Admin Law cases.docx

8/13/2019 Admin Law cases.docx

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/admin-law-casesdocx 1/68

Admin Law cases

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47065. June 26, 1940.]

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,

respondent.

C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.

Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 146 AS AMENDED BY

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 454; CONSTITUTIONALITY; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.— Section

8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or anyother form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty

years," and when it was ordained. in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the

issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a)

that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly

meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this. it has thereby also

declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than

fifty years. All that has been delegated to the commission, therefore, is the administrative function,

involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,

the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assemblymay itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does

not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.— With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects

of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly

growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval

of the practice by the courts. In harmony with such growing tendency, this court, since the decision in

the case of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (34 Phil.,

136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of

greater powers by the legislature."

3. ID; ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY TO EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE.— Under the

fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.

454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribe the conditions "that the service can be

acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of

the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," and "that the certificate shall be

valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment of



certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase equipment and properties."

We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject and have found that these conditions were

purposely made applicable to existing certificates of public convenience.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO AMEND OR ALTER EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF

PUBLIC CONVENIENCE.—

The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically succeeded tothe Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted

prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were

enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to

amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER.— Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a

proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming

into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.— Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the

Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to

operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. vs. Smith et al., 295 Fed., 385.) The

business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is

superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public

interest it ceases to be juris privati only." When, therefore one devotes his property to a use in which

the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to

be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He

may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to

control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of

the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of

commissioners.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.— This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police

power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the

protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not

unconstitutional, either as impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or

denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private

property shall be devoted to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the

owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it

becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9, 10.) This is the more so in

the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchisenor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS.— Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and

constitutional, Held: That the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and the case

remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. On the matter of limitation



to twenty-five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither

notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The commission appears to

have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of

twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say

the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must be

respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which

includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in

support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan vs. U.S. (304 U.S., 1; 58 Sup. Ct., 773,

999; 82 Law. ed., 1129), 'the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary

requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to

adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the

evidence presented.

D E C I S I O N

LAUREL, J p:

The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in

the Provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and

Zambales, by means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms

and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility

Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner

filed with the Public Service Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional new

Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and

conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the

decision of September 26, 1339, granting the petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the

Public Service Commission ordered:

"Y de acuerdo con lo que se provee por el articulo 15 de la Ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como ha

sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los

certificados de conveniencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la

autorizacion concedida en el expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos

las dos siguientes condiciones:

"Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y autorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y

subsistentes solamente durante el periodo de veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la

promulgacion de esta decision.

"Que la empresa de la solicitante podra ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna

dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio de costo de su

equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha de fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su

adquisicion."



Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the

petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service

Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ

of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the

Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No.

56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.

454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions

thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the

language of the petitioner, it is contended:

"1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and

judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its

functions in the premises, and. for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is

unconstitutional and void.

"2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is a valid delegation of

legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act

applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939,

when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional

guarantees.

Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,

invoked by the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the present

proceedings, reads as follows:

"With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the

Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission,

known as 'certificate of public convenience,' or 'certificate of convenience and public necessity,' as the

case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will

promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

"The Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the

preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any

instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable

depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time; and thatthe violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate

without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.

"In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of

the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into consideration.



"The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force and

to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public

services and to authorizations to renew and increase equipment and properties."

Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service

can operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and publicnecessity to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will

promote "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the

conditions which the Public Service Commission may prescribe for the issuance of the certificate

provided for in the first paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the

Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment,

less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a restatement of the principle already

embodied the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides at "the State may, in the interest of

national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and

communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities d other

private enterprises to be operated by the Government." Another condition which the Commission mayprescribe, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be valid only for a definite

period of time." As there is a relation between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the

two provisions must be read and interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the

Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the service under said certificate during

a definite period fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."

Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146 which is a complement of section 15, the

Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the

operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public

interests in a proper and suitable manner." Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under

section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by theCommission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public

interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the

Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period

shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8. ) We

have already ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs. Fernandez and

Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos.

46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U. S.

A., 287 U. S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. U. S., 295 U. S.

495, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570,1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)

Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or

any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than

fifty years," and when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the

issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a)

that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly



meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has thereby also

declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than

fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function,

involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,

the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly

may itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does

not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same

time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby

obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the

range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we

find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal

authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislature

alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements,

he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principleof separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata

potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legibus et Consuetudinious Angliae, edited by

G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the

Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments,

giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in

the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and

Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing

complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the

increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the

delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.(Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist. vs. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox County,

54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the

decision in the case of Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility

Commissioners (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of

approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public

Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., 366; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs.

De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No, 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938 in

People vs. Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and

Hilscher vs. People, G.R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.)

Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribe the conditions

"that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality

thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," and "that

the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any

extension or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase



equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject and have

found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing certificates of public

convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to suppress,

by way of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite

period of time," but the attempt failed:

xxx xxx xxx

"Sr. CUENCO. Senor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido que se

supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.'

Esta disposicion del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de vigencia del

certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que no se puede determinar cuando los

intereses del servicio publico requieren la explotacion de un servicio publico y como ha de saber la

Comision de Servicios Publicos, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses en cierta

ruta ya no tiene razon de ser, sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los servicios

publicos depende de condiciones fluctuantes, asi como del volumen del trafico y de otras condiciones.

Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos cuando el interes publico

asi lo exige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o menos

indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de anoche.

"El PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

"Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto de los certificados

de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia: se puede extender. Si los servicios prestados por la

compania durante el tiempo de su certificado lo requiere, puede pedir la extension y se le extendera;

pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica de urla manera

que podria pasar de cincuenta anos, porque seria anticonstitucional."

xxx xxx xxx

By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea

Nacional.)

The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been

granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of

Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in

perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be

granted to any corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment,alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law, incorporating a similar

mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or

corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by

the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provides, in section 8 of

Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except

under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National



Assembly when the public interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution,

logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any

franchise or right granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth

Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has

declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.

Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by

the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after

its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.

"Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's

operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for

the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon as the

power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the police

power thus called into operation. Producers' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228,

40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law vs. Railroad Commission, 184 Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R.

249. The statute is applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage,

but likewise to those already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation

Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of the police power. The only distinction

recognized in the statute between those established before and those established after the passage of

the act is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience and

necessity is required for any new operation, but no such certificate is required of any transportation

company for the operation which was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917. This distinction

in the creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and

regulate them. Obviously the power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective

against companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against those subsequentlysecuring such rights under a certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. vs.

Railroad Commission of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)"

Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service

Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a

franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a

common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it

the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be

juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an

interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by

the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his

grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed,

this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to

exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners.

(Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Georgia R. &

Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U. S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U. S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151

U. S. 556, 571; Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U. S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161



U. S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and

statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of

the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either

as impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal

protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be

devoted to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and

if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the

regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) This is the more so in the light of authorities

which hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers

no property right, and is a mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Aldermen of Brockton, 235

Mass. 95, 100, 126 N.E. 456; Roberto vs. Commissioners of Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass.

583, 160 N.E. 321, Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St., 83 148 N.E. 581; Matz vs. Curtis [J.L.] Cartage Co.,

[1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E. [2d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil. 773.)

Whilst the challenge provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are,

however. of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and thecase remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service

Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any

certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances of the strength

of which said certificate was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par.

[m]. Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment

to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of

limitation of twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been

neither notice not opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission

appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the

limitation to twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty of fifteen or any number of years. Thisis, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must

be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right of a hearing,

which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence

in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan vs. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773,

999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary

requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to

adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the

evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U. S., 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed.

1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence,

without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is

conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside

without notice or consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide

right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to

support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly

attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle



that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere.

Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service

Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any

pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 37878. November 25, 1932.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,

respondents.

Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.

Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.

P.A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez.

A.M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.

Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 1446, SECTION 11, VALIDITY OF; MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME

COURT SITTING AS A BOARD OF ARBITRATORS; DIVISION OF POWERS.—

The Supreme Court of the

Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in the Philippine Government. It is

judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and

its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to

assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.— The Supreme Court exercises

jurisdiction as a court and this jurisdiction does not include the exercise of jurisdiction by the members

of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.— A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term and

possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall exercised by the Supreme

Court.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARBITRATION AND AWARD.— Arbitration represents a method of the

parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a contract providing that all

matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a

contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to



them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. However, unless the

arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the

courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.— Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims

which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—It would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme

Court, to sit as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final.

D E C I S I O N

MALCOLM, J p:

The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company,

requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon

which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric

Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation

companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of

the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred

to is entitled, "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an

electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a

point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section

11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or

corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,

the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation

to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by themembers of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom

shall be final."

When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the

petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies

affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings,

and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of

memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.

Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be

granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and not to the SupremeCourt as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is

made final. And it is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the

Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to

effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.



The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to

arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction

of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and

1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in

the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a contract,

providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them

alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. (Wahl and Wahl vs.

Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs.

San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U.S., 161.)

We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far.

Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the

parties, the courts should took with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a

distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling

within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a

particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that thedecision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility,

not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial

determination of the question in dispute.

Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioners'

Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the

commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners

of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the

question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of

legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of theSupreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act

in that capacity.

We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall

within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the

right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the

courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would

then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the

Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if

the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be

considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties

which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The

present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as



a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which

is not a court of all.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our

government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as

the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by anyother department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the

powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its

members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume

any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise

jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by

law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it

could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly

mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members

of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and

possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme

Court.

In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:

"The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to

exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the

government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise

any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and anessential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the

legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and

nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would

remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should

at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such

is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the

whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes

firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power

that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . ."

(Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U.S., 697, Appendix.)

Confining the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No.

1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally

established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as

a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the



Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in

the matter.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ.,

concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28790. April 29, 1968.]

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as

Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J. p:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice frominvestigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative

his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and

qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms

of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,

emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws

(Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following

expression:

"1. One Land Registration Commissioner, with the rank and privileges of district judge—

P19,000.00."

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to

explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against

petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-

subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas

answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and

compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in

the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his

case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of theJudiciary Act (R.A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary,

"by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for

gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended,

upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."



On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to

the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining

writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but deny that petitioner, as Land Registration

Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First

Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of

investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature

may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to

the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be

investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore

mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of

First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for

investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be

separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in

the judgment of the Supreme Court . . . " and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the

Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes

by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed

upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of

executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These

favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec.

42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of

Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R.A. No. 4631 ) and (e) the Securities and

Exchange Commissioner (R.A. No, 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean

placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose

functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative

grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential

appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control

(Constitution, Art. VII), sec. 10 [1]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another

appointee of the President could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon

the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices areonly removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted

these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength

when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and

those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1206, as amended by



Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same

causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance" or "members of the

judiciary of appellate rank." The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act

No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that

where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of

First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal

language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had

really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the

Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or

removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be

unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging

this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and

simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655), saying:

"There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative

functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties."

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281

U.S. 469, 74 Law, Ed., 972,—

"But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or

otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial

power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classesenumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory nor can it exercise or

participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v.

Potomac Electric Power Co. supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited;

Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig. Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700 701, 71 Led. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284);

Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v.

Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite

Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General

Electric Company, 281 US. 469, 74 L. ed. 972) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and

can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining

to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to

arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay

Transportation Co. (57 Phil, 600).



Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that

under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked

runs as follows:

"Sec. 4.— Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration— When the Register of

Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuanceof any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in

interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall

be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of

Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in

interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records

certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an

order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be

conclusive and binding upon all Registers of deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest

disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law,

said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of thenotice thereof."

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds

is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision

of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon

all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation 1 in effect identifies the

resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose

resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable

does not prove that they are not administrative: any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to

the corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial

(or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration

Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas

are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the

latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,

whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are

constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the

"same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intendedto include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed

only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of

the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the

aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are

neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.



WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered

dismissed. No costs.

Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 53869. March 25, 1982.]

RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

CEBU, BRANCH II, presided by HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge; BRIGIDA VERA CRUZ, joined

in and assisted by her husband JOSE VERA CRUZ, and PRIMITIVO CANIA, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 51928. March 25, 1982.]

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO,RAFAEL R. RECTO, and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T.J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as

Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R.G.

VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and

ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Pablo B. Badong for petitioners.

J.R. Blanco for petitioners.

Pelaez Adriano & Gregorio for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

These two cases involve the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which used to

read: "No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a Court

with appellate jurisdiction, . . ." Under the amendment, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7,

1981, the said provision now reads: "No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel

before any Court without appellate jurisdiction, . . . ."

In G.R. No. 53869, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by petitioner

against private respondents before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. An answer was filed by private

respondents through their counsel, Atty. Valentino Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa.Petitioner "challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi" as counsel of record on the around

that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance of original

jurisdiction. Respondent Judge denied the disqualification bid, as well as a reconsideration thereof.

Hence, this petition.

In G.R. No. 51928, petitioner Reyes filed Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal

against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Exelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio Acero to



annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation to Acero, allegedly on

the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman

Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the

ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

In a joint resolution of the two cases, the Supreme Court held that what is prohibited to a BatasangPambansa member, under both the original and the amended constitutional provision in issue, is"

appearance as counsel" "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction," hence, since the respective

Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were

acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they are barred from appearing as

counsel before said Courts. Writs granted.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONS; EFFECTIVITY OF NEW OR AMENDED PROVISIONS;

CASES FILED PRIOR TO AMENDMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED UNDER THE AMENDED PROVISIONS; CASES

AT BAR.—

The Supreme Court abides by the proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions of a new

constitution take effect immediately and become operative on pending litigation." (16 Am Jur., 2d, p.219

citing Cassard vs. Tracy, 52 La Ann 835, 27 So 368.) Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the

amendment of Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on

April 7, 1981, they should be resolved under the amended provision.

2. ID.; ID.; ASSEMBLYMEN BARRED FROM APPEARING AS COUNSEL; MEANING OF THE

PROHIBITION UNDER THE ORIGINAL AND AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The original

provision of Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, used to read: "No member of the National

Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, . . ."

Under the amendment ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, the same section nowreads: No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without

appellate jurisdiction, . . ." Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance

as counsel" "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL" CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR.— "Appearance as

counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising lawyer

professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is the common, popular

connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. Judging from the prescribed

criteria, there should be no question that. Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, in preparing the Answer

for private respondents-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu,Branch II, appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel

for Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI. They

represent and plead the cause of another before a Court of Justice.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; APPELLATE JURISDICTION; CRITERION.— There are authorities

to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the

proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create the cause (Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,



175, 2L. Ed. 60; In re: Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 90 SW 2d 692, 293.) Or, that it necessarily

implies that the subject matter has been instituted in and acted upon by some other court whose

judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed (Ex Parte Evans, 52 S.E. 419, 420.) In an early Philippine

case, U.S. vs. Atienza, 1 Phil. 737 (1903), it was held to mean jurisdiction to review the judgment of an

inferior court. And, that it calls for and demands previous legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin (De

Rivera vs. Halili, 9 SCRA 59 [1963].

5. ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE VESTED WITH BOTH ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE

JURISDICTION.— Under Section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Courts of First Instance are Courts of

general original jurisdiction. However, under Section 43 of the same statute, their jurisdiction has been

stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate. They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases

arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by

Municipal Judges of provincial capitals or City Judges pursuant to the authority granted under the last

paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act (Section 45, Judiciary Act.)

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION, SECTION 11, ARTICLE VIII; PROHIBITION ON

APPEARANCE BY LEGISLATORS AS COUNSEL BEFORE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTRUED AS

LIMITED TO CASES WHEREIN SAID COURTS EXERCISE APPELLATE JURISDICTION.— We are of the

considered opinion that, to render effective Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, appearance

by legislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise

appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to render

effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must be

deemed implied and intended in the provision itself (Black, on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., 1911, p.

29.).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTIVE OF THE PROHIBITION ON APPELLATE PRACTICE.— The objective of the

prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, both under the original and the amended

provisions, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the administration of justice, to

eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus preserve

the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a single Judge of the

Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts

in the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented

by an Assemblyman by virtue of his office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original

cases than in appealed cases because the decision or resolution appealed from in the latter situation has

already a presumption not only of regularity but also of correctness in its favor. In fine, "appellate

practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and public interest.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT ASSEMBLYMEN BARRED FROM APPEARING IN CASES AT BAR.—

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez

appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be

held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.

D E C I S I O N



MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, respectively, involve

the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to read:

"Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior

to a court with appellate jurisdiction, . . ."

The antecedent facts follow:

L-53869

On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A.

Villegas against the Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private respondents) before the Court of

First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, then presided by Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay (Civil Case No. 43 1-L). An

Answer, dated October 11, 1979, was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman

Valentino L. Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas

"challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground that he is

barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial

Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction. After the Opposition and Reply to the Opposition were filed,

Judge Dulay issued an Order inhibiting himself from the aforesaid case because Assemblyman Legaspi

was likewise the lawyer of his wife in two pending cases. The case was re-raffled and re-docketed as Civil

Case No. R-18857, and transferred to Branch II, presided by Judge Francisco P. Burgos (respondent

Court). cdlaws06

In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of Assemblyman Legaspi,

as well as the Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this recourse to Certiorari and

Prohibition.

A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980 enjoining

respondent Court from acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.

L -51928

Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal

(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent

Eustaquio T. C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries

Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C. Acero, allegedly on the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares

had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as

counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11,

Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.

Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio Puyat, et als. vs.

Hon. Sixto T. J. de Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately. And since the issue involved



is on all fours with L-53869, the Court opted to resolve Case No. L-51928 jointly with L-53869 instead of

with L-51122 as originally directed.

The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys

Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.

A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman from

appearing as counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction," and the "similar"

provision of Section 17, Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter

provision reads:

". . . No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior

to a collegiate Court of Appellate Jurisdiction."

A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate." Further, the limitation now

comprehends all members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of the

Commission on Appointments, a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution.

Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on

April 7, 1981, Section 11 now reads:

"SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without

appellate jurisdiction, . . ."

The term "collegiate" remains deleted, and the terminology is now "Court without appellate

jurisdiction."

Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved under

the amended provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions of a new

Constitution take effect immediately and become operative on pending litigation." 1

Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any

Court without appellate jurisdiction."

"Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction." 2 "Counsel" means

"an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a legal

advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal

matters a particular client, public officer, or public body." 3 Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is

a "counselor; an attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in an action." 4 Thus,"appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court' s jurisdiction by a legal advocate or

advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is the

common, popular connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. In one case, 5 in

resolving the question of what constitutes "appearance as an advocate," the Court held that " advocate"

means one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or judicial court, a counselor.



Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman Valentino L.

Legaspi, in preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the

Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A.

Fernandez appears as counsel for Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

(Pasig), Branch XXI. They represent and plead the cause of another before a Court of justice.

The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez,

respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction?

There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises

and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that cause. 6 Or, that it

necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been instituted in and acted upon by some other court

whose judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed. 7 In an early Philippine case, 8 it was held to mean

jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court. And, that it calls for and demands previous

legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9

By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However, under the same

statute, their jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate. 11 They have

appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respective provinces

except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal Judges of provincial capitals or City Judges pursuant

to the authority granted under the last paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act. 12

It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the Judiciary Act of

1948, as amended, can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by the deliberate omission of the

word "collegiate" in both the original and amended Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the

obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall

within the ambit of the previous prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts with appellate jurisdictionfrom decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated otherwise, under the amended

proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.

It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the

suits in the exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen

Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit

to this contention.

It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality." Depending on the case

before it, said Courts can be either of appellate or original jurisdiction. The question then to be resolved

is whether or not Assemblymen can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance in cases originally

filed with them.

We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance by

legislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise

appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to render



effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must be

deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. 14

It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that members of

the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate

Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointmentscould not appear before Courts of First Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the framers was "appellate

jurisdiction" more than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the scope of the

prohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from

"appear(ing) as counsel before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction." The common

denominator was still "appellate jurisdiction" more than "Court." Under the amendment ratified in the

April 7, 1981 referendum, members of the Batasang Pambansa are prohibited from "appear(ing) as

counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction." Consistently, the principal criterion is,

"appellate jurisdiction." So that, when a legislator appears in an original case filed with a Court of First

Instance, he would not be appearing before a Court with "appellate jurisdiction."

Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in the

legislature. 15 Their office has always favored them with the influence and prestige that it carried.

Today, as before, it is only "appellate practice" that is allowed with the significant difference that, this

time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This is so because with the removal of the legislative power

to review appointments the source of power and influence that members of the National Assembly

could unduly exert in the exercise of the legal profession has been greatly minimized.

This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because the nature of the

subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. 16 In fact, the original

amendment proposed by Antonio V. Raquiza, Delegate of the First District, Ilocos Norte, in Resolution

No. 345 entitled "Prohibiting Members of the National Assembly to Use Their Office As a Means of

Promoting Self-Interest"— was to bar a National Assembly member from appearing as counsel before

any Court. In the "Whereas" clauses, that proposal was believed to be an "improvement" over Section

17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution and the purpose of the proposed amendment was explained as

follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or administrative cases where a

legislator cannot appear. In our proposal he is absolutely barred because it is feared that the practice of

his profession will interfere with the performance of his duties or that because the power of his officemight influence the administration of justice.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours) 17

The co-author of Resolution No. 345, Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone District of Isabela, and

Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated further on the purpose behind the

prohibition when he wrote in his Position Paper that "The prohibition against appearing as counsel is



necessary because of the undue influence which members of Congress enjoy when they practice before

the Courts and especially before administrative agencies. It is an accepted fact that our legislature is

composed of a predominance of practicing lawyers, and who are therefore expected to be naturally not

averse to exerting all influence that they can muster in the pursuit of their profession." Continuing, he

said: "The inability to practice as counsel . . . should be part of the sacrifices entailed in running for the

position of lawmaker. 18 The amendment proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O. Catan, Jr. of Negros Oriental

even went further: "No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office, appear as

counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative body . . ." 19 Delegate Emerito M. Salva

from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own amendment thus:

"Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office, practice directly or

indirectly any occupation or profession or be allowed to engage directly or indirectly in any trade,

business, or industry." 20

and explained:

"10.2 Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the assemblymen should render

full-time service to the nation. He pointed out that they should be barred from the practice of their

respective professions since they would reasonably be compensated for devoting their time to the work

of the National Assembly." 21

While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did not carry the

several amendments proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment prevailing at the 1971 Constitutional

Convention, and reinforce the conviction that appearance as counsel by Assemblymen was meant to be

confined to appellate practice and not unlimited practice before Courts of First Instance. That sentiment

has been carried over to the amendment ratified in the April, 1981 plebiscite. For, there is no substantial

difference between "Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction" (the original 1973 provision)and "Court without appellate jurisdiction" (the amended provision).

The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence

upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure

impartiality in trials and thus preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an

Assemblyman on a single Judge of the Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely

diminished where the latter Court acts in the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The

upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his office possesses is more felt

and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or resolution

appealed from in the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also ofcorrectness in its favor.

In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and

public interest.



The limited application to "appellate practice" is a viewpoint favored by a constitutionalist of eminence,

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution of the Philippines, 22 where

he said:

"It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal case, but he cannot do so

before any administrative body. Also, while it is only appellate practice that is allowed a member of theNational Assembly, formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a Senator or Representative who was in

the Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the present Constitution. Those differences

should be noted" (Emphasis supplied). 23

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the Constitutional prohibition,

thus:

". . . The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a sentiment shared by the last

Constitutional Convention, because of the widespread belief that legislators found it difficult to resist, as

perhaps most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the purpose was and is to stress the

fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the maxim that a public office is a public trust."

24

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez

appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be

held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court of First

Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A.

Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before the

Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of FirstInstance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, respectively. The Restraining Order issued

heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.

No costs in either case.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C. J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De

Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 98472. August 19, 1993.]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI), PHILIPPINE ENTERTAINMENT

EXPORTERS AND PROMOTERS ASSOCIATION (PEEPA), and ASSOCIATION OF FILIPINO OVERSEAS

WORKERS, INC. (AFOWI), petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND



EMPLOYMENT, respondent. JOBLINK INTERNATIONAL, INC. (herein represented by FEBI L. ENRIQUEZ,

Vice-President for Operations) and PROSPECS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANCY (herein represented by

QUINTIN C. FENIZA, Proprietor-General Manager), intervenors, RP-JAPAN ENTERTAINMENT PROMOTERS

ASSOCIATION, INC. (REPA), intervenor, AMADER INTERNATIONAL, INC., IDG TRADING & GENERAL

SERVICES, PHILCANGO INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT SERVICES, PAN ASIA MANPOWER PLACEMENT,

LYKA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, MAINLINE

RECRUITMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., WORLD MATRIX UNLIMITED SERVICES CONSULTANCY & TRADING

CO., NUBA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES CORPORATION, EL BARY MANPOWER SERVICES,

SOCIAL SERVICES CONT. INT'L CO. LTD., CDD ENTERPRISES and VELREY RECRUITMENT COMPANY,

intervenors.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Office for petitioner.

Domingo F. Gonzales for Intervenor RP-Japan Entertainment Promoters Association.

Gil-Fernando C. Cruz for Intervenors JOBLINK International, Inc. et al.

Ceferino P. Padua for Intervenors Amader International, Inc. et al.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES; WHEN CONSIDERED A LAW.—

In determining whether a presidential issuance under the 1973 Constitution may be considered a law,

we held in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that "[t]o form part of the law of the land, the decree, order of LOI

must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as

contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment,

there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan

Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any

reason that in his judgment requires immediate action . . . Verily, not all LOI issued by the President

should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land."

2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROPER-PARTY REQUIREMENT, CONSTRUED.— The "proper-party"

requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or are in danger of

sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures complained of.

3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL; GROUNDS; WANT OF VALID CAUSE OF ACTION; ACTION IN CASE AT BAR

FOUNDED ON MERE SPECULATION.— But, as regards petitioner Association of Filipino Overseas

Workers, Inc. (AFOWI), we are not persuaded that the proliferation of recruitment agencies willnecessarily result in exposure of workers to exploitation by unscrupulous recruiters, for the stiffer

competition may even compel these agencies to seek better terms and conditions for overseas workers.

Hence, the petition being founded on mere speculation insofar as it affects AFOWI, the same should be

dismissed for want of a valid cause of action.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO.

1190, MERELY AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, NOT A LAW.— As we view it, LOI 1190 simply imposes a



presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence,

directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be

treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained

acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere

administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist.

Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was

issued in response to "a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim

Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter."

The conspicuous absence of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any

more than a mere administrative issuance.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DID NOT MODIFY THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE MINISTER OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT.— There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code,

as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually ban the grant

of licenses nor bar the entry of new licenses since anybody could still apply for license with the Minister

of Labor and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President.In fact, the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under

the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review. As we earlier stated, the LOI did not suspend the

enforcement of Art. 25 of the Labor Code; it merely added another level of administrative review.

6. ID.; ID.; CONTROL OVER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; MANIFEST IN REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT OF

THE AUTHORITY OF THE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT TO GRANT LICENSES OF RECRUITMENT

AGENCIES.— Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an amendment

of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally sanctioned control over the

executive departments of government. Implicit in that power of control is the President's "authority to

go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries."

7. CIVIL LAW; EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS; LAWS HAVE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF PERMANENCE.—

Petitioners advance a rather outrageous interpretation of LOI 1190 when they claim that "[t]he then

President was in effect saying that 'Art. 25 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed as regards overseas

workers until I otherwise direct.'" By their nature, and their purpose to maintain stability in the polity,

laws have a certain degree of permanence such that they are not intended to be repealed one hour

after their enactment, then re-enacted the following hour, and so on. If the law has to be applied on a

case to case basis, as in the case of Art. 25 of the Labor Code, it does not have to undergo the tedious

process of repeal and re-enactment every time its application is warranted.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO.1190; MAY BE REPEALED, ALTERED OR MODIFIED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 450.— Petitioners also

contend that EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190 for Congress has not delegated that power to the

President. We do not agree. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to

revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive,

hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently be upheld.



9. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ATTORNEY'S FEES; GRANT THEREOF NOT ALLOWED WHERE COMPLEX

LEGAL ISSUE WAS RAISED.— Of the three (3) groups of intervenors, only AMADER, et al., pray for

attorney's fees claiming that they were compelled to hire counsel to enforce and protect their rights.

However, in view of the complexity of the legal issue involved, the Court resolves not to grant attorney's

fees.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J p:

May an Executive Order (EO)1 repeal a Letter of Instruction (LOI)? 2

Ordinarily, since both LOI and EO are presidential issuances, one may repeal or otherwise alter, modify

or amend the other, depending on which comes later. The case before us appears compounded by the

circumstance that the LOI in question was issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was

clothed with legislative power, while the EO revoking the LOI was issued by then President Corazon C.

Aquino at a time when she had already lost her law-making power after Congress convened on 27 July1987. 3 Although the EO issued by President Aquino is undoubtedly not a law but a mere administrative

issuance, the parties here debate whether the LOI issued by President Marcos was a law or simply an

administrative rule in view of his dual position then as chief executive and as legislative authority.

Petitioners contend that the LOI is a law, hence, the EO cannot countermand it, while public respondent

claims that the LOI is only an administrative issuance which may be superseded by an EO. LLphil

In determining whether a presidential issuance under the 1973 Constitution may be considered a law,

we held in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile 4 that "[t]o form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI

must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as

contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgmentthere exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan

Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any

reason that in his judgment requires immediate action . . . Verily, not all LOI issued by the President

should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land."

Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442, as amended)5 encourages private sector

participation in recruitment and placement of workers under guidelines, rules and regulations to be

issued by the Secretary of Labor. On 20 January 1982, President Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the

grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as

he may otherwise direct. 6 On 19 March 1991, President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on new

applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the

Secretary of Labor may promulgate. 7 On 8 April 1991, respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment

promulgated Department Order (DO) No. 9, Series of 1991, entitled "Guidelines Implementing Executive

Order No. 450."

In this Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order filed 14 May 1991

petitioners Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), Philippine Entertainment Exporters



and Promoters Association (PEEPA), and Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI) pray

that EO 450 be declared invalid for being contrary to LOI 1190.

On 16 May 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Secretary of Labor and

Employment to cease and desist from enforcing EO 450 and DO 9 until further orders. 8 Thereafter,

three motions for intervention were filed, 9 which the Court eventually allowed. 10 Intervenors JoblinkInternational, Inc. (JOBLINK), Prospecs International Consultancy, Amader International, Inc. (AMADER),

IDG Trading & General Services, Philcango International Recruitment Services, Pan Asia Manpower

Placement, International Manpower Services, Lyka International Manpower Services, Mainline

Recruitment International, Inc., World Matrix Unlimited Services Consultancy & Trading Co., Nuba

International Manpower Services Corporation, El Bary Manpower Services, Social Services Cont. Int'l Co.,

Ltd., CDD Enterprises and Velrey Recruitment Company, all applicants for new licenses, support the

position of respondent that LOI 1190 was not a law.

On the other hand, intervenor RP-Japan Entertainment Promoters Association, Inc. (REPA), a non-stock,

non-profit domestic corporation composed of private employment agencies authorized to recruit and

deploy contract workers abroad, prays for the modification of the restraining order we issued on 16 May

1991. We addressed this incident on 4 July 1991 when we explained that our temporary restraining

order did not comprehend renewal of existing licenses since EO 450 covered only new applications. 11

The other pending issue relating to the lifting and modification of our Resolution of 16 May 1991 will

accordingly be resolved in this decision.

First, on the challenge of intervenors AMADER, et al., that petitioners lack locus standi, we need only

reiterate that the "proper-party" requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors

have sustained or are in danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures

complained of. 12 Petitioners PASEI and PEEPA allege that their member agencies, which enjoy

protection against competition by new licensees pursuant to LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury with

the repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450, considering further that there is no additional demand for Filipino

workers abroad. Hence, any gain made by the new agencies on the supposed exclusive preserve of

existing agencies necessarily results in the latter's loss.

But, as regards petitioner Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI), we are not persuaded

that the proliferation of recruitment agencies will necessarily result in exposure of workers to

exploitation by unscrupulous recruiters, for the stiffer competition may even compel these agencies to

seek better terms and conditions for overseas workers. Hence, the petition being founded on mere

speculation insofar as it affects AFOWI, the same should be dismissed for want of a valid cause of action.

prLL

On the issue raised by intervenors that the petition can be decided without touching on the validity of

EO 450, we cannot find any other way but to meet the question squarely since petitioners' relief

depends on its validity.

The central thesis of the petition is that LOI 1190 was issued pursuant to the law-making power of the

President under Sec. 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution in response to "a grave



emergency which cried for immediate and decisive action," hence, should be considered part of the law

of the land. Petitioners argue that because of its repealing or modifying effect on Art. 25 of the Labor

Code, LOI 1190 could be valid only if treated as a law, and that a contrary interpretation that would

render LOI 1190 invalid could not have been intended by the then incumbent President.

As we view it, LOI 1190 13 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Laborand Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an

administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike

Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President,

Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set

out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land,

petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was issued in response to "a grave emergency or a threat or

imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails

or is unable to act adequately on any matter." The conspicuous absence of any of these conditions

fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance.

In arguing that LOI 1190 was issued to cope with "a grave emergency," petitioners point to the 3rd

"Whereas" clause which speaks of the concern of the state against cut-throat competition seriously

affecting the integrity and viability of the overseas recruitment industry, and the difficulty in the

regulation and supervision of agencies and the protection of the welfare of the workers. The petitioners'

appraisal that the 3rd "Whereas" clause manifests a grave emergency situation is as good as anybody

else's contrary view. Moreover, even if we treat as emergency the "situation which has seriously

affected the integrity and viability of the overseas employment industry," there is no indication that in

the judgment of the President it is grave.

Petitioners argue that since the repeal of Art. 25 of the Labor Code could not be done through an

administrative issuance, LOI 1190 must of necessity be a law. This reasoning is flawed.

There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually ban the grant of licenses

nor bar the entry of new licensees since anybody could still apply for license with the Minister of Labor

and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President. In fact,

the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor

Code; it only added another tier of review.

Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an amendment of Art. 25, for

this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally sanctioned control over the executivedepartments of government. 14 Implicit in that power of control is the President's "authority to go over,

confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries."15 Moreover, if we discern

the intent of LOI 1190 from the manner it was enforced, the unrebutted allegation of respondent - that

319 private employment agencies secured administrative presidential approval from 1982 to 1989 16 —

shows that then President Marcos merely intended to regulate, and not ban altogether, new



applications for licenses. For this reason, Marcos could not have contemplated repealing Art. 25 of the

Labor Code.

Petitioners advance a rather outrageous interpretation of LOI 1190 when they claim that "[t]he then

President was in effect saying that 'Art. 25 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed as regards overseas

workers until I otherwise direct.'" 17 By their nature, and their purpose to maintain stability in thepolity, laws have a certain degree of permanence such that they are not intended to be repealed one

hour after their enactment, then re-enacted the following hour, and so on. If the law has to be applied

on a case to case basis, as in the case of Art. 25 of the Labor Code, it does not have to undergo the

tedious process of repeal and re-enactment every time its application is warranted.

Petitioners would impress upon us the interpretation that LOI 1190 suspended the effectivity of Art. 25,

which could not be done because the chief executive is constitutionally bound to "ensure that the laws

be faithfully executed." 18 As we earlier stated, the LOI did not suspend the enforcement of Art. 25 of

the Labor Code; it merely added another level of administrative review.

The discussion on whether the word "I" in the phrase "except as I may otherwise direct" refers to the

President as chief executive or as a legislator is meaningless, for the correct interpretation would

ultimately depend on whether the LOI is a law or an administrative issuance. LexLib

Petitioners also contend that EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190 for Congress has not delegated that power

to the President. 19 We do not agree. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the

President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative

directive, 20 hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently be

upheld.

Of the three (3) groups of intervenors, only AMADER, et al., pray for attorney's fees claiming that theywere compelled to hire counsel to enforce and protect their rights. However, in view of the complexity

of the legal issue involved, the Court resolves not to grant attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 16 May

1991 is accordingly LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Executive Order No. 450 and Department Order No. 9 of the

Department of Labor and Employment are SUSTAINED. Accordingly, Letter of Instruction No. 1190 is

declared REPEALED and SUPERSEDED by Executive Order No. 450.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97412. July 12, 1994.]



EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE

COMPANY, INC., respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN

SHIPMENT OF GOODS LAST.— The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the

shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the

possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a

reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil

Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF CARRIER'S FAULT ON LOST OR DAMAGED GOODS SHIPPED; CASE

AT BAR NOT AN EXCEPTION.— When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition,

a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an

express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code; Philippine National Railways vs.

Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365). There are, of

course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated

in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one of which can be applied to this case.

3. ID.; DAMAGES; INTEREST AWARDED AS A CONCEPT THEREOF; RATE AND ACCRUAL THEREOF,

HOW DETERMINED.— With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and

compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1.

When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or

forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.

Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In

the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil

Code. 2. When a obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on

the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per

annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or

until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is

established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made

judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably

established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the

judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have

been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, beon the amount of finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money

becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or

paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period

being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

D E C I S I O N



VITUG, J p:

The issues, albeit not completely novel, are: (a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a

shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre

operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the payment of legal interest on an award of loss or

damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealedfrom is rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent

(12%) or six percent (6%). llcd

The findings of the court a quo, adopted by the Court of Appeals, on the antecedent and undisputed

facts that have led to the controversy are hereunder reproduced:

"This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-forwarded for

damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid

the consignee the value of such losses/damages.

"On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan for deliveryvessel `SS EASTERN COMET' owned by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines under Bill of Lading No. YMA-8

(Exh. B). The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy No. 81/01177 for

P36,382,466.38.

"Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the custody of

defendant Metro Port Services, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order, which

damage was unknown to plaintiff.

"On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment from defendant

Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per 'Request for Bad Order Survey.' (Exh.

D).

"On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of the shipment to

the consignees' warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of

the contents was adulterated/fake (per 'Bad Order Waybill' No. 10649, Exh. E).

"Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee suffered

losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants. Claims were presented against

defendants who failed and refused to pay the same (Exhs. H, I, J, K, L). Cdpr

"As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95

under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of

said consignee against defendants (per 'Form of Subrogation,' 'Release' and Philbanking check, Exhs. M,

N, and O)." (pp. 85-86, Rollo.)

There were, to be sure, other factual issues that confronted both courts. Here, the appellate court said:



"Defendants filed their respective answers, traversing the material allegations of the complaint

contending that: As for defendant Eastern Shipping it alleged that the shipment was discharged in good

order from the vessel unto the custody of Metro Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after

the shipment was incurred after the shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability (p.

17, Record); Metroport averred that although subject shipment was discharged unto its custody, portion

of the same was already in bad order (p. 11, Record); Allied Brokerage alleged that plaintiff has no cause

of action against it, not having negligent or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad

order condition when received by it, but nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary care and diligence

in he handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in the same condition shipment was received by it.

"From the evidence that court found the following:

"'The issues are:

'1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages;

'2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the custody of defendants (inwhose respective custody, if determinable); prLL

'3. Whether or not defendant(s) should be held liable for the losses/damages (see plaintiff's pre-

Trial Brief, Records, p. 34; Allied's pre-Trial Brief, adopting plaintiff's Records, p. 38).'

'As to the first issue, there can be no doubt that the shipment sustained losses/damages. The two drums

were shipped in good order and condition, as clearly shown by the Bill of Lading and Commercial Invoice

which do not indicate any damages drum that was shipped (Exhs. B and C). But when on December 12,

1981 the shipment was delivered to defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., it excepted to one drum in bad

order.

'Correspondingly, as to the second issue, it follows that the losses/damages were sustained while in the

respective and/or successive custody and possession of defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator

(Metro Port) and broker (Allied Brokerage). This becomes evident when the Marine Cargo Survey Report

(Exh. G), with its 'Additional Survey Notes,' are considered. In the latter notes, it is stated that when the

shipment was 'landed on vessel' to dock of Pier # 15, South Harbor, Manila on December 12, 1981,' it

was observed that 'one (1) fiber drum (was) in damaged condition, covered by the vessel's Agent's Bad

order Tally Sheet No. 86427.' The report further states that when defendant Allied Brokerage withdrew

the shipment, from defendant arrastre operator's custody on January 7, 1982, one drum was found

opened without seal, cello bag partly torn but contents intact. Net unrecovered spillages was 15 kgs. The

report went on to state that when the drums reached the consignee, one drum was found withadulterated/faked contents. It is obvious, therefore, that these losses/damages occurred before the

shipment reached the consignee while under the successive custodies of defendants. Under Art. 1737 of

the New Civil Code, the common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance of

goods remains in full force and effect even if the goods are temporarily unloaded and stored in transit in

the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised and has

had reasonable opportunity to remove or dispose of the goods (Art. 1738, NCC). Defendant Eastern



Shipping's own exhibit, the 'Turn-Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes' (Exhs. 3-Eastern) states that on

December 12, 1981 one drum was found 'open.'

"and thus held:

'WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:

1. The amount of P19,032.95 with the present legal interest of 12% per annum from October 1,

1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid (the liability of defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc.

shall not exceed US$500 per case or the CIF value of the loss, whichever is lesser, while the liability of

defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. shall be to the extent of the actual invoice value of each package,

crate box or container in no case to exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section 6.01 of the

Management Contract); LexLib

2. P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and

3. Costs.

B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of defendant/cross-claimant Allied Brokerage

Corporation.

SO ORDERED.' (p. 207, Record).

"Dissatisfied, defendant's recourse to US.

"The appeal is devoid of merit.

"After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. We find that the conclusion drawn therefrom is

correct. As there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage while in the successive

possession of appellants, and therefore they are liable to the appellee, as subrogee for the amount it

paid to the consignee." (pp. 87-89, Rollo.)

The Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto the judgment of the court a quo.

In this petition, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the common carrier, attributes error and grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the appellate court when—

I. IT HELD PETITIONER CARRIER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE ARRASTRE OPERATOR

AND CUSTOMS BROKER FOR THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS GRANTED IN THE QUESTIONED

DECISION;

II. IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF INTEREST ON THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD

COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AT THE RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT PER

ANNUM INSTEAD OF FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ONLY AT THE RATE

OF SIX PERCENT PER ANNUM, PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM BEING INDISPUTABLY UNLIQUIDATED.



The petition is, in part, granted.

In this decision, we have begun by saying that the questions raised by petitioner carrier are not all that

novel. Indeed, we do have a fairly good number of previous decisions this Court can merely tack to.

Cdpr

The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the

time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the

carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance,

by the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161

SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863).When the goods shipped either are lost or

arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that

diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code;

Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of Appeals,

131 SCRA 365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is not observed

but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 1 of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one of which can be

applied to this case.

The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the obligation of properly

delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the Court. In Fireman's Fund

Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455), we have explained in holding the carrier and the

arrastre operator liable in solidum, thus: Cdpr

"The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor

and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5 [1967]. The relationship between the

consignee and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator

(Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE totake good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the

consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are

therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in goods condition to the consignee."

We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the customs

broker are themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that

attendant facts in a given case may not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by

Eastern Shipping Lines which, being the carrier and not having been able to rebut the presumption of

fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of both the court a quo

and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustaineddamage while in the successive possession of appellants" (the herein petitioner among them).

Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is

inevitable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it. llcd

It is over the issue of legal interest adjudged by the appellate court that deserves more than just a

passing remark.



Let us first see a chronological recitation of the major rulings of this Court:

The early case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Manila Port Service, 2 decided 3 on 15 May 1969,

involved a suit for recovery of money arising out of short deliveries and pilferage of goods. In this case,

appellee Malayan Insurance (the plaintiff in the lower court) averred in its complaint that the total

amount of its claim for the value of the undelivered goods amounted to P3,947.20. This demand,however, was neither established in its totality nor definitely ascertained. In the stipulation of facts later

entered into by the parties, in lieu of proof, the amount of P1,447.51 was agreed upon. The trial court

rendered judgment ordering the appellants (defendants) Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad

Company to pay appellee Malayan Insurance the sum of P1,447.51 with legal interest thereon from the

date the complaint was filed on 28 December 1962 until full payment thereof. The appellants then

assailed, inter alia, the award of legal interest. In sustaining the appellants, this Court ruled:

"Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a stipulation, is the legal rate.

Such interest normally is allowable from the date of demand, judicial or extrajudicial. The trial court

opted for judicial demand as the starting point.

"But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest 'cannot be recovered upon

unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable

certainty.' And as was held by this Court in Rivera vs. Perez 4 , L-6998, February 29, 1956, if the suit

were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined

by the courts after proof (Montilla c. Corporacion de P. P. Agustinos, 25 Phil. 447; Lichauco v. Guzman,

38 Phil. 302),' then, interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'" (Emphasis supplied). Cdpr

The case of Reformina vs. Tomol, 5 rendered on 11 October 1985, was for "Recovery of Damages for

Injury to Person and Loss of Property." After trial, the lower court decreed:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and third party defendants and

against the defendants and third party plaintiffs as follows:

"Ordering defendants and third party plaintiffs Shell and Michael, Incorporated to pay jointly and

severally the following persons:

"(a) . . .

"xxx xxx xxx

"(g) Plaintiffs Pacita F. Reformina and Francisco Reformina the sum of P131,084.00 which is the

value of the boat F B Pacita III together with its accessories, fishing gear and equipment minus

P80,000.00 which is the value of the insurance recovered and the amount of P10,000.00 a month as the

estimated monthly loss suffered by them as a result of the fire of May 6, 1969 up to the time they are

actually paid or already the total sum of P370,000.00 as of June 4, 1972 with legal interest from the filing

of the complaint until paid and to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 with costs against defendants and

third party plaintiffs." (Emphasis supplied.)



On appeal of the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the amount of damages awarded but sustained

the trial court in adjudging legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. When the

appellate court's decision became final, the case was remanded to the lower court for execution, and

this was when the trial court issued its assailed resolution which applied the 6% interest per annum

prescribed in Article 2209 of the Civil Code. In their petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners

contended that Central Bank Circular No. 416, providing thus—

Cdpr

"By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended, Monetary Board in its

Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan, or

forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of

express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve (12%) percent per annum. This Circular shall

take effect immediately." (Emphasis found in the text)—

should have, instead, been applied. This Court 6 ruled:

"The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of

any money, goods or credits. any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor

involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the

said law for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one rendered in an Action for

Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and does not involve any loan, much less

forbearances of any money, goods or credits. As correctly argued by the private respondents, the law

applicable to the said case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which reads —

'ARTICLE 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in

delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of

interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per

annum.'"

The above rule was reiterated in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., v. Cruz, 7 promulgated on 28 July

1986. The case was for damages occasioned by an injury to person and loss of property. The trial court

awarded private respondent Pedro Manabat actual and compensatory damages in the amount of

P72,500.00 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Relying on the

Reformina v. Tomol case, this Court 8 modified the interest award from 12% to 6% interest per annum

but sustained the time computation thereof, i.e., from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Cdpr

In Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the trial court, in an action for the recovery of damages arising

from the collapse of a building, ordered inter alia, the "defendant United Construction Co., Inc. (one of

the petitioners) . . . to pay the plaintiff, . . ., the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate from

November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment . . . ." Save from the



modification of the amount granted by the lower court, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's

decision. When taken to this Court for review, the case, on 03 October 1986, was decided, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the special and

environmental circumstances of this case, we deem it reasonable to render a decision imposing, as We

do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the third-party defendants (with the exception of RomanOzaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code, Supra. p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar

Association of FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of

attorney's fees) occasioned by the loss of the building and an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

(P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of this

decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be imposed

upon aforementioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against the defendant and third-

party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta)." (Emphasis supplied).

A motion for reconsideration was filed by United Construction, contending that "the interest of twelve

(12%) per cent per annum imposed on the total amount of the monetary award was in contravention of

law." The Court 10 ruled out the applicability of the Reformina and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines cases

and, in its resolution of 15 April 1988, it explained: LLphil

"There should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to Central Bank Circular No.

416 . . . is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2) forbearance of any money, goods or credit; and

(3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments involving loans or forbearance of

any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Cruz, 143 SCRA 160-161 [1986];

Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 [1985]). It is true that in the instant case, there is neither a loan or

a forbearance, but then no interest is actually imposed provided the sums referred to in the judgment

are paid upon the finality of the judgment. It is delay in the payment of such final judgment, that will

cause the imposition of the interest.

"It will be noted that in the cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is imposed on the total sum,

from the filing of the complaint until paid; in other words, as part of the judgment for damages. Clearly,

they are not applicable to the instant case." (Emphasis supplied)

The subsequent case of American Express International, Inc., vs. International Appellate Court 11 was a

petition for review on certiorari from the decision, dated 27 February 1985, of the then Intermediate

Appellate Court reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, to

P240,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, and its resolution, dated 29 April 1985, restoring theamount of damages awarded by the trial court, i.e., P2,000,000,00 as moral damages and P400,000.00

as exemplary damages with interest thereon at 12% per annum from notice of judgment, plus costs of

suit. In a decision of 09 November 1988, this Court, while recognizing the right of the private respondent

to recover damages, held the award, however, for moral damages by the trial court, later sustained by

the IAC, to be inconceivably large. The Court 12 thus set aside the decision of the appellate court and

rendered a new one, "ordering the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of One Hundred



Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from

the finality of this decision until paid." (Emphasis supplied). Cdpr

Reformina came into fore again in the 21 February 1989 case of Florendo v. Ruiz 13 which arose from a

breach of employment contract. For having been illegally dismissed, the petitioner was awarded by the

trial court moral and exemplary damages without, however, providing any legal interest thereon. Whenthe decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held:

"WHEREFORE, except as modified hereinabove the decision of the CFI of Negros Oriental dated October

31, 1972 is affirmed in all respects, with the modification that defendants-appellants, except defendant-

appellant Merton Munn, are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amounts stated in the dispositive

portion of the decision, including the sum of P1,400.00 in concept of compensatory damages, with

interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid." (Emphasis supplied)

The petition for review to this Court was denied. The records were thereupon transmitted to the trial

court, and an entry of judgment was made. The writ of execution issued by the trial court directed that

only compensatory damages should earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the

complaint. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, a petition for certiorari

assailed the said order. This court said:

". . ., it is to be noted that the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of interest 'at the legal rate' from

the time of the filing of the complaint. . . . Said circular [Central Bank Circular No. 416] does not apply to

actions based on a breach of employment contract like the case at bar." (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterated that the 6% interest per annum on the damages should be computed from the time

the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid.

Quite recently, the Court had another occasion to rule on the matter. National Power Corporation vs.

Angas, 14 decided on 08 May 1992, involved the expropriation of certain parcels of land. After

conducting a hearing on the complaints for eminent domain, the trial court ordered the petitioner to

pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands so expropriated

"with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid." Again, in applying the 6% legal interest per annum

under the Civil Code, the Court 15 declared: LLpr

". . ., (T)he transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but

expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation

regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for

damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the propertiesexpropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.

Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be

enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art.

2209 of the Civil Code shall apply."



Concededly, there have been seeming variances in the above holdings. The cases can perhaps be

classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues involved and the corresponding rulings

rendered by the court. The " first group" would consist of the cases of Reformina v. Tomol (1985),

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Cruz (1986), Florendo v. Ruiz (1989) and National Power Corporation v.

Angas (1992). In the "second group" would be Malayan Insurance Company v. Manila Port Service

(1969), Nakpil and Sons v. Court of Appeals (1988), and American Express International v. Intermediate

Appellate Court (1988). LLpr

In the " first group," the basic issue focus on the application of either the 6% (under the Civil Code) or

12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum. It is easily discernible in these cases that

there has been a consistent holding that the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum

applies only to loans or forbearance 16 of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving

such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the Civil Code

governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising

from the breach of a delay in the performance of obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these

cases, a common time frame in the computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e.,from the time the complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.

The "second group," did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6% or 12% interest per

annum, 17 depending on whether or not the amount involved is a loan or forbearance, on the one hand,

or one of indemnity for damage, on the other hand. Unlike, however, the "first group" which remained

consistent in holding that the running of the legal interest should be from the time of the filing of the

complaint until fully paid, the "second group" varied on the commencement of the running of the legal

interest. cdll

Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of the decision of the

court a quo, explaining that "if the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until definitely

ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,' then, interest 'should be from the date

of the decision.'" American Express International v. IAC, introduced a different time frame for reckoning

the 6% interest by ordering it to be "computed from the finality of (the) decision until paid." The Nakpil

and Sons case ruled that 12% interest per annum should be imposed from the finality of the decision

until the judgment amount is paid.

The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have called for different

applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of

each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of clarification and

reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance.

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or

quasi-delicts 18 is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. 19 The provisions under

Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

20



II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory

damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: LibLex

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan

or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. 21

Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. 22 Inthe absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,

i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 23 of the

Civil Code.

2. When a obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on

the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court 24 at the rate of 6% per

annum. 25 No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or

until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. 26 Accordingly, where the demand is

established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made

judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably

established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the

judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have

been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be

on the amount of finally adjudged. LLjur

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the

rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per

annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an

equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT(6%) on the amount due computed from

the decision, dated 03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of

SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment

thereof. cdll

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,

Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6430. August 31, 1954.]



In the matter of the petition of EUSEBIO MANZANO DY CHAN TIAO to be admitted a citizen of the

Philippines. EUSEBIO MANZANO DY CHAN TIAO, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

oppositor-appellant.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor General Julio Villamor, for appellant.

Canuto Damaso, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION ; REQUIREMENT OF EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.— The Revised

Naturalization Law requires the applicant to have enrolled all his children in public or private schools

recognized by the Government in order to be entitled to naturalization. In the case at bar, applicant

admitted that his daughter studied in China where she had always lived since she was brought there at

the age of two. She was not, therefore, educated in schools approved or recognized by the Government

of the Philippines. The fact that she was outside of the Philippines at the time she was a minor does not

excuse her father-applicant from complying with the law as to her education when she was of schoolage (Quing Ku Chay vs. Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil., 736). Neither does the fact that at the time

of the filing of the application she had already reached the age of majority release him from said

obligation (Ibid.).

2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER.— The application for naturalization was

filed on June 30, 1948. In an affidavit dated September a12, 1948, the applicant admitted the existence

of his tenth child. He did not amend his application to insert therein this additional child, and neither did

he make mention of her until he was forced to admit it on cross-examination. Held: That existence of

this child is a material matter in the consideration of his application, as the applicant would have

succeeded in proving that he posses all the requirements of the law not this matter been elicited at thetime of the trial. In view of this suppression of a material fact in his application, the applicant has not

proved that he possess good moral character.

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J p:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo approving the petition of Eusebio

Manzano Dy Chan Tiao for naturalization. The evidence submitted by petitioner shows that he came to

the Philippines on June 10, 1909, and since then has continuously resided in the Philippines; that he is

married to Irene Gonzales, with whom he has nine children, namely, Elena, Felipe, Felisa, Ricardo,Lourdes, Loreto, Federico, Virginia, and Teresita, all of whom were born in the Philippines in the years

1927, 1929, 1930, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938, 1943, and 1946, respectively; that he has enrolled their

children in schools recognized by the Government, wherein Philippine Government is taught; that he

knows how to speak and write English and Ilongo; that he has lived and mingled with Filipinos; that he

has an annual income of more than P3,000 obtained through business; that he believes in organized

government, and is opposed to the principle of the necessity of force or violence in asserting the success



and predominance of political ideas and principles; and that he is a Catholic, and does not believe in

polygamy. In the course of his cross-examination he admitted having another daughter by the name of

Fanny Dy, whom he and his wife had brought to China when only two years of age, and who has not

come to the Philippines, but has studied in Fusan, Amoy, China, where she has lived since then, but who

is now married there (Exhibit 2).

The original opposition of the Solicitor General was based on the ground that the petitioner had not

filed a declaration of intention as required by section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law, and has not

complied with the requirement of section 6 thereof as to the education to be received by his children.

After trial, in a supplementary opposition, the Solicitor General further opposed the petition on the

ground that petitioner is not of good moral character, as he has deliberately omitted the name of one of

his children, Fanny Dy, from his application.

The lower court approved the petition over the opposition of the Solicitor General, who now prosecutes

this appeal, contending that the petitioner has not given primary and secondary education to all his

children in the private schools recognized by the Government, and that petitioner does not, in addition,

possess good moral character.

The contention that petitioner has not educated all his children in schools recognized by the

Government is well founded. It is admitted by petitioner himself that his daughter Fanny Dy studied in

Hosan, Amoy, China (Exhibit 2), where she has always lived since she was brought there at the age of

two. She was not, therefore, educated in schools approved or recognized by the Government of the

Philippines. The fact that Fanny Dy was outside of the Philippines at the time she was a minor does not

excuse her father-applicant from complying with the law as to her education when she was of school

age (Quing Ku Chay vs. Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil. 736). Neither does the fact at the time of the

filing of the application she had already reached the age of majority release him from said obligation

(Ibid.). The petitioner claims exemption from the obligation of filing his declaration of intention under

section 6 of the law. This section requires the applicant to have enrolled all his children in public or

private schools recognized by the Government. Whereas section 5 requires the applicant to have given

education to his minor children of school age (in public or private schools recognized by the

Government), such is not the case with an applicant claiming exemption under section 6. Whatever

reason may have impelled the Legislature to make a distinction, it is not for us to state. All that we are

called upon to do is to apply the law, and since the petitioner claims an exemption from the general

rule, the provision should be interpreted strictly against him.

The second ground of opposition to the approval of the petition is also well founded. The application

was filed on June 30, 1948. Petitioner made an admission of the existence of his tenth child, Fanny Dy, inan affidavit made by him on September 12, 1948 (Exhibit 2). Petitioner did not amend his application to

insert therein this additional child, and neither did he make mention of her until he was forced to admit

it on cross-examination. The existence of this child is a material matter in the consideration of his

application, as the applicant would have succeeded in proving that he possesses all the requirements of

the law had not this matter been elicited at the time of the trial. No explanation has been made why this

fact was omitted by petitioner in his application or in his testimony, and the fact that it would disqualify



him were it known, is sufficient to destroy the presumption of good faith that would ordinarily be

indulged in in his favor. We are not prepared to find the petitioner a man of good moral character, in

view of this suppression of a material fact in his application, and we hold that the applicant has not

proved that he possesses this moral qualification.

The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the petition for naturalization denied. Withcosts against the petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,

concur.

Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

G.R. No. L-6428 August 31, 1954

PATRICIO DAYO, ET AL. vs. FILEMON DAYO

095 Phil 703

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6428. August 31, 1954.]

Testate Estate of the Deceased TOMASA DAYO. PATRICIO DAYO and HIPOLITO DAYO, petitioners-

appellants, vs. FILEMON, AGAPITA, CANDIDO, AMADO, JULIO, LAURA, CRISPINA, FELIX, ADRIANO,

HIPOLITO, CORNELIO, TOMAS, GREGORIA, CASTOR, RITA, TEOFILA, GREGORIO, SILVINO, FELICIDAD,

QUITERIO, IRENE, and EMILIO, all surnamed DAYO, CORNELIA VILLAVERDE, MARIA JARDIN, ASUNCION

VILLAVERDE, RUFINO VILLAVERDE, SABINA TALABONG, LUCAS GAGAN, DIEGO SENO, and SOFIA DE ASIS,

oppositors-appellees.

Tañada, Pelaez & Teehankee, for appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; GENERAL CONSIDERATION FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS APPLIES TO

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.— Although no specific provision exists in the Rules of court regarding the

dismissal of special proceedings, the same general consideration for the dismissal of actions should

apply to their dismissal, with the added circumstances that since they are not contentious suits

depending upon the will of an actor, but upon a state or condition of things or persons not entirely

within the control of the parties interested, dismissals should be ordered not as penalty for neglect of



the applicants, but only in extreme cases where the termination of the proceeding by dismissal is the

only remedy consistent with equity and justice.

2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE OF WILLS; PROBATE CAN NOT BE DISMISSED FUR TO ABSENCE OF COUNSEL

OF APPLICANTS.— In the case at bar, the applicants for the probate of a will were present in court, only

that their lawyer was absent. The probate court denied the motion of counsel for applicants forpostponement and dismissed the application with prejudice. Held: The Rules of Court do not provide for

dismissal of an action on the ground of the absence of counsel. The probate court should have given the

applicants an opportunity, even, in the absence of their lawyer, to continue presenting their evidence

(as the case only needed the formal presentation of the deposition of the third attesting witness),

instead of dismissing the application for probate.

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J p:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the Honorable VicenteSantiago presiding, dismissing the petition for probate filed and pending continuation of trial in the

above-entitled proceedings. The petition for probate was filed on May 28, 1947, and was set for hearing

on June 24,1947. Three oppositions were filed against the petition, one by relatives of the decedent

represented by Attorney Felixberto M. Serrano, another by others represented by Attorney Vicente

Constantino, and a third by Sofia de Asis represented by Attorneys De Mesa and De Mesa. The hearing

of the petition took place as scheduled on June 24, 1947, and at said hearing the original will and a

duplicate were presented, and the testimonies of two attesting witnesses taken. The third attesting

witness is Attorney Nicodemus L. Dasig of Manila, and authority for the taking of his deposition was

obtained by the applicant. The deposition was actually taken on January 3, 1948, and certified to the

court in May, 1948. No action appears to have been taken on the case by the court or by the parties therest of the year 1948, but in the year 1949 the following proceedings were taken:

Date Nature of Proceeding Action taken

February 9 Motion by applicant to set Court did not grant

case for continuation of motion but ordered the

hearing transcription of the

stenographic notes.

July 29 Motion of applicant to set Court order, August 9,

case for continuation of setting trial for

hearing September 1.

August 23 Motion for postponement Granted. Attorney for



by Atty. F. M. Serrano, on petitioners did not

the ground that he is busy appear; postponed to

attending sessions of to September 23rd.

Congress

September 23. Telegraphic petition of Granted in order of

Atty. F. M. Serrano to September 29; post-

postpone trial. poned November 8

November 15. Order setting hearing for

December 6.

December 6. Order postponing for

December 21 trial of case

because of absence of clerk

of court and conformity of

parties.

December 12. Motion for postponement of Denied by Court

Attys. De Mesa & De Mesa December 19th.

on the ground that the lawyer

was going to act as sponsor

in a wedding.

December 19. Attorney for petitioner Denied by Court

telegraphs conformity December 19th.

to petition.

December 21. Hearing, Present were

applicants without lawyer;

oppositors oppositors with



their attorneys.

Motion for postponement Denied by Court on

by attorney for applicants December 21 and

alleging: "que el infrascrito dismissed petition

esta mejorandose de for probate, with

su reciente ataque de prejudice.

fiebre reumatica, y aunque

este dia ha podido bajar

un momento a la calle,

es el case de que no puede

todavia hacer un viaje

por tren o auto, como se

acredita por el adjunto

Certificado Medico," which

states that Atty. Salazar

Legarda, "is suffering

from rheumatoid arthritis

with acute episodes of attacks.

With his partial recovery,

it is advised that he should

keep and must avoid jerky

movements or any muscular

strenuous activity."

January 4, (1950) Motion for reconsideration, Denied by Court on

by attorney for applicants, March 31, 1950.



alleging partly that he himself

was to testify, as he is the

one who prepared the will,

and the words "her mark"

were placed by him thereon,

etc.

January 9. Opposition to motion for

reconsideration. Attention

called to fact that Atty. Salazar

appeared in Manila at hearing

of Electoral Tribunal on

December 21, 1949.

January 15, (1950) Oppositions of other oppositors

to motion for reconsideration.

On this appeal it is contended that the dismissal of the petition for probate is not justified by the

provisions of section 3 of Rule 30 of the Rules, and that inasmuch as the proceedings are special in

nature and no specific provision exists in the Rules regarding their dismissal as in ordinary cases, the trial

court should have given opportunity to the applicants, even in the absence of their lawyer, to continue

presenting their evidence (as the case only needed the formal presentation of the deposition of the

third attesting witness), instead of dismissing the application.

It is true that the Rules do not expressly provide for the application of Rule 30 in special proceedings,

but the same general considerations should apply to their dismissal (of special proceedings), with the

added circumstance that since they are not contentious suits depending upon the will of an actor, but

upon a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested,

dismissals should be ordered not as penalty for neglect of the petitioners, but only in the extreme cases

where the termination of the proceeding by dismissal is the only remedy consistent with equity and

justice. Here was a will of a decedent, in accordance with the provisions of which his properties are to

be disposed of. The oppositors are not in court because they have been forced to do so by summons, as

in ordinary cases; they are in court voluntarily, claiming right by intestate succession. Their right should

not be considered paramount to those of the deceased owner, who had tried to dispose of his

properties. Every opportunity should be afforded to the parties, who seek to have the decedent's will

carried out, to have the will admitted to probate before the oppositor's claims can be given



consideration. We hold that this opportunity was improperly refused the applicants in these

proceedings.

Even under the provisions of section 3 of Rule 30, the dismissal may not be justified. Said rule provides:.

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute.— When plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his

action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the

action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal

shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

In the case at bar, the petitioners were present in court, only that their lawyer was absent. The rule does

not provide a dismissal on the ground of the absence of counsel. In a case decided by this court (Lourdes

del Prado de Alegre vs. Jose Nespral, G. R. No. L-3933, promulgated May 28, 1952), it was held that

there is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled

trial, as when he or his attorney made no appearance at all. In the case at bar, only counsel for

petitioners were absent, not the parties interested in the probate. Neither can it be said that they have

failed "to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the rules or any

order of the court." Petitioner had also never asked for postponement; it was always the oppositors who

had asked for it, and at all times it was always granted by the court. As appellants claim, the most that

the judge below could have done, under the circumstances, was to grant the petitioners an hour or two

to engage the services of a new lawyer to terminate with the formal presentation of the deposition of

the last attesting witness and the documentary evidence.

An examination of the order denying the motion for reconsideration seems to indicate that the trial

judge was peeved at what he thought to have been an act of bad faith of counsel for petitioners in

claiming that he was unable to appear at the trial. There can be no justification for this conclusion, that

petitioners' counsel tried to mislead the court, misrepresenting that he was ill and could not attend.What counsel actually stated is that he was prohibited by his condition to undertake the trip to Lucena,

Quezon, from Manila. And this is proved by the medical certificate attached to the motion for

postponement.

We, therefore, hold that the trial judge erred in dismissing the petition for probate. The order appealed

from is hereby reversed and the case ordered reinstated for further proceedings. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and

Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC. October 5, 1988.]

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

SYLLABUS



1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 856, AS AMENDED; PROVINCIAL/CITY

COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE; PERFORMS ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.— It is evident that such

Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are

those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own

welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or

such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEC, ART VIII, NEW CONSTITUTION; PROHIBITION TO MEMBERS OF THE

JUDICIARY REGARDING THEIR DISCHARGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS I QUASI-JUDICIAL OR

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.— Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other

courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or

administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge

Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions,

will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. This declaration

does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming

indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of thestructure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the

solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-

members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said

Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance

may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting:

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 856, AS AMENDED; "ADMINISTRATIVE

FUNCTIONS" HOW CONSTRUED.— "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the

executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It

refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer

the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or

control.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVINCIAL/CITY COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE; DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY REGULATION

OR CONTROL OVER CONDUCT OF ANY INDIVIDUAL.— Membership in the Provincial or City Committee

on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals.

Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-

legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the

judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as thegroup merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those

involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the

members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have

the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.



3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

APPLY AS WELL TO THE PROVISIONS WHICH DEFINE OR CIRCUMSCRIBE OUR POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

AS THEY DO TO THE PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. — It is well

for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the

Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimiting the exercise of our jurisdiction and

functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply

as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the

provisions governing the other departments of government. The Court should not adopt a strained

construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing

times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this case — constitutional provisions are

interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.

Melencio-Herrera, J., dissenting:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEC. 12, ART. VIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN RESTRICTIVE

INTERPRETATION; COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, NOT THE AGENCY CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROHIBITION. —

Justices Melencio-Herrera hesitates to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section

12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr. What Justice

Melencio-Herrera believes as contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for

example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-

time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of

judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions. The

Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study

group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said

committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.

R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA, J p:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent

this Court a letter which reads:

"Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

of the Philippines

Manila

Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator

Supreme Court of the Philippines



Sir:

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos

Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee

on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended

by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the HonorableProvincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your

ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the

appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the

position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to

request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties

attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the

Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B),

both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as

Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the

Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive

Judge.

May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge"

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on

Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving

the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among

the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be

found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority

for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper

administration of criminal justice.



It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs

of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the

policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its

existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29

September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that —

"SECTION 6. Supervision.— The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision

of the Secretary of Justice. Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the

Secretary of Justice."

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall

not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.

VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,

which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is

constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig

(39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

"2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic

rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a

member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.

That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of

the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can

pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It

is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be

confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no leas than the maintenance of

respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or

unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form

part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases

contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to

said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such

assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. cdll

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.



Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-

judicial or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently

refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and

controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is

where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and

the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions,

determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make

government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:

"Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and

affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry

out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic

law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29

September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary.)"

we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve

any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on

Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely

advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which

concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems

involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or

detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations

which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular

function involved in their implementation.

We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration

of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and

various other officials concerned erecting watertight barriers against one another and limiting our

interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work,

all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the

majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements

cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their

findings to the people, public or private, where their findings would do the most good.



The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on

Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it

the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the

prohibited functions? If Judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even

encouraged to assist these Committees? The line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.

The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may

compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration

of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment

of the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns.

Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs.

As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away

from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but

which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut

himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the

presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be

said that the Judges— the officials most concerned with justice— have hesitated to join in such a

worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.

It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions

of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimiting the exercise of our jurisdiction and

functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply

as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the

provisions governing the other departments of government. The Court should not adopt a strained

construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing

times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this case—

constitutional provisions are

interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. Cdpr

I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to become a

member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such

quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions

involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions

or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.



The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a

study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said

committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.

The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under EO No. 326 amending EO No.

856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by nomeans extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 198-J. May 31, 1971.]

PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE; IN CASE AT BAR,

RESPONDENT'S RECEIPT OF SALARIES WITHOUT ACTUALLY PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS JUDGE NOT

DISHONESTY.— Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in

fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the

sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent

has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath

and formally assuming his position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge

even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while

preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do,

were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the

Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed impair his position as a

judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to furnish

him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to

provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally

work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time

made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast

experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the

circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government,

since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any

fault on his part.

2. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 5, 55 AND 58 OF THE JUDICIARY ACT AND CIRCULAR NO. 10 DATED FEBRUARY6, 1952 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; APPLICABLE ONLY TO JUDGES ACTUALLY HOLDING TRIALS

AND HEARINGS AND MAKING DECISIONS AND ORDERS.— Admittedly respondent has not prepared and

submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually

required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of

Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those

laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and



hearings and making decisions and orders. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for

taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he

simply made himself available for the purposes for which he was appointed. That he could not actually

hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of

providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have

it ready. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been

assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiative and

control of the Secretary of Justice and not of the respondent.

3. POLITICAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LIMITS OF COLLABORATION OF JUDGE

WITH OFFICERS OR OFFICES UNDER THE OTHER GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. — Of

course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long

standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if

it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line

between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or

officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealouslyobserved, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the

people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions

in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence

of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check

and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the

serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave

importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of

even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters

submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still,

reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or thisSupreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this

practice is discontinued.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; PRINCIPLE EMBODIED IN

DOCTRINE; REASON FOR DOCTRINE.— The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our

Constitution, embodies the principle of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to

Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law.

Three departments of government are thus provided for, the legislative vested with the lawmaking

function, the executive with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the

administration of justice, deciding cases according to law. The reason for such a doctrine is to assure

liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and thus in a

position to impose its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be

disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and coequal, each

having exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to

guarantee independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of



each. Much less is control by only one of the three departments of any or both of the others

permissible.

2. ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF JUDICIARY SHOULD NOT ASSUME A POSITION OR PERFORM A DUTY NON-

JUDICIAL IN CHARACTER; RATIONALE THEREFOR.— While the doctrine of separation of powers is a

relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precludingits doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a

position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a

plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher

court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an

executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the

rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his

sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with

nothing less . . . Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, a 1968 decision.

Justice J.B.L. Reyes who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to

Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held thatthe Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise

any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the

administration of judicial functions, and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes

between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.

600)." It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the Constitution, there was a

commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked to discharge non-judicial

functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm,

speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme Court and its members should not and

cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining

to or connected with the administering of judicial functions."

R E S O L U T I O N

BARREDO, J p:

Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,

formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his

former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . . gross

incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly)

Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:

"2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent

herein, has not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided

and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three

months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced

by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of



which is hereto attached as Annex 'A', Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice

dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'B';

"3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966)

from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the

certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex 'A', Item No. 2 thereof;

"4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and

knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining

to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to

February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of

Justice hereto attached as Annex 'C' and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex 'A', last paragraph thereof,

aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation of section 5 of

the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:

'. . . District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application for

leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their

salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal

cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or

more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate and . . . x no

salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Emphasis supplied).

"5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from

January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the number of hours of session that the Court holds

daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the

Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

"6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First

Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his

fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.

"7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing

him that he was entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:

'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office of

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'

"That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcyincompatible to the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral character

appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of justice."

Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:

"THE FACTS



"Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with

station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to

be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the

municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the

Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize

the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the

necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by

the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by

the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that

the province was not in a position to do so).

"As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent

that the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as

the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the

projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several

municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over someof the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will

shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the Republic

Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce

the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was the second floor of the

Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease

agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal

government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was

rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the

court and for the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the

provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies andmaterials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the

necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the

appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23, 1970 and

the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see

enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex 'A').

"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court,

he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice,

respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all

the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretaryof Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without

being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

"Charges Have No Basis—

"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave

incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.



"It is respectfully submitted that—

"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above

does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to

the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a

sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicialduties.

"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from

the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of

Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex

'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other

judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.

"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of

P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of

Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200

and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to

assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of

Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.

"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the

Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.

"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started to perform their

judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory provisions and circular (please see

enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').

"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has

not entered into the performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could

a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special proceedings,

applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have been under submission for

decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or

before the date of making the certificate.' And how could such a judge hold court in his place of

permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as

prescribed by Section 58: and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet in

physical existence. Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10

cannot apply to such a judge."

In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint and

answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the

Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.



After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. To

begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the respondent complained

of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainant's

theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such,

since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet

performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties

of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position

as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition

that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for

any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the

Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way

possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as

in this case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and

facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without

any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the

part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the

Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for

sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not

improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries,

while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part. As to whether or

not in doing so he placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to

the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of

the government will be discussed anon. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's

theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments andstatus of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the

corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started

performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them

contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On

the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid

confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose

for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was

appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him there with seem to have

been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it ready. Conceivably, under the law,

with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all

these preparations, but that is something within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and

not of the respondent.

Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long

standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if

it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line



between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or

officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously

observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the

people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions

in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence

of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check

and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the

serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave

importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of

even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters

submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still,

reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this

Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this

practice is discontinued.

WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution befurnished the Secretary of Justice.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Barredo.

Respondent Judge clearly should be exculpated of the charge filed against him. What is more the

opinion of the Court possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright and unequivocal language the

disapproval of the practice hitherto followed of having members of the judiciary perform non-judicial

functions. There is no doubt to my mind of its repugnancy to the fundamental concept of separation of

powers. It is to that aspect of the question as well as what, to my mind, is the doubtful constitutionality

of allowing the Secretary of Justice to exercise supervisory authority over lower court judges that this

brief concurring opinion addresses itself.

1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution, 1 embodies the

principle of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President, and the

Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three departments ofgovernment are thus provided for, the legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the executive

with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the administration of

justice, deciding cases according to law. 2 The reason for such a doctrine is to assure liberty, no one

branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose

its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be disregarded; he could

be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and co-equal, each having exclusive



cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee

independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of each. Much

less is control by only one of the three departments of any or both of the others permissible. 3

It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the independence of each of the

departments from the other being absolute. This is so especially as between the legislative andexecutive departments. What the former enacts, the latter implements. To paraphrase Roosevelt, the

letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the impulse of a common purpose compels

cooperation, It could be carried to the extent of such powers being blended, without undue danger to

liberty as proved by countries having the parliamentary forms of government. This is especially so in

England and in Switzerland, where the tradition of freedom possesses strength and durability. It does

not admit of doubt, however, that of the three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a function the

most sensitive and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only between citizens but

between citizens and government, the limits of whose authority must be respected. In a system like

ours, every exercise of governmental competence, whether coming from the President or from the

lowest official, may be challenged in court in an appropriate legal proceeding. This is an aspect of thetheory of checks and balance likewise provided for in the Constitution. 4 It is thus indispensable that

judicial independence should, by all means, be made secure. Not only that. The feeling that judges are

not in any way subject to the influence of the executive and legislative branches must be pervasive;

otherwise, there would be loss of confidence in the administration of justice. With that gone, the rule of

law is placed in dire peril.

Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceding observation blunted by the recognition that there could

be no precise delineation of the respective competence allotted to the legislative, the executive and the

judicial departments under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlapping and interlacing of functions could

not entirely be avoided. For as observed by Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in a case of Philippineorigin: 5 "The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.

Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one

extreme to the other. . . . When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that

they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on." 6 Further on, he

added: "It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words

we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with

mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable

to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires." 7

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic

rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a

member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.

That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of

the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can

pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It

is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be



confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of

respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

It is apposite to quote from an opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of the New York Court of

Appeals, 8 when that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that would vest in a justice of its

Supreme Court the power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion explained why: "Heis made the delegate of the Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a public officer . . . At the

word of command he is to give over the work of judging, and set himself to other work, the work of

probing and advising. His findings when made will have none of the authority of a judgment. To borrow

Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any

rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its branches. They will be mere advice to

the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject them altogether. From the beginnings of

our history, the principle has been enforced that there is no inherent power in Executive or Legislature

to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the

fulfillment of judicial duties . . . The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax as merely

doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensibleapproximation, as that of the separation of powers. Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence

of the judicial function may be destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity to

consult and recommend . . ." 9

Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, 10 a 1968 decision, Justice J.B.L.

Reyes, who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to Federal

Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. 11 It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held that the

Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any

power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the

administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputesbetween public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.

600)." 12 It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the Constitution, there was a

commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked to discharge non-judicial

functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 13 mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm,

speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme Court and its members should not and

cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining

to or connected with the administering of judicial functions." 14

3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise

accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in

accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute

in force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice

Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what previous

secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the statutory authority of the

Department of Justice over courts of first instance and other inferior courts. 15 While a distinction

could be made between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with

by the Department and the task of administration which is executive in character, still the conferment of



such competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is, to my mind, not only unwise

but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over matters

deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised

according to their conscience alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is

magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their

promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence

becomes even more difficult. It is thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That

certainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive in judicial affairs

arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the adverse party in criminal

cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be

looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.

The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my mind,

anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power granted the department head, respondent

Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the

Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is tobe totally freed from any supervisory authority of an executive department.

Makasiar, J., concurs.

Documents

Admin Law cases.docx