Agapay vs PalangAgapay vs. PalangGR No. 116668, July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Thereafter, the 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

BA Finance Corp vs CABA Finance Corp vs. CAGR 61464, May 28 1988

FACTS:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE:WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

HELD:

A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.Uy vs CAUy vs. CAGR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.Dela Cruz vs Dela CruzDela Cruz vs. Dela CruzGR 19565, January 30, 1968

FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their covertures, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

The husband has never desisted in the fulfilment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have wilfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

Villanueva vs IACVillanueva vs. IACGR No. 67582, October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their fathers property. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts decision.ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property.HELD:The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion.Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.

BPI vs PosadasBPI vs. PosadasGR No. 34583, October 22, 1931

FACTS:

Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.

ISSUE:WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD:

SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.