Aftermarket telematics devices:

a dangerous backdoor into your vehicle network?

Andy Davis, Transport Cybersecurity Practice Director

Agenda

• The connected car attack surface

• The risks associated with vehicle network access

• Secure development practices

• Summary: Reducing the risks

• Q&A

Connected car attack surface

Attack Surface Overview: Connected Cars

Tire Pressure

Monitoring System

Remote

Keyless

Entry

Diagnostics

port

Infotainment system:

wired & wireless

technologies Telematics services

& in-car apps

Rear Seat

Entertainment

Infrared

control

Exposed CAN

wiring

Wireless sensors:

Radar & Lidar Occupant’s mobile phone

Typical OBD device connectivity

Internet

Mobile Network Operator

3G/4G

When you have access to a vehicle network…

Another vehicle network attack scenario

Threats associated with vehicle network access

• Safety of the vehicle occupants

• Intellectual property theft from ECUs

• Cyber Physical Ransomware

• Cars can be upgraded / modified

• New keys can be provisioned

Secure Development Practices

Protecting the vehicle platform from ODB devices

Current vehicle platforms:

• Diagnostics port connectivity with other vehicle networks

• Segregation between vehicle network segments

• Segregation between head units / TCUs and vehicle networks

• Operating system hardening for all vehicle systems

• Vehicle network security devices?

• Independent security testing

Protecting the vehicle platform from OBD devices

Next generation vehicle platforms:

• Inter-ECU authentication and encryption

• Hypervisors/virtualisation for segregation

• More secure vehicle network protocols

• Cryptographically signed Over The Air firmware updates

• Independent security testing

OBD solution development – security considerations

Internet

Web application client Web application server

• Limit CAN commands that can be issued by the device

• If only CAN read access is required, physically remove write access from CAN transceiver

• Ensure actual CAN messages are generated as close to the car as possible

• Remove all debug/admin interfaces from the OBD device

• Ensure the data between OBD device and web application is encrypted

• During a registration process authenticate the device to the web application server

• Do not use WiFi or Bluetooth for direct wireless communication with the OBD device

Automotive Secure Development Lifecycle

The ASDL should be considered a

framework, rather than as a

solution that replaces any existing

standards

Training

ASDL Standards mapping

SAE

J3061

ISO

26262

MISRA

C

CERT

C

NIST

FIPS 199

TVRA

EVITA

HEAVENS

(cyber-physical focused)

(safety focused)

(functional safety focused)

ISO

12207

ISO

27001

(information security management)

(systems and software engineering)

(software architecture

design threats)

(security focused)

(risk assessment – telecomms network focussed)

(risk assessment – aligned with ISO 26262)

(risk assessment – designed

By US DoD for healthcare security)

STRIDE

(threat modelling)

Auto Alliance Consumer Privacy

Protection

Principles

OCTAVE (risk assessment - electrical systems focused)

NIST FIPS

140-2

(Security requirements for cryptographic modules)

(privacy focused)

Reducing the risks

Reducing the risks

• An awareness of the risks needs to be raised with the right stakeholders

• Techniques such as threat modelling would likely identify many vulnerabilities

introduced via OBD devices

• Vehicle manufacturers and their whole supply chain need to develop-in security

from day one (Secure Development Lifecycle) – bolt-on solutions are never as

effective and often very costly

• Automotive technology must be independently security assessed to ensure

that vulnerabilities haven’t been introduced during development or integration.

Q&A

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