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Against the flow – new power dynamicsand upstream mobilisation in the NileBasinAlan Nicol a & Ana Elisa Cascão ba Institute of Development Studies , University of Sussex ,Brighton, UKb Stockholm International Water Institute , Stockholm, SwedenPublished online: 21 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: Alan Nicol & Ana Elisa Cascão (2011) Against the flow – new power dynamicsand upstream mobilisation in the Nile Basin, Review of African Political Economy, 38:128, 317-325,DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2011.582767

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BRIEFING

Against the flow – new power dynamics and upstreammobilisation in the Nile Basin

Alan Nicola∗ and Ana Elisa Cascaob

aInstitute of Development Studies, Universityof Sussex, Brighton, UK; bStockholmInternational Water Institute, Stockholm,Sweden

Introduction

On 14 May 2010, four Nile Basin states(Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda)signed the Cooperative Framework Agree-ment (CFA) to develop the resources ofthe River Nile for mutual benefit. Thisnew agreement took over 10 years to nego-tiate between all riparians and provided ablueprint for international cooperationwithin the Nile Basin. Days later, Kenyasigned up to the agreement, leaving theparties just one signatory short of the two-thirds required for it to enter into force.This article provides a short commentaryon the hydropolitics of the process andimplications for future cooperation on theNile.

The four states that did not sign on 14May were Burundi, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC), Egypt andSudan.1 Burundi and Congo wereexpected to have signed together with theother five Nile upstream riparians, but forBurundi, one of the reasons presented fornot signing was that presidential electionswere due in June and the outgoing govern-ment was not in a position to commit tonew international agreements.2 Much of

the regional media reported, however,that the reason for reluctance on the partof these two riparians was politicalpressure being exerted by Egypt, includingprovision of diplomatic and financial‘incentives’ for these states not to sign(Daily News Egypt 2010). For Egypt, thestakes were high and only one of the twostates was required to sign in order tocreate a two-thirds majority under whichthe CFA agreement would become valid(Reuters 2010; also Al-Ahram Weekly2010).

As a result, Burundi came top ofEgypt’s foreign policy agenda from mid-2010 onwards. This small upstreamcountry, largely ignored beforehand byCairo, exchanged high-level visits withEgypt’s government and business officials(Al-Masry Al-Youm 2010a; also AfricanPress Agency 2010a, 2010b; Al-Masry Al-Youm 2010b). Egypt promised bilateralcooperation and investment in Burundi inreturn for Burundian acknowledgementthat no agreement in the Nile Basinshould be signed against Egyptian interests.Implicitly, therefore, Burundi would‘refrain’ from signing the CFA (Al-MasryAl-Youm 2010c; also African PressAgency 2010c). Egypt’s strategy implodedwith the convulsions that took place fromJanuary 2011 onwards. With turmoilacross Egypt, Burundi saw an opportunityto take forward its allegiances withupstream states and duly signed the CFAon 22 February 2011 (Bloomberg 2011).

ISSN 0305-6244 print/ISSN 1740-1720 online

# 2011 ROAPE Publications LtdDOI: 10.1080/03056244.2011.582767

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∗Corresponding author. Email: A.Nicol@ids.ac.uk

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The game had changed for Egypt andSudan.

The main point of contention within theCFA for these two downstream countries isthe wording of Article 14b on ‘WaterSecurity’, which states:

the Nile Basin States therefore agree, in aspirit of cooperation, to work together toensure that all states achieve and sustainwater security and not to significantlyaffect the water security of any otherNile Basin State.

The signed agreement provides the follow-ing additional text:

Egypt and Sudan expressed their reser-vations to the ambiguous article, and con-sidered that the last sentence of Art. 14bshould be replaced by the followingwording: ‘. . . not to adversely affectthe water security and current uses andrights of any other Nile Basin State’.

(emphasis added)

All of Article 14b in its current formwas annexed to the signed CFA, but notincluded in the main body of the agreement.

At the core of disagreement over thisarticle is the reference it makes –however obliquely – to existing agree-ments signed in 1929 and 1959, whichapportioned all the Nile’s flow to Egyptand Sudan alone. The 1929 Agreementwas signed between Egypt and Britain (onbehalf of Sudan as part of the Anglo-Egyp-tian Condominium), and established par-ticular volumetric water allocations for thefirst time: 44.4 billion cubic metres (bcm)for Egypt and 4.5 bcm for Sudan (Agree-ment 1929; cf. Godana 1985; Okidi1994). This agreement became the legalbasis for subsequent Egyptian and Suda-nese claims to historical rights over Nilewaters. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement(NWA) guaranteed minimum flows of theriver based on a notional annual flow of84 bcm as measured at Aswan: 55.5 bcmto Egypt and 18.5 bcm to Sudan, with 10bcm assumed lost to evaporation from

Lake Nasser/Nubia which was createdbehind the High Aswan Dam, builtfollowing the agreement. This figure of 84bcm/year is based on the calculation ofaverage flows over a century at Aswan.There is some dispute as to the accuracyof this figure. Waterbury (1979, pp. 22–23) suggests that the data used tocalculate these volumetric water allocationsare in fact underestimates that are based onthe lowest averages of Nile flows. Such anunderestimation would necessarilymean that Egypt receives annually atAswan far more water than is officiallydeclared.

Upstream states contend that thesigning of these treaties was during aperiod of colonial rule and means thatthey are no longer valid. Of equal if notmore significance for the current Nileimpasse is the fact that the 1959 Agreementwas concluded at a time of great politicalchange during the Cold War era and bytwo newly independent states – Egyptand Sudan. The Soviet Union and theUnited States had begun to overtake Brit-ain’s strategic dominance in the regionafter the Suez crisis in particular, and bothEgypt and Sudan had started comingunder Eastern Bloc influence. With Sovietsupport, Egypt began to construct theHigh Aswan Dam which for the first timeenabled the capture of more than an entireannual Nile flood, most of it stored withinEgypt’s national borders.

After 1971, when the dam was com-pleted, the Nile in effect became one longirrigation ditch from Aswan to the Mediter-ranean. Rapid expansion of irrigated agri-culture took place in the Nile Valley andDelta. Hydropower production alsoincreased markedly and the High AswanDam provided 50% of Egypt’s energysupply in its early years (though falling toless than 15% today). This providedenergy for industrial expansion and helpedto light the country’s burgeoning cities.The dam became the most potent symbolof the Nasserist Revolution and of Egypt’s

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national development and regional politicalstrength.

For upstream states, however – andtheir superpower allies – the dam also rep-resented an era of continued Egyptian hege-mony over the Nile. After the signing of the1959 NWA, the United States began a com-prehensive study of potential dam sites onthe Blue Nile in Ethiopia (United StatesBureau of Reclamation [USBR] 1964). Atthis time, Ethiopia’s Imperial Regime wasan important strategic ally. Though noneof the proposed developments came to frui-tion, the very threat of upstream develop-ment helped to stoke Egypt’s watersecurity fears. Vision of the Nile’s flowblocked behind dams upstream in Ethiopiabecame established within mainstreampublic consciousness. Bellicose politicalstatements – echoed in the national media– followed from the government on theconsequences of dams upstream on theBlue Nile and its tributaries.

For Sudan, caught in the middlebetween the major Nile water ‘producer’,Ethiopia – where some 85% of the totalNile’s flow derives – and the major ‘consu-mer’, Egypt, the 1959 Agreement was not aparticularly good deal. Nevertheless, in partdue to its post-independence weakness,Sudan was cajoled into signing the NWAby its more powerful northern neighbour.The NWA guaranteed Sudan a share ofthe Nile waters – 18.5 bcm comparedwith Egypt’s 55.5 bcm. Although this wasa substantial increase on the 1929 Agree-ment, the country was not in a position toutilise much of this allocation for severaldecades. In addition, the filling of the reser-voir behind Aswan had several adverseeffects, including the displacement of thou-sands of Sudanese Nubians.

Egypt, however, was in position to use– and reuse – its allocation under theAgreement. The irrigation system tookwater upstream on the river, delivered it tocrops and then returned it further down-stream through drainage in a continued(and relatively efficient) recycling of flow.

As a result, Egypt’s actual utilisation ofthe Nile exceeds its official quota, partlybecause it also receives additional ‘unuti-lised’ water from Sudan each year andany excess flows over and above the 84bcm received at Aswan. The Sudaneserefer to the water they do not use as‘water-on-loan’ (El-Zain 2007, p. 14). Cur-rently the ‘loan’ so-called is an estimated 4bcm/year given Sudan’s stated usage ofaround 14.6 bcm (Ministry of Agricultureand Forests, Sudan [MAF] 2000, the offi-cial number). In spite of the uneven natureof benefits and costs between the two signa-tories, the 1959 Agreement has persisted tothis day and a Permanent Joint TechnicalCommission established to oversee the pro-visions of the agreement has persisted evenduring periods of extreme political tensionbetween Cairo and Khartoum. The 1959Nile Waters Agreement has remained thesingle largest piece of hydropolitical furni-ture in the Basin to this day.

Changing geopolitical contexts

From the 1960s to the 1980s, much ofAfrica, including the Nile Basin, remainedlocked in the embrace of the two super-powers. However, during the late 1980sthis grip began to weaken as the SovietUnion and its Eastern Bloc allies felt theeffects of perestroika and glasnost. In themid 1980s, the geopolitical landscape inthe Horn of Africa began to change too,reflecting the weakening Cold Warembraces. This was a time of intense mili-tary confrontation between a slowly weak-ening Soviet-backed regime and astrengthening rebel movement in Ethiopia.At the same time, exceptionally low rainfallin the Ethiopian highlands contributed to aglobally emblematic famine in 1984/85which began to redefine the internationalcommunity’s response to developmentissues in the Nile Basin. Exceptionallylow flows on the Nile caused unpre-cedented concern in Egypt too wherethe levels of the river by mid 1988 had

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become such a national security concernthat they were on the masthead of nationalnewspapers on a daily basis. Built tosecure Egypt’s water supply, the reservoirlevels at Aswan had fallen to levels so alar-mingly low that they threatened the closureof hydropower turbines.

The eventual toppling of the MengistuHaile Mariam government in Addis Ababain 1991, although one of the smaller side-shows to wider geopolitical shifts, never-theless had profound resonancethroughout the region. Ethiopia’s newgovernment had an ostensibly develop-mental outlook and was quick to capitaliseon international goodwill, mindful of theimpacts on this hugely populous countryof the devastating famine suffered in1984/85. Population, development andfood security issues in upstream statesbecame part of a wider development dialo-gue with aid agencies and donors as politi-cal space opened up across the basin inKenya, Uganda and Tanzania too. Thenature of development discourse movedfrom exchanging slogans on sovereigntyover waters to a more comprehensive andbasin-wide approach which soughtbenefits through joint development of theriver. This discourse was strengthenedfurther by a new platform for dialogue –the Nile 2002 Conferences – launched inAswan in 1993 and held each successiveyear for a decade. This informal ‘track-two’ process contributed to paralleldonor initiatives, including greater collec-tive action under the Nile River BasinAction Plan.

The 1990s – in search of Nilecooperation

Combined with the geopolitical shift andwidening and deepening of developmentdialogue on the Nile, new international rec-ognition of a standard for cooperation onshared rivers was enshrined in the 1997UN Water Convention (International LawCommission (ILC) 1997). The Convention

emphasises the notion of equitable waterand benefit sharing.3 This concept provideda useful alternative for states seekingcooperation without wishing to enter intocomplex international legal processes onwater sharing. The new ‘orthodoxy’, if itcan be called that, was captured in theNile Basin Initiative (NBI), established inFebruary 1999 by nine riparians.

The increasing entente cordialebetween Ethiopia and Egypt was a keyplank in the NBI and was facilitated, interalia, by the two states’ wider co-interestin combating political threats. Theseincluded the rise of Islamism in the region(for Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, andfor both, state change in Sudan towards amore Islamist orientation and state disinte-gration in Somalia). The new entente pro-vided a window of opportunity throughwhich donors, including the World Bank,could support a more formal process ofhydropolitical cooperation in the basin.This was initially in the form of the ‘D3Project’, which later became the Coopera-tive Framework Agreement (CFA). D3aimed at constructing a legal and insti-tutional framework for cooperation andwas initiated in 1997 with financialsupport from the UNDP. D3 sought to con-clude a new multilateral agreement oncooperation but shied away from discuss-ing the status of existing water treaties, asexpected at the outset by upstreamriparians.

The second process set in motion wasthe NBI. This represented a temporarymechanism for strengthening cooperationand identifying potential joint investmentprojects between all riparians. The expec-tation of many was that after the conclusionof the multilateral agreement through theD3 process, the NBI would be replacedby a permanent Nile Basin Commission.The length of this ‘transitional period’was left undefined, however, and becamean important factor in the ensuing deadlock between upstream and downstreamriparians.

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The genesis of the CFA and the NBI

The CFA enshrined a number of inter-national legal principles including the‘equitable and reasonable utilisation’ ofwater resources preferred by upstreamriparians, but also the ‘no-harm’ and‘prior notification’ principles emphasisedby Egypt and Sudan. Whilst the CFA nego-tiations proceeded slowly, the NBI wasquickly institutionalised and a secretariatestablished in Entebbe. Two subsidiaryaction programmes at the sub-basin levelin the Eastern Nile (in Addis Ababa) andthe Nile Equatorial Lakes region (inKigali) began identifying joint water pro-jects for implementation and enabled aneat side-stepping of the World Bank’s(1994) Operational Directive 7.5 onlending within shared basins. In the past,this Directive had prevented the WorldBank from financially supporting hydraulicprojects in upstream Nile states when therewas downstream opposition (most notablyfrom Egypt). The new subsidiarity prin-ciple enabled financing through lower(and easier to achieve) levels of agreement.Donors, particularly some bilaterals, theWorld Bank and the African DevelopmentBank – other donors felt less sure – wereencouraged to achieve ‘quick win’ develop-ment projects which would, they believed,provide examples of confidence buildingto strengthen the wider NBI.

Realpolitik – beyond Nile cooperation

The NBI Subsidiary Action Programs(SAPs) played an important role in reinfor-cing the new political confidence enjoyedbetween riparians. Nevertheless, the‘cooperation’ represented by the NBI alsomasked realities including the continuationof unilateral developments by countriesincluding Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. InSudan the exploitation of its oil wealthwith Chinese and other Asian countries’support enabled domestic financing fornew dam projects at a time when the

country remained blacklisted by the inter-national financial system. This new-foundwealth allowed the government to completethe Merowe Dam in 2009 which addedsubstantial hydropower capacity to theSudanese grid. Further dams were sub-sequently planned on the main Nile. InEgypt domestic financing of the Toshkaproject – which diverted excess waterfrom the Lake Nasser/Nubia reservoir –opened up large areas of the south-western valley to agricultural expansion.Questions remain over the financial andpolitical viability of this huge undertakingparticularly given its remoteness, but theproject was mainly justified by former Pre-sident Mubarak on the grounds that it couldhelp reduce population pressure in the OldValley.4 Finally, Ethiopia pressed aheadand constructed the Tekezze Dam withChinese support, substantially increasinghydropower generation.

In spite of the paraphernalia of inter-national cooperation under the NBI andD3 negotiations, some countries pushedahead with national projects that wereneither part of joint cooperative regionalassessments, nor strictly speaking, in thespirit of wider ‘benefit sharing’. This latternotion became a centrepiece of the NBIand held that through working jointly andcooperatively countries could optimise thebenefits available to all. Worse still, forsome countries the projects also signalledpolitical manoeuvring to establish ‘factson the ground’ – particularly in Egyptand Sudan. Projects that would increasewater use would strengthen positions onacquired rights, even if the projects resultedin relatively higher net losses from thesystem because of poor siting of dams inareas of high evaporation losses. More sig-nificantly perhaps, in Ethiopia the TekezzeDam emphasised across the basin thatChinese backing and technical expertisecould and would assist states in takingforward their unilateral projects.

The logic of cooperation throughregional development suggested that

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benefits should be maximised by situatinghydropower dams and their reservoirs incountries where evaporation losses arereduced—for example, in Ethiopia’scooler highlands where the ‘head’ is alsogreatest and could generate up to 30,000MW of power, with significantly lowerwater loses. Moreover, under this logic,most large-scale irrigation would be inSudan where vast tracks of fertile soils arestill available. The reality on the ground,however, showed that narrower nationaleconomic and political interests continuedto prevail over the logic of cooperativeaction in part because of the slow pace ofchange under the NBI.

Negotiations under D3/CFA draggedon through the 2000s until a split tookplace along upstream–downstream lines in2007. After 10 years of negotiations, thefinal document was almost complete andriparian states had reached consensus on38 out of 39 articles. At the Nile Councilof Ministers (Nile-COM) meeting in Febru-ary of that year, the anticipated conclusion tothe agreement (and the one desired byupstream riparians) failed to take place.Instead, Nile security issues returned to thefore and responsibility for finally conclud-ing the document moved from technicaland legal experts to heads of state.

The tipping point

Although the technical–legal negotiationswere declared to have ended at theNile-COM meeting in 2007 in Entebbe,subsequently representatives (includingnegotiators and advisors) of the Nile ripar-ians held extraordinary meetings on thefuture of the CFA document, and in particu-lar what to do with Article 14b. In the latterpart of 2007 and throughout 2008, talkscontinued between states but failed toreconcile ‘water security’ with existingtreaties and the demands of upstreamstates for a fairer basis on which to continueinternational cooperation. Upstream stateswere keen to accept an ambiguous

definition of water security that would notmake specific reference to water realloca-tions, but neither would it refer to pastagreements. This was considered a possiblecompromise in order to move ahead withthe establishment of the permanent NileBasin Commission, and at the same timeensure the commitment of the two down-stream riparians. However, althoughEgypt and Sudan had earlier appearedready to accept ambiguity as a diplomaticsolution – given the oft-repeated mediareports that an agreement was near – theythen reverted to earlier hard-line positionson the new agreement explicitly recognis-ing their existing uses and rights to theNile waters. Upstream countries, that hadargued that the goal of the CFA was not toacknowledge historical agreements butinstead to move to a new era ofcooperation, regarded this as unacceptable.The upstream riparians interpreted thechanged wording as a way to legitimisethe past agreements instead of movingaway from them, and rejected it as awhole (The Standard 2007; The NewVision 2007).

Soon after the end of the negotiations in2007, the role of the international donorcommunity came under scrutiny. Increas-ingly some of the riparians viewed theWorld Bank’s role as having moved fromthat of neutral facilitator to value-laden sta-keholder. This was because the Bank wasbelieved to be pushing for an all-inclusiveNile Basin Commission and thereby reject-ing the option of a Commission beingestablished by a majority of states. Othermajor Nile donors, both multilateral andbilateral, tacitly supported this position,whilst remaining silent in public. Thisapparent taking of sides was reported atthe time to have angered upstream states,who perceived that donors had begun exert-ing pressure in support of the downstreamposition on the CFA’s final wording (forexample, The East African 2009).

Continued delay led the seven upstreamriparian states to form an unofficial bloc in

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support of the existing CFA text. Theyincreasingly warned downstream statesthat they would sign as a bloc and therebycreate a new internationally recognisedagreement in the basin, citing two mainreasons.5 First, because the window ofopportunity created in 2007 when the agree-ment was almost concluded by all riparianswas rapidly closing, and not to sign wouldhave wasted 10 years of serious and legiti-mate multilateral negotiations. Second,because the NBI was nearing the end of itsfirst phase of programmes (many of theShared Vision Programs were phased outin 2009), and the Nile Trust Fund wasexpected to be phased out in 2011. For thisreason alone, the establishment of a newvehicle for donor funding (i.e. the NileBasin Commission) became an imperativefor upstream riparians.

High-level meetings during late 2007and 2008 were inconclusive, and the ripar-ians could not agree on Article 14b. Theoptions were: (1) annexe Article 14b andreturn to negotiations over that article, butunder the auspices of the new Nile Com-mission; (2) delete and forget about italtogether; or (3) renegotiate it again fromscratch. Upstream states were in favour ofthe first two options; downstream stateswere in favour of the third option. Again,countries could not reach a consensus,and at the end of 2009 during a Nile-COM meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh theupstream riparians decided they couldwait no longer and announced thatsigning of the new agreement would takeplace on 14 May 2010, after which theAgreement would remain open for signa-ture for a year. By May 2010, five upstreamriparians had signed the CFA. Burundifinally signed in February 2011, and theDRC has yet to do so.

2011 – the beginning of the end of thestatus quo

The new challenge to the Nile basin statusquo changed dramatically in 2011. The

CFA has the sixth signatory, which meansthat it is open for ratification. At the sametime political space has opened up evenfurther in the basin with the passage oftwo major events.

The first was in Sudan. Although areferendum on the secession of SouthernSudan was included in the SudanesePeace Agreement (of 2005), few believedthe referendum would take place as sched-uled in January 2011 or that it would beconducted in a peaceful manner. Theemphatic vote with 99% in favour of separ-ation means that an 11th riparian state willjoin the basin in July 2011, representingan additional competitor for resources, butalso an additional partner in negotiationsand agreements, including the CFA.Given the equivocal attitude of the incom-ing Southern Sudanese governmenttowards the 1959 NWA – and theirclaims on future water allocations – thisis a worrying scenario for Egypt.

However, the second event, whichcame totally unexpectedly, overshadowssuch worries but has important long-termbearing on Nile Basin development.Once the Basin’s most monolithic andstable political system, Egypt underwentmajor convulsions in January 2011which have changed the nature of theEgyptian state and, potentially, itsrelationship to Nile development issues.Although it is unlikely that there will bea sea change in Egypt’s position on theNile and how the Nile figures on thenational security agenda, there maywell be a reassessment of Egypt’s positionon the CFA, and eventually a decisiontaken to join the future Nile BasinCommission.

Both events represent a change in thestatus quo of the Egyptian–Sudanese Nilebasin dyad. Upstream states now have astronger development narrative and theinstitutional–legal machinery with whichto pursue it. The opportunity now existsfor Egypt and both Sudans to choose toembrace this new reality.

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AcknowledgementsThe authors acknowledge with gratitude theinsights and views shared with them in recentyears by many professionals and academicsfrom the Nile Basin, and which help to informthis article.

Notes on contributorsAlan Nicol is a Research Fellow at IDS. He is apolitical scientist by background, and set up andran the Water Policy Programme at the OverseasDevelopment Institute. He has directed researchprogrammes in Ethiopia and the Nile region andconsulted for a wide range of government andnon-governmental institutions working in theNile Basin.

Ana Cascao is a political scientist with expertiseon hydropolitics in the Middle East and north-east African regions. Her main research topicis the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin. Her docto-rate focused on the political economy of waterresources management and allocation in theNile Basin.

Notes1. Eritrea is also a Nile riparian, but only has

observer status under the Nile BasinInitiative.

2. Interviews with members of the Nile Tech-nical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC),which comprises technical representativesfrom the partner states.

3. Article 5 of the Convention states: ‘Equi-table and reasonable utilization and partici-pation: Watercourse States shall in theirrespective territories utilize an internationalwatercourse in an equitable and reasonablemanner. In particular, an internationalwatercourse shall be used and developedby watercourse States with a view to attain-ing optimal and sustainable utilizationthereof and benefits therefrom, taking intoaccount the interests of the watercourseStates concerned, consistent with adequateprotection of the watercourse.’

4. Around 95% of Egypt’s population of some80 million people live along the banks ofthe Nile (‘the Old Valley’) and in the NileDelta. Combined, this land area is just 5%of total Egyptian territory. Competitionover the land resources between agriculture,industry and urban development is strongand has been felt acutely since the 1970s.Previous attempts to move people out ofthe Old Valley by creating new satellite

cities in the Western Desert in particularhave had little impact on the situation.

5. Personal communication with the authors.

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