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ADCO Bu Hasa Incident 07 May 2011 (2)

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Text of ADCO Bu Hasa Incident 07 May 2011 (2)

  • BuHasaIncident,7May2011

    ADNOCGroupCompaniesBriefing

    Wednesday20July,2011

  • IncidentDescription

    BuHasaCentralDegassingStation(CDS)hadanEmergencyShutDown(ESD).Itresulted in oil leaks from the flow lines of Bu407 & Bu 570resultedinoilleaksfromtheflowlinesofBu407&Bu570.

    Thecentralstationwasnormalizedatmidnightandoperationteamsstartedtoopentheclosedwells.At0125Hrs,oneofthecrewsobservedafireatBu407flowli ( i t l 200 t f th ll h d) d th llline(approximately200metersawayfromthewellhead)andthewellwasisolatedfromtheWellhead.

    AnotherOperationsteam(driverandfourcrewmembers)proceededtoRemoteDegassingStation(RDS3)toisolatethewellfromthestation.ClosetoRDS3therewasaseparateoilleakfromtheflowlineofBu570coveringthemainaccesstrack(approximately300metersfromtheRDS3).

    Whilecrossingtheoilpool,thevehiclecaughtfire.Itresultedinfivecausalities(fourfatalities,andonecrewmembersustainedminorinjuries)

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  • KeyFindings

    1) Theintegrityofflowlinesisnotassured.(Under"upset"conditions whenCDSisshutdown pressureintheflowlinesexceedsnormaloperatingpressuresandthechanceofleaksisincreased).

    2) Bu Hasa CDS plant was shutin due to an ESD Level 1.2) BuHasaCDSplantwasshut induetoanESDLevel1.

    TripinitiatedbyaproblematthecommunicationlinkbetweenDCSandEmergencyShutdownSystem(ESD)withfusefailureintheESD.

    Timetoidentifyfaultwasaround6hours.Timerequiredtoresolveproblemwastoolongforsuchay q p gfailure;especiallyforsuchacriticalasset

    3) Currentdesigndoesnothaveoverpressureprotectionattheexistingwells.

    TheHPpilotisanoperationalmechanismtocloseSSVandavoidholdingtheflowlineunderhighpressure.NoteflowlinesaredesignedforCITHPMajorityofwellsdidnottriponHPfollowingtheprolongedshutdownandbuildupofpressure.

    4) Wellheadmaintenanceisnotalwaysexecutedasperschedule.

    5) Operationsatnightinresponsetoemergency/incidentwasnotidentifiedasacriticalactivity".Riskassessmentandscenarioanalysishadnotbeenundertaken.

    6) HAZOP/SILrevalidationforBuHasafacilitieshasnotbeenundertakenwithinlast5years.

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    7) Laborersarenotissuedwithfireresistantcoveralls.

    8) Logisticsmanagementduringemergencywasnotadequateorrecorded

  • Cause Tree Analysis

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  • RootCauses

    1) InadequateRiskAssessment

    2) Inadequateidentificationofjobhazards(Nighttimejourneyforoperationrequirementsnotriskassessed)

    3) Inadequate Enforcement of Critical Behaviors (Maintenance)3) InadequateEnforcementofCriticalBehaviors(Maintenance)

    4) Inadequateworkplanning(Maintenancescheduleforcriticalequipmentwerenotmet)

    5) InadequateDesignforPiggingChemicalinjection(forflowlines)(Flow(2)linedesigndoesnotallowpigging/chemicalinjection)

    6) InadequatetechnicalReviewofEngineeringdesign(ESDDesignRedundancy)

    7) InadequateAssessmentofRequiredskillsICompetency(LackofcompetentstafftoensuremaintenanceofSSV)

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    )

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  • MainFindings:FlowlineIntegrity

    Finding

    Theintegrityofflowlines isnotassured.Thereremainsaconcernoverinternalandexternalcorrosion.Ina2008FlowlineIntegrityreport,61%offlowlineleakswereattributedtoexternalcorrosion.

    Under upset conditions when CDS is shutdown pressure in the flowlines exceeds normal operating pressure and theUnderupsetconditions whenCDSisshutdown pressureintheflowlinesexceedsnormaloperatingpressureandthechanceofleaksincreased.

    Causes

    Specificationforflowlineisuncoatedcarbonsteelpipe.Carbonsteelispronetointernal&externalcorrosion. Flowlinesaredifficultandoftenimpossibletoinspectforexternalcorrosioni.e.buriedundersand. Flowlinesarenotinspectedroutinelyforinternalcorrosion.

    IPStrialsundertakenon4&6linesin2004/5.Costwashigh(especiallyasnolaunchers/receivers) Alternativemethodstoinspectforinternalcorrosion(e.g.straponUSdevices)havebeentestedbutnotroutinelyused.

    Flowlinereplacementprogramisdirectionallygoodbuttheevaluationcriteriaforreplacementareindicative(age,watercutetc)andcriteriaestablishedwitheconomicimpactinmind.Onlyafewflowlinesareidentifiedforreplacementeachyearwhilsttheactualexposureishigher.

    ADCOhasacknowledgedthisflowlineintegrityproblemandundertakenvariousstudiesandtrials.However,ADCOfocusedonenvironmentalriskandunderestimatedthesafetyrisks.ADCOhasworkedtoreducethenumberofflowlineleaksovertheyearswithitsflowlinereplacementprogramandhasbeeneffectiveinminimizingenvironmentalimpactwiththoroughcleanup.Withthisanddidnotresolvetheissuewithurgency.

    HSEMSElement#5.2AssetIntegrity

    5 2 4 M i t i i i t it f i ti f iliti

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    o 5.2.4Maintainingintegrityofexistingfacilities

    o 4.2.1Improperriskevaluation&assessment

  • ADCOOILSPILLSADCOOILSPILLSYTD A il 2011YTD A il 2011

    50 100Number of Oil Spills % Recovery

    YTDApril2011YTDApril2011

    42

    34

    40 80

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    29

    25 26

    20

    30

    40

    6026

    1419 18

    10

    20

    20

    40

    712

    1

    6

    02003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Apr 2011

    0

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    No. of Onshore Spills > 6 Bbls No. of Onshore Spills < 6 BblsTotal No. of Oil Spills Total % Recovery

  • MainFinding:FlowlineIntegrity(contd)PriorandOngoingWork

    2008publicationofOilPipelineIntegrityassessment&ManagementReport,[email protected]%MAWPtoensureintegrityfor>5yrs;mothballingfor>3daysnoflow;Inspection

    usingguidedwaveUSorbellhole.[2005 IPStrials4&6flowlines]g g

    1stFlowlinetaskforcein2008deliveredStandardforIntegrityofNewflowlinesin2009.Testedmagnetictomographyon5linesinAsab.Trialpartiallysuccessful.

    October2010 GuidedwaveultrasonicinspectionofflowlinessuccessfullytrialedinBuHasa 2nd Flowline taskforce was established by ADCO CEO in 2010 to focus on existing flowlines.2ndFlowlinetaskforcewasestablishedbyADCOCEOin2010tofocusonexistingflowlines.

    WorkshopconductedwithADNOCgroup,consultants&contractors.Result:HDPEliners.TrialapprovedbyCEOfor2companieson28thApril2011.

    Extensivedatagatheringtoanalyzetrends&identifycriticallines. March 2011 taskforce refocused as Flowline Leaks Management. TOR covers:March2011 taskforcerefocusedas FlowlineLeaksManagement .TORcovers:

    ShortTerm(2011):HDPElinertrials,flowlinespigging/dewateringstrategy,mothballing,prioritizedintervention

    LongTerm(20123):Martialselectionstrategy(GRE/RTP),Chemicaltreatment,coating,improvisedsupports

    Recommendations

    Withurgencyanddedicatedresourcesfinalizetherevisedflowlinedesignspecificationsandintegrityassurancepracticessothatflowlineleakswillbeanabnormaloccurrencei.e.moveASAPfromstudyphasetoimplementation.

    Priority to be afforded to those flowlines which have higher safety risk i e near RDS CDS track crossing near access tracks

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    Prioritytobeaffordedtothoseflowlineswhichhavehighersafetyriski.e.nearRDS,CDS,trackcrossing,nearaccesstracks.

    (Itisrecognizedthataturnaroundprogramonflowlineintegritywilltaketimetoenact.Operationalcontrolswillneedtobeputinplacetomanagetherisksofflowlineleaksintheinterim.

  • MainFinding:FlowlineIntegrity(contd)

    ActionItems

    h f l l k h ld b f d f b d1. TheTORofFlowlineLeaksteamshouldberefocusedforDELIVERY teamresourcestobereviewed;programestablishedwithdefineddeliverablesandtimelinetoreflecttheurgency;progressreportsprovidedtoSponsor.

    2. StartimplementationofprovenintegrityassuranceactivitiesinthefieldsASAPi.e.consideringhydrotesting,IPSofsuitableflowlines,GuidedwaveUSinspection.

    3. Althoughtheexistingprocedurerequiresflowlinemothballingwhenflowlinesareshutinfor>3days,thecurrentpracticeis>3months.Reviewprocedure,amendifnecessaryandrigorouslyapplyprocedure(includeinprocedurehowstatusofflowlinesistobemonitoredandassignresponsibilities).p ( p g p )

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  • MainFinding:FieldOperationsatNight

    FindingOperationsandFieldServicesstaffweremobilizedtothefieldatnighttoeitherclosewells(afterplanttrip)oropenup

    wells(toreestablishproduction). Operationsatnightinresponsetoemergency/incidentwasnotidentifiedasacriticalactivity.Riskassessment

    andscenarioanalysishadnotbeenundertaken. Althoughtheunwrittenguidewastoattendtowellsthatweredirectlyaccessiblefrommaintracks,fieldstaff

    traveledcrosscountry.

    Causes Underpressuretomanagewellsandrestoreproduction,fieldstaffweremobilizedatnight. BuHasaFieldStandingOrder02/2007(Amendment2)of30th December2008,nighttripsareauthorizedtoRespondtoanyemergencies/accidents/incidentsintheBuHasaarea.18:00hrsto06:30hrs.DutyManagerapprovalisnotrequiredforauthorizedtrips.Typeofrouteisdefinedasblacktopandsandtrack.Beinganauthorizedjourney nospecialpreparations(hazardidentification,specificrouteinstructions,specificworkinstructions)wererequiredortaken.

    HSEMSElement#6.1Implementationo 1.1.6 Visibility Management evaluate HSE aspects before business decisions takeno 1.1.6Visibility ManagementevaluateHSEaspectsbeforebusinessdecisionstakeno 6.1.1Implementationofworkinstructions

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  • MainFinding:FieldOperationsatNight

    Recommendations Review field operating philosophy Reviewfieldoperatingphilosophy.

    oConsidermannedRDSs(vsadhocnightoperations)&automation. NightOperationshouldnecessitatespecificpreparationwithexplicitauthorizationatappropriatelevel. A guide is required to assist duty managers to make the appropriate decision when consideringrestoration of production after a plant trip versus field operation at nightrestorationofproductionafteraplanttripversusfieldoperationatnight.

    ActionItems ReviewoperatingphilosophywrtmanningofRDS,automationetc.Prepareanalysisandmakeproposal.p g p p y g , p y p p1. Amendfieldprocedures&instructionssuchthatnightoperationisconsideredasanabnormalandhigherrisk activity to be undertaken after consideration of inherent risk versus objective at appropriateleadershiplevel,underspecificcontrolsanddefinedprocedure. Quickwin :Fitvehicleswhichcould bemobilizedatnightwithsearch/floodlights.(AlreadyactionedinBug / g ( yHasa.)

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  • Finding:ESDtripandResponse

    FindingBuHasaCDSplantwasshutinduetoanESDLevel1.

    TripinitiatedbyaproblematthecommunicationlinkbetweenDCSandEmergencyShutdownp y p g ySystem(ESD)withfusefailureintheESD.

    Timetoidentifyfaultwasaround6hours. Timerequiredtoresolveproblemwastoolongforsuchafailure;especiallyforsuchacriticalasset.

    CausesTheESDsystemhasdualpowersuppliesi.e.redundancyprovidedindesign.However,theotherpowersupplycardforthisparticularESDsystemsectorhadbeenfaultyforsometime.Redundancyandthereforesystem reliability was thereby defeatedsystemreliabilitywastherebydefeated.

    Powersupplycardfailureisareoccurringeventi.e.>15failures.MaintenancestaffcalledtoinvestigateDCS/ESDproblemdidnothavesufficientfamiliaritywiththesystemstoinvestigateandidentifytheproblemquickly.Therewasarelianceonoffsitevendorsupport.

    HSEMSElement#5.2AssetIntegrity&3.4Competencyo 5.2.4Reliabilityofprotectivesystemso 3.4Competenceassurance

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  • Finding:ESDtripandResponse

    Recommendations Maintenanceofsafeguardingsystemsisessential.Sparepartsmustbestocked.Reoccurringproblemsh ld b l d b d d f d d b d bshouldberesolvedbyVendor.Anydeviationsfromstandardmaintenancepracticearetobeapprovedbyadesignatedauthority(M.O.C.).InthecaseofCriticalSafetySystems,itisproposedthatauthoritytodeviatefromthestandardpracticeiscarriedatManagementlevel.Improveonsitesupportforcontrolandsafeguardingsystems

    d ( d d d l lReviewcompetenceandtrainingrequirements.(Recommendtrainingengineerstoanadvancedlevelofsystemstroubleshooting)ReviewthecurrentpracticesinsisterOPCOs.

    Provide24/7coveragewithtrainedsystemsengineers.

    ActionItems1. Ensure that Critical Safety Systems (especially ESD, F&G) are properly maintained. Resolve the

    reoccurringpowersupply failureswithVendor. In themean time,ensureadequatesparepartsareavailable to account for frequent power supply card failuresavailabletoaccountforfrequentpowersupplycardfailures.

    2. EstablishpositionsanddefinecompetencyrequirementsforSystemEngineers.

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  • Finding:SSVreliability&functioning

    FindingThemajorityofwellsdidnottriponHPfollowingtheprolongedshutdownandbuildupofpressure.Note : Flowlines are designed for CITHPNote:FlowlinesaredesignedforCITHP.

    CausesHP pilots are found to be frequently out of calibration or not functioning HPpilotsarefoundtobefrequentlyoutofcalibrationornotfunctioning.

    -SetpointsofHPpilotsarenotsystematicallyreviewedtoaccountforthedeteriorationofflowlinesduetocorrosion.(Note:ThereisadifficultytoidentifyproblematicflowlinesandalsotoestimatetheappropriatereductioninHPpilotsetpoint.)

    HSEMSElement#6.3Performancemonitoring&Records

    RecommendationsReviewdesignphilosophiesandoverpressureprotectionfromthewellheadthroughRDSsallthewaytotheCDSinviewofchangingreservoirconditions,flowlineagingandrecentenhanceddesignpractice.

    ImplementaworkpracticetoperiodicallyreviewthesuitabilityofwellheadtoCDSfacilitiesspecificationand instrumentation setpoints.UnderMOCprocedure, accommodate any change in operating/designconditionsandtobeconsistentwithlatestinspection/integrityrecords.

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  • Finding:SSVreliability&functioning

    ActionItems

    1. ReviewFacilitiesDesignfromwellheadtoCDS

    2. Reviewthehighpressuresetpointofpilots.Thecurrentsetpointof1000psigmaybetoohighforeitheroperationalrequirementorflowlinecondition.

    3. SSVandassociatedpilotsshouldbefunctionallytested,testresultsdocumentedandsignedoffandresultsloadedinMAXIMOasperAPIRP14C.

    4. EvaluatealternativepressuresensorswithhigherreliabilityforHP/LPpilotsatwellhead(notingtheharsh desert environment)harshdesertenvironment).

    5. ReviewtheSILclassificationoftheoverpressureprotectioni.e.refertonewconfigurationwithdualpilotsandvalves,asinstalledinselectedserviceinotherfields

    6. Evaluate surge pressures which may be transferred through system to wellheads when CDS ESDl lvalvesclose.

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  • Finding:WellheadMaintenance

    FindingWellheadmaintenanceisnotalwaysexecutedasperschedule.

    Causes Inadequateplanningandassurance Inadequatemanpowerresources ManyMAXIMOrecordsforwellheadmaintenanceareinadequatetoprovideareliablehistoryrecord. HSEMSElement#5.2AssetIntegrity&3.2Resources

    o 5.2.4Maintainingintegrityofexistingfacilitieso 3.2.2Resources

    Recommendations Resolvemanpowerresourcerequirement. AnalyzewhystaffarenotloadingdataintoMAXIMOandcorrect.(Training?Time?Supervision/) Improvewriteupofmaintenanceproceduresforwellheadequipment(e.g.StandardProcedure7070) Instituteanassurancemaintenancemanagementsystemincludingselfauditverificationprocess TrainstaffondataanalysisinMAXIMO. ReviewfunctionalityofMAXIMOforeaseofuse.

    ActionsStarting with Bu Hasa field but eventually addressing all fields undertake a comprehensive review of

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    StartingwithBuHasafieldbuteventuallyaddressingallfields,undertakeacomprehensivereviewofmaintenancepractices.Reviewtoincludefitforpurposeprocedures,manpowerresourceavailabilityandcompetence,controlandassuranceprocesses,useofMAXIMO.

  • Finding:EmergencyResponse&IncidentManagement

    Finding HSE Team was not aware of the shutdown as ESD level 1 was not considered as an emergency HSETeamwasnotawareoftheshutdownasESDlevel1wasnotconsideredasanemergency. Inadequatecommunicationmeans(mobilephonesused;notradios). Safety&losspreventionteamwasdispatchedtoattendfireatBu407;usedGMCpickup.UnsuccessfulattempttofightfireofBu407flowlineusingpowderfireextinguishers,carriedinGMCpickup.

    Later a second safety & loss prevention team took RIV as search & rescue support to gatch road (Bu570 Later,asecondsafety&losspreventionteamtookRIVassearch&rescuesupporttogatchroad(Bu 570flowline).

    InsufficientresourcesatRAMS(staffandambulances)tomanageamulticasualtyaccident(s). Logisticsmanagementduringemergencywasnotadequateorrecorded.

    Causes Lackofclarityastowhenafireshouldbefoughtornot.Whereotherfacilitiesorpeoplearenotatrisk,itisadvisednottofightanoilleakfire.Thefireavoidsgascloud.

    ThecurrentOperatingPhilosophyisburndown.Implicitlyandinrelationtothisspecificevent,firefightingvehicleswerenotavailableforoffroaddesertconditions.

    HSEMSElement#5.6ContingencyPlanningo 5.6.1ContingencyPlanning

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  • Finding:EmergencyResponse&IncidentManagement

    Recommendations ReviewemergencyresponseproceduretoconsideranESDasanemergencyevent. Reviewfirefightingphilosophytoconsiderinterventiontoavoidfireescalatione.g.fireincloseproximitytoflowlines/fieldfacilities.Reviewfirefightingvehiclerequirement(i.e.suitablefordesert),watersupplyandequipment.

    DecisionalreadytakentorecruitprofessionalfirefightingteamsacrossADCOassets.Thiswillresolvel d h d h f f h b lleadershipissuesandshortcomingsonfirefightingcapabilities.

    Medical:Assesstheneedsforstaffandequipmentagainstrealisticscenarios.(Medicsvspopulation?) EmergencyResponse:Furthertrainingnecessaryinemergencymanagementprocess,riskassessment&procedures.

    d f ld d f d d f d Orderfieldcommunicationequipmentasidentified.Repairdefectiveradios.

    Actions WiththelearningsfromthisBuHasaincidentandwithviewtotheproposedestablishmentofprofessionalfirefightingteamsintheFields,reviewemergency/accidentequipmentrequirements,p g g , g y / q p q ,supportresources,implementationandtrainingrequirements.

    Thisisamajorinitiativewhichwouldhavebeenundertakenasamatterofcoursewiththeintroductionof the fire fighting teams. The scope of this initiative needs to be expanded to address associatedemergencyresponsesystemshortfalls.

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    g y p y

  • Finding:PPECoveralls

    Finding

    NotallcoverallsissuedbyADCOarefireresistant. Laborers are not issued with fire resistant coveralls. (Laborer who escaped Bu Hasa vehicle fire thought hisLaborersarenotissuedwithfireresistantcoveralls.(LaborerwhoescapedBuHasavehiclefirethoughthiscoverallswereplasticandthereforeflammable.)

    Causes

    Lackofdefinitionastowhichstaffmustwearfireresistantcoveralls.

    HSEMSElement#5.3Standards&Procedureso 5.3.4consistentapplicationofsuitablestandards

    d iRecommendations

    ReviewspecificationsforcoverallswithrespecttofireresistanceforbothADCOandcontractorstaff. Ifspecificationisnotthesameforallstaff providedefinitionofrequirementsforthevariousworkgroups.g p

    Actions

    Advise end users (field and drilling staff and contractors) of thework situations / types forwhich fireresistantcoverallsaremandated.

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  • Finding:HAZOPRevalidation

    Finding

    HAZOPrevalidationforBuHasafacilitieshasnotbeenundertakenwithinlast5years.SIL A t i d t i N b 2009 SILAssessmentwascarriedoutinNovember2009.

    Causes

    HSEIAshavebeencompletedforallassetsin2009andapprovedbyADNOC/SPCin2010.Th HSEIA d t i 5 l h d HAZOP lid ti h ll b d t d (Pl d t t TheHSEIAupdateisona5yearcyclewhereunderHAZOPrevalidationshallbeconducted.(Plannedstart

    Babin2012)

    HSEMSElement#4.1RiskIdentification,Evaluation&Assessmento4.1.3Uptodateregisterofrisks

    Recommendations

    ReviewadequacyofcurrentplanforrevalidationofHAZOP.

    Actions

    PresentplanforrevalidationofHAZOPtoGMCHSEandRiskCommitteeforendorsement.

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  • IMMEDIATEACTION

    IdentifyHighRiskflowlines:

    P i it t l t i d d t ko Proximitytopeoplemovement,i.e.roads,sandtrack

    o Closetofacilities

    Congestiono Congestion

    WellheadProtectionEquipment/Flowline:

    o Immediate campaign to functionally test all SSVs, SCSSVs, and wellheadmaintenance.

    o Hydrotest of vulnerable flowlines and repair accordingly.

    o Flowline approach to RDS, CDS: excavation, exposure, inspection, repair,pipeline crossing and coat accordingly

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    pipeline crossing and coat accordingly.

  • OTHERACTIONSOTHERACTIONS

    ImplementflowlineintegrityprogrammeacrossADCOfields.

    o Firm up aging flow line replacement philosophyo Firmupagingflowlinereplacementphilosophy.

    o Review flow line specification to reflect changes in production stream e.g. watercut.

    Reviewnighttimejourneymanagement.

    o Review field operating and manning philosophy (i.e. CDS, RDS 24/7 coverage).

    Implement a maintenance assurance management system including selfauditverification process.

    Review competency and training requirements (e.g. 24/7 coverage of trainedSystems Engineers).

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    ConductHazopCampaignforexistingfacilitiesevery5years.

  • thankthank

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  • KeyRecommendations

    1) Withurgencyanddedicatedresourcesfinalizetherevisedflowlinedesignspecificationsandintegrityassurancepracticessothatflowlineleakswillbean"abnormal"occurrenceLe.moveASAPfromstudyphasetoimplementation.

    2) ImplementconfirmedintegrityassuranceactivitiesLe.hydrotesting,mothballing,IPSofsuitableflowlines.

    3) Reviewfieldoperatingphilosophy.ReviewmannedRDS's(vsadhocnightoperations)&considerautomation

    4) OverallDCS/ESDsystemdesignneedstoberevisedtoimprovereliability.

    Improveonsitesupportforcontrolandsafeguardingsystems

    Reviewcompetenceandtrainingrequirements.(Recommendtrainingengineerstoanadvancedlevelofsystemstroubleshooting)ReviewthecurrentpracticesinsisterOPCOs.

    Provide24/7coveragewithtrainedsystemsengineers.

    5) Review Facilities Design from wellhead to CDS( consider involvement of SH's)5) ReviewFacilitiesDesignfromwellheadtoCDS(considerinvolvementofSH s)

    Reviewthehighpressuresetpointofpilots.Thecurrentsetpointof1000psigmaybetoohigh.

    ConsidercarryingoutfunctionaltestsofwellshighpressuretripsystemsbyshuttingdowndownstreamvalveandobservingthetripoftheSSVaspressurebuildsup.Thisshouldbecarriedoutatfrequentintervals(sayeverysixmonths)andwouldalsoactasatestofflowlineintegrity.

    Evaluatealternativepressuresensorswithhigherreliability,

    Consideroverpressureprotectionmeans

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    Evaluatesurgepressures(waterhammer)whichmaybetransferredthroughsystemtowellheadswhenCDSESDvalvesclose.

  • KeyRecommendations(Contd)

    6) ImproveMaintenance

    Resolvemanpowerresourcerequirement. AnalyzewhystaffarenotloadingdataintoMAXIMOandcorrect.(Training?Time?y y g ( g Supervisionj) Improvewriteupofmaintenanceproceduresforwellheadequipment(e.g.Standard Procedure7070) Instituteanassurancemaintenancemanagementsystemincludingselfaudit verificationprocess TrainstaffondataanalysisinMAXIMO. Review functionality of MAXIMO for ease of use ReviewfunctionalityofMAXIMOforeaseofuse.

    7) Reviewfirefightingphilosophytoconsiderinterventiontoavoidfireescalatione.g.fireincloseproximitytoflowlines/fieldfacilities.Reviewfirefightingvehiclerequirementandequipment.

    8) Medical:Assesstheneedsforstaffandequipmentagainstrealisticscenarios.(Medicsvspopulation?)

    9) EmergencyResponse:Furthertrainingnecessaryinemergencymanagementprocess,riskassessment&procedures.

    10) Orderfieldcommunicationequipmentasidentified.Repairdefectiveradios.

    11) ReviewspecificationsforcoverallswithrespecttofireresistanceforbothADCOandcontractorstaff.

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    ) p p

    12) ReviewadequacyofcurrentplanforrevalidationofHAZOP/SILrevalidation.PresentevaluationandrecommendationtoGMCHSEandRiskCommitteeforendorsement.

    Bu Hasa Incident-ADNOC Group Companies Briefing part1 APage1 to 8.pdfBu Hasa Incident-ADNOC Group Companies Briefing part1A Page9 to 13Weekly HSE Meeting 05-June-11Bu Hasa Incident-ADNOC Group Companies Briefing part 2 Page20-39