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ORGANIZATION OJ AFRICAN UNITY.

ORGANISATION DE L'l.JNITE AFRICAINE

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Secretariat I'. O. Box 3243

Addis Ababa .. ~ 441 ..ri.>t

Secretariat B. P. 3243

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CM/~03 (PART I)

Twenty-First Ordinary Session

Addis Ababa - May 1973

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR Tll:E LIBEful.'HON OF AFRICA

(COMMITTEE OF SEVENTEEN)

REPORT OF THE 21ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE C.0-0RDINATINci-------­

COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA TO THE

20TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

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CM/503 (PART I)

Page 1

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBffiATION OF .Al!'.EUCA

(COMMITTEE OF SEYENTEEN).

REPORT OF THE 21ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE CO-ORDINATING

COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBffi.ATION OF AFRICA Ki THE

20TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINIST:ERS

This report covers the period between the 20th Ordinary Session

whioh was held in Kampala, Uganda, in May 1972, and the 21st Ordina~.

Session which took place in .Accra, Ghana from 8; - 12 .. Janua?y. 1973; ,-

2. At its 21st Session, the Committee which was fully "&t~ed

by all.its 17 Members, examined in detail the activities of liberation

movements as well as the developm.ent of the liberation struggle as

a whole. It also considered the reports of the Standing Committee

on Policy and Information, Defence, Finance a~d .Administration,

3, The Inaugural Session of the meeting was addressed by the

Chairman of the National Redemption Council and Head of State of the

Republic of Ghana, His Ex:cellency Colonel I, K. Acheampong, the

out-going Chairman of the Committee, His Ex:oellency Mr. Wanume

Kibedi, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Uganda and also by the

.Administrative Secretary-General of the 0.AU, H.E, Mr. Nzo Ekangaki.

4, The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

Ghana, N.E. Major Kwame Baah, was elected Chairman of the 21st

Session while the following were elected Vice-Chairman: His

Eiccellency, Mr. Celestin Goma-F~utou, Minister Plenipotentiary of the

Republic of Congo and His Ex:cellency, Ambassador Taieb Bouszza of Morocco.

The .Ambassador of Nigeria to Ethiopia, H. E. Mr. Olu Sanu was elected

Rapporteur to be assisted by a Drafting Committee comprising Libya,

Senegal, Zambia and Ethiopia.

I

5, The Committee expressed its satisfaction with ~he political , I

and diplomatic victories soared by the African Group at 'the United

Nations in securing United Nations observer status for some of the

liberation movements and for its success on the inscription of the

Comoro Islands as a dependent territory and was also privileged to

CM/503 (PART I)

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be addressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee

on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories (Committee of

24), the Chairman of the United Nations Committee on Apartheid and the

President of the UN Council for Namibia who attended as speoial observ­

ers, Also attending as observers were representatives from the

following countries: Lesotho, Kenya, Gabon1 Gambia, Mali, Tunisia,

Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Togo, Sudan, Liberia and Burundi. It should

also be noted that this was the.first Ordinary Session of the Committee

since the increase in 1ts membership from ~leven to seventeen.

6. In a· general review of the liberation struggle in both

West and Southern Africa, the Committee noted with satisfaction the /

remarkable progress made by the freedom fighters both in the poli tioaJ.

and military fields, Of particular significance has been the military

achievement ma~e by P.A.I.G.C. in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the

FRELIMO in Mozambique as well as the liberation movements operating

in Angola,

" P.A.I.G.C.: (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde)

7, During the period under review both regional and national

elections were held by the P.A.I.G.C. in the liberated areas of Guinea­

Bissau and Cape Verde in a bid to pave the way for the proclamation of

the territory as an l.ndependent and sovereign state in the very near

future. The elections, which were a spectacular political achievement,

were concluded on the 14th of October 1972. Regional elections _were

held and those elected as members of the Regional Assemblies then

returned 120 members to the National Assembly to work out the programme

for declaration of an Independent State of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

8. In the military field, the P.A.I.G.C. made successive gains

and intensified its operation on various fronts, Thus for example,

in June and July 1972, the P.A,I.G.C. foroes successfully attacked

fortified enemy posts and camps ira Kebn and Cabedu in the Southern

front. In August 1972, P.A.I.G,C. forces also successfully carried

out several military operations in the towns of Catio, in the south,

and Bafata, in the Ell.st-Central of Guinea-Bissau. During the same

period, however, Portugal intensified her pre-mediated policy of

intimidation and oppression against some OAU Member-States bordering

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CM/503 (Part I)

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Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The air space of the Republics of

Guinea and Senegal were freq~ently violated. Notwithstanding the

';rutal repressive acts of Portugal in Cape Verde, the P.A.r:G:c. is

still carrying out political mobilisation and underground ·activi tie.s

in the ii.lands.

9. The Committee weloomed the plans being made by the P:A;I.G.c.

leadership to proolaim Guinea-Bissa~ an independent sovereign S]ite

and of the appeal made by its leader for recognition of the new

State and of the P.A.I.G.C. as its legitimate representatives~ 'l'll.e

leader of the P.A.I.G.C., Dr. Amiloar Cabral, promised to unfold

his party's timetable to OAU Member-States when the time was ripe

and to solicit their financial and moral ~upport at the crucial

time.

10. The Committee after considering the appeal of P.A.I.G.C.

decided that the case of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde merited priority

treatment. It was felt t!lat m.aximum assistance, both financ:i,al as

well as material, should be aocorded to PAIGC to enable that movement . I

to execute its program~e for the launching of a new severeign arid

independent State.

FRELIMO: (Mozambique)

11. One of the most important and· significant developments in

Mozambique has been the opening of a new front by FRELIMO in the

Central and strategic Province of Mani ca· e Sofala. FRELIMO forces

also continued to operate South of the Zambezi along Rhodesian and

· ,Maliawi borders. DJ.ring the period under review, a delegation from the . Executive Se_.,retariat, ~,.mprising the Executive Secretary, the Assistant

Executive Seeretary for Defence, and two others, visited liberated areas

in Mozambique and has reported:-

that the armed struggle in Mozambique was making

satisfactory progress,

that FRELIM0 1 s military strategy was sound,

that FRELIMO enjoys tho f,ull support and confidence

of the people in the liberated areas and

that although the enemy still maintained air superiority

CM/503 (PART I)

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FR:ELIMO was nevertheless'in full command of the situation

on the ground. The report of the OAU Mission to both

Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are submitted as separate '

documents,

12. Sinoe·in the present circum8tances it would be necess~y

for FRELIMO to consolidate its activities in the liberated areas,

recruit more cadres and equip itself with more arms, ammunition,

military equipment as well as non-military equipment like foodstuff

clothing, medicine, school materials and the necessary funds, the

requests submitted by the movement for both material and fightiag

assistance were sympathetically considered l>y the Committee. As a

result, the monthly allocation for foodstuff to FRELIMO has been

increased.

M,P,t.A, and F.N.L.A, (Angola):

13. The successful effo~ts .made by the Foreign Ministers

of Zambia, Zaire, Tanzania and Congo, to uni.te the two liberation

movements of Angola (M.P.L.A. and F.'N.L.A.) were highly commended by

the Committee, The Committee e:irpressed the hope that such an example ' would soon be emulated b<' the other liberA.tion movements. The

Committee took note of the efforts being made by the leaders of the

two liberation movements of Angola to consolidate their union and

to establish a Unified Military Command,

ZIMBABWE:

14. The Committee regretted that the Joint Military Command

which was expected to be established between the two Zimbabwean Liberation

Movements (ZANU and ZAPU) had not yet materialized, In order to effect

the necessary unification between the two inoviements the Committee

decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee comprising Zambia, Cameroon,

Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya to mediate between ZANU and ZAPU and report

to the next As~embly of Heads of State and Government. The Ad Hoc

Committee was invited to endeavour to bring about unity between the

two liberation movements - ZANU and·ZAPU , and to assist them establish

a firm united organisation. Failiqg to come together within the next

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CM/503 (PART I)

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six months, the Committee would have to reoonsider its position

with regard to the two movements,

15, With regard to FROLIZI, the Committee took note of the

views expressed by the Zambian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

to the effeot that the Movement was non-existent in reality. It was

therefore deoided that FROLIZI cadres should be merged into the ZilJ'fJ/

ZANU Joint Milit~y Command. All forms of assistance to FROLIZI as a

movement were to be discontinued forthwith. Only FROLIZI cadres who '

are willing to fight in Zimbabwe under the direction of the Joint

Military Command would henceforth be provided for by the Ex:ecutive

Secretariat,

16. The Committee took note of the increase in

of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe as a result of which

the tempo

the illegal

regime of Ian Smith has resolved to impose an economic blockade

against the Republic of Zambia. The Committee however pledges its

full solidarity with the Government and people of, Zambia in their

endeavour to maintain their sovereignty and economic integrity.

The Committee, also commended Zambia for not yielding to economic

black-mail. A communique issued in this re~pect by the Committee

is attached as Annex I,

SWAPO (Namibia):-

1 7,' While continuing its undergr~und and mobilisation work

inside the country, SWAPO has been carrying out sabotage operations

in the Northern and ])J,stern regions of Namibia (Okavange/Caprivi

Strip),

A.N.C. and P.A.C. (South Africa):-

18. The poor level of activities being carried out by the

two liberation movements the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. has been most

discouraging. Whilst the P.A.C. attributed its failures to inadequate

support from the Liberation Committee, the representative of the A,N,C,

stated that his O:r,ganization was trying to· build-up a political

organization which would gradually develop into an armed struggle.

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19. The Committee decided to re-activate the Sub-Committee

comprising Zambia and Tanzania and assisted by the Ececutive Secretariat,

to assist the PAC and A.N.C. reach an agreement on the formation of

a united front,

UNITY MOVl!Ml!NT OF SOUTH AFRICA:-

20, The Committee felt that the activities of the U.M,S,A.

were not sufficiently effective or satis.factory as to merit recognition

of that movement by the OAU.

S,P,U.P. (Seychelles):-

21, The Committee. expressed appreciation of the stJ.Oategi•.

geographical position which the i"\land-'l._ pons ti tutine the- ~4hl>l.1e.i..

now oocupy especially following the set-back suffered by the WesteYn

imperialist powers in Malagasy. Full support.and sympathy was

expressed for the efforts being made by the S.P.U,P. which is the only ' '

lilo=a.i>ict1 · movement_.advaoail'48' ·indeyerul.enoe £or .the .. Seychelles'•

22, The Committee therefore deoide~ to grant :formal reoognit:i.~n

to the S,P,U.P. in the hope that the movement would be enhanced in its

en•i'eavours for the liberation of that ter~i tory frdm foreign colonial ··r '

domination.

MOLINACO ( Comoro) :-

_,. 23 1 .The Committe~··expressed great satisfaction with the

pol~tioal development in the Comoro !~lands following' the landslide

victory" of'

privileged

,. the Pro,-Independence Coalition Party.· The Committee'was . ' , to if~ten 'to· representative of the MOLINACO ~~ th~ plan~ ..

, ' being made by the Pro~Independenoe Coalition Group to organise a

s'.emin.ax'.-at whicli'a'strategy for the struggle for total independence

would be) <jxawn ,up;· , ,The O::-o$'!3-nisati9n was,. .assur,ed of, :the., C911!mi~!'i'e 1 s

full .co:-;OPe.~a;tion and its representat~ves .w.ere,114y?,~ecj..;tc :g~;t ... in;_t2uch

'11'~ ;th. the Ex:ecuthre Secretariat wl;l9nev:er _their ()rg~:j.<;atiOI) requ~reQ.,,

some .... help. I. ' . ·- •

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CM/503 (PART I) /

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F.L,C.S. and L.M.D, - (So-called French Somaliland) - (Djibouti):-, '

24. The Cammi ttee observed.' that President Pompidou of Franoe

was soon to undertake a state visit to the so-called French Somaliland

(Djibouti). , Due note was taken of the financial grant of £7,500 made

to each of the two movem~nts (F.L.C.S. and L.M.D.) for the purpose

of conducting a campaign to mobilise the people during the French

President's visit to 'that territory. The two movements were however

requested to submit to the next Session of the Committee a detailed

report on the results of their campaign as well as a detailed account

of how the special grant had been utilised. The Committee decided to

send a telegram to President Pompidou expressing the hope that he will

consider the case of the independence of that territory during hi&~.

M.L.S.T,P. (San Tome and Principe):-,

25. After listening to the petition submitted by the represent-,

ative of the M.L;S, T. P. seeking for recognition of his movement by the

OAU to enable it to re-activate the liberation struggle in that Portuguese

territory of San Tome and Principe, the'Committee decided to recognise

the movement.

26. The requests of liberation movements for assistance as

' contained in the report of the Standing O:immi ttee on Defence, have

been approved as part of the 1973/74 Budget. (See Annex IV).

A NEW STMTIDY FOR 'l'HE,LIB:ERATION STRUGGLE;,.-

27. The Committee aooepted the prop~sal made by the Standing

Committee on Defenc~ that aftElI' ten years of armed struggle, it was now

desirable that new ways and means should be devise,d by which the libera-

tion struggle could be further enhanced. The Committee decided to set

up an Ad-Hoo Committee 'to examine a paper submitted by the Standing

Committee on Defence on a review of the policy towards the liberation

struggle with a view to developing a new strategy and new priorities.

Some highlights of the new strategy inolude:-

(i) Training of oadres in independent African States;

(ii) Eliuoational and Technical training facilities for

liberation m~vements in Africa;

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

CM/503 (PART I)

Page 8

Closer oontacts between the fighting cadres and

the OAU Mili·~ary Ex:perts;

Aggressive information and propaganda service;

Member-States. should endeavolir to meet their

o::iligations by paying their arrears o.jt cohtribution .

towards the Speoial, Fu.nd. To this end the Chairman

of the Libera·cion Cammi ttee should undertake trips

to African countries to take up the matter with them;

(vi) The Liberation Cammi ttee and its J!kecutive Secretariat

should endeavour to bring about unity among the libera­

tion movemen·bs in order to oonsti-tute united fronts

in all areas engaged in the liberation struggle.

The Accra Declaration on the new·strategy for the libera•

tion s-trugg:te. ~a . .a.ttached_.as .. .Annex II of this Report,

28. One of the basio suggestions in the strategy was that a

Cammi ttee headed by the Chairman of the Liberation Commi·btee should make

contacts with the outside world particularly the non-aligned nations,

the Scandinavian countr~.es and the 'l'lcialist countries which h1we

sustained the ·armed struggle tb~c·ough the material, and financial aid

made available to the liberation movements. However this suggestion

caused prolonged' discussion as to whether the Organisation should

embark on missions which would entail exorbitant expenditure. It was

decided that no firm deeisions should be taken until the Council of

Ministers had taken a closer look at the matter.

PROMOTION OF PROPAGANDA MACHINERY FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE :-

29. The Cammi ttee a.eaided that a detailed plan for the promo­

tion of qn effective propaganda machinery should be worked out by the

Ex:ecutive Secretariat. Iq this regard, the Ex:ecutive 'secretariat

could make good use of OAU Regional Offices as well as African Diplomatic

Missions abroad. with a view to enlisting their assistance in the disse­

mination of information and propaganda on the liberation struggle.

INFDRMATION SERVICE ;-

30, The Committee deoided that the question· of establishing . '

Intelligence Service in the Ex:eoutive Secretariat should be more

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CM/503 (PART I)

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thoroughly studied before being presented to the Committee for

further consideration.• Meanwhile expenses in respect of day-to-day

information services could be met from the Special Fund. The Committee

emphasised the importance of information and propaganda services and

as such the urgency of. establishment of effective machinery to ca:rry out ....

this task,

EXECUTIVE SJ[)REI'ARIAT

31 •. The Committee felt that matters of indiscipline, incompetence

or inefficiency in the Ex:ecutive Secreta:riat should, in the final anal;y<>ia,

be handled by the Ex:ecutive S<Hl:re·tJlil."iltldi:IUJ.in the terms and pr0visione. of

the OAU Rules· and Regulations. Any such matter that could not easily

b'e resolved by the Ex:eoutive Secreta:ry could be referred to the Admini:o• ' .

trative Seoreta:ry-General who has overall supervision of th.a .a.dm.inati:a-

tion of the General-Secreia:riat and the regional bodi'es of the OAU,

APFDINTMENT OF A NEW .EJXJiJJUTIVE SEJ'.:RE!'ARY :

32. The Committee w~loomed the appointment of Major Hashim

Mbi ta, by the President of Tanzania, as the new Ex:eoutive Secreta:ry of

the Liberation Committee in succession to Mr. George Magombe.

ALLOCATION OF DUTIES TO THE ASSISTANT l!XECUTIVE SEJ::REI'ARIES:

33, The Committee took note of the report of the Standing

Committee on Administration and Finance, It was however felt that

allocation of depa:rtmental duties by the Ex:ecutive S~creta:ry should

take into consideration the qualifications and experience of the

Assistant Ex:ecutive Secreta:ries,

FIRST OAU ALL-AFRICA TRADE FAIR

34, The Committee took note of the over-expenditure incurred

in respect of the pa:rticipation of liberation mwements at the First

All-Africa Trade Fair and the fact that all bills have been settled.'

The Committee's ratification of the over-expenditure should, however

await the audit report being prepa:red by the General Secretariat, for

submission t'o the Advisory Cammi ttee ozi. Budgeta:ry and Financial Matters, . '

on the accounts of the Liberation Committee.

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RENOVATION OF THE MAIN OFFICE BUII,DING OF THE .EXEJUTIVE SIOCJRErARIAT

35, The Committee took note of the steps being taken to

obtain tenders with cheaper quotations for the re-oonstruotion and

repair of the old Secretariat Office building in Dar es Sala.am.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTl!RS - MANAGEMENT OF JJUNJ)S :

36. On the ques·tion of the signing of the Cheq_ues of the

Committee's funds, the Committee'deoides as follows :-

GJ!Nl!RAL ]UN])

(a) As regards the management of the General Fund

the co-signatories to .the cheques shall be the

Assistant Ex:ecutive Secretary in Charge of Administ:r-ation

and Finance,, and the Accountant, in conformity with the ,

practice which obtains in the General-Secretariat of the

OAU. The Ex:ecutive Secretary shall, however, be a reserve , . signatory in the ev·ent of the absence from post of either

of the two principal signatories,

SP ElJ IAL ]UN])

(b)· For the management of the Special Fund, the Ex:ecutive

Secretary and the Assistant Ex:eoutive Secretary

(Administra,tion and Finance) shall be the sole signatories

of cheques drawn from this, fund •

. CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT "RULES OF PROCEDURE

37, The Draft Rules of Procedure drawn up by the Sub-Committee

set ~p for the purpose by the Standing Committee on Administration and

Finance, was presented to the Committee by the Ececutive Secretariat, The Committee however, decided to defer the examination and discussion

of the same to the next Session.

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APPOINTMJNT OF MILITARY EiCPERTS :

38. The Committee approved the budget proposed for Military

Ex:perts as contained in Annex III. It decides to postpone discussion.

of the re-appraisal of its policy on the mode of their appointment,

functions and geographical distribution until the next Session.

PROPOSED BUDGE!' - SP:ElJIAL FUND 1973/74

39, The Committee approved the budget of the Special Fund as

contained in Annex IV.

The Committee decided to maintain the status quo with

regard to the budgetary appropriations for the 1973/74 financial yea:r

but that future budgetary appropriations should take, into account the

list of priorities set out in the newly-devised strategy and the

\udgets submitted by the liberation movements.

I CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB REPU13LIC OF IDYPT :

40. The Committee unanimously adopted a communique on the

.continued Israeli aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt

and pledged its full support for and solidarity with the Egyptian·,

people in their legitimate struggle to recover totally their occupied

territory and to maintain by all means their territorial integrity.

Text of communique is attached as Annex V.

VENUE OF NEX:T MEEI'ING 41. The Committee accepted with appreciation the invitation

extended by the Somali Government through its Secretary of State,

H.E.·Mr. Jalle Omar Arteh, to hold its next Ordinary Session in

Mog,,cisoio •

CLOSING CEREMONY:

42, The 21st. Ordinary Session was formally closed by His

Ex:oellenoy the Chairman of the National Redemption Co~noil and Head

of State of the Republic of Ghana, Col. I.K. Acheampong and the Chair­

man of the Liberation Committee, H.E.· The Commissioner for Foreign

Affairs; Major Kwame Baah, The Committee has taken note with thanks

the offer of increased assistance by the Government of Ghana to libera­

tion movements in various fields including ~he establishment of an Information Centre for the +iberation struggle, Fund-Raising Campaigneto,

MOTION OF THANKS: 43, A motion of thanks was moved by H.E. The Foreign Minister

of the United Republio'of Tanzania, Hon. John Malecela, on behalf of the

members of the Liberation Committee. 1 ~oOo--

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/ CM/503(Part I)

_'INNEJC I

ORGANIZ~TION OF AFRICAN UNITY

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA

COMMUNIQUE ON THE LIBERATION CO!VJMITTEE 1S PL.EDGE OF

SOLIDARITY WITH ZAMBIA

The Orga.nization of African Unity's Liberation. Committee, holding '

its 21st Regular Session in Africa, Ghana, has learnt with great disgust

and indignation the d~sperate, attempts being made by the illegal racist

minority r~gime cf Ian Smith to intimidate the heroic people of Zambia

by economic strangulation into abandoning their support for the freedom­

lo-ving people of Zimbabwe.

The Committee wishes to express its full support for and solidarity

with the Governm~nt a.nd people of Zambia in.their determination ·to maintai.n

their sovereignty and economic integrity.

The Committee notes with great satisfey.ction the forthri~ht and

prompt declaration of soli~arity with and support for Zambia made by

the G!i1J,naian Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemp,tion

Council, His Excellency Colonel I. K, Acheampong, and calls upon all ' '

African States to rally round Zambia at this orucial time to def·eat the

forces of oppression, imperialism, racism and colonialism,

The action of the illegal regime of Ian Smith is an indication of

the state of panic which the gallant freedom fighters have caused by their

recent offensive,' The Committee calls upon these m ·,vements to uni ta,

re-double their effort and intensify the struggle until Zimbabwe is free,

It'also pledges the fighting forces its continuing support, b9th moral

and material until total victory is won. )

ACCRA,

GHANA, 10th January, 1973, /

21ST REGULAR SESSION

ACCRA, GHANA

8 - 13 JANUARY, 1973

CM/503 (Part I.. ) ;\.nnex II Appendix I

THE ACCRA DECLARA'l'ION ON THE NEW STRATEGY FOR THE

LIBERATION OF AFRICA.

1. The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa,

meeting in Accra, Ghana from January 8 - 13, 1973 has made a serious

evaluation of the situation prevailing in the African T,1rritories sillr

under foreign domination, This appraisal was made in the light of the

experience gained in the last ten years since the launching of the

Committee for the purpose of co-ordinating the struggle of the African

people languishing under colonial and racist domination.

2 In so doing the Committee took note of the progress as well as

the setbacks. In the light of its experience, the Committee is determined

to draw the right conclusions and plan its work in a more dynamic way o ..

for the purpose cf not only consolidating the gains so far achieved by

the 1 Lberation mr;vements but also to intensify assistance to the struggling

brethren so as to secure greater victories and move decisively towards

the final elimination of colonialism and racism from our Continent.

3. Convinced of the commitment of the OAU Members States to the total

liberation of the Continent, the Liberation Committee believes that this

commitment should be matched with a more determined·concrete action, It is

regrettably true that the total assistance so far provided to the

1 :'.beration movements by the African States is very negligible compared

to the totality of aid received by these movements outside our Continent,

If, as we rightly maintain, our Continent cannot c.laim complete freedom

unless every single inch of its soil is liberated, then it is our duty

and responsibility to fully, unequivocally and collectively meet our

obligations to the struggle,

C'!IJ/503 (Part I) .lj.nnex II Appendix I

Page 2

4. While taking note of the progress made in several. theatres of war by the national l~beration.m1vements, particularly in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, lliozambique rend Ang9la, we must admit that this progress is far frOfl! being commensura·he with Africats potential, We have to recognise 'that there have been a number of obstacles impeding the progress towards liberation, We are quite aware o.f the ~assive support that the enemies of Afrioan freedom - the raoist and colonial regimes received from their principal al~ies - some major Western·powers, But we would be shirking our responsibilities if we were merely contented with lamentations of

' this unholy alliance or, attributing all our setbacks to the viciousness of the enemy. We boldly accept our own responsibilities for lack of proper, concerted and effective action to confront tile onslaught of imperialism and reaction. As This Committee therefore enters the second d.ecade of supporting the armed struggle heorically being waged by the liberation movements, it is incumbent upon us to reevaluate the whole situation and devise more effective actions to meet the challenge imposed on Africa's freedom and dignity.

5. The Organiza·hion of Afrioan Unity oannot be accused of failing to explore all possible avenues towards a peaceful solution to the lib'eration problems, The Lusaka Manifesto which has been treated with contempt by the minority racist authorities in Southern Africa, is a living testimony of free Africa's desire to avoid bloodshed wherever and whenever possible. There is 'not a shadow of doubt that the liberation of most of the Afrioan T.arritories under foreign domination can only be achieved through armed struggle as clearly recognised by the Mogadiscio Declaration. Support for the armed struggle, of our, brothers is therefore the clarion call •.

6. The armed struggle in the T irritories under folleign domination has reached an advanced and crucial stage, ·Nationalist forces have inflicted severe defe~ts on the enem;y, liberated large areas a~d have extended the struggle to new regions and military fronts, The exigencies of the armed struggle hav~ become greater and so have the needs of active liberation movements increased in volume and quality. It is also evident that the evolution of the s~ruggle, the extension of war zones, the ever-increasing

I

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-CM/503 (Fart I ) .'l.nnO''= I:( Appendi~ I Page 3 •

build-up and aggressiveness of the enemy have created a new situation which makes it imperative for the liberation m~vements to be properly provided with the resources to meet the new situation, and with the necessary equipment to effectively contain and overcome the supremacy in weaponry which the enemy enjoys.

THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN STATES:

1.. While the responsibility of carrying ~n the armed struggle remai·ns that of :the liberation m:ivements, free Ai'rica's role is no less crucial. The intensification of' such a st~ggle presupposes the avail­ability of appropriate resources at the disposal of the liberation movements. The OAU members must accept the responsibilities or pro~itiJ:lg and, where necessary; mobilising for these resourcos. It is regrettable to note that a number of States are still in arrears in their contribu­tions to the Special Fund. All OAU embers must· now fulfil their commitments and pay without undue delay their outstanding dues. This is the minimum that we can do if we are determined to re-invigorate the liberation struggle. To achieve this goal, the Committee has mandated its current Chairman, to d esigna·te one or two Foreign Ministers, who would lacoompany him with senior officials of' the General Secretariat and the Executive Secretariat, to visit all those member oountries which have not paid their contributions or arrears. This mission shall make a personal plea to the Heads of State or Government requesting the settiement of the dues. The Committee earnestly hopes that all such' dues would have been paid at the time of the commemeration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity.

8. The Committee also strongly recommended that the decisions of the ' Rabat Summit Conference, requesting Member States to make additional

·voluntary material and financial assistance to the liberation movements, be implemented without delay as such assistance is a must in the current situation.

' CM/503 (Part I) Annex II Appendix I

Page 4·

It was _further recoml)lended that Member States should as a matter

of urgency, provide training facilities for the cadres of the l.tberation

m:>vements in conformity with their needs and reg_uirements. '.!'his training

which should as far as possible be extensively provided by the African

States in a position to do so, would constitute the additional contribution

of those Member _States to the liberation struggle. In this context,

concrets programmes indicating specific number of cadres, should be

periodically drawn by the liberation movements in conjuction with the

Liberation Cammi ttee ·and in conformity with their ne,eds. /

10, Taking into account the desperate, and aggressive policies pursued

by the olonial regimes against ·independent African States due to the

reverses that these regimes suffe,r in their oolonies, the Committee firmly

recommended that African States be collectively prepared to assist thes-e

States in overcoming all economic and milit~ry aggressions~ The current

economic blockade perpetrated by the racist regime of Ian Smith and the

colonial regimes in s0uthern Africa against Zambia is a case in point.

By the very J:lature of the struggle now.going on in s?uthern Africa and '

·Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, free Africa must be eg_uipped to meet any

eventuality.

11. But Africa's total commitment to the struggle can only be properly

ensured by a firm and dedicated commitment of its people. The need must

therefore, be stressed to mobilise the African masses and in particular

the youths and students so as to inculcate in them a greater sense of

awareness of the struggle now intensifying, The Committee called for

the maximum utilisation of the broadcasting and other mass media of

communication for the attainment of this singular objective. Governments

of all Member States are reg_uested to provide all possible assistance,.

THE ROLE OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS:

12. The supreme and decisive role of the l:\beration m?Vements in the

struggle cannot be put to question, In the final analysis, it is they

and they alone who are responsible for the progress or lack of progress

in the liberation struggle.

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I I

I

' CM/~03 (ps_~:i;) .Annex II .1l.ppen<fix I

l!'age 5-

r

13. In evaluating the performance of the. Liberation Movements in this decade of the struggle, the ::.2.beration Committee noted with satis­faction the generally serious and d<3dicated ::iatur•' of these Movements, They paid partioular tribute ";o tl'.J :.iberation 111ovements of Angola,

' Duinea.-Bissau and Capo Verds and Mozambique, '!'hoy especially welcomed. the r84>oncilia~ion b:itween· the M.P.L,A. and the F,N,L.A. which step is bound to have a positive effect en the strug~le in Angola1 In the· , same vein, the Committee no'ted with profound regrets and concern that this unity of purpose and action does not exist in other liberation

wav.emell't6- of Zimbabwe and ·South .ilfrica.

14, ~he Committee called upon all liberation movement& to play fully• th.air J:'OlG by increasing thGil' Gfforte and activities and &tre.ngt.b.enitie

'. their o:ffensive through the creation of conditions of ineeourity for the ellSmies, Experience has demonstrated that the liberation of one territory can never be won by two rival movements fighting ag":inst each other or separately, With this background in mind, the Liberation Committee is all the more disturbed by the ,dissension and, at times, petty rivalry that seem to permeate these m'Jvements ma.king the ob.jective of a united front a S<lemingly impossible e:x:eroioe.

15. In order to meet the demands of.the second decade of the armed struggle, the Liberation Committee has resolved not to acquiesce to any

further dissension or bickering i,n these liberation ra.ovements and among them, It has also resolved to energetically oppose any proliferation

' of splinter groups. To this end, the Committee firmly resolve~ to be guided in its future actions and policies by an overriding principle, that of grani;ing recognition and assistance only to "Fronts" which are politically and militarily united and which can provide evidence of effective operation within the country, While appealing once again to the said l :.beration movements to forge the necessary united fronts, the Committee decided if this appeal is unheeled, to reconsider its position on the m<>vements at its next Session, . il.t the same time, the Liberation Committee nppealed to all Member States of the OJ1U not to provide· encouragement and assistance to splinter organizations,

CM/503 (Part I) %nnex,I+_ Append:i;x:. I Page 6

16. In its evaluation of the perf~rmance of the Liberation Movements

and also the present phase of the struggle in the different areas, the

Committee agreed on a set 'of priorities pertaining to the manner of

providing assistance to the m·,vements, The Committee <?-ecided to grant

the largest part of its assis·Gance to the liberation mwements in the

Territories under Portuguese domination. Taking into account the fact

that the armed struggle in the other territories is either in the phase

of establishment or in the embryonic stage of underground activities and

mass mobilisation, the Liberati.on Committee 1'esolved to assist the

nationalist forces in these territories to establish themselves and

intensify their struggle. Moreover, the Committee recognised the inter­

relationship of the whole struggle and called for maximum c~-•rdinatU-.n

among the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

17. With regard to Guinea Bissau in particular, the Committee takes

note with satisfaction of the tremendous progress made in the liberated

areas where political and administrative institutions have been firmly

established and where general elections have been conducted prior to

the setting up of a People's National Assembly, Indeed, as a result of

the activities of PAIGC, the people of Guinea Bissau now have a State

machinery forged during the struggle and, as has been rightly noted by

the ,Special Mission of the United Nations, this movement "effectively

exercises a de facto administrative control over vast areas of the

country with the enthusiastic support of the population."

18. In the context of t'he new strategy and in view of the announcement

made by PAIGC to the effect that the People's National Assembly shall be

invited to proclaim the existence of a State of Guinea Bissau to be

er.dewed with executive organs which will meet inside the country and

request international recognition, the Committee deems it necessary '

for the OAU to lend every necessary support for the consolidation of

the State of Guinea Bissau and for the full realization of the objectives

set forth by PAIGC.

The Role of the Executive Secretariat:

CM/503 (Part I) .Annex n; \ _Appendi;x: I

Page 7

19, The role of the Executive Secretariat is important and essential to the effective pursuit of the struggle. The need to strengthen the institutional structure of the Executive Secretariat to enhance its capacity to respond effectively to the urgent needs of the next phase of the liberation struggle was recognised by the Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee stressed the importance for the· Executive Secretariat of fulfilling the functional role of an action orientated organ with sufficient fJ.exibility for fulfilling efficiently its task of co~o:i-dination.

International Action:

20, The African States have consistently appealed for the 1.1.Ddar-

standing sympathy and support of the international community for the -Oause of African Liberation, They have directed numerous appeals particularly to the Western countries and more so to those principal allies and supporters of the colonial and racist regimes in Africa, These appeals have twice been made at the highest level of the Organization of African Unity,

The Committee took note of·the fact that in some oases the appeals have been,favourably responded to while in others they have fallen in deaf ears. In the latter case, Portugal, for example, continues to enjoy massive economic, political and military aid from some of her IrATO allies, This aid makes the African struggle more difficult,

21. Faced with this situation, the Liberation Committee is convinced of the imperative need to maximise international moral, political diplomatic and material support, This support must be solicited f~om all sympathetic sources as well as from international institutions in particular the United Nations family.

22. The Committee resolved that direct approaches be made to States ' ,

ae well as institutions be directly approached to obtain maximum concrete assistance, with special emphasis on arms and equipment,

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CM/503 (Part I) Annex II Appendix I

I:age 8

'r

The Committee resolved to work in close co-ordination with all UN

bodies dealing with decolonization and apartheid for the purpose of

launching a ooncerted international campaign in support of the

liberation struggle. and isolating the racist and colonial regimes in

Africa, The Cammi ttee also agr.eed to request all OAU Member States to

use their membership in both the United Nations and· its affiliated·

bodies to urge for the provision of assistance by the specialised

JLgencies to the :L.iberation movements - more so in the ·liberated

areas.

23, To obtain such assistance, the Committee decided to despatoh

miss;ions:

(1) to tho So~ialist. oountries currently assis~ing,the

liberation struggle including China and the USSR1

for the purpose of solioiting greater material

assistanoe to the liberation movements,

.. · (2) to the Non-Alligned countries as a follow-up

of the decisions taken by the Conference of

Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana,

in August 1972 pledging to support the liberation

movements,

(3) t·o other sympathetio oountries in particular

the Scandinavian countries in search of

humanitarian and financial assistance,

24. These ~issions are to be led by the Chairman of the 21st Session

of the Committee and assisted by one or two Ministers to be nominated

by him with the Committee's approval 'and accompanied by senior represen­

tatives .of the OAU General.and Executive Secretariats,

CONCLUSIONS:

25. It is to be reiterated· that the struggle for the liberation of

our continent ~emains primarily the responsibility of the Africans

themselves. The Supreme Organ of the African people the Orga~ization

of African Unity through its Liberation Committee will continue to fulfil

its obligations in support of those who have taken up arms to de:t;'end:

the freedom, honour and dignity of our continent,

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26.

CM/503 (Part I) Annex II Appendix I

Page 9

In reaffirming this commitment, the independent African States and the African Liberation Movements, are fully aware of its consequences and repercussions. Some i~dependent African States may suffer further aggressions by imperialism and colonialism. The African Liberation

' Movements will have to make greater sacrifices. But we shall not be deterred from our noble objective.

27, It shall always remain the firm determination of the African people and. their Organization, to make the.second decade of the armed struggle a decade of tangible and decisive victoriees, in the struggle for total African Liberation.

28. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of African which has been entrusted by the Assembly of Heads of State'and Government

' of the Organization of African-Unity, with the noble task of faoilita-­ting· and co-ordinating the struggle of thg African freedom fighters, pledges once. more its unequivocal committment to live to the expectati~ns of the millions of Africans still longing for their freedom and dignity, To this end, the Liberation Committee will work actively and relentlssly for the total mobilisation of resources in order to achieve this objective.

29~ In persuance of the above, the Liberation Committee wishes to reaffirm its faith and in full committment to this NEW STRATEGY.

-------- ODO --------

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COUNC·IL OF MINISTERS Twenty-First Ordinary Session Addis Ababa - May 1973

CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II

A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE LIBEBATION STRUGGLE

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CM/503/~art I/Annex II Appendix II

EXPLANATORY NOTE

• 1. The Standing Committee on Defence, which met. in Dar-es-SalaaB, • Tanzania, on 5th and 6th December 1972, has reviewed the militr-yy

si tl'C.tion in dependent territories, the level of the liberation struggle and its requirements.

2. The Committee felt that after 10 years of armed struggle and the results achieved so far, it has become imperative that the Liberation Committee devises new ways and means of enhancing the liberati9n struggle.

3. Following an expose made by the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence underlying the necessity for a new approach to 'u~.e liberation struggle, the Cammi ttee ~ccepted a proposal made by the representative of Ghana that the following point be included as a special item on the Provisional Agenda of the 21st Ordinary Session of the Liberation Committee to be held in Accra, Ghana, from 8 to 13 January 1973:

"Review of the policy towards the liberation struggle and in particular towards the Liberation Movements, with the view of developing a new strategy and setting priorities""

4. The Standing Committee on Defence decided to set up a Sub-Co11L~ittee to prepare a Work~ng Document on this item.

5. The Sub-Committee met in Dar-es--Salaam on December 27 1972, and was compos'ed as follows:

H.E. Mr. Tahar Gaid

H.E. Mr. R.S. Makasa

M:.:-. P. Rupia

Major ''. l"lb:i'.ta

Mr. AL Sidky

Ambassador of Algeria to Tanzania (CHAIRMAN) High Commissioner of Zambia. to Tan:o:ania. Director of Africa & Middle East Division, Foreign Affairs, Tanzania. Executive Secretary OAU Liberation Committee. Assistant Executive Secretary in charge of Defence.

6. The Sub-Committee submits, for the consideration of the

·21st Cession of the Liberation Committee, the Working Document·

attached herewith.

•

CM/503/Part I/.llnnex II

Appendix II Page 1.

A NEW STR1).TEGY FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

· Introduction:

1. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of ' '

Africa, meeting in its 21st Ordinary Session in Acera, Ghana•

from s· to 13 January 1972, has reviewed the situation and

conditions in territories still ~der foreign 'domination, after

10 years of armed liberation struggle.

2. Throughout these years OAU Member-States have continued '

to voice unequivocally their total comrnitinent to the prinaiples

and purposes contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter of ·

the OAU, especially in regard to the er~dication of all forms

of colonialism from Africa and the absolute dedication to the

total emancipation of the African Territori~s whiyh are still

under foreign domination.

3. In the manifesto on Southern Africa - The Lusaka Manifesto -'

unanimously adopted by the OAU 1 endorsed by th~ UN and the

Conference of Non-Aligned States, but rejected by the racist ' regimes of Southern Africa, Member-States have stated cleary

their posi ti•on on the question of decolonisation; that. is to say, .

the legitimacy of t~e liberation struggle being waged by the

peoples of Africa to obtain their inalienable rights to inde­

pendence, freedom, human dignity and equality, and that all

Member-States of the OAU remain totally and unconditionally

committed to their just struggle. It has also been agreed in

the Lusaka Manifesto that any action to be 'taken by Member-States

in regard to the solution of the problems of colon~alis~, racial

discrimination and apartheid in Africa, must be underteken within

the framework of the OAU and in full consultation with the

liberation movements·of the territories concerned.

CM/503/Part I/Annex II

Appendix II

Page 2.

4. At the 7th Summit Conference of the East and Central

African States, in October 1971, the leaders of these countries

adopted a historical declaration - The Mogadiscio 'Declaration -

declaring .that ·there. was no way left to the liberation of

·.southern Africa except armed struggle. This declaration was . ' '

endorsed by the 9th OAU Gummit held in Rabat in June 1972 -

(Document .AHG:/DEC/78 1.IX). Th;is was a very .important landmark

in the struggle because it brought to an end the debate on ways

and means of ending colonial rule and racist domination, thus

enabling the liberation r:iovements and independent African States

to organise and carry on the struggle till final victory.

General Assessment of the Armed 'Struggle

5. After 10 years of armed struggl~ the Co-ordinating Committee

for the Liberation of Africa is bounl to review its e:KI{erience,

to assess the progress made as well as shortcomings and to draw the

correct lessons so that the coming decade must see much more rapid

advance .towards the .total liberation of Africa •

. 6. During the past decade the struggle in Territories under

Portuguese domlnation has progressed. Nationalist forces while

consolidating the liberated areas, had extended the struggle to new

regions and military fronts whether in Angola, Mozambique or

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

(a) In Angola, both liberation movements recognised by

the OAU - MPLA and FNLA - have throughout this period succeeded'

in cohE0lidating and stabilising rear bases and liberated zones

as well as developing new fronts. The important progress achieyed by

MPLA has enabled guerrilla forces to advance towards.the more

populated coast region, where the economic interests of the enemy

lie. The Kinshasa Agreement signed by.MPLA and FNLA on December '

13· 1972, on the creation of a_united front between these two

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CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II

Page 3

Movements is opening a wide range of po'ssibilities for action

and is likely to revolutionise the war in Angola beyo1i.d all expecta-

tio113 c··

(b) In Mozambigue, the most predominant feature of the

military situation has been the spread of the struggle to new

regions towards the South, both jn Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete,

creating strong bases for the launching of operations to new provinces.

The opening of a new front in Manica a Sof ala is a significant

development since it is bringing the war of liberation to the door~

steps of white-dominated Mozambique, and is constituting a military

and political threat to the racist and colonial regimes in Southern

Africa.

(c) In Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the Fil.IGO has succeeded

in liberating inore than two-thirds (2/3) of the natio!lal territory and

the Portµguese High Command has come to the conclusion that the

colonial war cannot be w'on by military means. Vast areas in the

North, South and East have been liberated and the PAIGC is exercising

effective control and administration in these areas.

The PAIGC has conducted elections inside the country for

the Regional Councils and is about to hold elections for the National

Popular Assembly. Upon completion of these elections, Fil.IGO intends

to declare "The existence of the ~>tate of Guinea-Bissau and Cape

Verde Islands".

7. In Namibia, SWAPO has continued to mobilise the oppressed

population; to organise strikes and mass resistence; and to carry

out underground operations and sabotage. On the political and the

International level, SWAPO ·has continued with success its action in

mobilising world public opinion against the illegal presence of

South Africa in the territory.

8. On the other hand, in Zimbabwe, liberation movements have

unfortunately, been engaged in internecine conflicts and dissensions

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CM/503/Part I/Annex II

Appendix II

Page 4.

to the extent that one can speak of a paralysis which has als<'

affected negatively the struggle on other fronts. The Liberation

Committee is continuing to exert all effrts t,o bring about a unified

front between forces fighting in Zimb.abwe. This unf'ortrni;te state

of affairs is more regrettable that the political situation inside

the country has developed a climate of resistance and a massive

rejection by the .Zimbabwe population of the proposals for settlement

as evidenced by the conclusions .of the Pearce Commission.

9. Though a favourable political awareness to the idea of

liberation is constantly shaping up within the masses in South

Africa, the fact remains that the liberation movements ,recognised

by t·he OAU have not organised themselves for launching the struggle

even on a limited scale. The efforts of the Liberation Committee

to bring about a united action front between these 0 ovements have

yet to produce the required results.

10. As to the· enemy, a strong alliance has been developing

between Portugal, the illegal Ian Smit regime and South Africa,

with the latter playing a predominant role. With the Portuguese

reverses in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the

regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria are escalating their intervention

and their direct involvement in the colonial wars is not to be

a~cluded. During the last decade t~e enemy has been embarking on

its policy of subverting and aggressing independent African States

committed to the support of the liberation struggle by frequent un­

provoked aggressions, and constant violation of the territorial inte­

grity and airspace of these countri~s. This decade has also witnessed

an escalation of terrorism practised by the colonial and white rinority

fascist regimes against the African people. These regimes have

desperately attempted to demobilise the population through psychologi­

cal action and to destroy human and material means· essential to the

development of the armed struggle •

. The enemy has increased and strengthened his military potential

numericall;}'.", technologically, in terms of fire power, supplies and

mobility. He has been endeavouring to strengthen and consolidate his

/

CM/503/Part I/Annex II· Appendix II Page 5.

•

repressive colonial machinery. Besides their political support, • some NATO powers continued to provide the colonial and racist regimes

with all, sophisti~ated war material and equipment (fighter bomber jets, bombers, helicopters, transport ships, patrol poats, military vehicles, all types of NATO weapons and al!llllunition). NATO assistance to Por~ugal has enabled the enemy High Co=and in very short periods to replace needs and equipment destroyed by the guerrilla and ensured the absolute supremacy of the enemy in the air and on the sea.

In the economic field, projects as Cabora Bassa in Mozambique and Cunene in Angola, aim at perpetuating the colonial regimes,. on

' '

one hand and the commercial relations that some States c0utside Africa have with Portugal and the r1cist regimes on, the other hand, thus further strengthening the political and military postions of these regimes.

A New Strategy and·SAt of Priorities

11. The struggle against colonial and racist regimes in southern Africa is by definition a pro~racted war which will be long and bitter, for the enemy is ruthless and deeply entrenched. In order' to create a material ai:{d moral basis for victory it is imperative to develop a radically new approach to the liberation struggle in the light of the past experience. This _new strategy would be devised on the following levels:-

The Liberation Movements; Member States .of the OAU; OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa:

12. On the level of the liberation movements, the armed struggle in southern Africa must be considered .as an indivisible whole. The ostruggle waged in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. cannot be dissociated from the struggle in South .Africa, Namibia and strategy adapted to

Zimbabwe. all those

It is necessary to develope a territories and to co-ordinate the

CM/503/Part I/l.nnex II

Appendix II Page 60

activities of the liberation movements struggling in these

territories. The progress achieved by liberation movements in

territories under Portuguese domination has led to more

co-ordination in the war effort between the colonial and facist

regimes, and it i.s important to activate all fronts militarily in

order to prev.ent the enemy from concentrating forces on one frdnt

and to compel him to disperse his forces; The enemy, though

potentially strong militarily and technologically, ,is experiencing

shortage of persom1el, judging from the feverish policy of

stepping-up the Africanization of the colonial wars by bringing

in so-called African forces to confront the guerrilla. However,

this policy is on its way of collapse. Deserters are joining

the ranks of the guerrilla with their arms and e~uipment in

growing numbers. If the Zimbabwean and South African fronts are

militarily active, the Vorster and Smith forces will be compelled

to withdraw or tJ reduce their forces from Mozambi~ue and Angola,

thus acc~lerating the liberation of those territories,

13. In order to launch a meaningful and effective military

struggle in Zimbabwe and South E£rica, the liberation movements

recognized by the OAU should endeavour to forge united fronts and

work out concrete joint programmes of action and to be greared to

a situation of war organisationally, politically, ideologically,

militarily and leadership-wise. They should ensure the

mobilisPtion of the masses which are absolutely the most decisive

force in the struggle. Their participation and the level of their

participation are the determining factors whether the struggle

succeeds or fails. Liberation movements should also ensure the

existence of military and technical preparedness among the

militants and cadres,

14. No war can succeed without the active and continuous support

of a stable and reliable rear.

however, be utterly of no value The stable and reliable rear

as has been demonstrated by

practical experience, if there is no effective and efficient \ '

mechanism inside the country to receive, distribute and

shall,

retionalise the means of struggle forwarded to the fronts by the

rear. Never a war of liberation has been solely waged and won

from outside or by elements in exile,

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CM/503/Part I/Annex II

Appendix II

Page 7.

15. Having unified their ranks an~ established strong organisa­

tion inside the country, 1 iberation movements in Zimbabwe and

South Africa should create military alliances not only between

themselves but also with other movements fighting in Mozambique,

Angola and Namibia FJO as to co-ordinate their activities and

draw up plans for the struggle in order t.o scatter the forces

of the enemy on the largest possible number of fronts. The'

experience in the wars of liberation has demonstrated that tbe

liberation of one territory can never be won by two rival Move­

ments fighting against each other or separately: Unity is ;Jtrength.

On the Level of OAU Member-States

16. The armed struggle in territories under PortuguesB domination

has , reached an advanced stage. Nationalist forces, while consolida­

ting the liberated areas, are extending the struggle to new regions

and military fronts. In some cases war zones have extended to ' .

hundreds of miles from rear bases thus creatin~ problems and

difficulties as to logistics.

Consequently, the exigencies of the armed struggle have

become greater and needs of active liberation movements have

necessarily increased in volume and quality (to equip the larger

formations cr'eated, new recruits, trainees and self-def,ence uni ts;

light weapons, ammunition and sabotage equipment; ade 1~uate anti­

aircraft defence; long-range artillery,; boats and naval equipment;

teleco=unication; foodstuff; clothing and medicines,; means of

transportation; financial assistance for urban guerrilla warfare;

infiltration of cadres; work of mobilization and administration

of the liberated areas).

17e The 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State

and Gove'rnment, held in Habat, Morocco (June 1972), while ,, endorsing the Mogadiscio Declaration to the effect that the armed

struggle has become the only means to liberate southern Africa,

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CM/503/Part I/1\.nns~.II Appendix II Page 8.

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, has recognised the urgent need for

increasing material and financial assistance to the liberation

struggle .and has consequently:

18.

! .

,- decided to increase the Special Fund for

liberation by 5e%

I

reiterated its appeal to Member-States to meet their

obligations to the Special Fund by paying their arrears

and contributions;

requested Member-States wishing to make additional

voluntary material and financial contributions to give

the required assistance direct· to the Liberation Co=ittee -

(AHG/DEC.71/IX).

I Despite the fact that border States have continued to

assume their historical responsibilities towards the struggle and

that other Member-States continued on a limited scale to assist

liberation ~ovements, the bulk of war material and equipment has

continued to originate from f-riendly countries outside Africa. . .

On the other hand, the realities of contributions has continued

to be far below the adopted figure in the budget and still falls

seriously short of the actual requirements and exigencies of the

armed struggle. Therefore, the strict implementation of the

decisions of the OAU Heads of Btat.e and Government would greatly

enhance the liberation struggle •

19. Border States are the immediate rear bases of support of

the national liberation movements and with the progress achieved

in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape, Verde, the enemy

is expected to try to deprive guerrilla forces from their rear . .

bases and logistic support in border States through armed provo­

cations and overt aggression against those countries.

\

I

•

•

CM/503/Part I/Annex II 6 Appendix II

Pll.ge 9

It is, therefore, the duty of all Member-States to give the

necessary support to the States bordering the Territories under

colonialist and minority racist domination and to be ready to go

into action, if requested, against the enemy in order to deter or ' repel aggression and violation of tµe territorial integrity of

border States.

20e National liberation movements should be allowed free transit " of men and war materials through nEighbouring independent Member-

States1 territories to the war fronts, bearing in mind the security

of the States concerned. It is in the interest of the liberation

struggle that the territories of .border States remain secure and

strong rear bases.

21~ At the· present evolution of the liberation struggle, Member~

States should endeavour to inculcate to the African masses a high

degree of consciousness and identity with the liberation struggle,

ensure the strict implementation of the OAU and the UN resolutions

on boycotts and sanctions against Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa

and should reinforce their action on international level in order

to isolate the enemy bot~ politically and diplomatically.

The Co-ordination Action of the OAU

Liberation Committee

22. On.the eve of the Tenth .Anniversary of the Organisation of

African Unity, the Liberation Committee is bound to review its policy

towards the liberation struggle and in particular towards the libera­

tion movements. In the light of past experiences and the exigencies

of the struggle, the Committee has to devise new methods and a new

approach if it is to carry out its mandate fully.

23. Though the national l~beration movements recognised by OAU are responsible for the planning and conduct of the armed struggle

and the.mandate of the Liberation Committee continues to be the

harmonization and the co-ordination of assistance to the liberation

\ .

CM/503/Part I/Anllax .II Appendix II

Page '10

aovemsnts, it is nevertheless, evident that the evolution of the

struggle, the military progress achieved in some territories, the

extention of war zones, the ever-increasing build-up and 'aggressive­

ness of the enemy have created a new situation which adds to the ' '

responsibilities of the Committee as embodying the determination of

Africa to resist and to liberate the Territories still under colonial

and racist domination through armed struggle.

24. The Liberation Committee and its executive organ should be

given all material and financial means to carry out its mandate.

The ,consolidation of the.,liber(l.ted areas, the increasing require­

ments of new fronts and combat zones !constitute new exigencies.

The planning and conduct of the struggle cannot be done on !£11f2.2. basis or conditioned by the availability of funds and the realities

of contributions; a war budget is a must at the present juctlilre.

Additional material, and financial volutary contributions have also

to be made to the Liberation Committee. The oathods of implementing

the decisions of the Committee as well as .those of the OAU higher

organs have to be adapted to a war situation.

25. In T,rritories under Portuguese domination, the military

situation necessitates not only increased financial and material

assistance to the nati.onalist forces, but new military means an<'!­

sophisticated equipment in order to nullify or neutralise the

s;upremacy the enemy enjoys, especially in air and on the sea.

The Liberation Committee should give serious consideration to this

military aspect in the war in Guinea-Bissau and Ca1e Verae,

Mozambique and Angola.

26. Though liberation movements in pri.iaciple are sovereign " and solely responsible for conducting their wars of liberation,

the Committee should be able to intervene resolutely in order to

redress a situation created on one front or more which, if left

unattended, might affect negatively other fronts. The crisis

which prevails within some liberation movements has not only

crippled the struggle in some territories but has also enabled

Ci~/503/P(:crt I/l\11110:~ II Appendix II Page 11"

the enemy to divert t? other important fronts its forces which could have been pinned doWn by a resoiute resistence and meaningful struggle.

' 27. Unless liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa organise themselves politjcally and militarily, constitute strong united fronts and work out concrete programmes of joint action, the whole struggle in South~rn A£rica could be dealt a serious ' blow, at a time when the Soµth African troops and the forces of the Ian Smith rebel regime are intervening directly in Portuguese colonial wars.

28. In the light of the above considerations, it is time for the Liberation Committee to reconsider its policy and strategy towards liberationnovements. It should be guided.by an overriding principle, that is to grant recognition and assistance .only to "Fronts" which are politically and militarily united. On the basis of this principle· it can draw its strategy:

....

..

·, '

/

within a definite period liberation movements should endeavour to forge united fronts; meanwhile the Liberation· Committee would c9ntinue to grant them material and fina­ncial assistance, in accordance with its scale of priorities. On its part,. the Executive Secretariat will establish, in ·collaboration with Member-States concerned, programmes of training and infiltration of a limited number at a·time .•

- · .Once the· above period has elapsed, the Committee· might be:confronted with two possible situetio:us:

* No unity achieved but one Movement has emerged as a strong orl!,an:itsation. In such case others would be requested to join, if not the Committee would re­cognise only that Movement. ,

' ' '

•,

CM/503/Part I/ll:nneX II Appendix II

Page '12.

No front has been achieved and no strong Movement

has emerged. In such case, recognition would be

·withdrawn and no assistance granted.

29. For the past decade the Liberation Committee has continued

to grant material and financial assistance to all liberation move­

ments recognised by the OAU. Member-States have also done, the

same on bilater·al bases. Some liberation movements, despite

all assistance granted to them, have shown throughout the years

a persistent unwillingness to wage a meaningful struggle. Thus

the efforts, energy and meagre resources of Africa have been

dispersed without tangible results.

30. In the light of the progress achieved in Territories under

Portuguese domination and

territories, a new policy

of material and financial

Fund has to be formulated.

present:

the advanced st age of tbe war in these · '

of setting priorities as ato allocation

assistance in the budget of the Special

Three main active fronts exist at

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angl;ila,

which could be considered priority.fronts.

The action of the Liberation. Committee should concentrate on

consolidating the struggle in these territorieso

In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the armed struggle

is either in the phase of establishment or in the embryonic stage

of undepground activities and mobilisation. In these territories

the Liberation Committee is called upon to assist national forces

to estab.lish themselves and intensify underground activities

until such time when they can pass to the :c~exc phase of. consoli­

dation. Other liberation movements engaged in political activities

are to be assisted and given a low priority.

•'

CM/503/Part I/All~ex II Appendix II Page 13.·

The following ratio ' could be applied:

PAIGC 25% FRELIMO 25% JVJPLA & FNLA Unified Military Command 20%

SW APO 10%

JMC (Zimbabwe) 10%

PAC and ANO 5%

Other Liberation Movements 5%

' It goes without saying that the above ratios are eu.bject

to change, depending on the progress of the struggle.

31~ One important aspect of the Liberation Committee's task is the development and strengthening of its propaganda machinery as well as the promotion of its political action in international forums to ensure the isolation of the colonial and racist regimes.

'

•'

•

•

'

CM/503/Part 1

ANNEX III

l"IILITARY EXPERTS ~ EMOLUMENTS DRAFT BUDGET 1972/73

I. SALARIES:

1. Lt. Colonel Scale P3 Step 8@

4 Majors Scale P3 Step 4@

2 Captains Scaj)le P2 Step 8_@

1 Medical Officer Scale P2 Step 8@

6 Drivers (Locally recruited) .

1 Cleaner (Locally recruited)

TOTAL a o a o a o o o a

II. TRAVEL (HOME LEAVE, INITIAL RECRUITMENT, SEPARATION FROM SERVICE)

Passages for 4 non-Tanzanian Officers with families 00000000•~

III. DEPENDENCY ALLOWANCE:

Seven married officers with children

IV. MEDICAL EXPENSES:

All officers, families and local staff

v. Transport and subsistence travel allowance

us

$11,707p.a.~ 11,707 ' I

$10,695p.a.- 42,780 $10,018p.a.~ 20,036 $10,0l8p.a.::' 10,0.18

900p.a.- "1?()

us $

11,450

0 •• 0 •• 4,400

e D 0 0 O o e ~ 4,000

2,500

' VI. Gratuity for eight officers at 15% of basic 12,682 salary o•oO•OO

GRAND TOTAL ••••••• U6$124,693 =======

' '

i ,

•

cc·a-NCIL. OF MINISTERS

Twenty-First Ordinary Session

Addi~ A~aba - May 1973

CM/503 (Part I)

Annex IV

PROPOSED BUDGET OF THE SPECIAL FUND FOR THE FINANCIAL

YEAR 1973/74 \

•

•

CM/503 (Part I)

.Annex IV

PROPOSED BUDGET OF THE SPECIAL FUND FOR THE FINANCIAL

YEAR 1973/74

REVENUE:

In view; of the fact that the budgetary appropriations

for the liberation movements have been increased in conformity

with the decision of the 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly

of Heads of State and Government by 50%, the Standing Committee

is ealled. u'pen ' to ·reco!nmEind are-vote of last year's budget

as detailed hereunder:-

EXPENDITURE:

(a) Liberation Movements:

i. Administration and propaganda )

ii, Material and equipment to be )

supplied to Liberation MoVQments h 1,031,752-00

(b) ' . Training Centres: . . .. .. . . . . .. ( c) Reserve Fund: . . . .. . . . .. .. .. . . 4,776-00

Total reocmmendation

l

/

•

ADMINISTRATION .AND PUBLICITY

Country and Movement

.ANGOLA

S. C, L, A,

GUINEA-BISSAU

P. A. I. ,G. C.

MOZAMBIQUE

FRELIMO

SOUTH AFR! CA

A. N, C.

P. A. C,

NAMIBIA

SWAPO

SO-CALLED FRJ'iNCH SOMALILAND

(DJIBOUTI)

F. L, C. S.

L. M. D.

COMORO (MOLIN ACO)

ZIMBABWE

ZAPU

ZANU

SEYCHELLES

S. P. U. P.

SAN TOME AND PRINCIPE

L. M. S. T. P.

Total

·~ 1.)..)

CM/503 (Part I)

Page 2

Allooation

!;

21,600;00

17 ,500;00

8,749.50

1,752;00

9,000. 50

6,000.00

6,ooo~oo

9,000;00

13 ,125;00

13,125;00

10,000;00

6,ooo~oo

CM/503 (Part I)

Page 3

DETAILS OF THE DRAFT EXPENDITURE ON LIBERATION

MOVEMENTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR l213ll214

(All the figures are in Pound Sterling)

MATERIAL ASSIST.AN CE

Territo·ry and Movement Allocation

.ANGOLAs

s. c. L. A. . . . . . . . . 160,500:00 ,

GUINEA BISSbU:, 1

P. A. I. G. c. . . . . .. 217,500:00

MOZAMBI QVE:

FRELIMO . . • • . . . . .. 217,500;00

SOUTH AFRICA:

A. N. c. .. • • • • . . . . • • • • 52,500;00 . · P. A. c. . . • • • • • • . . • • . . i5,ooo.oo

NAMIBIA• SW APO .. .. •• .. .. . . •• 63,000:00

SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALIL.AND:(Djibouti)

F. L. c. S.' • • .. .. 12,000:00

L. M. D. (Djibouti) • • . . . . • • 12,000:00

COMORO: (MOLINACO) .. . . • • • • . . • • . . 12,000:00

ZIMBABWE:

ZAPU •• . . • • . . • • . . . . 60,000~00

ZA.'IU .. . . . . . . • • . . . . . . 60,000:00

SEYCHELLES: (

s. P. u. p, • • • • . . • • • • • • • • 5,000:00

SAN TOME .AND PRINCIPE: M. L. s. T. P. .. . . 2,000;00

. II. TRAINING CENTRES:

(a) East Africa: •• .. • • 183,755;25

(b) West Africa: .. •• . . .. • • 183,776;00

III. RESERVE FUND: 4,776:00

Grand Total !. l '265 '307: 25

,.

CM/503 (PartI)

Page 4

DECISIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE. ON

DEFENCE INVOLVING FINANCIAL.IMPLICATIONS.

6TH DECEMBER 1972 .. ;,

,'··, · ...

The :;;ltanding Cammi t'tee on Finano'e.ilild Administratia'.!l·.··· ·:· . ~·:·· . . - . . ..,... . .. ····· .,.... . . .,. ' .~"' ... ,. ,, ' ' ' - ' . .

may wish to appro-ife tb'e following deoisions of the Standing

Cammi ttee on De:t1.onoe involving finanoial implication.s: . "

ITEMS ESTIMATED COST I

' ... ,·.,

1, Consolidation of the, .. l;i,per.ation struggle

II,

in Guinea (Bissau), Miizambique ·and Angola.

Funds to be earmark.ed··for·that ·purpose and

disbursement effect.,,d:·under thEf"st!pervision .. . . ,..,

of the three Chairmen of the Standing Co-.

mmi ttee; · Requests made by MPLA, FRELIMO

and PAIGC as per report of the Secretary

of the Standing Committee on Defence. 'As·.

to F, N. L. A., the Secretariat has been

mandated to study with the leadership of

that Movement their requests. • • .. • • • • for '

.. Increase in the FRELIMO monthly allocation

foodstuff (Sns. 40,000/-) by 50 per cent t • 0 I

·III. Allocation to MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, of one ' (8-Tons) Truck and two Land Rovers each. Total:

\ •

(stg~ :s)

150,000.00

3,529.e0 monthly (in­cluding in­crease)

.,

OM/503 (Part I)

Page 5

ITEMS ESTIMATED COST

(Stg~ '1) ,

3 trucks and 6 Land Revers. (Cost per

uni ti Truck - '16,000; Land Rover - 52,500)

IV, Allo~ation to SWAPO of One (8-Tons) T:t"Uck

and Two Land Rovers .. .. • • • • .. .. • •

V~ ~onstruotion of Six Store~i

* 2 for supplying Mozambique and Zimbabwe

* 3 for supplying Angola (North/Eastern F:!:'ont)

* l· for supplying the Eastern Angolan and

Namibian Front.1.

VI, Two Trucks for the Secretariat Pool of Vehicles

to be stationed at Lusaka • • .. • • .. .. -

VII. Three trucks and Three Land Rovers for

33,0011.00

.. l?,000.00

Training Centres in East Africa ,, •• ,, );; 27 1000 One truck for Training Centres in West Africa )

(Existing vehicles to be traded-in)

'

UPON APPROVAL of the above requests the Secretariat

will start implementation according to priorities

and within available funds.

I

CM/503 (Part I) . ANNEX V :;

Communi~ue on the Continued Aggression of the Israeli Forces against the

Arab Republic of Egypt

Page 6

The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Li­beration of Africa meeting in its 21st Regular Session in Accra, Ghana from 8 to 12 January 1973, noted with anxiety and deep concern the deterioration of the si'tuation in the North Eastern part of Africa, as a result of the continued Israeli aggression against the territory of Egypt as well as other Arab States, for nearly five years:

Despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the OAU as· well as the United Nations calling upon Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all occupied Arab territories, Israel continues to refuse~ comply with those resolutions, in defiance of the international community.

Considering.that the continued Pccupation of part of the territory of Egypt, a founding Member of the OAU,

'constitutes a serious threat to the independence, security ·and unity of the African continent at large, the Committee condemns Israel for its refusal to withdraw from all the oocup~ed Arab terri tori,es, and calls for the immediate with­drawal of Israel from these territories to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

The Committee expresses its full support to and solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to recover totally and by all means its territorial integrity,

CM/503 (Part I)

.ANNEX V

Page 1

Aware of the dangerous threat to the security,

independence and unity of the African continent· represented

by world imperialism, in all its manifestations namely

zionism, colonialism and racism, the Committee welcomes all

actions taken by African States to isolate the zionist·,

racist and colonialist regimes;

' '

I

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Twenty-first Ordinary Session Addis Ababa, May 1973,

OM/503/Part II

RhPORT OF TH? FIRST Mhl!.TING OF THh AD HOC COMMITThE '

ENTRUSThD WITH THb CRhATION OF A UNIThD FRONT OF THE,

~MBABWE·FREhDOM FIGHTbRS

LUSAKA , ZAl"!B IA •

13 - 17 March, 1973.

/CONFIDhNTIAL/,

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAJT UNITY,

CO-ORDINATING COMHITTLL :OOR THh

LIBhRATION OF AFRICA,

P.O. BO~{ 1767, '

DAP. E:.S sA:.,p...f',1·1 ,

TANZANIA.

CM/503/Part II

RLPORT OF THh FIRST MEE.TING OF THh AD. HOC COMMITTEE -----~---·--------·----------·----

ENTR~JL.::.\111!:1_.'.H!.£_£!?,.£~.TJ;ON,_QF A_UNIT!;.JLfEONT OF THL

illll'U~!?i!_E _fE E:.hD.QM FIGHT !;.RS

l. During its 21st Ordina::y Session held in Accra, Ghana,

January 1973, the Co-ordinating Coml'1i ttec for the Libcrat ion of

Africa decided to s<?t up an E-1! .Hoc Co,,ridttec comoosed of the

following thr<'P countrirs - ·'.:amProun, Ghana and Zambia - to unite

in a practical mannPr the two Liberation Movem<'nts, ZAPU and ZANU,

of Zimbabwe and help thPm to set up a unitPd and.strong organisationo

The Lib<?ration Committee had also intimated that if such

unity werP not achi<'ved during thP coming months, it would

reconsider its attitud0 towards thEn e two MovemPntS.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee met. accordingly in Lusaka from the

13th to th<' 17th of March, 1973, and His EXcellency_, Major

Kwame Baab,

of the 21st

Ghana's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Chairman ' ' J •

Session of the Co-ordinating Committee for the

Liberation of Africa, presided over thP opening session.

3. During the. pr<'liminary consultations hEld between the

lcadErs of thr drlegations of Cameroun, Ghana and Zambia, and '

upon a suggPstion inade by the Executive Sf'cretary, it was df'c:j.dc-d

to includP Tanzania and KPnya in thP mcmbrrship of the i1Q Hoc

Committef'. Thus, the mreting was attPndcd by thP reprpsentativPs

of Camcroun, Ghan;i., K0nya, Tanzania and Zambia and the 1E'ad0rs

of ZANU and ZAPU outside Zimbabweo I

4. In his opening address, the Chairman of the Liberation

Committee decriPd th<" machinations of th~ common Pnemy who was

seeking through trick~ry and political blackmail and through

outright usurpation to dPprive Zimbabwean p0oplP of th0ir land. ·

This was what madf' thP strugglE' of this peoople a legitimPtP one.

'

- 2 - Cl'l/503/Part II

He called on the frerdom fighters of Zimbabwe to bury thrir

differences and launch a decisive onslaught against their

oppressors.

the need for

Indeed, the current situation in Zimbabwe makes

such unity compelling. Thr enemy is panicking and

must be rele·ntlessly assailed.

5. The representatives of Zambia and Cameroun indicated

in th<?ir sp!?Pches that the liberation struggl"' was gaining

momentum and that the mrrting had, as an .objectiv<", to d0fin0

a strategy in ordrr to intensify the strugglP in Zimbabwe.

This was th<" wish of indeoendent Africa. They also declared

that unity betwPen ZAPU and ZANU would constitute the only

grnuinr .sourer of powPr in defeating the common <"nrmy, namely,

the reb<?l rPgime of Ian Smith. They also called on the two

Liberation Move~ents to contributP to thr cause of African unity

by uniting.

6. The floor was then given to the representatives of the

two LibPration Movem0nts, ZAPU and ZANU, who PXpressed their

gratitude to the peoplr and Government of Zambia :for their

sacrifice. They mainly stressed the seriousness of the situation

following upon the action of the enemy and the closure 0£ the

border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. They pledged to carry on

the struggle with determination, until' final victory.

7. After having designated His Excellency, the Zambian

Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chair the meeting of the Ad Hoc

Committee, and after having decided on the procedure 0£ work,

thP Committee startPd examining th€ question based on its terms

0£ reference as mentioned in paragraph (1).

8. ThP Committee listPned with attention to the statements

made by the representatives 0£ the two Liberation Movements,

ZANU and ZAPU, and proceeded with the discussion of the £acts and

considerations raised by the ZANU and ZAPU rPpresentatives.

9. The participants of .the meeting of the Ad·Hoc Committee,

while taking into account the stat<"ments· mad<e by the ZANU and

ZAPU leadf'rs, examined the two documents of the Mbeya Protocol

which were sign<"d by the two Movements on the 23rd 0£ March, 1972.

10. Discussion took place on the two aspects 0£ the issue,

namely:

3/ ...

·:

11.

had,

(a)

- 3 - CM/503/Part II

the contents of the Mbeya Protocol which was

signrd by thP leaders of thr two Libf'ration

MovPments, ZANU and Z~PU, which created a Joint

Military Command to study, guide and undertake

on thr battle-field all activities and oprrations

rPlatPd to thr struggle on thr basis of a co-or.dina­

tf'd plan;

(b) thr derp differences of viPw points, as expressed

in the statements of the ZANU and ZAPU leaders.

As the two

first of all,

quPstions

to out 'on

are closPly relatPd, the Committee

record the position of the two

MovemPnts.

'-..

( i) ZANU:

ThP leadership of ZANU statrd that since thr signing

of the Mbeya Protocol which set up the Joint Military Command

(J.M.C.), many happrnings had taken place and efforts made to such

an rxtent that the provisions of thr- Protocol had bern overtakrn

by E"VPnts:

that anyhow thF J .M .c. h'ad n<'"i th•r br•n establishPd

nor b•gun functioning;

that accordingly the J.M.C, was not a viable instrument

for achieving the unification of the Zimbabwe freedom

fighters;

that at thr- current sta~e, priority should be given

to the strugglF and not to unity as the latter can

be achiPved du~ing the armPd action;

that in view of this considtora,tion ZANU was categori­

c~lly rPj<"cting th<' J.M.C. formula SPt out in MbPya

as a basis for unity bPtWPen thr two Movements and

thr prosecutions of thP struggle in Zimbabwe.

4/ •••

I I

I

- 4 -CM.1503/Part II

(ii) ZAPU:

ZAPU accPptPd and rcgarddd thP J.M.C. as. the appropriatp

instrument for the prosecution of thP struggle. He said

•that it had bel?n set up by common cons0nt by the two

parties. ThE' ZAPU spokesman said further that the J.M.C.

must bP given thP chancP to function and rejected th0

ZANU leaders' statement that the J.M.C, would hamper

and prejudice thr liberation strugglr of the peopl<? of

ZimbabwP.c·.Asfar as ZAPU was conc<'rnrd, th<' J.M.C, was

still in <'XiSt<'nCP,

12, Gen0rally, thr Committee noted with regrPt and serious

concern the ncgativ" attitude of the ZANU lraders as madc manifest

througpout thc discussions and which clearly indicated that the

ZANU leaders were rejecting the Mbeya Protocol and accordingly

the exist<'nc0 of any united action front .•.

13, After lengthy and heated discussions intended to break

the statE'm<'nt which the meeting had reached, the participants · ·

requEst<:.>d th<:.> l<:.>ad<?rs of thl? two Movements (ZANU and ZAPU) to

meet, with the assistance of the Chairman of the fu:! !::!.ili;. Committee

and the Executive Secretary in order to formulate objective and

new practical proposals to be submitted for consideration by thP

Committee.

14, During the exchange of views bPtwren thr leaders of the '

two Liberation Movements, with the assistance of the Chairman

of th0 Ad Hoc Committee and thE' Ex£cutiv0 Secretary, they agrrrd

to draw up a programme of common strategy for thP nrosecution

of the librration struggle ~n Zimbabwe.

15. Thr Ad Hoc CommittP<? accordingly adoptrd the docum<?nt

attached hFreto on the programme of common strategy which was

duly signed on th<' 17th March, 1973 by the accredit<?d l<?adf'rs of

.ZAPU and ZANU outside Zimbabwe.

16. According to its tPrms of rrfPr<?ncP, the Ad f!Q£ Committer

submits the results of l~s first meeting to thr- Co-ordinating

Committee for the Liberation of Africa,

5/ •••

- 5 -Cl"l/503/Part II

17. ThP participants to the Ad Hoc Committee meeting

paid tributr to the fraternal spirit of re-conciliation which

the reprrs12ntatives of ZANU and ZAPU displayrd during thP

dPlibPrations.

18. Thr participants WPrP also gratifird by the- r<'sults

achiPved and paid spec;ial tribut0 to H .. E. Pre:sid0nt K, Kaunda

and the Government of thr Republic of Zambia for thr rPlentless

<'fforts thry had rxcrt<'d to f'nsurr thr succrss of the mr rting.

--oo--

\

' .

•

CM/503/Part II Ann0x I

STRATEGY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE

. PREAMBLE:

Considc:ring ( .

(a)· that tbe peoplr of Zimbabwr ar<" one, and our

Organisations'have the same objective;

(b} that th@ objective of achieving the unity of our

Movements could best be attained through combined

action;

(c) the grave necessity to wage a more effective

revolutionary armed struggle, for the attainment

of that obj0ctive;

{d} the current phase of the mass resistance of our

peopl0 to the settler machinery of oppression;

Conscious of thr increasing danger to the attainment of '

these objectives posed by intPrnal and external

forcrs which arE' determined to '··J'>Ose, promot€ or

accommodate. splitist divisionary or disruptive

· elemPnts ·in thP Zimpabw0 revolutionary· struggle;

Determin.-d to giv.- effpct to our Bcmghazi Declaration of

January 18th, 1972, and our subsequent joint

document dated 11th February, 1912·, whose essential

purpose is' to attain si~uitanPous~y the unity of

the Zimbabwe people, and a more pffective prosecution

of t.he armed revolutionary struggl0 and having

signed the Mbeya Protocol es'tablishing the J',M .C.

on March, 23•;':).972.

.- '

2/ •••

(

•

•

- 2 -CM/503/Part II Ann<"X I

WP, thP External Missions of ZANU/ZAF\.J, having r0vi0wrd

the J.M.C. as Pstablished at Mbeya in March, 1972, now

deci·d.,:-

that a Political Council for ZimbabwP bP created,

A. JOINT MILITARY COMMAND - (J .M .C.)

1. That a unifi<"d military command bP crPatPd;

2, That areas of joint action Qf the J.M.C. shall be,among

other thi~gs:

\

(i) recruitmPnt and training

(ii) logistics and supplies

(iii)

(iv)

operations

military intelligence and information.

3. Th<" Joint Military Command shall b.- rPsponsiblP for

planning and conducting the war in all its asprcts and

shall remain subject to the genrral dirrctives of thr

Political Council of ZimbabwP.

4. ThP Joint Military Command shall consist of:-

(i) Chairman,

(ii) Vice-Chairman,

(iii) Six military cadres s<"lectpd by ZANU,

(iv) Six military cadr<'s selPcted by ZAPU.

s. ThP Chairman of the J.fvl.C. shall be provided by ZANU

thP Vice-Chairman by ZAPU,

and

6, The J.M.C. shall work out as soon as possible programm0s

for familiarisation, recruitment, training, deployment and

assPssmi:-nt of thco· means of th<" strugglP and joint

op<"rations.

3/ .•.

- •.

- 3 -

B. PObJJIC~b COUNCIL bF ZUABA!li!.£

CM/503 Part II Annex I

1. That a Political Council of ?imbabwe be created:

2... Th<' Political Council of Zi~t-tkwi; (P.C.Z.) shall be I

rPsponsiblP for, among othPr things:

(i) propaganda, mobilization and diplomatic

activities,

(ii) welfare of the civilian population,

(iii) administration and consolidation of areas of operation.

3, The Political Council of Zimbab~e shall also work out a

programme of political integration.

4; The Political Council of Zimbabwe shall consist of:-

(i) Chairman

(ii) Vice-Chairman

(iii) Six members to be providPd by ZANU,

and (iv) Six members to be prov id Pd by ZAPU.

5. Thr Chairman of the f'olitical Council of Zimbabwe shall

bP providPd by ZAPU and thP Vice-Chairman by ZANU.

ZANU and ZAPU have agreed on:-

(i) Th< establishment of an atmosphere of

peace and fraternity among their forces;

(ii) The imm.C?diate Cl'ssation of all acts of hosti.lity or attacks in the press, the r,adio and other mass m0dia;

(iii) The fact that from now onwards, in order to gradually achievP unity; their press. relPasPs . . and all propaganda work shall give emphasis on

' the newly-created bodies, J .M .C. and P ;C .Z., as

to make them known to the pe>ople of Zimbabwe.

(iv) To work out a common policy for integration of

all Zimbabweans willing to join :the struggle.

4/ .••

c.

- 4 -

IMPLFM hNTATION

Cl"l/503/P.ART II .Annex I

T~is document will· comr to forc<' two months

hPnCP, during which pl'riod th<' two Parties, with thE'

help of thr Ministe~ of ForE'ign Affairs of Tanzania

and Zambia assistE'd by thc- ExecutivE' SPcrE'tariat of

thE' O.A.U. Liberation CommittPE'; wlll work out1methods

of fmpiPmentation.

Thi' Chairman of the O.A.U. Liberation Committef'

.and thP ForPign Ministers of Tanzania and Zambia,assistPd

by th<- Executive Secrf'tariat of the Liberation Committee,

shall supc-rvis0 the implemPntat ion of this Agreement.

5/' .•

\

•

. '

- 5 - Ci'I/503/Part II .Annex I

This Agreement was signed under our hands this seventeenth

day of March, Ninetl:'en· hundred and Sevpnty three;

H.W. CHITEPO RhPRhSbN'.t:ATIVh OF ZANU

J .z. MOYO RLPRESENTATIVE CF ZAPU

in the Drf'SPnCP of th<" O.A.U. Ad Hoc Committ•r. for the Conciliation

con.sis ting of: -

3.

s.

HON. E.H.K. MUDhNDA,M.P. MINISThR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ZAMBIA.

HON. VINChNT EFON MINISThR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CAMhROUN,

HON. I .A. ShPhTU, M. P. , JUNIOR MINISTJ::R OF FORhIGN AFFAIRS, TANZANIA.

, 2, MAJOR KWAME BAAH, COMMI~SIONbR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GHANA.

4. HON. B. ·NABWERA, M,P;, ASSISTANT MINISThR OF FORhIGN AFFAIRS, KhNYJ\.

6·. MAJOR H. I, MBITA, hXhCUTIVh ShCRhTARY OF OAU LIBhRATION COMM ITT hf. •

'

CAMB.ROUN:

rnANli:

KENYA:

TANZANIA:

ZAMBIA:

' CM/503/Part II Annex II

LUSAKA MEETING

UNITY BB.TWEEN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ZIMBABWE

. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

H:E:Vinc~nt E£on - MinistEr 0£ Foreign A££airs

H.E, hlhaj M.H. Dicko - Ambassador 0£ Cameroun to Ethiopia.

H.L. Major Kwamc Baah - Commissionrr £or Foreig~ A££airs

Mr. Annan A. Cato - Special Assistant to the Conimissioner £or Foreign Affairs"

Hon. Burudi Nabwera,M .• P. Assistant Minister £or Foreign Affairs.

H.E. L.P. Odero

Mr. Micha0 l G, Okeyo

- Kenya High Commissioner to Zambia.

- Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"I

Hon. I.A. SepE:·tu, M.P •. - Junior Minist<"r £or Foreign A££airs.

H.E. Mr·. O.M. Katikaza - Tanzania .High Commissioner· to Zambia.

Mr. P. Rupia '

- Director £or African Affairs and Middle East A££airs.

Hoii.E.H.K. Mudenda,M.P.-. Minister ·Of Foreign A££airs

Hon. G. Zulu, M.P. - Minister of Defence

Hon.T.J. Kankasa, M;P. - Minister 0£ State for Foreign Affairs.

Hoi;i. C.M. Mwananshiku, M.P.

Mr. A.N. Chimuka

Mr. C.T.A. Banda

Lt. Col. T. Fara

Mr. J.C. Musole

- Minister of State for Defence

- Under-Secretary, Foreign Affairs.

- Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

- Ministry of De£encc

- Ministry 0£ D££ence,

~ 2/ ...

\

•

ZAPU:

ZANU:

Mr. J.Z. Mayo

Mr. T.G. Silundika

Mr, Dumiso DabE'ngwa

Mr, A1£rc-d Nikita

Mr. H. W. Chitc-po

Mr. M .K. Hamadziripi

Mr. M. M. Mudzi

Mr. W. Malianga

Chairman

S<:'crPtary

01'1/503/Part II Ai:;:w6X II

of R£volutionary

for Publicity and Information.

Secr•tary of RPvolutionary

Chief of Sta££.

Chairman {National)

Treasurer

AdministrativP Spcretary

Publicity Secr0tary.

Council

Council,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Major H. Mbita

Mr. A. Sidky

Mr. M. K. Simumba

Mr. J. Sh0nouda

Exccutivr Srcretary

Assistant Executive Secr0tary in Charge of Defence"

--Ob--

Dir0ctor of Lusaka Sub-O££ic0

Int0rprctrr, ( Exccutivr SFcrrtariat).

\ .. , .. . .

OK?.GANIZATION OE l_,j, ·':}\ o.b- 11 ~ AFRICAN UNITY • • .I '-"

ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE • 4-...t IJ .f...Jl · ~fflliWff, OF MINISTERS . r-rt.!

~· ~1'1't;?~rst Ordinary Session ·Y ·.i'

Secretariat B. P. 3243

•

Addis Ababa - May 1973

Addis Ababa • l.l.11 .......i>I , • • . • " C'.!/503 (PART III)

appendix I

..

THE EXECUTIVE SEJ'.:REI'ARIAT 1 S MISSION TO

LIBERA.TED AREAS IN MOZAMBIQUE

(FROM 5 TO 17 OCTOBER 1972)

·. \ '

; -

/

CM/503/(PART III) Appendix I Page l

_REJ:ORT OF THE EXE:CUTIV.O: SECRGTARIAT ON ITS·

MISSION TO THE LIBERATED ARFAS IN MOZAMBIQUE

' (FROM" 5 TO 17 OCTOBER 1972)

INTRODUCTION

Objeoti ves and Acti vi tJ.es of the Mission:

}

.1. The eyolution of the armed struggle waged by FRELIMO i• Mozam~iqtlAI

' '

. ' and the recent developments ,on the terrain ouJ.mi.natine in th~ opening

by FRELIMO of a new Military Front,, in .July 1972, in the strategio

Prdvince of Manicae Sofala has been of significant importance, both

for the war in Mozambiq_ue and the gl "'bal strat~yyin "•,nrthe=. A:f'ri..ca... __ .. -----·­

Tliese developments made it imperative upon the Ex:ecutive Secretariat,

~h order to assess the situation and to familiarise itself with it

and to carry out more fully its co-ordinating task of assistance to

1PRELIMO, to undertake without delay a mission to one of the li~erated

areas in Mozambiq_ue, especially so that since May 1968 no mission has

been sent by the Liberation Committee to bhe liberated areas,

2. Discussions with FRELIMll leadership on the matter led to the oho±•e

of the Province of Cabo Delgado as the visiting site for the following

reasons i

The President of FRELIMO was at the moment inside at Cabe

Delgado;

·- An important meeting of Military Commanders. and responsible

cadres of different Provinces and War Zones was taking plaoe ' I ·. at Cabo Delgado and would enable the Mission to get first-han<l.

\

information on the development of the armed struggle carried out

by FRELIMO in most combat zones;

'

I ,I

I

•' CM/ .03(PART III) Ap:,iendix I

Page 2

During the month of September 1972, FRELIMO had launched

a generalized offensive against Portuguese posts and encampmebtu

in the First and Second Sectors particularly,

3. The Mission was composed of:

Major Hashim !llbita

Mr. Ahmed M· Sidky

Capt. ·s. A. Makaranga

Dr, J.P. Kasiga

Mr. Jenerali Ulimwengu.

Ex:eoutive Secretary (CHAIRMAN)

Assistant Executive Secretary (In CharGe of Defence)

Military Expert (Headquar~ers)

Based at Headquarters

Jou:rnalist (Daily News),·

4·; The Mission left D:>r'-es-Salaam on October 5th 1972, W<":it immediately

to the point of entry where it was met by the President of FREI.IMO,

Comrade Samora Machel, crossed the Ruvuma Ri v3r under heavy FRELIM''

armed escort and went to Caba Delgado in /f!ozam.bique,

5, During the 10 days and 11 r;ights whic!l it spent in Mo!Oambique,

the Mission travelled or. foot mostly by day time, a distan~e of

approximately 180 kilometres and in some instances betireen 8 and

10 marching hours a day on the oentre.l plateau of the First Military

Sector,

(i) It visited:

a control centre

an Instruction Cen'vre

a Central Base (which was the target of the enemy offensive "Gordian Knot" druing 1970 and 1971)

a school

Field medical units and dispensaries

a Co-operative Centre for produc'ti ou and marketing (at the border)

FRELIMO '<l Mterera Iloep:'.+.aL

•

•

C,M/503 (PART III) Appendix I

_ Page 3

(ii) It discussed at great length with FRELIMO leadership,

Military Commanders, Political Commissars, responsible

cadres for production, health, education and social

welfare, It reviewed with them the military situation

in various Fronts and Combat Zones·, the programmes of

consolidation' of the liberated areas and, in particular,

the present needs and exigencies of the armed struggle.

, in Mozambique,

(iii) The Mission attended mass public meetings and had ~he

opportunity to gain an insight into the i,,ondi tions of lif~

of the population of the liberated areas and had the opportunity

to see .the devastati'on brought up by enemy aerial bombardmenit

on the villages and ou.ltivated field)" of the inhabitants.

(iv) The Mission was also shown a wide variety of captured

. enemy aquipment and war material as a result o± FRELIMO's

assaults on Portuguese posts and encampments; vehicles

des·oroyed ! unexploded bombs; planes and helicopters shot

down, etc,

6,, An account of the visit, together with the Mission's observations,

conclusions and recommendations., is set out below, In addition,

it may be noted that'material collected hy the Mission in the form

of taped inter,iews, photos, films, captured enemy material, etc.

is available at both ]'RELIMO and the Liberation Committee H,ead­

quarters,

7. Though material oonditions have not allowed the Ei~~hti.,.-e SQoretaria~

to organise fact· tir.J.ing .missions to other liberated areas or combat

zones in Mozambique (Niassa and Tete) which would be d"ne in future,

FRELIMO lead~rship has asserted that the general observation and

conclusions that could be made in Cabo Delgado also apply to other

Provinces as to the military situation in general, the need for

more oonsolidation of the.liberated areas and the exigencies of the

armed struggle.

CM/50) (PART III) Appendix I Page 4

It may 1-.e useful, in this respect tQ, mention that other

liberated areas have been vl.sited by various delegations from

Afri.ca and outside, testifying to the progress and consolidation

of the struggle:

a delegation of Dar-es-Salaam University students visited

Niassa in 1971;

in December 1971 and January 1972, a five-man team of

journalists and Cameramen from the People 1s Republic

of China visited Caba DeJ.gado;

~ during Maret, 1972, a team of Russian Journalists visited Tete;

three members of the British Committee for Freedom in Territo:::-ies

under Portuguese Domination visited Tete in le.gust 1972;

an I·'.rnlian Delega'Jion visited Caba De'.i.gado in August 1972,

Observations of the Mission: ·--·-~---... ·--·---....

From its own experience o~·- the ter:':"~·l-~\.'1 and from wid.a

discussions with FRELIIv'iO Military Commanders in various

military sectors as ;;ell as other responsible ce,dres, the

mission is in a position tc make the following observations:

8, The Portuguese army uni ts c,re f0:·· the most part - in the First

Military Sector - entrenched in the few remaining and isolated

posts in the liberated areas, .Chese posts and encampments ai·a ' being beseiged by the forces of FRELIMO and are being supplied

by air. The enemy has been compelled to evacuate some of the

posts - such as Limpopc and Muidumbe - which he was not anymore

Cl~/'.903 (PART III) .AppendiX I . Page_ 5

able to hold. The remaining enemy posts in the First Sector are

Ng 1 apa, Namatil.i, Nangade, Sagal, J;Jiaca, Nangololo, Palma and l\!ueda.

These are constantly attached and harassed by guerrilla forces; On the

ground the enemy is unable t .. move without being ambushed, atta~-ked

or destroyed, Though the Mission travell2d on foot for 10 days and

mostly in dr~ time no ground activities of the enemy were signalled in the whole of the First Sector, In the three other Military Seotors

constituting the Province of Cabe Delgado the situation is-not different,

9, Enemy activities are being carried out exclusively through air

operatio~s: aerial bombardments of liberated areas, points of concentra­

tion of the population (villages, water spots, etc,), destruction of

crops by incendiary bombs, napalm and chemical agents, Very limited

helibor~e oyerations take place occasionally for few hours or 48 hours

at maximum, Though the Mission itself did not come. under direct air attack by the enemy, it was able to hear sporadio bombardments and

' to see reconnaissance planes, helicopters, ])ODl1)a-:-a e"~d jets flying ove:c-

head, bombarding and straffing the bush in neighbouring areas, In one

instance enemy bomba. dment occurred sc me 4 kilometres from the itinerary_

of the Mission and some villagers were reported to have been killed or

wounded. Enemy aerial ac-tion gained intensity on the 7th, 10th-, 11th,

l,2th and 13th of November and one of the FRELIMO Bases was bombarded a few hours aTter the Thlission had left, while FRELIMO's amt~-aircraft

H,M,G, and artillery went· into action against enemy planes, The

Mission was told that the recrudescence in air activity was exceptio­

nal and to be considered as a reaction to FRELIM0 1s successful

offensive during September 1972, particularly against ·Jl!ueda .Air Base,

wtioh took the enemy completely by'surfrise. (See below),

The Mission identified the enemy aircraf~s used during

bombardments as:

- Cessna T-37 C

Dornier :00,27

- North American Harvard T-6

- Fiat G.91 Nata Type R-4

- Alouettes 2 and 3

I

cw/503 (PART III) Appendix I

Page 6

10, The enemy in his isolated post8 seems to be quite demoralised

• judging from the increasingly reported number of deserters

from both the metropolitan contingents and the African troops,

By night the Mission could hear sporadic enemy artillery

positions (Recoil Cannons) firing at random into the bush in

vain attempts to keep away1guerrilla forces,

11. . ' The Missi.on was shown a quant1 ty of captured arms and ammuni tio1',

(all this material in good condition is NATO type) as well as

:~exploded fragmentation bombs (57 Kg.) French-made), tele-0ommun- , ication equipment (French-m.:W.e) as a result of FRELIM0 1e aeeaults'\O~

enemy posts, ambushed vehicles, planes and helicopters ·uot down

etc,,

The Mission indentified,, among other things, the following:

• Walter P.38 9 mm. Pistols

Browning FN 9 mm. Pistols

G 3 7,62 NATO type S. L. R.

FN 7.62 NATO type

FN M.A.G. Sub-maohine guns

60 mm. Mortars

81 mm. Mortars

Rocket Launchers F.44-1

Fragmentation hand grenades

(West Germany)

(Belgium)

(West Germany)

(Belgium)

(Belgium)

(French-USA)

(USA-NATO)

(w. Germany-USA)

(U.S.A.)

12, The Mission was given a detailed. account on the September FRELIMO

offen~ive in Cabo Delgado.

On.i.18th September, 1972, guerrilla forces combining

infantry and artillery, attacked the Portuguese

Military Headquarters, Mueda, and its airfield·

destroying 18 planes and helicopters on the grou~d,

blowing up matGrial stores, fuel depots and officers'

quarters. A force of 800 guerrillas participated

in this attack and the enemy was taken complete·ly

by surprise to the ext'ent that he did not react.

-·

r

I

cMj503 (Pil.RT ru) Apper:.d.u I 1<,., ,, 7

FRELIMO forces have also attacked simultaneously ' 7 enemy posts in the First Sector, Paralysing him

completely. One of the Planes - a harvard bomber -

in.tervening from Nongalolo nearby ai;r--field was

shot dcwn and crash-landed in FRELIMO positions.

Inside the wreckage two bodies were found, a radio

salvaged and two sub-machine guns.

- On the 24th of September a helicopter was also

shot down in the First Sector.

- On the 4th of October FRELIMO attacked the post of

· Lissomo on the ocean near Mocinna de Praia, the post

Commander and his.wife were killed and the guerrillas

managed to liberate one African from a concentration

oamp. The Mission interviewed him and was shown

official files and persor.al belongings of the Post

Commander,

13. At present, the predominant features of the military situation

is the spreading of the struggle to new regions towards th~

South, both in Cabo Ilelgado,. Niassa and in Tete, The progress of

the struggle was made possible after FRELIMO had achieved a high

level of consolidation of the lib~rated areas, Such has been FRELIM0 1 s

success that Ca~o Delgado, Niassa and Tete now provide strong and

effective rear bases, both militar~ly and politically, from which

forward movement can spring,

The enemy, realizing the signific.anoe of the progress ao~ieved

and ~he changes which had taken place in the military situation,

decide~ to transfer the Headquarters of the general staff of its

armed forces from NAMroLA, in the North, to BEIRA in the · Cer.tre of

the country,

•

CM/503 (PART III) f;ppencj.iz: I, Pa;,·e u

While consolidating and strengthening control of , the li bera11.1d, zones,

FRELIMO's strategy aims at

isolating enemy positions.

FRELIMO prevented the enemy

ext~nding. war zones to the South and at

By constantly attacking and harassing,

in 1972, fr~m launching any major

offensive. Whenever the enemy starts to concentrate the giierrilla

launches preventive strikes in order to di'sorganise its forces.

FRELIMO lead'ership and military commanders reiterated to the Mission

that at present the Portuguese forces are unable to launoh major

offensives in the liberated areas such as those it carried out during

1970/71 in which it concentrated, in 20 days, 55,000 soldiers and

15,000 Tons of material, The period of the dry season elapsed witho1 tany

<.:o.ypossi bili ty for the Portuguese High Comma::>d to res9rt to, its

. "lass:i,c dry season offensives •·,l.:eatb.a::: · :'..;~ Caso Delgado, ¥iassa or Tete.

14. It is important to mention some observati0ns of a military character

which the Mission was able to ascertain:

FRELIMO's modus operandi at present in assaulting enemy

posts and positions is hy large formations (up to one

thousand men 'in some cases) combining infantry aud art;i­

llery. 'It has particularl~ improved qualitatively its

field artillery and anti-aircraft weapons,

The Mission was able to Witnesu i~ position:

75 mm, ·Recoiless BlO

' 12,7 mm. H.M,G. (Ths 14.50 mm, Ao~. Cannon has also been

60 mm. Mortars

82 mm. Mortars

Rocket Launchers

introduced)

It has b,een able to exert control on the lines of

oc·mmunioation between the border, the 1i berated areas and war

zones,

\

l

. ---·-·· .

I.

cMj503 (PART· III)

Appenr(l.iz I . l J I Page 9

)l T

· --·. Transmission on enemy activities is ensured by a solid

net of ·information r.nd intelligenne with the active and

unconditional participation of the population and militia,

It is important to mention in this respect that the Mission was able

to move-and-·change--bases as ··q'.ickly--as information ··on enell17· movemer.t

was-bei!-.g signalled,

I FRELIMO-. has--e s.tablished . ...a-sys-t em--0£--oo:A trol in--~- l:Lloa.ratQd - .

areas to fail enemy attempts to infiltrate agents,

The looa.l _lX>Pula1;.ion...i.s-asaumiJ'lg._j__tself'-··-t'b.e--de.fe>toe -.o.f ..

-----~~__x;l.ll~es and various localities,

- The enemy yolioy·-of- strate1ri.c_hamle'ts .. (AJ.deamer.tos) completely

--·------·--·Jailed-in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and particularly in T~e where

the arms given to the population to defend thell'l.SeJ.ves··aga:inet

the so-called "ter~'btists" 1;ere. simply handed over to the

guerrillas· thus--contri bu-ting to the opening o:f the new front

of Manica e Jofala,

Along with the armed struggle, FRELIMO is intensifying its

work of political mobilisation on all levels of its organisa-

tion (armed forces,· militia, papilla ti on of- the liberated areas,.

population of the combat ~ones) to the. extent that one can Speak in

in the liberated areas of .a higb:ly mobilized and committ&d

·population in arms, The Mission often came across popular

columns transporting material and equipment for-·-bhe _guerrillas,

on foot and marching more than eight hours a day-with total-'ded.i.- -......

cation and abnegation,

15.. With the evolution of the armed struggle, the extens:ion· 0£ -the liberated

areas and comba:t .. wnes, .. tlle Mission was abl1,.to saa f~ .!>taelf e.nd ·ta 'di-6'-

.ouss_at.lsngth ~ith FRELIMO leadership.and ~~litary Commanders the ne 0 ds

and requirements of the Movement whicl) have necessarily increased in

.. - -· ·--

•

•

CM/503 (PART III) Appenjllz fl: , ~ Page 10

. l

volume and quality to equip the larger military··formations created,

new recrutts, trainees and self-defence units, besides the programmes

of O<•l!.SOlidation of li.bera-hed areas and the work of mobilisation and

infiltration in new zones,

(:!.)-... Th.ere . .is ·an _incr.~asing demand for war material and equipment 1 ---- ---Light weapons with ammunition

and in.f'a.n.t~pment

Uniforms

Ground Sheets

Underwares

Pullovers

Boots

SeiQl!:S

Blankets

WE>.t•rrbottles

Binoculars

Shovels

sacks

Sabotage equipment

--

'

( Semi._J3ill;01lla:il.o .lli.,Ues 7. 62 mm.

( Sub-machine guns 7,62 mm.

( 1. M. G. 7. 62 mm.

( Automatic Pistols

( Hand Grenades

( Mine Detectors

Mugs, watches, Transistor Radios, Soap, Jericans, Kerosene, torches greasing oil for equipment mainte­nance, Foodstuff (dried ration), medicin~s and equipment for field medical uni ts,

!TNT in block forms, fuse and electric code mines, anti-vehicle mines (T!.!,,16) &x:plosi ves (Plastic) Electric detcna-'-tors - Dynamos ·

(Deto1ating cords - electri6 wire, (wire cutters.

(Pyrotechinic - chemical produ~ts (to manufacture explosives,

r

•·

Field artillery , weapons· with ammunition,

CM/503 (PART III) ~ppendjl.:I: I 1 ··~ie .:i.l

\

75 mm. Recoille~s B,10 Anti-Tank · 60 mm, Mortars and 82 L. P, G. 2 and R. P. G, 7 Launchers.

I

mm. Rocket

l

Anti-aircraft weapons with ammunition,

(12.7 mm, H.M.G, ·(Double Barrelled) ( 14. 50 mm. A. 1.. Cannon,

(ii) The extension of combat zones has made communication and

intelligence very important for the success of the war,

In Mozambique there is a serious shortage of telecommuni­

cation equipment,' As a start FRELIMO is requesting short

and medium range transmission equ~pment (Man-pack).

(iii) In Mozambique the progress achieved by FRELIMO has been

associated with an acute problem as to logistics,

Needs are:

~ Sufficient means of transportation from rear bases to

the border (Trucks, Land Rovers), I

Supply inside Mozambique is effected by popular columns

on foot and for several weeks, particularly for advanoed

units~ FRELIMO is requesting the provision of beasts of

traction to alleviate this problem. (Mules, Donkeys),

In most liberated areas and combat zones transport of

supply through rivers, especially during the rainy season,

creates immeuse problems, hence the urgent need for small

pne1matic or fibre/plastic boatti,

(iv) FRELIMO leadership pointed out time and gain to the urgent

need for increased financial assistance to implement its

programmes of underground activities and urbaa guerrilla

warefare as well as to carry out the task of national

reconstruction'i::t the liberated zones, (Collective Centre~,

CM/503 (PART III) Appendli.x I~

Fag," 12

Ag:;-icmltural Co-operatiTes, etc,.). The Movement has emphati­

cally mentioned in this respect that the monthly allocation it

receives from the Liberation Committee for foodstuff (Shs,40,000/-)

has become completely inadequate and ought tc be increased,

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

1'. The Mission has wi'91essed in the liberated areas of Mo~ambique a gigantic

effort of,•ational reconstruction and a radical transformation of the

·eolonised society in all its social, cultural, e·~onomic, administrativ\)

and· political aspects; The nationalist administration is firmly establi­

shed in the liberated areas and FRELIMO has drawn up programmes with

the aim of increasing production in the rural areas, of developing

handicraft industry, building the bases for light industries, improving

existing•resources, health conditions and educational· services,

THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM - (RECONSTRUCTION OF THE

ECONOMY)

l'f. The Mission ·held discussi ms· ll'i th responsible cadres for produotion,

It also participated to discuss with the local population at public

meetings,

FRELIM0 1s policy in the li~erated areas is aimed at eliminating all

vestiges of economic organisation and exploitation imposed by the , Portuguese and replacing it with a new economic. system appropr~•te

to the needs of the country, As the econoffiY of the liberated areas

is essentially agriculture, FRELIM0 1s first concern was to ensure

a minimum.level of agricultural production, sufficient both to

meet the people's need in food as well as the combatants and to

produce some surpluses which oould •e exported in order to provid"

the means for obtaining essential manufactured goods,

.,CM/503. (PAR'f'_IJiI) .L\ppendi:t I · · . Page 13

I I.

Strv.otural .. mobilisation also had to be made in produotion,

Political mobil:j.sation in favour of ·the.co-operative mode of

production has made it possible to generalise peat· 'lt mutual

aid and co-operative. movement which has made· produotion efforts

. .far. more effective despite the-persistent war conditions,

bembihg rates, and. spraying of chemical agents. Di versification

of agricul "ture was a must, to meet local r€1{:tui,rements. Production

consists of-simsi.m,. castor-oil s<>eds,_ ground-nuts, cashew nu-ts,

dri.ed fish, salt and bees wax, etc,

Party property

~- .. Golle-o-lrl.-.,.e ·pro]:><>rty ..

·· .... -- Individual property

·•• .•. {)oaQ..Of .. the.._jllaj_o:c "'1.ms. cf th<> ··caJ_omal . .army :i.a to st.<n-ve-the

population. Helj ported ·

burn c~ops and grenaries.

Phosphorous bombs on crops.

troops come to search and loot, to

The airforce uses napalm and. _pho­

More recently; with South African

help, the enemy has been using chemical. agents~- and spraying h'10

parti.cularly affected cassava,

One of the most serious bottle-ne.cks in bo'th external and

internal trade is the lack of transport facilities apart

from men, A man can oarry an average of 25 kilos over a dis­

tance of about 40 kilometres~ a day's march which is not

nearly enough for the level of production already.reached

and for the internal a,rid external tra,de requireme~ts for the

liberated areas. There exist also craft-based light industry

tendencies (carving, salt extracting, manufacture of element&ry'

agricultural impliments, though there is a serious shortage

in the necessary tools for agriculture in' the liberated areas).

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CM/503 (PART III) Ap,:endix I · Page 14

Trade is transacted on a barter basis and Protuguese currency is no longer usea •. People's stores, organised by FRELIMO, are in the process of establishment throughout the liberated ar·eas where the villagers may exchange their produce under the barter system for basic necessities such as clothing, cooking utensils and other manufactured goods, Local produoe is stored for use of the liberatio~ army and for distributioa in regions where th'ere is a shortage or the destruction of cl.'ops, The, surplus is exported in exchange for manufactured goods needed by the population.

The Eliucational System:

The deve).opment of education is one of the highest priorities in the programme of national reoonstruotion. FR;irrLIM0 1s. policy for tile liberated areas aims at rapid elimination of illiteracy, Schools are organised and centrally administered by FRELIMO •

• ... The Mission 'visited an Infantario (Nursery) where 54 children from 7 to 10 yoars of age were boarded. They were either orphans of the war of liberation or children of combatants. The Centre is run by solidier nurses,

Tba responsible cadres for education i~formed the Mission that in one District, Nangade, there exist 11 elementary schools with 1104 students,

Health Conditions:

The.~im is to provide health services to active freedom_ f~ghters and to the population of the liberated areas in general. Medical facilities are under the direction of FRELIM0 1 s Military_ Command. Hospitals located at Military Bases give first priority to the treatment of wounded

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CM/503 (PART III)

AA>penqix I L. 15

combatants'and to the victims of Portuguese bombardments

from the civilian. population, The Mission was told, however,

that the efforts of the health service were hampered by the

serious lack of medical eQuipment and supplies, especially

suppl.ies of anti··biotics, anti-parasitic drugs and vaccines,

There was a similar shortage of vitamins and protein diet as

well as food supplement. Another difficulty is the transport

situation, It is not easy to carry seriously~wounded or sick

people to FRELIMO hospitals at rear bases,

Because of the difficulties of war, it is impossible to

establish proper di'et. So in these areas mulnutri tion of all

kinds is endemic, Diseases here are plenty, virulent and

mortality is exceedingly high because of the empoverished life,

malnutrition and water situation, Hospitals in these areas are

rudimentary because it is impossible to establish proper hospitals

for fear'of enemy attacks, lack of facilities and trained

personn.el.

The most common diseases ar~: malnutrition, dystenry, baoterial

and amoebic, ·resulting from the consumption 9f filthy water;

tropical ulcers and helmintic diseases suoh as Ankylostomial

(hook worm), tape worm, ascariasis (round worms) and bilharzia1

malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis and leprosy/ sleeping sickness,

hydrocoeles and eye disease,

Medical facilities a~·<e meagre and are wholly provided by the

Medical Department of FRELIMO through their cadres, whose

training is agin very limited,

There are, however, ways which could help these areas improve

in this. field, First on the list is the fast recovery of th.e ·

economic situation, This process has already been started by

FREL~O in their programmes of national reconstruction, Next

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CM/503 (PART III)

Apps11di:it·I Paf!;e l•

.is the improvement of sources of water in these areas. Better

wells could be construoted. and protected to reduce diseases.

Rsga.rd,iJl€_)'llitr1tion, to start with, thes~ areas must bs

helped with foodstuffs, espaoiaJ.),y in .oJ>ganiz~ habi.t....,,.. .su<>b,

as schools, nurseries and hospitals.

<),. .i.;....,.. .. .,.. ~valen;t now, a steady supply of drugs is weeded

and also a tra.i~ P"'~ £=. --~ to :thii;i j<>l>. i-"

lJl.'gent.J.¥ ;i:-equired.

jttwara Hospital:

The Mtwara Hospit<i.l h"-" .a. oapaci ty of up to 70 beds, It has

also a small cut-pa~ .d&~~ • ....,__ o~t.i""l -t>n~. a

small_ pharmacy and a laboratory. Most of the facilities are

meaf!;re in comparison to the amount of work which is pQ~~ 1\'l the hospital, The hospital was opened in 1970 and was meant

not only to oater for the injused FRElJ:M) soldiers, ~t for ~he

masses in the liberated areas.

The hospital gets its medical supplies from-donations from

friendly organizations and governments. The Liberation

Committee has not yet been able to offer very substantial aid,

Besides the hospital, there is an annex at Kianga village

where the recuperant patients and those receiving ambulatory

out-patient treatment. This Camp consists of two buildings

which are furnished with double-decker beds, Here it must be

emphasized that the greatest problem facing FRELIMO is

accommodation and food for these people,

To try and reduce some costs of food FRELIMJ has opened a

"shamba" for the patients. They are taken to work when they

feel well enough to do so,

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CM/503 (PART III),

Appendix I Page 17

During the Mission's visit FRELHD urgently asked for weight·

scales for babies and adults, as well as anti-biotics.

There are, at the moment, plans -Go expand the hospital

' and the cost of expansion will be met· by the Dutch

Government.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMWJENDATIONS

20. Having spent 10 days in the liberated areas of Caba Delgado

province in Mozambigue, familiarising itself with the.

prevailing situation in these a~eas; holuing lengthy

discussions and exchange of views on mj.li tery developments

in various fronts and combat zones 1ri th FRELH!O leadership,

Military Commanders, Poli ti cal Commissars, responsible

cadres, s~ldiers ·of the National Liberati a~' Army, Civilian

population of the liberated areas; visj:bing FRELIMO 1 s I

operational bases, oentreu, schools, hospitals, co-operatives;

the Mission fe1els that it is in a T)osition to submit to 'the

Liberation Committee its conclusions and recommendations.

The. Ex:ecuti ve Secretariat t~'usts ".ohat they would receive

the serious consideration they deserve on the part of the

Committee and would contribute' ·bo fur~,her and enhance the ,

armed struggle waged by FRELI'!'ftJ in Mozambigue. I

21. The armed struggle in Mozambigue continues to progress.

22.

FRELIMJ, while consolidating the liberated areas in Cabo

Delgado, Niassa a,-id Tete, has 8Xtended its operational .. '

zones further South and has oper.<;d new fronts.

FRELIMO has re-organized 'its forces, 1both guan~itatively

and gualitatively, oarry.ing out systematic assaults on

Portugl.1-ese posts, harassing its cc·nvoys and disrupting its

lines of communications. ,Portliguese posts in liberated

areas have become besieged garrisons, being supplied solely

by air, unable to communicate by land· without being ambushed,

attacked or destroyed,

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CM/503 (PART III) APPENDIX I Page 18

23. The Mission found FRELIM0 1 s strategy militarily sound, pa~ticularly by carrying out:

offensive action aiming a"h disorgani1>.ing the ene;;iy

forces and preventing him from concentrating the

superior means at its disposal;

~urprise attacks on its airfields and installations,

using large formations, combining infantry and.

artillery which adds to its demoralization.

This strategy has prevented the enemy from launching any major offensive during the period under review.. Moreover, FRELIJ[) succeeded in foiling enemy attempts to commit guerrilla forces to fight on defensive ·fortified perimetres as in _the oase of the Cabora Bassa area; instead while

containing the enemy it managed to extend its operational zones further South and to open a new front, Manica e Sofala, in the oentre of the country heavily populated and where the-economic interests of the colonialists are.

24. In the liberated areas, though the enemy has lost the initiative on the ground, he is_ still master of the sky and is using this superiority to the maximum by frequent air bombardments and straffing of suspected points of

concentration of FRELIMO cadres as well as the civilian population, He is also resorting to ~idespread indiscri­minate bombing of villages, the use of napalm, inoendiary, fragmentation bombs, defoliants and various types of chemical agents to subdue the_ population by means of famine and starvation.

25. Most of the captured enemy material and equipment displayed to the Mission was of NATO type, originating from NATO

countries.

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CM/503 (P.A:RT III) Appendix

1I

Page 19

~-• Everywhere-th'e...Missior.-wi1;r.e.ssed the presence of a strong

organisation - FRELIMO - with capable -leadership and c. dres,

deeply united with the masses,

27.• In the liberated areas visited by the Mission the colonial

administrative machi:;.ery x:o longer exists and has- beep. rep.laced

by a !lew natior.al administrative and poli tioal organisation

ooverlllg every facet of community life, The Mission was

impressed by the. enthusiastic and .whole-hearted· <"o-operatioll.

and support FRELIMO receives from the people in the liberated

areas a~d the extent· to whi~h they are.participating in the

administrative machinery set up by FRELIMO--and .. fur-the--variowi . '

__ pro~·-of-n.a:ti.Dnal .:Ceo-Ol'.Etrll.."'1;i.o11 •

. -·

·::n. As to the enemy, the Exeo..itive Secretariat is in no way minimis~

its potential a..~d responsibilities, On the-contra.rj'·he is

expected in the coming mont!:s to ex 'rt .all efforts-.and.depl<ly

all its forLes in an attempt to stop FRELIMO ·advance to the '

South. One should also expeot an even more active engagement

on the part of South Afri~an and Ian· Smith's rebel regime in the

war in Mozambique. Their physical inv©lvement will increase

with Portuguese reverses.

28, ·on the other hand as FRELIMO extends its operational zones,

it will no do'·llt encour.ter vast problems as to· logistics,

armaments, recruitment, foodstuff, mobilisation work, etc,

Hence the necessity for the Liberatic.n Commitee to be in a

position to cope with the exigencies of the armed struggle,

29. The Mission recommends to the Liberation Cammi ttee that the

requests submitted hy FRELIMO and endorsed by tiie Ex:ef'utive

Secretariat as set out above in paragraph 15, be met,

especially the provision for: ·

Light armament with ammunition

Infantry equipment

CM/503 (PART III) Appendix I Page 20

Artillery weapons with ammunition

Anti-aircraft weapons with ammunition

Sabotage equipment.

Transmission equipment;

Logistics (trucks, Land Rovers, Boats)

Medicines and medical equipment,

It is also of paramount importance that the monthly allocations

for FRELIMO for foodstuff and fuel be increased •.

30,· The Executive Secretariat would like to put emphasis on the

FRELIWil reuqests for increased financial assistance to implement

its programmes for boosting the urhan guerrilla action, since

it has started to operate in· the vicinty· of cities and heavily

populated agglomerations.

31. As FRELIM0 1s new opera,tional zones are at present along the

border with Rhodesia, it is a must that the Zimbabwe Western

Front be militarily activated to prevent Smith's troops from

assisting the Portuguese in Tete and Manica e Sofala which they

are doing already. Hence the necessity of reconciling the

activities of both ZAPU and ZANU under the Joint Military

Command with FRELI!l:08s strategy. In other words, the crisis

within Zimbabwean Liberation Movements should be resolved

and the J.M.C. be put '>n foot at all costs. The Bx:ecutive

Secretariat considers that the armed strug~le in Southern

Africa must be taken as an indivisible whole and that t.he

struggle waged in Mozambique and Angola cannot be dissociated

from the struggle in South Africa and Rhodesia,

3?., The Executive Secretariat strongly feels that the Liberation

Committee's action should concentrate particularly on consoli­

dating the liberated areas so as to be strong~r rear bases

from which further advance to the 3outh could sprL1g.

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CM/503 (PART III) Appendix I Page 21

33, The Mission wishes to place on record its appreciation

to the Leaders of FRELIMO, in particular to its President,

Comrade Samora Machel, for the constant assistance and

co-op~ration~ and for the facilities they have placed

at the Mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated

areas of Mozambique. A particularly warm tribute is due '

t~-' the officials and cadres of FRELIMO who accompanied the ·

Miasion throughout its visit,

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COUNCIL OF -MINIS'l'ERS __ _ Twenty-First Ordinary Session Addis Ababa - May 1973

-~--..

CM/503 (PART III) APPENDIX II

·--

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT'S MISSION TO THE--~-­

LIBERATED AREAS IN GUINEA BISSAU

(From 7 to 16 November 1972)

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CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II Page 1

.REPORT OF THE EXECU~'IV~ SF::?RETARIAT

ON ITS MISSION TO THE LIBERATED

AREAS IN GUINEA BIS~A:Q:

(FROM 7 t,,~ 16_.lIDYWMBER l9]J)

PURPOSE OF THE MISSION AND ITS ACTIVITIES•

1. The Executive Secretariat feit that the evolution of the poli tioo-

mili tary situation in Guinea.Bissau and the crucial phase of the armed

struggle reached by P, A. I. G, C, necessi.tated a thorough assessment of

the situation on the spot.

At the present juncture rounC: up d:i.soussions ui th P.A. I. G., C.

leadership were of paI·amount importa:nce to find ways and means to

strengthen PlA. I. G. C, action both militarily and poli tioally.

The Executive Secretariat also felt that consultations with

officials of the host country, the Republic of Giinea, deeply committed

.to the support of the. liberation strugg1e, and shoulderin.g a great part of

the burden of the war as 3. strong :>:>ear oass fc'r P.A. I. G, C,, were not only

useful but impe.ra.tive.

It had also to look into the work of 'the Libe1-ation Ccmmi ttee 1 s

·Sub-Office in Conakry and assess· its action after one year of operation,

O.A. U, Training Centres in Wes b 1'.frioa were also to be inspected,

2, The Mission was composed of•

Major Hashim llibi ta

Mr. Ahmed M. Sidky

Major M'Zemba,Keita

Capt. S. Makaranga

Mr. Bala Kouyate

Executive Sec:cetary

Assistant Executive Secretary

(In Charge cf Defence)

Director of the Sub-Regional Officer Conakry,

Military Ex:pert (Hgrs,)

Staff membei· of the Sub­Regional Of:i'ice ;.:1 Conakry,

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CM/503 (Part .l\,ppendix II

page 2

III)

The a~tivities of the Mission for the time it spent in Guinea

Bissau and the ~epublic of Guinea were as follows;

A. The Mission was met at Conakry by Mr. Aristides Pereira,

Deputy Seere~ary-General of P.A. I. G. C, and Jllr, Victor Maria,

Member of the Executive Committee with whom the itinerary of

its visit to the liberated areas of Guniea Bissau was

worked out,

·B, A visit to the liberated areas of the Southern Front (Balana -

Kitafine Seo~or). Base of the Southern Command,

Control base at Kandiafra

Base of the Political Commissariat for the Southern Sector.

Military base of the Southern Command

Anti-aircraft batteries covering the border area

A Fi.eld Hospital at Donka

A Co-operative Centre for production and marketing (Peoples' Stores)

Attended mass public meetings.

·C, A visit to the liberated areas of the Eastern Front (Madina

da Bar Sector) - P.A.I.G,C, Politico/Military Orientation

Centre.

D,

E.

F.

G.

A visit to P.A.I.v.c. Hospital in Bake.

A visit to PAIGC pilot school and kindergarten in Conakry

Inspection of OAU Training Centres in West Africa.

The Mission held discussions in Conakry with

The Secretary-General· of P,A.I,G,c., Mr. Amilcar Cabral and. members of the Ex:ecutive Committee

The Minister of Defence of the Republic of Guinea

The Deputry Foreign Minister·of the Republic. of Guinea

The Minister of Justice of the Republic of Guinea

The Governor of Boke Province.

H. The Mission was privileged to be received b~ His Ex:ecellency­

President Ahmed Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea.

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CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

Page 3

4, An account of the visit, together wHh the Mission 1 s .observations,

conclusions and rebommendations, is set out below.

OBSERVATIONS OF 'I'HE MISSION:

5~ From,its visits to th£' liberated zones in the Southern and

Eas~ern fronts as well as form discussions with P.A.I.G.C. leadership,

Military Commanders, Political Commissars, Responsible Cadres for . Production, Health, Educationmd Social Welfa~e, the Mission is in a

position to make the fellowing observations: I

The Military Situation:

6. ·_ It ·is a well known fact that after ten years of armed struggle,

the P.A.I.G,C. has succeeded in liberating mere than two-thirds of the

national te~ritory and is administering large liberated areas where it

exercises all attributes of _sovereignty.

7. In the Southern Sector visited by the Mission, Portuguese forces

are entrenched in few isolated posts in the liberated areas. These

posts are besieged by P.A.I.G.C, forces and constantly attacked er

harassed. The remaining enemy posts in .the Balana-Kitaf.ine Seater,

along the border are Aldeia, Formose, Guiledge and Cadamael, They are

heavily fortified and supplied by air. In general the enemy has

evacuated most of its fortified positions and withdrawn to the ooean

where it oan def·end them through sea power. Enemy activities are

carried out by air operations: aerial bombardments of liberated areas,

points of concentration cf the population, destruction of crops and

-livestock by incendiary bombs, napalm·and chemical agents •

8. Commander "Nine", Chief of Staff of P.A. I. a. C. Army and member '

of the 1High Council cf War, emphasized to the Mission that the enemy

enjoys total supxemacy on the air and overwhelming power on the sea and

rivers,aud ... :hat it was imperative for P.A.I.G,c. in order to nulliiT

that sui-:,···~naoy to utilise more advanced technical means. The Mission

has, in ihis respect, observed the fellowing:

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CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 4

That the Po11tuguese air f'oroe has of' late intensified its

bombardments and burning of' villages in an attempt to destroy

and sweep away signs of' P.A. I. G, C. sovereignty in the

liberated areas. In the Southern' Seotor, the Mission came

aotoss one village 11 Tchinchidi" which has been bombed and burnt

several times. It was also reported during our :presence in the

Southern Sector that the enemy was bombing f'or the second oonsecutive

week the area of 11 Tombali 11 in the Catio Sector. During the last

three months enemy air action has been particularly severe against

border villages, but significant enough the population stayed

working in the rice fields.

The Mission trav, lled twice for more than 4 hours on the

Balana River - main route of supply for the Southern Front and

noticed that most of' P.A.I.G.C. and population movements on

, rivers are effected by night to evade enemy reconnaissance and

air attacks, wreckage of' boats destroyed by the enemy was olearly

seen in different spots. Though P.A.I,G.O. has succeeded in

de,stroying and sinking a big number of enemy boats on the rivers

with light artillery, the enemy ,is st.ill using them unchallenged

due to air cover,

That P.A.I.G.C, has not got enough or adequate antiaircraft

weapons to cover all the liberated areas. The Mission visited

the site of' an A.A. Batteries covering the border area and met

the personnel manning them who had also been a week earlier

involved in important engagements. In position were:

12 • 7 mm, ( 4-Barrelled)

- · 14,5 mm.

37 mm. Cannon.

It was obvious that these weap,ons, though suitable f'or the area

visited, were too heavy f'or tactical deployment inside the country,

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. CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

Page 5

The Mission could hear sporadic artillery fire from nearby Portuguese posts, shelling guerrella key positions and routes supply. The ~act that these posts are heavily fortified makes P.A.I.G,C, assaults often costly due to ~he lack of Long Range artillery. In this respect

' P.A.I.G.O. arsenal consists mainly of:

82 mm. mortars

75 mm. Recoiless gun

RPG 2 and 7 (Rocket Launchers) 122 mm, Rocket Launchers (in limited numbern).

10. TransILission equipment used by P.A.I. G, C. is ej.ther not adequate for jungle warfare or very limited in range and therefore create diffi­culties as to the co-ordination of infantry action as well as the correction of ground artillery fire.

11. In the Eastern Front visited by.the Mission (Madina Da Boe Sector) the military situation is different from the ,South. The area is not heavily populated. In this Sector the liberated zones are vast and in an area of 3,600 sq, Km. adjacent to the border not even a single enemy post exists since the P.A.I,G.C, big offensive in 1969. In order to reach the first Portuguese·posts it is necessary to march 4 days, and P.A.I.G,0, is using ~ehioles up to 15C' Km. inside the libera·~ed zones. In this Sector Portuguese offensives are non-existent and the enemy realizes that the bombing of combatants would not achieve results. Its strategy there is purely defensive especially in Gabu and Bafata Sectors.

12. At Madina da Boe, where the Command of the Eastern Sector the Mission visited PAIGC's Politico-Military orientation Centre

is based,

for the formation and training of cad.res to the armed forces. The school, which started in 1969, has at present 35n cadres besides Instructors and Political Commissars. It represents one of the greatest P.A.I.G,C. achievements, for its main objective is the integra.tion of cadres coming from different regions and tribal background into one single and homogenous fighting force, Training takes usually. two or three months. Morsovar,. aot.ivities of the school are not limited to training and proViding educa­tion, the centre is also entrusted with the inculcation of a high level of national consciousness not only·to cadres under training but also to

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·cM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

Page 6

all other oadres serving in the army or having other activities, especially those who have returned from abroad after accomplishing missions or undertaking studies for a number of years and might have lost during thJt period touch ~ith the realities and conditions in the country, The Mission visited the school premises, looked into military, educational, health and social programmes, Cadres displayed self'-defenoe and close combat e:x:ero.ises. i-lome of the instructors and oadres were previously enrolled in the "African Forces" of t4e Portuguese army and have joined the ranks of P.A.I,G,C,

13. The liberated areas are divided into three military zones (North, South, and East) administered each by a National Committee and one Military Command. The "Superior Cou_noil of War" directs the armed struggle, Besides the National Regular Army (Army Corps), local armed forces (units of self'­defenoe) are organised by Regions, and plans are underway to bring the local forces to the level of the Regular Army; some local units have already participated in assnults against enemy positions,

To each Army Corps is attached a group o_f artillery; plans for restruoturation of the artillery for more mobility are-near·oompletion,

14. P,A.I.G.C. military action is mainly characterised by systematic assults against enemy posts and positions, combining heavy artillery and large infantry formations. While intensifying attacks against enemy convoys and means of transportation on the roads and rivers, P.A.I.G.C. has started, since the beginning of the year, developing commandos' action and sabotage against urban centres (Bissau - the Capital, Bafata, Gabu and Fa:x:im have been attacked by 122 mm. Rockets more than once during the period under review).

15. The Portuguese polioy of· the 11afrioanisation of the war" is on the way to total collapse. Military Commanders and the Secretary-General

.. of P.A.I.G.c., Mr, Amiloar Cabral, on numerous occasions introduoe'd to the Mission Officers and soldiers from the enemy "African Forces" who

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'had deserted and joined the PAIGC Army with their arms and equipment in most oases.

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Work of Mobilisation:

CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 7

16, Along with the armed struggle, F.A.I.G.i'• is intensifying its

work of politioal mobilisation on all levels of its organization

(armed forces, local defence forces, :population of the liberated areas;

oomoat zones and the inhabitants of Cape Verde Islands).- It exercises

llA eff$0o't;ivs a.dm,inistrative cont.rol on more of two-thirds of the national

territory (except Cape Verde Islands) with signs and attributes of

~~izy, ( •ainea Bissau has an area -0f app:i.ox~ma:b~ }7-,J)OO 1>q,. Km• l•

-court records

medical statistics

birth certifioates and oivio status

* school attendance cards

Ls.issez--passer

• .:i.JiV<>j.PO"l .a.I)'\ ~.,q ~i_pts

~' i;he Party enjoys the total SU.p1>0r-1' of the population whifh ..

'af;ively participates in the work of na:no.na:J. ~.,..,~~OA and the

war ~ffort• The Population is fully aware that after 10 years ~f !U"Olet,,

•t:ruule it has 'iQQ for itself the right to self-government.-

llleotions for Regional Councils and the

People's National Assembly: Declaration

on the "existence of the State of Guinea (Bissau)

and Cape Verde Islands".

The Mission discussed at length with Mr • .Amilcar Cabral on the

future political developments in Guinea Bissau in the light of his

intervention before the U.N. General As'sembly 1s Committee on Trustee­

ship and Non-Sell-Governing Territories, in October this'year, to the

effeot 'that Guinea (Bissau) will be declared an independent State by

the end of 1972 or early 1973.

.. •'

The P.A.I.G.C. Secretary-General explained that the People of

Guinea (Bissau) had already achieved self-determination through 10 years

of armed struggle and possessed all the components of sovereignty,

C!1Ij503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 8

He added that P.A. I. G, C, had been considering such a s.tep since

1969 but had preferred to .wait until all the conditions gathered,

He went on to say,

11 Now, how.ever, these r_,ondi tions had been fulfilled because the people had

already achieved self-determination by liberating more than two-thirds

of the territory and by establishing a sovereign political, economic,

social and cultural entity, In other words, CLlinea (Bissau) was in fact

an independent State, part of whose territory was occupied by a foreign ll.!J~, 11

L 8. Mr, Cabral explained further that the elections for the People's

National Assembly was to be oarried out' in two phases, The first of

which - 'elections for the Regional Councils - were completed in early

October, 1972, with heavy participation from the population of the

liberated areas, In the second 'phase of the elections - which was to

start soon - the Councillors of each region ~rnuld elect one-third of

their members to represent the region as Deputies in the People's National

Assembly, which would be composed of 120 Deputies, of whom 40 would be

representatives of P.A.I,G.C, from the Northe:cn, Southern, Eastern Regions

and the Bijagos Islands, and Sci would be representatives of mass organiza-' .

tions, suoh as the "Union of Guinean Workers",' the 11 Un{on of Youth and

Students" and the "Union of Guinean Homen",

19. Upon completion of elections for the People's National Assembly

P.A. I. G, C, will declare Th~_Exi~eJ1:.~_£[__1'._~ "Si!ate of Guinea• (Bissau}

and Cape Verde Islar.ds" and the establi.shmen-o of a National Executive

without prejudicing the fight and the pursuit of war. From this stage,

the new State shall ask for reoogni ti on· an.d integration with the OAU and

shall also request the' U.N. for representation within the U,N, system

and its specialised agencies as.observer or associated members, From

there the new 'state will act step by. step to occupy its rightful pla~e,

taking into consideration the real situation in the country and the fact

that parts of its territory would be still occupied by foreign troops,

with all what suoh a situation entails in I!1ternational Law,

I

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Educational System:

CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 9

20. The development of education is ·one of the highest priorities in

the programme of PAIC1C reconstruction, The Party policy for the liberated

areas aims at the rapid elimination of illiteracy, From the outset of I

the liberation struggle, a mass literaoy oampaign has been in for,oe.

P.A.I,G,C, has established more than 200 schools in the liberated area,

wi~h a.n enrolment in exc·ess of 20,000 students. These schools are

organised and centrally administered by the Party,

The P.A.I,G.c., with the help .it receives from friendly countries

and UNESCO program~e, has already printed its own toxt books in History,

Geography, Arithmetio, Grammer; eto.

21. The Mission visited in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, the following

institutions run by P.A.I.G.C, g

Kindergarten with 68 children (between 6 and 8.years of age) all of them either orphans of war or oombatantsm children;

. I

Secondary pilot school· with 118 pupils ohosen according to merit from e~ementary schools in the liberated ~reas.

Health Conditions:

22. The organization of health services is being given a high ~riority I

within the national reconstruction.scheme with the aim of providing

treatment to aotive freedom fighters and to the population of the

liberated areas in general. Medical services are under the direction

of the P,A,I,G,C. Military Command.

23. There exists a Central Hospital for each of the three military

fronts:

:Soke ·in the South - Republic of Guinea Koundara

in .the North / East Republic of Guinea Zinguinohor

in the Republio o,f Senegal,

-,-

•

•

•

CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 10

P.A.I.G.C. ,has also 9 Field Hospitals and 116 Dispensaries in the

liberated areas. Hospitals and Field Hospitals are run by medical

doctors (foreign volunteers or nationals of Guinea Bissau) while

disponsaries are run by Medical Assistants.

24. In the Southern Sector the Mission visited a Mobile Field Hospital

(Donka area). It gives first priority to the treatment of W>unded combatants

and to victims of Portuguese bombardments (minor surgical operations).'

Subject to this, treatment is given to sick persons in general. The

Donka Field Hospital gives also First Aid training for Medical

Assistants,

25, The Mission also visited the P,A,I,G.C, Bake Hospital giving

treatment to serious oases of combatants and civilians alike. It has

76 beds and consists of:

an operation room

Radiology room

Pharmachology room

A Laboratory

•, It is run by a P.A. I. G. C, Medical Doctor and 5 Yugoslav Medical Doctors

and Specialists.

The mission was told that there exi,sts a laok in anti-biotics, anti­

parasi tic drugs and vaccines. Specialised trained Medical Assistants are

very limited in' number. On the other hand the transport situation is

creating serious problems since most important cases are carried from

ihe front and combat zones in the South, to the border and then by a

ver,.r rough road to Boke.

26, The Secretary-General of the Party informed the Mission that

P.A.I.G.C. succeeded during the years of the struggle in forming 600

Medical \

abroad,

Doctors and Nurses and that at present 497 cadres are studying I

~:

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CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II

page 11

The Produotion System - (Reconstruction

of the Eoonomy)

27; The Mission held discussions with responsible cadres for

production. The P.A.I.G.C. policy in the liberated areas is aimed at

eliminating all signs of economic' exploitation imposed by the oolonial

system and replacing it with a new eoonomic organization appropriate to

the need of the country. PAIGC 1s" first 'concern -is to ensure a minimum

level of agricultural production, sufficient both to meet the people's

need in food as well as the combatants, and to produoe some surpluses

whioh would be exported in order to provide the population with the basin

necessities of life,

A system of co-operative farming has been created and the main

:produata to-day are groundnuts,. rice, palm kernels and palm oil~ kola

nuts and wax,

Sinoe the commencement of the armed struggle in each village has

been created a Committee (Comite de Ease) composed of 5 members which is

the political adjllinistrative organ res-ponsible for the produotion, and

each family contribu~es to the Party a oertain quantity of a,grioultUl'al

food for supply of the armed forces.

Trade is transacted on a barter basis through peoplefs co­

operative shops and Portuguese currency is no longer used, People's '

Stores, organised by the P,A.I.G.c., exist throughout the liberated

areas where the villagers may change their produce under the barter

system for such needs as clothing, cooking utensils and other manufao­

ture' goods. Looal produce accumulated at the People's Stores is used

fo.r the needs of the Liberation Army and for distribution in Regions

where shortage may ooour; the surplus is exported to neighbouring,

countries. The P.A. I. G. C, exports quantities of rice, kola nuts,

beeswax and crocodile skins.

The Responsibles for produotion informed the Mission that the

People's Stores are in need of tobacco, cloth, material for clothing,

sewing machines and agricultural impliments.,

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CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 12.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

' In the light of the above observations, the Mission feels

that it is in a position to submit to the Liberation Committee

'the following findings, oonolusions and recommendations on its

visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau):-·

28, After 10 years' of armed struggle the P.A.I.G.C. has

succeeded in ~iberating more than two-thirds of the

national territory and the Portuguese High Command

in.Guinea (Bissau) has acme to the conclusion that the

colonial war cannot be won by military means,

29, Vast areas in the North, South and East have been liberated

and the P_.A.I.G.C. is exercising effective control and

administration in these areas and enjoys full support on

the part of the poyulation which is actively pa:rticipating

in the effort of war. Everywhere the Mission witnessed the

presence of a strong organisation, P.A.I.G.C,, with able

leadersh;i.p, cadres and a population all geared ,towards armed

struggle a,nd national I:'econstruction t,o the extent tha'i one

can speak confidently of the achievements which symbolize

all necessary facets of sovereignty,

30. The armed struggle in Guinea Bissau co~tinues to progress,

P.A.I,G.C. armed forces and local defence forces are daily

engaged in fight against positions still held by the enemy,

Isola,ted Portuguese posts iri the liberated areas are syste­

matically assaulted·by infantry and artillery, the enemy has

been compelled to evacuate many of its posts which it has

not been able any more to hold. The P.A.I.G.C. has started,

since the beginning of the year, to launch bold atta,oks,

commando operations and sabotages against ~he urban oentres,

while in the Cape Verde Islcinds the mobilisation.of the

people is making important progress preparing the ground

for a new phase of struggle.

i

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31.

CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 13

The Portuguese policy of the "Afr.icanisa ti on of ihe war"

by using African troops has comp~etely failed and deserters

in growing numbers come everyday to join the guerrilla ranks.

32. The enemy action is being characterised mainly by intensive

air bombardments ag~inst the liberated areas and its

population in an attempt to destroy all signs of sovereignty.

Villages 1 livestock and crops are frequently bombed or

destroyed through the use of napalm, incindi~ry bombs and

chemical agents. Few and very limited heliborne operations

take place.

33. P.A.I.G.C. is continuing to consolidate the liberated

areas, establishing schools, hospitals, people's tribunals,

~eople 1 s Stores, Co-operatives and other services.

34,

It has successfully carried out the first ppase of

elections inside the country, the Regional Council

elections thus realising self-government and elections

for the People's National Assembly would be held soon,

On the military side,. though checked '1nd isolated in

posts and urban centres, the enemy is able to carry on

its colonial war due to the following•

(i) increased help from its allies in NATO in

sophisticated material and equipment (fighter

bomber jets, bombers, helicopters, transport

ships, patrol boats, minesweepers, milit'1ry

vehicles, all types of NATO weapons and

ammunition) NATO assistance to Portugal is

enabling ~he enemy High Command in very short

periods to replace means and equipment destroyed

by the guerrillas •

•

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I

•

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 14

The enemy enjoys an absolute supremacy in the

s!Cies, using most sophisticated aircr~fts

(Fiat G,91, Sabre, etc.) while PAIGC's anti­

aircraft defence is very limited, unable to cover

the whole liberated o.re.i.s, Large zones are

completely without anti-aircraft weapons, leaving

the enemy free tc move with impunity,

The enemy has also complete supremacy on the sea

and on murnerous rivers in the country. The

Portuguese fleet, though limited in number, is

able to bring in wi•hout challenge all kinds of

cargoes and transport of troops. On the other

hand though PAIGC attacks enemy patrol

P.oa ts and mo.tor launches with- ligh:t .. artillery

from the rivers' banks its action is not quite

effective due to the fact that these em)arkations

are usually protected from the air, while most ·

guerrilla movements on the rivers are effected by

ni.ght to evade reconn.i.issance and air bomb..i.rdmen·t.

The P.A.I,G,C. is lacking long range artillery

(15 30 Km) to hammer enemy main positions and

urban centres which are usually heavily fortified,

Guerrilla attacks against these positions are

sometimes costly.

(v) The P.A.I.G.C. is badly in need of more ammunition

for its artillery weapons to eubdue enemy positiens.

it is necessary at the present stage of the war

(vi)

to utilise a bigger quantity of ammunition fer

the purpose of saturation and a stronger impact. ' '

Means of transportation. for supplying the various

fronts are either inadequate or limited suoh as,

4-wheel drive trucks and motor-boats.

•

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(vii)

I

CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II ~age 15

Financial assistance that P.A.I.G.C. receives

from the O.A.U. or on bilateral ·basis from some

Af:t•ican countries is fa.r from corresponding to

the new exigencies of the struggle as well as

to the administration of the vast zones already

liberated.

35., From the above consi.der":tions, it is clear that the armed

struggle in Guinea (Bi.ssau) has re~ched a crucial stage.

All means should therefore be pu·G at the disposal of

P.A.I.G.c. to enable it overcome the difficulties it

encounters and nullify or neutralise the enemy advantages ·

36.

' or supremacy in the military sphere. Unless a substantial

and adequate assistance is granted to P.A.I.G.C., a _

stalemate in the war is ~.nevi table, with the Portuguese

holding fortified positions and urbc.n centres, the

guerrillas continuing to assault these positions and to

hold the countryside without any decisive conclusion on

the terr<o\in. Such a si tua ti on could continue ad infinitum

which P.A.I.G.C. cannot afford or allow.

The Executive Secretariat discussed at length with P.A.I.G.C.

, leadership and Military Commanders the Party's urgent needs

and requests whi.oh are listed below, The Secretariat

trusts that they would receive the serious consideration

they deserve on the part of the Li bera,tion Cammi ttee in order

to bring the armed struggle in Guinea Bissau to a successful

end. In that way will be fulfilled the hope expressed by

the Heads of.State and Govarnment of Africa at their meeting

.in Addis Ababa in June 1971, that at least one African ' territory will be totall;y J.i beru. ted. from colonialism ii).

the two or three years to come.

•

NEEDS ARE:-

CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 16

(J.') l Nava Eguipment:

Motor boats or Launches (Light - 40 Knots -

armed) for action, patrol and control of '

costs against enemy transport and supply

ships as well as the control of rive~·s.

This type of equipment could be mostly needed '

for operutions at -::ha entrance of'•Bissau

· (Canal do Ge ba) ••....•..•• ( any number)

Pneumatic boats for 4/6 and 8/12 persons

without board motors for supplying variou·s

fronts and liberated areas ••••••• (any number)

' Two or three boats (large autonomy) armed

for liaison with Cape Verde Islands:

(16 Knots)

Naval mines.

(ii) Anti-Aircraft Weapons and Ammuni'tions:

Heavy A.A. on the level of the border:

3 7 mm., 14,.5 mm,

12.7 mm 2 and 4-barrelled.

Light A.A. on the level of various fronts,

combat zones and. liberated areas:

12.7 mm simple H.M.G.

' Man-pack anti-aircraft·missile (carried ~nd

fired by one man - weighs 13 Kg.)

Type: Red-eye, American-made or Eastern

type equivalent weapon.

This missile with its expandable launching·

tube, has proved to be, with its auto direction

device, a d·eadly weapon for interception of

aircrafts and helicopters flying at low altitude.

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(iii)

CM/503/(~art III) Ap:pendix II Page 17

Artillery and Infantry Weapons with Ammunition:

Long-Range artillery_ (15 - 30 Km) to be used

against enemy f-ortified positions and urban

centres. Heavy artillery at the .level of the

border; Light in the various operational

zones.

More ~rtillery wea:pons and ammunition from

type already used by P.A.I.G.C.

Mortar 82 mm

75 mm Recoiless

Rocket wunchers R.P.G.2 (40 mm-.) ammunition badly needen.

Rocket Launchers R.P.G.7

Rocket Launchers 122 mm (Type GRAD-P) improved version for 15 - 18 Km. Range.

(iv) Transmission Equipment suitable for Jungle:

Medium Range for co-ordination of Infantry action. '

Short Range for coDrecting artillery fire.

(Transmission equipment presently used - R,104,

E~stern -type, direct waves - not suitable for

- Jungle communication) •

(v) Means of Transport to improve the Supply of

Various Fronts and Liberated Zones

Trucks, 4-wheel drive (Mercedes, Berliet, Zil

131, GAZ 66, MAZ.).

Jeeps, Land Rovers, Ambulances.

Pueuma tic boats ( ou:~boards)

Fuel and lubricants.

(vi) Infantry Eguipment:

(vii)

Uniforms, boots, water bottles, hamacks,

sac a dos, mosquito nets, etc.

Financial Assistance to continue the war, and to

cope with the situation in the liberated areas.

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GM/503/(Part III) Append.ix II

·Page 18

38. 3 Having outlined the ~1ew exige~cies of P.A. I. ci. C. struggle and its needs, the Executive Secreti1riat would like to point out to the n";cessi ty of strengthening_ PAigC.~s actioi:i politically and in in~ernationiJ.l forums. This is an area

-where the O.A,U. i1nd_ the Liberation Committee should contribute to the utmost, especially in the few months to ~ome during which P.A.I.G,C. is expected to declare the

\ ' existence of the "Sta.te of Guinea (Bissau) and Co.pe Verde Islands".

39, The Executive Secretariat would like to· pay a special tribute to. the peoples, leaders and Governments of ihe Repubiic of Guinea and Senegal who are sparing no efforts . in supporting and assisting the struggle waged by P.A.I.G.C., and who are shouldering an importan1 part of the burden of the war.of liberation. The territories of these two Member-Countries are strong rear bases of P.A.I.G.C. The leadersh:i.,p of the Movement has expressed to the Mission its deep appreciation and gratitude for their commitment and relentless efforts. According tO Mr, Amilcu.r Cabral'11 own stcLtement: "They are suffering everyday with us from Portuguese terrorism and their reserves are ours".

40_. ·rhe Mission had the honour to be received by His Excellency,

President Ahmed Sekou Toure, whose kind words and wise advice, were ~ source of great inspiration and .enoouro.gement

to the members of the Mission. Talks held with various Ministers and Officials of the Guinea Government proved to be most useful for the practical conduct of the liberation

struggle.

41, The Mission wishes. to place on record its appreciati.on to the P.A.I.G.C, leaders, in particular to its Secretary-

' General, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, for their constant assistance and co-operation, and for the facilities they have placed at the Mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated

' areas of Guinea Bissau, A warm tribute is a.lso due . to the . officials and cadres of P.A.I.G,·c. who accompanied the

Mission throughout its visit.

I

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Organization of African Unity

Co-ordinating Committee for the

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seventeen) report of the 21st Ordinary

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