a creative tensionbetween strategies based on cooperative engagementwith governmental and IGO decision-makers versusstrategies that deploy confrontation to generate politicalpressure for change. Yet there are a range of othermodalities.



CSOs need to deliberate andanalyze the values and politicalpositioning that characterizes theirrelationships, so as to engage moreeffectively, ethically andstrategically in responding toconflict. • Complicit - as citizens and as

organizational groups embeddedin a country’s civil society, weare party to the decisions that our

governments make in our name.• Contractual - when CSOs

implement government policiesand programs through theirwork, often by receiving fundingfrom governments.

• Contributing - throughparticipation in policy dialogueand recommendations forappropriate responses to specificsituations or issues.

• Complementarity - working inparallel as separate / autonomousentities within the same systemof issues and relationships.

• Contesting / Confronting - whenCSOs challenge governmentactions, priorities, and behaviors

(This framework was developed bythe participants in the GPPACLondon ‘Brainstorming’ Meeting of3 December 2003, with key inputsfrom Andy Carl and Simon Fisher.)

Modalities for engagement between civil societyorganizations and governments

128 Secretary-General’s opening remarks at the Security Council debate on“The Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding” 22 June2004. Available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=989

The distinctive identities and roles played by CSOs,governments and IGOs can make engagement complex.Mutual misperceptions and lack of understanding of theother’s institutional imperatives may create obstacles toeffective cooperation. Government and IGO personnelmay question the quality, legitimacy and accountabilityof specific NGOs - or of civil society organizationsmore generally. They may not see their relevance andbelieve that they can create more trouble than theyresolve. Civil society actors may, in turn, be deeplysuspicious of the motives and commitment of ‘officials’.They may have considerable ideological or politicaldifferences and believe the contradictions areinsurmountable without becoming too compromised. Insome cases, all these concerns are well-founded.Furthermore there are situations when it may beinappropriate or worse to engage. Yet in times when it isan advantage to cooperate, these difficulties underscorethe importance of developing both a shared frame ofreference and of a common set of desired objectives tounderpin more cooperative engagement, as well as theimportance of mutual perceptions of reliability and trustas a key component to developing collaborative workingrelationships.

There are also a number of institutional andorganizational obstacles to engagement. Many of thesestem from the lack of formal structures andarrangements to enable active cooperation and thescarcity of ‘entry points’ to enable even more informalengagement. For example, the vast and dispersed UNsystem can make it difficult for external stakeholders -including local CSOs and their international partners -to know the appropriate channels to request assistancefrom the UN in an emerging crisis or to otherwiseengage with it. It is also a potential barrier to moreeffective coordination with other relevant actors,including (sub-)regional inter-governmentalorganizations. In many of the countries where itsmission includes working on conflict issues, there is nospecific appointed person to support peacebuildingaction plans. Local UN staff encounter difficulties infinding ways to support local organisations dealing withpeacebuilding and conflict transformation. The GPPACworking group on ‘strengthening local, regional and

international mechanisms’ stressed the importance ofIGOs - and the UN in particular - creating institutionalmechanisms that can act as a linkage between civilsociety and government structures, and hence create apolitical space for interaction.

Towards partnerships for peace

While it is rare for grassroots efforts to transform widersystems of conflict and war; it is also not possible forthese wider systems to be transformed withoutstimulating changes at the community level. Thereforemany analysts and practitioners are agreed with JohnPaul Lederach’s observation that there is a need to buildpeace from the bottom-up, the top-down and themiddle-out.129 Yet the methodologies for crossing thescale barrier, simultaneously and in a coordinatedmanner, are not well developed. Therefore the keyseems to be in negotiating dynamic and strategicpartnerships.

Primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests withnational governments and other local actors. Greaterownership is likely to result in a more legitimate processand sustainable outcomes. The primary role of outsidersis to create spaces and support inclusive processes thatenable those directly involved to make decisions aboutthe specific arrangements for addressing the causes ofconflict. Outsiders should help to build on the capacitiesthat exist and avoid actions that displace and underminehomegrown initiatives or that promote short-termobjectives at the expense of long-term prevention. Basedon a collaborative understanding of the sources ofconflict and the factors that continue to generate it,people based elsewhere can seek to address some of thecauses that ‘located’ elsewhere in the conflict system(such as arms suppliers in third countries or policiespromoted by foreign governments that further escalatewar).

Partnerships for peace may be the antidote to systemsand networks sustaining war. Yet to achieve thispotential, we need to acknowledge the legitimacy ofCSOs in peace and security matters and to strengthenofficial recognition of their roles in the conflict



prevention partnership. This can then be operationalisedthrough stronger mechanisms and resources forinteraction between IGOs, CSOs and governments inorder to institutionalize the capacity for prevention.

It is likely, however, that efforts to shift to a culture ofpeace and to prioritize prevention over crisis

management will be sustained only when there iswidespread awareness amongst the general publicsaround the world that common security cannot beobtained through the barrel of a gun; instead, we canbest work towards sustainable peace through collectiveefforts at meeting basic human needs and strengtheningsystems for managing differences peacefully.



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Bibliography

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of ArmedConflict is building a new international consensus andpursuing joint action to prevent violent conflict andpromote peacebuilding, based on the Regional ActionAgendas and the Global Action Agenda. GPPACmaintains a global multi-stakeholder network oforganisations committed to act to prevent the escalationof conflict into destructive violence at national, regionaland global levels. This multi-stakeholder networkincludes civil society organisations, governments,regional organisations and the United Nations.

The primary function of the Global Partnership is topromote and support the implementation of theRegional Action Agendas and the Global ActionAgenda. For this purpose, GPPAC represents importantregional concerns on the international level, enhancesthe functioning of the international systems for conflictprevention and uses its capacities to assist theimplementation of key regional activities.

Sub-programmes are:

Promote acceptance of the ideas of conflictpreventionGPPAC supports regional efforts to raise awarenessregarding the effectiveness of conflict prevention, andundertakes parallel efforts at the global level.

Promote policies and structures for conflictpreventionGPPAC generates ideas for improving policies,structures and practices involving interaction amongcivil society organisations, governments, regionalorganisations, and UN agencies for joint action forconflict prevention.

Build national and regional capacity for preventionGPPAC strives to enhance the capacity of its regionalnetworks and global mechanisms to undertake collectiveactions to prevent violent conflict.

Generate and share knowledgeGPPAC engages in a process of knowledge generationand sharing, by learning from the experience of regions

and developing mechanisms for regularcommunication/exchange of such information. GPPACactivities aim to improve our mutual understandingregarding important methodologies and mechanisms foraction.

Mobilise civil society early response actions topreventGPPAC develops the capacity of civil societyorganisations to contribute to early warning systems andto intervene effectively in impending crises/conflicts. Inresponse to regional requests, the global network will a)mobilise coordinated civil society responses, based onearly warning of impending conflict escalation; and b)pressure governments, regional organisations, and theUN system to respond to early warning information.

GPPAC / International Secretariat www.gppac.net

GPPAC’s Regional Initiators

Central and East AfricaNairobi Peace Initiative-AfricaKenyaMs. Florence MpaayeiEmail: [email protected]

Southern AfricaACCORDSouth AfricaMr. Kwezi [email protected] www.accord.org.za

West AfricaWest Africa Network for PeacebuildingGhanaMr. Emanuel [email protected]


The Global Partnership for thePrevention of Armed Conflict

Latin America and the CaribbeanRegional Coordination for Economic and SocialResearchArgentinaMr. Andrés [email protected]

North AmericaCanadian Peacebuilding Coordinating CommitteeCanadaMr. David LordEmail: [email protected]: www.peacebuild.caandInterActionUSAMr. Peter WoodrowEmail: [email protected]

South AsiaRegional Centre for Strategic StudiesSri LankaMr. Syed Rifaat [email protected]

The PacificPacific People Building PeaceFijiMr. Jone [email protected]

Southeast AsiaInitiatives for International DialoguePhilippinesMr. Augusto N. Miclat [email protected]

Northeast AsiaPeace BoatJapanMr. Tatsuya [email protected]

Central AsiaFoundation for Tolerance InternationalKyrgyzstanMs. Raya [email protected]

Middle East and North AfricaArab Partnership for Conflict Prevention and HumanSecurityp/a Permanent Peace Movement LebanonMr. Fadi Abi [email protected]

Western Commonwealth of Independent StatesNonviolence InternationalRussian FederationMr. Andre [email protected]

The CaucasusInternational Center on Conflict & NegotiationGeorgiaMs. Tina [email protected]

The BalkansNansen Dialogue Centre SerbiaSerbiaMs. Tatjana Popovic [email protected]


Northern and Western EuropeEuropean Centre for Conflict PreventionNetherlandsGuido de Graaf Bierbrauwerg.bierbrauwer@conflict-prevention.netwww.conflict-prevention.net

International SecretariatEuropean Centre for Conflict PreventionNetherlandsMr. Paul van [email protected]


Agents for Change:


Preventing War &

Building Peace

Ag

en

ts for C

han

ge: C

ivil S

ocie

ty R

ole

s in P

reven

ting

War &

Bu

ildin

g P

eace


The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

c/o European Centre for Conflict Prevention

Laan van Meerdervoort 70

2517 AN Den Haag

The Netherlands

Tel.: + 31 70 3110970

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Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War - GPPAC