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AFTER ACTION REPORT

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Table of Contents

Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program ...................................................................... 2

Exercise Overview ........................................................................................................................... 3

Exercise Structure ........................................................................................................................... 5

Breakout Group Discussions ........................................................................................................... 7

Exercise Data Capture and Analysis .............................................................................................. 10

Participant Feedback .................................................................................................................... 14

Participant Contact List ................................................................................................................. 15

Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... 19

Options for Consideration ............................................................................................................ 20

Resources ...................................................................................................................................... 21

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Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

BACKGROUND The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) provides exercise, training, and security planning tools and services to the transportation community. The program focuses on the security nexus of the intermodal transportation environment, serving mass transit, freight rail, pipeline, port and intermodal, highway and motor carrier, and aviation modes. Working in partnership with the transportation modes, I-STEP enables security partners to:

• Enhance security capabilities – Strengthen plans, policies, and procedures; clarify roles and responsibilities; validate planning needs; and strengthen grant proposals.

• Build partnerships – Develop relationships with regional transportation players and other stakeholders.

• Gain insights in transportation security – Network with peers to gain a deeper understanding of security lessons learned and best practices.

I-STEP is the only Federal exercise program to focus on the security nexus of the intermodal transportation environment. As a result, the program reduces risk to individual systems as well as the entire transportation network. I-STEP aligns to TSA’s Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plans (TSSSP) under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement (SPIE) manages this program. Lessons learned from I-STEP exercises, training events, and workshops help shape national transportation security policy.

I-STEP PROGRAMMATIC GOALS • Develop a comprehensive transportation security exercise program

• Serve as a training resource for TSA security partners

• Foster information sharing/collaboration among security partners

• Provide support services to TSA modal representatives

POINT OF CONTACT For more information on I-STEP exercises, contact: Marie Binder-Sealy I-STEP Branch Exercise Project Manager Marie.Binder-Sealy@tsa.dhs.gov (571) 227-3249

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Exercise Overview

PURPOSE & SCOPE The New England Regional Intermodal Security Exercise (RISE) was a one-day workshop and facilitated discussion at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, MA. The exercise included representatives from all five surface transportation modes (Highway and Motor Carrier, to include school bus, highway infrastructure, and over-the road-bus, Mass Transit and Passenger Rail, Freight Rail, Pipeline and Maritime) as well as representation from six states in the region. The purpose of this exercise was to:

• Introduce participants to federal, regional, state, local, and private sector counterterrorism resources, capabilities, technologies, personnel, and initiatives;

• Provide participants with a comprehensive and integrated understanding of transportation security preparedness;

• Inform best practices and improve information sharing; and

• Evaluate prevention- and protection-related capabilities, plans, resources, and coordination.

EXERCISE MISSION AREAS, CORE CAPABILITIES, AND OBJECTIVES Mission Areas: Prevention, Protection Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

Objective 1: Introduce participants to federal, state, local, and private sector counterterrorism resources, capabilities, technologies, personnel, and initiatives

Core Capability: Operational Coordination Objective 2: Evaluation prevention- and protection-related capabilities, plans, and coordination among New England regional transportation security stakeholders

Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing Objective 3: Collect and evaluate best practices and improve information sharing among New England regional transportation security stakeholders

PARTICIPATING STAKEHOLDERS Federal • Amtrak

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

• National Park Service (NPS)

• TSA

• U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

• U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT)

Local • Franklin Regional Transit Authority

• Laconia Police Department

• Lowell Emergency Management

• Lowell Fire Department

• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Transit Police

• Manchester-Boston Regional Airport

• Merrimack Valley Regional Transit Authority

• New Haven Health Department

• Newport Fire Department

• Springfield Area Transit Company

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• Manchester Transit Authority • Worcester Fire Department

Private • Central Mass Transit Management Inc.

• DATTCO

• Genesee & Wyoming Railroad

• Glatfelter Public Practice Insurance

• Greyhound Lines, Inc.

• I-95 Corridor Coalition

• Iroquois Pipeline Operating Company

• MA Port Authority (Massport)

• RI Public Transit Authority (RIPTA)

• School Transportation Association of MA

• Sprague Operation Resources LLC

• Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority

• Transportation Research Board (TRB) National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)

State • Commonwealth Fusion Center CT State Police/Intelligence Center

• MA Department of Transportation (MassDOT)

• MA Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)

• ME Department of Transportation

• Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) at San Jose State University (SJSU)

• New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN)

• NH Information and Analysis Center (NHIAC)

• RI State Police/Fusion Center

• VT Department of Public Safety

• VT State Police/Intelligence Center

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Exercise Structure

MORNING WORKSHOP The New England RISE consisted of a multi-modal workshop, a working lunch, and facilitated breakout group discussions followed by outbriefs by exercise players in plenary. During the workshop portion of the exercise, participants received briefings concerning current and emerging threats to transportation, topical expertise on both chemical and vehicle ramming threats, Regional Information Sharing Systems® (RISS) and fusion center capabilities, as well as Amtrak’s law enforcement and intelligence capabilities.

Time Exercise Activity

8:30 AM – 9:00 AM Registration and Networking

Opening Remarks

9:00 AM – 9:20 AM College of the Holy Cross, TSA, MassDOT, and the TRB NCHRP

9:20 AM – 9:30 AM Exercise Overview

Morning Plenary Briefings

9:30 AM – 9:45 AM TSA intelligence – Siobhan Desmarais, Field Intelligence Officer - BOS

9:45 AM – 10:05 AM Chemical threat – Dr. Mark Kirk, DHS CWMD Office

10:05 AM – 10:20 AM Vehicle ramming – David Cooper, TSA Industry Engagement Manager -

Highway

10:20 AM – 10:50 AM

NESPIN – Curt McKenzie, Law Enforcement Coordinator/Field

Representative

VT Intelligence Center – Greg Campbell, Sergeant - Vermont State Police

RI State Fusion Center – Glen Hogan, Intelligence Analyst

Commonwealth Fusion Center – Lyndsey Nystrom, Intelligence Analyst

NHIAC – Mark Mudge, Planning Analyst

CT Intelligence Center – Marc Housley, Law Enforcement/Liaison Officer

10:50 AM – 11:00 AM Amtrak – James W. Rice II, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Unit

11:00 AM – 11:15 AM Participants Retrieve Deli Buffet Lunches

11:15 AM – 12:15 PM Working Lunch – Incident Command System (ICS) Kits

AFTERNOON BREAKOUT GROUPS AND OUTBRIEFS IN PLENARY Following a working lunch provided by the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO)’s TRB NCHRP, participants separated into two breakout groups for facilitated discussions. One group consisted of players and observers from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, while the other group consisted of participants from Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Participants recorded responses to the following scenario injects in a provided worksheet and then presented their key observations and findings in plenary following the facilitated discussions.

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Time Exercise Activity

Afternoon Breakout Groups

12:15 PM – 12:25 PM Concept and Scene Setters

12:25 PM – 1:25 PM State Injects, Worksheet Completion, and Facilitated Discussions

1:25 PM – 1:30 PM Breakout Group Wrap-ups

1:30 PM – 1:45 PM Break

1:45 PM – 2:15 PM Outbriefs in Plenary

2:15 PM – 2:30 PM Exercise Wrap-up

2:30 PM NCHRP ICS Kits (optional)

Figure 1: Regional largescale events impacted by the scenarios

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Breakout Group Discussions

OVERVIEW Exercise participants split into two breakout groups consisting of transportation security stakeholders from the federal, state, local, and private sectors across the region. The MA and NH breakout group focused on attacks upon the Lowell Folk Festival in Lowell, MA, and Laconia Motorcycle Week® in Laconia, NH. The CT, ME, RI, and VT breakout group focused on attacks upon the International Festival of Arts & Ideas in New Haven, CT; the Hall of Fame Tennis Championships in Newport, RI; and the Burlington Jazz Festival in Burlington, VT (the ME participant was an observer). Facilitators led discussion of participants’ physical protective measures, intelligence and information sharing, and operational coordination in response to the following transportation security scenarios:

SCENE SETTER FOR BOTH BREAKOUT GROUPS In spring 2018, fusion centers across New England request that law enforcement and public safety personnel remain on heightened alert for threats, specifically to open-air venues.

LOWELL, MA, THWARTED CHEMICAL THREAT ATTACK Lowell Folk Festival In July, Lowell hosts its annual Folk Festival, the longest running and second largest free folk festival in the US. Festival planners anticipate an estimated 100,000 people attend over the three-day period. Inject 1: The director of a MA research facility notices a staff chemist acting suspiciously. An inventory reveals missing chemicals and equipment. Inject 2: MBTA personnel at the commuter rail station platform identify an unattended bag with a container housing a suspicious-looking liquid substance. Customers evacuate the facility, and a hazmat team arrives before any toxic release.

Figure 2: Lowell, MA, scenario inject 1

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LACONIA, NH, ONGOING VEHICLE RAMMING ATTACK Laconia Motorcycle Week® In June, Laconia hosts Laconia Motorcycle Week®, a nine-day motorcycle rally with various racing events, concerts, and charity rides. It is the world’s oldest motorcycle rally and among the largest with 300,000+ visitors annually. Inject 1: Staff from a local motel find photographs of the nearby Church Street Bridge and schematics of entry points to the swap meet in a guest’s trash. Inject 2: Laconia police receive multiple reports of a large delivery truck driving erratically up North Main Street toward crowds at the swap meet.

NEW HAVEN, CT, ONGOING CHEMICAL THREAT ATTACK International Festival of Arts & Ideas In June, New Haven hosts the International Festival of Arts & Ideas, a two-week event that includes performing arts, lectures, and exhibitions across the city, attracting 150,000+ patrons. Inject 1: A New Haven resident overhears a group of individuals planning an attack on a freight train during the festival. Inject 2: A noticeable, unusual odor floats through the crowd at the New Haven Green. Patrons disagree about the origin of the smell; some believe it’s from a tanker at State Street Station. Patrons begin to exhibit a wide-array of symptoms.

Figure 3: Laconia, NH, scenario inject 1

Figure 4: New Haven, CT, scenario inject 1

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NEWPORT, RI, COMPLETED CHEMICAL THREAT ATTACK Hall of Fame Tennis Championships In July, Newport hosts the Hall of Fame Tennis Championships, a professional tennis competition on the grass courts of the International Tennis Hall of Fame. The event draws 15,000+ spectators. Inject 1: A Newport State Airport employee notices two individuals acting suspiciously as they prepare their aircraft for takeoff. Newport residents notice a low-flying aircraft near the tennis tournament. Inject 2: The plane approaches the International Tennis Hall of Fame and sprays an unknown chemical onto the spectators watching live tennis.

BURLINGTON, VT, COMPLETED VEHICLE RAMMING ATTACK Burlington Discover Jazz Festival In June, Burlington hosts its annual Discover Jazz Festival, a popular local jazz event with an estimated 45,000 patrons expected to attend. Inject 1: A festival-goer overhears two individuals discuss their plan to hijack a Greyhound bus. Inject 2: Two assailants assault a Greyhound bus driver at the Downtown Transit Center, hijack the bus, and drive it into crowds entering the festival. The assailants exit the vehicle and proceed to stab concert-goers before fleeing down College Street to a boat docked on Lake Champlain.

Figure 5: Newport, RI, scenario inject 1

Figure 6: Burlington, VT, scenario inject 1

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Exercise Data Capture and Analysis

Note: Several strengths listed in this report rise to the level of Best Practice – a practice worthy of sharing with industry partners due to its positive impact within that industry. All Best Practices throughout this report (highlighted in callout boxes) also include industry considerations.

OBJECTIVE 1 Introduce participants to federal, state, local, and private sector counterterrorism resources, capabilities, technologies, personnel, and initiatives STRENGTHS

1. The morning workshop introduced participants to current and emerging security threats across the transportation sector as well as topical expertise on chemical threats and vehicle ramming attacks, regional fusion/information sharing center capabilities, and the law enforcement and intelligence capabilities of Amtrak. This exercise structure enabled participants to improve their knowledge of relevant resources as well as the regional entities and personnel responsible for specific technologies and initiatives.

2. During the working lunch as well as immediately following the exercise wrap-up, participants received ICS kit assembly instruction from the TRB NCHRP. A forum for coordinated and collaborative research, the NCHRP addresses issues integral to state DOTs and transportation professionals at all levels of government and the private sector. The NCHRP provides practical, ready-to-implement solutions to pressing problems facing the industry. Its ICS instruction is available free of charge to interested participants from any I-STEP exercise.

AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT 1. The RISE demonstrated that certain regional largescale event cities and venues have robust

protective measures; that said, physical protective measures are not known regionwide. Root Cause Analysis: While it was clear from both the morning and afternoon sessions that physical protective measures exist across the region, stakeholders expressed some unfamiliarity with measures outside their own jurisdictions/geographies. In the event of a security incident, stakeholders may be unaware of the potential cascading impacts of physical protective measure implementation. Option for Consideration:

A. Regional stakeholders could cross-communicate information regarding physical protective measures and cascading impacts across modes in the event of implementation.

B. Regional stakeholders could consider creating a Surface Transportation Security Committee (STSC), a group made up of federal, state, and local governments, as well as private transportation operators, to discuss security issues such as physical protective measures, in addition to numerous other challenges.

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OBJECTIVE 2 Evaluate prevention- and protection-related capabilities, plans, and coordination among New England regional transportation security stakeholders STRENGTHS

1. Law enforcement and intelligence analysis personnel from a total of six regional fusion/ information sharing centers briefed on their entities’ capabilities during the morning workshop and contributed to breakout group conversation during the afternoon facilitated state-based discussions. While some centers employ an “all-crimes approach” and others an “all-hazards approach,” all participating centers confirmed their responsibility for covering the types of regional, largescale events attacked in the exercise scenarios. Before, during, and/or after such events, the centers could engage in activities including threat assessments and command post deployments, if necessary.

2. Regional transportation security stakeholders across all six New England states have well-established relationships and participate in joint training and exercise programs across modes. Maintaining a close-knit community provides greater understanding of stakeholders’ emergency procedures and resources.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

1. Local players from Lowell, MA, shared that they have not incorporated MBTA and MassDOT into their past Folk Festival planning. Root Cause Analysis: The MA scenario involved MBTA security thwarting a potential chemical attack upon the Lowell Folk Festival by identifying an unattended bag while patrolling at the commuter rail station. This scenario heightened the importance of transportation and security personnel knowing how to best communicate emergency notifications to festivalgoers via social media hashtags and any other relevant means. Option for Consideration:

C. Lowell Folk Festival planners, including local emergency management and first responders, could consider incorporating MBTA and MassDOT into their formal festival planning so to improve security preparations.

2. Although the RISE planning team, as well as exercise participants, identified the threats of chemical attacks and vehicle rammings as top risks to largescale events within New England, few, if any, organizations had written chemical attack or vehicle ramming response plans. Root Cause Analysis: Most, if not all, participating organizations did not have response plans specific to the two threat types discussed throughout the exercise. Participants noted a lack of topical expertise regarding chemical attacks among their entities and only a newfound interest in vehicle rammings resulting from recent terrorist activities in Nice, France, and elsewhere.

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Options for Consideration: D. Participating organizations could revise existing, or create new, security/emergency

response plans to include chemical attacks and vehicle ramming activities. These plans could also include recurring training for employees that encourages constant vigilance and awareness of suspicious activity in their areas.

E. Participating organizations could leverage existing resources and/or form working groups to share and develop written plans and procedures. The DHS CWMD Office significantly contributes to various resources that organizations could use to craft WMD policies, including the Health and Safety Planning Guide for Planners, Safety Officers, and Supervisors for Protecting Responders Following a Nuclear Detonation (https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ind-health-and-safety-planning-guide) and the Patient Decontamination in a Mass Chemical Exposure Incident: National Planning Guidance (https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/Pages/patientdecon.aspx).

OBJECTIVE 3 Collect and evaluate best practices and improve information sharing among New England regional transportation security stakeholders STRENGTHS

1. The New England RISE included briefer, player, and observer participation from all six states in the region—and industry and federal transportation security partners from Washington, D.C.—as well as scenario injects from all states vice ME. Comprehensive stakeholder outreach across the region resulted in a rich diversity of exercise participation and could serve as an effective model for future multi-modal exercises involving intra- or inter-state jurisdictions.

2. The RI scenario involved a toxic chemical release from an aircraft flying above the Hall of Fame Tennis Championships in Newport. Players agreed that this emergency could call for an immediate evacuation of the sports venue, a decision likely resulting in many saved lives. This type of security incident could also necessitate CodeRed Mobile Alerts to mass notify as many potentially affected individuals as efficiently as possible.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

1. The RISE revealed limited awareness of local, state, and/or regional prevention- and protection-related security information sharing. Root Cause Analysis: While exercise participants across New England states demonstrated strong coordination capabilities and knowledge of mutual aid resources, players did not describe comprehensive established plans regarding information sharing between law enforcement and local/private sector entities. In the event of an emergency or security incident against disparate jurisdictions and agencies, the lack of awareness surrounding such plans that integrate various organizations may lead to confusion regarding roles and responsibilities. Options for Consideration:

F. New England transportation security stakeholders could develop or better familiarize themselves with prevention- and protection-related plans that outline

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interdependencies and priorities and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities—especially public information officers—in the event of an attack upon one or more largescale events in the region, as depicted in the exercise scenarios. For example, stakeholders could take free ICS training from the FEMA website at https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-100.c).

G. As suggested during the exercise wrap-up and in Option for Consideration B, regional transportation security stakeholders could stand up transportation working groups such as a Surface Transportation Security Committee (STSC) to facilitate coordination and information sharing between regional entities.

2. The New England region experiences limited security-related information sharing among public and private transportation entities. Root Cause Analysis: While transportation modes within the New England region share intelligence and information effectively, some private sector entities are more removed from the rest of the network. The region also encompasses a relatively complex network of varying transportation modes, with public and private organizations and law enforcement interspersed. Exercise participants discussed the importance of balancing the “need to know” aspect of information sharing with informing all relevant and affected parties. Options for Consideration:

H. Regional stakeholders could consider targeting their promotion and information sharing efforts to improve private sector awareness and participation in federal and local law enforcement programs.

I. Regional stakeholders could consider targeting their information sharing efforts to ensure relevant and affected parties receive an appropriate amount of information that is pertinent and actionable.

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Participant Feedback

OVERVIEW All participants had the opportunity to complete feedback forms, which allowed them to provide input on the content and conduct of the exercise. This section includes participants’ comments related to changes or improvements participants would like to implement within their organizations. Participants provided the following comments as written.

• Further marketing of Vermont’s See Something, Say Something (S4) and more buy-in by LE to report Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) is needed.

• Increase the situational awareness of the operators and have more cohesion with local law enforcement entities.

• One thing I learned is we all need to network more with other agencies.

• Heighten awareness of all staff to potential threats and appropriate responses.

• Institute training and policies to support safety and security.

• We need stronger outreach to the transportation sector through more contacts and greater knowledge of their response procedures.

• Need for a greater push for deeper participation within the state at all levels.

• Must better verify that intel connections are in place and correct.

• Communicate and have the transportation agencies involved with protective service planning for events.

• Work more closely with fusion centers and law enforcement to better share communications with regional and state agencies.

• Organize more mock scenarios along the lines of this exercise.

• Have attendees share policies and procedures with others, so best practices can be shared.

• Meet annually and do reviews of events that occurred to learn about changes that could be put in place to be more successful.

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Participant Contact List

Name Organization Email

Algozzini, Peter TSA peter.algozzini@dhs.gov

Allen, Dave ME Department of Transportation david.allen@maine.gov

Andromaco, Ronald Franklin Regional Transit Authority rona@frta.org

Baio, Frank DATTCO frank.baio@dattco.com

Billings, Jack Newport Police Department rduffy@cityofnewport.com

Binder-Sealy, Marie TSA marie.binder-sealy@tsa.dhs.gov

Brierly, Ken TSA kenneth.brierly@tsa.dhs.gov

Buzzerio, Lori Greyhound Lines, Inc. lori.buzzerio@greyhound.com

Cacciolfi, Mark TSA mark.cacciolfi@tsa.dhs.gov

Campbell, Greg VT Intelligence Center/State Police greg.campbell@vermont.gov

Cioffi, Michael TSA michael.cioffi@tsa.dhs.gov

Cobb, Joseph Springfield Area Transit Company jcobb@pvtransit.com

Cooper, David TSA david.cooper1@tsa.dhs.gov

Cosgrove, Todd VT Hazardous Materials Response Team

todd.cosgrove@vermont.gov

Creney, Sean TSA sean.creney@tsa.dhs.gov

D’Amelio, Teresa Glatfelter Public Practice Insurance tdamelio@glatfelters.com

Darling, Tim FBI tadarling@fbi.gov

Demers, Brett TSA brett.demers@dhs.gov

Desautels, Patricia Iroquois Pipeline Operating Company

patricia_desautels@iroquois.com

Deshane, Jennifer TSA jennifer.deshane@tsa.dhs.gov

Desmarais, Siobhan TSA siobhan.desmarais@tsa.dhs.gov

Donnelly, Tim DHS NPPD, PSA MA timothy.donnelly@hq.dhs.gov

Doria, Burke TSA burke.doria@tsa.dhs.gov

Dugan, Brian Newport Fire Department bdugan@cityofnewport.com

Dyer, Martin Worcester Fire Department dyerm@worcesterma.gov

Edwards, Frankie MTI at SJSU kcgthm@yahoo.com

Elliott, Jonathan RI State Police jonathan.elliott@risp.gov

Fadden, Kerri Massport kfadden@massport.com

Felder, Deanna TSA deanna.felder@tsa.dhs.gov

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Name Organization Email

Ferreira, Lawrence Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority

lferreira@steamshipauthority.com

Francis, Paul TSA paul.francis@tsa.dhs.gov

Frankenberry, Rebecca

TSA rebecca.m.frankenberry@tsa.dhs.gov

Garden, Jude Amtrak gardenju@amtrak.com

Garrison, Lindsey Eagle Hill Consulting lgarrison@eaglehillconsulting.com

Gincauskis, Ed MassDOT edward.w.gincauskis@dot.state.ma.us

Goodrich, Dan MTI at SJSU daniel.goodrich@sjsu.edu

Gosselin, Jason VT Department of Public Safety jason.gosselin@vermont.gov

Graton, Allan Laconia Police Department agraton@laconiapd.org

Grout, Brett Franklin Regional Transit Authority brett@frta.org

Guillermo, Jesus Merrimack Valley Regional Transit Authority

jesusg@mvrta.com

Hahn, Charles TSA charles.hahn@tsa.dhs.gov

Halzel, Eric Eagle Hill Consulting ehalzel@eaglehillconsulting.com

Hanson, Robert Amtrak robert.hanson@amtrak.com

Hegarty, Tim Merrimack Valley Regional Transit Authority

thegarty@mvrta.com

Hettrick, Krys CT Intelligence Center ctic.sc@ct.gov

Hoban, Kevin TSA kevin.hoban@tsa.dhs.gov

Hogan, Glen RI State Fusion Center glen.hogan@risp.gov

Horrocks, Ron Manchester Transit Authority rhorrocks@mtabus.org

Housley, Marc TSA marc.housley@tsa.dhs.gov

Hynes, John MassDOT john.hynes@dot.state.ma.us

Jackson, Kevin TSA kevin.p.jackson@tsa.dhs.gov

Jerome, Kristen MEMA kristen.jerome@state.ma.us

Katona, Joey Eagle Hill Consulting jkatona@eaglehillconsulting.com

Ketchale, Joel TSA joel.ketchale@tsa.dhs.gov

Kirby, Bryan Genesee & Wyoming Railroad bryan.kirby@gwrr.com

Kirk, Mark DHS CWMD Office mark.kirk@hq.dhs.gov

Kirouac, Mark NH Department of Transportation mark.kirouac@dot.nh.gov

Klingener, David Springfield Area Transit Company dklingener@pvtransit.com

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Name Organization Email

LaChance, Paul Lowell Emergency Management plachance@lowellma.gov

Laferriere, David Manchester Transit Authority dlaferriere@mtabus.org

Laverriere, Larry Sprague Operating Resources LLC (National Maritime Security Advisory Committee)

llaverriere@spragueenergy.com

Lyons, Dennis DATTCO dennis.lyons@dattco.com

Maloney, Patrick FBI pjmaloney@fbi.gov

Manchester, William TSA william.manchester@dhs.gov

Markow, Denise I-95 Corridor Coalition dmarkow@i95coalition.org

Martinez, Pam DATTCO pamm@dattco.com

McGreevy, Darrin TSA darrin.mcgreevy@tsa.dhs.gov

McKenzie, Curt NESPIN cmckenzie@nespin.riss.net

Moore, Wayne Amtrak moorew@amtrak.com

Morin, Tim MassDOT tim.morin@state.ma.us

Morrison, Chris TSA christopher.morrison@tsa.dhs.gov

Morse, Hank DHS/TSA hank.morse@dhs.gov

Mudge, Mark NHIAC mark.mudge@dos.nh.gov

Mueller, Paul Manchester-Boston Regional Airport pmueller@flymanchester.com

Mueting, Clare TSA clare.mueting@tsa.dhs.gov

Mulvenna, Joseph Greyhound Lines, Inc. joseph.mulvenna@greyhound.com

Murray, Frank MBTA Transit Police fmurray@mbta.com

Narducci, Justin Amtrak justin.narducci@amtrak.com

Nystrom, Lindsey Commonwealth Fusion Center lindsey.nystrom@state.ma.us

O'Brien, Patrick TSA patrick.o'brien@tsa.dhs.gov

Osborne, Chester MassDOT chester.osborne@dot.state.ma.us

Ouellette, James TSA james.ouellette@dhs.gov

Packer, Mark CT State Police mark.packer@ct.gov

Padilla-Murray, Shastri

TSA shastri.padilla-murray@tsa.dhs.gov

Parker, Stephan TRB NCHRP saparker@nas.edu

Parra, Lorenzo MassDOT lorenzo.parra@state.ma.us

Pate, Stuart Genesee & Wyoming Railroad stuart.pate@gwrr.com

Pelletier, Brian TSA/Federal Air Marshal Service brian.pelletier@tsa.dhs.gov

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Name Organization Email

Pereira, Jamie RIPTA jpereira@ripta.com

Peterson, Lyn School Transportation Association of MA

stam@schoolbus.org

Peterson, George School Transportation Association of MA

stam@schoolbus.org

Pichan, Laura Eagle Hill Consulting lpichan@eaglehillconsulting.com

Piepiora, Eva TSA eva.piepiora@tsa.dhs.gov

Porter, Brian Massport bporter@massport.com

Pugsley, Steve Amtrak pugsles@amtrak.com

Renaud, Michelle Eagle Hill Consulting mrenaud@eaglehillconsulting.com

Rice, James Amtrak james.rice@amtrak.com

Rodger, Thomas TSA thomas.rodger@dhs.gov

Rose, George Lowell Fire Department grose@lowellma.gov

Roy, Bonnie MEMA bonnie.roy@state.ma.us

Santana, Stan TSA stan.santana@tsa.dhs.gov

Selby, Robert TSA/Federal Air Marshal Service robert.selby@tsa.dhs.gov

Sentementes, Dan FBI dasentementes@fbi.gov

Sheehan, Terry USDOT terry.sheehan@dot.gov

Singer, Maxwell MassDOT maxwell.singer@dot.state.ma.us

Smith, Alan Greyhound Lines, Inc. alan.smith@greyhound.com

Stuckert, Donna Greyhound Lines, Inc. donna.stuckert@greyhound.com

Sullivan, Shannon TSA shannon.d.sullivan@tsa.dhs.gov

Talukdar, Kallol TSA kallol.talukdar@tsa.dhs.gov

Tierney, James R. RIPTA jtierney@ripta.com

Veilleux, Amy TSA amy.veilleux@tsa.dhs.gov

Venturelli, Salvatore TSA salvatore.venturelli@dhs.gov

Walker, Thomas USCG thomas.j.walker@uscg.mil

Walsh, Thomas TSA thomas.a.walsh@tsa.dhs.gov

White, Andrew Worcester Fire Department whitea@worcesterma.gov

Whitehead, Ryan TSA ryan.n.whitehead@dhs.gov

Wise, Faith Central Mass Transit Management, Inc.

fwise@therta.com

Wright, Ryan NPS ryan_wright@nps.gov

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Acronyms

Acronym Definition

AASHTO American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials

CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

ICS Incident Command System

I-STEP Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

MassDOT MA Department of Transportation

Massport MA Port Authority

MBTA MA Bay Transit Authority

MEMA MA Emergency Management Agency

MTI Mineta Transportation Institute

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NESPIN New England State Police Information Network

NHIAC NH Information and Analysis Center

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NPS National Park Service

RIPTA RI Public Transit Authority

RISE Regional Intermodal Security Exercise

RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems®

SJSU San Jose State University

SPIE Security Policy and Industry Engagement

TRB Transportation Research Board

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSSSP Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plans

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USDOT U.S. Department of Transportation

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Options for Consideration

Code Option for Consideration

A Regional stakeholders could cross-communicate information regarding physical protective measures and cascading impacts across modes in the event of implementation.

B Regional stakeholders could consider creating a Surface Transportation Security Committee (STSC), a group made up of federal, state, and local governments, as well as private transportation operators, to discuss security issues such as physical protective measures, in addition to numerous other challenges.

C Lowell Folk Festival planners, including local emergency management and first responders, could consider incorporating MBTA and MassDOT into their formal festival planning so to improve security preparations.

D Participating organizations could revise existing, or create new, security/emergency response plans to include chemical attacks and vehicle ramming activities. These plans could also include recurring training for employees that encourages constant vigilance and awareness of suspicious activity in their areas.

E Participating organizations could leverage existing resources and/or form working groups to share and develop written plans and procedures. The DHS CWMD Office significantly contributes to various resources that organizations could use to craft WMD policies, including the Health and Safety Planning Guide for Planners, Safety Officers, and Supervisors for Protecting Responders Following a Nuclear Detonation (https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ind-health-and-safety-planning-guide) and the Patient Decontamination in a Mass Chemical Exposure Incident: National Planning Guidance (https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/Pages/patientdecon.aspx).

F New England transportation security stakeholders could develop or better familiarize themselves with prevention- and protection-related plans that outline interdependencies and priorities and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities—especially public information officers—in the event of an attack upon one or more largescale events in the region, as depicted in the exercise scenarios. For example, stakeholders could take free ICS training from the FEMA website at https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-100.c).

G As suggested during the exercise wrap-up and in Option for Consideration B, regional transportation security stakeholders could stand up transportation working groups such as a Surface Transportation Security Committee (STSC) to facilitate coordination and information sharing between regional entities.

H Regional stakeholders could consider improving private sector awareness and participation in federal and local law enforcement programs through active and targeted promotion.

I Regional stakeholders could consider targeting their information sharing efforts to ensure relevant and affected parties receive an appropriate amount of information that is pertinent and actionable.

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Resources

During the exercise, participants expressed uncertainty about the security resources available to their organizations. The table below provides a series of resources participants can use to enhance their security posture.

Resource Description

Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) Program

The BASE program establishes standards for security programs, identifies strengths as well as potential vulnerabilities, and assesses progress with TSA’s stakeholders within the mass transit, passenger rail, and highway modes at no cost. Contact: kallol.talukdar@tsa.dhs.gov

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office

The mission of the DHS CWMD office is to counter attempts by terrorists or other threat actors to carry out an attack against the United States or its interests using a weapon of mass destruction. The CWMD heavily contributes to various reports on WMD topics, including the following: https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/Pages/patientdecon.aspx https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ind-health-and-safety-planning-guide and https://chemm.nlm.nih.gov/

eGuardian System The eGuardian system is a Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information sharing platform hosted by the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division as a service on the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP). The eGuardian system allows law enforcement agencies to combine new suspicious activity reports (SARs) with existing (legacy) SAR reporting systems to form a single information repository accessible to thousands of law enforcement personnel and analysts directly supporting law enforcement. https://www.fbi.gov/resources/law-enforcement/eguardian

First Observer Plus Program

TSA’s First Observer Plus™ Program is a voluntary program that provides transportation professionals with training to effectively observe, assess, and report suspicious individuals, vehicles, packages, and objects. https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/firstobserver

The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)

GETS supports national leadership; federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments; first responders; and other authorized national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) users in an emergency or crisis when the landline network is congested and the probability of completing a normal call is reduced. https://www.dhs.gov/government-emergency-telecommunications-service-gets

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)

DHS uses HSIN as its trusted network to share SBU information for homeland security mission operations with Federal, state, local, and private sector homeland security partners. http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network-hsin

InfraGard InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the US. https://www.infragard.org/

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Resource Description

National Incident Management System (NIMS)

NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together seamlessly and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards. http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system and https://training.fema.gov/nims/

National Threat Advisory System (NTAS)

NTAS replaced the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System in April 2011. NTAS provides timely, detailed information about terrorist threats at the federal level to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports, and other transportation hubs, and the private sector. https://www.dhs.gov/national-terrorism-advisory-system

Operation Secure Transport (OST) and Security & Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP)

OST is a multi-part security awareness training video/DVD. SEPP offers best practices and self-assessment tools to the commercial bus industry. Contact: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov

See Something, Say Something

DHS’ national “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign raises public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime and the importance of reporting suspicious activity to state and local law enforcement. http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something

Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)

TSA’s TSOC is the primary coordination point for multiple agencies that oversee and respond to security-related operations, incidents, and crises related to aviation and transportation security. https://www.tsa.gov/file/inside-look-transportation-security-operations-center

TSA Surface Transportation Resources

TSA works collaboratively with surface transportation operators, industry partners, local, state and federal security partners to safeguard all four general modes of land-based transportation. TSA Counterterrorism guides (CT Guides) provide stakeholders with information about terrorism threats, tactics, prevention and protection measures, and available federal resources. https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Team (VIPR)

VIPR is TSA’s program to deter and prevent acts of terrorism by conducting operations that promote confidence in and protect our nation’s transportation systems through targeted deployment of integrated TSA assets using visible deterrence and law enforcement capabilities in the deployment of specialized teams to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location within the US. Contact: kallol.talukdar@tsa.dhs.gov

Wireless Priority Service (WPS)

WPS supports national leadership; federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments; and other authorized national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) users in an emergency or crisis when the wireless network is congested and the probability of completing a normal call is reduced. https://www.dhs.gov/wireless-priority-service-wps

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I-STEP NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL INTERMODAL SECURITY EXERCISE AFTER ACTION REPORT

“I left with a greater knowledge that will improve my performance in protecting both life and safety at the local level.” - Exercise Participant