The Aesthetic (Rasāsvadā) and the Religious (Brahmāsvāda) in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir ŚaivismAuthor(s): Gerald James LarsonReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 371-387Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398282 .

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Gerald James

Larson The aesthetic

(rasasvada)

and

the

religious

(brahmdsvada)

in

Abhinavagupta's

Kashmir

Saivism

INTRODUCTION

In

recent

years

a

significant

number

of

publications

have

appeared

analyzing

the work of the well-known

tenth and

early eleventh-century

Kashmir

Saiva

thinker,

Abhinavagupta.

In these

publications

there

has

been

a

noticeable

division

in focus. On one

side,

such

Indologists

and

Sanskritists

as S.

K.

De,

E.

Gerow,

A.

Aklujkar,

R.

Gnoli,

S.

Iyer,

J.

L.

Masson,

M. V.

Patwardhan,

V.

Raghavan,

D.

S.

Ruegg,

G. Sastri

and

others have

addressed themselves

to

problems

of

language

and

aesthetics

in

Abhinavagupta's

work and

have

shown

that

Abhinavagupta

made

important

contributions

in these

areas.'

On the other

side,

researchers like

Gopinath

Kaviraj,

K. C.

Pandey,

Andre

Padoux,

Lilian

Silburn,

and others have

focused that attention on

Abhinava-

gupta's

work in

mystical

theology,

monistic

philosophy,

and

the Hindu

tantra

and have shown

that

Abhinavagupta

made

equally important

contributions

in these

areas.2 Both

groups

of

scholars,

of

course,

have

made reference

to

both sides of

Abhinavagupta's

work and

have

referred,

at least in

passing,

to

possible

connections between

these two

seemingly disparate

dimensions in

the

corpus

of

Abhinavagupta.

Thus

far,

however,

few

attempts

have

been

made

systematically

to

develop

an overall

theoretical clarification of

Abhina-

vagupta's

intellectual

contribution.

Partly,

to

be

sure,

this reticence has

been

due to

the

lack of

scholarly

editions and

translations of the

vast and

difficult

corpus

of

Abhinavagupta,

and,

as

a

result,

even

now,

though

many

primary

and

secondary

works are

becoming

available,

one

must exercise

caution in

attempting

to raise the issue of

theoretical

clarification,

recognizing

that

corrections and

amplifications

will

undoubtedly

be

necessary

as further

textual

research

proceeds.

Nevertheless,

one of

the

primary

tasks

of

the historian

of

religious thought

is

precisely

to

raise

issues of overall

theoretical

clarification,

for

only

a

broadly

based,

interdisciplinary approach

(making

use of

Indology,

philosophy, history,

philology,

and

theology)

is

able

to

provide

access to

the historian of

religious thought

must

understand-namely,

the

religious

significance

of

what

he

studies,

or in this

case,

the

religious

significance

of

Abhinavagupta.

Thus,

this

article is a

tentative

and

exploratory

attempt

to

raise the

issue of

theoretical

clarification with

respect

to

the work

of

Abhina-

vagupta,

an

attempt

which

hopefully

will

prove

useful,

at

least

heuristically,

not

only

to

historians

of

religious

thought

but to

researchers

working

in

highly specialized

aspects

of

the

corpus

of

Abhinavagupta

as

well.

THE

CONTEXT

Unlike

most

ancient

cultural

traditions

of India

about

which we

know

very

GeraldJames Larson

is

Professor

and

Chairman

of

the

Departmentof

Religious

Studies,

University

of

California,

Santa

Barbara. AUTHOR'S

OTE:

This

paper

was

first presented

at the

meeting of

the

International

Association

for

the

History

of

Religions

in

Lancaster,

England,

in

August

of

1975.

Philosophy

East and West

26,

no.

4,

October

1976.

?

by

The

University

Press

of Hawaii.

All

rights

reserved.

 

372

Larson

little,

the

culture and

history

of

Kashmir

is not

completely opaque

to

the

intellectual

historian.

Especially

in Kalhana's

Rajatarahgint,

written

in

the

twelfth

century

A.D.,

we

have an

important quasi-history

or

near-history

of the

Kashmir area which

provides

a

valuable

and

reasonably

accurate

picture

of

the social-cultural

life of

the

region

from

the

eighth

or ninth centuries onward.3

Prior to the

eighth

century,

we know that Kashmir

was a

center

for

Buddhist

studies.4

Already

in the

reign

of

Asoka

in

the third

century

B.C.,

some Buddhist

traditions had

spread

to

the Kashmir

region.5

Moreover,

from the

first

few

centuries

A.D.,

beginning

with the

reign

of

Kaniska and

thereafter,

Kashmir

became

an

important

center for northern

Buddhist

developments

including

traditions

of

Sarvastivada,

the

Graeco-Buddhist

art

of

Gandhara,

and

early

Mahayana

both

in its

popular

manifestations

and

in

its

more intellectual

formulations

of

Madhyamika

and

Yogacara. Running parallel through

these

Buddhist

centuries

in

the Kashmir

area there

were also

developing

traditions

of

an archaic

Naga

cult

together

with the

emergence

of

the

early

texts

of

Saivagama, although

very

little

is known about these latter traditions

prior

to the

eighth

or

the

ninth

century.6

At

any

rate,

there

is

enough

evidence,

even

for

these

earlier

centuries,

to

suggest

that,

in

spite

of

the

geographical

isolation

of the

Kashmir

valley,

the

region

was

unusually cosmopolitan,

wherein

tradi-

tions

of

Hindu,

Buddhist, Jain,

Central Asian

and even Mediterranean culture

freely intermingled

and cross-fertilized

one another.

It

was,

however,

the

political

expansion

under

the

powerful

king, Lalitaditya,

in the

eighth

and the

cultural consolidation

under

King

Avantivarman

in

the

ninth

century

that

presumably

provided

the

social

reality

requisite

for

the

emergence

of

what we

now call Kashmir Saivism.7 Hindu culture

in all

of

its

dimensions was

patronized

and

encouraged, including poetry,

drama,

music, dance,

dars'ana,

vydkarana,

temple

building,

smrti,

purdna,

and tantra.

Well-known

br5hmana-panditas

were

brought

from elsewhere in north India

to

Kashmir,

and

Abhinavagupta,

in a later

text,

comments that

his

ancestor,

Atrigupta,

came to Kashmir

by

invitation

of

King

Lalitaditya

in this

period.8

It

should be

noted, moreover,

that

even in this time of Hindu

ascendancy,

Buddhist

studies were also

encouraged,

and one can

only

wonder

about

and

perhaps

envy

the

vigorous

debates

and

intellectual

exchange

that must

surely

have taken

place

in the

period.

It

should

also be

noted

that

this was

probably

the era

of

the

great

Sanikaracarya,

and one is

strongly

tempted

to

believe

the

tradition

which asserts

that

Safikara

visited Kashmir

during

his career both

to

carry

on his

polemic against

the

Buddhists

as well

as to

help

reshape

the

older dualistic Saiva

traditions

in

the

region.9

In

any

case,

a

reshaping

of the older

Saiva

traditions

was

precisely

what

took

and the

reshaping

moved

primarily

in two distinct directions.

Vasugupta

and

Kallata

are

credited

with

the

founding

of

spanda-sistra,

a

collection

of

religious

speculations

focusing

around

the idea

of

consciousness

as

"vibration;"

and

Somananda

and

Utpaladeva

are

generally

credited

with

 

373

establishing pratyabhijhii-sstra,

a

collection

of

philosophical

writings dealing

mainly

with the

notion

of

"re-cognition."10

Both traditions

apparently

grew

out

of

the

older

Saivagama

and

undoubtedly represent

efforts

to

construct

more

sophisticated

interpretations

of

Saivite

religion

and

philosophy.ll

These

religiophilosophical

traditions taken

together

are

referred to as the Trika-

that

is,

triple,

threefold

or a

triad,"

usually

construed to mean

the

triad

siva, sakti,

and

anu,

or

the

triad

pati,

pasa,

and

pasu

(that

is,

the

lord,

the

fetters,

the

souls,

respectively).

The Sanskrit literature of the

movement

is

extensive

as can

be

seen in the

numerous

volumes of the Kashmir Series of

Texts

and

Studies,

and

the

active

intellectual

life of

the

movement runs

from

the

late-eighth

or

early-ninth

centuries

through

the twelfth or thirteenth

centuries

or

roughly

until

the

period

that

Kashmir

came

under the control

of

invading

Muslims.

Key figures

in

the

movement,

in

addition

to

Vasugupta,

Kallata, Somananda,

and

Utpaladeva,

included

Laksmana,

Ramakantha,

Abhinavagupta,

Ksemaraja, Yogaraja,

and

Jayaratha.12

It was

primarily,

however,

in the

latter

part

of

the

tenth

century

and the

early

eleventh-and

interestingly

in the

reign

of the infamous

Queen

Didda13-that

the school

reached its

highest

point

under the influence of

one

of the most remarkable

minds that India has

produced, Abhinavagupta.14

Coming

from a famous

brihamana

family, Abhinavagupta

was

trained,

according

to

tradition,

in

Saiva

philosophy,

the Kula

and

Krama

systems

of the Hindu

tantra,

Jain

thought,

and

Mahayana

Buddhist

philosophy

(primarily

Yogacara).15

In

addition,

his numerous

writings

indicate a careful

training

in

traditions

of

the

philosophy

of

language

as

represented

in

Mimamsaka

and

Naiyayika

thought

as well as the

linguistic speculations

of

the famed

Bhartrhari,

together

with

a

careful

training

in

alamkara-sastra

or Sanskrit

poetics

as

represented

in the works

of

Bharata, Anandavardhana,

Bhattanayaka,

and

Bhattatauta.16

He

composed

numerous

works

touching

on

many

of

these

subjects

and,

according

to

all

accounts,

made distinctive

contributions

primarily

in three

areas:

first,

in the area of

pratyabhijhii-sastra,

n which his

Isvarapratyabhijha-

vivrtivimarsin,

his

LaghvTvrtti,

nd his

Paramirthasara

became

perhaps

most

well

known; second,

in the

area

of

alamkara-sastra,

in

which his

Dhvanya-

lokalocana and his

AbhinavabharatT

ecame

famous;

and

finally

in

the area of

tantra,

in

which he set

forth

a

massive twelve-volume

synthesis

of

the

mystical

Saiva

philosophy

and

tantra,

known as

Tantrdloka.17

As

just

indicated,

his

corpus

is

so

vast and

difficult

that

there has

been

a

tendency

to focus on one or

another

aspect

of

his

work,

thereby

creating

the

impression

that these various

areas of

his interest

were

really quite separate.

As

translations and

studies

have

emerged,

however,

and as

one

begins

to

get

a

picture

of

Abhinavagupta's

technical

terminology,

which

clearly

carries over

into all

the areas

of

his

interests

(namely,

philosophy

of

language,

philosophy

of

religion,

tantra

and

poetics),

one

begins

to

get

a sense of

an

overall

integrity

and

intellectual

pro-

gram

that,

in

many

ways,

is

one of

the most

remarkable

legacies

of

classical

or

 

374 Larson

medieval

Indian

culture,

as

valuable

as

and in

many

ways

more

impressive

than

that

of

Kalidasa,

Nagarjuna,

Vasubandhu,

Saiikara,

or

Ramanuja.

Subsequent development

in

Indian

poetics,

even

down to

our

own

time,

is

inconceivable

apart

from

Abhinavagupta,

and

many

of

the later

poetic-

theologies

of

the

Vaisnava Goswamins in north

India as well as

the

later

systematic interpretations

of theistic

Vai.nava

and

Saiva

thought

in south

India

undoubtedly

owe much to his contribution.18

THE PROBLEMOF RASASVADA AND BRAHMASVADA

In

order to

get

at this overall

integrity

or

unified

intellectual

program

of

Abhinavagupta,

I

propose

to focus

my

comments

around the issue of the

relationship

between rasasvdda

(the

enjoyment

of

aesthetic

tasting)

and

brahmisvada

(the

enjoyment

of

spiritual

realization)

in

Abhinavagupta's

thought.

In

terms of what we

presently

know of

the

Abhinavagupta corpus,

this

appears

to

be

a

crucial

issue for

understanding Abhinavagupta's unique

theosophy

or

"metaphilosophy"

together

with

his

philosophy

of

language,

his aesthetics

or

poetics,

and his

appropriation

and

reinterpretation

of earlier

traditions

of Indian

philosophy.19

Using

this issue as

a

focus,

I

wish to

suggest

the

following:

(1)

Abhinavagupta

but

clearly goes beyond

the

older

grammarian-philosophers,

including

Bhartrhari,

by redefining

the

role and function of

language;

(2)

that

he assimilates but

beyond any

view that would reduce

the

religious experience

to

the aesthetic

experience;

and

(3)

that

he

assimilates but

goes beyond

the

position

of Advaita

as a

philoso-

phical

treatment

of

the

monistic

position.

His overall intellectual

vision,

moreover,

is not

the

negation

of

language,

art,

and

philosophy,

but

rather a

vigorous

defense of

their

integrity

and

reality-an

integrity

and

reality

dialecti-

cally

construed

vis-a-vis

brahmisvida.

In the introduction

of

this article

I

referred to

a

split

or

divorce

in

research

publications

on

Abhinavagupta

with

some

focusing

on

his

poetics

and

other

focusing

on his

religious

and

philosophical

speculations.

That

split

or

divorce,

as

I

indicated

at

the

beginning,

is

partly

due to the

extent and

difficulty

of

Abhinavagupta's

work,

but one

might

also

argue

that it

is,

to some

extent,

symptomatic

of a more

general

division

in

many

cultures

between those

interested in what

might

be

called the

immediate,

undifferentiated aesthetic

dimension

of

experience

and those interested

in the more

theoretical,

discursive

problems

of

logic, epistemology,

and

philosophy

in

general.20

In

India

this

more

general

division is evidenced

in the

polarity,

which can be traced over

many

centuries,

between

kavya

and sistra. Most learned

men

were

trained

in

both,

but

it is not unusual to

find thinkers

working

in either

one or the other.

Moreover,

one

frequently

senses

a certain

hostility

or

indifference

in each

toward the other.

Masson and Patwardhan

rather

nicely

capture,

albeit

in a

somewhat

anachronistic

manner,

what must

surely

have been

in

the

minds of

numerous

poets

when

they

comment,

 

375

One's

mind is

irreverently

invaded

by

an

image

of

Kalidasa

politely

bored,

listening

to

explain

to him the

deeper

significance

of his

plays,

his ears

really

attuned

to the

joyous

shouts

of the

spring

festival

taking place

outside.21

At

the same

time, however,

in

many

cultures there

are at least a few

seminal

minds who

attempt

to

bridge

or assimilate divisions like this. In the

history

of

European

thought,

for

example,

one

thinks

of

Aristotle, Kant,

Hegel, Heideg-

ger,

and so forth. In the intellectual

history

of

India,

unfortunately,

one finds

very

few

such

minds,

partly,

I

suppose,

because

patterns

of

education tended

to limit the

scope

of a

pandita

to a rather

narrow

cultural

focus;

partly

because

caste

restrictions

limited

learning largely

to an elite

priestly group,

whose

preoccupations

were

primarily

religious;

and

partly

also

because

of

what

Edgerton

once called the

"extraordinary

norm"

of moksa

in Indian

culture,

which

encouraged

a kind of

religious imperialism

that

devoured

all

other

aspects

of culture

in

a

way

unmatched

in

any

but the most archaic

of

social

environments.22

Whatever the

reasons,

India

has

produced

few

minds that have

attempted

to

interpret

the

significance

of the various

aspects

of culture in a

balanced

manner,

and, hence,

one is

rather amazed to find

Abhinavagupta

and

others

in the

Kashmir

region

in

this

period

not

only

speaking

about

possible

analogies

or

homologies

between the aesthetic and

the

religious,

but even more

than

that,

writing

extensive treatises on

drama,

poetry,

music,

language, religion,

and

philosophy.

Regarding

the

specific problem

of

rasavada

and

brahmasvada,

t was

evidently

Bhattanayaka,

toward the

end of the ninth

century,

who

first called attention

to

the

issue.23

In an

eleventh-century

work of

Mahimabhatta,

Bhattanayaka

is

quoted

as follows:

Dramatic

performances

and the music

accompanying

them feed the Rasa

in all its

fulness;

hence the

spectator,

absorbed

in the

tasting

of

this,

turning

inward,

feels

pleasure through

the whole

performance.

Sunk into

his

own

being,

he

forgets everything

(pertaining

to

practical

life).

There is

manifested

in him

that

flow of

inborn

pleasure,

from

which the

yogins

draw their satis-

faction.24

Abhinavagupta

himself refers to the issue in

his

AbhinavabharatL,

commentary

on

Bharata's

Nf.tya-sastra.

Abhinavagupta

in

the context of

citing

various

views

about the nature of the

aesthetic

experience

discusses with

approval

a

view which he

characterizes

as

follows:

Therefore ... Rasa is

revealed

(bhivyamana)

by

a

special

power

assumed

by

words in

poetry

and

drama,

the

power

of revelation

(bhavani)-to

be distin-

guished

from

the

power

of

denotation-consisting

of

the

action of

generalizing

the

determinants,

etc.

(i.e.,

vibhavas,

anubhavas,

etc.)

This

power

has the

faculty

of

suppressing

the thick

layer

of

mental

stupor

(moha)

occupying

our own

consciousness.

...

 

376 Larson

Rasa,

revealed

by

this

power,

is

then

enjoyed (bhuj)

with a

kind of

enjoyment

(bhoga),

different from

direct

experience, memory,

etc. This

enjoyment, by

virtue

of

the

different

forms

of

contact

between sattva and

rajah

and tamah

...

is

characterized

by

a

resting

(visranti)

on

one's own

consciousness

(samvit),

which due

to

the

emergent

state of

sattva,

is

pervaded by

beatitude

(ananda)

and

light (prakisa),

and is similar

to

the

tasting (asvida)

of

the

supreme

brahman.

(...

parabrahmisvadasavidhena

bhogena

param

bhujyata

iti.)25

Clearly

in

this

passage Abhinavagupta

is

only stressing

a

similarity

(savidha)

between

rasdsvida and

brahmasvada,

and

one sees even

more

clearly

in

other

passages

that

whatever

homology

Abhinavagupta

points

to

between the

two

experiences

is often in the direction

of

allowing

the

fundamental

and

final

dissimilarity

between

the two

to

emerge.26

For

example,

Abhinavagupta

in

another

passage

of

AbhinavabhdratT

omments,

Therefore,

the

tasting

of

Rasa

(which

consists in

a

camatkira

different from

any

other kind of

ordinary cognition)

differs from

memory,

inference

and

any

form of

ordinary

self-consciousness ...

This

tasting

is

distinguished

(a)

from

perception

of

the

ordinary

sentiments

(delight,

etc.)

aroused

by

the

ordinary

means of

cognition

(perception,

infer-

ence

...

etc.);

(b)

from

cognition

without active

participation

of

the

thoughts

of

others

(namely,

yogi-pratyaksa);

and

(c)

from

the

compact

(ekaghana)

experience

of one's own

beatitude,

which is

proper

to

yogins

of

higher

orders

(presumably

brahmasvdda)

..

Indeed,

these

three forms of

congition

are

deprived

of

beauty

(saundarya-

virahat).27

Thus,

although

there

is a

striking family similarity

between

rasisvdda

and

brahmdsvdda,

here

appears

to

be

no

doubt

in

Abhinavagupta's

mind

that

they

cannot be

reduced to

one another.

Visvanatha,

a later

fourteenth-century

poetics

writer,

calls attention to this

striking family

likeness

by commenting,

Rasa is tasted

by qualified persons.

It is

tasted

by

virtue

of

the

emergence

of

sattva.

It is made

up

of

full

Intelligence,

Beatitude

and

Self-Luminosity.

It is

void of

contact with

any

other knowable

thing,

twin brother to the

tasting

of

brahman. It

is

animated

by

a

camatkdra

of

a

non-ordinary

nature.

It is tasted

as if it were our

very

being,

in

indivisibility.28

In

attempting

to

unpack

the

significance

of

this issue

of

rasisvada

and

brahmaisvdda

n

Abhinavagupta's

work,

it is useful

to

look, first,

at his

general

views

regarding language

and

poetics; secondly,

at his

theosophical

or

"meta-

philosophical"

views;

and,

finally,

at

possible

interrelations between

the two

together

with

possible

interrelations

and contrasts with

the

Advaita

position.

Such

a

breakdown

is not

simply

for the

sake of ease of

exposition

but

reflects

to

some extent

Abhinavagupta's

own

approach.29

Abhinavagupta's approach.29

(1)

Language andpoetics.

Both Anandavardhana and

Abhinavagupta

were

familiar

with older discussions

among

Naiyayikas,

Mimamsakas,

and

gram-

marians

regarding

the

nature of

words

(sabda)

and their

meanings

(artha).

Prabhakara and some

other Mimamsakas had

argued

for

the

theory

of

 

377

anvitibhidhina,

or

the

doctrine that

meaning

resides in words

alone and

that

the relations between

these words

in

a sentence

provide

the basis

for a

verbal

judgment.30

Kumarila

and

other

Mimamsakas

had

argued

for

the

theory

of

abhihitinvaya

or the doctrine that verbal

meanings

are more

important

than

the words themselves and that these verbal

meanings

come

to be related to

one

another

in

a

verbal

judgment by

means of

a

secondary

denotation

or

laksani.31

Various

Naiyayikas

had maintained a

position, combining

to some extent

the

views

of

both

Prabhakara

and

Kumarila,

and

added

evidently yet

a

third

capacity

of

language

known as

titparyasakti

or an

"extradenotative function"

which

provides

the

"motive-power"

of

the verbal

judgment.32

In

all of

these

discussions,

therefore,

three

primary

functions

of

language

were

gradually

being

isolated: a

primary

denotative

function

(abhidha);

a

secondary

or

meta-

phorical

function

(laksa.na);

and

an

extra-denotative function

or

motive-power

(tatparyasakti).

Moreover,

Anandavardhana and

Abhinavagupta

were also

familiar

with

the work of

Bhartrhari and other

grammarian

philosophers

who

had

argued

for

the

theory

of

akhan.da-vikya-sphota

or

the

doctrine that the

primary

vehicle

of

meaning

is

the

sentence

as a whole

(vikya);

that the

meaning

of words has to do

with

revealing

the

"integral linguistic symbol"

or

semantic

significance

(sphota),

which

exists

quite apart

from

but

is related to the ideal

or

actual

pronunciation

of

the

words;

and

that this

meaning

is

grasped

in the

mind

by

an "immediate intuitive realization"

(pratibhi).33

Also,

Abhinavagupta

was familiar

with Bhartrhari's

notion of

sabda-brahmanand the

related

theory

that creation

emerges

from sabda-brahmanvia

the

pasyanti,

the

madhyama,

and

the

vaikhari

(that

is,

the

pure potency

of

all

possible

meaning,

the

pasyantT;

the

intermediate

phase

of

imagining

specific

meanings

that

might

be

uttered,

the

madhyamii;

and the

actual

utterance

in

natural

speech,

the

vaikharT).34

Older

theorists

in

poetics

and drama had

worked,

to a

large

extent,

within

the

boundaries

of

these older discussions

of the

function

of

language,

and,

as

a

result,

it

is

probably

no

accident

that

discussions of

poetry

were

largely

limited to such

issues as

figures

of

speech (alamkara)-that

is

to

say,

issues of

secondary

denotation,

various kinds of

metaphor,

and

so on.

Anandavardhana

and

Abhinavagupta,

however,

argue

persuasively

for

another

function of

language,

namely, vyahjani

or

"suggestion."35

This

"suggestion"

is

referred

to as

dhvani

(which

means,

literally,

"sound" or

"resonance")

and refers to

an

evocative level of

meaning

which

transcends the

level

of

primary

denotation

as well

as

the level of

metaphor.

It

emerges

in

the

context of

primary

and

secondary

denotation,

but

it

expresses

an

idea or a

figure

of

speech

or

an

emotion

over and

above the

over and

above the

actually expressed

or

secondary

utterance.

Dhvani,

manifested

primarily

in a

medium such

as

poetry,

is that

dimension of

meaning

responsible

for and

inextricably

allied with

the realization of

rasa or

aesthetic

tasting.

For

Anandavardhana

and

Abhinavagupta

the

realization

of

rasa

is

not the

experience

of an

emotion

(either sthiyi-bhava,

vibhiva,

anubhava,

or

vyabhicdribhiva),

although

it

occurs in these

emotional

environments.

Rasa,

 

378

Larson

rather,

is

a sui

generis

realization of

"tasting,"

evoked

by

dhvani

(or

vyahjana)

in the

cultivated

spectator

or reader

(sahrdaya),

sparked

by

pratibha

or

bhivani,

correlated with the

spectator's

or reader's

deepest impulses

(samskiras

or

visanas),

and

accompanied

by

(a)

a

sense

of distance from one's

ordinary

awareness

in

terms of

time,

space,

inference,

ordinary

emotional

involvements,

and so forth

(that

is,

it is

alaukika),

and,

hence,

an

experience

of

"generaliza-

tion"

(sadhiaran-karana)

as if one

has been

lifted

out

of one's

particular

condition;

(b)

a sense of elevated

joy

or

bliss

(ananda);

(c)

a

sense of

surprise

or charm or wonder

(camatkira);

(d)

a

sense

of

profound harmony

or

appro-

priateness

(aucitya);

and

(e)

a

sense

of relaxed

tranquility

(visranti).36

Crucial

to

understand, however,

is that this realization

of

rasa

is evoked

by

one of

the

functions

of

language-namely,

language

in its function

of

vyahjana

or

"suggestion."

Hence,

it is

clearly

savikalpa

and can endure

only

so

long

as

the

vikalpa-medium

endures,

through

which

it is

evoked.

The ultimate

experi-

ence of the

yogin,

however,

according

to

classical

Yoga

traditions

of India and

according

to

Abhinavagupta

(and,

of

course,

to the Buddhists

as

well),

is

always

nirvikalpa;

and,

hence,

the

realization

of

rasa is an

important yet

finally

rather

pale

foretaste

of

that

final

"tasting"

of brahman.37One

might say

that

rasa-dhvani

brings

one to the

boundary

between

savikalpa

and

nirvikalpa

and

as such becomes

an

important

discovery

or

perspective

for those

attempting

to

express

symbolically

the

inexpressible.

Nevertheless,

rasa-dhvani

clearly

operates

in a

linguistic

environment

and thus

can never

be

more than

a

foretaste

of that

which

is

nirvikalpa.

This fundamental

distinction

between

nirvikalpa

and

savikalpa

is one of

the basic reasons

why

in

the

recent debate between

Masson and

Patwardhan,

on

one

side,

and

Gerow

and

Aklujkar,

on the

other,

the latter

two

are

probably

correct

in their

suggestion

that the

problem

of

santa-rasa

must

have been

something

of

an

embarrassment

to

Abhinavagupta;38

for to

admit the

possi-

bility

of

sinta-rasa

is

precisely

to break

down

the distinction between

savikalpa-

experience

and

nirvikalpa-experience

which

would

surely

have been

unaccept-

able

to

Abhinavagupta.

As a

result,

Abhinavagupta

reinterprets

santa-rasa,

making

it

into the

rasa

of rasas or the

ground

rasas and

suggesting

that its

sthayibhava

is

not nirveda

but

rather

tattva-jhiana-in

other

words,

lifting

isnta-rasa

out

of its

context

qua

rasa and

transmuting

it

to the

level of

brahmisvida.39

The fundamental

distinction

between

nirvikalpa

and

savikalpa

is

probably

also a

basic

reason

for

Abhinavagupta's

need to

reinterpret

Bhartrhari.

Whether

for this

shift or

con-

Abhinavagupta

himself

is

responsible

for this

shift or

perhaps

simply

con-

solidates

what other

Kashmir

Saivas

had been

suggesting

makes little difference.

Bhartrhariasserts

that

sabda-brahman

s

equivalent

to the

level

ofpasyant7,

and

this

by

implication

suggests

the

well-known

view of the

grammarians

that

experience

is

always

savikalpa

and cannot

be

nirvikalpa.40

Abhinavagupta

takes

over

many

of Bhartrhari's

views,

but

on this issue

makes

an

important

 

379

addition.

He

suggests

a

category beyond

the level of

pasyanti,

which he calls

para-vik, equating

it with the level

of

pure

sakti

or

svatantryasakti

n the

scheme

of

thirty-six

tattvas,

thus

preserving

a

place

for

nirvikalpa-experience

and

at

the same time still

providing

an

important

place

for

Bhartrhari's

linguistic

philosophy.

In

the

area

of

language

and

aesthetics,

therefore,

Abhinavagupta

works out

an

interesting

synthesis

of older traditions.41

Anvitibhidhina,

abhihitinvaya,

sphota,

and

pratibhi

are

utilized

in

bringing

forth a new

aesthetic

vision-the

theory

of

rasa-dhvani-which

aesthetic

vision

is linked in a

pro-

vocative

or evocative manner

in

the

homology

with

brahmisvada,

the

latter

being

preserved

in

its essence as

nirvikalpa,

while

allowing

the

savikalpa

dimensions

to

stand

very

much in the

way

construed

by

Bhartrhari

in

his

analysis

of

pasyanti,

madhyami,

and

vaikhar.

In

this

synthesis

Abhinavagupta

accomplishes

two

exceedingly

important

results.

First,

he

succeeds

in

consoli-

dating

a new

interpretation

of the

function of

language

(namely,

rasa-dhvani

or

vyahjana),

thereby greatly

expanding

the

expressive power

of

words and

sentences.

Second,

he succeeds in

preserving

the

transcendence of

brahmanor

parama-siva

as

nirvikalpa

or

visvottlrna,

while

at the same time

homologizing

the

"tasting"

of

the transcendent with the

"tasting"

of

the

aesthetic,

thereby

opening up

the

possibility

of

an

interesting

dialectic between

spiritual

experience

and other kinds of

experience.

(2)

Theosophy

or

"metaphilosophy."

As was

true

in

the

preceding

discus-

sion of

language

and

aesthetics,

so also

on the level of his

theosophy

or

"meta-

philosophy," Abhinavagupta

is

working

in

a

framework

that

presupposes

older traditions

of

Indian

philosophy.

In one

passage

of

his

Isvarapraty-

abhijhivivrtivimarsinT,

or

example,

he

explicitly

indicates that

his own

views

represent

an assimilation and

correction

of

Samkhya

and

other

dualisms,

Advaita Vedanta

and

Vijinanavada

Buddhist

thought.

The

truth would

be

established

and all could

agree,

says

Abhinavagupta,

in

that

manner of

special

pleading

so

typical

of an Indian

pandita

and

at

the same

time

so

irritating

to

opponents,

if

only

the

Agamikas

would

give

up

their

dualism,

if

the

Advaita

Vedantins

would

finally

admit that

miya

is an

inherent and

active

power

in

the

ultimate,

and if

the

Yogacarins

would

concede

that their

momentary

consciousness-only requires

an

ultimate source

in

brahman or

parama-siva.42

Abhinavagupta

knows full

well,

of

course,

that his

opponents

will

not

concede

these

points,

but the

passage

is

interesting

in

terms of

revealing

the

direction

of

Abhinavagupta's

own

thinking

and in

calling

attention to

the

sources he

was

using

and

appropriating

for his own

philosophical

reflection.

For

the

ultimate

or

is

in

its

essence

For

Abhinavagupta

the

ultimate

or

parama-siva

is

in

its

deepest

essence

totally

transcendent-that

is to

say,

visvottTrna

nd anuttara.

It is

finally

an

unfathomable

mystery.43

Yet

this

mysterious

ultimate shines in

its

clarity,

and in

that

shining

is the

presupposition

or

ground

for all

manifestation.

Hence,

the

totally

transcendent

(visvottirna)

is

also

the

totally

immanent

(visvamaya)

as universal consciousness

(samvid,

cit),

as

universal

joy

(ananda),

and as

 

380

Larson

prakdsavimarsamaya-that

is

to

say,

made

up

of

"pure

undifferentiated

light

or

clarity" (prakasa)

and

"pure

unhindered

awareness"

(vimarsa).

Prakasa

or

pure

clarity

implies

perfect

knowledge

and

is the

ground

or

source for all

knowing

or

jhana-sakti.

Vimarsa

or

pure

unhindered

awareness

implies

com-

plete

spontaneity

or

freedom

(svitantryasakti)

and

is

the

ground

or

source

for all

activity

or

kriya-sakti. Moreover,

vimarsa

as

unhindered

awareness

is

pure

intuitive

illumination,

a

kind of

ultimate

pratibha,

which is

the

ground

or

source for

the

creative

urge

(iccha-sakti,

para-vak)

and

which is

the

ground

or

source for

bringing

into

being

(bhavand)

all

levels of

meaning.

Such

pure

clarity

and

pure

unhindered

awareness

presuppose,

on

the

one

hand,

a

com-

plete

subjectivity

(ahantd)

and a

continuing,

exhilarating

wonder or

surprise

(camatkira)

at the

very

being-ness

of

one's

own

being

so

to

speak.

This same

realization,

however,

on

the

other

hand,

also

presupposes

a

depth

or

fullness

in

awareness,

a

complete

objectivity

(idanta).

Pure

consciousness

encompasses

and

sublimates,

in

other

words,

both

pure

subjectivity

and

pure

objectivity;

not,

however,

by

the

absolute

negation

of

the two

modes

but rather

by

a

brdadening

or a

sublimation of

the

modes.

This

"final"

broadening

or

sublimation is

nirvikalpa

and

hence

goes

beyond

what

language

is

capable

of

denoting,

implying,

or

suggesting.

Yet

this

inexpressible

and

ineffable

ultimate is the

very ground

or

presupposition

for

all

language,

and

more than

that,

the

very ground

or

presupposition

for all

manifestation.

Abhinavagupta

subsumes all of

these

analyses

under

what he

symbolically

calls

the

"pure"

creation,

including

the tattvas of

siva, sakti,

sadisiva,

isvara,

and

suddha-vidyd.

He also

symbolically

relates this

"pure"

creation to

the

Saivite theism of

Mahesvara and

Sakti and

correlates the

various

levels of

emergence

with

various

mantras and

worlds.

Clearly,

however,

his

analysis

is

not theistic in

the sense

of

the usual Vaisnava and

Saiva

theologies,

and

hence

my preference

for

characterizing

Abhinavagupta's

vision

as a

Theosophy

or

perhaps

a

"meta-

philosophy."44

Apart

from

the

structures or

possibilities

of the

"pure"

creation,

Abhina-

vagupta goes

on to

characterize the

"impure"

or,

perhaps

better,

the

realized

or

expressed

creation,

which he

breaks down for

the sake of

exposition

into

the

miay-realm,

the

prakrti-realm,

and the

prthivT-realm.45

The

maya-realm

has for

its structures what

Abhinavagupta

and

the Kashmir

Saivas

call

the

pahca-kahcukas

or

five

coverings

of

determinate

becoming

(kala);

determinate

of

limited

knowing (vidya);

determinate

enjoyment (raga);

determinate time

of

past, present,

and

future

(kala);

and

determinate location in

space (niyati).

In

other

words,

the

miay-realm

is

the structure of

finitude or

finite

existence,

and

provides

the

presupposition

for

the

purusa (the

finite

self

or

anu).46

The

prakrti-realm

includes

buddhi,

ahamkira, manas,

the

five

sense-capacities,

the

five

action-capacities

and the

five subtle

elements,

and is

the

sphere

of

the three

gunas (sattva,

rajas

and

tamas)-the

whole

realm

functioning

precisely

as

in

the

analysis

of classical

Samkhya,

with the

important exception

that

prakrti

 

381

is

construed

pluralistically.47

The

prthivT-realm

s,

of

course,

the

explicit, gross

reality

of the

mahabhitas.

The

"impure"

creation-that

is to

say,

the

maiyi-

realm,

the

prakrti-realm

and

the

prthivi-realm-is

characterized

respectively

by

the defilement of

finitude

(.nava-mala),

the

defilement of the

subject-object

dichotomy

(miyTya-mala),

and

the defilement

of

ordinary

existential

action

having

samsaric

(or

the

karma-mala).48

Finally,

it should

be

noted that

these three

realms-namely,

maya,

prakrti,

and

prthiv--are sym-

bolically

correlated with

various

mantras,

deities

and worlds

as was true

for

the

higher

or

"pure"

creation.

All of these levels of

emergence,

according

to

Abhinavagupta

and

the

Kashmir Saivas

(ranging

from the

highest, "pure"

sakti-level

all the

way

through

the

lower

"impure"

myii,

prakrti,

and

prthivT-levels)

re

manifesta-

tions or reflections

(tbhasa)

of

universal

consciousness,

either in its mode

as

subjectivity

(ahanta

or

jTvibhisa)

or

in its

mode as

objectivity

(idanta

or

ja.dibhasa).49

All

of

manifested

or reflected

reality,

therefore,

is of

the

nature

of

consciousness-only,

and these

objective

and

subjective

modes

or s'aktis

of

consciousness

are construed as

being

momentary

reflections

of

the

highest

level of

pure,

unhindered awareness

(that

is,

of

vimarsa,

svdtantrya.akti,

or

pari-vdik)

and of

pure,

radiant

light

(that

is,

prakisa,

samtmid).

n terms of

metaphors

or similes this manifest

world of reflections

on

all

levels is

compared

to the realm

of

remembrance,

or the realm

of

pure

imagination,

or the realm

of

yogic

creation.

Also,

the manifest world

as reflection

is

compared

to the

images

in a

mirror,

or the

images

on a

bhitti,

that

is to

say,

the screen

or wall

on

which

images

are

cast

in a

theatrical

production.50

These reflections

or

ibhiisas

spontaneously

shine

forth,

remain

for a

moment,

and then subside.

They

are

symbolically

described

as

the threefold

process

of

creating

(srsti),

standing

forth

(sthiti),

and

withdrawing

(samhara),

and

though

these three

processes

reside

ontologically

in universal

consciousness

(samvid),

they

are

epistemologically

arranged

or

construed

according

to the

karmic

transactions that

take

place

on the

level of the

"impure"

creation.

According

to

Abhinavagupta

and the

Kashmir

Saivas, however,

there are

two additional

processes

or

powers

that are to

ordinary

karmic

transactions,

but

are

due

rather to the

unhindered awareness

or

will,

the

svdtantryasakti

of

universal

consciousness. These two additional

and

are the

tirodhana-

sakti

(the

veiling

or

concealing

capacity

of

universal

consciousness)S1

and

the

anugraha-sakti

the

gracious

or

welcoming

capacity

of

universal

consciousness).

Usually

these

capacities

are

interpreted

theologically

in terms

of

the

veiling

I and

the Kashmir

and the

grace

of

the

Lord,

but

I

suspect

that

Abhinavagupta

and

the Kashmir

Saivas

are

interested in more at

this

point

than a

theological interpretation.

I

think,

rather,

that

they

are

attempting

to

say something

about

the nature

of

universal

consciousness

and the related

problem

of

epistemology.

Universal

consciousness as

svatantryasakti,

as

I have

already pointed

out,

in

its

very

nature

is the

intuitive

urge

to

express

as indicated

in the notions

of

iccha-sakti,

 

382

Larson

pratibhd,

bhdvana,

and

pari-vik.

No

intelligible

account

is

given

for

this

inherent

urge

or

desire. The

Kashmir Saivas

here

simply

follow older

traditions

and

speak

about the

play

or

sport

of

brahman.Unlike

Advaitins,

however,

the

Kashmir Saivas do

not

finally

strip

brahmanof all

predication

and

account

for

multiplicity solely

on the

basis

of an

unintelligible

(anirvacaniya) avidyd

and

maya.

The Kashmir

Saivas,

to

be

sure,

make use of the terms

mayai

and

avidya,

but

they

offer an

interpretation

of

these

notions,

which

attempts

to maintain

a

relation between the

one and

the

many, unity

and

or

the absolute

and

relative.

Insofar as universal consciousness

encompasses

subjectivity,

it is

pure,

self-awareness

and

wonder or

surprise

(camatkara)

at

its own creative illumination

(aham-vimarsa);

and insofar

as consciousness

encompasses

objectivity,

it is sheer

presence

or fullness to itself

(idam-

vimarsa).52

Any

expression

of

this awareness or

fullness, however,

presupposes

or

requires

vikalpa-in

other

words,

it

requires

limitation, differentiation,

the

isolation of

subject

and

object

in a

verbal

judgment

or

statement.

Any

expres-

sion,

in other

words,

is

by

definition

tirodhana-sakti,

a

veiling

or

concealing

in the sense that relata and relations

are

established

which

isolate,

or differentiate

what,

in

fact,

cannot be

isolated or differentiated.

As

a

result,

ignorance

and

error

are

basically privations

or

lacks.

Universal consciousness

appears

as

what it is not-that

is to

say,

the

Self

appears

in the

not-self,

and not-self

appears

the Self.

Miya,

then,

is not

unintelligible

(anirvacanlya)

but,

rather,

the

nonbeing

of the not-self.

Tirodhdna-sakti,

n

other

words,

is

apohana-sakti

(a

or or

an

unavoidable

result

in

the

very

act of

expression

or

vikalpa,

an

act

which

leads,

respectively,

to

the

mdyi,

prakrti

and

prthiv7

realms.53

At

the

same

time, however,

this

very

act

of

expression

as differentiation

suggests

a

negation

of the first

negation.

This

second

negation

cannot itself be

expressed

(for

obviously

that would be further

vikalpa

or

infinite

regress),

but

it is

always suggested,

or it hovers

or

it

haunts

any expression.

Thus,

expression

always

points

beyond

itself to

that

which can

only

be

suggested

or evoked but

never

articulated.

This

second

negation,

then,

sparks

a

nirvikalpa-experience

and is

what,

I

would

suggest, Abhinavagupta

and the Kashmir

Saivas

mean

by

anugraha-sakti.

Moreover,

this

"suggested"

but

inexpressible overcoming

of differentiation

is

what

is

meant

by

the

Kashmir

Saiva

notion

of

pratyabhijhi

or

"re-cognition,"

wherein I

come

to

recognize

what has

always

been

true-namely,

to

use

Hegelian

terminology,

that sub-

stance

finally

is

subject

and that

subject

is

finally

the sublimated

fullness

(idam)

and awareness

(aham)

of universal consciousness.

Ordinarily

I

do not so

"re-cognize" my

true

nature,

for

I

am involved

and,

indeed,

choose to be

involved

in

seemingly

endless

differentiation

or

vikalpa-distinctions.

At

any

point,

however,

the

anugraha-sakti

s

present

if I would but

see

it.

It is

for

this

reason,

I

would

suggest,

that

Abhinavagupta

and the

pratyabhijhi-school

of

Kashmir

Saivism talk about

"instantaneous

grace,"

for

they

are not

at

all

 

383

concerned

about the

arbitrary

will

of

some

deity,

but rather with

the

very

nature

of universal consciousness

itself.54

(3)

Interrelations

between

the

linguistic-aesthetic

and

the

theosophical

and a

comparison

with Advaita.

If

my exposition

of

Abhinavagupta's thought

is

in

any

sense

correct,

it can be

argued

that

Abhinavagupta's

Kashmir

Saivism

differs

from

Advaita

monism in

interesting

and

important ways. Although

both traditions are monistic

and

although

the

Kashmir

Saivas

have

been

clearly

influenced

by

Advaita

thought,

both traditions

move

finally

in

almost

opposite

ways.

Whereas

Advaita

characterizes the relation between

brahman

and the manifest world as vivartavada

(the

theory

of

appearance),

Abhinava-

gupta

and the Kashmir

Saivas

speak

rather

of

abhasavada

(the

theory

of

reflection).

Whereas

Advaita

suggests

that

miiy

and

avidya

are

finally

anir-

vacaniya,

Abhinavagupta

and

the Kashmir Saivas

speak

rather about

apohana

or

tirodhana-sakti

(differentiation

as

negation).

Whereas Advaita

suggests

that error is

finally

anirvacanlyakhyati,

Abhinavagupta

and the

Kashmir

Saivas

speak

rather about

akhyati

or

svarupakhyiti

(the

nonrecognition

of

nondistinction).

Whereas Advaita characterizes the

absolute in

terms of

sat,

cit, ananda,

Abhinavagupta

and

the Kashmir

Saivas

refuse to

exclude the

dimensions of

vimarsa,

svatantryasakti,

or

iccha

in the

very being

of

the absolute.

Most

important,

however,

is a difference

regarding

the

role and function of

language

in the two

systems,

and

this difference can

be

clarified

by bringing

together

the

linguistic-aesthetic

dimension of

Abhinavagupta's thought

with

the

theosophical.

For

Abhinavagupta

what

appears

to be

important

is

the

fullness or one

might

even

say

the "concretion" of

the ultimate or

absolute,

which

sublimates

subjectivity

and

objectivity,

is

nirvikalpa

and is

actively

present throughout

the manifested

or

reflected world on all

levels. Such an

ultimate

or

absolute can

only

be

suggested

or

evoked,

and

hence it was

probably

no accident that

Abhinavagupta

was

preoccupied

with

that dimension of the

vikalpa-realm

which comes

closest

to

evoking

or

manifesting

the

ultimate-

namely,

the

aesthetic

or

suggestive

use of

language

as

found in

poetry

and

drama. With the

rasa-dhvani

theory

Abhinavagupta

was

able

to

point

to

a

function of

language

which

opens,

enriches and

expands

our

awareness,

not in

the

direction of

abstraction but rather in the

direction of a

resonant fullness

wherein

ordinary

differentiations of

time,

space, ego,

and

so

on,

are

sublimated.

For

Advaitins,

on the

other

hand,

what

appears

to

be

important

is

the

vacuity,

emptiness,

or sheer

abstraction of

the ultimate or

absolute,

which is

nirvikalpa

but

radically

discontinous with the

manifest world.

Advaita

appears

to move

in a

direction of

rigid,

numerical

oneness

purged

or

purified

of all

distinctions.55

It was

probably

not an

accident, therefore,

that

Advaitins

generally rejected

the

theory

of dhvani or

vyahjana

as a

function of

language

and

were

rather

pre-

occupied

with the

problem

of

identity-propositions.

Advaitins,

for

example,

as

Kunjunni

Raja points

out,

were

quite

interested in

the

variety

of

metaphor

 

384 Larson

known as

jahadajahallaksanai

or

bhdgatyagalaksanag,

wherein a

portion

of

primary

denotation can be

preserved

in a

verbal

judgment

while other

portions

can

be

rejected.56

This

enabled

the

Advaitin

to

interpret

such

mahavakyini

as

"tat

tvam

asi"

as

identity-propositions-that

is

to

say,

the

pure

consciousness

in the

individual soul

is identified

with the

pure

consciousness

in

the Universal

Soul.57

Finally,

of

course,

both

the

Kashmir Saivas

and the

Advaitins have to

admit

that

the ultimate

or

the absolute

transcends

conceptualization

and

expression,

and as such the two

systems

are

closely

allied.

When

one

begins

to

resonate

to or

intuit

the

"symptoms"

of the absolute which the two

systems

evoke or

point

to, however,

the

resulting

intuitive realizations

appear

to

be

interestingly

different.

CONCLUSION

I

have tried

to show in this article that

(1)

Abhinavagupta

not

only appropriates

but reworks

the

views

of

the

older

grammarian philosophers

and alamkirikas

in terms

of

developing

the notion of

vyanjana

and rasa-dhvani and

that

this

notion

has

important

implications

for his overall theoretical

position;

(2)

that

he makes use

of the

homology

between rasivada

and

brahmisvdda

while

carefully refusing

to reduce

one to the

other,

thereby maintaining

an

interesting

dialectic

between

spiritual

experience

and other kinds

of

experience;

and

(3)

that

he

develops

monistic,

theosophical perspective

that

appropriates

and trans-

mutes

the Advaitin

position

in an

important

way.

Let me conclude

by suggesting

that the

force of his overall theoretical

appears

to

be

that

language,

art,

and

philosophy

are

important components

in

any adequate religious

anthropology.

Each

operates

in a

separate

sphere

and at the

same

time

provides

valuable

input

into the fullness

of

what

a

person

is and into

the

fullness of what

the ultimate

is.

A

kind of conversation

appears

to take

place

in

his intellectual

vision between

the various

aspects

of

culture,

and the

result

of

that conversation

is a

vigorous

affirmation

of the value

of man's total cultural

life.

It

is

appropriate,

I

think,

to

close

with the words of

Abhinavagupta

himself.

The

person

who comes

thus to realize

that

knowledge (jhdna)

and

activity

(kriyd)

are

solely

manifestations

of

the

svatantrya

and

that

these manifestations

are

inseparable

from

oneself

and from the

very

essence

of the

ultimate,

whose

form

is

the

Lord

(Isvararupa)-a person

in such a fashion

(iti

parimrsan),

not

partially

(but

completely),

and who

has come to see that

knowledge

and

activity

are

really

one-whatever

such

a

person

desires,

just

that

he or

she comes to show

person

is

solely given

over

to

the

practice

of "total

abiding"

(samavesa),

even

though

still

accompanied

by

a

To be

sure,

such a

while

still in the

body,

is

ajivanmukta;

but

such

body.

To be

sure,

such a

person,

while

still in the

body,

is

ajivanmukta;

but

a

person

is

even

more than

that;

for when the ultimate realization

has

come,

there

is

only paramesvara

58

 

385

NOTES

1. S. K.

De,

History

of

Sanskrit

Poetics

(Calcutta,

1960;

2d rev.

ed.),

vol.

2,

pp.

139-212;

E. Gerow

and A.

Aklujkar,

"On

Santa

Rasa

in Sanskrit

Poetics,"

Journal

of

the American

Oriental

Society

92,

no.

1

(Jan.-Mar.,

1972):

80-87;

R.

Gnoli,

trans.,

The Aesthetic

Experience

according

to

Abhinavagupta

(Varanasi,

1968;

2d rev.

ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit

Series,

vol.

47),

passim;

Subramania

Iyer,

Bhartrhari

Poona,

1969;

Silver Jubilee

Series,

68),

pp.

106ff., 128ff., 142ff.,

147ff.;

J.

L. Masson

and M. V.

Patwardhan,

Santarasa

and

Abhinavagupta's

Philosophy of

Aesthetics

(Poona,

1969;

Bhandarkar Oriental

Series,

no.

9),

passim;

V.

Raghavan,

The

Number

of

Rasas

(Adyar,

1940),

passim;

D.

S.

Ruegg,

Contributions

&

'histoire

de la

philosophie

linquistique

ndienne

(Paris,

1959;

Publications

de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne

(hereafter

PICI),

fas.

7),

passim;

and Gaurinath

Sastri,

The

Philosophy of

Word and

Meaning

(Calcutta,

1959;

Calcutta

Sanskrit

College

Research

Series,

no.

V),

see

especially pp.

1-82.

2.

Gopinath

Kaviraj,

"TheDoctrine of

Pratibha"

in

Aspects

of

Indian

Thought

Burdwan,

1966),

pp.

1-44;

K. C.

Pandey, Abhinavagupta.

An Historical and

Philosophical

Study

(Varanasi,

1963;

2d rev. ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit

Series,

vol.

1),

pp.

289-460,

461ff.;

Andre

Padoux,

Recherches

sur la

symbolique

et

l'energie

de

la

parole

dans certains

textes

tantriques

Paris,

1963; PICI,

fas.

21),

passim;

and Lilian

Silburn,

trans.,

Le

Paramarthasdra

Paris, 1957;

PICI,

fas.

5),

pp.

5-56.

3.

M. A.

Stein,

ed. and

trans.,

Kalhana's

RajatarahginT

1900;

reprint

ed.;

Delhi,

1961),

and

see

in addition

to

the text itself the useful

collateral

material

provided

by

Stein

in vol.

1,

pp.

1-145;

and volume

2,

pp.

273-494.

4.

For useful

surveys

of the

history

of

the various

religious

traditions in

Kashmir,

see the

following

(in

alphabetical

order):

P. N.

K.

Bamzai,

A

History of

Kashmir

Delhi,

1962),

pp.

84-107,

226-279;

S. C. Cultural

Heritage of

Kashmir

(Calcutta,

1965),

pp.

106ff.;

Edward

Conze,

A

Short

History of

Buddhism

Bombay,

1960),

pp.

41ff.,

64ff.,

and

87ff.;

and S. C.

Ray, Early

History

and Culture

of

Kashmir,

2d ed.

(New

Delhi,

1970),

pp.

168-174.

5.

Conze,

op.

cit.,

p.

42.

6. J. C.

Chatterji,

Kashmir Shaivism

(Srinagar, 1962),

pp.

1-14.

7.

Bamzai,

op.

cit.,

pp.

108-136.

8. K.

C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

pp.

5-6.

9.

Ibid.,

pp.

151ff.

10.

Chatterji,

op.

cit.,

pp.

15-42;

K. C.

Pandey, op.

cit.,

pp.

154ff.;

and

Silburn,

Le Para-

marthasira,

op.

cit.,

pp.

6ff.

11.

For useful

treatments

of

the

Saiva traditions

generally,

see the

following

(in

alphabetical

order):

R.

G.

Bhandarkar,

Vaisnavism,

Saivism

and Minor

Religious Systems

(reprint;

Varanasi,

1965),

pp.

102ff.;

Arabinda

Basu,

"Kashmir

Saivism"

in The

Cultural

Heritage of

India

(Calcutta,

1956),

vol.

4,

pp.

79ff.;

J. C.

Chatterji,

Kashmir

Shaivism,

op.

cit.,

pp.

15ff.;

J.

N.

Farquhar,

An

Outline

of

the

Religious

Literature

of

India

(reprint;

Delhi,

1967),

passim;

J.

Gonda,

Visnuismand

Sivaism

(Oxford,

1970),

passim;

S.

Kumaraswamiji,

"Virasaivism"

in

Cul.

Heritage of

India,

op.

cit.,

vol.

4,

pp.

98ff.;

K. A. Nilakanta

Sastri,

"An

Historical

Sketch of

Saivism" in

The

Cultural

Heritage

of

India,

vol.

4,

pp.

63ff.;

L.

N.

Sharma,

Kashmir Saivism

(Varanasi,

1972);

and K.

Siva-

raman,

Saivism

in

Philosophical Perspective (Delhi,

1973).

12.

Chatterji, op.

cit.,

pp.

15ff.

13. For a

useful

summary

of

Kalhana's

description

of

political

events

from

Avantivarman to

Queen

Didda,

see

Bamzai,

op.

cit.,

pp.

109-136. For

Kalhana's own

account,

see

Stein,

op.

cit.,

vol.

1,

pp.

186ff.

14. K. C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

pp.

3-26.

15.

Ibid.

16. P. V.

Kane,

History of

Sanskrit Poetics

4th

ed.

(Delhi,

1971

;),

pp.

236-243.

17.

K. C.

Pandey, op.

cit.,

pp.

27-77;

and

for a

good

summary

of

Pandey's longer

discussion,

see Lilian

Silburn,

Le

Paramirthasira,

op.

cit.,

pp.

9-19.

Editions of

primary

sources

consulted

for

this

paper

are

the

following: (1)

philosophical:

Abhinavagupta's

Isvarapratyabhijhavivrtivimar-

sin (Bombay,

1938-1943;

Kashmir

Series

of

Texts

and

Studies

(hereafter

KSTS),

nos.

60, 62,

and

65);

Abhinava's

Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini

r

LaghvTvrtti

Bombay,

1918 and

1921;

KSTS,

nos.

22

and

33);

Abhinava's

Paramirthasara in

Lilian

Silburn's

edition,

op.

cit.;

and

in L.

D.

Barnett,

 

386

Larson

trans.,

"The Paramarthasara

of

Abhinavagupta,"

Journal

of

the Asiatic

Society of

Great Britain

and

Ireland,

parts

3-4

(1910):

707-747;

(2)

aesthetic:

portions

of

Abhinavagupta's

Dhvanyaloka-

locana and

AbhinavabhiratT

s

found

in Masson

and

Patwardhan,

op.

cit.,

passim,

and in R.

Gnoli,

op.

cit.,

pp.

3-114;

(3)

philosophical

tantra:

Abhinavagupta's

Tantralokawith the

commentary

of

Jayaratha

called the

Viveka

(Bombay

and

Srinagar,

1918-1938;

KSTS nos.

3, 28, 30,

36, 35, 39,

41,

47, 59, 57,

and

58).

In

addition

to the works

of

Abhinavagupta,

the

following

works of the Kashmir Saiva tradition

have also been

consulted:

Ksemaraja's

Pratyabhijiihrdaya

in K.

F.

Leidecker,

trans.,

Pratyabhij-

iihrdayam:

The Secret

of Recognition

(Adyar,

1938),

and

in

J.

Singh,

trans.,

Pratyabhijhihrdayam

(Delhi, 1963);

Ksemaraja's

Pardpravesika

(Bombay,

1918;

KSTS,

no.

15);

and the

following

translations

and studies

of Lilian

Silburn:

Vatulandtha-sutra,

Le

Vijhana

Bhairava,

La Bhakti

dans

le

Sivaisme

du Kashmir

(Stavacintdmani),

La

Mahdrthamanjart

Paris,

1959, 1961,

1964

and

1968

respectively;

PICI,

fas.,

8,

15, 19,

29).

mention must be made

of K. C.

Pandey's copious

textual notices

in

Appendix

A of his

Abhinavagupta,op.

cit.,

pp.

733-907. The latter are invaluable

and essential

for

any

serious

study

of the

vast

corpus

of

Abhinavagupta.

18. E.

C.

Dimock, Jr.,

et

al.,

The Literatures

of

India. An Introduction

Chicago:

The

University

of

Chicago

Press;

1974),

pp.

136-143.

19.

Kashmir

Saivism

combines

a

strong

emphasis

on

philosophy

with an

equally

strong emphasis

on

mystical

insight

and

tantric

ritual.

It, thus,

transcends

the usual notion of

philosophy

in India

(for

example,

Samkhya, Yoga,

Vedanta,

etc.)

as

well as

the

usual notion

of

theology

(a

la

Ramanuja,

et

al.).

Insofar

as

it

provides

a foundation

or structure

for

dealing

with most of the traditional

issues

in Indian

philosophy,

it

can

be

called

a

"metaphilosophy."

Insofar

as its notions are

finally

inseparable

from

elaborate rituals

and

mystical

intuitions,

it

can

be

called a

"theosophy."

20.

For

a

useful

discussion

about the

relation between worldviews

and

aesthetic

vision,

see

Eliot

Deutsch,

Studies

in

Comparative

Aesthetics

(Honolulu:

The

University

Press of

Hawaii,

1975),

preface,

pp.

1-19,

39-74.

21.

Masson

and

op.

p.

xvii.

22.

F.

Edgerton,

"Dominant Ideas

in

the

Formation

of

Indian

Culture,"

Journal

of

the American

Oriental

Society

62,

pp.

151ff.

23.

Masson

and

Patwardhan,

op.

cit.,

pp.

1-24;

and

Gnoli,

op.

cit.,

pp.

xx-xxvi.

24.

Gnoli,

op.

cit.,

p.

xxvi,

and for

Sanskrit,

see

p.

48.

25.

Ibid.,

pp.

45-48,

and for

Sanskrit,

see

p.

10.

26.

See Masson

and Patwardhan's

excellent

collection

of

passages

on the

issue,

op.

cit.,

pp.

60ff.

27.

Gnoli,

op.

cit.,

p.

82.

28.

Ibid.,

p.

47.

29.

It

appears

to

be

the

case that

Abhinavagupta

passed

through

three

phases

in his career:

a

tantric

phase,

an aesthetic

phase

and a

philosophical

phase.

See K. C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

pp.

41ff.;

and

Silburn,

Le

Paramarthasara,

op.

cit.,

pp.

9-19.

30. G.

Sastri,

The

Philosophy

of

Word and

Meaning, op.

cit.,

pp.

172ff.;

K.

Kunjunni

Raja,

Indian

Theories

of

Meaning,

2d ed.

(Adyar,

1969),

pp.

191ff.

31.

Ibid.

32.

G.

Sastri,

op.

cit.,

pp.

224ff.

33.

Kunjunni

Raja,

op.

cit.,

pp.

95-148;

Subramania

Iyer,

op.

cit.,

pp.

86ff.;

and

John

Brough,

"Theories

of

General

Linguistics

in the Sanskrit

Grammarians"

and "Some

Indian Theories

of

Meaning,"

both

of which

are in J.

F.

Staal, ed.,

A

Reader on

the Sanskrit Grammarians

Cambridge,

Mass.,

1972),

pp.

402-414,

and

414-423. For a useful

survey

of the

philosophy

of

language

in

India,

see J.

F.

Staal,

"Sanskrit

Philosophy

of

Language"

in T. A.

Sebeok, ed.,

Current

Trends n

Linguistics

5

(Mouton,

1969),

pp.

499-531.

34.

Gopinath

Kaviraj,

op.

cit.,

pp.

1-44.

35.

Kunjunni

Raja, op.

cit.,

pp.

275-315;

and

for

an

excellent

discussion of the

theory

of rasa-

dhvani,

see

Dimock,

et

al.,

The

Literatures

of

India,

op.

cit.,

pp.

136-143,

216-227.

36. Masson and

Patwardhan,

op.

cit,,

passim,

and

summarized,

pp.

161-164;

Gnoli,

op.

cit.,

pp.

xiv-lii.

37.

Ibid.

38. Gerow

and

Aklujkar,

op.

cit.,

p.

82.

39. Ibid.

 

387

40.

Kunjunni Raja, op.

cit.,

p.

80.

41.

Gopinath

Kaviraj,

op.

cit.,

pp.

1-44;

and K. C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

pp.

47-51. It

should be

noted here that

Abhinavagupta's

contribution with

respect

to issues in the

philosophy

of

language

and aesthetics

appears

to

be

mainly systematization

and

synthetic

exposition.

In

almost

every

instance the seminal notions-for

example,

sphota,

rasa-dhvani,

etc.-come from

elsewhere,

namely,

Bhartrhari, Anandavardhana,

et al. It was

Abhinavagupta's

genius

to relate

these notions

to one another

and

to think

holistically

about overall

theoretical

presentation.

42.

IsvarapratyabhijiivivrtivimarsinT,

ol.

3,

p.

405,

cited

in

K. C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

p.

386.

43.

Jayaratha's

comment on

Tantriloka

1,

65,

op.

cit.,

vol.

1,

p.

105

(sarvikrtih

visvamayah

nirakrtih

visvottirnah),

cited

in

K.

C.

Pandey,

op.

cit.,

p.

799.

44. The ultimate

experience

is described

by

Abhinavagupta

in

Tantriloka, 1,

41

as follows:

ksine

tu

pasusamskare

pumsah pripta-parasthiteh

/

vikasvaram

tadvijiina.m

paurusam nirvikalpakam

/

op.

cit.,

p.

78.

45. For a

summary

exposition

of these levels of

emergence

(namely,

sakti,

miyd,

prakrti

and

prthvT),

ee

Paramarthasara,

vss.

4-22,

either in the Barnett or Silburn editions

already

cited

(see

note

17).

46.

Paramirthasdra,

vs. 17.

47.

Ibid.,

vss. 19-22.

48. See the

quote

in

Jayaratha's

commentary

on

Tantraloka

VI, 61,

op.

cit.,

p.

56:

devdilndm

ca

sarvesiim

bhavinaim

rividham

malam

/

tatra

api

kirmam

eva

ekam

mukhyam

samsirakaranam

//

and cited in K. C.

Pandey, p.

816.

49.

For a useful discussion of the

theory

of

abhasa

in

Abhinavagupta,

see

chapter

4 of

K.

C.

Pandey, op.

cit.,

pp.

382-427.

50. K.

C.

Pandey, op.

cit.,

p.

326.

51.

Ibid.,

pp.

440ff.

52. See

notes

44

and 49.

53. In

ITvarapratyabhijhC-vimarsinm

1.37),

Abhinavagupta

describesjhiina-sakti,

smrti-sakti,

and

apohana-sakti. Abhinavagupta

concludes:

anena

saktitrayena

visve

vyavaharaih

tac ca

bhagavata

eva

saktitraya

m-yat

tathabhitinubhavitr-smartr-vikalpayitr-svabhava-caitramaitrddyavabhasanam

/

sa

eva

hi

tena tena

vapusa anati,

smarati

vikalpayati

ca

/,

op.

cit.,

vol.

1,

pp.

110-111.

54.

For a useful discussion of

anugraha

and

the various means for

liberation,

see

Silburn,

Le

Paramirthasara,

op.

cit.,

pp.

41-56.

55.

For a

helpful

discussion of

Advaita

monism

vis-a-vis Saiva

monism,

see K.

Sivaraman,

op.

cit.,

pp.

127-152.

56.

Kunjunni Raja, op.

cit.,

pp.

251-254.

57.

Ibid.

58.

Isvarapratyabhijhi-vimarsin7

V.1.15,

op.

cit.,

p.

269. The

Sanskrit

of

the

kiriki or

verse

together

with

Abhinavagupta's

comment is as follows:

evam

adhikiracatustayoktam

yad

vastu

tatphalam

aha

evam

atmdnam

etasya

atmdnam

etasya

samyagjiinakriye

tathi

/

janan yatha Ipsitin

pasyan

jniiti

ca

karoti

ca

//15//

evam

iti,

ivararupam

itmanam

tasya

ca

svavyatirikte

svitantryamiitraripejhiinakriye inan

evam-

bhuto

'yam

dtmd na tu

kniid

adidarsitah,

ittham ca

jiinakriye

na tu

tasya vyatirikte

kecana,-iti

pardmrsan yad

yad

icchati tat

taj

janati

karoti

ca

samdvessaparo

'nena eva

sarTrena;

tatparas

tu

sati dehe

jivanmuktas

tatpite paramesvara

eva

iti

//15 //

Lilian

Silburn renders

Abhinavagupta's

comment in a less

literal and more

elegant way

as

follows:

"L'homme

qui

a

longuement

pratiqu

1'ensevelissement n

Siva

(samivesa)

et

a

la

pleine

reconnaissance

de

ses

energies

de

connaissance et

d'activite

comme

etant

la

pure

autonomie du

Seigneur, peut

alors

connaitre et

faire

tout

ce

qu'il

desire

bien

qu'il

soit encore

associe

a

un

corps.

II

est

non

seulement

un

jivanmukta,

libere

vivant au sens

ordinaire

du

mot,

mais

il

est

foncierement

libre car

il utilise a

son

gre

les

pouvoirs

divins

propres

a Paramesvara et

vit dans une

liberte eternelle."

See

Silburn,

Le

Paramarthasara,

op.

cit.,

pp.

54-55.