ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER

LIV TRACY CIELA KIRK

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWERI. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope of Administrative Law

1. Internal administration considers the legal aspects of public administration as a going concern

2. External administration refers to the legal relations between administrative authorities and private interests

This is the chief concern of administrative law, which is the protection of private rights, the subject of which is the nature and the mode of exercise of administrative power and the system of reliefs against administrative action.

B. Kinds of Administrative Law

1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities

2. Body of doctrines and decisions

3. Rules, regulations, or orders

4. Determinations, decisions, and orders of administrative authorities

The 1987 Administrative Code did not entirely repeal or modify the Revised Administrative Code and special legislations. What 1987 Code repealed or modified are only those laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof which are inconsistent with this Code.The two administrative codes are general laws and as between the codes and special legislations on specific subject matters, the latter prevail as an exception to the former. General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable.

C. Administrative Framework

Government of the Republic of the Philippines corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, or the LGUs.

Agency any of the various units of Government including a

Department

Bureau

Office

Instrumentality

GOCC

LGU

Instrumentality any agency of the National Government,

not integrated within the department framework,

vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,

endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and

enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter

It includes

regulatory agencies

institutes

GOCC

The terms agency and instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which the government acts, or by which a certain governmental act or function is performed.

Agencies or instrumentalities are either

Corporated, or

Vested by law with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the reublic

Incorporated

Those not vested with a juridical ersonality distinct from the Republic, endowed by law with some if not all corporate powers

Both have legal personality. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence ofspecial provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a specific charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives

Administration refers to the aggregate of those persons in whose hand the reins of government are for the time being

D. Reasons for creation of administrative agencies

1. To unclog court dockets

2. To meet the growing complexities of modern societies. As problems of modern society multiply, which can hardly be met by the legislature, administrative agencies are established to promptly cope up with such problems

3. To help in the regulation of ramified activities of a developing country

4. To entrust to specialized agencies in specified field with their special knowledge, experience, and capability the task of dealing with problems thereof as they have the experience, expertise and power to dispatch to provide solutions thereto

II. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

A. In general

As a rule, the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of legislative power, the vesting of judicial officers with non-judicial functions, as well as the investing of non-judicial officers with judicial powers.

However, the doctrine of separation of powers is not an iron-clad restriction against delegation of powers. With

The growing complexity of modern life

The multiplication of subjects of governmental regulations, and

The increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by

permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and

the vesting of a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive agencies and officials

in the execution of the laws, in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations, and in the adjudication of claims and disputes calculated to promote public interest.

Notes

You have to weigh power and rights.

In the following cases, you will see that the exercise of the police power by the legislature is being delegated to the executive branch.

To test the power of the agency and how that power is being exercised, you must base it on two standards

1. substantive due process

Purpose of the law

Means of the law

2. procedural due process

To test whether there is a valid delegation of power1. WON the administrative agency has the power as authorized by law

There is the presumption of regularity

2. WON there is a standard

Administrative agencies administer and execute the law and perform internal administration of agencies.

Functions of administrative agencies

1. administration

2. regulation

3. policy-making

Guidelines

Rules and regulations

With sanctions and rights are affected

4. Investigation

Policy investigation

Investigation in aid of legislation

The purposes of investigation are

1. to make new standards

2. to hold persons accountable

5. Adjudication

6. Others as defined by the charter

Calalang v. Williams

Social justice is neither communism nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Notes

Construe the power liberally and look at the intention of the law.

Social justice is giving more in law for those who have less in life. It means that there is more government intervention.

You must analyze social justice vis--vis property rights and non-impairment of contracts

B. Express and Implied Powers

Public officials possess powers not rights. Administrative agencies have only such powers as are expressly granted to them by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercised thereof. There is no presumption that they are empowered to act. An administrative agency cannot grant itself jurisdiction to decide a particular matter by issuing the appropriate rules and regulations in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, where the enabling statute does not so confer.

Liberal construction is adopted to enable administrative agencies to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose or intent. The grant of quasi-judicial power to try actions carries with all necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs, processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction effective. Accordingly, unless the enabling law provides otherwise, a quasi-judicial body has the power to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision.

The CS, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, has the power to order execution of its decision which has become final.

Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Torres

DO 16 and POEA Memorandum Circulars temporarily suspended the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to HK as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids in HK.

Ratio:A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents. The power to restrict and regulate conferred by Art. 37,LC involves a grant of police power. To restrict means to confine, limit, or stop whereas the power to regulate means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.

Art. 36, LC The SOLE shall have the power to restrict and reulate the recruitment and placement activities x x x and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. Functions by PoEA

2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas.

Said administrative issuances are justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business is affected with public interest.

JMM Promotion v. CA

D.O. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be an Artists Record Book, a necessary prerequisite to processing of an contract of employment by the POEA.

Ratio:Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. Thus, the Dos enjoy a presumed validity, and the burden rest upon petitioners to demonstrate that the ARB requirement does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

The ARB requirement is aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.

No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.

Existing law is read into every contract, and always, a reservation of the police power for as long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

Notes

In this case, no source of general power was cited by the SC to justify the grant of regulatory power.

GTEB v. CA

The power to adjudicate on the question of an entitys entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.

C. Ministerial and Discretionary Powers

Ministerial duty - one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.

The fact that the duties of an official are ministerial does not necessarily follow that he may not, in the administration f his office, determine questions of law. Mandamus lay lie to compel performanceDiscretionary duty - one in which the officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done.

Petition for certiorari may lie where there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the official or administrative agency. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment or discretion and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.Mateo v. CA

Petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment which has become final and executor, alleging excusable negligence in their failure to appeal the decision. The lower court denied the petition. The petitioners elevated the case to the CA on a petition for mandamus alleging that the granting of notice of appeal was a ministerial duty.

Ratio:

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.

The approval of the notice of appeal is a ministerial duty and enforceable by mandamus.

Discretionary duty is one in which the officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done.

If the law imposes a duty and gives him the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed, such is discretionary.

A petition for mandamus does not lie to compel the doing of a discretionary act. Mandamus is not a remedy available to grant a petition for relief from judgment. A petition for relief from judgment can only be resorted on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

Notes

A ministerial duty may be mandatory or permissive. Discretionary and ministerial duties are determined by the nature of the act and the law.

A ministerial duty pertains to a mechanical act.

D. Mandatory and permissive duties and powers

The question as to whether a duty or power vested in an official or administrative agency is mandatory or permissive depends upon the kind of the statute which granted such power.

Mandatory statute a statute which commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey

A provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory.

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

Where a statute is mandatory, the court or quasi-judicial tribunal has no power to distinguish between material and immaterial breach thereof or omission to comply with what it requires.

Directory statute a statute which is permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.

A statute is regarded as directory where no substantial rights depend on it.

The constructions of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature.

Tests

1. What is the legislative intent?

2. Will substantial rights be affected by it? Will injury result from ignoring it?

Tanada v. Cuenco

Art. 6, Sec. 11, 1935 Consti: Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine members x x x and the remaining 6 shall be members of the Senate or HOR x x x three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.

Ratio:The procedural requirement is mandatory while the number of members of Senate Electoral Tribunal is permissive. The main objective of the framers of the Cosntitution is to determine legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the convention, to provide for this body known as the electoral commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created. Its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the SET and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein.

Example

Confirmation of dismissal for it to be effective mandatory

WON the judge will confirm discretionary

WON the judge will act on such case - permissive

E. Errors in exercise of powers

Gen. Rule - The government can do no wrong. It authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Its officers and agents do wrong or commit unauthorized acts. Mistakes of government personnel in performance of their duties should not affect public interest. Hence, the government is never estopped by such mistake or error. Errors of public officers should never deprive the people of the right to rectify them and recover what might be lost or bartered way in any action, deal or transaction concerned. It does not bar future action in accordance with law. A person acquires no vested right in such mistake.

Exception When in reliance thereon in good faith and a person compliance with what the law requires as construed by the administrative officer, his right which accrued therefrom may not be disturbed.

Presumption of regularity

Acts done in the performance of official duties are protected b the presumption of good faith, and even mistakes committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

USA v. Reyes

Montoya, an employee at the US Naval Exchange, JUSMAG headquarters, was searched in front of onlookers by an ID checker upon instruction from Bradford, an American store manager. Bradford and US filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is in effect a suit against the US, a foreign sovereign, without its consent.

Ratio:The State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the state, and an action against the official or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights is not a suit against the state within the rule of immunity of the state from suit. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetuating injustice.

The doctrine of immunity from suit may not be invoked, and will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damages he may have causes by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority of jurisdiction.

The rule is that if the judgment against such public officials will require the state itself to affirm an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.

III. POWER OF CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INVESTIGATION

A. President as chief executive and administrative officer

The President and other executive or administrative agencies or bodies are granted powers and functions by the Constitution or by statutes to enforce the laws and to carry out the governmental functions, as well as policies and objectives provided in statutes creating them. Among such powers are those of control, supervision, and investigation.

Executive power of the President

Administrative powers of the President can be implied from his executive power.

Sec. 20, Book III, 1987 Administrative Code. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.Marcos v. Manglapus

The President decided to bar the return of Marcoses to the country as this was deemed to threaten national security.

Ratio:The right involved is not the right to travel but the right to return to ones country.

The enumerated powers in the Constitution are not the breath and scope of executive power. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive (residual power). What shapes the power of the president is the person, sitting as president, dealing with the exigencies.

It would not be accurate to state that executive power is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of State as well as head of the government. The Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the president, it also grants the President other powers, e.g., his power over the countrys foreign relations.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated.

NotesRoles of the Constitution

1. To insure that the boundaries are not overstepped

2. To insure that the rights of individuals are not violated

This, in short, is a balancing of interest.

The court here did not examine the sufficiency of facts that will justify the barring to return to the Philippines. It examined whether or not those facts would justify such decision of the President.

Right to travel from the Philippines to another country

Liberty of abode within the country, right to change your residence from one place to another

Presidents power of control

1987 Consti, Art. 7, Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

power of control - the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.

It means that the President is the Executive of the Government and no other. It implies the right to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. The President can do what any of his cabinet secretary can lawfully do as conferred by law. It includes the power to detail an executive officer in the Office of the President, or to any executive officer in the Office of the President, or to any executive office, without any prior approval from any executive officer, so long as there is no reduction in rank or salary and is not considered as a disciplinary action.Limitations to power of control

The power of control does not include the ff

1. The abolition or creation of an executive office

2. The suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees without due process of law

3. The setting aside modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, including that of the Office of the President, on contested cases that have become final pursuant to the law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law

Ang-Angco v. Castillo

The Executive Secretary found Ang-Angco guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and considered him resigned. Petitioner argues that since he is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Sec. of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by the President. He argues that the CSC has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service subject to appeal before the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

Ratio:

The case of the petitioner comes under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and thus, he has been deprived of due process.

The President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the procedure.

The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belongs to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service, for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised (CESO career executive service officer).

The power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. The power of control does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.

Agpalo

The President may not, by his control power, suspend or remove the official without due process of law, except those officials who serve at his pleasure, such as cabinet secretaries.

Pending investigation of an administrative complaint against a presidential appointee who is a career officer, the President or a cabinet secretary may, however, detail said officer to any other executive office so long as the detail does not amount to an imposition of disciplinary action. (Agpalo says does, but I think, it is does not)

Carpio v. Exec. Sec.

R.A. 6975 was passed wherein NAPOLCOM and DILG are under the Office of the President. NAPOLCOM is attached to DILG for purposes of administrative supervision. The PNP is under NAPOLCOM. The issue is whether RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of executive control and commander-in-chief powers.

Ratio:The reorganization is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

The national police force does not fall under the commander-in-chief powers of the President. As civilian agency of the government, it is subject to the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. Thus, there is no abdication of commander-in-chief powers. The President, as a commander-in-chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces.

The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He is the Chief Executive the head of the government and the chief administrative officer. Presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.

The Presidents power of control means his power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

By authority of the President

The Exec. Sec. or his Deputy or Assistant Executive Secretary or any cabinet secretary, who acts and signs by authority of the President, acts not for himself but for the President. Thus, they are presumed valid and performed in behalf of the President and should be accorded due respect.

Such acts are not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Malayan Integrated Industries v. CA

Although the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and Malaya was signed by the Exec. Sec, by authority of the President, and not by the Presidents own hand, the Exec. Sec.s action is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President.

As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary is an alter ego of the President. One of his myriad functions is to

exercise primary authority to sign papers by authority of the President,

attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President

assist the President in the administration of special projects

perform such other functions as the President may direct

Notes

The next after the secretary is the assistant secretary, not the undersecretary.

1987 Administrative Code

Sec. 26. The Executive Secretary, the Deputy Executive Secretaries, and the Assistant Executive Secretaries. - The Executive Office shall be headed by the Executive Secretary who shall be assisted by one (1) or more Deputy Executive Secretaries and one (1) or more Assistant Executive Secretaries.

Sec. 27. Functions of the Executive Secretary. - The Executive Secretary shall, subject to the control and supervision of the President, carry out the functions assigned by law to the Executive Office and shall perform such other duties as may be delegated to him. He shall:

1. Directly assist the President in the management of the affairs pertaining to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

2. Implement presidential directives, orders and decisions;

3. Decide, for and in behalf of the President, matters not requiring personal presidential attention;

4. Exercise supervision and control over the various units in the Office of the President Proper including their internal administrative requirements;

5. Exercise supervision, in behalf of the President, over the various agencies under the Office of the President;

6. Appoint officials and employees of the Office of the President whose appointments are not vested in the President;

7. Provide overall coordination in the operation of the Executive Office;

8. Determine and assign matters to the appropriate units in the Office of the President;

9. Have administrative responsibility for matters in the Office of the President coming from the various departments and agencies of government;

10. Exercise primary authority to sign papers "By authority of the President", attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President;

11. Determine, with the President's approval, the appropriate assignment of offices and agencies not placed by law under any specific executive department;

12. Provide consultative, research, fact-finding and advisory service to the President;

13. Assist the President in the performance of functions pertaining to legislation;

14. Assist the President in the administration of special projects;

15. Take charge of matters pertaining to protocol in State and ceremonial functions;

16. Provide secretarial and clerical services for the President, the Cabinet, the Council of State, and other advisory bodies to the President

17. Promulgate such rules and regulations necessary to carry out the objectives, policies and functions of the Office of the President Proper;

18. Perform such other functions as the President may direct.

Doctrine of qualified political agency

All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the executive department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and

Except in cases

where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive department secretaries as his alter egos, and

the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, preemptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Lacson Magallanes v. Puno

The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Settled is the rule that the Exec. Sec. is the alter-ego of the President.

Macailing v. Andrada

The Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources rejected the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents as his decision had long become final and executor. The decision of the SANR was reversed by the Exec. Sec. The plaintiffs went to the CFI who ruled in their favor.

Ratio:Appeal to the President is time-barred. In administrative law, an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law, is law. Administratively speaking, 30 days after receipt by the interested parties, the decision of the SANR becomes final, except in cases of mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect. Closed proceedings should remain closed. Vested rights should not be unsettled.

Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become fial at some definite date fixed by law.

The plaintiffs recourse to the CFI is proper. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available.

On the issue of WON the CFI-Cotabato has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari considering that the Asst. Exec. Sec. holds office in Manila, the SC held that the CFI may take cognizance of cases involving judicial review of administrative decisions where the sole issue is whether the decision of respondent public officials was legally or correct or not. However, it has no jurisdiction where the writs of injunction are issued or sought in order to control the acts of non-resident officials.

Power of supervision

1987 Consti, Art. 7, Sec. 17 implies that the President may not have the power of control over agencies which are not categorized as executive departments, bureaus, and offices, unless the law creating them provides that he shall have such power.

Supervision overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties

when contrasted with control, it is the power of oversight over an inferior boy and it does not include any restraining authority over such body

Taule v. Santos

In the election of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, DLG Circular issued by the Sec. of Local Government was allegedly violated. The Sec. issued a resolution nullifying the election and ordering a new one. The issue is whether the violation of the circular would vest the jurisdiction of the election protest upon the secretary.

Ratio:

The violation of said circular does not automatically give him the authority to declare the election null and void. The Sec. of Local Government, as an alter ego of the President, can only exercise power vested by the Constitution to the latter. The Presidents power, being limited the Constitution to general supervision over local governments, the Secretary can only exercise the same extent of power. The exercise of general supervision is to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.

Supervision overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties

If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Agpalo

The department secretarys supervision and control over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction is limited to the bureaus and officers under him, but does not extend to agencies attached to the department.

Attachment refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination

Power of supervision and review

Phil. Gamefowl Commission v. IAC

It is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Phil. Gamefowl Commission.

Phi. Gamefowl Commissions license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.

The power of review is within the power of supervision. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over him.

If at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove. But it does not carry the authority to substitute ones own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion.

Assuming Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained with the municipal authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC.

B. Power to reorganize

Public office refers to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public

A public office refers to either of two concepts

1. Functional unit of government

Such as department or bureau

2. Position held or occupied

A public office is a public trust or responsibility, and embraces the idea of term, duration, emoluments, powers and duties.

The Constitution established offices which perform administrative functions

1. President

2. Constitutional Commissions

COMELEC

Civil Service Commission

Commission on Audit

3. Office of the Ombudsman

4. National Economic and Development Authority

5. Commission on Human Rights

6. National Police Commission

Except such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function.

The power to reorganize includes power to create or abolish offices

Reorganization the process of restricting the bureaucracys organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable in terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law

The legislature usually exercises the power to create or abolish by delegating it to the President or to another executive officer or body. The legislative power to reorganize and therefore to abolish offices applies to all offices, including lower courts, except only those created by the Constitution itself.

Larin v. Exec. Sec

While the Presidents power to reorganize cannot be denied, it does not mean that the reorganization itself was properly made in accordance with law. Reorganization is only regarded as valid when it is pursued in good faith.

The ff are badges of bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of reorganization

1. Where there is a significant increase in the no. of position in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned

2. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created

The non-reappointment of Larin after the reorganization violates RA 6656 because under the law, a preference is given to officers holding permanent appointments to take over the new positions.

Miller v. Mardo

The legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of an administrative function. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.

Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority, said plan, nevertheless, became a law by non-action on the part of Congress. Such contemplated procedure is contrary to the settled and well-understood parliamentary law which requires that the two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other. It would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by submitting the plan, rather than approve or disapprove the action taken by Congress. The delegation of the rule-making power has never been intended as another mode of passing or enacting any law on measure by the legislature.

Eugenio v. CSC

As the Career Executive Service Board was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature (and not by a mere resolution of the CSC). Creation and abolition of public offices are primarily a legislative function.

CSCs power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated under Sec. 16. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee, CESB shall be autonomous and not negated by the attachment to CSC.

C. Power of investigation

Power of investigation / inquisitive power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise.

In the exercise of his investigatory power, the President may do so thru an executive officer, or create a body or committee to conduct the investigation, empower said officer, body or committee to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the purpose, and to make appropriate recommendations, on the basis of which he will make his appropriate action.

The person under investigation is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of said investigating body or committee. He is only entitled

to be informed of the charges against him

to a hearing of said charges

to a opportunity to meet the evidence against him

to present his own evidence, and

to be furnished with copy of the administrative decision, so that he may, if he so desires, appeal therefrom to the Civil Service Commission within 15 days from notice.

Investigatory power as main function

An investigatory body with the sole power of investigation does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigation the facts and making findings in respect thereto.

Test whether it exercises judicial or merely investigatory functions - adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it

With only investigatory powers

CHR

NBI

1987 Consti, Art. 13, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

6. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

11. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

Investigatory powers of the Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman has been granted vast powers which may be classified as follows

Investigatory power

Broad enough to include the investigation of any crime committed by a public official

Prosecutor power

Public assistance functions

Authority to inquire and obtain information

Function to adopt, institute, and implement preventive measures

The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or office upon whom the judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.

1987 Consti, Art. 11, Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

R.A. 6770, Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

Evangelista v. Jarencio

The issue in this case is whether the agency, acting thru its officials, has the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations not in connection with quasi-judicial or adjudication functions.

The agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. Investigations are useful for al administrative functions, not only for rule-making and adjudication, but also for prosecuting and determining general policy. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings with legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information and may require attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.

EO4 empowered the agency to summon witnesses, administer oaths and take testimonies relevant to the investigation. This power is not limited in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. To hold that the subpoena power is confined to such would imperil or inactivate the agency in its investigatory functions.

The contention that a non-judicial subpoena can only issue in a specific case pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the trial must be in connection with the exercise of the courts adjudicatory function in untenable. An administrative subpoena differs from a judicial subpoena. Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown. It is not necessary that a specific charge or complaint be pending. It is enough that investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The agency can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or that it wants assurance that it is not.

Requirements for subpoena

If inquiry is

1. Within the authority of agency

2. The demand is not too indefinite

3. The information is reasonably relevant

The privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge and is merely cited as a witness. The only purpose of the investigation is to discover facts. Anyway, Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation which tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

Carino v. CHR

The CHR has no power to adjudicate the case like a court of justice or even as a quasi-judicial body. All that CHR can do is to investigate. The power to investigate cannot be likened to a power to adjudicate.

Power to investigate the function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom facts

Power to adjudicate power to render judgment which entails an application of the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law

IV. Quasi-legislative Power

A. In General

Legislative power is the power to make, alter or repeal laws. Legislative power is plenary for all purposes of civil government, subject only to such limitations as are found in the constitution.

The doctrine of separation of power prohibits the delegation of purely legislative power. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

People v. Maceren

As electro fishing is not banned under the Fisheries law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is powerless to penalize it.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an administrative official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

Administrative regulations must be in harmony with law. It must not amend an act of legislature. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

While the administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can only have the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.

Smart Communications v. NTC

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.Central Bank v. Cloribel

Rule-making is legislation on the administrative level, i.e., legislation within the confines of the granting statute, as required by the constitution and its doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. It is a function of laying down general regulations as distinguished from orders that apply to named persons or to specific situations, the latter being adjudicatory in nature.

Previous notice and hearing are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise, and there is no statutory requirement to this effect, insofar as the fixing of maximum rates of interest payable by banks is concerned.

B. Delegation of Legislative Power

Delegation of legislative power refers to the grant of authority by the legislature to administrative agencies to issue rules and regulations concerning how the law entrusted to them for implementation may be enforced.

This delegated authority to issue rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the stature is called subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative agencies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the OCngress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, which have the force and effect of law.

Reasons for delegation:

1. increasing complexity of the task of government

2. inability of legislative bodies to copy directly with myriad problems demanding its attention

The delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in the light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers.

What may not be delegated:

The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation that which is purely legislative in nature. This consists of the power to make the law or to determine what the law shall be,the power to alter or repeal it, and the power to determine the purpose or policy to be achieved by the law.

The ascertainment of what the law shall be is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated by the legislature to the delegate, without rendering the statute delegating it unconstitutional.

What may be delegated

The legislature may delegate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise police power, and to fix rates. To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the completeness and sufficiency of standard tests.

A. Completeness Test

a. The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do us enforce it

b. A statute is complete when the subject, manner, and the extent of its operation are stated therein.

c. The test of completeness is whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to know his rights and obligations; whether it describes what must be done, who must do it, and the scope of his authority.

d. The operation of a statute complete in itself may be made dependent upon the existence of some contingency fixed therein or some ascertainable facts

B. Sufficient Standard Test

a. The legislature must declare the policy or purpose of the law and must fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases by setting up standards or guides to indicate the extent or prescribe the limits of the discretion which may be exercised under the statute by the administrative agency

b. Standard may be express or implied

c. Standard may be found within the framework of the statute under which the act is to be performed, or may inhere in its subject matter or purpose

i. i.e. a clearly defined field of action may implicitly contain the criteria which must govern the action

d. standard may be found in other pertinent legislation, executive order or in the field of law governing the operation of the agency

e. the standard must be reasonably adequate, sufficient and definite for the guidance of the administrative agency in the exercise of the power conferred upon it

f. standard must be sufficient to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations.

g. Statute is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide administrative body concerned. Otherwise, no means to ascertain WON body acted within its scope of authority.

h. Court upheld such standards as sufficient

i. Simplicity and dignity, public interest, public welfare, adequate and efficient instruction

ii. Public convenience and welfare (Calalang v. Williams)

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan

In the questioned section (section 9c), the President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by ay state law or valid delegation.

Sec. 9 does not qualify the Presidents authority by reference to the basis or extent of the States limitation of production. It does not state whether, or in what circumstances or under what conditions, the president is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum products produced in excess of the states permission. It establishes no criterion to govern the Presidents course. It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action. The Congress thus declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production. It gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.

Questioned sec. 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act: authorized the President of the US to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act.

Issue: WON Congress, in authorizing Codes of fair competition has itself set the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others

Ratio:

Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.Notes: Sir noted the issue of there not being any adequate definition of the subject of the Code. The restrictions were too few, policies were too broad, leaves the proponents of the Code to roam at will and gives the President unfettered discretion.

Mistretta v. US

The Sentencing Reform Act created the US Sentencing Commission and granted it the power to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines for all categories of federal offenses.

Issue: WON Congress delegated excessive legislative power to the Commission (NO)

So long as Congress shall lay down an intelligible principle to which the person or the body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.

In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems, Congress cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. The constitution has never been regarded as denying Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function.

It is constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the:

(1) general policy

(2) the public agency which is to adopt it

(3) boundaries of the delegated authority

Congresss delegation of authority is sufficiently specific and detailed. It charged the commission with specific goals, prescribed a specific tool-the guidelines system, enumerated factors to consider and not to consider, outlined the policies which prompted the establishment of the Commission, explained what the Commissioned should do and how it should do it, and set out specific directives to govern particular situations.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA

Completeness test it must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, all he has to do is enforce it

Sufficient standard test there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and to prevent the delegation from running riot.

In this case, the standard was found in the E.O. creating the POEA itself: fair and equitable employment practices.

Tatad v. Sec. of the Department of Energy

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. J. Cruz states that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.

Given the groove of the Courts rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President; he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180reveal that only two factors were to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. We hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, We rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.People v. Vera

Reminder of questioned provision in probation act: this act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.

The Philippine Legislature may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata no delegare potest.

TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION; DETAILS OF EXECUTION. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ( [1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.

PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS. The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.

"The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed."

The legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary be cause it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.Araneta v. Gatmaitan

For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act no. 4003 to prohibit the use of any fish net or trawling device that could endanger and deplete supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve aquatic resources. In so far as the protection of fish fry is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people, issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by meals of trawls, he did nothing more but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of the said coastal province and dispose issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity of law. The exercise of such authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers of Congress.

Under the Fisheries Act, the Secretary had the power to issue rules and regulations. However, as the Secretary exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President, the president can exercise the same power and authority thru executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon the recommendation of the Secretary.

Notes from sir:

Standard: as long as it was deemed necessary in order to preserve aquatic resources

Policy: to preserve marine resources

Ynot v. IAC

Questioned E.O.: Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Santiago v. COMELEC

The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated. Potestas delegata non delegari potest.

Exceptions:

(1) delegation of tariff powers to the president Sec. 28(2), Art 6 of the Constitution

(2) delegation of emeregency powers to the president under Sec. 23 (2) of Art 6, Constitution

(3) delegation to people at large

(4) delegation to local governments

(5) delegation to administrative bodies

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.

Pelaez v. Auditor General

Facts: The president, acting pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities. The last sentence of sec. 68 says: the president .. may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.Ratio:

Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Sec. 68, insofar as it grants the President the power to create municipalities, does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power to fix the details in the enforcement of law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.

If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.

It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question or a political question.

Others:

Congress may delegate to another branch power to fill in details or the execution of law, ascertainment of facts, provided the law is (a) complete in itself, and (b) fixes a standard

1. The law must set forth the policy to be executed. Otherwise, the delegate would in effect be formulating policy, which is the very essence of law.

2. The law must also set limits to the discretion of the delegate (limit may be determinate or determinable); without such standard setting a limit, once cannot determine if the delegate is still acting within the scope of his authority.

Agpalo Notes: There is no uniform application of standard. Whether a standard is sufficient or not depends upon the nature of the statute involved, the issues raised, a