Aftermath of Enron

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    2

    Things Well Discuss

    The Environment

    Worst Practices

    Best Practices

    Possible Change Areas

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    3

    The Environment

    Enron/Andersen collapse

    Depressed market despite stronger earnings

    Continued investor dilution concerns New disclosure for stock plans

    Continued concern about stock plan approval

    Finalization of EITF 00-23, but IASB is here

    Options continue to be underwater

    Missed incentive goals

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    Enron/Andersen Collapse

    Heavy scrutiny of stock options

    Distrust of financial disclosure

    Earnings comparisons less meaningful

    Whats in the numbers?

    Re-thinking director compensation Are options right?

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    Continued Investor Concerns

    Higher average potential dilution from stockplans

    1997 2001 % change

    S&P 500 10.0% 13.7% 37.0%

    S&P Mid Cap 10.5% 15.6% 48.5%

    S&P Small Cap 13.8% 17.0% 23.2%

    Total Super 1500 11.6% 14.1% 21.6%

    Continued scrutiny from institutional investors

    Source: Stock Plan Dilution, 2002: Overhang from Stock Plans at S&P Super 1,500 CompaniesInvestor Responsibility Research Corp

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    Continued Investor Concern

    35819737 95

    32%31%

    22%

    18%

    18%

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    < 10% 10-15% 15-20% 20%-30% > 30%Total Potential Dilution Range

    #ofplans

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    35%

    %N

    egative

    Votes

    No. of Companies-2001 % Negative Votes-2001

    Source: Stock Plan Dilution, 2002: Overhang from Stock Plans at S&P Super 1,500 CompaniesInvestor Responsibility Research Corp

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    Public Perceptions

    Executive greed and duplicity contributed toEnron debacle

    Mega-options drove management to falsify accountingto keep stock prices high and rising

    Executives used inside information to exercise and selloptions while price high

    Stock option accounting contributed to the

    speculative bubble in stocks by inflating thegrowth rate in EPS

    Stock options cause short-term behavior and aremisaligned with long-term interests of

    shareholders

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    New Financials

    EBIT: Earnings Before Irregularities and

    Tampering

    ROIC: Restated on Instructions of Counsel

    CFO: Chief Fraud Officers

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    Worst Practices

    Enron

    Philosophy to reward shareholder valuecreation

    Stock options and restricted stock (50/50)

    RS vesting accelerated based on TSR performance

    4 year reduced to 1 year

    Large grants (Lay: 1.3 million in 2000)

    Limited partnership interests

    Executive loans and repayments

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    Worst Practices

    Tyco

    Loans

    Stock sales Actions without compensation committee

    knowledge

    $20 million to director

    Chair of Corporate Governance and NominatingCommittee

    Reloads with 10-year terms

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    Worst Practices

    E-Trade

    CEO loan settlement

    Forgiveness $15,000,000

    Tax Gross-Up 15,211,481

    $30,211,481 For elimination of certain contractual

    relocation benefits

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    Worst Practices

    K-Mart

    Full recourse retention loans

    $2.5 - $5.0 million

    Made in 20002002

    Vest in 2004, i.e., Forgiveness

    Tax gross-up

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    Worst Practices

    WorldCom

    Stock options only

    Large grants (Ebbers1.2-1.9 million per year) Loan arrangements

    Company guaranteed $195.6 million (B of A)

    Company paid at $198.7 million plus $35 million for LC Company direct loan of $165 million

    Why: to avoid the need for Mr. Ebbers to sell

    large quantities of WorldCom stock

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    Worst Practices - Other

    GE

    3,000,000 stock options and 850,000 RSUs

    ($48 million) to Welch 1 year vesting

    Recognize 20 years of service and developing

    and implementing plansConseco

    $45 million cash signing bonus to Gary Wendt

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    Worst Practices - Other

    Dell and Oracle

    38 million options from 1996 to 1998 to MichaelDell

    Already owned 353 million shares

    20 million options to Larry Ellison

    Already owned 700 million shares

    Dynergy CEO severance 2.99x base and incentive

    compensation

    But incentive compensationincludes stock options

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    Worst Practices

    Layoffs with big pay

    Pay Layoffs

    Disney $72.8 4,000

    Cisco Systems $28.7 8,500

    WorldCom $10 million 6,000

    stay bonus

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    Best Practices (?)

    Amazon.comAMB Property Corp.Bank OneBoeingCoca-ColaDole FoodsFannie MaeFreddie MaciStar FinancialLevel 3 CommunicationsSovereign BancorpWashington Post

    Winn-Dixie

    Delta Air LinesHeinzTarget Stores

    Others:Companies

    Expensing OptionsCompanies Considering

    Expensing Options

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    Best Practices

    Krispy Kreme

    Since 1937; public since early 2000

    Development rights agreements while private

    Also had franchise equity pool for

    management

    All pools and rights agreements terminated

    Return of original investment

    All sales through 10b5-1 plans

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    Best Practices

    Ownership Guidelines

    13% of Top 250

    Not a lot, but more considering

    Most use multiple of retainer

    5x most common

    Comcast & Fordmultiple of retainer/fees

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    Best Practices

    Ownership Guidelines

    Other examples

    Citigroup75% of shares granted Pitney-Bowes$350k owned in order to sell

    stock

    PNC Bankmust use of retainer to purchase

    stock

    Tribune5x most recent stock grant

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    Best Practices

    Director Performance Options

    Computer Associates# based on ROE

    ADC Telecomgrant only if 10% ROE

    SYSCOoptions granted only if 10% growth

    in EPS

    UP & CapOneoptions vest on stock price

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    Possible Change Areas

    1. Compensation Committee Governance

    Committee Charter x x 100% Disinterested (Audit Standard) x x

    Compensation Literacy and Experience x

    Strong Chair, Periodic Rotation x

    Code of Conduct (conflicts of interest; sales) x x

    Total Compensation Oversight x

    Access to Outside Advisors and Staff Support x x

    Legal Representation x x

    Executive Sessions x

    CEO Pay Determination x

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    Possible Change Areas

    2. Annual and LTIP Design

    Relevant Metrics x

    Audit Confirmation of Formula Results x

    Negative Discretion x

    Strategic and Qualitative Factors x

    Recapture for Restatements x x

    Operational vs. Market Goals x

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    Possible Change Areas

    3. Stock Options

    SFAS 123 Accounting x x

    Managed Run Rate and Overhang x

    Nonshareholder Approved Plans x x

    Mega Grants x

    Performance Vesting x

    Ownership Intent x

    Inside Information x

    Repricings x x

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    Possible Change Areas

    5. Deferred Compensation

    SERP Accrual Disclosure x

    Lump Sum Settlements x x

    Recapture for Bankruptcy x

    Stock Account Switching x x

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    Possible Change Areas

    6. Directors Compensation

    Stock Options x

    Restricted Stock x

    Committee Chair Fees x

    Ownership Standards x

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    Freder ic W. Cook & Co., I nc.provides management compensation consulting services to business clients. Formed in 1973, our

    firm has served over 1,200 corporations in a wide variety of industries from our offices in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Our

    primary focus is on performance-based compensation programs which help companies attract and retain key employees, motivate and

    reward them for improved performance, and align their interests with shareholders. Our range of consulting services encompasses the

    following areas:

    Total Compensation Reviews

    Strategic Incentives

    Specific Plan Reviews

    Restructuring Services

    Competitive Comparisons

    Incentive Grant Guidelines

    Executive Ownership Programs

    All-Employee Plans

    Directors Compensation

    Equity Instruments

    Performance Measurement

    Globalization

    Privatization

    Compensation Committee Advisor

    Stock Option Enhancements

    Our offices are located:

    New York

    90 Park Avenue

    35thFloor

    New York, New York 10016

    212-986-6330 phone

    212-986-3836 fax

    Chicago

    19 South LaSalle Street

    Suite 400

    Chicago, Illinois 60603

    312-332-0910 phone

    312-332-0647 fax

    Los Angeles

    2029 Century Park East

    Suite 1130

    Los Angeles, California 90067

    310-277-5070 phone

    310-277-5068 fax

    Website address:

    www.fwcook.com