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Abstract for: The International Society of Neoplatonic Studies Conference

“Neoplatonism in the East – ex oriente lux”, University of Haifa, 22-24 March 2011

THE PROPHET ABAMON AND THE DIALOGUES OF HERMES:

IAMBLICHUS’ DE MYSTERIIS, PORPHYRY’S LETTER TO ANEBO AND THE HERMETICA

When describing the hieratic path of ascent to the gods which comprises theurgy, Iamblichus states

“Hermes also has set out this path; and the prophet Bitys has given an interpretation of it to King Ammon,

having discovered it inscribed in hieroglyphic characters in a sanctuary in Sais in Egypt. He has handed

down the name of god, which extends throughout the whole cosmos; and there are many other treatises on

the same subject.”1 Recent scholarship has explored the presence of Egyptian theology within De

Mysteriis Books 7 and 82 and has noted Iamblichus’ evident allusions to the Hermetica contained therein.

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However, while scholars have noted Iamblichus’ espousal of Egyptian theology, less attention has been

paid to important similarities in structure and literary genre between Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis and the

Hermetica.4

It is well-known that the original title of Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis was in fact “The Reply of the

Master Abamon to the Letter of Porphyry to Anebo, and the Solutions to the Questions it contains”

(jAbavmmwno~ didaskavlou pro;~ th;n Porfurivou pro;~ jAnebw; ejpistolh;n ajpovkrisi~ kai; twn ejn

aujth/ ajporhmavtwn luvsei~).5 Written under the guise of the Egyptian prophet “Abamon” as a reply to

Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo, the original title places the work firmly within the philosophical genre of

“Problems and Solutions”6: cast in an epistolary form, it is essentially a series of replies to a set of

problems (aporiai) proposed by Porphyry about the nature of the gods and the proper modes of

worshipping them. Meanwhile, Iamblichus’ adoption of the pseudonym Abamon shows a self-conscious

location of the work within Egyptian religious tradition. The philosophical dialogue between Porphyry and

1 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, 8.5 (267.11-268.4), trs. and eds. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and Jackson P. Hershbell, Atlanta:

Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. All citations and quotations refer to this edition and translation, unless otherwise specified. 2 Cf. Dennis C. Clark, “Iamblichus’ Egyptian Neoplatonic Theology in De Mysteriis,” International Journal of the Platonic

Tradition 2 (2008) 164-205; Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1986, 131-141; Algis Uzdavinys, Philosophy and Theurgy in Late Antiquity, San Rafael, CA:

Sophia Perennis, 2010. 3 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, 8.1 (260.14-261.3); 8.2 (262.8); 8.4 (265.9-266.1; 266.5-7); 8.5 (267.11-268.4); 8.6 (269.1). Cf. also

Garth Fowden 1986, 134-139. 4 One important exception should be noted: Emma C. Clarke has commented in relation to the structure of Iamblichus’ De

Mysteriis, “the Hermetic discourses which purport to be addresses by Hermes to Tat, Asclepius or Ammon might seem

particularly relevant given that they appear to be written from one pseudonymous character to another” (Iamblichus’ De

Mysteriis: A Manifesto of the Miraculous, Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), 15, n.34. Cf. also Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and

Jackson P. Hershbell 2003, xxxi, n.61. 5 The title of Iamblichus’ work which we use today, De mysteriis Aegyptiorum, Chaldaeorum, Assyriorum, dates only from the

Renaissance and was originally coined by Marsilio Ficino in the fifteenth century (in his 1497 edition and translation) and

subsequently accepted by Scutellius, the second translator of the work into Latin in 1556. 6 The literary genre of “Problems and Solutions” was fairly common in the later Platonic tradition and, more generally, stretches

back to the early Hellenistic period and beyond. Porphyry himself had composed both Questions on Homer (Homerika

zêtêmata) and a Collection of Questions on Rhetoric (Synagôgê tôn rhêtorikôn zêtêmatôn), as well as a book of Miscellaneous

Questions (Symmikta zêtêmata), many of which concern philosophical topics. Later, Damascius (the last head of the Academy)

composed a work of Problems and Solutions (aporiai kai lyseis) on First Principles. Cf. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and

Jackson P. Hershbell 2003, xlviii.

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Iamblichus has predominantly been characterised by scholars as a vicious and hostile disagreement

between a sceptical Porphyry and a defensive Iamblichus.7 Yet such assessments obscure important

parallels with certain dialogues within the Hermetica: this paper will argue that the exchange between

Porphyry and Iamblichus evident in the Letter to Anebo and the De Mysteriis comprises a mystagogic

dialogue and a type of philosophical and religious discourse with protreptic, educational and initiatory

functions. In this sense, the exchange shares significant similarities with certain treatises of the Hermetica

which will be explored.

The possibility of a parallel between the exchange of Porphyry and Iamblichus evident in the

Letter to Anebo and the De Mysteriis and the philosophical writings of the Hermetica, many of which were

written in dialogue form for the purpose of philosophical paideia, is suggested by the Egyptian pseudonym

adopted by Iamblichus in the De Mysteriis as well as by the nature of the programmatic statements in the

first chapter of his work. Here, Iamblichus specifically locates himself within the Egyptian religious

tradition by allying himself with the ancient ranks of the Egyptian priesthood and by reminding us of the

tradition that Greek philosophers, such as Pythagoras and Plato, first learnt their wisdom from the

Egyptians.8 Whatever the precise meaning of the pseudonym, Iamblichus deliberately chose an Egyptian

name in order to provide a frame and setting for his treatise. The presence of pseudonymous authorship

combined with the philosophical dialogue between Porphyry and Iamblichus on metaphysical and religious

phenomena represents a very similar case in terms of structure to some of the philosophical treatises of the

Hermetica. Within the De Mysteriis, a tacit link is made between “Abamon” and Hermes, with whose

name Iamblichus says all such works are inscribed and dedicated.9 Iamblichus thus places his work under

the divine patronage of Hermes and hints at the status of himself as exegete and of his text as a divine

symbolon in the chain of the god Hermes (to be discussed further below).

The educational and initiatory function of certain dialogues within the philosophical Hermetica

has been discussed and emphasised by Garth Fowden: different dialogues are aimed at different levels of

initiate; from certain initiatory texts within the Hermetica we can construct a picture of the various stages

of the Hermetic paideia.10 He explicitly compares the teaching and learning structure of Hermetic initiates

with that practised by Neoplatonic philosophers, stating that they “...proceed systematically from

elementary to more sophisticated texts, just as the Platonic philosophers of the age graded Plato’s

7 See Emma C. Clarke 2001, 7; Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and Jackson P. Hershbell 2003, xxii; Gregory Shaw, Theurgy

and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995,

13-15; Gregory Shaw, “Living Light: Divine Embodiment in Western Philosophy,” in Patrick Curry and Angela Voss (eds.),

Seeing with Different Eyes: Essays in Astrology and Divination, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007, 71, 74. 8 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, 1.1 (2.8-3.2). Cf. also 7.5 (258.2-5); 8.5 (268.3-6); On the Pythagorean Way of Life 29.158- 31.198,

trs. and eds. John Dillon and Jackson Hershbell, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1991; Garth Fowden 1986, 186-87. 9 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, 1.1 (2.1-7). 10 Garth Fowden 1986, 98-100. Cf. especially Corpus Hermeticum XIII, 1-2, the dialogue On rebirth; Corpus Hermeticum I, 1,

29, The Poimandres, trs. W. Scott, Hermetica I, Boston: Shambhala, 1993. The so-called Discourse on the Ogdoad and the

Ennead (Codex VI.6), a treatise from the Coptic Hermetica found at Nag Hammadi, also exhibits an initiatory structure: cf. Jean-

Pierre Mahé, “A Reading of the Discourse on the Ogdoad and the Ennead (Nag Hammadi Codex VI.6)” in Roelof van den

Broek and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (eds.), Gnosis and Hermeticism: from Antiquity to Modern Times, Albany, NY: State

University of New York Press, 1998, 79-86.

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dialogues, for teaching purposes, according to their greater or lesser explicitness about the things of the

spirit.”11 Indeed Iamblichus seems to have been the first Neoplatonic philosopher to establish a definite

order and number of Platonic dialogues to be studied within his philosophical school. Yet the possible

paideutic and protreptic functions of his exchange with Porphyry in the Letter to Anebo and the De

Mysteriis have largely gone unnoticed. I have suggested elsewhere that De Mysteriis Book 3, which deals

with divination, could itself be viewed as a textual symbolon and as a sacred, ritualistic invocation of the

divine reality which it describes.12 The structure of Book 3 reflects and symbolises the course of

procession and of illumination from the divine realm to the mortal realm and the reversion to the divine

from the mortal world through different types and levels of divination and divine possession; in this sense,

Book 3 reflects the cycle of procession and reversion and traverses the metaphysical and psychic landscape

of ascent and descent.13 Such a structure may have been intended as an initiatory tool for philosophical

contemplation leading to theurgic visions for the ideal “philosophic” or “theurgic” reader: in this sense

Iamblichus’ text could itself be viewed as having protreptic and initiatory functions. This paper will

explore this possibility, examining the nature and possible implications of the pseudonym adopted by

Iamblichus, the structure of Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo and Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis and possible

functions of the dialogue form, as well as comparing the stages of paideia, preparation (ethical, ritual and

intellectual) and initiation evident in the philosophical Hermetica with the ritual path of theurgic ascent

described by Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis.

Dr. Crystal Addey

Cardiff University, UK

AddeyCJ@Cardiff.ac.uk

11 Garth Fowden 1986, 99.

12 Crystal Addey, “Oracles, Dreams and Astrology in Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis,” in Patrick Curry and Angela Voss (eds.),

Seeing with Different Eyes: Essays in Astrology and Divination, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007, 52. This

idea depends upon the view that language itself can be a symbolon. Cf. Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, 5.15 (219.1-220.14), where a

kind of sacrifice that is wholly immaterial is mentioned; Algis Uzdavinys 2010, 207-217. This argument draws on the recent

research of Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 167-179, who suggests that Proclus’ Platonic Theology presents itself as a

theurgic, textual symbolon with the status of a ritual invocation, since it enumerates successive orders of gods and metaphysical

grades of reality. 13 I owe this phrase to Sara Rappe 2000, 179, who states: “As if it were a theurgic rite, combining all the divine series in order to

re-create a sacralised cosmos, the Platonic Theology divulges a kind of cosmic prehistory, in which the psychic landscape, the

geography of ascent and descent, is traversed in detail.”

Plotinus and the Orient: Aoristos dyas

Vishwa Adluri, Hunter College vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu Porphyry tells us that at the age of twenty-seven, Plotinus was seized by a passion for

philosophy. Plotinus searched long for a teacher until he finally met Ammonius in Alexandria. “From that day he followed Ammonius continuously, and under his guidance made such progress in philosophy that he became eager to investigate the Persian methods and the system adopted among the Indians. It happened that the Emperor Gordian was at that time preparing his campaign against Persia; Plotinus joined the army and went on the expedition. He was then thirty-eight, for he had passed eleven entire years under Ammonius. When Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia, it was only with great difficulty that Plotinus came off safe to Antioch.”1 Scholars have long wished to investigate the relationship between Plotinus and the Indian “System” of thought. But such research was limited to historical research or philosophical speculation. Thus far, no specific Indian text has been suggested where such a “system”—one that bears the closest resemblance to Plotinian thought—could be found.

In this paper, I introduce such a text: the Nārāyaṇīya, found in the Soteriological Portion (Mokṣadharmaparvan) of the Mahabharata. Containing 18 short chapters, this text contains the essential elements of Plotinian thought: 1. Henadic soteriology, 2. Difficulty of seeing and describing this One, 3. Levels of Being, 4. Intense erotic love and its relationship to the One, 5. An ontological hieros logos which serves upwards as a soteriology and downwards as a cosmology. The entire discussion, further, is based on an analysis of the properties of numbers. A more relevant “Plotinian” Indian text cannot be wished for, nor does one exist.

The method I follow in this text is straight-forward. I will present the text,2 its basic structure and philosophical project and argue for why Plotinian-Indian studies should base further research concretely on the study of this text. For the purpose of this abstract, the following brief summary of the text will have to suffice.

Sage Nārada realizes that the highest Being has become four. So, he goes to seek out two of these four, Nara and Nārāyaṇa. These two are a pair. When he reaches their retreat, he is surprised to find them engaged in worship. “You are the unborn, eternal creator and mother, immortality, and the highest being …To whom today do you sacrifice?–which god or which ancestor—we know not!” (12.321.24-26). Learning that the One is higher than the four, he sets out to behold that highest Being. He travels to Śvetadvīpa or the “White Island,” a luminous abode inhabited by beings that are “Without senses or sustenance … unblinking and fragrant … With tongues and faces turned in every direction, they lick up the illumination of the sun” (12.322.8-12). But the most interesting thing about these beings is that they are dyadic. For example, each of these radiant beings is endowed with four testicles, sixty-four teeth, and one hundred lines on the soles of their feet. A clear numerology is being worked out here.

The text then tells us how, before Nārada arrived there, three “sons of the Creator,” Ekata, Dvita, and Trita had previously come there to view the One Being. In spite of their askesis they

1 Plotinus, The Enneads, ed. John Dillon and trans. Stephen McKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991), civ;

emphasis mine. 2 Nārāyaṇīya: Mahābhārata 12.321-339. As no good English translation of this text exists, I am working on

translating it from Sanskrit for publication. I will provide handouts and use this version in my presentation.

failed, because they lacked intense love or bhakti. Literally translated, the names Ekata, Dvita, and Trita mean: Unity, Duality, and Trinity. Nārada is luckier, but the vision he is granted of the One is a unity, a vision of the “form of all beings”: viśvarūpa. This One Being, surprisingly shimmers in various colors and is glorified with numerous names. The simple One, he is told, is beyond this cosmic form and is ineffable and incomprehensible. But the discourse that follows insists that cosmology and soteriology are intimately linked, and that the One being is to be experienced (rather than viewed) through exclusive and unwavering love, and a philosophical system for this is expounded. The rest of this story and analysis must await the actual presentation.

In conclusion, my paper will show how the text is not merely a “parallel” to Plotinus’ work, one which can serve as a locus for further research. In presenting these “dyadic” beings, this text provides a way for us to understand a very obscure component of Neoplatonist philosophy: the Indeterminate Dyad.

Select bibliography:

Armstrong, A. H. “Plotinus and India.” The Classical Quarterly vol. 30, no. 1 (Jan., 1936): 22-28. Brehier, Emile. The Philosophy of Plotinus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Cooper, John M., ed. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997. Harris, R. Baine, ed. Neoplatonism and Indian Thought. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1982. Horn, Christoph. Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit: Eine Studie zu den systematischen Grundlagen der

Enneaden. Stuttgart/Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1995. Mar Gregorios, Paulos, ed. Neoplatonism and Indian Philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001. Plotinus. The Enneads. Ed. John Dillon and trans. Stephen McKenna. London: Penguin Books,

1991. Radke, G. Die Theorie der Zahl im Platonismus – ein systematisches Lehrbuch. Tübingen/Basel: A.

Francke-Verlag, 2003. Schreiner, Peter, ed. Nārāyaṇīya Studien. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997. Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla. Plotinus on Number. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Dr. Adam Afterman

Senior lecturer in Jewish theology and kabbalah

The department of Hebrew Culture Studies

Tel Aviv University

"The influence of Neo-Platonism on the shaping of the "devekut" in

medieval Jewish theology and kabbalah"

In my paper I will address one of the more important cases of direct contact between

medieval Jewish theology and kabbalah and Neoplatonism: the emergence of the idea and

experience of communion and union as religious ideals in Judaism. With the appearance

of medieval Jewish theologyand Kabbalah, the ideal of mystical cleaving and mystical

union with the divine, or devekut, began to acquire a special and significant status. The

articulation of the category of devekut was one of the most important developments in

medieval Jewish thought, as a result of the exposure to, and consequently the absorption

of, large theoretical systems, most importantly Neoplatonism into the heart of Jewish

thought. With the advent of this revolution, diverse ancient Jewish sources and ideas

were reinterpreted in light of these theoretical frameworks, using various theological and

philosophical systems and new conceptions of the divine and human nature. These

creative hermeneutics gave birth to new understandings regarding the reciprocal relations

between man and God. The crystallization of the mystical value of devekut was an

outcome of creative hermeneutics reaching back to ancient biblical and rabbinic sources,

first emerging in medieval Jewish thought, and finding a full/er expression in early

Kabbalah.

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English Version THE PRESENCE OF BASÍLIDES IN NUMENIO OF APAMEA Juan Carlos Alby Summary In the process of re-dogmatización of platonism undertaken by Antiochus of Ashkelon in the second half of the century I. C. and continued until the end of the century II d. C. by authors like Eudoro, Numenio, Plutarch, Albino, Attic and Alcinoo author of Didascalicus , among others, intervened numerous elements from the pythagoreanism, stoicism and aristotle, to the point that this way of understanding to Plato that later would the name historic of platonism medium , presents no concordance strict between its various representatives. Thus, for example, Eudoro of Alexandria, Numenio of Apamea, Following of Gerasa and Moderato of Cadiz, presented many elements of platonism pitagorizante. However, can be identified some common ground between these authors, such as: (a) the objective of systematizing the Platonic philosophy, a revitalization of the intuition platonic of transcendence that leaves view in the central place assigned to the intellect quasi-divine-divine; (b) the assimilation to God as end of the man, who comes to replace the ethical ideal of the stoic of live according to the nature; (c) a model of virtue founded in the domain of the passions, in opposition to the radical apathéia stoic that tends to the elimination of the same; (d) a hierarchy of the reality expressed in the admission of different levels of the divine, in order to fill the gap between what intelligible and The sensitivity. The latter interest to our work, which seeks noted the influence of Basílides with their notion of filiedad in the hierarchy numeniana of the divine reality, as well as the relationship between the theory basilidiana appendices and ethics of Numenio.

Spanish Version

LA PRESENCIA DE BASÍLIDES EN NUMENIO DE APAMEA

Juan Carlos Alby

Resumen

En el proceso de re-dogmatización del platonismo emprendido por Antíoco de Ascalón en

la segunda mitad del siglo I a. C. y continuado hasta el final del siglo II d. C. por autores

como Eudoro, Numenio, Plutarco, Albino, Ático y Alcinoo ─autor del Didascalicus─,

entre otros, intervinieron numerosos elementos procedentes del pitagorismo, estoicismo y

aristotelismo, a punto tal que esta manera de entender a Platón que más tarde recibiría la

denominación historiográfica de “platonismo medio”, no presenta concordancia estricta

entre sus distintos representantes. Así, por ejemplo, Eudoro de Alejandría, Numenio de

Apamea, Nicómaco de Gerasa y Moderato de Cadiz, presentan muchos elementos del

platonismo pitagorizante. No obstante, pueden señalarse algunos aspectos comunes entre

estos autores, tales como: a) el objetivo de sistematizar la filosofía platónica, una

revitalización de la intuición platónica de la trascendencia que se deja ver en el lugar

central asignado al intelecto demiúrgico-divino; b) la “asimilación a Dios” como fin del

hombre, que viene a sustituir el ideal ético de los estoicos de vivir conforme a la naturaleza;

c) un modelo de virtud fundado en el dominio de las pasiones, en oposición a la radical

apathéia estoica que propende a la eliminación de las mismas; d) una jerarquización de la

realidad expresada en la admisión de distintos niveles de lo divino, en orden a colmar la

brecha existente entre lo inteligible y lo sensible. Este último aspecto interesa para nuestro

trabajo, que intenta señalar la influencia de Basílides con su noción de “filiedad” en la

jerarquía numeniana de la realidad divina, así como también la relación entre la teoría

basilidiana de los “apéndices” y la ética de Numenio.

LA PRESENCIA DE BASÍLIDES EN NUMENIO DE APAMEA

Juan Carlos Alby

UNL-UCSF

Introducción

La contribución de Francisco García Bazán al conocimiento de Numenio de

Apamea en lengua española es invalorable, pues, como él mismo lo señala, al momento de

la edición de su traducción de los fragmentos del Apameo1 sólo se conocían al respecto dos

estudios en castellano2, además de las citas de A. Orbe en sus monumentales Estudios

Valentinianos.3

En el proceso de re-dogmatización del platonismo emprendido por Antíoco de

Ascalón en la segunda mitad del siglo I a. C. y continuado hasta el final del siglo II d. C.

por autores como Eudoro, Numenio, Plutarco, Albino, Ático y Alcinoo ─autor del

Didascalicus─, entre otros, intervinieron numerosos elementos procedentes del

pitagorismo, estoicismo y aristotelismo, a punto tal que esta manera de entender a Platón

que más tarde recibiría la denominación historiográfica de “platonismo medio”4, no

presenta concordancia estricta entre sus distintos representantes. Así, por ejemplo, Eudoro

de Alejandría, Numenio de Apamea, Nicómaco de Gerasa y Moderato de Cadiz, presentan

muchos elementos del platonismo pitagorizante. No obstante, pueden señalarse algunos

aspectos comunes entre estos autores, tales como: a) el objetivo de sistematizar la filosofía

platónica, una revitalización de la intuición platónica de la trascendencia que se deja ver en

                                                            1 Oráculos caldeos con una selección de testimonios de Proclo, Pselo y M. Itálico. Numenio de Apamea. Fragmentos y testimonios. Introducciones, traducciones y notas de Francisco García Bazán, Madrid, Biblioteca clásica Gredos, 1991.

2 HERRÁN, Carlos, M., “El conocimiento místico según Numenio de Apamea”, en Cuadernos de Filosofía, XIII/19 (1973), 23-27; LISI, Francisco L., “Niveles de la divinidad en Numenio de Apamea”, en Cuadernos de Filosofía, XVII/26-27 (1977), 111-130. Cfr. GARCÍA BAZÁN, F., op. cit., pp. 223 y 227.

3 Véase ORBE, Antonio, Hacia la primera teología de la procesión del Verbo. Estudios Valentinianos, Vol I/1, Roma, Analecta Gregoriana, 1958, p. 66, n. 38, p. 420; ID., En los albores de la exégesis iohannea. Estudios valentinianos, Vol. I//2, Roma, Analecta Gregoriana, 1955, p. 273; ID., La teología del Espíritu Santo. Estudios Valentinianos, Vol. IV, Roma, Analecta Gregoriana, 1996, p. 290; ID., “Los ´apéndices´ de Basílides”, I y II, en Gregorianum, 57 (1976), pp. 81-107 y 251-284.

4  Término acuñado por Karl Praechter en su estudio “Die Philosophie des Altertums”, en F. Überweg, Grundriss der Geschichte des Philosophie, Band 1, Berlin, 1909, p. 524.

el lugar central asignado al intelecto demiúrgico-divino; b) la “asimilación a Dios” como

fin del hombre, que viene a sustituir el ideal ético de los estoicos de vivir conforme a la

naturaleza; c) un modelo de virtud fundado en el dominio de las pasiones, en oposición a la

radical apathéia estoica que propende a la eliminación de las mismas; d) una jerarquización

de la realidad expresada en la admisión de distintos niveles de lo divino, en orden a colmar

la brecha existente entre lo inteligible y lo sensible.5

Este último aspecto interesa para nuestro trabajo, que intenta señalar la influencia de

Basílides con su noción de “filiedad” en la jerarquía numeniana de la realidad divina, así

como también la relación entre la teoría basilidiana de los “apéndices” y la ética de

Numenio.

1. La teología de Numenio

Anterior a Plotino, Numenio el Pitagórico era leído por el gran Neoplatónico

durante sus clases en Roma, a punto tal que llegó incluso a afirmarse que Plotino plagiaba a

Numenio, acusación desestimada por Amelio, profundo conocedor de los trabajos del

Apameo.6

Numenio sostenía un dualismo estricto entre Dios y la materia y, a pesar de

inscribirse en el platonismo pitagorizante preplotiniano, su interpretación de las relaciones

de Dios con el mundo se apoya en los “tres reyes” o “dioses” de la Carta II platónica:

“Sócrates establecía tres dioses y filosofaba sobre ellos de acuerdo a la manera de ser que conviene a cada uno.”7

En esta interpretación no tiene en cuenta al Parménides, cuya exégesis resultará

fundamental más tarde, especialmente a partir de Plotino.

                                                            5 Cfr. FERRARI, Franco, “La filiación en la teología medioplatónica”, en: AYÁN CALVO, Juan José, DE NAVASCUÉS BENLLOCH, Patricio, AROZTEGUI ESNAOLA, Manuel (editores), Filiaición. Cultura pagana, religión de Israel, orígenes del cristianismo, Madrid, Trotta, 2005, p. 57.

6 Cfr. GARCÍA BAZÁN, F. ibidem., p. 218.

7 NUMENIO, Sobre el divorcio de los académicos de Platón, fr. 24, 51-53, p. 257. Cfr. PLATÓN, Carta II, 312e 1-3:”En torno al Rey de todas las cosas está todo, por él todo existe y es causa de todo lo bello; en torno al Segundo, las cosas segundas, y en torno al Tercero, las terceras.”

En su concepción del Dios primero, Numenio deja ver una mayor influencia de los

Oráculos caldeos y de la Sigé de los gnósticos que del Uno/Bien “más allá de la esencia y

del conocimiento”, principio supremo de las “doctrinas secretas” de Platón que alcanzaron

notable trascendencia entre estos pensadores.8 En efecto, el Dios primero numeniano es

considerado como Intelecto vacío, aperceptivo, poder generador y sustentador de un

pensamiento creador:

“El Dios primero es inactivo respecto de toda obra”9

También se aprecia la influencia del Oráculo 7 cuya segunda parte Numenio cita

literalmente en otro fragmento, identificando su sentido con el demiurgo del Timeo.

“Puesto que Platón sabía que entre los hombres sólo el demiurgo es conocido… por esto habló igual que la persona que se expresara así: ´Hombres, aquel que vosotros conjeturáis el intelecto no es Primero, sino que anterior a él hay un Intelecto más antiguo y más divino´.”10

El conocido pasaje de Platón a partir de cuya exégesis surgieron notables

variaciones teóricas respecto de las jerarquías teológicas en el ambiente intelectual

medioplatónico, dice:

“Ahora bien, hallar al creador y padre (poihthvn kaiV patevra) de este universo es ya una tarea, y habiéndolo hallado es imposible anunciarlo a todos.”11

Numenio invierte intencionadamente el orden que aparece en el texto, escribiendo

patevra kaiV poihthvn, refiriéndose así al primer Dios como “Padre” y al segundo como

“artífice”, ganándose el reproche de Proclo por expresarse en sentido trágico:

“Porque Numenio habiendo proclamado tres dioses llama al Primero ´Padre´, ´Demiurgo´ al segundo y al tercero ´Producto´ (poihvma), ya que según él el mundo es el tercer Dios; de esta manera su demiurgo es doble; es el primer dios y el segundo, y lo creado es el tercero. Porque es mejor hablar así que decir ─en su opinión con exageración y énfasis trágico─ ´abuelo´, ´hijo´ y ´nieto´. Ahora

                                                            8 Cfr. el fr. 23, Sobre los secretos de Platón, 650c-651a 19, p. 254.

9 Fr. 12, p. 245. Cfr. Oráculo 5: “…Pues lo Primero, Fuego trascendente, no encierra su potencia en la materia por sus operaciones, sino a causa del Intelecto. Porque el artesano del cosmos ígneo es un intelecto de Intelecto.”, p. 57.

10 Fr. 17, p. 250; cfr. Oráculo 7: “Pues el Padre ha concluido todas las cosas y las ha entregado al Intelecto segundo (el demiurgo), al que vosotros llamáis primero, en la medida en que pertenecéis a la raza humana.”, p. 58. El mencionado oráculo denuncia aquí el error de los hombres en reconocer al demiurgo o Intelecto segundo como agente principal del universo.

11 PLATÓN, Timeo 28 c 3-5.

bien, quien habla así cuenta incorrectamente al Bien entre las causas mencionadas, ya que no es propio del Bien aparearse con nadie, ni ser en el orden segundo respecto de otro.”12

Su caracterización de la absoluta anterioridad de Dios se corresponde con el

“Silencio” del “seno del Padre”, o Proténnoia que permanece junto al Padre según los

valentinianos, así como con la “Filiedad sutil” de Basílides, de quien puede haberle llegado

con preferencia a Numenio el influjo de los gnósticos. Según los basilidianos de Hipólito13,

de un sperma primordial lanzado fuera de sí por el Trascendente, se fueron separando en

orden de dignidad las sustancias que habrían de integrar el mundo creado. Resulta central

en esta cosmogonía la noción de “filiedad” (uJiovthò), que expresa la consustancialidad con

la naturaleza divina. Se trata de un concepto específicamente cristiano que no aparece antes

de Basílides, ni en el griego clásico, ni en el helenístico y el cristiano.14 El tratado

basilidiano concibe tres modos de filiedad que, en conjunto, expresan la voluntad de Dios

de alzarse desde la “panspermia” para llevar consigo hasta lo divino trascendente o “Dios-

que-no-es” la totalidad de los seres bajo su dominio. La primera consiste en la filiedad de

“lo que hay de más sutil”, el Unigénito, que una vez separada del germen del mundo se alzó

rápidamente como “ala o pensamiento”, encumbrándose hasta Dios. Esta primera filiedad

designa la plenitud de todos los surgidos del germen cósmico. La segunda es llamada “lo

que hay de más espeso” y representa la función soteriológica dotada de mivmhsiò,

capacidad que resulta insuficiente para reunirse en lo divino trascendente. La tercera

filiedad, por su parte, es designada como “lo que tiene necesidad de purificación” y se

identifica con la filiedad “abandonada en la fealdad”, a saber, el cuerpo carnal. Caracteriza

la situación de este cosmos en el que viven mezclados los gnósticos ─”los hombres de la

tercera filiedad”─ y aquellos que no lo son, es decir, “las almas de este espacio de abajo”.

Entre la primera filiedad basilidiana y el primer Dios de Numenio se advierte

similitud, en cambio, las nociones numenianas del segundo y tercer Dios no revelan

influencia gnóstica.

                                                            12 Fr. 21, Sobre el Bien, p. 252s.; cfr. PROCLO, In Timmaeum I, 303, 27.

13 Cfr. HIPÓLITO, Refutaciones (en adelante: Ref.) VII, 22, 9-16.

14 Cfr. TARDIEU, Michel, “Las filiaciones basilidianas o el horror al vacío”, en: AYÁN CALVO, J. J., DE NAVASCUÉS BENLLOCH, P., AROZTEGUI ESNAOLA, M., op. cit. I, Madrid, Trotta, 2005, pp. 337-351 (aquí: p. 348).

2. La ética de Numenio

En su escrito Sobre el alma parásita, Isidoro, hijo y discípulo de Basílides, se hace

eco de la doctrina de su padre según la cual, al alma racional se le adhiere en virtud de una

culpa un alma aditicia que la induce al mal. Según Clemente, con su doctrina sobre las dos

almas Isidoro procedía “igual que los pitagóricos”.15 En una ocasión, Porfirio identifica a

Numenio entre aquellos que hablan de dos almas:

“Otros, empero, y entre ellos también Numenio, no atribuyen tres partes a un alma única, o al menos dos, racional e irracional, sino que piensan que tenemos dos almas (como también otras cosas), la racional y la irracional.”16

En otra parte, el mismo Porfirio se refiere a los que sostienen una dualidad de almas,

pero sin mencionar específicamente a Numenio:

“Porque ni siquiera los que dicen que tenemos dos almas nos han concedido dos capacidades de atención…”17

La teoría del alma parásita sostenida por el basilidiano Isidoro no se encuentra en la

línea del hermetismo egipcio descrita por Jámblico18, sino más cercana a la de los

pitagóricos Numenio y Cronio. Así lo atestigua Jámblico:

“Por su parte otros, estando en desacuerdo con los anteriores (Ático y Plutarco), agregan de algún modo el mal al alma a partir de apéndices venidos de afuera19: según Numenio y Cronio frecuentemente de la materia; en ocasiones de los cuerpos mismos también, según Harpocración, y de la naturaleza y del alma racional, según Plotino y Porfirio”20

                                                            15 Cfr. CLEMENTE de ALEJANDRÍA, Strómata II, 20, 113, 2-114, 2.

16 Fr. 44, p. 289.

17 PORFIRIO, Sobre la abstinencia I, 40; versión española con traducción, introducción y notas de Miguel Periago Lorente, Madrid, Gredos, 1984, p. 67.

18 “Pues bien, dices que ´la mayoría de los egipcios hacen depender nuestro libre albedrío de los movimientos de los astros´ (Carta a Anebo II 13a). Cómo es, debe explicársete más extensamente partiendo de las concepciones herméticas. El hombre, según afirman estos escritos tiene dos almas: una derivada del primer inteligible, que participa también del poder del demiurgo, la otra, en cambio, engendrada a partir del movimiento de los cuerpos celestes, en la cual penetra el alma que contempla a la divinidad.” Sobre los misterios egipcios VIII, 6; versión española con introducción, traducción y notas de Enrique A. Ramos Jurado, Madrid, Gredos, 1997, p. 209.

19 Para este tema véase ORBE, A., “Los ´apéndices´ de Basílides” (Ver n.3).

20 Fr. 43, p. 288s.

Según Numenio, entonces, el alma racional se mantendría siempre en el bien, pero

se ve arrastrada hacia el mal por algo que le viene de afuera, esto es, el “alma de la

materia”, de índole irracional.

La psicología numeniana inspirará a Calcidio, quien hablará de dos almas

antagónicas en el hombre: la racional y la sivestre (o simplemente silva, “materia”), a la

que llamará stirpea anima, porque anima no sólo a los vegetales, sino también a los

irracionales.21

Consideraciones finales

Si Numenio floreció en la primera mitad del siglo II22, entonces fue contemporáneo

de Basílides. Este hecho aporta un dato significativo en orden a sostener la tesis de la

influencia del gran gnóstico sobre el pensamiento del Apameo. En su teología, Numenio se

encuentra más cercano a la tesis platónica de un solo Demiurgo orientado simultáneamente

a las Ideas y a la materia que a la dualidad valentiniana entre el Dios Bueno y el Demiurgo

psíquico. No obstante, su noción del Primer Dios muestra elementos comunes con la

primera filiedad de Basílides. Asimismo, la ética del basilidiano Isidoro revela puntos de

contacto con la teoría numeniana del alma procedente de la materia.

Estos aspectos hablan en favor de las constantes y profundas relaciones entre el

pensamiento cristiano de los gnósticos y la filosofía de su tiempo y, aunque su talante

filosófico fuera cuestionado por los grandes neoplatónicos, jamás fue puesto en duda.

                                                            21 Cfr. CALCIDIO, In Timmaeum c. 31; ver ORBE, A., op. cit., p. 101s.

22 Cfr. GARCÍA BAZÁN, F., idem, p. 197; ORBE, A., ibídem, p. 100.

Anna Gierlińska

Jagiellonian University in Cracov,

Department of Philosophy

PhD student

The principle of Infinity in Proclus` philosophy and its religious

sources

The problem of principles – peras and apeiria is one of the most significant

in Proclus` philosophy and it is strictly connected with the understanding of

the One in his thought. Particularly interesting in this case is an issue of the

principle of Infinity, especially because of the fact, that Proclus` approach to

the problem differs form his predecessors in the key aspects.

In my paper I would like to put the light on the Proclus` conception of the

principle of Infinity in context of Pythagoreian thought and Plato’s agrapha

dogmata. I would also like to show some religious influences on Proclus’

conception of Infinity namely the Chaldean Oracles. I would try to examine a

hypothesis about the influence of the feminine principle in Chaldean Oracles

– identified sometimes with Hecate – on the Proclus’ philosophy of peras and

apeiria.

Paper Abstract

Dr Bilal Bas, PhD (McGill University)

Research Fellow,

Marmara University, Faculty of Theology,

Istanbul, Turkey

bilalbas@hotmail.com

Tel. 0090 530 9323487

Platonic Elements in Athanasius of Alexandria’s Doctrine of Salvation

Athanasius is among the most influential theologians of early church history, especially owing

to his championship of Nicene orthodoxy against Arianism in the fourth century. Arguably

the most important component of his theology is his doctrine of salvation, according to which

the saving reality of the incarnation is the key event of the entire salvation history. In his De

incanatione verbi dei, he reconstructs his doctrine of salvation in the context of creation and

salvation. As a matter of fact, De incanatione presents a profound exposition of the doctrine

of the incarnation as well as the central doctrines of Athanasian theology including creation,

the fall, the doctrine of man (theological anthropology), the problem of evil, resurrection, and

reconciliation in a salvation-historical/heilsgeschichte setting. He and other defenders of the

Nicene formula held the principles that salvation of human beings could only be achieved by

the one who created the universe and that the creator of the universe and the redeemer of

humanity himself had to be divine and not a creature. Athanasius thus interpreted the Nicene

formula as a cosmological and soteriological creed simultaneously. As a prominent

representative of the Alexandrian tradition, Athanasius’s soteriology contains important

Platonic presuppositions in shaping the Biblical notion of salvation history. It is the aim of

this paper to shed light on this Platonic elements in Athanasius’s soteriology.

Mark Brouwer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, IN 46112

brouwerm@wabash.edu

Submission for the ISNS conference in Haifa, March 22-24, 2011

“Courage and Free-Speech in Plato's Laches”

Abstract

Plato’s aporetic dialogue on courage, the Laches, presents interpreters with one central problem:

Why is the entire first half of the dialogue devoted to something other than courage? Or again:

What is the elaborate dramatic frame doing for Plato’s consideration of courage? After briefly

surveying the main solutions to this problem in the secondary literature (e.g., Schmid 1992,

Dorion 1994), this paper will argue that three key references to παρρησία (frankness or speaking

freely) at the beginning and end of the dramatic frame indicate a novel solution to the problem.

Frankness or freedom of speech, παρρησία, and the freedom to do what one wants, ἐλευθερία,

are—for Plato and Aristotle—crucial features of Athenian democracy; both are featured

prominently in the dramatic frame of the Laches. By interpreting Plato’s use of freedom of

speech and action in the first half of the Laches, I will show that the problem of why good men

have bad sons, the problem of the transmission of excellence, is the dramatic frame of Plato’s

discussion of courage. With support from a passage in Plato’s Meno (89e – 95a)—where four

characters from the Laches serve as central examples—I will conclude that manly courage, for

Plato, must be distinguished from the democratic courage to speak one’s mind, the courage of

sincerity. True courage is indeed political, but it is the manly courage that strives for the

harmonization of word and deed, the courage to do what you say, and the courage to act through

political discourse. Democratic equality deprives young men of the exceptionally good models,

the truly good and noble men of Athens, they must imitate to become virtuous. Democratic

equality devalues the great words and deeds of our fathers, transforming their virtue of courage

into mere sincerity. The failure to transmit true political courage from father to son is the frame

through which Plato’s Laches forces us to reconsider courage in light of democratic equality.

Dr. David D. Butorac Assistant Professor, Fatih University (Istanbul) Fatih Üniversitesi 34500 Büyükçekmece İstanbul, Turkey davidbutorac@gmail.com The order of nature and ascent to science in Athenian Neoplatonism

‘Following, then, the order of nature, let us begin with the principles which come first.’, Aristotle, Poetics

In a hand full of places in the Aristotelian corpus, Aristotle employs the distinction between things better known to us and things known by nature or in themselves (eg. Posterior Analytics 71b32; Prior Analytics 68b35-7; Physics A.1, 184a16-20; Metaphysics Z.3, 1029b3-12; Topics Z.4, 141b2-142a12). This concept was developed, in short, as a means to explain how the soul can move from the bare experience of the sensible world to a knowledge of the intelligible causes of things and of the principles of their respective sciences.

This concept is, not surprisingly, not used in the Epicureans, Stoics or the Sceptics, but neither is it used in the works of the early Neoplatonists (Plotinus, Iamblichus and Porphyry). However, it reappears in Syrianus’ Metaphysics commentary (eg. in meta 55, 36–56, 12.), in Proclus’ Parmenides commentary (eg. in parm 1006, 22–27, 1007, 3–7) and in his Euclid Elements commentary (eg. in eucl 8, 4–8 and in general, ibid. 18–19 and 31–32) and in Damasicus’ work (eg. in phil ß 68). The aim of this paper will be to determine why this concept reappears in later Athenian Neoplatonism and the effect it had on that system.

To accomplish this, I will briefly illustrate this concept’s role in the Aristotelian philosophy (both in Aristotle and Alexander). I will then examine why the early Neoplatonists abandoned this specific concept and then how they filled philosophical gap left by its absence. I will then move to a consideration of Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius’ reemployment of this concept again. (Where illuminative, I shall employ Ammonius, Hermeias, Elias and Philoponus.)

The reappearance of this concept cannot be completely due to the reading of Aristotle, for the early Neoplatonists either implicitly used much of Aristotle’s system (Plotinus) or flatly tried to reconcile them (Porphyry). My working hypothesis is that this later usage of this concept is due to a deepening reflection on the implications of the descended soul for science, which, although fully descended, must nonetheless begin ‘from above’ if science is to be achieved. The later Neoplatonists had to, like Aristotle before them, provide a simple technical ladder that showed how the soul, beginning from objects more familiar to it, can nonetheless move from these to a consideration of universals which are both causal of those objects and which are more knowable in themselves.

Carmen Angela Cvetkovic University of Aarhus, Denmark cac@teo.au.dk Panel: Platonism and Christianity in Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages Paper title: Conversion and Neoplatonism in Augustine’s Confessions and the Cassiciacum Dialogues This paper reassesses the role played by the reading of the libri Platonicorum in Augustine’s conversion. While, since Courcelle mainly, the scholarly claims that Augustine converted to Platonism rather than to Christianity have been put to rest, there is still ongoing disagreement with regard to the predominant element in the synthesis of Christianity and Platonism, which most likely experience at the time of his conversion. This paper explores this problem by focusing on the dialogues written by Augustine during his retreat at Cassiciacum in the wake of his conversion and at the same time takes in consideration the crucial accounts regarding Augustine’s encounter with Platonism from Confessions book 7.

Liberté et Providence, dans le Commentaire sur Epictète de Simplicius par jmcharrue@free.fr

Institut saint-Pierre de Brunoy (91) France

Simplicius, dans le Commentaire sur Epictète, part de l’opposition de « ce qui dépend de nous » et de « ce qui ne dépend pas de nous », pour dans le livre I, 57-6221, lorsqu’il commence par son approche ontologique, par le faire dépendre de l’âme et du choix délibéré. Il repousse l’influence du hasard, puis de la nécessité du besoin et de l’objet, ou encore de notre disposition. L’influence de l’astrologie, s’expliquerait par une sorte d’harmonie des indices :l’âme reste maîtresse de ses choix délibérés et du choix de vie. Dans les lemmes XXXVIII, et Xl 2, il distingue la providence de la fatalité, et ayant établi l’existence des dieux, note que leur providence s’étend sur tout, contrairement à ceux qui prétendent qu’ils n’ont pas soin des hommes : cela ne se peut ni par ignorance ni par négligence, que les méchants ne » sauraient être heureux, ni les bons malheureux, puisque le bonheur est intérieur et dépend de nous , car la divinité a soin des âmes.

Le lemme XXXV3 évoque, au début la cosmogonie manichéenne, puis récuse le dualisme des deux principes du bien et du mal. Dans la suite qui n’est pas sans rappeler Proclus4, le mal ne peut être une substance seulement un accident, une privation, car l’action ne se fait que pour le Bien, pour lequel la providence a créé. Le choix dépend de nous, de notre âme. Epictète disait qu’on ne met pas un but pour le manquer : le mal n’a pas d’existence dans le monde. .

1 Simplicius, Commentaire sur le manuel d’Epictete, tr. I Hadot, Paris, 2003, p. 9-31. 2 Simplicius, On Epictetus, Hanbook 27-53 , Duckworth, London, 2002, p. 75-82, et 89-91. 3 Simplicius, op. cit. , p. 37-51. 4 Proclus , Trois Etudes sur la Providence, III, De l’existence du mal. tr. D. Isaac, Paris, 1982.

Abstract Why does Simplicius comments Epiktet ? Because he was a model for education, concerning this freedom for the condamned, whom he could sense solidarity with . Near that more theoretical freedom, in the Discourse IV, the Handbook had also more practical calling, saying “among things which exist , there is some of them which are up to us, others which are not up to us” (I, 1), overcomming so the quarrel of the compatibilism with the determinism, ensuring men an essential place. To stress the prohairesis, the deliberate choice, marked this entrance in the freedom that Simplicius might estimate, in that treatise I, “freedom was in school”, but it was the school of life. Against those who believes in chance, in that treatise I, he could send back to external circumstances and speak about which is up to us, even if that exists, he says, more is that goddess, Tuché. Against the excessive dependance , he recognized, as Epiktet did, the corporeal needs. Should we be fascinated by the objects of desire? Sensations which give them birth, he says, in the Commentary of the Aristotle’s treatise On Soul, is in harmony with the world. Follow one nature ( οἰκεῖον ) ? He saw , such as some modern commentator, an objective, and subjective oikeiôsis, to give endless, the last word to the soul which chooses. Astrologers? They were too, in harmony, which explains sometimes the aptness of their predictions; but they are signs, not causes. In theTreatise 38, on commentary on Handbook 31, the presence of what is called the”tetralemma”: God doesn’t neglect men by ignorance, or he cannot because their smallness, or their greatness, or he doesn’t want to preserve his pleasures, or by contempt, seems parallel with the Alexander ‘s treatise On Providence, three centuries ago, now translated from the arabic, inspire him, and also on other points, without sharing all his solutions . God takes care of the world, such as the general, or the house-bursar –examples taken by Alexander- he lets somebody free in his will of what is up to us, and demonstrates that such as the legislator, he doesn’t abandon his own, the men are not softened by presents, and go on to exercise a providence which is apt to reward and punish. The treatise35, on commentary on Handbook 27, shows there is no badness in the cosmos. Simplicius attacks, for a long time, the manichaeism that he manifests a great knowledge: the monster with his five heads, the fight between light and darkness, are in coptic Kephalaia, the twelve pillars which show the hours look like a passage in a sogdian treatise of Berlin. Goodness and Badness cannot be these two principles, even if man uses , such as the Kephalaon 2, the biblical parabol of two trees. Badness is nature? accident? privation? Counter-nature? weakness and corruption, solutions which move closer of the Proclus’ treatise, On the existence of badness, in the Tria Opuscula. But Simplicius has his own solutions: it is as the archer who fails his goal, and more than Alexander, providence must exercise in the sublunar areas, keeping the” which is up to us , because it is an internal motion of the soul”.

“La cuestión del Logos en el Comentario al Evangelio de Juan de Orígenes:

Implicancias cosmológicas y místicas”

Patricia Andrea Ciner

Universidad Nacional de San Juan-Universidad Católica de Cuyo

Antonio Orbe, en su ya clásica obra En los Albores de la Exegesis Iohannea, destacó la

importancia de los dos primeros libros del Comentario al Evangelio de Juan, escribiendo

que: “los dos han de situarse dentro de la doctrina más pura y significativa de Orígenes”.

También el gran especialista francés Henri Crouzel, ha afirmado que este texto puede ser

considerado como “la obra maestra de Orígenes”. En esta ocasión profundizaremos en uno

de los temas más complejos de la teología cristiana: la cuestión del Logos y sus

implicancias cosmológicas y místicas. El lenguaje de Orígenes ofrece distintas expresiones

para nombrar al Hijo. La expresión más usada es la predicativa, llamada epinoetica.

Justamente es en los dos primeros libros del Comentario a Juan en donde, a partir del

prólogo a Juan, se profundiza en la noción de Logos y Sabiduría. ¿Pero qué relación existe

entre el Lovgo" la Sofiva y el Hijo?. Los especialistas han sostenidos dos líneas de

interpretación al respecto: la de Koch, quien en una lectura platónica, filoniana y plotiniana

de Origenes, afirma una primacía del Logos sobre el Hijo y la de Crouzel que restituye al

Lovgo" origeniano su pertenencia a la narración de la Escritura y lo sitúa en el aérea

propia del Hijo. Nuestra investigación continuará con esta misma línea, mostrando como

ambas  1epivvvnoiai  sintetizan la esencia misma del Hijo, pero no como entidades

diferentes, sino como momentos ontológicos del Hijo. Orígenes se alista dentro de la

llamada literatura sapiencial, mostrando como la Sabiduría es la epivvvnoia más antigua

de todas y le cabe por lo tanto ser identificada con la noción de 1archv. Por ser la primera

es la que tiene más “dignidad ontológica” y no es posible advertir en ella ningún tipo de

caída pleromática. Por este motivo Orígenes sostendrá que el cosmos sensible fue

organizado según las líneas directrices de la sabiduría y en ese sentido es bello. Desde la

perspectiva mística sólo una Sabiduría viviente, puede permitir el paso del Logos del

principio al Logos hecho carne. Este Logos viviente, tiene por función recordar a las

criaturas racionales, también encarnadas, que su verdadero destino es retornar al Padre. El

Logos-Dios puede entonces,  revelar a los perfectos (oi2 tevleioi),  los misterios

profundos de Dios que se hallaban escondidos en la Sabiduría.

Personal Information:

Full name: Dra. Patricia Andrea Ciner Academic affiliation: Universidad Nacional de San Juan – Universidad Católica de

Cuyo Current email and postal address: patriciaciner@yahoo.com.ar, Esteban

Echeverría 1006 (sur), Bº Universitario, Capital, San Juan, Number of accompanying persons: uno (1), Miss Berta Levin, DNI 5.670995, Whether a university hotel booking would be required: YES.

PROPOSAL

Pseudo-Dionysius: a border-line character The aim of my paper is to discuss about the identity of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the light

of some recent publications.

My presentation starts discussing about the article of prof. Mazzucchi1. He has proposed to identify

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite with the pagan philosopher Damascius. I'd like to present why I

don't accept Mazzucchi's thesis.

I'd like to exclude any other identification of Dionysius with any pagan Neoplatonists. In his book

Eric Perl has written: “I see no fundamental opposition between Neoplatonism and Christianity, and

hence no need to decide on which side of this supposed disjunction Dionysius belongs”2. I think

that this statement is quite wrong: I'd like to show 1) We have to distinguish Pagan Neoplatonism

from Christian Neoplatonism; 2)Pagan Neoplatonism is not compatible with Christianity 2) we

have to decide whom Dionysius belongs.

So, I accept the judgment of Beirwaltes3 about Dionysius “Christianus simulque vere Platonicus”

and like him is necessary to specify in which way. I'll discuss the opinion of C. Schafer. He propose

the metaphor of “baptising” Neoplatonism instead of “churching” it4 . The link between Saint Paul

and Dionysius will help to clarify these points.

The last part is dedicated to the connection between theology and philosophy in Dionysius.

Contemporary scholars regret about the fact that most of publication about Dionysius is interested

only in his theology overlooking his philosophy. I'd like to show a brief example: ineffability of

God is a real philosophical issue and even analytical philosophers are engaged in it5.

1 Mazzucchi C.M. , Damascio, autore del Corpus Dionysiacum, in Aevum 80 (2006), pp. 299-334. 2 PERL E., Theophany. The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, New York 2007. 3 Beierwaltes W., Platonismus im Christentum, Frankfurt am Main 2001. 4 SCHÄFER C., The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, Leiden-Boston 2006. 5 Alston W.P., Ineffability, in The Philosophical Review, 4/65(1956), pp.506-522.

GIOACCHINO CURIELLO PH.D CANDIDATE AT UNIVERSITY OF PARMA (ITALY) GIOACCHINO.CURIELLO@STUDENTI.UNIPR.IT 24th March, 2011

Gabriel Danzig <danzigg@mail.biu.ac.il> Intuitive and Discoursive Reasoning in Maimonides and Hallevi While the Neoplatonic background of Medieval doctrines such as Emanation and Influence are well-known, less attention has been given to the dependence of Medieval psychology on Neoplatonism. In this paper I explore the influence of the distinction between intuitive reason (nous) and discoursive reason (to logismon or dianoia) on the writings of Maimonides and Hallevi. These doctrines came to the attention of Medieval thinkers through the edited compilation of excerpts from Plsotinus known as the Theology of Aristotle. In this work, nous is described especially active when disembodied. "When the soul enters bodies she does not see things as she saw them formerly when she was disembodied, so she is bewildered and confused and full of cares and anxieties. She therefore grows weak and takes refuge in thought and reasoning (logismon). For thought is the deficiency of mind, because mind is defective and imperfect when it needs reasoning and thought." (Dicta Sapienta Graeci II, HSL 37.) DIscoursive reasoning requires more effort than direct intuitive intellectual apprehension: "she used to perceive things there with the slightest of efforts, and here she perceives them only with toil and difficulty." (Badawi 102, 3-4; HSL 75.) This distinction was transformed into religious terminology and was used to solve some of the pressing religious questions, such as the problem of providence. For these thinkers, intuitive intellectual activity is the state of the angels and prophets, and the goal of human intellectual effort. For those who reach such a level, both theoretical and practical difficulties are solved. For this reason, Maimonides is able to claim that providence is a function of the intellect (aql). Since the possession of the intuitive intellect solves both practical and theoretical difficulties its possessor will experience felicity. On the other hand, since few if any can achieve or retain such a level of intellectual apprehension, the suffering of mortals is justified.

Socrates in “Phaedo” and the Image of Martyr in Hagiography

(Concerning the Typological Comparison)

(Abstract)

Byzantine ecclesiastical literature, Christian theology and philosophy should be considered in

relationship with Platonism. The attitude of Plato’s philosophical teaching to Christianity is one

of the main subjects to be researched by scholars even today.

In many researchers’ and thinkers’ works we find the parallel between Socrates and a Christian

martyr (e. g. J. Manetti, M. Ficino M. Montuori F. Doherty etc.), but nobody has tried to show

and analyze systematically the typological similarity that takes place between Socrates in

“Phaedo” and the main hero of hagiography.

The aim of my paper is to show the typological similarity between Socrates and a Christian

martyr, comparing the character of “Phaedo” with a martyr in hagiography. The research showed

us, that the images of Socrates in Plato’s “Phaedo” and of a Martyr in hagiography have the

same structure and characteristics; the typological similarity between Socrates and a

hagiographic hero is reflected not only in the common features of the characters but also in the

stylistic devices used by the authors.

The typological similarity discussed in my paper is important for three reasons: a) Once more it

shows the close cultural-historical connection between Platonism and Christianity; b) Again it

proves Plato’s creative intuition. The philosopher of V-IV B.C. created the universal image of

the man who had been persecuted for Truth. And this image proved to be acceptable for the

Christian outlook; c) The comparison of Socrates to a hagiographic hero provides some

additional traits for his literary portrait.

Additional Information:

Author: Dr. Irine Darchia (irinedarchia@yahoo.com) , Associate Professor, Deputy head of the

Institute of Classical, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State

University (Georgia)

I would like to take part in all social events planned during the Conference.

Reason and Irrationality: The intersection of Philosophy and Magic in Later Neoplatonism John F. Finamore

Iamblichus (c. 245-c. 325 C.E.) established a major school of Neoplatonism in Syria and is known primarily for transforming Neoplatonic philosophy from the rationalism of Plotinus and Porphyry into a religious/ritualistic magical practice. E. R. Dodds, writing in the middle of the 20th Century, called Iamblichus' On the Mysteries "a manifesto of irrationalism."1 Although there is certainly truth to Dodds' claim that Iamblichus favored an approach to philosophical enlightenment that depended heavily on ritualistic and religious beliefs, there is also much more rationalism in Iamblichus' writings than Dodds gave him credit for. Further, the concept of the "irrational" in Platonism does not begin with Iamblichus but has a long tradition. In this paper I will explore Iamblichus' use of rationalism and irrationalism in his philosophy, especially as it is expressed in his De Mysteriis, and will show how it is part of a larger Platonic tradition. I hope to show that Iamblichus is not any more "irrational" than many of his Platonic predecessors and in many ways is more rational. The use of irrationalism and even what we might call magic begins with Plato himself, who tells us that Socrates listened to a daemon and believed in the inspiration of dreams. Plato himself in the Timaeus argues that the gods placed the liver in the human body to act as a kind of receptacle for divine dreams and divination. Throughout the Middle-Platonic period (roughly the 1st through 3rd Centuries C.E.) Platonists like Plutarch, Apuleius, Numenius, the authors of the Chaldaean Oracles, and others regularly accepted ritual and magic into their philosophies. Moreover, outside of the philosophical schools, learned authors were distinguishing good and bad magic, with the good being characterized as more philosophical. Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana and Heliodorus of Emesa in his novel Aethiopica, two very different works of the 3rd Century, both reflect what must have been a common distinction between two kinds of magic. Apuleius uses a similar distinction in the 2nd Century in his court defense, the Apologia. Iamblichus therefore is exploiting a distinction that already had prominence, but he is carefully and more fully blending magico-religious doctrine with Platonic arguments. The result is not so much a new form of Platonic philosophy as it is a more carefully crafted one. For example, Iamblichus establishes a new hierarchy of gods and other divinities (such as angels and daemons), based on Platonic antecedents. He supports his use of ritual by more meticulously interpreting Plato's myths and imagery. For Iamblichus, it is axiomatic that Plato's doctrines mirror those of the Egyptians and other ancient peoples. The philosophy that Iamblichus espouses therefore made philosophical use of ancient rituals and magical practices, giving them an honored place in a rigorous philosophical system. Iamblichus is therefore in a sense an irrationalist, but so were most of his pagan predecessors and contemporaries. What makes Iamblichean philosophy new and important is not the irrational elements in it, but the way the irrational is blended with Platonism to create a new amalgam, one that is in step with the Platonic tradition that he follows but that creates a new philosophical approach. It is this approach that is adopted by all later Neoplatonists.

1 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951) 287.

Gary Gabor

“Epictetus and Simplicius on what is up to us”

Epictetus in the Enchirdion separates action and ethical reflection into two domains: what is up

to us, and what is not up to us. Throughout, Epictetus encourages his readers to focus only on

what is up to us. However, at Enchiridion 32 an interesting paradox is raised regarding fortune

telling. If the matter concerns something that is not up to us, the philosopher will be indifferent

to whatever advice he receives from the gods. In the case of matters which are up to us,

however, Epictetus’ advice is more pointed. In such cases, Epictetus says, one should have

recourse to divination only in those cases which Socrates thought right: (1) when the entire

enquiry has reference to the outcome, and (2) when no resource is available from reason or any

other technique for understanding the matter. What Epictetus means by these, however, is far

from clear. In this paper, I examine several alternate possibilities, and attempt to identify the

position which Epictetus himself likely held. After providing a provision answer for Epictetus, I

then turn to Simplicius’ account of the problem in his commentary on Ench. 32. There,

Simplicius appears to offer an understanding of (1) and (2) which diverges from that of Epictetus

in several important respects. In particular, he appears to countenance a number of different

scenarios concerning matters up to us, such one’s belief whether the soul is immortal or who one

should take as one’s teacher, which may be referred to the gods without objection.

Gary Gabor Fordham University Philosophy Dept., 441 E. Fordham Rd., Bronx, NY 10458 ggabor@fordham.edu Accompanying persons: 2 (2 adults, 1 child) University Hotel Accommodation: likely

Haud Guéguen, Paris, Cnam, Laboratoire Dicen

« Liberté et nécessité chez Platon et Aristote »

Haîfa 23 mars 2011, Panel « Freedom, Fate and Providence »

Abstract :

I aim to show that Plato and Aristotle defend opposites conceptions of the relation

between liberty, fate and time. Whereas Plato, in the myth of Er, presents liberty as inclusive

and constitutive of necessity and fate, Aristotle goes against this idea, and affirms their

complete incompatibility. Hence, it is also their respective conceptions of the role of time that

differs radically. In Plato’s myth and thought, time – the difference between past, present and

future or the openness of future – has no reality and represents only an appearance. The soul

has consequently to escape its illusion and to access to the timeless dimension of the truth

and, in the mythical language, of the reincarnation’s cycles.

In Aristotle’s philosophy, on the contrary, time and contingency become the positive

and real principles of the action and freedom : if the future was determinate like the present

and the past, the man could not deliberate and take decisions about what he has to do. This is

the explicit lesson of De interpretatione 9, and this is also one of the main aims of

Nichomachean Ethics to show this necessity of an opened time for human action or for what

Aristotle calls the « eph’hèmîn ». Aristotelian’s philosophy proceeds then to a rehabilitation

of time and contingency that is not only physical, but also practical and logical. The time, on

one hand, is thought as opened and founded on a non-symmetrical structure : irreversibility of

past, determination of present and unpredictability of future. And the contingency, on the

other, is stated at two distinct and inseparable levels. First, the internal, active and positive

level of the eph’hèmîn or the prakton or practical dunaton that give the possibility, for a man,

to change the course of the events. Second, the externe, passive and negative level of the

fortune that can both accommodate or impend the action, and that is only the axiologicaly

neutral material of the action. The notions of fate and necessity are consequently conceived as

incompatible with those of eph’hèmîn or prakton, but they are not completely rejected by

Aristotle who restricts them to another field : the poetry or, more precisely, the tragedy where

the dunaton doesn’t mean contingency, but the necessity of the events.

Proposition de contribution au colloque : « Platonism, Freedom, Fate, Providence », Haîfa,

22-24 mars 2011 Haud Guéguen, Docteur en philosophie. Titre de la thèse « La mesure du possible chez

Aristote. Étude de la notion aristotélicienne de δυνατόν » (dir. R. Brague, Paris 1) Prag au Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris.

Tel. : 06 15 42 67 92 Mail : haud01@yahoo.fr

Adresse postale : 9, rue Tolain Paris XXème. Proposition : « Destin, temps et vérité chez Platon et Aristote. »

Chez Platon, la liberté apparaît paradoxalement articulée à la notion de destin. Ainsi,

dans le mythe d’Er, où Platon donne bien à penser quelque chose comme un choix originaire,

celui d’un daimôn et donc de sa vie, ce choix et la liberté qu’il présuppose ne sont pas ceux

qui consisteraient à s’ouvrir une multiplicité de possibles et, donc, à une contingence, mais

procèdent à l’inverse de la détermination d’un destin qui, une fois posé, a valeur de nécessité.

Liberté et destin, loin de s’opposer, s’articulent donc et se présupposent mutuellement. Le

temps, dès lors, n’a pas de valeur propre, et la vérité, définie de façon mythique et donc

immémoriale, apparaît de nature extra-temporelle.

Avec la philosophie d’Aristote, au contraire, on assiste à la dissociation de ce qui chez

Platon se trouvait corrélé : liberté et destin ne s’incluent pas mais s’opposent, et cette

opposition se marque notamment par des rapports au temps et des régimes de vérité distincts.

Notre contribution se propose de confronter ce traitement de la liberté et du destin chez

Aristote et chez Platon, en faisant l’hypothèse que leur différence de traitement se joue

principalement dans la façon dont le temps et la vérité s’y trouvent conçus. Le point focal de

l’analyse résidera plus particulièrement dans la philosophie d’Aristote, où nous chercherons à

mettre au jour deux traitements distincts de cette question : l’un dans lequel la liberté est

affirmée à l’exclusion du destin ; et l’autre dans lequel, c’est le destin qui se trouve affirmé, à

l’exclusion, ou presque, de la liberté.

Via les notions clés de eph’hèmîn, bouleusis et prohairesis, la liberté, d’abord, se

trouve mise au principe de l’action humaine : c’est le plan de ce que nous pouvons faire et

qui, par définition, suppose la possibilité de faire autrement (Éthique à Nicomaque III). Dans

cette sphère pratique, la vérité n’est donc pas une vérité définie de toute éternité (cf.

l’exemple de la bataille navale en De l’interprétation, 9), mais une vérité éminemment

temporelle. La pensée d’Aristote présente néanmoins une figure du destin qui se caractérise

au contraire par un rapport au temps qui n’est plus celui d’une ouverture mais d’une clôture,

et une vérité définie : c’est celle qui se joue au plan poétique à travers l’agencement des faits

(sunthesin tôn pragmatôn, Poétique 6) qui permet au poète tragique de construire ou de

rendre compte d’un destin. En confrontant les traitements platonicien et aristotélicien de la

liberté et du destin, notre objet sera donc de déterminer le sens et les enjeux de ces

déplacements opérés par la philosophie d’Aristote.

Misgav Har-Peled

Department of History, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

Groupe d'Anthropologie historique de l'Occident medieval, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris.

misgavh@gmail.com

12/5 Oppenheimer st. Ramat Aviv, Tel-Aviv, 61650, Israel.

Avoiding the most legitimate meat : Stoicism, Platonism and the Jewish Pork Avoidance

Feldman and Schäfer‘s analysis of thirteen Greco-Roman authors, discussing the issue of Jewish

pork avoidance, collected by Menahem Stern,1 overlooks the philosophical nature of these

writings, as the original authors were either philosophers or deeply influenced by it.2 It is

proposed that negative perceptions of the pork avoidance were influenced by stoicism (Juvenal,

Tacitus, Petronius, Epictetus),3 while positive ones were held by middle or neo-Platonists

(Plutarch, Celsus, Porphyry, Julian and Damascius) . While the Stoics see the pork as the

ultimate legitimate meat,4 Platonists make it into the emblematic animal of impurity.5 This

difference became part of the Stoic-Platonist, and later on the Christian-Platonist debate about

the moral status of the animal, the limits of philanthropia, and universalism.6

                                                            1 Stern, Menahem. Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, 3 vols. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974-1984. 2 Feldman, Louis H. “The Attack on the Jewish Dietary Laws.” In Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian pp. 167-170. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.; Schäfer, Peter. “Abstinence from Pork,” Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World, pp. 66-81. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1997. 3 Berthelot, Katell. Philanthrôpia Judaica: le débat autour de la “misanthropie” des lois juives dans l’Antiquité, Leiden : Brill, 2003. 4 Chrysippus of Soli and Cleanthes, cf.: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.64.160.; On Moral Ends 5.38; Varro, On Agriculture 2. 4. 9-10; Pliny, Natural History 8.77.208; Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals 3.20; Lactatntius, Divine Institutes 5.17; Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata 7. 5 Cf. Bréchet, Christophe. “La philosophie de Gryllos,” in Les Grecs de l'Antiquité et les animaux. Le cas remarquable de Plutarque, pp. 43-61. Édité par J. Boulogne. Lille, Collection UL3 - Travaux et Recherches, 2005. 6 De Fontenay, Elisabeth. “La philanthropia a l’épreuve des bêtes,” dans L’animal dans l’antiquité, pp. 281-298. Édité par B. Cassin & J.-L. Labarrière, Paris: Vrin, 1997. 

The Eastern Origins of the City of God in Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of 

Soli. 

 

It is the light.  According to Plotinus it is the divine light that makes us 

citizens of the divine city, and Augustine follows him and writes the idea of the 

heavenly city into western history.  But the idea of the heavenly city goes back at 

least to Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Soli, from the East. 

Zeno and Chrysippus teach that there are two legitimate cities: the city of the 

wise, that includes the gods and the wise, and the city of reason that includes the 

gods and all humans.  All humans are bound together under Zeus’ universal law and 

reason that punishes the evil and rewards the good. 

Plotinus adopts the idea of the two cities, but his two cities differ from 

Chrysippus’s.  His two cities follow Plato’s division of the world into the intelligible 

and sensible.   For Plotinus, the sage is a citizen of the heavenly city and has little 

time for the earthly city.  But like the Stoics, the earthly city is the entire cosmos 

because it is all governed by God’s wisdom. 

Augustine too adopts the idea of two cities, but once again transforms it.  

Augustine’s two cities are not divided by their knowledge, but by their wills.  The 

city of God loves God, but the city of the world is defined by its love of self.  So the 

two cities are mutually exclusive, unlike the Stoic cities, in which the gods and the 

sages are citizens of both cities.  For Plotinus too the sage is citizen of both cities, but 

for Plotinus the sage flees the sensible city. 

With Augustine, the break is complete.  The two cities are defined by two 

distinct loves and cannot overlap.  But the Augustinian notion of two cities, so 

definitive of western theology and political theory, had its origins in the East with 

Chrysippus of Soli. 

PLATONIC MODEL OF THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL DOCTRINE

OF DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

The hierarchical structure of reality and the central role of ecclesiastical system in the process of deification are well known features of Dionysius the Areopagite’s thought. The hierarchy, a word that the Areopagite himself coined, is defined by him as “a sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity approximating as closely as possible to the divine. And it is uplifted to the imitation of God in proportion to the enlightenments divinely given to it”.

The ecclesiastical hierarchy is divided into three orders: sacraments, initiators, and initiated. Initiators are then divided into bishops, priests, and deacons, while initiated consist of monks, holy people, and those being purified. It has been argued that, despite Areopagite’s attempt to create tripartite structure of ecclesiastical hierarchy, it is in fact bipartite, consisting of initiators and initiated. Such is, in its root, also the Platonic division in the ideal state, which is actually dyadic, consisting of guardians and producers, i.e., those governing and those being governed. Another similarity stands in Dionysius insistence on the proper function of each ecclesiastical rank, which reflects the Platonic idea of justice, according to which everyone realizes his/her own proper task. Furthermore, it is easy to draw a parallel between Dionysian hierarchs (bishops) and Plato’s philosopher-kings…

This paper will elaborate on the issue of to what extent did actually (Neo-)Platonic writings influence Dionysius’ ecclesiology and what are the similarities and dissimilarities between the two.

Filip Ivanovic

Norwegian University of Science and Technology – Trondheim

Norway

John Chrysotom's Homilia dicta postqam reliquiae martyrum (PG 63:467-72) and the Hazards of Platonic Reminisence

On more than one occasion John Chrysostom (bishop of Constantinople, 398-404 CE) claimed in his preaching that Plato's teachings had vanished from the earth and been "lost in silence." (e.g. Homilia habita postquam presbyter Gothus, PG 63.501). But Constantine Bosinis, reflecting on John Chrysostom's employment of two metaphors from Plato's Phaedrus: the wings of love and the charioteer of the soul in his homiletic output, ("Two Platonic images in the rhetoric of John Chrysostom" Studia Patristica (2006) 433-438), notes that Chyrostostom "repeats verbatim the philosophical axiom of Plato on the higher status of madness" from Phaedrus 244a. at opening of a homily Chrysostom's delivered in the presence of the empress Eudoxia (Homilia dicta postqam reliquiae martyrum, PG 63:467-72). According to the title given in the manuscripts, this followed a nocturnal translation of anonymous relics to a martyrium of the apostle Thomas located some nine roman miles from the city center. Bosinis' description of the reference is exaggerated, but nonetheless the source of the allusion is plain enough. Chrysostom's objection to Plato's liberal use of irony (Hom 4. In Acta apostolorum, PG 60.48) is itself undercut by his own ironic reworking of Plato's paradox of benficial madness for a Christian audience. I will argue that such ironic Platonizing contributed to Chrysotom's deposition and exile at the Synod of the Oak in 403 CE. The ninth century patriarch Photius preserves an account of the otherwise lost acta of the synod (Bibliotheca, cod. 59) in which he reports that the Syrian monk Isaac produced his own libellus of charges, among them that while preaching Chrysostom had claimed the altar (trapeza) to be "full of furies" and that he also had boasted that he was passionately in love (ero, mainomai), and "he should have explained what Furies are and what it means to say 'I am passionately in love,' for these expressions are unknown to the church." Chrysostom's major biographers have followed Photius himself in dismissing such charges as "bizarre" (atopous), but precise correspondances can be found for both examples (for the first: In epistulam ii ad Corinthios (PG 61:381-610; for the second, the spurious Hom 2. In Psalmum 50: PG 55:585 shows that a dedicated imitator found such phrasing unproblematic). Platonizing with respect not just to to its conspicuous irony and paradox, its highly charged and figured language (the "sublimity," to Platono hypsos Chrysostom ordinarily despises, I will conclude that Chrysotom's opening to the homily before the empress cited by Bosinis could have precipitated an similar instance of misunderstanding and the alienation of an audience, like Isaac, unprepared for such tours-de-force. Paul Kimball, pkimball@bilkent.edu.tr

To be holy as an implementation of homoiosis theo (likeness to God) in the philosophy of Philo of

Alexandria and his Greek and Jewish milieu

Philo’s philosophical origin begins with the Plato’s Theaetetus 176b where the latter urges to

become like God. He continues that to become like God menas to become righteous and holy by

wisdom. This passage became of great importance to Middle Platonic and also Neoplatonic

philosophers. In Philo’s philosophy its importance is stressed by its almost direct quotation.

On the one hand the holiest attributes and virtues is a model of moral behaviour and fulfillment of

divine commandments like was stressed in biblical and rabbinic view: „You shall therefore sanctify

yourselves, and you shall be holy, for I am holy“ (Lev 11, 45). We shall not forget that Philo is also

a part of this milieu. On the other hand, the concept of holiness already presupposes a kind of

transcendent and divine entity for human nature. The idea that the man who imitates the virtues of

God can be called by name of God, thus becoming holy and in a way God himself allows to

transcend his humanity, for already Plato urges that „we try to escape from earth to heaven“ (Theaet

176b) and later Plotinus claims that virtues, i.e., cathartic ones, perform purificatory process in

which a person detaches oneself from his body.

Thus the question arises if being a part of two milieu – Jewish and Greek - Philo’s concept of

holiness and becoming like God is simply a fulfilment of human nature like in Aristotle and the

basis of moral and proper behaviour like in biblical and Jewish view or rather endeavour to

transcend the human nature and detach oneself from mundane activities? Or maybe he has found

some compromise trying to reconcile these different attitudes?

1

Numenius of Apamea and the Unruliness of Matter in Proclus on the Timaeus. Proclus holds that matter is not ‘evil’ yet curiously, it is unruly and not simply a

passive hupokeimenon which receives form but at times is destructive and opponent of

form.( His treatment of the narrative of Atlantis documents this ) In his On the

Revolution of the Academics against Plato (fr 24) Numenius clearly labors to strengthen

the link between Pythagoras and Plato.. Numenius doctrine of matter, following Plato’s

Timaeus, as in a disorganized state is identified with the dyad, a Pythagorean principle

par excellence. Though there are two souls, one evil derived from matter and one good

from reason, Numenius is not a complete dualist as reason does not have ultimate

dominion over matter since matter can be recalcitrant. Numenius images of the

helmsmen, his streaming river, ‘infinite and without limit ’(aoristos kai anênutos) (fr. 3

and 4)and ‘axuppopos kai roôdes’ are similar to allusions in Proclus, suggesting that

Numenius sets the precedent for Proclus theory of matter as not evil but recalcitrant and

resistant to form. This view of matter differs from Plotinus, even though Plotinus

borrowed much from Numenius . It is a view in which matter is considered neither ‘bad’

and ‘evil’ or tonally ‘good’ and colonized by form but infinite and greedy to expand

without limits.. In its association with life it is good and accounts for the fecundity of

creation however its erratic expansiveness identifies it as a streaming river potentially

resistant to Intellect. Although for the most part as Tarrant points out, Proclus is critical

of Numenius, it seems he has incorporated the spirit of his view of matter. While the

figures of speech found in Numenius and Proclus can be traced to Statesman’s sea of

dissimilitude’, I will also explore possible connections, as Festugiére and Dillon suggest

to Chaldaean and/or Hermetic influence or to his fellow Syrian: Pherycedes..

2

Ibn Kammūna’s Exposition of Abrahamic Philosophical Piety

Y. Tzvi Langermann

Sa‘d bin Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284) was a Jewish philosopher who worked mainly in Baghdad

and had connections to the Mongol court. His interests in comparative religion and general, mainly

Avicennan, philosophy (with a specialty in theories of the soul and its eternal salvation) are by now

well-known, even if not fully appreciated and contextualized. On the other hand, his pietistic writings,

in which he integrates praxis with theory so as to provide a life strategy that can appeal equally well to

members of all Abrahamic faiths (indeed, to all monotheists), are an important and as yet unstudied part

of his project, and very worthy of our attention.

My paper will focus upon his longest pietistic tract, Kalimāt wajīza mushtamila ‘alā nukat laṭīfa fī

al-‘ilm wa-l-‘amal (Brief words comprising subtle remarks on knowledge and practice), recently

published but never studied. As the title indicates, in this work Ibn Kammūna gives equal weight to

'ilm and 'amal (knowledge and practice); this pairing of terms was widespread among Sufis but by no

means limited to them alone. Ibn Kammuna usually identifies the reader of these tracts as an 'aqil,

literally someone who employs his intellect. Other expressions he uses to describe his audience are

“seeker of perfection” and “seeker of salvation (najat) and perfection.” His appeal to all philosophically

educated monotheists is evident as well in the style of exposition, for example, the many different ways

by which the deity is usually called (First Reality, True Light, Highest Excellency), but hardly ever as

Allāh (as one would expect when writing for a Muslim patron). The breadth of his call is manifest even

in his rare scriptural citations. It is striking that the only Qur'anic verse cited, from the fifty-seventh

sura (“Iron”, verse 3) has, at least for its first part (“He is the first and the last…”), an exact parallel in

both the Hebrew and Christian bibles.

In my paper I will discuss the philosophical underpinnings and moral plea of this unusual tract.

Pythagoras visit to Mt. Carmel in Iamblichus

Pythagoras' education and even origin in Phoenicia goes back to Porphyry who

naturally connects the philosopher with Tyre. In Iamblichus his origin is rather placed

in Sidon. Although the earlier tradition has Pythagoras derive his wisdom from the

Chaldaeans, it is in Neoplatonism that we find the tradition of his Syrian and

Phoenician origins developed. However, Pythagoras alleged journey to Egypt and its

periplous round the ports and holy sites of the eastern Mediterranean became a them

in itself. The earliest tradition is concerned merely with transporting Pythagoras from

Samos to Italy. His free stop-over in Crete with its holy mountains was an early

addition. However the early Neoplatonists attempted to combine the aims of both

traiditions: a periplous round Tyre, Sidon and the Carmel could in their opinion

explain not only how Pythagoras imbibed the mysticism of Egyptian mathematics, but

also his purification in the rites of the mountain deities of Phoenicia. According to

Iamblichus, his visit to the altar on the Carmel summit was said to have been

motivated by the solitude of the site and its propinquity to God.

Al-FÁrÁbÐ on Forms and Intelligibles

Abstract of Proposed Paper for the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies Conference

Yoav Meyrav

In this paper I identify two contrasting positions in Al-FÁrÁbÐ's (c. 870-950) discussions of the relation between

forms and intelligibles and demonstrate how they reflect a gradual and conscious shift away from a Neoplatonic

interpretation of the forms, on both the ontological and epistemological levels. The texts I discuss are the Epistle on

the Intellect (RisÁlah fÐ al-‘Aql), the Governance of Cities (Al-SiyÁsah al-MadanÐyyah), and the Principles of the

Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City (MabÁdi ArÁ’ Ahl al-MadÐnah al-FÁÃilah), with the Philosophy of

Aristotle (Falsafat ArisÔÙÔÁlÐs) functioning as a starting point for the philosophical problems Al-FÁrÁbÐ is concerned

with.

Since there in no certain information about the chronology of Al-FÁrÁbÐ's writings, his thought is rarely

analyzed from a developmental point of view. However, with regard to the texts in question, I believe that a case can

be made for ordering them chronologically in a certain way, since their respective treatments of the forms and the

intelligibles can be shown to reflect a linear progression of thought. In short, while in the Epistle of the Intellect Al-

FÁrÁbÐ presents an overtly Platonic, exaggerated, and inflationary doctrine of forms and intelligibles, in the

Governance of Cities he undertakes a systematic removal of any platonic context from the term "form", as well as a

disassociation between the forms and the intelligibles. The results of this process are assumed – although less

carefully applied – in the Principles. Nevertheless, Al-FÁrÁbÐ manages to maintain some sort of vague presence of

the Platonic Forms within his system, at least on the terminological level, by allowing the separate intellects to be

labeled as forms, but only homonomously. As far as I am aware, this discrepancy in Al- FÁrÁbÐ's thought has yet to

be acknowledged in modern scholarship.

Contact Information: Yoav Meyrav Junior Faculty Member Departments of Philosophy and Hebrew Culture Tel Aviv University E-mail Address: yoav.meyrav@gmail.com Home Address: 10 Ben Yosef St., Ramat Gan 52474, Israel Telephone Number: + 972 77 4420422 Note: I am interested in attending the farewell dinner, and perhaps also in the conference trip to Caesarea.

THE EASTERN INFLUENCE ON THE PORPHYRIAN THOUGHT IN THE PHILOSOPHY FROM ORACLES: MAGIC, DEMONOLOGY, THEURGY.

One of the most obvious works in which there is eastern influence on Porphyrian thought is

the Philosophy from Oracles. Written, probably under the Aurelian empire, to request the cives

romani to embrace the god's cult again, and consequently to keep away from the more intrusive

Christianity, the work highlights very well the transformation of the Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism.

Called a theurgic handbook, the work deals in a particular way with the demonology, magic and

theurgy. Although fragmentary the Philosophy from Oracles treats in the first book a classification

of the god's hierarchy, in the second a complex description of the demons, and in the third an

account of heroes.

From the demons classifications, you can see the Persian influence about the distinction

between the daimones agathourgoi (i.e. good demons) and daimones kakourgoi (i.e. bad demons).

In his work Porphyry dedicates a lot of interest to magic: coming from East, science of the

Persian Magoi, magic becomes one of the most important themes within the Neoplatonism, having

a divine origin and having a direct contact with gods. The symbols, the karaktères put one in contact

with divinity; the magèia becomes wisdom, sophia or better theo-sophia.

Another viewpoint shown in the work is theurgy. Porphyry, maybe for the first time,

indicates a possible way for the purification of the pneumatic soul (qua corporalia rerum capiuntur

imagines [Augustine]), a way open to non-philosophers who cannot purify their intellectual soul

with the practice of philosophy.

In this work you can see Porphyry detaching himself from the intellectualism of his teacher,

changing Neoplatonism from that time on, and introducing the eastern religious syncretism present

not only in the Roman Empire, especially during the second half of the third century, but also in the

culture of the philosopher of Tyre.

GIUSEPPE MUSCOLINO

UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI MACERATA (ITALY)

Giuseppe.muscolino@alice.it

Giuseppe Muscolino, via del castello 5, 98023 Furci Siculo (ME), Italy

I Wish to have a room in the University Hotel

Accompanyng persons: 2 ?

The so-called Plotinian Großschrift (III 8-V 8-V 5-II 9) against the Gnostics: a necessary reevaluation

Ever since Richard Harder wrote his famous article describing his so-called discovery of a new Treatise by Plotinus (“Eine neue Schrift Plotins”, Hermes, 71 (1936), p. 1‐10), it has been the rule to think that what could be called “the Gnostic file” or the “Gnostic disagreement” actually occupied a clearly delimited space in the Plotinian corpus: treatise 30 to 33, which have since been commonly referred to as die Großscrhift (D. Roloff, Die Großschrift III 8-V 8-V 5-II 9, Berlin, Gruyter, 1970), as if the controversy with the Gnostics, save for the odd marginal scuffle, was simply the mark of a single period, among other comparable periods, staking out Plotinus’ intellectual career. The point of view put forth in the following presentation, is quite different. It endeavour to show, on one hand, that Plotinus was familiar with Gnostic doctrines from very early on, even in Alexandria, where these were already flourishing and certainly later in Rome, from the very first moments after he made it the home of his teaching. It assumes, on the other hand, ongoing discussions of some nature with his “Gnostic”—yet Platonizing—friends; discussions which would have been subject, naturally, to the usual high points and low points, and which would have found themselves woven in with other important theoretical debates, but which Plotinus nonetheless never lost sight of. This is why we would suggest to substitute, for the idea of a Großscrhift, that of a Großzyklus, that is, a more subtle concept : the great cycle has decisive roots in Plotinus’ initial writing period (for which we will examine proofs, to be found in treatises 2, 6 and 8, for example), it culminates naturally in the incisive treatise 33, and extends on the other hand into the years that follow Porphyry’s departure, in his treatises 47 and 48, on providence, for example, and especially in Treatise 51, on the source of evils.  

Jean-Marc Narbonne

Faculté de Philosophie, Université Laval (Canada)

Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca

1

Acerca de otro “vínculo objetivo” entre Proclo y Dionisio Areopagita

La dependencia de Dionisio Areopagita respecto del pensamiento metafísico de

Proclo ha sido señalada varias veces en el transcurso de las investigaciones llevadas a

cabo desde hace largo tiempo. Tal dependencia se ha mostrado en el uso de ciertos

vocablos y expresiones que poseen un relieve singular en la filosofía procleana y que,

casi sin modificaciones, aparecen nuevamente en la obra dionisiana. Así H. D. Saffrey

ha forjado la noción de “vínculos objetivos” para resaltar tal uso en contextos

semejantes de la obra dionisiana, y entiende que estos vínculos pueden ser lingüísticos o

estructurales.

En esta comunicación se intenta demostrar la existencia de otro “vínculo objetivo”

entre Proclo y Dionisio. En tal sentido, se analizará el pasaje 997 b de Sobre la teología

mística donde Dionisio exhorta a Timoteo a realizar “una intensa ejercitación sobre tá

mystiká theámata”. Ahora bien, dicha expresión posee una singular significación en un

pasaje (Libro III cap. 18) de la magna obra de Proclo, Teología Platónica. Esta

significación está inserta en un claro contexto de alusión a los ritos de iniciación en las

religiones de misterios, lo que le permite al Licio resaltar que la especulación acerca de

las grandes verdades que están ocultas en Platón exigen una auténtica mistagogia, tal

como se esfuerza en hacerlo en dicha obra. En Dionisio puede percibirse con claridad

un significado análogo de dicha expresión, en cuanto alcanzar la unión con Aquél que

está más allá de toda esencia y conocimiento no es otra cosa que ser iniciado en los

misterios supremos de la teología.

José María Nieva Universidad Nacional de Tucumán

Universidad del Norte Sto. Tomás de Aquino jose_marianieva@hotmail.com Crisóstomo Álvarez 1035 3º C

(4000) Tucumán-Argentina

Everything is Illuminated: Plotinus on Matter In her book Plotinus on Number, Slaveva-Griffin outlines a process of apostasis in which the

ontological chain is full of movement both towards and away from the One. which grounds the

hierarchy of beings. Thus, multiplicity functions as a measure of distance from the One in terms of

ontology and perfection. However, matter is pure potentiality and the absolute limit of being; it is

unquanitifiable. An account that understands the universe’s generation in terms of number seems to

imply that matter is wholly beyond the One, to the extent of constituting its own reality. Thus, the view

that the One did not generate matter, the subject of a controversial debate, seems a natural part of

Slaveva-Griffin’s interpretation. The picture is also muddled by the view espoused in ‘On Evils’ that

matter is absolute evil, which causes instances of evil in ensouled bodies. O’Brien, and others, have

argued that the soul generates matter in order to remove the One from culpability in generating absolute

evil. However, I argue that Plotinus’ concept of matter is usually simplified and misunderstood. Using

Kevin Corrigan’s analysis of matter as a starting point, I explore the concept of levels of matter and the

complex soul-body relationship. Understanding how a soul crosses the realms and becomes the

guardian of a body is a crucial aspect of understanding from where matter came. Corrigan traces

“three...moments of [matter's] unfolding or realization” in the Enneads—first, when matter is cast out

of the intelligible realm, second, the pre-cosmic matter used to generate the material realm, and third,

matter as the substratum of objects in the sense world. I relate this to the idea of apostasis while

providing a critical look at Corrigan's exegesis of certain passages.

. Keywords: Matter, multiplicity, generation, number, realms, emanation, the One, the soul, the descent of the soul

Maria S. Picone Rice University mspicone@gmail.com 163 Tisdale St. Leominster, MA 01453 USA No accompanying persons Yes on the hotel booking Yes for the dinner and both excursions

Bardaisan of Edessa:

a Syriac Christian Middle Platonist

I shall study the conception of creation and the role of Christ-Logos in it according to Bardaisan of Edessa († 222), a Christian philosopher influenced by Middle Platonism and Stoicism and well steeped in both Greek and Syriac. A contemporary of Clement of Alexandria (who might even have been his disciple), he was probably known to Origen and certainly to Eusebius of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, Diodore of Tarsus, and Gregory of Nyssa. It is remarkable that the only sources on Bardaisan who depict him in a favourable light are all authors belonging to the Origenian tradition. I shall ground my analysis in a fragment from Bardaisan’s De India preserved by Porphyry word for word, in the so-called cosmological traditions (later Syriac and Arabic accounts of Bardaisan’s cosmology, which do preserve some literal quotations from him), and in some fragments handed down by Ephrem (a hostile source that must always be read critically, but which proves extremely helpful). The comparative approach to these sources allows the investigator to reach a high degree of certainty concerning what Bardaisan really thought. This is indeed a crucial methodological issue.

What will emerge from my scrutiny of the sources is that Badaisan read the Bible in the light of Plato’s Timaeus and Middle-Platonic concepts, especially that of the Logos, which he, like Clement and Origen, applied to Christ. Bardaisan, especially in his Porphyrian fragment, describes Christ-Logos as both the transcendent unity of all the existing beings (the cosmic Christ) and the transcendent unity of all humanity (the new Adam). As the seat of the Ideas, and thus the noetic world, Christ-Logos, the Son of God, is seen by Bardaisan as the exemplary cause of the creation of the cosmos, but at the same time he is also considered by him to be its efficient cause, in that he also plays the role of Plato’s Demiurge. It is striking that these two functions in creation (efficient cause and noetic cause at the same time) were ascribed to Christ-Logos by Origen as well. But there are further impressive parallels in Origen’s and Bardaisan’s conceptions of creation.

Ilaria L.E. Ramelli

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart ilaria.ramelli@unicatt.it; ilaria.ramelli@virgilio.it

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan,

Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milan, Italy

 Panel:  reading  Plato’s  Phaedrus  in  the  East    This  panel  will  be  organized  around  three  readings  of  Plato’s  Phaedrus,  247-­‐249,  the  ascent  into  the  Hyperouranian  Topos.    The  purpose  of  the  panel  is  to  illuminate  Philo,  Origen  and  Iamblichus’  methods  of  Platonic  exegesis    and  in  particular  to  discuss  how  writers  belonging  to  disparate  religious  affiliations  (pagan,  Jewish,  and  Christian)  deploy  the  text  of  Plato.      1.  Origen’s  reading  of  the  Phaedrus  myth:  “Going  home”  (Phaedrus  247  e4) This  paper  will  survey  several  sites  of  Origen’s  engagement  with  the  Phaedrus:  the  super  celestial  sphere  as  treated  in  the  De  Principiis;  the  fall  of  the  soul  and  the  diversity  of  rational  natures  as  treated  in  the  De  principiis,  and  finally,  the  vehicle  of  the  soul  as  it  emerges  in  the  eschatological  passages  of  the  De  principiis  and  Contra  Celsum.  In  the  paper,  I  ask  whether  or  not  Origen  presents  a  coherent  reading  of  the  Phaedrus  myth  and  also  ask  about  the  extent  to  which  Origen’s  reliance  on  this  myth  informs  his  theological  solutions  to  problems  about  the  resurrection  body,  the  meaning  and  economy  of  embodiment,  and  the  reconciliation  to  God  in  the  apokatastasis.        Philo’s  reading  of  the  Phaedrus  myth:  breathing  Genesis  into  the  Platonic  text  Given  both  his  focus  on  the  human  soul  and  his  unquestionable  Platonic  affinities,  Philo’s  reliance  on  the  Phaedrus  imagery  is  not  surprising.  For  example,  easily  borrows  the  Phaedrean  chariot  and  “cybernetic  eye”  of  nous  in  his  ascent  passages.  But  other  passages  are  more  difficult:    the  question  that  this  paper  hopes  to  explore  is  exactly  how  Philo  utilizes  the  Phaedrus  imagery,  especially  in  relation  to  the  creation  of  humanity.    This  question  would  be  a  simple  one  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  Philo  must  engage  with  not  one  but  two  biblical  creation  accounts,  the  second  of  which  introduces  a  very  non-­‐Platonic  concept,  God  breathing  the  divine  pneuma  into  the  face  of  the  earth-­‐born  man.    In  order  to  understand  how  these  two,  seemingly  disparate  notions,  are  reconciled  in  Philo’s  thought,  I  will  examine  primarily  the  relevant  sections  in  De  Opificio  Mundi,  Quod  Deterius  Potiori  Insidiari  Soleat,  and  the  first  book  of  Legum  Allegoriarum.    Iamblichus  on  the  divine  circuit  This  paper  treats  the  cosmic  circuit  of  the  soul  in  Iamblichus,  focusing  on  the  economy  of  salvation  expressed  in  the  De  Mysteriis.  Of  particular relevance is this section (VIII.8): “but from the first way of descent God sent the souls down for this purpose, so that they might go back to him again. Therefore, neither does any change occur on account of such a bringing-upward nor do the ways of descent of the souls and the ways of ascent fight.” This passage amounts to an Iamblichean interpretation of Phaedrus 247-9: the twin tendencies of the soul are invoked, phrased here as a desire to be free of creation and a care for it that prima facie conflict, but in fact do not, since they can be traced individually to each part of the two-natured soul. The original descent is evidently necessary but now God causes it for the express purpose of allowing ascent.  

 

al-Ghazali's Criticism of Neoplatonism

Sobhi Rayan

Abstract

Neoplatonic philosophy greatly influenced Islamic philosophy. This effect is evident

in the writings of Al Farabi and Ibn Sina. Al-Ghazali opposed to this philosophy

because it contradicts different principles in Islamic faith.

This study analyzes the criticism of al-Ghazali against the Neoplatonic philosophy,

and will mainly discuss al-Ghazali's arguments against the fundamental ideas of

Neoplatonic philosophy, such as soul, world's pre-eternity and emanation.

Al-Ghazali's criticism was expressed in various writings, especially his famous book

Tahafut Alflasiph (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) which involves twenty

philosophical issues. In this book, Al-Ghazali attempts to refute the claims of the

philosophers, most of which are those of Neoplatonism, by raising arguments against

them. These arguments were systematical, dialectical and used logical tools. Al-

Ghazali used to present the philosophical argument at first, then present his

objections, and finally express his opinion towards the issue in question.

 

Two stages of patristic understanding of grace on the horizon of apophatic theology

Theologia Apophatica, a traceable element in classical Greek thinking, progressively evolves into one of

the structural constituents of Neoplatonic thought.

Conversely, in Christian theology the theological notion of “grace” (cháris), is commonly understood as

a primary expression of God’s project of salvation (oikonomia) and thereby assigned to the cataphatic

realm of knowledge concerning God.

In the light of an earlier and later “stage” of Eastern Christian thought (Cappadocians and Maximus the

Confessor) – each of them to be considered seminal for the theological development of the doctrine of

grace - this paper intends to present the complexity of the patristic understanding regarding grace. Thus

it will be shown that the notion is taken up to provide a coupling link between Theologia Cataphatica

and Theologia Apophatica, in this manner “undermining” the Greek separation of the two without

renouncing the legitimacy of the distinction:

- the Cappadocians through the development of a pneumatology that insists on two equally valid

realities, the true divinity of the Holy Spirit and the spiritual gift of “communion” by which we become

participants in the divine life.

- Maximus the Confessor, by elaborating a theological epistemology in which the multi-layered meaning

of “apophasis” serves as pointer to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine Logos, replacing the

ontological perspective with a theo-anthropological approach the centre of which is constituted by the

finality of dynamic grace.

Philipp Gabriel Renczes sj

Philipp Gabriel Renczes sj Professor of Dogmatic and Patristic Theology Pontificia Università Gregoriana Piazza della Pilotta, 4 I-00187 Roma tel.: (+39)06/67015378 (+39)06/67015473 (ufficio) e-mail: renczes@unigre.it pgrenczes@gmail.com Accompanying persons: 0 Hotel booking: yes I would be interested in the farewell dinner on Thursday, March 24th and the trip on Friday, 25th to Ceasarea.

International Society for Neoplatonic Studies Neoplatonism in the East - ex oriente lux

Platonism and Christianity in Late Antiquity and Early Middle

Ages

THEARCHIC LIGHTS Graciela L. Ritacco de Gayoso, MTH

When DAMASCIUS (In Phil. 238) states in relationship to the “Sole Cause of all” that “its light is the Truth”, he’s simply synthesizing PLATO’s principal teaching (Rep. VI 508 E-509 A). Both the Platonic and Christian theologies have developed in this assertion a fine net of interpretations in which center we find the analogy of the Sun and the Good. A thorough treatment of all the Ancient Greek sources –either Pagan or Christian– that have dealt with this issue would result much widespread. In this opportunity, therefore, I would rather limit myself to consider only two of its exponents: DIONYSIUS THE AEROPAGITE, who through the appropriation of the Platonic comparison of the Sun and the Good in the Divine Names IV, he extends to the Christian God a good part of the Platonic understanding that will in return allow him to formulate the expression “thearchic lights”. The various meanings of this expression will come together in order to provide the form to his singular understanding of Theology. At the same time, I will serve of Emperor Julian’s discourse On the King Sun in order to describe the principal ideas and worldview that encloses the Platonic formulation of Theology.

The broad comparison with the Light encounters, both under the darkness of Dionysus’ prose as in Julian’s fervent and exalted reflection, two of the rising moments in the conformation, between the IV and VI centuries of our era, of the scholarly way to reflect the question in the academic circles of Platonic origin. Julian, a vehement follower of Jamblicus’ teachings previous to the School of Athens’ (Proclus, Damascius) systematization as received by the Corpus of the Anonym – transmits an organic version of the Pagan vision of the Principle, which allows a comparison with the Christian configuration as adopted by Dionysus. The influence that this thinking puts forth in the Latin Christianity would deserve indeed another discussion.

GRACIELA LIDIA RITACCO de GAYOSO Master of Theology in Philosophy of Religion, King’s College, University

of London, UK Research Member, Centro de Filosofía de la Religión, Academia

Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires, CONICET Professor of History of Medieval Philosophy, Facultad de Filosofía,

Universidad del Salvador, San Miguel campus glritacco@gmail.com Constitución 1889, San Miguel (1663), Bs.As., Argentina

International Society for Neoplatonic Studies Neoplatonism in the East - ex oriente lux

Platonism and Christianity in Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages

LAS LUCES THEÁRQUICAS Graciela L. Ritacco de Gayoso, MTH

Cuando DAMASCIO, (In Phil. 238) dice a propósito de “la Causa Única de todo”, que “su Luz es la Verdad”, simplemente sintetiza la enseñanza principal de PLATÓN (Rep. VI 508 E-509 A). Las Teologías platónica y cristiana han elaborado en torno de esta afirmación una finísima red de interpretaciones cuyo centro es la comparación del Sol con el Bien. Resultaría muy extenso un tratamiento exhaustivo de todas las fuentes griegas antiguas –paganas o cristianas- que se han ocupado de esta cuestión. Prefiero, en esta oportunidad, limitarme a considerar solo dos exponentes: DIONISIO del AREÓPAGO, quien a través de la utilización expresa de la comparación platónica del Sol con el Bien en Los Nombres Divinos IV, extiende al Dios cristiano buena parte de la comprensión platónica, lo que le permite formular la expresión “luces theárquicas”, de variados significados que confluyen para dimensionar su comprensión de la Teología. Y, por otro lado, me serviré del discurso del Emperador JULIANO Sobre el Rey Sol para describir los lineamientos principales de la cosmovisión que encierra la formulación platónica de la Teología.

La amplia comparación con la Luz encuentra, tanto en las oscuridades de la prosa de Dionisio como en la ferviente y exaltada reflexión de Juliano, dos momentos salientes de la conformación, entre el siglo IV de nuestra era y el siglo VI, de un modo escolar de ocuparse de la cuestión en los ámbitos académicos de raigambre platónica. Juliano, como vehemente continuador de las enseñanzas de Jámblico -anteriores a la sistematización de la Escuela de Atenas (Proclo, Damascio) recibidas por el Corpus del Anónimo- trasmite una versión orgánica de la visión pagana acerca del Principio, que permite una comparación con la configuración cristiana adoptada por Dionisio. La influencia que este pensamiento ejerció en el Cristianismo latino merecería otra ponencia.

GRACIELA LIDIA RITACCO de GAYOSO Investigadora, Centro de Filosofía de la Religión, Academia Nacional de

Ciencias de Buenos Aires, CONICET Profesora Titular de Historia de la Filosofía Medieval, Facultad de

Filosofía, Universidad del Salvador, sede San Miguel glritacco@gmail.com Constitución 1889, San Miguel (1663), Bs.As., Argentina

Plato, Plotinus, and the Chaldean Oracles on “Pure Soul”

In VP 23.3–4, Porphyry reports that Plotinus kept his soul pure. Although the remark has

the air of a pupil’s rhetorical embellishment of his teacher, a closer examination of the

use of the concept of “pure soul” in Plato, Plotinus, and the Chaldean Oracles reveals its

ontological origin and dispels the air of hagiographical simplicity from it. The goal of this

paper is to investigate the ontological root of the term and to demonstrate the confluence

of ontology and soteriology in the conception, as presented in the Phaedo, the Enneads,

and the Chaldean Oracles.

“Likeness to god” (ὁµοίωσις θεῷ, Theaet. 176a–b) is Plato’s prescription for the

meaning of man’s life. In the Phaedo (65e–70a), he envisions katharsis as the means for

attaining this purpose. As a result, one of the main themes of the dialogue is soul’s

liberation from the body. In this line of reasoning, Plato very often uses vocabulary

related to καθαρός to convey the idea of soul’s separation from the body. There is

nothing surprising in this usage. The surprising element, however, is that τὸ καθαρόν in

Phaed. (79d2, 80d6, 82b11, to list a few) does not denote, as expected, the final result of

the soul’s separation from the body, but the original starting point of soul’s descent into

the body. Τὸ καθαρόν, in other words, does not mean “purified from the body” but

“absolute existence” or “existence without body.” I will argue that, in the Phaedo, this

ontological meaning is primary and the soteriological meaning is only secondary to it.

Plotinus, in his turn, also emphasizes the ontological meaning of “pure soul.” He

uses the expression when he talks about “the first principle of soul” (Enn. II.3.9), soul in

the intelligible realm (Enn. III.3.5.17–18), Intellect “in pure light and pure radiance”

(Enn. III.8.11.26–29), the individual soul without body (Enn. IV.3.24.22–29), and above

all the unifying existence of all souls before they become attached to a particular man and

descend into a particular body (Enn. VI.4.14.18–32). The proposed examination will

show that Plotinus places the same ontological emphasis on the term as Plato does in the

Phaedo.

In the Chaldean Oracles, however, we find the emphasis shifting from the

ontological to the soteriological meaning of καθαρός (fr. 213). Paradoxically, then,

Porphyry’s statement about Plotinus’ “pure soul” rings more true with the Chaldean than

the Platonic and even Plotinian conception of “pure.”

Plato’s Vocabulary of Madness

Plato uses a rich array of words to describe the condition of being ‘out of one’s mind’ or ‘beside oneself’ (mania, paranoia, anoia, ptoiēsis, katokōchē etc.). At times he ascribes the condition to diseases of the mind, at other times to diseases of the body. Although he mostly presents the condition as deleterious, he does not unfailingly do so. In some contexts ‘madness’ is celebrated as a sign of divine favour or, arguably, as a source of cognitive and moral benefits that enable the ‘mad’ to aim at truth and a noble life. The focus of the paper will be on mania and its specific properties as described in the Protagoras, the Symposium, the Republic, the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. To clarify, so far as possible, the ambiguities of the concept and account for Plato’s ambivalence to the condition, particular attention will be paid to the following questions: Who is affected by mania? How ‘Platonic’ is the fourfold distinction drawn in the Phaedrus? What exactly is meant by ‘divine madness’? Does Plato consistently view it as a source of value? Lastly, it will be considered whether divine mania in its various guises is compatible with the Socratic ideal of self-knowledge and the Platonic ideal of god-likeness? Suzanne Stern-Gillet University of Manchester and University of Bolton

Wiebke-Marie Stock Theurgic Thought

1

Dr. Wiebke-Marie Stock, Institut für Philosophie/Freie Universität Berlin

Conference of the ISNS in Haifa: “Neoplatonism in the East – ex oriente lux”

Theurgic Thought

The liturgical philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite

In the rich history of the reception of Dionysius the Areopagite (approx. 500 AD), the writ-

ing “On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy” is the only treatise of the Corpus Dionysiacum that has not

been given much philosophical attention. It is considered helpful in gaining information about

time and context of Dionysius’ writings, but not as interesting and important from a philoso-

phical point of view. In this treatise Dionysius deals with the ecclesiastical hierarchy; the or-

der of the sacraments of Baptism, Eucharist and the sanctification of the myron; the rites of

burial and the whole system of the church. Though these topics might appear purely ecclesias-

tical and only related to the liturgy, this treatise is as philosophical as Dionysius’ other works;

in this text, central concepts from the Neoplatonic tradition are further developed in a creative

way as Dionysius combines them with Christian ideas. The Christian transformation of these

Neoplatonic ideas involves concepts in the areas of political philosophy, ethics, philosophy of

religion, aesthetics, anthropology, epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics.

Some authors have accused Dionysius of being a Neoplatonist in a Christian shape, while

others allege that he might be a Christian using certain Neoplatonic notions to defeat Neopla-

tonism. A study of his writings, especially of the treatise On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, shows

that Dionysius is a Neoplatonist as well as a Christian author. His ideas and concepts bring a

new perspective to those already present in both traditions.

Dionysius' treatise “On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy” discusses the hierarchy of the Church and

the liturgy. The practice of liturgy is a means of guiding the participants upwards (anagôgia);

it is a materialis manuductio (cheiragôgia), designed to lead them toward union with the di-

vine (henôsis). It is obvious that Dionysius is well acquainted with Christian tradition and

ritual (probably a Syrian liturgy). However, his way of talking about these matters – espe-

cially about theourgy – is deeply influenced by the philosophers of late Neoplatonism like

Iamblichus and Proclus.

The notion theourgia in late Neoplatonism was often used to designate the religious rites

themselves. Dionysius transforms the pagan use of the idea and transfers it into Christian lit-

urgy. According to him theourgia is the work of god, especially the incarnation, and the lit-

urgy appears as a continuation of this divine act, it is theurgic, though not theourgia itself;

Dionysius refers to it as hierourgia. The power of the hierarchy is concentrated in the bishop

whom Dionysius calls the hierarch; it is his responsibility to think and to do ta theourgika.

Wiebke-Marie Stock Theurgic Thought

2

The holy acts (hierourgiai) are described as “the images of the divine power that perform per-

fection” (EH 107, 21f (505B)). In the hierourgia, the theourgia is remembered and praised,

and – what is more important – it continues to work on those who participate in the liturgy, it

works ‘theourgically’, it makes the participants divine themselves.

As in Pagan Neoplatonism the liturgy is based on symbols. But these symbols are not the

symbols sown into the world by the gods; they are not holy in themselves, but only in and

through the liturgy; they are not based on a general sympatheia of the world.

Another important difference between Pagan theurgy and Christian hierourgy is the commu-

nal aspect of hierourgy. The pagan theurgos cannot guide someone to the union, he can only

attain the union himself and help others find the way, but they cannot be unified by his ac-

tions. While the lower forms of theurgy (making rain, healing etc.) are material, the highest

forms of theurgy – the ones that lead to the union -- are not, or are barely related to material

rites. According to On ecclesiastical hierarchy, on the other hand, material rites – gestures,

readings, chants, the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, the sacrament of union – can and

do lead to union with the divine. Here, not only does the bishop or the priests attain the union,

but so do all the participants which is an idea that would be inconceivable for a Pagan Neopla-

tonist.

The human being is considered to be a unity of soul and body, and this conception leads to a

new concept of human understanding. Without the necessary mediation of the world of sense

perception given through of the body, the human being – soul and body – cannot achieve the

union. The sacramental effect of the rites is based on the corporeal participation; it is not suf-

ficient to merely contemplate them. Understanding and contemplation are important, but Dio-

nysius’ reflections on the baptism of children show that there are cases in which comprehen-

sion is not required. While the correct performance of old, sacred and unintelligible rites is all

that is required according to Iamblichus, Dionysius considers the understanding of these rites

as a higher stage though he does not separate it form the performance of liturgy itself. Every-

one – a simple member of laity, a monk, a priest, a bishop – has to participate in it. However,

there are different ways and different levels of participation and understanding. The liturgy is

beautiful because it is, as hierourgia, part of the theourgia. Its beauty shows itself in its effect

on the mind and the senses, and it can be understood on different noetic levels. Those who are

deeply initiated are able to see the more divine beauty while they perform the liturgy, others

gain knowledge according to their level of understanding, but they all participate in the same

liturgy, there is no higher cult for the elite.

In summary it can be said that Dionysius uses both the Christian and the Neoplatonic tradi-

tions to create a new concept of theourgia in which the aesthetic value of the ritual plays an

important role.

Jacob Stump

At the beginning of the Crito Socrates dreams that a beautiful woman in white raiment comes to him and says, “Socrates, on the third day you would arrive at fertile Phthia” (Cr. 44b). To my mind this quotation has never been given the serious attention it is due; the great majority of commentators either dismiss the dream as just a fanciful poetic allusion or briefly note it in passing.1 Of the few commentators who do discuss it, some, connecting Phthia to the verb (“to die”), suggest that it foreshadows Socrates’ coming death. The others attempt to place it in its Homeric context by proposing that Phthia represents the region in Thessaly – not, as the former group would have it, as representing Hades – and thus transform the dream’s meaning from one of spiritual homecoming to spiritual temptation of the kind Achilles faced when he was stuck in the dilemma of whether to return to battle and fight or sail away to his hometown Phthia. I argue that both interpretations fail precisely insofar as each omits what the other includes: The Phthia dream should be taken both with respect to the Iliad and as a spiritual homecoming. When done so, however, it raises the embarrassing point that, just as (according to Socrates in the Apology) Achilles would have betrayed his responsibility to fight had he fled to Phthia, so would Socrates have betrayed some responsibility in his choice to drink hemlock and go to Phthia instead of escape from jail. That this identification of Socrates with Achilles is unique in the Platonic corpus should make us question what in the Crito is unique about Socrates to warrant that portrayal. I argue that the responsibility that Socrates seemingly betrays was his divine obligation to practice philosophy, which he interpreted as the practice of elenchus. He abandons this when he does not engage the Laws in elenchus, thus, as it seems, making the analogy complete. I conclude however by calling attention to passages in the Euthyphro, Protagoras, and Apology that suggest Socrates’ ability to engage in elenchus depends upon divine influence; his elenctic silence becomes then merely the result of his not being enthused, an event finally explained with recourse to Thetis’ last visit to Achilles before his death.

Jacob Duane Stump Student, Wabash College stumpj@wabash.edu 303 Russell Avenue Crawfordsville, IN 47933 I will travel alone. I would like a university hotel booking, and I do intend to

participate in the conference activities.

1 Tate 1929, 150 considers the quotation evidence that Socrates regarded “poetry and myth” as “the natural vehicles of solemn information.” Shorey 1933, 36 considers it “the most beautiful symbolic quotation in European literature.” Segal 1978, 320 thinks it ‘places philosophical choice into a heroic perspective,’ as does Greenberg 1965, 48: “The reminiscence of Achilles is inescapable and plays its part in emphasizing Socrates’ heroic stance.” Polansky 1997, 53 makes a similar point: “Plato intends for us, of course, to find Socrates a new, more admirable hero than that of the epic.” Holway 1994, 590 thinks it shows that Socrates ‘interprets his death as a reunion with Achilles’ divine mother.’ See also Quandt 1982, 251.

CHRISTOS TEREZIS – ELIAS TEMPELIS

PROCLUS’ ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF THE FORMS

In his commentary on the Parmenides (785.4-799.22 and 978.21-983.18)

Proclus offers a systematic defence of the objective existence of the Forms by means

of the use of distinctive arguments, four of which are ontological. In contrast with

Aristotle, Proclus clearly accepts that the Forms exist as causes of the world and not

as posterior concepts describing the common elements of the sensible entities. Thus,

he argues, first, that the ontological presuppositions of the sensible beings are placed

in the area of the self-subsistent beings, which correspond to the categories of the

second hypothesis of the Parmenides. The Forms belong to this area as well. In this

respect, Proclus refers to the way of production of the sensible beings, aiming at a

strict definition of this process. Secondly, he proves that the existence of the Forms,

which possess ontological completeness, is prior to the existence of the sensible

things. This is possible since the Forms are generated by the Demiurge of the whole

world, by means of an internal reflection upon himself. Thirdly, in order to prove that

the sensible world cannot be attributed to mere chance, he argues that the external

activity, i.e. the creation of the world, depends on the internal activity, i.e. the

development of the Forms in the divine Intellect. Fourthly, he implements the concept

of hierarchy in the realm of the Forms, through an extensive reference to the

ontological priority of the imparticipable over the participable. Thus, it is shown how

the existence of the primary and intelligible Forms is prior to that of the substantiated

Forms. Interestingly enough, the above-mentioned arguments exercised considerable

influence on the commentaries of the members of the school of Ammonius, son of

Hermias.

Prof. Christos Terezis, Department of Philosophy, University of Patras, Greece E-mail: terezis@upatras.gr Address: Themistokleous 60, 26222 Patras, Greece, Ass. Prof. Elias Tempelis, Hellenic Naval Academy – Hellenic Open University, Greece E-mail: chrisdar@otenet.gr Address: Ogdoi odos 3, 15236 Penteli, Greece *** The paper will be presented by Ass. Prof. Elias Tempelis, who is interested in participating in the farewell dinner, the conference trip to Caesarea and the trip to ancient sites in the area of the Sea of Galilee. A university hotel booking is required; there will be no other accompanying persons. *** Prof. Terezis will not be able to participate in the conference.

Dr Andrei Timotin, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris,

Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes (UMR 8584)

Four Demonologies in Conflict in Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis

This paper attempts to reveal the existence of four distinct, albeit overlapping

demonologies in Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, and to study their mutual relationships.

Iamblichus devotes a significant part of his response to Porphyry to reject the

demonological explanation of divination and to build a theology of divination which

restricts the influence of daimones to the inferior levels of the hierarchy of divine

beings. The demonological interpretation of divination put forward by Porphyry in his

Letter to Anebon, a common place in Middle Platonism (Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus

of Tyre), derives ultimately from Symposium 203 e, that stipulates that the daimon

mediates the functioning of oracles. In Middle Platonism, this interpretation was also

stimulated by the equivalence the Old Academy established between traditional gods

and demons.

In his response to Porphyry Iamblichus clearly refutes the demonological

rationalization of polytheism inherited from the Platonic tradition. Worship is

essentially theurgical; theurgy, and not demons, provides the communication between

men and gods in the traditional pagan rites. The distinction that the post-Plotinian

Platonism operated between demons and gods dramatically restricts the place of

demonology in the Platonic theology. Iamblichus’ demonology is based on a radically

new representation of the traditional worship which distinguishes in the same ritual

act an upper part dedicated to gods, and inferiors ones which are reserved for the

lower classes of divine beings (angels, daimones, and heroes).

In De Mysteriis, the criticism of the Middle-Platonic demonology ends with

the firm rejection of an “even worse” interpretation dealing not with the Platonic

daimones, but with “a certain kind of deceptive nature, both protean and versatile,

which takes on the forms of gods, daemons, and ghosts of the dead” (p. 175.16-176.1

Parthey, transl. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell). This view, quoted by Iamblichus from

Porphyry’s Letter to Anebon, is attributed to the “atheists” according to whom “all the

divination is accomplished by the evil demon” (p. 179.13-15 Parthey, same

transl.). These “atheists” are most likely the Christians, the “atheoi” par excellence for

Iamblichus, fierce critics of Hellenic divination that they used to attribute to the

influence of evil demons.

It is interesting that despite Iamblichus’ obvious contempt for the Christian

demonology, De mysteriis includes a long digression (p. 176-179 Parthey), which

pretends to report the opinion of the “Chaldean prophets” - certainly an allusion

to Chaldean Oracles -, and which deals precisely with this contemptible view and

corrects it. This Chaldean doctrine blurs the theological scheme developed in previous

chapters, since it opposes the pure spirits (the gods) to the evil ones, theurgy to

witchcraft, worship of gods to worship of evil demons, piety to atheism. I shall

attempt to highlight the incongruity between this Chaldean demonology and the

“orthodox” Iamblichean one.

Finally, this paper aims to reveal the function of each of the four

demonologies (Middle-Platonic, Christian, Chaldean, and Iamblichean) in De

Mysteriis and to underline the polemical meaning of demonology in Iamblichus.

Vladimir Cvetkovic University of Aarhus, Denmark vc@teo.au.dk Paper title: The Transformation of Neoplatonic Philosophical Notions Procession (proodos) and Conversion (epistrophe) in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor Abstract: The aim of the paper is to explore the way in which the Byzantine philosopher and theologian Maximus the Confessor (580-662) adapted Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophical concepts of procession (proodos) and conversion (epistrophe), in order to articulate the central theme of his thought, namely the Incarnation of God in human form. According to a Syriac Life of Maximus discovered in the British Museum by Dr Sebastian Brock, Maximus the Confessor was born in the village of Hesfin, east of Lake Tiberias, which is not far from modern Haifa. Maximus’s writings have traditionally been approached either from a philosophical or from a theological standpoint. The first approach has been preoccupied with Maximus’s indebtedness to Neoplatonic metaphysical tradition, while the second has explored his contribution to the Christian tradition, especially the ascetic writings. This has created a rupture in the reception of Maximus’s thought, artificially opposing Maximus the Theologian to Maximus the Philosopher. The proposed paper intends to bridge the existing gap between the two approaches showing that Neoplatonic metaphysical notions such as procession (proodos) – conversion (epistrophe) are employed by Maximus to describe the core of Christian belief that is the Mystery of Christ.

Philo’s Contribution to the Re-integration of Homer into the City of Philosophers

Maren R. Niehoff

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

My paper addresses the paradox that Homer became a prominent and very positive figure

in Neo-Platonism, while he had been disqualified from the philosophical discourse by

Plato himself. I shall argue that the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria played an

important role in the process of re-integrating Homer. Writing just one generation before

Plutarch, he is the first extant writer, who came to terms with Plato’s specific criticisms

and tried to show that Homer was a wise man, who had expressed ideas similar to those

of Plato and Moses.