Mobilisation of Political Participation

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Group Membership and the Mobilizationof Political Participation

Jan LeighleyTexas A&M UniversityTh is article addresses two que stions relating to how grou ps mobilize members to participate in poli-tics. First, does group mobilization result from the intentional efforts of group leaders or instead unin-tentionally, from the interaction of group leaders and members in routine internal group activities?Secon d, how do ind ividuals' incentives for group m embership influence each type of mobilization? Dataused are taken from a national study of voluntary associations and random samples of their member-ships. The analysis indicates that unintentional mobilization occurs in both political and nonpoliticalgroup s and is unconstrained by individu als' incentives for group m emb ership. Th e effects of intentionalmobilization, ho wever, are basically restricted to political groups and mem bers with lobbying, norma-tive, or occupational incentives.o,ne of the striking trends in American politics over the past several decades is

the d ram atic increase in the n um ber and size of interest groups and advocacy orga-nizations (Berry 1984; Petracca 1992; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1983).While the institutional consequences of this "advocacy explosion" are often seenas negative (see, for example, Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1991; Heinz, Nelson,La um ann, and Salisbury 1993; Lowi 1979; Olson 1982; Tierney 1992), a some-what more positive assessment of its consequences for mass political behavior canbe made.Organizations, for example, subsidize the costs of political information for mem-bers and may therefore promote broader involvement in the political system(Baumgartner and Walker 1988; Downs 1957; Pollock 1982; Verba and Nie 1972).This thesis is consistent with the empirical finding that individuals who belong tovoluntary associations are more likely to participate in politics (e.g., write lettersto Congress, attend meetings, sign petitions) than individuals who do not belong(see, among others, Verba and Nie 1972). Yet why this pattern holds has not beendetermined.Rosen stone and Han sen (1993) claim that voluntary associations prom ote po liti-cal activism because members are susceptible to mobilization by their own, as wellas other, g roup leaders. Th eir evidence on this point, however, is basically anecdo-tal. While the frequency of intentional mobilization by group leaders is often notedin research on interest groups and voluntary associations, only Knoke (1990) pro-vides systematic evidence on. the effectiveness of such efforts.T H E JOU RN AL OF PO LIT ICS , Vol. 58, No. 2 , May 1996, Pp . 447-63 1996 by the U niversity of Texas P ress, P.O . Box 7819, Austin, T X 78713-7819


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448 Jan LeighleyYet Kno ke's evidence is limited because he fails to con sider an equally plausiblealternative explanation of group mobilization: organizations may promote political

involvement by providing individuals the opportunity to develop skills necessaryto engage in various types of political participation (Verba, Sch lozm an, Brad y, andNie 1993; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Pollock (1982) refers to this as "u n-intentional" mobilization because it is an unintended consequence of individuals'activities and experiences in a me mb ership group.The question of how groups mobilize members to participate has not been ad-dressed in earlier studies primarily due to a lack of data on group mobilizationefforts. Pollock (1982) and Verba and Nie (1972), for example, use survey respon-den ts' reports on group m em bership , types, and activities; data on w heth er partic-ular group leaders had requested mem bers to participate (intentional mo bilization)are simply not available in these m ass surveys. Hen ce, the relative effectiveness ofintentional and unintentional mobilization has not been established.Th is research is distinguished from earlier studies in that it uses direct measuresof intentional and unintentional mobilization provided by group leaders. This im-proves upon a methodological weakness of relying on member reports of groupcharacteristics: mobilization effects identified in previous studies may simply re-flect the fact that individuals who belong to and are active in groups also generallyparticipate m ore in politics, regardless of group dynam ics.

Independent (group-supplied) reports of the mobilization efforts of the groupthus reduce the error introduced by potentially biased reports of group membersconcerning the nature of the grou p to which they belong. Th is provides an opp or-tunity to assess the extent to which earlier studies erroneously assigned a causal ef-fect to the nature of the group rather than the nature of those individuals who arelikely to join that type of group.Fu rthe r, these data are used to test a model of grou p mobilization tha t ex plicitlyincorporates both group and individual characteristics as independent and interde-pendent stimuli of participation beyond the group. W ith one exc eptio n the activ-ity level of the group member within the grouplittle evidence regarding howspecific individual characteristics structure the mobilization process has been of-fered. Noticeably absent is any consideration of how in div idu als' origina l in cen -tives for belonging to the group constrain the mobilization process, as the study ofinterest group membership decisions is almost entirely focused on this theoreticalperspective (Hildreth 1994; Knoke 1988; Olson 1965; Ro then berg 1988, 1992).The model developed below incorporates details regarding the individual'sincentives for group membership in two ways: directly, by influencing the individ-ual's likelihood of participating beyond the group, and indirectly, by structur-ing the effects of intentional and unintentional mobilization. For example, individ-uals who belong to groups for political reasons may be more likely to participatein politics beyond the group, as well as more likely to respond to group lead-ers' intentional mobilization efforts or to transfer skills gained within the groupcontext to the broader political realm. Excluding this information from a mod el ofgroup mobilization may lead to incorrectly attributing a mobilizing effect to the


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450 Jan Leighleyinterested in solidary benefits are more likely to participate internally, while indi-viduals interested in lobbying benefits are more likely to pa rticipate externally.Knoke (1988, 1990) fails to consider another possibility: that individuals' incen-tives for joining structure the group mobilization process. The most obvious possi-bility is that having lobbying incentives in joining may d etermine the effectivenessof group leaders' appeals to participate, or the extent to which skills obtainedthrough member involvement are transferred to other types of participation. Theanswer to this question is particularly important in assessing whether groups cantruly "command" participation on their behalf regardless of individuals' initial in-terests in the group, or whether the consequences of group mobilization are indeedconstrained by the interests of their members.

RESEARCH DESIGNThe National Association Study (NAS), conducted by David Knoke with thesupport of the National Science Foundation, consists of two interconnected sur-veys, a telephone survey of organization informants (typically one of the executiveofficers) and a mail survey of organization members. The telephone survey wasconducted in 1984, with informants representing 459 trade associations, profes-sional societies, labor unions, and recreational associations, among others. Theseorganizations were randomly chosen from a list of voluntary associations dev elope dfrom three d irectories: the National Trade and Professional Associations of the United

States (Colgate and Fowler 1983); the National Recreational, Sporting and HobbyOrganizations of the United States (Colgate and Evans 1981); and the EncyclopediaofAssociations (Akey 1983).The survey of association m embers was conducted between 1984 and 1986, withan overall response rate of 61.6%. A quota sample of organ izations was draw n fromthe association list noted earlier, stratifying professional, recreation al, and wom en 'sassociations by size; 20 (out of 24) professional societies, 9 (out of 15) recreationalsocieties and 6 (out of 8) women's associations cooperated by permitting theirmem bership lists to be sampled. W hen m erged with the N A S , we have data on theindividual's political participation, intentional and unintentional mobilization (asreported by organizational informants) and the incentives valued by individualmem bers and group leaders.2Because we have a sample of group m embers, and not of the general ad ult po pu -lation, the sample consists primarily of high-status individuals. Obviously a ran-dom sample of the mass public would be preferred in addressing questions relating

2 Although the total number of respondents in the membership surveys for whom complete groupdata were available was 6,718, the sample used for this analysis consisted of the individuals for whomcomplete individual-level data were also available, reducing the sample size to 3,587. Comparisons ofthis sample with 1987 General Social Survey respond ents, and K nok e's original samp le, are inclu ded inthe appendix.


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Grou p M em bersh ip and the Mobilization of Political Participation 451to why individuals join groups.3 The central focus of this analysis, however, is onhow groups mobilize their members, and for this particular question the sample is ap-propriate particularly so given the quality and variety of data on group character-istics, as well as individuals' incentives for joining or belonging to the g roup , both ofwhich are unavailable using current mass survey data.4 Furthermore, results basedon this data are likely to be conservative estimates of the effects of group mobiliza-tion on political participation, as we are studying a group of individuals who are likelyto be more socially and politically connected and therefore less "needful" of groupmobilizationthan are individuals typically included in national random samples.5The participation model estimated below consists of three group characteristicsreported by organizational informants and five variables indicating the incentivestha t individua ls report for belonging to the g roup (lobbying, normative, social, oc-cupational, and material benefits or goals). The group characteristics measure thelevel of intentional and unintentional mobilization within each group, and w hetherthe group is political or not. Due to the nature of the sample, demographic vari-ables that are typically used in such models (e.g., education, income, and age) arenot included. However, each of the analyses below was replicated with the inclu-sion of these variables, resulting in only slight changes in the statistical estimatesand no differences in the substantive conclusions.

3A random sample would be preferred due to the selection bias introduced by a sample of groupme mb ers. Th e sample of group mem bers obviously precludes group n onmem bers from inclusion in thesample, and thus is not a representative sample of the adult population. This is referred to as a "cen-so red " samp le, in that non-m em bers are censored from selection, and the sample is said to suffer fromselection bias. Hence, standard econometric analyses using such data are biased or inconsistent for in-ferences about the U.S. population (Achen 1986). King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), however, arguethat samples censored in such a way as to be correlated with the dependent variable being analyzed willunderestimate the causal relationships being investigated. Since the "sample selection rule" (member,nonmember) in this case is likely to be correlated with the dependent variable used in the analysis (po-litical participation), it is expected that the reported OLS coefficients are conservative estimates of theeffects of intentional and unintentional mobilization.4 In other words, I assume that the sample represents the population of voluntary group members inthe United States, not the adult population (consisting of group members and nonmembers).sThis raises yet another methodological issue, that of endogeneity: if highly skilled people are morelikely to join participatory organizations in the first place, then what we observe as "group effects"might simply reflect this selection process. To fully solve the endogeneity problem would require paneldata on group members and nonmembers over time, which is simply not available. The best argumentagainst the endogeneity problem is theoretical, and that is we know individuals are likely to have imper-fect information, at best, when joining a group. I would argue that the participatory nature of the groupis not as critical a factor in choosing which group to join as are other incentives that would be more ob-vious to the newcomer, and that are included in the model (e.g., lobbying, material, or occupational in-centives; see Rothenberg 1988). I would also point out that the sample of groups is quite varied innature, with respect to how political and participatory they are. Finally, as I report later, when educa-tion, income and agevariables measuring individu als' skills and resou rces are included in the modelas "controls" for this alternative interpretation, the results are unchanged. Although none of thesepoints eliminates the problem of endogeneity, they nonetheless provide some confidence in the su bstan-tive results.


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452 Jan LeighleyThe dependent variable is the respondent's reported average frequency of en-gaging in five types of participation outside of the group (see the data appendix formore specific details). Intentional mobilization is the average frequency with whichthe group asked its mem bers to engage in each type of participation on beh alf of thegroup.Unintentional mobilization is an interaction term consisting of the extent towhich the group engages in practices associated with pa rticipato ry democracy (e.g.,high levels of interaction or policy debate) multiplied by the individual's level ofactivity within the group.6 Finally, lobbying, normative, social, material and occupa-

tional goals indicate how imp ortan t each type of incentive is to the individual in be -longing to the group.How AND W HIC H GROUPS MOB ILIZE

Estimates for the basic participation model are presented in table 1, column 1.Both intentional and unintentional mobilization are significant predictors of exter-nal political participation, as suggested in previous research. Hence, we have em-pirical evidence that group mobilization results from direct requests of group lead-ers for members to act on the group's behalf, as well as from the inte rnal gro upactivities that provide members the opportunity to develop skills transferrable tothe political sphere.It is important to note that these two mobilization processes are independent ofseveral other factors influencing individuals' participation beyond the group.Individuals in political groups are more likely to participate beyond the group, afinding consistent with Pollock's (1982) analysis. This might reflect the individ-ual's predisposition toward political activity or, instead, suggest that politicalgroups provide social cues and informal incentives for participating in politics be-yond the group.The latter interpretation is perhaps more likely, in that the model estimated intable 1 controls for individuals' incentives for belonging to the group. As expected,individuals with a lobbying incentive are more likely to participate beyond thegroup ; individuals with normative incentives are also inclined to participate mo reon behalf of the group. Individuals with occupational or social incentives, on theother hand, are less likely to participate beyond the group, while individuals' mate-rial incentives are not associated with external participation. Hence, we have evi-dence that individuals' reasons for belonging to the group have a direct effect onwhether they engage in political activity outside of the gro up .Following Verba and N ie's (1972) main findings, I next test wh ether the na tureof the group context constrains the group mobilization process. I expect that bothintentional and unintentional mobilization are associated with enhanced partici-

6Though it is assumed that this indicator most accurately assesses the nature of unintentional mobi-lization as described by Verba and N ie (1972), all of the analyses were repeated using these two term sseparately, and no substantive differences resulted.


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Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political ParticipationTABLE 1

GROUP MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

453

Independent VariablesIntentional mobilizationUnintentional mobilizationPolitical groupLobbying incentiveNormative incentiveSocial incentiveOccupational incentiveMaterial incentiveIntercept

Adjusted R2N

AllCroups0 . 0 3 7 " *

(0.003)0 . 0 1 6 " *(0.001)0.063***(0.016)0 . 0 6 5 * "(0.007)0 . 0 7 2 * "(0.009)

-0 .016* '(0.007)-0 .022*(0.009)-0 .003(0.009)

0 . 5 4 5 " *(0.026)0.343,287

PoliticalGroups0 . 0 5 3 * "(0.005)0 . 0 3 2 * "(0.002)

0.094***(0.012)0 . 1 0 9 * "(0.020)0.020(0.015)- 0 . 0 6 5 * "(0.017)

-0 .037*(0.017)0.274***

(0.056)0.461,284

NonpoliticalGroups

0.007(0.004)0 . 0 1 1 * "(0.001)

0 . 0 4 3 " *(0.006)0.019(0.010)

- 0 . 0 2 1 "(0.007)0.009(0.009)0 . 0 3 2 * "(0.009)0 . 8 0 9 " *

(0.026)0.24

2,003Note: Dependent variable is the group member's average level of participation in five political ac-tivities outside of the group. Table entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors inparentheses.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

pation in both political and nonpolitical groups. To test these propositions, I es-timated the basic participation model separately for political and nonpoliticalgroup s; these estimates are presented in table 1, columns 2 and 3 .'These estimates suggest that, for both political and nonpolitical groups, unin-tentional mobilization significantly enhances participation outside of the group.

'Alternative ly, these interactive effects could be estimated by adding interactive terms to the partici-pation m odel. Fo r several practical reasons I chose to use the split-sample estimates. F irst, there was aprohibitively high level of multicollinearity among the intentional mobilization, unintentional mobi-lization and political group variables, and their respective interaction terms. Second, the inclusion of12 interaction terms (intentional mobilization and unintentional mobilization, each by political groupand five incentive variables) to the basic model results in a model consisting of 19 predictor variables,rendering interpretation of the basic relationships difficult. T hir d, and related, one cannot argue on th e-oretical grounds that this large model is "properly" specified, as opposed to the split-sample models.Thus, I proceed to test whether intentional and unintentional mobilization vary across group types, orincentive types, by estimating the basic equation separately for each subset. Based on these separatetests, I then present a model includin g in teractive effects in the final section of the article.


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454 Jan LeigKleyIntentional mobilization is basically restricted to political groups, though the OLScoefficient for the nonpolitical groups approaches conventionally accepted levels ofstatistical significance (p < 0.064). Beyond the issue of statistical significance, how-ever, the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients for intentional mobilizationin political and nonpolitical grou ps is substantial: the effect of intention al mobiliza -tion is more than seven times its estimated effects in nonpolitical groups. Hence,although intentional mobilization occurs in both types of groups, it is far more ef-fective in political, than in nonpolitical, groups.Having established independent effects of intentional and unintentional mobi-lization in political and nonpolitical groups, while controlling for individuals' in-centives for group membership, the rest of the analysis focuses on how these mem-bership incentives structure the m obilization process. First, and most imp ortan tly,I test whether individuals with lobbying goals are more susceptible to group mobi-lization than individuals who do not have lobbying goals. More specifically, I testwhether intentional and unintentional mobilization are equally effective for bothsets of individuals. Again, the basic participation m odel is estimated sepa rately forboth group s, and these results are reported in table 2.The independent effects of both intentional and unintentional mobilization areclearly evident for group members with lobbying goals. However, for individualswithout lobbying incentives, only unintentional mobilization is associated withparticipation beyond the group. This is the first direct evidence that individuals'membership incentives structure the mobilization process. It is also interesting tonote that belonging to a political group is associated with greater participation,both for individuals with and without lobbying incentives. This suggests that, inthe case of individuals without lobbying goals, the informal interaction and socialcues provided in political groups are actually more importa nt factors in stim ula tingparticipation than is any effort of the leadership to mobilize participation.Previous research provides only vague theoretical exp ectations as to how each ofthe remaining membership incentives might influence the mobilization process.Since unintentional mobilization is driven primarily through the transfer of skillsdeveloped in the context of the organization, this mobilization process should beeffective regardless of individuals' motives for belonging to the group. Intentionalmobilization, on the other hand, is likely to be more sensitive to individuals' rea-sons for belonging to the gro up.M ore specifically, I hypothesize that individuals whose inc entives are associatedwith external gains to be realized from the success of the group will be more re-sponsive to intentional group mobilization than individuals without incentives as-sociated with external gains. Hence I expect that individuals with normative or oc-cupational incentives will respond to intentional mobilization by group leaders,while those without normative or occupational goals will not. In contrast, I expectindividuals' responsiveness to intentional mobilization by group leaders to be thesame whether or no t they report having solidary or material incentives.


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Group M embersh ip and the Mobilization of Political Participation 455TABLE 2

GROUP MOBILIZATION CONTROLLING FOR MEMBERS'INITIAL LOBBYING INCENTIVES

Independent VariablesIntentional mobilizationUn intentional mobilizationPolitical groupNormative incentiveSocial incentiveOccupational incentiveMaterial incentiveInterceptAdjusted R2N

For Individuals Joining:With a LobbyingIncentive

0.045***(0.004)0.018***(0.001)0.088***

(0.019)0.115***(0.013)-0 .009(0.009)-0 .027*(0.011)-0 .000(0.011)

0.532***(0.033)0.342,540

Without a LobbyingIncentive-0 .003(0.004)

0.007***(0.001)0.080***(0.019)0.017(0.012)

-0 .020*(0.008)0.023*(0.012)0.018(0.012)0.942***

(0.028)0.15747

Note: Dependent variable is the group member's average level of participation in five political ac-tivities outside of the group. Table entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors inparentheses.p < 0.05; **/> < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Table 3 and table 4 present the results of a series of models, estimated separatelyby the four incentive types. Table 3, which includes the estimates for individualswith and without normative incentives, and with and without occupational incen-tives, is consistent with these expectations. In every case, intentional mobilizationis associated with participation beyond the group only for those individuals withnormative incentives and for those individuals with occupational incentives. Indi-viduals with no normative incentive, and those with no occupational incentive, arenot responsive to the intentional mobilization efforts of group leaders. On the otherhand, unintentional mobilization is significantly related to participation in everycase, as expected.The resu lts for social and material incentives, reported in table 4, are also consis-tent with the hypothesized relationships. As expected, unintentional mobilizationis significantly associated with greater participation beyond the group whether the


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456 Jan LeighleyTABLE 3

GR OU P MOBILIZATION CONTROLLING FOR ME MB ERS' INITIAL NORMATIVEAND OCCUPATIONAL INCENTIVES

Independent VeriablesIntentional mobilizationUnintentional mobilizationPolitical groupLobbying incentiveNormative incentiveSocial incentiveOccupational incentiveMaterial incentiveIntercept

Adjusted R2N

With aNormativeIncentive

0 . 0 3 8 * "(0.003)0 . 0 1 8 * "(0.001)0 . 0 8 5 * "(0.017)0 . 0 8 3 * "

(0.007)

0.003(0.008)

-0 .0 0 3(0.010)-0 .0 0 4(0.010)

0.541***(0.028)0.332,963

For Individuals Joining:Without aNormativeIncentive

0.010(0.007)0.005*

(0.002)-0.009(0.038)0.035*(0.014)

-0.040*(0.O18)0 .O72"(0.O24)0.O42(0.024)0 .8 1 9 " *

(0.049)0.13324

With anOccupational

Incentive0 . 0 4 3 " *

(0.003)0 . 0 1 7 * "(0.001)0 . 0 5 8 "

(0.018)0 . 0 6 2 * "(0.008)0 . 0 7 2 * "

(0.012)- 0 . 0 1 2(0.008)

- 0 . 0 1 3(0.010)0 . 4 5 9 " *(0.030)0.352,716

Without anOccupational

Incentive0.003(0.006)0 . 0 1 1 " *(0.002)0 . 0 7 6 "

(0.028)0.062***

(0.011)0.035(0.020)- 0 . 0 2 0(0.014)

- 0 . 0 1 7(0.021)0 . 8 5 8 * "(0.050)0.21571

Note: De pend ent variable is the group me mb er's average level of p articipation in five political ac-tivities outside of the group. Table entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors inparentheses.p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; */> < 0.001.

group member has social or material incentives or not. Intentional mobilization isalso significant in each model; group leaders are about equally likely to mobilizegroup m embers w ith social incentives as they are to mobilize members w ithout so -cial incentives. The same is true for material incentives.The findings reported in table 3 and table 4 underscore the critical role of lobby-ing and normative incentives in structuring the group mobilization process.Intentional mobilization is ineffective for those individuals with no interest in anyexternal rewards or benefits that the group might convey, regardless of their otherincentives for group membership; member interest in immediate "internal" re-wards (e.g., solidary or selective benefits) does not similarly constrain intentionalefforts by group leaders to mobilize participation. Put simply, individuals with no


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Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political ParticipationTABLE 4

GR OU P MO BILIZATION CONTROLLING FOR MEMB ERS' INITIALSOCIAL AND MATERIAL INCENTIVES

457

Independent VariablesIntentional mobilizationUnintentional mobilizationPolitical groupLobbying incentiveNormative incentiveSocial incentiveOccupational incentive

Material incentiveInterceptAdjusted R1N

With aSocialIncentive

0 . 0 3 4 " *(0.005)0.017***(0.001)0.137***(0.023)0.085***(0.010)0.081***(0.016)

-0 .012(0.014)-0 .005(0.012)

0.403***(0.040)0.361,762

For Individuals Joining:Without a

SocialIncentive

0.042***(0.004)0.016***(0.001)

- 0 . 014(0.021)0.045***(0.009)0.060***(0.014)

-0 .032*(0.012)-0 .012(0.014)

0.626***(0.031)0.31

' 1,525

With aMaterialIncentive

0.034***(0.004)0.017***(0.001)0.064**(0.023)0.067***(0.009)0.071***(0.015)- 0 . 011(0.009)

- 0 . 004(0.013)

0.495***(0.040)0.331,798

Without aMaterialIncentive

0.043***(0.004)0.016***(0.001)0.060**(0.022)0.062***

(0.010)0.070***(0.016)-0 .017(0.012)

-0 .0 3 5 *(0.015)

0.555***(0.039)0.341,489

Note: Dependent variable is the group member's average level of participation in five political ac-tivities outside of the group. Table entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors inparentheses.p < 0.05; **/> < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

external goals are not likely to respond to group leaders' efforts to mobilize theirparticipation.Although the evidence for these conclusions in terms of statistical significance isclear, it is, in some respects, disjointed due to the use of a series of subset analyses.T o provide a better substantive understanding of the group mobilization process, Ialso estimated a participa tion model tha t consisted of the variables used in the basicmodel, in addition to interaction terms consisting of intentional m obilization mu l-tiplied by a dum my for being in a political group; by a dum my for having a lobby-ing incentive; by a dum my for having a normative incentive; by a dumm y for hav-ing an occupational incentive; and interaction terms consisting of being in apolitical group multiplied by having a normative goal and by a social goal. These


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458 Jan LeighleyTABLE 5

GR OU P MO BILIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION,INCLUDING INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION,GROUP TYPE AND MEMBERS' INCENTIVES

Independent VariablesIntentional mobilizationUnintentional mobilizationPolitical groupLobbying incentiveNormative incentiveSocial incentiveOccupational incentiveMaterial incentiveIntentional X political groupIntentional X lobbying incentiveIntentional X normative incentiveIntentional X occupational incentivePolitical group X norm ative incentivePolitical grou p X social incentiveInterceptAdjusted R1N

0.013*0.017***-0 .683***0.072***0.029*- 0 . 019*- 0 . 020- 0 . 008

0.056***- 0 . 003-0 .012***0.0010.144***0.042**0.818***0.383,287

(0.006)(0.001)(0.054)(0.009)(0.014)(0.008)(0.011)(0.009)(0.006)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.018)(0.014)(0.037)

Note: Dependent variable is the group member's average level of participation in five political ac-tivities outside of the group. Table entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors inparentheses.*/. < 0.05 ; **/> < 0.01; ***/. < 0.001.

six interaction terms represent differences in coefficient estimates across the subsetanalyses in table 1 through table 4, where multicollinearity limits th e use of th ismodel in determining statistical significance of direct effects.The results of this model are presented in table 5. These estimates generallyreplicate the findings presented earlier, with the exception of the coefficient estim atefor political groups (estimated as negatively related to participation in this model).This likely results from the model's large number of interactive terms that includethe political group variable. Nonetheless, the advantage of this model is that pre-dicted values of political participation by different types of group members can becalculated to provide a sense of the "overall" effects of the m obilization pro cess.For example, an individual in a group with an average level of unin ten tion al m o -bilization and the minimum value for all other variables (including intentional mo-bilization) has a predicted participation score of 1.07; the same individual in agroup with the highest level of intentional mobilization has a predicted value of1.19. H ence, intentional mobilization is sufficiently stron g to m ove this "b as eline "individual from a below-average level of participation to about average level of par-


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Grou p M em bership and the Mobilization of Political Participation 459ticipation. In contrast, an individual in a group with an average level of uninten-tional mobilization, with the highest lobbying and normative incentives, in a politi-cal grou p, but with the m inimum intentional mobilization has a predicted value of1.43 (much higher th an the sample m ean, as well as higher than the predicted valuefor our baseline member, with no lobbying or normative goals); the same individualin a group with maximum intentional mobilization has a predicted participationscore of 1.94, a statistically significant difference. Hence, these predicted partici-pation scores underscore the critical importance of group members' incentives instructuring the mobilization process.

CONCLUSIONSWhile earlier research had identified intentional and unintentional mobilizationas two possible mechanisms linking group mem bership with higher levels of politi-cal participation, it had not provided systematic evidence of their independenteffects. Nor had earlier research demonstrated that the two processes operateuniquely depending on characteristics of individual members. The analyses abovedemonstrate that both intentional and unintentional mobilization enhance the par-ticipation of group members in politics beyond the group, though the effects ofintentional mobilization are constrained both by individuals' incentives for group

mem bership and by the nature of the group .Having specified more clearly the nature of the group mobilization process, Ishould note that these findings are based on data restricted to individuals' m em ber-ships in only one group. To the extent that individuals are members of more thanone group, or that alternative mobilization contexts are considered, these conclu-sions might be modified. Yet this limitation also means that I have conductedrather conservative tests of the impact of group mobilizationknowing only onegro up 's characteristics, strong and consistent relationships between intentional andunintentional mobilization and participation have been established. Additional in-formation on other group memberships would most likely provide evidence formultiple sources of similar relationships.Another, perhaps m ore fundam ental, set of findings relates to the important roleof members' incentives in structuring the group mobilization process. Individuals'incentives for belonging to a group are powerful constraints on the group's abilityto intentionally mobilize political activity, a point that Knoke (1990) failed to con-sider. Although group leaders may seek to cultivate the value accorded certain in-centives by members, Rothenberg (1988, 1992) suggests that individuals' learnabout the incentives offered by groups and are less likely to retain membershipin groups that offer incentives inconsistent with their own interests. Together,these findings suggest a temporal priority in the conceptual status of members'incentives for joining or belonging to a grou p: if they desire lobbying benefits froma group, they join political groups and confirm that decision through experiencewith the grou p. Henc e, group mobilization efforts are fundamentally structured by


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460 Jan Leighleyindividuals' incentives for group me mb ership, and secondarily by th e individu al'sactivity level or the group's mobilization efforts.

Beyond these particular findings, understanding how groups mobilize membersto participate more broadly in the political system reflects on the nature of demo-cratic politics in the contemporary United States. A group mobilization processdriven by elite efforts to mobilize members suggests that broader involvement inthe political system will be sporadic, and possibly tied to the interests of groupleaders rather than individual participants. On the other hand, an unintentionalmobilization process, similar to the workplace and community-based involvementemphasized by democratic theorists, suggests that individuals gain the ability torepresent their self-interest more fully in the broader political system (see, amongothe rs, Keim 1975; M ansbridg e 1983; Pateman 1970; Th om ps on 1970). It wouldseem that the latter is not only the m ore palatable, bu t also the m ore likely, scenarioin contemporary group politics in the United States.

D A T A A P P E N D I XI. Sample Means

Education Income Age1987 Genera l Social Survey: 12.3 years 827,000 47.6(for individuals who belong to one organization)1985 Na tional Association Stu dy : 17 years 845,000 42.2(mail survey of individuals)1985 National Association Stu dy : 17 years $42,191 44.5(mail survey merged with telephone survey oforganizational informants)

II . Variable CodingParticipation is the respo nden t's average frequency (never, rarely, som etimes, reg ularly, coded as 1, 2,3 and 4 , respectively) of engaging in five different types of participation: contacting gov ernm ent offi-cials, writing letters to newspapers, signing a petition for the organization, pick eting or dem on strat ing ,and working in a political candidate's cam paign.Intentional Mobilization is the average response of organizational informants as to the frequency(never, rarely, sometimes, regularly) with which the group attempted to mobilize members to contactgovernm ent officials on behalf of the grou p; to write newspapers or magazines; to participate in d em -onstrations or picketings; and to work in political candidates' campaigns.Unintentional Mobilization is an interaction term based on the extent to which the group provides op-portun ities for the individual to participate (as reported by organizational informa nts) a nd how activethe individual reports being within the group. Opportunities to gain skills within the group are mea-sured as the average response, on a five-point agree/disagree scale, of organizational inform ants on twoitems: Most members only pa y their dues and do little else for the organization; and This organization re-quires little interaction among its members to conduct its essential business; this variable ranges from 1 to 5.Activity within the group is the average level of self-reported activity in nine d ifferent tasks associatedwith group maintenance: recruiting members, phoning other members, working on special projects,attending conferences, providing transportation for other members, giving or loaning equipment, rep-resenting the organization to others, voting in organizational elections, and soliciting d onatio ns for theorganization. This variable ranges from 0 to 9.


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Grou p M em bership and the Mobilization of Political Participation 461Political Groups are defined as those groups for whom influencing public policy decisions of govern-ment is a major goal, as reported by organizational informants. Nonpolitical Groups are those for whominfluencing public policy decisions is a minor or unim portant goal.

T h e importanc e of member incentives is based on m em bers' evaluations of how important a varietyof organization activities are personally to the member. More specifically:Lobbying Goal is how imp ortant, on a scale of 1 to 4, lobbying government was as an incentive forthe respondent in joining the group: not important, somewhat important, very important, or extremelyimpo rtant. Wh ere the sample is split between those with or without a lobbying goal, individuals re-porting "not imp ortan t" are those coded as w ithout a lobbying goal; all others are coded as having alobbying goal.Social Goal is how important, on a scale of 1 to 4, social or recreational activity was as an incentivefor the respon dent in joining the group : not important, somewhat im portant, very impo rtant, or ex-tremely important. Where the sample is split between those with or without a social goal, individualsreporting "not imp ortan t" are those coded as without a social goal; all others are coded as having asocial goal.Material Goal is the average impo rtance , on a scale of 1 to 4, of two incentives, group insurance andgroup purchasing benefits, as incentives for the respondent in joining the group. Each incentive israted by the respond ent as not important (1), somewhat imp ortant, very im portant, or extremely im-portant (4); the material goal variable is the average of these two scores. Where the sample is split be-tween those with or without a material goal, individuals reporting "n ot im portan t" are those coded aswitho ut a m aterial goal; all other s are coded as having a material goal.Occupational Goal is the average im portance, on a scale of 1 to 4, of three incentives, certificationor licensing program s, professional or business contacts, representing m embers in negotiations, as in-centives for the respo nden t in joining the gro up. Each incentive is rated by the respondent as not im-

portan t (1), somewh at im portant, very imp ortant, or extremely importan t (4); the occupational goalvariable is the average of these three scores. Where the sample is split between those with or withoutan occupational goal, individuals reporting "not impo rtant" are those coded as without an occupationalgoal; all others are coded as having an occupational goal.Normative Goal is the average importance, on a scale of 1 to 4, of three incentives, main principlesor goals, general prestige, and changing lives of nonmembcrs, as incentives for the respondent in join-ing the group . Each incentive is rated by the respondent as not impo rtant (1), somewhat im portant,very important, or extremely important (4); the normative goal variable is the average of these threescores. Where the sample is split between those with or without a normative goal, individuals rep ort-ing "no t im po rtant" are those coded as without a normative goal; all others are coded as having a nor-mative goal.

III. Descriptive Statistics (n = 3,287)VariableParticipationIntentional mobilizationUnintentional mobilizationPolitical groupLobbying incentivesNormative incentivesSocial incentivesOccupational incentivesMaterial incentives

Mean1.196.689.010.392.412.101.822.011.62

Standarddeviation

0.412.509.760.491.030.690.920.770.75

Range1,41,50,450,11,41,41,41,41,4


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462 Jan LeighleyManuscript submitted 14 September 1994Final manuscript received 12 June 1995

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Mobilisation of Political Participation