Activation of Social Norms in Social Dilemas

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Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 93112

www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

0167-4870/$ - see front matter 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.03.003

Activation of social norms in social dilemmas:A review of the evidence and reXections on the

implications for environmental behaviour

Anders Biel a, John Thgersen b,

a Gteborg University, Department of Psychology, Haraldsgatan 1, SE-405 30 Gteborg, Swedenb Aarhus School of Business, Department of Marketing and Statistics, Fuglesangs Alle 4, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark

Received 23 August 2005; received in revised form 3 February 2006; accepted 6 March 2006Available online 11 May 2006

Abstract

Taking rational choice theory for granted, cooperation in social dilemmas may be seen as mysteri-ous. In one-shot dilemmas where subjects unknown to one another interact and make their decisionsanonymously, cooperation could even be regarded as lunacy. Several authors have challenged thisview, though. Research has also identiWed various factors that imply why people cooperate or defectin social dilemmas and what motivations that might guide the decision in one way or the other. Here,a closer look will be taken at social norms as a reason for departure from rational choice, a factorthat rarely has been recognised in the social dilemma literature. Social norms imply that peopleshould manifest a prescribed behaviour or not manifest a proscribed behaviour. Furthermore, socialnorms are often guiding behaviour in speciWc contexts, and many times they need to be activated.Such an activation process is often unconscious and once a norm has been activated, people tend tokeep following the norm that has been primed. We wish to add to the social dilemma literature by

suggesting what kinds of norms that are likely to be activated under diVerent conditions such as one-shot vs. iterated dilemmas, but also separate domains of social life. 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classiWcation: C710; Z130

PsycINFO classiWcation: 3000; 4070

*

Corresponding author. Tel.: +45 8948 6440; fax: +45 8615 3988.E-mail address:[email protected] (J. Thgersen).
mailto:%[email protected]:%[email protected]


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94 A. Biel, J. Thgersen / Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 93112

Keywords: Social norms; Social dilemma; Environmental behaviour

1. Introduction

Taking rational choice theory for granted, cooperation in social dilemmas may be seenas mysterious. In one-shot dilemmas where subjects unknown to one another interact andmake their decisions anonymously, cooperation could even be regarded as lunacy. Severalauthors have challenged this view on theoretical (e.g., Dawes, 1980, 1988) as well as onempirical grounds (Clark, 1998; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Kurki,2004), however. Research has also identiWed several factors that explain why people coop-erate or defect in social dilemmas (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1994) and what motives mightguide the decision in one way or the other (Messick et al., 1983; Wilke, 1991). Here, a closerlook will be taken on social norms as a reason for departure from rational choice.Although attempts to give social norms a more prominent place in the explanation ofcooperation are rare (Kerr, 1995) the signiWcance of norms has been recognised in thesocial dilemma literature (Bicchieri, 1990, 2002; Ostrom, 1990; Von Borgstede, 2002).

Social norms evolve to regulate social life. In particular, they arise when individualactions cause negative side-eVects for others (Coleman, 1990) and serve the function ofrestricting egoistic impulses in favour of collective outcomes (Biel, Eek, & Grling, 1999).Social norms imply that (certain) people should manifest a prescribed behaviour or notmanifest a proscribed behaviour. Violation of social norms is met by sanctions. Social

norms may become internalised, in which case sanctions (in the form of guilt feelings orpride) are administered by the individual him or herself. Internalised norms are called per-sonal norms (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1982). As deWned by Cialdini and Trost(1998, p. 152): Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of agroup, and that guide and/or constrain social behaviour without the force of laws. Fur-thermore, social norms are often guiding behaviour in speciWc contexts, and many timesthey need to be activated. Such an activation process is More often than notunconscious, it does not involve much thinking or even a choice on the part of subjectsandonceactivated, it will show some inertia, in the sense that unless a major changein circumstances occurs, people will keep following the norm that has been primed (Bic-

chieri, 2002, p. 198). Bicchieris characterisation of social norms has much in common withhabitual behaviour. Just as habits are functional for the individual in reaching his or hergoals, norms arise and operate in groups because they are functional for the group (Kerr,1995). Habitual behaviour is activated by relevant cues in the environment and thesequence of acts reveal itself with little attention paid by the actor (Verplanken & Aarts,1999). In social contexts, people search their memory to Wnd similar situations and expecta-tions about proper behaviour (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Pillutla & Chen, 1999).

Two types of norms will be addressed: general interaction norms and benevolencenorms (Kerr, 1995). The former kind of norms provides rules of interaction and exchange.They are based on shared beliefs about how people ought to behave in a given situation.

Rewards and sanctions are administered by other group members or by the individual himor herself. While general interaction norms promote group members welfare indirectly,benevolence norms prescribe behaviour that beneWts others directly. Benevolence normsare private and internalised prescriptive norms. These norms are activated when individuals


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A. Biel, J. Thgersen / Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 93112 95

believe that important values are threatened (e.g., Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof,1999). Here, sanctions and rewards are initiated by the individual him or herself only.

In this paper we will review social dilemma research on the importance of these kinds ofnorms, focusing on research of interest for environmental behaviour in particular. Most

research on general interaction norms is experimental by nature, although studies of localcommon-pool resource dilemmas add to the knowledge base. Most research on benevo-lence norms, on the other hand, is survey based. After a brief discussion of cooperation inone-shot social dilemmas and iterated games, we proceed with an examination of literatureon the inXuence of norms on cooperation and comment upon its relevance for behaviour inenvironmental dilemmas. We also oVer some suggestions about which kinds of norms thatare likely to be activated under diVerent dilemma conditions and how they might promoteor obstruct environmentally friendly behaviour.

2. Cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas and in iterated games

2.1. One-shot social dilemmas

In a one-shot public-good social dilemma, participants can choose between keepingresources to themselves or contribute to a common pool. Given that enough participantscontribute, the good is manifested and all are free to use it. In a resource dilemma, all par-ticipants can harvest from a common resource, but the group runs the risk of excessive har-vesting, leading to depletion of the resource. Both kinds of dilemmas embrace a mixedmotive. One can either pursue individual or collective interests. Furthermore, the decision

situation is set up such that the individuals rational choice is to pursue his or her individ-ual interest, defection, but if all or most participants defect, all are worse of than if they hadcooperated and met the collective interest (Dawes, 1980). The one-shot character of thedilemma implies that choices are made simultaneously and privately.

Over the years, experiments on one-shot social dilemmas show a cooperation rate some-where between 40% and 60%.1 For example, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) reporteda cooperation rate of 57%. In his meta-analysis of over 100 social dilemma experiments,Sally (1995) reported an average rate of cooperation of 47% across a wide variety of condi-tions. Of course, cooperation is contingent upon many things. For instance, contributionrates may diVer between discrete contributions, all or none, and continuous contributions,

where people can contribute any amount they wish. If anything, contributions seem to begreater in the latter than the former condition (e.g., Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). Evi-dently, around 50% approach the experimental social dilemma with an intention to coop-erate. It should be recognised that in experimental dilemmas participants are aware of thenature of the dilemma. Furthermore, the resource is represented by points or some smallsum of money to gain or lose. The resource is of minor importance to those involved.Finally, the behaviour of others is unknown to the participants. Hence, the intention tocooperate can, loosely speaking, be attributed to individual characteristics. Cooperatorshave been characterized as persons that have a pro-social value orientation (cf. Van Lange,Otten, de Bruin, & Joireman, 1997) and/or put a trust in others propensity to cooperate

1 In repeated dilemmas, as long as the resource is not abused by others cooperation rates tend to decline as thedilemma progresses (Komorita & Parks, 1994).


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(Yamagishi, 1986). Of prime interest in the present paper is how norms may contribute tothis base-rate cooperation around 50%, and under what conditions they may contribute toan increase or decrease of the cooperation rate.

Several authors have noticed the positive eVect of communication on the cooperation

rate (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Ostrom, 1998; Sally, 1995). This eVect is notrelated to just any kind of communication, but only communication that is relevant for thesituation at hand. In later studies (Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988; Orbell, van deKragt, & Dawes, 1988) the importance of group identity was emphasised to account for thehigher rate of cooperation. As people communicate, a group identity is activated thatenhances the importance of group welfare over individual welfare. This explanation waschallenged by Bicchieri (2002), who instead proposed that communication elicits socialnorms. The supporting evidence comes from studies of iterated games.

2.2. Iterated games

Should group identity account for higher cooperation rates, then this eVect would bevisible whenever group identity is made salient. This is certainly not the case (Bicchieri,2002). One piece of evidence put forth comes from a study of iterated games by Kiesler,Sproull, and Waters (1996). Here, the subject communicated or did not communicate withanother subject; either a human confederate or a computer. The subject and the partnerinteracted in six rounds. In four of these, discussion took place. Discussion implied that aproposal about cooperation was put forth. In the rounds of no communication, the coop-eration rate dropped signiWcantly compared to when discussion took place. Bicchieri

argues that should discussion trigger a group identity, then commitments to cooperateshould have been carried over to rounds with no communication. Since it did not, a normof commitment and promise keeping is a more credible explanation.

Although it may take more than two persons to evoke a group identity, we do believe inBicchieris general conclusion that norms act as default social rules in social dilemmas. Indi-rect evidence in support of this conclusion comes from studies showing that expectationsabout others cooperation and own cooperation are strongly interrelated (Dawes et al.,1977; Messick et al., 1983). More direct evidence comes from a prisoners dilemma studywhere participants experienced cooperation or competition in repeated games (Bettenhau-sen & Murnighan, 1991). Feedback about the other players behaviour, a confederate, con-

tributed to the establishment of a norm for proper behaviour. In the next round of games,participants were paired with a new member; confederates excluded. Participants appliedthe norm when interacting with a new participant, and also expected others to do the same.Hence, in new and homogenous groups those who cooperated in the Wrst round continuedto do so, while those who defected stayed defectors. In heterogeneous groups, when theestablished norm was challenged, cooperation fell in between the two homogenous groups.

3. General interaction norms

3.1. Norms elicited by the behaviour of others

Based on work by James March and on Messicks (1999) AIR hypothesis, an appropri-ateness framework to decisions in social dilemmas was recently advanced (Weber, Kopel-man, & Messick, 2004). This framework identiWes three factors of signiWcance for


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cooperation: classiWcation of the situation, the identity of the decision maker, and identiW-cation of rules and heuristics that may guide behavioural choice. Among these three fac-tors, classiWcation of the situation is the principal point. Is this a dilemma situation or not?In terms of norm activation, the appropriateness framework has much in common with

how Bicchieri frames the dilemma situation. In any situation, an individual will search forcues to interpret the situation. This is often done as an instance of a well-known schema,mentally stored. Once a situation is categorized as Wtting a particular schema, behaviouralnorms and role expectations will be elicited (see also Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991).The question is then: which cues will elicit which schemas?

Since behaviour often takes place in a social context, the behaviour of others is likely toinXuence which behavioural decision an individual takes. If people are kind to you, you arelikely to respond with kindness. A favour is often reciprocated. Part of the reason may bethat by observing the behaviour of others social rules are inferred.

In contrast to a one-shot dilemma where people act once and simultaneously, socialinteraction reXects that behaviour unfolds over time. Without invoking a norm explana-tion, the diVerence between simultaneous and real-time contributions was investigated in apublic-good dilemma (Goren, Rapoport, & Kurzban, 2004). Under real-time conditions,participants are informed about the decisions of other participants as they make the deci-sion (i.e., real time) rather than just the aggregate result after all participants have madetheir decision, as is usually the case in laboratory research. One major Wnding was consid-erably higher levels of contribution under real-time than simultaneous contributions. Sincethe former procedure more closely mirrors real-life contributions to voluntary publicgoods, earlier studies using simultaneous contributions could have overestimated free-rid-

ing tendencies. We suggest that the diV

erence between real-time and simultaneous contri-butions conditions could be the result of the norm of reciprocity being made more salientunder real-time conditions. Seeing others contribute would require one to cooperate inkind. Before we turn to the norm of reciprocity, the consistency norm and norms aboutfairness will be brieXy discussed.

Above, the importance of communication for cooperation was spelled out. It has beensuggested that communication in groups elicit a commitment norm (Kerr, 1995). Oncepeople have committed themselves to a course of action, they are expected and likely to actconsistently (Cialdini, 2001). The importance of this principle is evident in social dilemmaresearch. A study by Orbell et al. (1988) found a strong relationship between commitment

and cooperation rates. To the extent that group members in the discussion groups prom-ised to cooperate, the actual proportion cooperating was high. Similarly, did they promiseto defect they also defected. Keep in mind that promises were public, while the actualchoice was made anonymously.

As proposed by Kerr (1995), to free-ride in a social dilemma is to violate the norm ofequity. In order to receive something from a public good, one should contribute with somekind of input. Furthermore, if group members experience that inequity exists in a resourcedilemma, those that are treated wrongly are prepared to take action (Allison & Messick,1990). In line with a welfare state ideology, studies also show that to the extent that citizensperceive that resources for social welfare are distributed in a fair manner they are also will-

ing to contribute the resource (Biel et al., 1999; Eek & Biel, 2003). In addition, people whoare better oV contribute more than people with smaller endowments. Taken together,norms for distributive justice seem to have a double entrance. Once a decision situation isrecognised as a social dilemma, norms about fair contributions and distribution tend to be


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elicited. These norms may diVer depending on which particular situation people are in andwhich goals they wish to pursue. This is a further indication that norms act as defaultsocial rules in social dilemmas. Elicited norms are then matched or evaluated with regardto peoples actual behaviour. If people perceive that fairness is upheld, they tend to con-

tribute to the common good or refrain from overusing a common resource. If not, they areprepared to punish others for their defective behaviour, or refrain from contributing them-selves.

In a recent article, Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, and Bembenek (2003) proposed a sequen-tial model of justice in social dilemmas. People attend to the allocation of resources amonggroup members; distributive justice. When resources are perceived to be distributed in anunfair manner, group members may try to change allocation rules or the procedure.Despite fair procedures, some group members may continue to defect. To recognise justiceand bring defectors back on the right track, a sense of justice has to be restored. Those whohave been harmed should be compensated by the defectors. If procedural changes and res-toration fail, retribution will follow. Retribution is primarily a mechanism to preventfuture violations of justice. The model by Schroeder et al. suggests that social dilemmas areembedded in justice concerns at various phases in the management of common-poolresources. Justice motives do not only concern own contributions in public-good dilemmasor harvest behaviour in resource dilemmas, but also the behaviour of others. This brings usto the norm of reciprocity.

The norm of reciprocity calls for positive responses to positive actions, but negativeresponses to unfavourable treatment. In her studies of local common-pool resource (CPR)dilemmas, Ostrom emphasises the importance of the reciprocity norm for cooperation

(Ostrom, 1998). She listsW

ve ingredients of reciprocity strategies that apply to social dilem-mas: identify who else is involved, asses the likelihood that others are cooperators, cooper-ate given that others can be trusted to cooperate, do not cooperate with those who do notreciprocate, and punish those who betray trust. In local communities where the behaviourof others can be monitored, cooperators and defectors might be identiWed. Unless earlierbehaviour of those involved is known, people have to infer from a more general base ofbehaviour in society whether they can trust others to cooperate or not. This implies thatthe higher the proportion of people that act in a self-interested way there is in society, theless trust in one another and the less likely it is that positive reciprocity evolves. No exactestimate can be given for what should be considered a high or a low Wgure. That around

50% cooperate initially in a one-shot dilemma under anonymity indicates that this is theWgure in some Western countries. As for the fourth ingredient, cooperation rates shouldvary with the amount of contribution of others. Several experiments support this idea ofconditional cooperation. Finally, there is clear evidence that reciprocity norms areenforced by sanctions (for a review, see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). People may even beprepared to reward those who behave in a fair manner and punish unfair behaviour despiteentailing costs to themselves and no present or future material rewards. This kind ofstrong reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gchter, 2002) towards defectors is upheld bymeans of altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gchter, 2002). In a repeated public-goodsexperiment, Fehr and Gchter ruled out direct reciprocity and reputation formation.

Never-the-less, participants imposed costly punishment on defectors. Moreover, the coop-eration rates were much higher in a condition of punishment than in a no punishment con-dition. This was also true for punished non-cooperators. The sanctioning of defectors isalso observed in local common-pool resources dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990).


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3.2. Norms elicited by the situation

Not only are people receptive to the behaviour of others. Situations that an individualencounters may also vary with regard to which particular norm that is evoked. In his work

on distributive justice, Deutsch (1975, 1985) proposed that there is a match between princi-ples of distributive justice and the goals that people wish to achieve. When personal devel-opment and well-being is the primary goal, an allocation based on relative need shouldmanifest itself. If a group is oriented towards economic productivity, it should embrace anallocation norm that encourages eYciency and distribute resources based on past contribu-tion; equity. When a group wish to support relationships among its members, an equalitynorm that signals equal status among its group members is expected to be applied. Othershave pointed at diVerence between the market and policy (Lane, 1986). While equality isexpected to be a prime norm in policy, equity is often adhered to in the market. What theseauthors emphasise is that diVerent norms of conduct are expected to be elicited in businessand in policy. Lane also makes a distinction between fairness, as a criterion for allocation,and justice, referring to the outcome of the process. Connecting this to the sequentialmodel of justice (Schroeder et al., 2003), diVerent social norms are expected to be appropri-ate in the business and the policy frame. In the market, people would be concerned aboutequity as a fairness principle, and then mainly in relation to allocation procedures. In thepolicy, not only must procedures be fair. Outcomes must also be just. Distributive justicewill mainly be measured against the norms of equality and need. Moreover, in the policydomain, but not in the market, there may be calls for redistribution (Lane, 1986). Thiswould imply that restorative justice is a concern under a policy frame but not under a mar-

ket frame. Finally, retributive justice is by Schroeder et al. associated with procedural rules(p. 383). Hence, retributive justice may be an issue both in a business and a policy frameand human concern for retribution might be guided by the norm of reciprocity.

In a study on social norms and cooperation, Pillutla and Chen (1999) predicted thatpeople would behave more competitively in dilemmas involving economic as compared tonon-economic decisions. Given that self-interested behaviour is the implicit norm in aneconomic context, people are more likely to defect than in a non-economic context. Theydesigned two vignettes where participants, taking on the role of an investment manager,where asked either to invest in a private or a common good. Both vignettes were framedwithin a business setting. The economic decision concerned investing in a joint investment

fund, while the non-economic decision involved a contribution to a social fund. Resultssupported their hypothesis. Furthermore, participants expected larger contributions, i.e.,cooperation, in the non-economic than in the economic context.

A second example comes from a study by Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999). Again, a pub-lic-good dilemma was set up. Two groups of subjects took the role of managers that wereasked to allocate part of their budget in running scrubbers that would reduce air-borneemissions. If most managers did so, the goal of the company would be reached. In one ofthe two groups, a weak sanctioning system was introduced. If managers in this group didnot comply with the companys policy, there was a small risk that they would be met withsanctioning costs. No commitments were asked for or given in advance. In the group with-

out sanctions around 75% of the managers cooperated, while less than 50% did so in thesanctioning group. Evidently, the critical cue here is the sanctioning system. Without sanc-tions, the decision was seen by the managers as an ethical one. One should stand up for thecommon good. However, when sanctions were introduced it turned into a business decision.


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Although the expected costs for not running the scrubbers where somewhat higher in thesanctioning group, the costs were still so low that it paid not to run the scrubbers.

Both these studies show that in the domain of business diVerent social norms maypotentially guide behaviour than in policy or private domains. However, once a business

frame is adopted the likelihood of a cost beneWt process increases while the tendency tocooperate decreases. This implies that should strong sanctions be introduced, the rate ofcooperation would increase under a business frame. This is exactly what Tenbrunsel andMessick found.

Money incentives do not only aVect cooperation rates in business. As shown by Freyand Jegen (2001), economic incentives can crowd out moral motives among ordinary citi-zens. The test case was an upcoming referendum about acceptance of a repository for spentnuclear fuel in the home canton of the participants. On a direct request, just over 50% ofthe respondents were in favour of the location. In a second stage, monetary compensationwas introduced. The sum amounted to between CHF 2500 and CHF 7500. Once compen-sation was introduced, the acceptance rate dropped to 25%. Without money, proceduralfairness surrounding the location decision predicted acceptance. With compensation, pro-cedural fairness no longer had any eVect. Rather, economic consequences for the votersdetermined their decision.

To show that diVerent norms reside on the market and in the policy, Eek, Biel and Gr-ling in an experimental study (2001) manipulated the provision holder of child-care, whichwas either provided by the municipality or by a private business. Two diVerent principlesfor distributing quality of child-care were described. One principle stated that all childrenreceive equally good care, regardless of how much their parents pay (equality) and another

that children whose parents pay more receive better care than do children whose parentspay less (equity). Although equality was the dominating principle, equity was regardedmore fair under private than municipal provision holder, while equality was rated as fairerwhen the municipality was provision holder rather than a private business.

Taken together, these studies show that variations in the social dilemma are paired withthe elicitation of diVerent social norms. Sometimes, such variations contribute to the adop-tion of a business frame. Adoption of a business frame implies that people adhere to calcu-lating costs and beneWts for themselves, while at the same time paying less attention toethical aspects. As a result, tendencies to cooperate decline. This should not be interpretedsuch that social norms are absent in economical settings, however. The norm of reciprocity

is pervasive and could, for example, aVect how wage oVers from employers are respondedto in terms of work eVorts by employees (Kirchler, Fehr, & Evans, 1996). Tax compliancecould also be related to social norms in that a strong social and national identity appearsto go hand in hand with adherence to norms of taxpaying behaviour (Wenzel, 2004).Rather, their relative importance is weaker under a business than under a societal frame.

3.3. Implications for environmental behaviour

Given this rather bright picture of social norm application and cooperation in experi-mental social dilemmas and local CPR dilemmas, how come that pro-environmental

behaviour is not more frequent? As was spelled out above, in experimental studies theresource is of little value to the participants. Hence, to cooperate involves small costs. Withincreasing costs or eVorts, cooperation rates may drop. This is a general conclusion thatStern (1992) and Gardner and Stern (2002) draws. Attitudes and norms have more eVect


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on behaviours that are relatively inexpensive or easy to perform (see also Diekmann & Pre-isendrfer, 2003). Further evidence comes from the study by Bettenhausen and Murnighan(1991). In pairs that had established cooperation, a structural change was introduced. Thisimplied that defection became more proWtable. As a result, the earlier norm supporting

cooperation was no longer eVective and cooperation rates decreased drastically. Researchon CPRs shows a diVerent pattern. Despite high cooperation costs, reciprocity norms seemto uphold cooperation. At the same time, negative eVects of defection may be prominent.Participants are part of a social group that interacts over time and with which they iden-tify. To defect may not only be met by sanctions, but also entails the risk of being turnedinto an out-cast. Simultaneously, users are highly dependent on the resource for anextended time period. An ineYcient use could undermine opportunities for future support.

It should also be recognised that in experimental studies, as well as in local CPRs,group members pay attention to the resource and, in repeated situations, receive feedbackabout its status. Many of the most pressing environmental issues, such as ameliorating cli-mate change, concern large-scale resources where cause and eVect are separated both inspace and time. Hence, users may not be able to watch over the condition of the resource.Should such be the case, information from experts and mass media may be vital. Presently,most experts seem to agree that the average temperature increase on earth during the last100 years is exceptional. Most also attribute part of the cause to an increase in CO 2 in theatmosphere with the implication that the temperature rise is (partly) people-induced.Whether this attribution will aVect environmental behaviour in the positive is unclear. AWeld study of a water draught in California (Talarowski, 1982; cited in Samuelson, Mes-sick, Wilke, & Rutte, 1986) showed that consumers who thought that the draught was

caused by nature consumed less water than those who thought that the shortage was peo-ple-induced. Presumably, if shortage was attributed to the behaviour of other people thiswas considered unfair. BeneWts and burdens were not divided in an equitable manner. Ifthe shortage was nature-induced one could hope that others would act in a fair manner.However, in most large-scale environmental dilemmas general interaction norms mayhave a minor role to play. Rather, to acknowledge the importance of environmental valuesand a personal responsibility for acting in a benevolent manner may foster individualrestraint.

4. Benevolence norms

Unfortunately there is not much experimental evidence to support (or reject) assertionsabout the importance of benevolence norms (i.e., private and internalised prescriptivenorms) for showing restraint (i.e., cooperation) in social dilemmas. More indirect evidencespeaks in favour of such an assertion, however. Notably, the base-rate cooperation ofabout 50% in one-shot dilemmas is diYcult to explain by other than private, internal char-acteristics. There is also plenty of evidence linking cooperation in one-shot dilemmas to apro-social value orientation (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997) and to benevolence values (Sch-wartz, 1996).2 Another class of evidence links defection in social dilemmas to defence strat-egies that individuals apply when moral and non-moral costs and beneWts of available

actions are perceived as relatively balanced and they therefore experience a decisional

2 As one would expect, these two measures of personal values are positively correlated (Grling, 1999).


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conXict (Schwartz & Howard, 1982, 1984). In a prisoners dilemma context, Schwartz andHoward (1982) found that defectors justify their uncooperativeness by denying theirresponsibility for the outcome. And in a step-level public goods context, Kerr and his col-leagues found that defectors tend to convince themselves that they probably couldnt

have made a diVerence anyway (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). The fact thatdefectors apply defence strategies in order to justify their defection to themselves stronglysuggests that they struggle with an internal norm-pressure to cooperate.

When specifying the benevolence norms that might account for cooperation being avalued choice by the individual, Kerr (1995, 1996) mentions the norm of social responsi-bility (Berkowitz, 1972) and the norm of in-group favouritism (Tajfel, 1970). Here, we usethe term benevolence in a broad sense, including actions aiming to preserve and enhancethe welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact as well as actionswhere the goal is to beneWt allpeople and nature (termed universalism by Schwartz, 1992).The former type of benevolent actions is especially relevant in local, small-scale CPRdilemmas, such as the commons dilemma described by Hardin (1968). Cooperation inclose-knit contexts such as this is mostly a matter of conventional decency and thoughtful-ness (Schwartz, 2005) guided by benevolence values such as responsible, helpful, and for-giving. Cooperation in large-scale social dilemmas involving a large social group ofanonymous others, such as other commuters using the same roads or other householdersusing the same landWll, on the other hand, is more likely to be guided by values such associal justice, equality, and protecting the environment (Schwartz, 2005; Thgersen &lander, 2002).

It is assumed that these and other benevolence values are activated by situational cues

suggesting a discrepancy between the actual and a desired state (Schwartz & Howard,1984); a need. In an experiment involving manipulations to prime benevolence values, Ver-planken and Holland (2002, Experiment 1) found that environmentally friendly behaviour(i.e., cooperating) increased when values relevant for such behaviour were primed, hencesupporting the assumption that benevolence values are not necessarily chronically accessi-ble in people, but may need to be activated.

4.1. Norms elicited by the situation

Schwartz (1977) and Schwartz and Howard (1984) suggested that situational cues indi-

cating a need for action may initiate considerations about the implications of action alterna-tives for ones moral values, which then generate feelings of moral obligation to perform orrefrain from speciWc actions. It is these feelings of moral obligation that he terms personalnorms. The evidence supporting the importance of situational cues for activating personalnorms includes Verplanken and Hollands (2002) priming experiment, mentioned above, aswell as research on bystander helping in an emergency showing that the likelihood of help-ing depends on his or her visual proximity to the victim (Piliavin & Piliavin, 1973; cited inSchwartz & Howard, 1984) and on how clearly the need for help is spelled out (Schwartz,1970). The valence of situational cues also seems to play a role. For instance, it has beenfound, in a social dilemma context, that a hurt frame (i.e., one that makes salient that

defection leads to negative consequences) is more likely than a help frame (i.e., one thatmakes salient that cooperation leads to positive consequences) to activate a personal normfor cooperation (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). This Wnding is consistent with otherresearch, which has found that negative information (e.g., information about a negative


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event, such as an accident) is more likely to catch attention than positive (Carretie, Mer-cado, Tapia, & Hinojosa, 2001) and that negative information inXuences peoples evalua-tions more than comparable positive (e.g., Grankvist, Dahlstrand, & Biel, 2004; Ito, Larsen,Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998).

Awareness of a need for action is a necessary, but not a suYcient condition for the acti-vated benevolent value(s) to be transformed into a personal norm for a particular behav-iour (Schwartz & Howard, 1982, 1984). In addition, the person needs to be aware ofactions that he or she could do to help, a non-trivial condition outside the laboratory, andhe or she needs to feel able to execute a relevant action. The importance of the lattercondition for initiating action towards a goal and for persisting in goal striving is well doc-umented (e.g., Ozer & Bandura, 1990), also with regard to environment-friendly action(e.g., Allen & Ferrand, 1999; Ellen, Wiener, & Cobb-Walgren, 1991; Pelletier, Dion, Tuson,& Green-Demers, 1999). Without awareness of relevant action(s) which the person feelsable to carry out, an identiWed need may still lead to aVective arousal, but it will not betransformed into a feeling of obligation to do something to relieve the need. Further, asmentioned earlier, in cases where following the activated personal norm is costly a psycho-logical defence reaction may set in with the purpose of neutralizing the norm. Kerr and hiscolleagues documented the propensity of defectors to convince themselves that theycouldnt have made a diVerence anyway (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997), but thedefence repertoire is broader, including denying the need for action (Opotow & Weiss,2000) and denying ones personal responsibility for solving the problem (Schwartz &Howard, 1980).

4.2. Survey research

Most of the research investigating the inXuence of benevolence values, and of normsgenerated from these values, on cooperation is based on survey research. Some studieshave reported a positive correlation between benevolence values and a speciWc environ-ment-friendly behaviour, such as recycling (e.g., Dunlap, Grieneeks, & Rokeach, 1983;Thgersen & Grunert-Beckmann, 1997), reducing personal car use (e.g., Garvill, 1999;Nordlund & Garvill, 2003), buying green products (e.g., Grunert & Juhl, 1995), or politi-cal action for environmental protection (e.g., Stern et al., 1999). Others have reported apositive correlation between benevolence values and an index or indexes based on a broad

range of environment-friendly behaviours (e.g., Karp, 1996; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002;Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 1995). Thgersen and lander (2006b) used structuralequation modelling-based partial correlation analysis to show that the positive correla-tions between diVerent environment-friendly behaviours can be accounted for by theircommon roots in environmental concern and benevolence values. In another study basedon a two-wave cross-lagged panel analysis, Thgersen and lander (2002) found that thepositive correlation between benevolence values and an index based on 17 environment-friendly behaviours reXects a causal inXuence of the former on the latter, rather than vice-versa.

A few studies have investigated, and conWrmed, the assumed mediation of the inXuence

of benevolence values on behaviour through the formation of a personal norm (e.g., Nordl-und & Garvill, 2002, 2003; Stern et al., 1999; Thgersen & Grunert-Beckmann, 1997). Themain bulk of survey studies investigated only the relationship between personal norms andbehaviour, however.


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The study of the behavioural implications of felt moral obligation (i.e., a personal norm)to perform a pro-social behaviour started in the area of one-to-one helping (see the reviewsin Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1982). However, by now there is plenty of evidencelinking environment-friendly behaviour to personal norms as well, including, but not lim-

ited to, the previously mentioned mediation studies.A positive correlation between everyday environment-friendly behaviour and personal

norms has been reported for (a) waste-handling behaviours such as (abstaining from) lit-tering (Heberlein, 1972), participation in a recycling programme (e.g., Hopper & Nielsen,1991; Thgersen, 2003; Vining & Ebreo, 1992), and (refraining from) yard burning (VanLiere & Dunlap, 1978), (b) consumer purchases of environment-friendly products such aslead-free petrol (Heberlein & Black, 1976), environment-friendly packaging (Thgersen,1999), organic food products (Thgersen & lander, 2006a), and eco-labelled products(Grankvist, 2002), and (c) energy-saving behaviours such as turning down the thermostat(Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985) and using other means of transportation than a private car(Garvill, 1999; Hunecke, Blbaum, Matthies, & Hger, 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003)(but see also Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). A positive relationship has also been reported forpolitical action for environmental protection, such as joining or donating money to anenvironmental NGO, writing to a congressman in support of an environmental cause andvoting in support of environmental legislation (Stern et al., 1999). No eVects of personalnorms were found for larger investments in energy saving (Black et al., 1985), however.

A number of these studies also measured perceptions about social norms for the speciWcbehaviour in ones relevant reference groups and they generally found that, although therewas a signiWcant and positive bivariate correlation between perceived social norms and

behaviour, the correlation was strongly attenuated and in most cases became insigniW

cantwhen personal norms were controlled (e.g., Black et al., 1985; Hopper & Nielsen, 1991;Thgersen, 1999). There are exceptions to this general Wnding, though, such as Huneckeet al. (2001) with regard to travel mode choice and Vining and Ebreo (1992) with regard torecycling. But it seems that, in studies of activities involving a goal of improving the (bio-physical) environment, a positive correlation between perceived social norms and behav-iour usually only reXects that perceived social norms and personal norms are positivelycorrelated.3

A number of studies of environment-friendly behaviour, usually applying modiWed ver-sions of the theory of reasoned action or the theory of planned behaviour, have controlled

for a measure of the attitude towards the behaviour (e.g., Thgersen, 2002), and in somecases also for perceived control (e.g., Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Harland, Staats, & Wilke,1999), in addition to perceived social norms. The general Wnding in most of these studies isthat, when adding personal norms to these other predictors, the amount of explained vari-ance in behavioural intentions or behaviour increases.4 The same has been found withregard to morally relevant behaviours in other areas (for a review, see Ajzen, 1991). In anattitude theory context, the personal norm may be understood as a special type of attitude,but conceptually distinct from other attitude constructs in the type of evaluations they

3

This latter correlation might be due to measured personal norms to some degree reXecting internalised socialnorms, as suggested by Schwartz (e.g., 1977), or to perceptions about social norms in reference groups being in-ferred from ones own personal norms.

4 There are exceptions, though, such as Bamberg and Schmidts (2003) study of German students car use fortravels to the university.


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refer to (Schwartz & Howard, 1984). When the inclusion of a measure of personal normsleads to an increase in explained variance, after controlling for the attitude towards thebehaviour, it not only indicates that the persons evaluation of the behaviour in terms of itsmoral worth to the self has behavioural implications, but also that this type of evaluation is

not fully integrated in the usual measures of the attitude towards the behaviour.It appears from this review of the literature that although there is strong evidence link-

ing personal norms to a host of environment-friendly behaviours, there are cases, such aslarger investment decisions (Black et al., 1985), where they play a less signiWcant role, andwith regard to some other behaviours (such as travel mode choice, e.g., Bamberg &Schmidt, 2003; Garvill, 1999; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003) the evidence is mixed. The excep-tions and mixed evidence come from cases where pro-social behaviour is quite costly. Itshould come as no surprise that the persons non-moral values and evaluations are moreimportant for behaviour under high-cost than under low-cost circumstances. In addition, itmay be that in some of these cases the need for pro-social action is either not noticed or theperson feels unable to perform any relevant behaviours that might help solving the needand, therefore, a cooperative personal norm is not activated (Schwartz & Howard, 1982,1984). Another possibility is that a personal norm is activated, but since non-moral costsare very salient a process of protective denial and redeWnition of the situation is initiated,as demonstrated, for instance, by Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1997).

5. Summary and implications

There is plenty of evidence supporting the assertion that social norms play an important

role for cooperation in social dilemmas. WhenW

nding themselves in a social dilemma, alarge share of the population perhaps even a majority spontaneously intends to cooper-ate. Cooperation is consistent with their moral values and when perceiving a need foraction, knowing what to do, and feeling able to do it, they feel a personal obligation to actaccordingly. Hence, they form a personal norm for cooperation in the speciWc situation.

In social dilemma research, individual variation in value priorities is often conceptual-ized as diVerent social value orientations with regard to the distribution of a commonresource (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Some people have a cooperative social value ori-entation (usually referred to as pro-socials). For pro-socials, equal distribution is a funda-mental goal and equality is a highly prioritized value. Others approach the dilemma with

an individualistic or competitive orientation (pro-selfs). They are guided by goals such asindividual achievement and wealth, and achievement and power are among their highlyprioritized values. Hence, individual variations in the activation of personal (benevolence)norms may either be related to the importance attached to benevolence values or to socialvalues in general.

Such situationally activated personal (benevolence) norms can explain the widespreaddeviation from rationality reXected in a base-rate cooperation of about 50% in one-shotsocial dilemmas. However, the evidence regarding the importance of personal (benevo-lence) norms for cooperation is mostly indirect and/or survey based. There is a need formore research providing unambiguous experimental evidence on this issue. Further, and

complicating matters, a number of situational factors seem to moderate the inXuence ofnorms on behaviour. Under some circumstances, cooperation norms fail to be activated, orthey may be repressed through a process of defensive denial. Other circumstances can acti-vate additional norms, which reinforce cooperation.


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Cooperation norms are not activated if the individual fails to notice a need, or its rele-vance to his or her moral values, or eVective action that he or she can master. Especially,the importance of need salience and activation of moral values for norm activation hasbeen demonstrated repeatedly in the cited research.

In a laboratory environment and in local CPRs need salience and knowledge of eVectiveaction are generally high because the resource is prominent as is, via feedback, the eVects ofbehaviour on the resource. In large-scale dilemmas such as air pollution, resources are lessvisible and environmental uncertainty is likely to play a larger role. In addition, feedbackmechanisms may be lacking. For instance, eVects of transport in terms of greenhouse gasesdo not present themselves to the actors. This implies that in experimental studies and insmall-scale property regimes, the dilemma perspective is salient, while in large-scale dilem-mas it is regarded less appropriate.

The Wnding that cooperation depends on the framing of the situation, and especiallythat a business framing leads to less cooperation than a policy framing or a private-sphereframing, also becomes more meaningful in this context. The framing inXuences whichaspects of the situation are most salient and it thereby determines which values becomeprimed. And a business framing tend to activate non-moral values rather than any of themoral values that can lead to norm formation. Finally, even if they have been activated,benevolence norms dictating cooperation may be neutralized, again due to defensivedenial. This happens in cases where cooperation is costly, which explains the frequent Wnd-ing that norms are less predictive of environment-friendly behaviour in high-cost than inlow-cost situations.

Another distinguishing feature between laboratory environment and local CPRs vs.

large-scale dilemmas is that in the latter, face-to-face communication is improbable and,as a result, the social group identity vague (Dawes, 1991). Hence, social norms of fairnessand reciprocity may not play as important a role as in the laboratory or in local CPRs.This boils down to that in large-scale environmental dilemmas, people are more likely tochoose the primrose path than the narrow way. Along this path, they are unlikely to beexposed to rules that govern interpersonal interaction and encourage cooperation. To theextent that people promote the common good, their behaviour is determined by benevo-lence norms.

However, it should not be ignored that under some circumstances, general interactionnorms may be activated and support cooperation. Especially, in local common-pool dilem-

mas, when there are opportunities to communicate among participants in the dilemma,and they use the opportunity to make commitments to cooperate, most individuals willhonour the commitments made, thus adhering to a general commitment norm. Also, whenindividuals understand that they also beneWt from the public good or from the conserva-tion of the resource, a general equity norm may be activated, which (in this case) reinforcescooperation. Further, experiencing that others cooperate may elicit a general reciprocitynorm, which again reinforces cooperation.

Under some circumstances, the two latter norms may make a participant in a socialdilemma defect, however. Individual participants who perceive that the distribution ofcosts and/or beneWts is unfair, and that they are not receiving their equitable share, may

defect out of concern for equity, even in situations where it would be rational to cooperate(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). And in situation where they experience others defecting, theinXuence of the reciprocity norm may make them defect, even though they would prefer tocooperate.


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To summarize, both personal and situational factors are relevant for the activation ofnorms in social dilemmas. Personal and situational factors are linked to a somewhat diVer-ent pattern of norm activation, however; see Fig. 1. The most distinctive feature is that sit-uational factors, including the behaviour of others, are associated with norms related to

cooperation, whereas personal factors are associated with felt obligation to protect theresource at hand (i.e., a norm of environmental responsibility). Whereas behaviour guidedby social considerations (norms related to cooperation) have an indirect eVect on the envi-ronment only, behaviour guided by environmental values have a direct eVect. Needsalience, emanating from the situation, is expected to have an impact on environmentalresponsibility, but only in conjunction with environmental values.

Above, we have emphasised the importance of framing. In particular, the diVerencebetween a business frame and a policy frame has been demonstrated repeatedly in the citedresearch. A distinction has been made between market justice and political justice (Lane,1986). In the market, justice is more or less tantamount to equity, while equality and need

are associated with the policy sphere. Future study of justice and fairness in social dilem-mas should address diVerent functions that norms may serve under these conditions. Suchresearch could also have implications for policy instruments like emission trading, thatbrings collective goods to the market.

It appears from this review of the literature that social norms in general tend to supportcooperation in social dilemmas, sometimes also in large-scale dilemmas involving environ-mental problems. Further, there are actions that issue entrepreneurs can take in order forpeople to recognise the social dilemma and promote cooperation. In order to facilitate theactivation of relevant benevolence norms, they can communicate to the general publicabout existing environmental problems, how they relate to everyday behaviour, and what

the individual can do to help solving the problem(s) (see, e.g., Thgersen, 2005). Also, itneeds to be realized that sometimes the relevant individual cooperative actions are per-ceived as too costly. In these cases, the structural characteristics of the dilemma need to bechanged in a way that favours cooperation (Messick et al., 1983; Van Vugt, 1999). Finally,

Fig. 1. Factors inXuencing the activation of norms in social dilemmas.

Norm

activation

Situational factorsPersonal factors

Internalized

values

Salience of

need and

actions

Benefits

and costs

Framing

(market/

non-market)

Behaviour

of others

Commu-

nication

Environmental

responsibility

Fairness

and JusticeReciprocity Commitment


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due to the high degree of anonymity characterizing participation in large-scale socialdilemmas, there can be much gained by informing participants about others cooperativebehaviour (Aronson & OLeary, 19821983; Schultz, 1999), thus activating general equityand reciprocity norms in support of cooperation.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a grant from the Swedish Environmental ProtectionAgency (I-25-01) to the Wrst author and by a grant from the Danish Social ScienceResearch Council (24-03-0020) to the second author.

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Activation of Social Norms in Social Dilemas