Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994FELICIDAD UY,petitioner,vs.HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER,respondents.Albon & Serrano Law Office for petitioner.Ramon M. Velez for private respondents.DAVIDE, JR.,J.:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the order dated 2 July 1993 of public respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss is based on the failure of the private respondents, as the offended parties therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of disputes to theLupong Tagapamayapaof the proper barangay.At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be resolved in the light of the revised law onkatarungang pambarangayprovided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992,1this Court would have declined to accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled that while it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court.2The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not complicated.Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafterAtayde) the other half of the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor.3The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties.On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing.4The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafterJavier), on the other.On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner.5On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as Barangay Cases Nos. 10236and 1024.7The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.8On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-affidavits.9In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila.10She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No. 1023.11On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to theLupong Tagapamayapaand pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which read:The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit. In the first place, the offense subject of these cases accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had started the conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has been achieved by the barangay (Annex "2" of the Counter-Affidavit of the accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had already filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused and complainant are residents of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is about to prescribe.Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so holds, that the complainants may go directly to the court where their complaint is about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1508."12A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.Hence this special civil action forcertiorari. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to theluponis not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to theluponis not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assumingarguendothat prior referral to theluponapplies to the case of private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement.In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of the Office of the Solicitor General. The private respondents filed a rejoinder to the petitioner's reply to their comment and a reply to the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which the petitioner and the private respondents complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it be excused from filing a memorandum.The petition is impressed with merit.The law on thekatarungang pambarangaywas originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof,13revised the law on thekatarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof read as follows:Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. Thelupponof each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriatelupon;(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by appropriatelupon;(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of theluponunder this Code are filed may, at anytime before trial,motu propriorefer the case to theluponconcerned for amicable settlement.Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before theluponof said barangay.(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .xxx xxx xxx(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by theluponor pangkat secretary:Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.xxx xxx xxxSec. 412. Conciliation. (a)Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of theluponshall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before theluponchairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by theluponsecretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by theluponchairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:(1) Where the accused is under detention;(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling forhabeas corpusproceedings;(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and supportpendente lite; and(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.xxx xxx xxxSec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary of Justice promulgated theKatarungang PambarangayRules to implement the revised law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as follows:SECTION 8. Failure to appear. a. SanctionsThe complaint may be dismissed when complainant, after due notice, refuses or willfully fails to appear without justifiable reason on the date set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal ordered by the Punong Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving the complainant an opportunity to explain his non-appearance shall be certified to by theLuponor Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and shall bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action as that dismissed.xxx xxx xxxSec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action. The prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipts by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by theLuponor Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in court or government office for adjudication shall be subject to the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules.It may thus be observed that the revisedkatarungang pambarangaylaw has at least three new significant features, to wit:1. It increased the authority of theluponin criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by theluponor pangkat secretary." What is referred to asreceiptby thecomplainant of the complaintis unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by thelupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of theluponand if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local Government code, also broadens the authority of theluponin the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result.14Elsewise stated, convenience is theraison d'etreof the rule on venue.The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties.While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to theluponas a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.In Peregrina vs. Panis,15this Court stated:Thus,Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), andVda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay and their disputes does not fall under any of the excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so inGarces vs. Court of Appeals:16In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.xxx xxx xxxThe precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. (emphasis omitted)There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the appropriateluponoperated as a waiver thereof.17Furthermore, when such defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured the defect.18On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.19Section 18 thereof provides:Sec. 18. ReferraltoLupon. Cases requiring referral to theLuponfor conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.In the proceeding before the courta quo, the petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati,in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code."20Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the courta quobecause (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantially complied with it.The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to theluponwas necessary before filing the informations.Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on theKatarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.21He should have applied the revisedkatarungang pambarangaylaw under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with theluponof Valenzuela Makati.Moreover, having brought the dispute before theluponof barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of theluponby unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.Grantingarguendothat the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that per the medical certificates22the injuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties arelightunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would prescribe intwo monthspursuant to Article 90.Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with theluponof Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before theluponof Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to theluponin her counter-affidavit.23Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.24The request is dated23 June 1993,25or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the courta quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to thelupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revisedkatarungang pambarangaylaw plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by theluponshould, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.Costs against the private respondents.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 113615 January 25, 1996BIENVENIDO VELARMA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA PANSACOLA,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Will the lot owner's agreement to sell the property to the government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a forcible entry suit? This was the main question raised in this petition for review oncertiorariwhich seeks to set aside the Decision dated January 26, 1994 of the Court of Appeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution dated October 25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was transferred from the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on the submissions of the parties, it was assigned to undersignedponentefor the writing of the Court's Resolution.This case arose from an "ejectment suit"2filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981, petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in the name of private respondent's husband Publio (deceased); (2) that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences during which petitioner promised to vacate the land and remove his house therefrom, notwithstanding which he still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted Criminal Case No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for violation of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated demands to vacate, petitioner continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the suit.The trial court in its nine-page judgment rendered on April 2, 1991 found that private respondent had satisfactorily established her ownership over the parcel of land in question. It also found that petitioner entered and occupied private respondent's land "without authority of law and against the will of the owner . . . through strategy and stealth."3Furthermore, it declared that the claim of petitioner that "by virtue of an agreement between the former owner (Publio Pansacola) and the Municipality of Mauban . . . the lot [being occupied by petitioner] became the property of the government, and therefore, [respondent] has no cause of action against [petitioner]" was "baseless and unwarranted"4since no deed had ever been executed to "perfect the deal" between the municipality and Publio for the exchange of a portion of the abandoned provincial road with a portion of the lot owned by Publio (on which was built petitioner's dwelling), such that the Pansacola spouses later demanded that petitioner vacate the land and sought the help of the barangay council. They eventually instituted the criminal case against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove his house therefrom and pay private respondent exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively.The Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.Petitioner insists that private respondent has no cause of action against him because the land on which his house stands belongs to the government. Petitioner's dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new provincial highway, part of which was constructed on a portion of the land belonging to and titled in the name of private respondent's husband. According to petitioner, "while it is conceded that the premises [occupied by him] is still within the area covered by [private respondent's] title, nonetheless, . . . [the subject premises] . . . already belong to the government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge."5Petitioner's claim is anchored on a document entitled "Minutes of the Meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon" dated November 5, 1974. Therein, Publio Pansacola signified before the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial road.As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land traversed by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced by petitioner to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, private respondent continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.We note that the ejectment suit should have been filed before the Municipal Trial Court, and not the Regional Trial Court. The issue of ownership, however, had been specifically raised before the Regional Trial Court by petitioner himself, who at the same time did not move to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he filed his answer and went to trial. Estoppel by laches has already set in at this point in time.6Petitioner also challenges the findings of the respondent Court that prior referral to the Lupong Barangay had been made before the ejectment case was filed in the lower court, and that therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. We agree, however, with the trial court's finding that -The compliance (with) the provision of P.D. No. 1508, Katarungang Pambarangay Law, can no longer be assailed by the defendant [herein petitioner], its reference having beenadmitted(in) his affirmative allegations and affirmative defenses in the Answer (page 3, par. 3.3 of defendant's answer).7(emphasis supplied)Other issues raised had already been adequately traversed and disposed of by the appellate Court.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes1Fourth Division, composed ofJ. Asaali S. Isnani,ponenteandJJ. Nathanael P. De Pano Jr. (chairman) and Corona Ibay-Somera.2Civil Case No. 0371-M, filed on June 24, 1987; Judge Antonio O. Cabungcal, presiding.3RTC Judgment, p. 9;rollo, p. 39.4RTC Judgment, pp. 6 & 7;rollo, pp. 36 & 37.5Petition, p. 9;rollo, p. 15.6Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 7, Tacloban City, et al.,226 SCRA 408 (September 14, 1993);Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,224 SCRA 477 (July 5, 1993).7RTC Judgment, p. 8;rollo, p. 38.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS, respondents.Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.Luis S. Cuvin for private respondent.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508); SCOPE OF POWER; RULE. From the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities. The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion. In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1 dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent Mila Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are the only legitimate children of spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia Santos as shown by the certificates 2 of the latter's Record of Marriage and the petitioners' Record of Birth.However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived with Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to be the sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by the latter and sold to private respondent Mila Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered under TCT No. T-120656-M.On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against Sagraria Lozada, Gorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido, Eduardo Candido, Register of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private respondent and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on the ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the same municipality with the petitioners.On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned for lack of prior referral of the dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay, without prejudice." 5Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 which was denied in an Order 7 dated August 9, 1991.Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint instituted by the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and cities.The petition is impressed with merit.Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 provides:"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:"(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof:"(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;"(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;"(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;"(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."Further, section 3 of the same law provides:"SEC. 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; . . ."From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities.In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are residents of Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while defendants' residences are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge Candido at Javier Compound, Bo. Sto. Nio, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina Candido at Road 2, Doa Faustina Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388 Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; and the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan at his official address in Bulacan.The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion. 8 In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays other than the one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the trial court dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 697-M-90 in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are hereby annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for further proceedings and to REINSTATE private respondent Mila Contreras as defendant in Civil Case No. 697-M-90. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995WILSON DIU and DORCITA DIU,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and PATRICIA PAGBA,respondents.REGALADO,J.:Before us is an appeal bycertiorarifrom the judgment of the Court of Appeals1setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16,2without prejudice to the refiling of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law."Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention to the lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation of justice and the regrettable abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this case. For, if just to collect an indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred way back in 1988, the proceedings had to go through all the rungs of the judicial ladder and still present the prospect of hereafter infringing again upon the time of this Court and three other courts, such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the very law which ironically was intended to prevent such delay, then the bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take stock of themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are other cases agonizing under the same ennui created by our courts.Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.Petitioners brought the matter before theBarangayChairman of Naval and the latter set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, thebarangaychairman issued a Certification to File Action.3Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.Private respondents, in their Answer,4while admitting the indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before thebarangaychairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent and her husband.Aside from petitioners claim and private respondents' counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of Naval also resolved the issue on whether or not there was compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on conciliation. In resolving the said issue, the trial court relied on the case ofTijam vs.Sibonghanoy5which held that:While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exemption thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining the respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.6However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling against the admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which are the receipts of good marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners' manifestation therein, for not having been properly identified in court.7On private respondents' counterclaims, said trial court also ruled that the same had been settled when the contending parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved on January 9, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Branch 16, in another action between them, that is, Civil Case No. B-0719.8Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the merits. Modifying the decision of the lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that:The case should have proceeded to its conclusion under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .The claim of the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The only pleadings allowed are complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. The case could have been decided based on affidavits of the witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order of the Court, after the preliminary conference, together with the position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by the parties.The need for a formal offer, identification and cross-examination on Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15" was not necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible (sic). The receipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and their possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the suit gives rise to the legal presumption that the debts in the total amount of P7,862.66 have not been paid.Where, under the contract of sale, the ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract of sale, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods.9Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and ordered private respondent Patricia Pagba to pay the former the amount of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees, and the costs of suit.Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising just two issues,viz.: (1) whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in not making a factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply with Presidential Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or not said Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the appeal or case for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508.10Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. If no conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be brought to the regular courts.In the case at bar, it has been established that there was no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed, the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However, the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case ofRamos vs.Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely because he himself has failed to work out an agreement between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute should not end with the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement . . . . InBejer vs.Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, it was held that "failure to avail of conciliation process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss." Inasmuch as petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of action of respondent, objection to the complaint has been timely made.11The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the confrontations before theBarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court finds for petitioners.It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code of 199112which took effect on January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. (b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed or instituted in court . . . unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman . . . .In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before theBarangayChairman of Naval although they were not sent to thepangkatas the same was not constituted. Their meetings with saidbarangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. This prompted the issuance of the following Certification to File Action.13This is to certify that:Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness with complainant but she refused to pay because according to her, complainant has also an unsettled accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be filed in court.Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991.(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZLupon Pangkat ChairmanAttested:(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOSLupon/Pangkat SecretaryAccording to private respondent, however, the above certification is "falsified" since nopangkatwas constituted. She, therefore, insists that petitioners have not complied with the mandatory provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory arbitration. We disagree.While nopangkatwas constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of thebarangaychairman for possible settlement.14The efforts of thebarangaychairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although nopangkatwas formed, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before theluponchairman OR thepangkatis sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing the case in court.This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same law that thebarangaychairman shall constitute apangkatif he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that thebarangaychairman orpunong barangayis himself the chairman of theluponunder the Local Government Code.15From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before thepangkatcaused any prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before thebarangaychairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting before thepangkatis merely a ploy for further delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions therein.The courta quowas likewise correct in invoking the doctrine inTijamand, as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense.16To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the complaint and require the parties to meet before thepangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent court, they did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for the sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right to confrontation before thepangkat.However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to show or evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their insistence on technical compliance with the requirements of thebarangayconciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this petition is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with thebarangayconciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of their indebtedness.We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in single short sentences in private respondents' Answer in the courta quo, running the implausible gamut from supposed defects in parties tores judicataand up to capacity to sue, without any statement of the facts on which they would rely to support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be countenanced.The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no compliance with thebarangayconciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer in the trial court was that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even the semblance of any reason to support or explain that allegation. On the other hand, they admitted the confrontations before thebarangaychairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer.17Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they actually did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein.18ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992CECILIA U. LEDESMA,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON,respondents.NOCON,J.:Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 19901ordering the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the Resolution of January 7, 19912denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision.The facts of this case as summarized by thepetitioner in her Memorandum are as follows:Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two (2) units of said apartment building were leased (now being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated December 10, 1984 and except for the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-to-month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and received by, private respondent.Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist, copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-E10" of the said Petition.Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to retain the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment proceeding.3The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision on June 21, 1989 ordering private respondent to vacate the premises, to pay rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P2,500.00.4The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal, affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of attorney's fees which it reduced to P1,000.00.5Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of Appeals when he elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled, thus:IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989 of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is reversed and set aside and the Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No costs.6Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the Court of Appeals erred 1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the lower court when in fact and in truth his answer and position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence on record;2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived his right to question the lack of cause of action of the complaint, if there is any, contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and evidence on record;3. In giving undue weight and credence to the self-serving allegations of the private respondent that summons was not served him, contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that barangay authorities are presumed to have performed their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and grossly and manifestly erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect, contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law and evidence on record.6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . .xxx xxx xxxwhile Section 9 states that:Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private respondent in the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals, citingSaludes vs.Pajarillo.7Private respondent had waived said objection, following the line of reasoning inRoyales vs.Intermediate Appelate Court.8Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of cause of action, to wit:xxx xxx xxx4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8, the truth of the matter being that he was not duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear for hearing.9xxx xxx xxx7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering defendant.8. The certification to file action (annex D of the complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued as the defendant was never summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing in connection with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with warranting the dismissal of the instant complaint.xxx xxx xxx10We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or objections in the court below.Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared before the Lupon Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated in her Petition11and her Memorandum12that:Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipt and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist copies of which are attached herewith as Annexes"E-E10."However, as found out by the respondent court:We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The record of the case is barren showing compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the documentary evidence of the private respondent herself attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion. They show that it is not the private respondent but her son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the other hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More telling is the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant is Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent.13As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because:. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level.14Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 198815 specifically September to December 6 there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office.Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.16As explained by the Minister of Justice with whom We agree:To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the express exceptions made regarding minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.17Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila.18Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss the other issues involved.WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent Court are affirmedin totowith treble costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 117005 June 19, 1997CARLITO D. CORPUZ,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO ALVARADO,respondents.ROMERO,J.:Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court ofAppeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use.Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate the room.2Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said court rendered its decision3which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject premises.His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack of merit by the RTC4on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed decision dated July 14, 1994.5A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated September 1, 1994.6Hence, this petition.The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of said property, and whether the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground to divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction.7The petition is impressed with merit.It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases.8As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possessionde facto.9In the recent case ofRefugia v.Court of Appeals,10however, we ruled that:In the case ofDe la Santa vs.Court of Appeals, et. al., this Court, in making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinal pronouncement inRefugiais applicable.Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel. The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property.11InWilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et al.v.Court of Appeals,12Justice (now Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or document over the property which should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit, to wit:Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document] , 177 SCRA 288 [1989].Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties.It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.13Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held inDui v.Court of Appeals14that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.In any went, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 14, 1994, of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO,petitioners,vs.ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.1The antecedent facts are as follows:Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa2filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,3they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.4Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 19915and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure6to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.7The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 19958denying petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases.9Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.10On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.11More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.12Attached to the motion was a Certification, dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal13stating that the parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a comment and opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive14.On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order15granting private respondents' motion to revive. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration16of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the municipal trial court.17Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition forcertiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the said Order, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order.18In response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment,19arguing that the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.20After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions21, the regional trial court rendered the assailed decision denying the petition forcertiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as follows:Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents' comment thereto, the Court regrets that it cannot agree with the petitioner (sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.22The regional trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration23of the aforementioned decision for lack of merit.24Hence, this petition.Petitioners raise the following questions of law:1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and executory.25Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or information.26Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case.27On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.28Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.29As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.30This Court has previously held that