• BTI developed and implemented a local budget transparency index and a website, the “Cameroon Budget Inquirer,” whichpresents the national public investment budget using appeal-inggraphics.AFacebook pagecreatedundertheinitiativewith 2,138 “friends”fromtheNorthwestRegionallowsinterestedciti-zenstoexchangeviewsonbudgettransparencyandallowedtheWorldBankteamtoremotelysuperviseactivitiesunderthepilot.

• Inorder tobuild capacity, over 30 workshops were organized totrainheadsofschoolsandhealthcentersonhowtofill out simplified budget templates andtoexplaintherolesofdifferentstakeholders, including principals, health center managers, localofficials and mayors, during budget dissemination meetings. Aworkshop to train journalists onhowtoinvestigateandreportonbudget-relatedissueswasalsoconducted.

Results Anecdotal evidence shows that activities under the BTI were suc-cessfulin:

• Increasing tax revenues. Inatleastonelocalcouncil(NgaoundereIII), taxrevenues increasedafterabudgetdisseminationsessionbecausethecouncilmanagedtoraiseXAF763,400 (US$1,527) incattletaxesforthefirsttime.ThemayorattributesthechangetoactivitiesundertheBTI.

• Empowering parent-teacher associations (PTAs). ParentsreducedtheirPTAcontributionsby50percent(fromUS$4toUS$2)atoneschoolafteritsbudgetwasdisclosedbecausetheyfeltthattheschool’sofficialfundsweresufficientformostofitsneeds.

• Increasing trust between citizens and officials. Disclosingbudgetinformationanddirectlyengagingcitizensincreasedtheirtrustinofficials,improvingrelationshipsbetweenthem.Forinstance,dur-ingaBTIradioprogram,themayorofthecouncilofNgaoundereIcouldclarifyacaller’squestionaboutabridgehehadpromisedtobuild.

• Influencing priorities. Secondary-schoolstudentsuseddissemi-nationmeetingstoexpresstheirprioritiesandconcerns;insomecases,theywereabletoinfluenceschoolprioritiesanddecisionsonresourceallocation.

Context Despite relatively strong economic growth in recent years, ser-vicedeliverycontinues tobepoor inCameroon.Whencomparedto other countries in the region, Cameroon lags behind on manyhumandevelopment indicators and is unlikely tomeet any of theMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsby2015.AnimportantreasonforthisisCameroon’sweakgovernance,asevidencedbyitsconsistentlylowscore on theMo-Ibrahim governance index (45 outof 100 in 2012)andalowrankingonthe2012CorruptionPerceptionIndex(144).Asforbudgettransparency,Cameroonscoredonly10outof100ontheOpenBudgetIndexin2012.Thisreflectsthefactthatwhilebudgetsarepublicdocumentsaccessibletoallcitizens inprinciple, inprac-tice, budget information is difficult to come by because of politi-cal,administrative,capacity,andlogisticalconstraintsaswellascostbarriers at all tiersof government, includingnational, regional, andmunicipallevels,andatservice-deliverypointslikeschoolsandhealthcenters.Toaddressthisproblem,aGovernancePartnershipFacility(GPF)-financed initiative has piloted a citizen-centered approachfor disseminating simplified budget information for 151 schools, 58healthcenters,28municipalities,regionaladministrationsfrom2ofCameroon’s10regions,andthenationalpublicinvestmentbudget.

ACtions (2011–13) • TheBudgetTransparencyInitiative(BTI)pilotedanewapproach

to simplify, analyze, and disclose budgets at multiple levels (i.e.,national,district,healthcenter,andschool)andtobuildtheawareness and capacity of government officials at various lev-elsaswellascitizenstopromoteapublicdialogueaboutpublicexpenditures,therebyincreasingsocialaccountability.

• BTI introduced transparency into budget processes to reducewasteandcorruptionandtofosterthedemandfordisclosureoffinancialinformation.ThiswasaccomplishedintwopilotregionsofCameroonbyactively engaging citizens and soliciting their feedback.

• Activitiesprimarilytargetedhealthclinicusersandstaff,parents,teachers,students,localcommunities,mayors,localcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs),andthemedia inover230 institutions (151schools,58healthcenters,and28municipalities).Theycreated awareness and engaged citizens through radio programs, the-ater and art competitions, and newly-established student bud-get clubs.

• BTIorganized and facilitated over 200 public meetings inlocalcommunities during which budgets were read out and citizenfeedbackgathered.

A1.1. Simplifying and Disseminating Budget Information to Increase Citizen Feedback and Reduce Waste and Corruption

Country:CameroonSectors:Education;Health;PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(Decentralization,PublicFinance)Levels:Local;National;ProvincialName of Project:BudgetTransparencyInitiativeAreas of Engagement:BudgetSimplification;CapacityBuilding;Dissemination

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At the subnational level, where budgets impact citizens mostdirectly,thiscanbeachievedthroughpublicmeetings,localandsocialmedia,andentertainmentapproachesliketheater.Atthenational level,awebsitevisualizingbudget information inuser-friendlywaysisapromisingapproach.

• An index tobenchmark local governmentbudget transparencycan spur greater transparency and improved performance ifimplementedrepeatedly.

RefeRenCes CameroonBudgetInquirer:http://cameroon.openspending.org/en/

Facebookpage:https://www.facebook.com/budgettransparencyinitiative.cameroon?fref=ts

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• Reducing corruption. A school principal was forced to returnmisappropriatedfunds(XAF10million,approximatelyUS$20,000)afterstudentsandparentsrevealedthathehadraisedfeesforitems already covered by the lump sum registration fees. Inanothercase,aCSOgalvanizedbyBTIexposedacorrupthealthofficial.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • Forbudgetstoresult infeedbackfromcitizens,betterpolicies,

andmoreefficientresourceallocations,budgetsnotonlyneedtobemadepublicbutalsosimplifiedandproactivelydisseminated.

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• Once the memorandum was signed by the minister, REGEDengaged in working sessions with the budget minister’s office todiscusstheissueshighlightedinthememorandumandhelpedtheministrydevelopaCitizensBudget.

• As a civil society representative in the Economic GovernanceThematic Group, REGED participated in the committees that produced the March 2010 Strategic Plan for Public Finance Reform and played a key role in introducing the concept of “citizen oversight” in the strategic plan.

Results • Release of hitherto unpublished budget documents.Bytheend

ofSeptember2010,thegovernmenthadmadethebudgetsum-mary,aCitizensBudget,theenactedbudget,andin-yearreportspublic. As a result, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s overallscoreroseto6inthe2010OBI.Thegovernmentalsopublishedtheexecutive’sbudgetproposalfor2010,butdidsoafterthecut-offdateusedbytheOBStoassessthepublicavailabilityofdocu-ments.Ifthisdocumenthadbeenpublishedinatimelymanner,theOBSscorewouldhavebeenmuchhigher.

• Enactment of laws promoting budget transparency. Soonafterthereleaseofthestrategicplanforpublicfinancereform,newlawswereenactedthatfurtherentrenchedbudgettransparency.Law No. 10/010 ofApril 27, 2010,which relates toprocurementcontracts,hasseveralprovisionstopromotefiscaltransparency,includingArticle6 thatestablishesprerequisites forpublicpro-curement, the integration of needs assessments within budgetplanning,andcompliancewithdisclosurerequirementsandtrans-parency.TheprovisionsofArticle17,whichenshrinetheprincipleof bidding for public procurement, constitute important ele-mentsofdisclosurebecausethelawmandatesalloffersbepub-lishedinthepressforseveralweeks.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms LeveragingtheWorldBank’sconveningpowertobringtogethercivilsociety organizations that are willing to engage in evidence-basedadvocacywithrelevantgovernmentstakeholdershasthepotentialtoresultinsignificantimprovementsinbudgettransparency.

RefeRenCes InternationalBudgetPartnershipWebsite:www.internationalbudget.org.

Schouten,Claire,andJean-PierreSamoliaMonamoto.2013.“TheImpactoftheOpenBudgetInitiativeSecretariatanditsPartnersonBudgetTransparencyintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.”CaseStudyandBackgroundPaperPreparedforOpenBudgetIndex,InternationalBudgetPartnership,February2013.

Context The 2008 Open Budget Survey (OBS) revealed that of eight keybudget documents,1 the government of the Democratic Republicof Congo only provided information on one, the enacted budget,anditonlyprovidedthatafterthebudgethadalreadybeenpassed,denyingcitizenstheopportunitytoprovideinputonthebudgetfor-mulationorexecutionprocess.Asaresult,theoverallOpenBudgetIndex(OBI)scorewas0outof100.RéseauGouvernanceEconomiqueet Démocratie (REGED), a civil society network originally launchedto support the postconflict transition process in the DemocraticRepublicofCongo,waswellawareofthereasonsforthislowscore.Government employees, for example, are generally subject toadministrative secrecy and disclose information only after receiv-ingauthorizationfromseniorofficials.Ahighlevelofadministrativesecrecyhasbeenobserved,particularlyasitrelatestodemandsforfinancial information. Furthermore, the government struggles withdatamanagementandreliability.Thedataexistsbut itscollation iscomplicatedandrequires improvedcapacity.Asingledirectorate isresponsibleformanytasks,includingdatacollection,budgetprepara-tion,andmonitoring.

ACtions (2008–11) • After the release of the 2008 OBI in February 2009, REGED

directly engaged with the ministry of budget and discussed essential documents that should be published by the govern-ment toimprovebudgettransparency.Afterthesesessions,thegovernment began publishing more budget reports in detail,startingwithquarterlyreportsdatingbacktoJanuary2009.

• REGEDorganized a workshop for civil society tointroducetheCitizensBudgetandhelda workshop for journalists ontheeightkeybudgetdocumentsoftheOBS.Italsotrained media on how to follow the parliamentary debate on the budget law andhowtodiscusstaxationandbudgetinformationontelevision.

• REGEDprepared a memorandum fortheministerofbudget.Thememorandumcalledforthereleaseofdocuments,thedevelop-mentandpublicationofaCitizensBudget,andtheneedtoworkwithofficialsforjointownershipofbudgettransparencyrequire-ments.Concurrently,ittrained provincial assemblies on budget transparency in7ofthe11provinces,held formal and informal meetings with parliamentarians and advisers, and submitted formal proposals and briefing notes to government officials toexplainandgarnersupportforthememorandum.

1.Theseeightkeybudgetdocuments includethepre-budgetstatement,theexecutive’sbudgetproposal,theenactedbudget,theCitizensBudget,in-yearreports,themid-yearreview,theyear-endreport,andtheauditreport.

A1.2. Using the Open Budget Index to Promote Budget Transparency

Country:DemocraticRepublicofCongoSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level:NationalImplementing Organization:RéseauGouvernanceEconomiqueetDémocratieAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;CapacityBuilding;CitizensBudgets;Legislatures

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Results • Large volume of SMSs received. Over250,000SMSshavegone

out,ofwhich100,000arereceivedmessagesfromthepopulation.Evidencesuggeststhatevenfarmersfromfarflungvillages(whocannottraveltomeetings)havesuccessfullysentinvotesarticu-latingtheirpriorities.

• Better allocation of resources. Asseniorofficialspointout,thishassubstantially improvedtheirunderstandingofwhatcitizenswantandhasallowedthemtoreadjustbudgetsaccordingly.Theyhadassumedthathealthandeducationwerepriorities,buttheyfoundoutthatwhatwasinfactmoreimportantwasinfrastruc-ture(e.g.,buildingbridgesbetweenschoolsandfarmingareas).

• Increase in transfer of funds from provincial to local level. Astheprovincialgovernmentseesanincreasingcapacityofthelocalgovernmenttobetterallocateresources,communitiesinvolvedhavealreadyseenanincreaseintransfer(andregularity)offundsfromtheprovincialtothelocallevel.

• Reduction in tax evasion. Thepreliminaryresultsofanexternalevaluationsuggestareductionoftaxevasionatthelocal level,withcitizensmorewillingtopaytaxesastheylinkgovernmentspendingtoanimprovementinthedeliveryofservices.

• Greater trust and enthusiasm among citizens. Inasurveycon-ductedin2012,70percentindicatedthattrustbetweencitizensandtheleadersofthelocalgovernmentshasbeenstrengthenedthroughout the process and 92 percent of citizens said theywouldenthusiasticallyparticipateinthenewcycleofparticipa-torybudgetingin2012–13.

• Replication of the model in other countries. ThemobileusageexperiencesinSouthKivuhavebeenreplicatedintheDominicanRepublic,Cameroon,andBrazil.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Infragilecontexts,wherelevelsoftrustarelowandcitizenshardtoreach—bothbecauseofalackoftrustandbecauseofthelimitedreach of the state—information and communication technologytoolscanprovetobepowerfulforenhancingcitizenparticipationinbudgetsfromadistance.Ashighlightedabove,alargenumberofcitizens were able to make their investment priorities heard, eventhoughtheywerenotattheassemblymeetingswhereinvestmentdecisionsweremade.

RefeRenCes Estefan,Felipe,andBorisWeber.2012.“Mobile-EnhancedParticipatoryBudgetingintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.”blogs.worldbank.org. February13.http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/mobile-enhanced-participatory-budgeting-in-the-drc.

Powerpointcreatedbyprojectteam:http://prezi.com/s0rtts3nlpqz/ict-mediated-participatory-budgeting-in-south-kivu-drc/.

Context TheDemocraticRepublicofCongohas long suffered fromcondi-tionsthathavepreventedthefulldevelopmentof itscitizensandcommunities.Citizenshave suffered theeffectsof conflict and inmanyprovincesareunabletoaccessthemostbasicofpublicser-vices.SouthKivuisacontextwherelackoftrustbetweencitizensandthegovernmenthasbecomeamajorbarrier forbetterpublicservicedelivery. Infact,acorereformareanowisdecentralizationbecausethetransferoffundsfromprovincialtolocalgovernmentsisnotcurrentlymandatedby law,nor isparticipationor feedbackfromcitizens.Whilemanycitizensintheprovincedonothaveaccessto water or electricity in their homes, most have mobile phones.Mobilephonesareperformingakeyroleinenhancingtransparencyandaccountability.Mobilepenetration intheDemocraticRepublicofCongo is increasing rapidly, from 16percent toanestimated47percentin2013.Inaddition,55percentofthecountry’spopulationresides in areas currently covered by mobile networks, includingmostruralareasfromtheeasternprovinceofSouthKivu.TheWorldBankInstitute’s ICT4Govprogramis leveragingandimprovinguponthistechnologytoenhanceparticipatorybudgetingprocesses.

ACtions (2010–pResent) ICT4Govisusingmobilephonesforfourpurposes:

• Participatory budgeting meeting/assembly announcements are made through mobile phones.GeotargetedSMSmessagesaresenttocitizenstoinvitethemtotheassemblies,providingthemwiththedate,time,andlocation.

• Mobile phones are also being used for voting, allowingcitizenstosendatexttoidentifytheirinvestmentpriorities,hencepoint-ingoutwheretheywouldliketoseethemoneybeingspentintheircommunity.

• Moreover,mobile phones are being used to announce the voted decision, makingtheprocessmoretransparentandinclusivethaneverbefore.

• Finally,mobile phones are being used to ask citizens about the projects that had been chosen. Through text messages, citi-zensareabletoofferfeedbackandmonitortheprojects.Over250,000 text messages have already been sent throughout thedifferentstagesofthisinitiative.

A1.3. Using Information and Communication Technology-Mediated Participatory Budgeting to Mobilize Resources for the Poor

Country:DemocraticRepublicofCongoSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(Decentralization)Level:LocalName of Project:ICT4GovforParticipatoryBudgetingAreas of Engagement:ICT;ParticipatoryBudgeting

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Results • High rate of budget disclosure.Overthelasttwoyears,public

budget and service-delivery information has been disclosed atpublicvenuesinover95percentofdistrictsusingFTAtools.

• Higher number of budget-literate citizens.Nearly200,000citi-zensdrawnfromdifferentsectionsofsocietyhadreceivedbasicbudgetliteracytrainingasofMarch2013.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms FinancialtransparencyinitiativesarelikelytobemoresuccessfulwhentheyareanintegralpartoflargeprojectslikePBSthatcanhelpwithscaling up and securing the necessary attention from all partners.Furthermore, if such initiatives complement existing governmentpolicies,theyaremorelikelytogarnerthepoliticalsupportnecessarytosucceed.However,adaptingtoolstolocalcontextspresentssev-eraldesignchallengesandcancauseimplementationdelays.Further,newmethodologiesandtoolssuchasthoseassociatedwiththeFTArequirelongincubations/learningphases.

RefeRenCe Ethiopia—EthiopiaPromotingBasicServicesProgramPhaseIIIProject:P128891—ImplementationStatusReport:Sequence01(English),WorldBank,WashingtonDC.

Context In2006,thegovernmentofEthiopia,throughtheMinistryofFinanceand Economic Development, began publishing its budget online.It also provided guidelines for districts to publically disclose theirbudgets;soonbudgetdisclosurewasinstitutionalizedinthegovern-ment’sfinancialmanagementsystemdowntothesubdistrict level.TheFinancialTransparencyandAccountabilityInitiative(FTA),partoftheWorldBank’sPromotingBasicServices(PBS)PhaseIinEthiopia,aimed at furthering the government’s efforts to deepen budgettransparency.FTAisagovernment-ledinitiativefundedbymultipledevelopmentpartners;itsupportsthedisseminationofthebudget,provides large-scale budget literacy training, and obtains feedbackthroughexperience-sharingforums.PBSiscurrentlyinitsthirdphase.

ACtions (2006–pResent) • AFinancial Transparency and Accountability Perception Survey

(FTAPS) was conducted,whichrevealedalowlevelofawarenessabout the public budget and uncertainty about where budgetdecisionsweremadeamongcitizens.Italsoshowedthatcitizenshaveaverylimitedaccesstoinformationbutstillretainastronginterestinlearningabouttheirlocalpublicbudgets.

• FTA developed several budget tools to address the needs ofcitizens, including a simplified budget guide, a layperson’s bud-get, expenditure templates, service facility-level templates, andbudget-literacy training modules. These simplified tools weredesigned,pilottested,validated,andownedbythegovernmentofEthiopia.FTAcustomizedthetoolstolocalcontextsandusedthemtodisseminate informationat thedistrict and subdistrictlevels.

A1.4. Simplifying and Disseminating Budgets to Expand Budget Literacy

Country:EthiopiaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level:LocalName of Project:ProtectionofBasicServicesI,II,IIIAreas of Engagement:BudgetDisclosure;CapacityBuilding;Dissemination;Simplification

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Country: TheGambiaSectors: Education;PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level: NationalImplementing Organization: Pro-PoorAdvocacyGroupAreas of Engagement: BudgetAnalysis;CapacityBuilding;Disclosure;Dissemination

A1.5. Championing Pro-Poor Budget Policies through Budget Analysis and Training

Context ThePro-PoorAdvocacyGroup(Pro-PAG)wassetupin2003bycivilsociety organizations, donor agencies, and government partners.ProPAGemergedata timewhentheGambiawasgraduating fromthestrategiesforpovertyalleviationimplementedsince1994tothefirstpoverty reductionstrategypaper.Within that framework, thegovernmentoftheGambia identifiedPro-PAGas“aforumforon-goingdialoguebetweenstakeholderswithaviewtoopeningupthebudgetprocesstocitizenparticipation.” Itsvisionistoensurethatthenationalbudgetisresponsivetotheprioritiesandneedsofthepoorbyraisingawarenessofcommunity-basedpovertyissues.

ACtions (2004-pResent) • During the annual budget consultations, Pro-PAG conducted a

series of capacity-building and sensitization workshops forcivilsocietymembersandparliamentariansonbasicbudget literacyandanalysis.Uponreceiptofthecabinet’sbudgetestimates,Pro-PAGcarried out a preliminary analysis and released a “budget brief,” acopyofwhichwasofficiallysharedwiththeDepartmentofState for FinanceandEconomicAffairs (DOSFEA).Once thebudget was submitted to the national assembly, and before itwas debated, Pro-PAG convened a budget sensitization ses-sion for parliamentarians tosharekeyobservationsonthedraftestimates.

• Pro-PAGbuilds the capacity of the national assembly tounder-stand the education budget and analyze allocations to educa-tion. Members of the national assembly were taken to localschoolstoseeforthemselvesthat,althoughalargeproportionofnationalresourceshavebeencommittedtoeducation,thisdidnotautomaticallytranslateintogainsintheinternationaleduca-tion goals committed to by the government. As each nationalassemblycommittee’s termendsandanewbodyofmembersiselected,thesetrainingsarerepeated.Pro-PAGexpandedthesecapacity-buildinginitiativestoincludeothergroups,includingtheGambianteachers’unionandtheChildProtectionAlliance.

• Pro-PAGproduced a database on educational expenditures by level and type that allowed for a review of budget estimatesandactualexpendituresfrom2000to2004,aperiodwhendec-larations were made in “Education for All,” the government’snational action plan for education from 2004–15. The resultswerepublishedinasynopsisofgovernmentspendingoneduca-tionandwereused toadvocate forgreaterbudgetallocationstotheeducationsector. Inabidtotakebudgettrackingdownto subdistrict-level communities, Pro-PAG presented the datain an understandable format and materials were disseminated

that were used for sensitizing communities ontheimportance,nature, and magnitude of resources made available by centralgovernmenttotheeducationsector.Materialswereusedtotrainregionalbudgetgroupsofteachers,parent–teacherassociations,and representativesof theTanjiBirdReserveSiteManagementCommittee.

• The 2000–04 budget expenditure publication was later updated for the period 2001–05 and shared with the national assembly,sparkingactionontheparliamentarians’parttorequestadvancecopiesofthe2006budgetfromDOSFEA.Thenationalassemblyaired their concerns via the media and in discussions with theministryoffinance.

Results • Increased budget allocations for education. Increased alloca-

tionof1.5mGMD(US$45,696)tothe2004–05educationbudgetbenefitedvoluntaryschoolstaff,suchasuntrainedteachersandschoolcaretakers.

• Improved awareness of parliament. Members of the NationalAssembly Select Committee have become more aware of theimportanceoftheirroleinlegislativeoversightandhavegainedabetterunderstandingofissuesrelatedtotheeducationbudget.

• Increased support from donors. Budgetworkwithcommitteemembers attracted the support of other organizations, suchastheUNDP,theAfricanDevelopmentBank,andDFID.Duetothesuccessoftheinitialtrainingprogram,itbecamepossibletoexpandthecapacity-buildinginitiativestoincludeothergroupssuchastheGambianteachers’unionandlocalmunicipalities.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • Insomecontexts,workingfromthenational leveldowntothe

community level with national government support might bemoreeffectivethanstartingwithlocalbudgetwork.

• Working closely with members of parliament to build theircapacitytoengagemoreeffectivelyinthebudgetprocesshelpsmitigatethesuspicionsurroundingbudgetwork,makingiteasiertoworkatregionalandlocallevels.

RefeRenCes Pro-PoorAdvocacyGroupWebsite:http://www.pro-pag.org/.

Harrison,Amy,andSimonBlower.2011.“FinalReportforAnnualGeneralMeeting(AGM).”PreparedforPro-PoorAdvocacyGroupAnnualGeneralMeetingOctober29,2011.

Perry,Victoria.2008.“CivilSocietyEngagementinEducationBudgets:AReportDocumentingCommonwealthEducationFundExperience.”PreparedforCommonwealthEducationFund(CEF).

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• Afterconducting a detailed survey of the capacities, attitudes, and practices of local stakeholders, ILGS drafted modules to provide training for the district assembly and others in thetransparent,accountablemanagementofminingresources.

Results • Disrupted fund flows. Becauseofalackofadditionalresources

andexpertise,ILGSwasunabletofinalizethemodules.• Pushback from hierarchical authorities. ISODECdesignedtem-

platesforthetraditionalchiefstoreporttheuseofminingroyal-ties,buttheywentunusedbecauseofthechiefs’refusaltobemoreaccountabletotheircommunities.

• Limited uptake of findings in the district plans. Even thoughparticipatoryprocessesledtoprioritizingandincorporatingcom-munityneedsintoAsutifi’sMTDPfor2010–13,itisunclearifthoseneedshavebeenadequatelyincorporated.Inshort,eventhoughtheprojectsetouttoimprovethetransparencyofthespendingandmanagementofminingroyalties,theAsutifigovernmenthasnotshownmuchprogress.

• Inability to support the creation of functional and multistake-holder consultative platforms. Overall, the project requireddialogue and the entering into coalition with Asutifi’s electedassemblyandadministration,NGGLandNADeF,traditionalchiefsinthedistrict,localbusinesses,andcivilsociety,theabsenceofwhicheventuallyledtotheproject’sderailment.

• Small wins of more awareness and trust. Despite its failure inachieving its objectives, the project did build awareness of theneedfortransparencyintheminingsectoramongbothassemblyandcommunitymembers.Moreover,theleveloftrustandcollabo-rationinthedistrictimprovedwiththeformationoftheconsulta-tiveforum.Forinstance,asaresultofadvocacybyCSOs,throughtheAhafoExtractiveEngagementGroup,in2010,Newmontagreedtopayafineof7millionGhanaiancedis(approximatelyUS$3.7mil-lion)forcyanidespillageinthepreviousyear.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Building alliances for monitoring and working through civil societypartnersthathavegravitasinagivencontextiskeytothesuccessofBudgetTransparency&Monitoringinitiatives.Moreover,itisneces-sary toalign interests andvoiceswithincivil society—in this case,amongthedistrictassemblyofficers,thetraditionalchiefs,andcom-munitymembers—inordertobringaboutconstructivechange.

RefeRenCes WebsiteofRevenueWatch:www.revenuewatch.org.

Boampon,Owusu.2012.“Ghana’sGoldenOpportunity:ADistrictStruggleswith

StrikingitRich.”CasestudypreparedforRevenueWatchInstitute(RWI).

http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/GhanaCaseStudy7.10.12.pdf

Context In 2006, Asutifi, a tiny district in central Ghana with a relativelyunknown farming community, caught the attention of one of theworld’slargestgoldproducers,NewmontMiningCorporation(NMC).WhiletherevenueAsutifiwastoreceivefromNewmontwassmallcomparedtootherdistricts, itmadeupasignificantpercentageofAsutifi’sincome.Incomefromgold,however,isvolatileandrequiresfinancial forecasting, realisticbudgeting, andparticipatorymanage-ment, all of which were major challenges for Asutifi. Three yearslater,RevenueWatch Institute (RWI)partneredwith twoGhanaianorganizations—theIntegratedSocialDevelopmentCentre(ISODEC)andtheInstituteofLocalGovernmentStudies(ILGS)—tocreatetheAsutifisubnationalprojectandproduceabaselinestudy.Thestudyfoundweaknessesinthegovernancemechanismsforrevenueman-agementinthedistrict:miningrevenuewasbeingspentarbitrarilyandtherewerenointernalfiscalrulesforspendingit.In2008,NewmontGoldGhanaLtd(NGGL)establishedNewmontAhafoDevelopmentFoundation(NADeF),acorporatesocialresponsibilityinitiative,inanattempttospurdevelopmentin10communitieswithinthecompa-ny’soperatingarea;itagreedtocontributeUS$1foreveryounceofgold sold. They raised US$7 million, but soon after, tensions arosebetweenNGGLandthelocalauthoritieswiththelatteraccusingthecompanyofdisregardinglocally-determineddevelopmentpriorities.Therefore,RWI’saimwastoimprovetheoverallgovernanceofmin-ingrevenues.Theprojectlastedfortwoyears,2009–11.

ACtions (2009–11) • Toensurethatthecommunity’sneedswerereflectedinAsutifi’s

2010–13 Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP), ISODEC andILGS led a workshop that targeted 15 district officials, who in turn trained 80 people drawn from area councils, unit commit-tees, and other community leaders. Thisworkshopfocusedonhelping participants identify and prioritize their needs so theycouldofferinputtothelocalgovernment’sdevelopmentplan.

• ISODECcoordinated the formation of a quarterly consultative forum, comprised of traditional chiefs, district assembly mem-bers, NMC, and local civil society organizations (CSOs). Intheforum, these stakeholders shared expectations and discussedmining-relatedissues,includingenvironmentaldamage,transpar-encyintheuseofroyalties,andparticipationinthedistrictplan-ningprocess.

• ToaddresstheproblemofNADeFandtheassembly’sdevelop-mentplansnotbeingalignedandthattheformerwasdisregardinglocally-determined development priorities, ISODEC prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that required Newmont to consult the MTDP when selecting projects to support.EventhoughNewmontrefusedtosigntheMOU,attheveryleast,theMOUproposalcatalyzedamorecollaborativeapproachamongNewmont,thedistrictassembly,andthedistrictoffice.

A1.6. Unsustained Budget Monitoring Fails to Improve Weaknesses in Governance Mechanisms

Country: GhanaSector:MiningLevel:LocalImplementing Organizations:InstituteofLocalGovernmentStudies;IntegratedSocialDevelopmentCentre;RevenueWatchInstituteAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;CapacityBuilding

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Country: GhanaSector: PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel: NationalImplementing Organization: ParliamentaryCentreAreas of Engagement: BudgetAdvocacy;CapacityBuilding;Legislatures

A1.7. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Budget Oversight

Context For most of the tumultuous political period since Ghana becameindependent,parliament’sproscribedroleinmattersofgovernancehasbeenpartlyresponsibleforits limitedcapacityandweakover-sight. When Ghana turned to a multiparty electoral democracy intheearly-to-mid-1990s,anumberofbilateralandmultilateraldonorsidentifiedtheopportunitytoprovidesupporttoGhana’sparliamentsothatitcanplayastrongerroleinthecountry’sgovernance.OneofthemistheParliamentaryCentre,aCanadiannonprofit,nonparti-sanorganizationthatsupportsparliamentsaroundtheglobe,includ-ingGhana’s, byproviding training and technical assistance tobuildcapacity.

ACtions FundedbytheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)andUKAid,theParliamentaryCentreassistedGhana’sparlia-mentwiththeGhanaParliamentaryBudgetandFinanceUnitprojectaswellastheFinancialScrutinyproject.

October 2006–December 2008. FortheGhanaParliamentaryBudgetandFinanceUnitproject,theParliamentaryCentre:

• Established a budget and finance unit equippedwiththenec-essary expertise, including economic modeling and forecastingknowledge.

• Developed consultative mechanisms such as roundtablesbetween key parliamentary committees, budget policy thinktanks,andtheMinistryofFinancetoincreaseparliament’scapac-ity to engage effectively in Public Financial Management andbudgetprocesses.

• Developed internal performance indicators toenableParliamentassess its own progress with respect to its role in the budgetprocess.

May 2007–November 2009. For theFinancial ScrutinyProject, theParliamentaryCentre:

• Provided training to the members of the public accounts com-mittee (PAC) to improve their knowledge of Public FinancialManagement and to scrutinize the evidence produced by theauditorgeneral.

• Organized a public meeting of the PAC, October 16–29, 2007,to deliberate on the auditor general’s report on the ministries,departments,andagenciesfor2004and2005topromotepublicsupportfortheworkofthecommitteeandparliament.

Results For theGhanaParliamentaryBudgetandFinanceUnitproject, theParliamentaryCentre:

• Contributed directly to the drafting of a budget bill by intro-ducingabipartisandraftversionthatincludedaprovisionforaparliamentarybudgetoffice.

FortheFinancialScrutinyProject,theParliamentaryCentre:

• Increased the openness of PAC proceedings byopeningthemtothepublic,achangethathasnowbeeninstitutionalized.Thishasboostedparliament’seffortstoincreaseaccountabilityandtrans-parency,combatcorruption,andimprovebudgetoversightandresourceallocation.This,inturn,hasrenewedpublicconfidenceintheabilityofparliamenttooverseetheexecutive;ithasalsoincreasedthetransparencyandaccountabilityofPublicFinancialManagementproceduresandofficials.

• Increased interest to establish audit report implementation committees. ByNovember2007,asresultofthePAC’sprobingquestions,theDailyGraphicreportedthat10ministries,depart-ments, and agencies approached the Internal Audit Agency tohelpthemestablishauditreportimplementationcommitteestostrengthenPublicFinancialManagement.

• Prosecuted malfeasance. Theattorneygeneral setupaspecialunittoprosecutecasesrecommendedforprosecutionpriortotheestablishmentoftheFinancialAdministrationTribunal(court).Theprojectalsosawtheattorneygeneralresumetheprosecu-tionofdormantcasesaboutthelossofpublicresources.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Inadditiontoprovidingtrainingandtechnicalassistancetolegisla-tures,itiscriticaltodevelopinternalperformanceindicatorstoallowparliamenttoassessitsownprogresswithrespecttoitsengagementin the budget process. These indicators could prove to be a valu-able tool if they are institutionalized and used to hold successiveparliamentstoaccountfortheirlevelofengagementinthebudgetprocess.

RefeRenCes ParliamentaryCentreWebsite:http://www.parlcent.org/en/.

FinancialScrutinyProjectWebsite:http://www.parlcent.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/project_pdfs/Project_Description_-_Financial_Scrutiny_Project.pdf.

Anthony,Tsekpo,andAlanHudson.2009.“ParliamentaryStrengtheningandtheParisPrinciples:GhanaCaseStudy”,PreparedforParliamentaryCentre,January2009.

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Country: GhanaSectors: Education;PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Levels: National;LocalImplementing Organization: IntegratedSocialDevelopmentCentreAreas of Engagement: BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;CapacityBuilding;Monitoring

A1.8. Analyzing and Publicizing the Budget to Promote Pro-Poor Fiscal Policy

Context In2000,theIntegratedSocialDevelopmentCentre(ISODEC),acivilsocietyorganization(CSO),createdtheCentreforBudgetAdvocacy(CBA)withthemandatetospecialize insocialbudgetingactivities.NowrelaunchedastheInstituteforFiscalPolicy(IFP),theCBAhelpsISODECandotheradvocacygroupsunderpintheirpolicyargumentswithinformedbudgetanalyses.Furthermore,itusesbudgetinforma-tiontoengagewithpolicymakersformorepro-poortaxrulesandspending,particularlywithregardtoeducation.

ACtions (2000–pResent) • The IFP analyzes annual pre-budget and post-budget state-

ments andcommentsongovernmentbudgetpolicy.Italsopart-ners with other groups toproducethemedbudgetanalyses.Forinstance,in2009,itproducedastudywithUNICEFthatshowedthat,despiteoverallexpenditureexceedingthebudgetin2008,spendingforsectorscritical tochildrenandwomenwasbelowbudgetedamounts.

• Oncethenationalbudgetispassed,theIFPanalyzes district-level budgets to determine the share of the budget going to socialsectors. It has also worked with the Ghana National EducationCampaign Coalition (GNECC), a network of nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs)workingoneducation issuestotrack dis-trict-level education budgets. The IFP developed surveys for GNECC to interview students, teachers, and others to monitor how capitation grants1 are used and helped the coalition ana-lyzethegathereddata.ThecoalitionusedtheresultingreportstoengagetheMinistryofEducationandschool-levelofficials.

• The IFP disseminates the findings of its pre- and postbudget analysis through ISODEC’s bulletin “Public Agenda” as well asthroughradioandtelevision.Itorganizeslocal,national,andinter-nationalworkshopsaswell aspressconferences,andalsopub-lishesarticlesinnewspapers.Itsponsorsannualforumsacrossthe10 regions tocollectpublicopinionsontheannualbudgetandthenincludestheminits“OpenLetters”tothePresident.

1.Capitationgrantsareschooloperatinggrants.Underthepolicy,thecentralgovernmentmakescashtransferstoallpublicschoolsbasedonthenumberofstudentsenrolled.Inotherwords,itallocatesfundstoschoolsonapercapitabasistosupporteffortsatimprovingschoolperformance.

• TheIFPalsoprovides training to local government staff, legisla-tors, and civil society groups onpro-poorplanningandbudget-ing,enablingittoengagedirectlywithkeydecisionmakers.

Results • Adoption of IFP’s fiscal policy suggestions. Somerecommenda-

tions included in theOpenLetters to thePresidentand in theIFPbudgetstatementshavebeenadoptedbythegovernment,including revenue and expenditure measures advocated for bythe IFP, although other factors could have contributed to this,too.

• Dissemination of budget and regular reports on education expenditures. The IFP has been successful in producing andwidelydisseminatingregular reportsonthebudget. Italsosuc-cessfully facilitated the formation of the GNECC, and throughthecoalition,theproductionofregularreportsonexpendituresattheschoollevel.Inaddition,itcollaborateswiththecoalitionto influence educational policies and allocations, resulting inincreased investment in theeducationsector throughthegov-ernment’scapitationgrant.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • SupportingorganizationssuchastheIFPcanleadtomorebudget

transparencyand,eventually,toincreasedexpenditureonsocialdevelopment.

• Forresultstomaterializeinbudgetprocessesorpolicies,techni-calorfinancialsupporttoCSOsmayneedtobeprovidedoverseveralyears.

RefeRenCes ISODECWebsite:http://www.isodec.org.gh/aboutus.php.

DeRenzio,Paolo.2005.“CSOsandBudgets:LinkingEvidenceandPro-PoorPolicies.”OverseasDevelopmentInstituteUnitedKingdom.

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A1.9. Tracking District Budget Allocations and Disbursements to Promote the More Efficient Use of Public Resources

Context Decentralizationcanleadtosevereimbalancesintheregionaldistri-butionofwealthanddevelopment,astheresourcesoflocalauthori-tiesareoftenunequal.ThiswasthecaseinGhana,inthe1990s,whendistrictassemblieswerefacingproblemsingeneratingtheirownrev-enuestomeettheirfinancialcommitments.TheDistrictAssemblies’Common Fund (DACF) was set up as a pool of resources createdundersection252ofthe1992constitutionofGhana.Itisaminimumof5percentofthenationalrevenuethatissetasideforsharingwithall district assemblies in Ghana by a parliament-approved formula,enablingtheuseofthenation’swealthforthebenefitofallcitizens.Sincetheturnofthecentury,however,paymentsintotheDACFhavebeendelayedformorethanayear,resultinginafailuretodisburseto the metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs).Moreover,therehavebeencomplaintsfromcitizensandreportsofmisapplicationandfinancialmalpracticesinconnectionwiththedis-bursements toanduseofproceedsby theMMDAs.Therefore, tomonitortheDACF,tofindoutiftheguidelinesoftheDACFaretrans-parentandwell followed, if resourcesallocated indeedget to theMMDAs,andifthefundsreceivedbyMMDAsareusedforassignedpurposes, theAfricanDevelopmentProgram, in collaborationwithothernongovernmentalorganizations,hasengagedin intensebud-getanalysisandtrackingwiththeexplicitaimofbringingaboutmoretransparencyandmoreefficientuseofpublicresourcesatthedis-trictlevel.

ACtions (ApRil–july 2003) • Primary and secondary data was collected on allocation and

disbursements of the DACF attheregionalanddistrictlevel.Acomprehensivebodyof informationonbudgetallocationswascompiledonfourdistrictassemblies—fromtheWest,East,North,andtheAshantiregionbymeansofkeyinformantinterviewscar-riedouttogatherprimaryinformationandtoverifyinformationprovidedbyvariousagenciesanddocuments,throughobserva-tionofphysicalevidence,andthroughfocus-groupdiscussionsatthecommunitylevel.

• Thedata was then analyzed intermsofthetimelinessofalloca-tions,disbursements,receiptsofthefunds,andtheconsistencyoftheamountsallocatedbyeachagencywiththeamountactu-allyreceivedbythefourdistrictassemblies.

Results• Evidence of a serious lack of accountability and transparency

in district budget allocations and disbursements. Someofthemajor findings were that (1) for the past four-year period, theministryoffinancehadneverreleasedthefullallocationtotheadministratoroftheDACF;(2)therewereseveraldelaysthrough-out thedisbursementprocess, including the submissionof theproposed formula to parliament, the acquisition of approval,theallocatingoffunds,andfinally,thedisbursementoffundstothevariousMMDAsandeventhereceiptofthemoneybytheassemblies;and(3)baringonedistrict,theamountsreceivedbythedistrictassemblieswerelowerthanwhatwasallocatedandwhatwastobedisbursedtothem.

• Improved sensitization and awareness. Through the process ofparticipating in this research, monitoring, and evaluation of theDACF,andthroughfocusgroupdiscussionswithcommunitymem-bers,bothweresensitizedtotheDACF.Moreover,thiswasthefirsttimethatlinkswereestablishedbetweenthegovernment,devel-opmentpartners,andtheteamundertakingthestudy.

• Limited follow-up by district officials. Documentation on theDACFandtheundertakenprojectsiseithernotavailableornoteasilyaccessible.Attheroundtablediscussionsinoneofthedis-tricts, the representatives of the assemblies promised to sendmoredetailedinformation,butnoneofthefourdistrictsactuallydidso.

• Lack of sustained funding. Oneproblemisthe lackoffundingsupporttomobilizeandtraincommunitiesasafollow-upactivityandfortheinstitutionalizationofinvolvingcivilsocietyorganiza-tionsinthetrackingofDACFandotherpublicfundstobecomepartofthedecentralizationprocess.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Involving the government and communities in the research andmonitoring and evaluation process from the very beginning is keyto ensuring that their perspectives are taken into account, whichalso facilitates data collection for budget tracking and analysis.Additionally, technical and financial support for such initiativesneedstobesustainedoverlengthyperiodsoftimeiftheyaretobeeffective.

RefeRenCes King,Rudith,VitusAAzeem,CharlesAbbey,SamuelKwakuBoatang,andDonkrisMevuta.2010.“AReportonTrackingoftheDistrictAssembliesCommonFund:APilotStudyofFourDistrictAssemblies.”InDemanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa,editedbyMaryMcNeilandCarmenMalena,chapter4.Washington,DC:WorldBank.

Country: GhanaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)and(Decentralization)Level:LocalImplementing Organization:AfricanDevelopmentProgramArea of Engagement:BudgetAnalysis;Monitoring

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A1.10. Using Social Audits to Monitor Constituency Development Funds

Context Established in2003,Kenya’sConstituencyDevelopmentFund (CDF)entitleseachMemberofParliament(MP)inKenyatoallocateapprox-imately 83,839,922 Kenyan shillings (approximately US$987,420) peryeartosupportdevelopmentprojectsintheirdistrict.WhilesomereportspraisetheprojectsfundedbytheCDFand itspotentialtoimprove community infrastructure, others complain about corrup-tionandalackofpublicaccountabilityinthemanagementofCDFfunds.Since2005,MuslimsforHumanRights(MUHURI),anongovern-mentalorganizationbasedinMombassa,Kenya,hasbeenmonitoringexpendituresmadeundertheCDF.

ACtions (2005-pResent) MUHURI conducted two social audits—one in August 2007 inChangamweandtheotherinJuly2008inBahari.

• Becausethereisnoaccess-to-informationlawinKenya,MUHURIstruggledunsuccessfully against resistantofficials for twoyearsto gain access to CDF documents. However, by describing theauditasa“training”eventinsteadofapublicdiscussion,MUHURIeventuallyconvincedtheMPofChangamwethatthesocialauditwouldbeagroundbreakingeventbecausehewouldbethefirstMPtoeveropenhisaccountstocivil society. Inaddition,theyconvinced the MP that the audit would help boost his publicimage—a particularly persuasive argument during an electionyear.MUHURIobtained a partial set of CDF records for 14 proj-ects as part of the social audit—projectstheChangamweCDFCommittee (CDC) considered the best. These included bills ofquantities,minutesofCDCmeetings;andcompletioncertificates.

• Using theseacquireddocuments,MUHURIand the social auditteam conducted site visits to all 14 projects, which includedinterviews with local residents. They discovered a number ofproblemsintheimplementationoftheprojectsthatwouldhavebeenimpossibletoidentifywithoutdetailedprojectrecords.A day-long public hearing was then held to announce the findings, with an attendance of approximately 1,500, including residents,localCDFofficials,andthemedia.

Results • Signing of petition for greater transparency. Toward the end

of the hearing, the Chamgamwe MP signed a petition thatdemandedgreateraccountabilityandtransparencymeasuresbeincorporated into theCDFActandcalled foracomprehensivefreedom-of-informationlaw,whichhehadpreviouslyopposed.

• Reelection of the Chamgamwe MP. At the end of 2007, theMP was reelected, even while the majority of sitting MPs losttheir seats.CDCofficials and theMPhimself acknowledged toMUHURIstaffmembers that “at least40percent”of thevotestheMPreceivedwereduetothesocialaudit.

• Social audit precedent for the Bahari constituency. Given theprecedent set in Chamgamwe, the Bahari MP agreed to giveMUHURI access to Bahari’s CDF records. According to govern-ment audit reports, Bahari had the “best-managed” CDF in thecountry,butthesocialauditrevealedseveralirregularities.Apub-lichearingwithover1,000attendeeswasheld,buttheproceed-ingsweredelayedandCDCmembersdidnotattend.

• Unsuccessful attempts to gain access to CDF funds in other con-stituencies. Afterthesetwosocialaudits,attemptsbyMUHURItoacquireCDFdocumentsfromtheKisauniandLikoniconstitu-encieswereunsuccessful.EventhoughbothconstituencieshadnewMPswhowouldnotbe implicated inanymismanagementoftheCDFsthatthesocialauditsmightuncover,bothrefusedtoprovidetheCDFrecordstoMUHURI.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms CDFlegislationshouldhavedisclosureprovisions,andright-to-infor-mation legislation greatly facilitates the implementation of budgettransparencyinterventions.Furthermore,reelectionplanscanbelev-eragedtogainsupportforbudgettransparencyactivities.

RefeRenCes MUHURIWebsite:http://www.muhuri.org.

InternationalBudgetPartnership.2008.“PartneringtoMakeBudgetsWorkforthePeople:CaseofMuslimsforHumanRights(MUHURI),Kenya.”InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

O’Riordan,Alexander.2010.“TowardsanEnablingEnvironmentforSocialAccountabilityinKenya.”InSocial Accountability in Africa: Practitioners’ Experiences and Lessons,editedbyMarioClaasenandCarmenAlpin-Lardies,Chapter12,Section3,IDASAandANSA-Africa.

Country:KenyaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:LocalImplementing Organization:MuslimsforHumanRightsAreas of Engagement:BudgetDisclosure;ConstituencyDevelopmentFunds;Monitoring;SocialAudits

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Results • Positive influence over legislation. In March 2003, parliament

passedamotionallowingabilltobebroughtbeforetheHousethat would establish a parliamentary budget office. The IEA,working with several reform-minded legislators, was centrallyinvolvedinthedraftingofthisbillandthesubsequentrevisiontotheparliamentarystandingordersthatenhancedtheroleandeffectivenessofparliamentinthemonitoringofpublicfinances.Morerecently,BIPmadeanumberofproposalsforKenya’sPFMBill2011,oneofwhichreiteratedtheneedforcleardisclosuresonallfinancialreportsandwasincorporatedinthepublisheddraftoftheamendedPublicFinancialManagementbill.

• Improved communication of the concerns of multiple sectors. BIP’sactivitieshavegivenvoicetosectorsthatarenotnormallyconsultedbygovernment.Ratherthanconsideringonlythemainproductive sectors likeagricultureandmanufacturing, thegov-ernment is now exposed to the concerns of, for example, theservicesector,thecapitalmarkets,theBankersInstitute,andthesocialsectors.

• Utilization of BIP Training. Some organizations have used theskills and knowledge from BIP’s trainings to undertake budgetmonitoringandanalysisfromagenderperspective;organizationssuchasABANTU,MuslimsforHumanRights (MUHURI)andtheHealthRightsAdvocacyForum(HERAF),amongothers,haveusedvarioustools,includingcommunityscorecards.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Building expertise to influence the budget process and gain legiti-macyasastakeholdertakesanumberofyearsaswellasstrategiessuchascapacitybuildingandinformationdissemination.

RefeRenCes InstituteofEconomicAffairsWebsite:http://www.ieakenya.or.ke.

InstituteofEconomicAffairs.2012.“AnnualReport2011.”IEA-Kenya.

InternationalBudgetProject.2000.“ATasteofSuccess:ExamplesoftheBudgetWorkofNGOs.”InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

Mwenda,AlbertK.,andMaryN.Gachocho.2003.“BudgetTransparency:KenyanPerspective.”ResearchPaperSeriesNo.4,InstituteofEconomicAffairs,London.

Context During the 1980s and 1990s Kenya’s fiscal policy was characterizedbypersistentbudgetdeficits, a risingdebtburden, andpoorutili-zation of public funds resulting from corruption, weak account-ability, wasteful spending, and a lack of openness in the budgetprocess.Becausebudgetinformationhasnotbeenreadilyavailabletocivil society,Kenya’s InstituteofEconomicAffairs (IEA’s)BudgetInformationProgramme(BIP)promotesinformeddebatesonpublicpolicyissuesbytargetingpolicymakers,includingmembersofparlia-ment(MPs),civilsociety,privatesectoractors,andthepublicatlarge.

ACtions (1994-pResent) • Everyyear,BIPhostspre-budget hearings thatprovideanoppor-

tunity for the corporate sector, the social sector, and otherinterestedgroupstomakebudgetproposalsforpossibleconsid-erationbythetreasury.SubmissionsaresynthesizedbytheIEAintheformofaCitizenAlternativeBudgetandpresentedtothetreasuryforconsideration.

• Afterthepresentationofthebudgetbutbeforetheparliamen-tarydebateonthebudget,BIPsummarizes key points from the budget documents and presents the information to members of parliament in a timely manner that is easy to comprehend. Italsoprovides key budget information to the media inordertostimulatepublicinterest.

• BIPconducts additional in-depth research and analyses onpub-licpolicyandbudgets,disseminating it intheformofbulletinsandresearchpaperstothemedia,civil society,parliament,andministries.Itsmanualsonbudgetliteracyincludethe“MP’sGuidetotheBudget”and“TrainingforTrainers.”

• BIPorganizes post-budget workshops. Duringthepost-budgetworkshopfortheMembersofParliamentinSeptember2011,BIPpresented a written memorandum to the commission entitled“Implementationof theConstitutionandtheMinistryofLocalGovernment.”ItlaidoutBIP’sconcernsabouttheneedforspaceforpublicparticipationanditssupportforstrongertransparencyinthebudgetprocess.

• BIP represents civil society inthetaskforceestablishedbythepermanent secretary in theministryoffinance todevelop thesecondfive-yearPublicFinancialManagement(PFM)reformstrat-egy(2013–18).

A1.11. Facilitating the Review of Public Policy and Public Affairs to Inform Budget Decision-making

Country:KenyaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level:NationalImplementing Organization:InstituteofEconomicAffairsAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;CapacityBuilding;Dissemination;Legislatures;ParticipatoryBudgetPlanning

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Results • Creation of self-sufficient budget groups. Thegrassrootsgroups

createdbySODNEThavebecomeeffectiveattransmittingpopu-larsocialdemandsfrombelowandmobilizingpopularparticipa-tion inpolicymaking.Theyelecttheirownrepresentativesandform committees for this work. The committees also submitquarterly reports to SODNET and monitor resource allocationanduse.Overall,SODNET’sactivitieshaveprovidedawayforciti-zenstoeffectivelyengagewithotheractors,allowingcitizenstoshapesocialpolicyprocessesthat influencedevelopmentplan-ning,resourceallocation,anduseandtomonitorpublicresourcemanagement inawaythatfacilitatesgovernmentfulfillmentoftheneedsofpeople,especiallythoselivinginpoverty.

• Improved understanding of budget processes. The initiativesfirstbeganin1996inonlythreedistricts,buttodaySODNEThaschapters in sixteen Kenyan districts. There has been an ever-increasingdemandfromSODNET’sgrassrootsconstituenciesformore intensified popularization of the budget process and formeetingordinaryKenyans’needtogainadeeperandmorefunc-tional understanding of the intricate—and sometimes decep-tive—linkages between macroeconomic framework conditionsandthebudgetarydispensationsthataccompanytheannualpar-liamentarybusiness.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Aneffectiveway toenhancecitizen awareness andcollect citizenfeedbackonthebudgetisbycreatingandnurturinggrassrootsorga-nizationsthatworkonbudgetaryissues.However,itisimportanttogobeyondmerelybuildingstrategicalliancesonthedemandside—SODNET’sprimaryfocus—becauseitisonlywhenthedemandsidestrategicallylinksupwiththesupplyside,andrelevantentrypointsofthesupplysideareidentified,thatthebudgettransparencyloopcanbeexpectedtobeclosed.Theabilityofacivilsocietyorganiza-tiontoadvanceitsgoalscanbegreatlyenhancedifitdevelopsthecapacity toengageaspartners in the local andnationaleconomicgovernanceprocesses.

RefeRenCeSODNETWebsite,Kenya:http://www.sodnet.org.

Context The Social Development Network (SODNET) is a voluntary forumfoundedinApril1994topromoteeffectivestrategicalliancesamongnongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interested in social devel-opment.OneofSODNET’sprogramsisdesignedtofacilitatepublicparticipationinthebudgetprocess.Thiswasinresponsetothefactthatmost citizens inNairobi areunawareof the linkbetween thenationalbudgetandgrassroots-levelspendinggiventhatthebudgetisatechnocraticprojectinvolvinglittleefforttoengagethepublicbythegovernment.SODNETprovidesopportunitiesforlocalcom-munitiestomonitorthemanagementofpublicresourcesacrossthecountrythrough itssocialwatchchapters.This isachievedbypro-cessingpublicdemandsforprobity,transparency,andaccountabilityamongpublicservants.

ACtions (1996–pResent) • SODNEThasfacilitated the establishment of committed grass-

roots groups inthedistrictstomonitorpublicexpendituresanddemandparticipationinthegovernanceprocesses.SODNETalsosupportsthiscadrebyholding workshops and training events, presenting group concerns to national ministries, encouraging cooperation with government officials at the district level, and holding regional and national meetings.

• SODNEThassetupwhatisnowcalledthe“Infonetprogramme,”whichaimstoweavetechnology,opendata,andcitizenempow-erment into a potent product for social change. SODNET’sInfonet program supports four different projects.Oneofthem,named Ugatuzi, is a budget-tracking tool designed to enablecitizenengagement inPublicFinancialManagement. Itprovidesconstituency-level informationonprojectsfundedbydevolvedfunds:projecttimelines,description,projectstatus,andmultiyeardisbursementschedules.Itallowsorganizedgroupsincommuni-tiestoinputcommentsandidentifyincidencesofcorruptionandmalpractice.

• SODNET works closely with multiple stakeholders on budget issues, including government officials, parliamentarians, othernongovernmentalorganizations,andthemedia.ItalsoestablishesliaisonswithNGOsworkingonsimilarissues.

A1.12. Mobilizing Citizens to Influence Development Planning and Resource Allocation

Country: KenyaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Levels:Local;ProvincialImplementing Organization:SocialDevelopmentNetworkAreas of Engagement:BudgetAnalysis;Disclosure;CoalitionBuilding;Monitoring

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Results By addressing capacity issues for the regulatory body, public sec-torpersonnel,andprivateserviceproviders,theapproachisalreadytransformingLiberia’sprocurementprocess.

• Enhanced procurement oversight. The reforms have strength-ened the public procurement and concessions commission,enablingittorecruitandtrainnewmonitorssoitcanbeginpro-curementmonitoringexpectedofaregulatorybody.Governmentinstitutions must have approval from the commission for theirprocurementplansbeforetheycanaccesstheirallocationsfromthenationalbudget.Thecommissionnowhasapublicwebsitewhereitpublishesinformation,includingprocurementplansandopportunities. Ithasalso started reviewingprocurementdocu-mentsfromgovernmentinstitutions,incompliancewiththelaw.

• Strengthened capacity for cadre of professionals. The short-term in-service training and monthly procurement clinics havestrengthened staff capacity, resulting in better quality docu-mentsandreducedleadtimesfortheprocurementprocesses.

• Increased budget utilization. The percentage of the budgetspent rose nine points—to 58 percent—for the year 2010–11,benefitting all sectors, from agriculture and infrastructure tohealthandeducation.Insteadofobtainingquotationsonlyfromknownsuppliersorawardingcontractsdirectlytoaspecificcom-pany,procurement staffnowplacesnoticesofpublicprocure-ment opportunities in the newspapers. Tighter procurementpracticeshavehelpedLiberiaimproveitsscoreonTransparencyInternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index since 2010, from arankingof87outof178countriesin2010to75outof176in2012.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Whilecapacitybuildingisroutineinprojectsofthisnature,ensuringthat it isholistic takesmoreeffort. Ina fragilestatewithadearthofcriticalskills,capacitybuildingcanbeaccompaniedbyimprovedincentive schemes and intensive in-service training. Enriching thecareer development of participants ensures their commitment tothecourse.

RefeRenCe Chinamale,Winter.2012.“ReconstructioninPostWarLiberia:HolisticProcurementReform.”CaseStudypreparedforProcurementInnovationChallenge,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

Context Fourteen years of civil war (1989–2003) destroyed Liberia’s profes-sionalworkforce,infrastructure,andinstitutionalcapacity.Thepublicprocurementsystemdisappearedandthecountrywasleftwithoutskilled practitioners. Civil servants, without the necessary trainingand experience, carried out procurement. This held back Liberia’srecovery—inlargepartduetoprocurementdelays,only46percentofthecapitalbudgetwasspentinthefiscalyear2009–10.Facedwithanoverwhelminglackofcapacity,theLiberiangovernmentrealizeditneededtogobeyondtraditionalprocurementreform,whichtendstoemphasizethecreationofastrongregulatorysystem.Instead,firstandforemost,itaimedtoensurethatallstakeholders—frommoni-torstosuppliers—hadtherightknowledgeandsystemstofullyplaytheirroles.

ACtions (2011–13) Todrivethemassivereconstructioneffort,athree-prongedapproachto procurement reform assisted by the World Bank supportedReengagementandReformSupportProgram(RRSP4)wastaken:

• Liberia’s existing oversight body, the public procurement andconcessions commission (PPCC), urgently needed strengthen-ingsoitcouldadequatelyperformitsregulatoryfunction.WithWorldBanksupport,aconsultantconducted an assessment of its human resource requirements andidentifiedasevereshort-age.Asaresult,thegovernmentemployed12additionalprocure-mentmonitors, increasingthetotalnumberofstaffto40.Theconsultant developed a roadmap to further strengthen the commission’s institutional capacity andfundingwassecuredtoimplementtheserecommendations.

• Toupgrade the skills of existing procurement employees and to train newly-recruited personnel,thegovernmentbegan a short-term in-service training program through the Liberia InstituteforPublicAdministration.AWorldBankprocurementspecialistfacilitatedmonthlyprocurementclinicsattheministryofpublicworkstoimpartpracticalskillsforcarryingoutprocurementpro-cessestostaff.ThegovernmentalsoestablishedaProcurementTraining School to deliver an intensive one-year procurementtrainingcourseto25studentsperyeartoprovideprocurementspecialistsfordeploymentinthepublicsector.

• Tohelp localsuppliersofgoodsandservicesparticipateeffec-tivelyinthetenderprocess,thePPPCbegan regular sessions to train private sector staff on how to submit competitive bids.

A1.13. Holistic Procurement Reform toward Reconstruction of Post-War Liberia

Country:LiberiaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalName of Project:FourthReengagementandReformSupportProgramAreas of Engagement:CapacityBuilding;Procurement

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• CSCQBEhasset up 13 district networks to decentralize moni-toring of the education budget inorder togive citizensmorecontrolofthebudgetmonitoringprocess.Thesenetworkssup-portschool-basedbudgetmonitoringbyschoolorcommunity-basedgroupslikeschoolboardsorparent–teacherassociations.

Results • Increased allocations. Based on the evidence provided by

CSCQBE, the Malawi government has been addressing the dis-parities between rural and urban areas and plans to introduceincentivesforruralteachers, includingprovidinghardshipallow-ancesandpayingfortheconstructionofhousingforruralteach-ers.Similarly,governmentbudgetstatementsreflectedthatfundstopurchaseteachingandlearningmaterialsandtotrainteacherswhospecializeinteachingchildrenwithspecialneedsincreasedfromMK20million(US$51,638.480) in2002–03toMK34million(approximatelyUS$87,777)in2004-05.

• Institutionalization of budget work. ComplementingCSCQBE’ssurveyefforts, in2004, theMalawigovernmentconducted thefirstpublicexpendituretrackingsurvey(PETS)fortheeducationsector,andcivilsocietycounterpartswereincludedintheSurveyManagementTeam.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms PETScanbesuccessfullyconducted,even in low-capacityenviron-ments,ifchallengessuchasinadequatebudgetdataproducedbythegovernmentandlimitedtimeandtechnicalcapacityofcivilsocietytoanalyzedataandproducequalityreportsareovercome.

RefeRenCes CSCQBEWebsite:http://www.cscqbe.org.

Ramkumar,Vivek.2008.“CivilSocietyCoalitionforQualityBasicEducationCarriesoutPublicExpenditureTrackingSurveysinMalawi.”InOur Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizen’s Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditure.Washington,DC:InternationalBudgetPartnership.

Context From 1994 to 2001, increased funding for education in Malawi hasnot translated into increased quality of education. The Malawigovernment’s funds for education are given to the National LocalGovernmentFinanceCommittee,whichallocates fundsdirectly todistricts using parliament-approved formulas. District assembliesthen distribute funds to the schools as they see fit. In 1999, forexample,theMinistryofEducationwasconnedoutofMK187mil-lion(US$453,585)slatedforschoolconstruction.Tofightsuchabuse,since 2002, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education(CSCQBE)inMalawihasperformedannualbudgetmonitoringsurveysofeducationexpenditures.UsingtheEducationforAll(EFA)assess-mentandtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs)asguidelines,thecoalitionhasconductedsurveystoensurethatthegovernmenthasallocatedsufficientresourcestobasiceducationthatareinlinewith the EFA and MDG goals and that these resources are spentaccordingtothegovernment’spolicyandbudget.

ACtions (2002–pResent) • For its surveys, the CSCQBE samples roughly 10 percent of all

schools in Malawi. The schools are divided into geographicalregions and then subdivided into rural andurban schools fromwhichacertainnumberarerandomlychosen.Member organiza-tions of the CSCQBE administer the surveys to sampled schools.

• Whenin2003itwasdiscoveredthatanumberofteacherseitherreceivedtheirsalarieslateordidnotreceivethematall,CSCQBElobbied a parliamentary committee on education to investi-gatetheissue.Thecommitteereturnedareporttothenationalassembly.

• Adraft report of the results of each year’s survey is circulated amongCSCQBEorganizationsanddiscussedataspecialbudgetmonitoringmeeting.Inordertocoincidewiththebudgetdelib-eration in Parliament, the report is released in June at a publicmeeting with ministry officials, parliamentarians, developmentpartners,andthemedia.TheCSCQBEsends out press releases and holds district meetings where district assembly officials,districteducationofficials,civilsocietyorganizations,andschoolofficialscandiscusstheresultsand,ifnecessary,formulateactionplanstoaddressanysalientissues.

A1.14. Public Expenditure Tracking of the Education Budget for Better Outcomes for Students and Teachers

Country:MalawiSectors:Education;PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalImplementing Organization:CivilSocietyCoalitionforQualityBasicEducationAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Dissemination;Monitoring

Africa

Results • Preparation and dissemination of studies and templates for

training and capacity building of CTs and communities. Firstandforemost,studieshavebeenpreparedtoidentifyresourcestobetransferred to CT and guidelines and templates on the partici-patorymonitoringandevaluationsystemsineducationarenowavailableandhavebeendisseminated.Moreover,trainingmaterialoncitizenbudgetstotraincommunitymembershavealsobeencleared.Andfinally,templatesforthetreatmentoffinancialdataforcitizensurveillancecommitteesarenowavailable.

• Training of CTs and piloting of citizens budget. SeveraltrainingsessionshavealreadybeenorganizedonbudgetpreparationandexecutionaswellasonprocurementproceduresattheCTlevel.Moreover,incertainCTs,citizensbudgetsarenowbeingpilotedaswell.

• Delay of progress due to country context. Todate,therehavebeen a number of barriers to project implementation; giventhe weak capacity of implementers, some aspects related tothe implementationmechanism,specificallycombiningnationalandWorldBankprocedures,haveproventobequitecomplex.FollowingasupervisionmissioninMarch2013,anumberofmea-sureswereadoptedtosimplifyprocurementplanswithamorefluidvalidationmechanism;significantprogressregardingimple-mentationisexpectedbytheendof2013.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Oncecitizensbudgetsarepreparedanddisseminated,itisimportanttotakethenextlogicalsteptoclosethebudgettransparencyloopbyensuringitsactiveutilizationbyallstakeholdersandownershipbyboththeCTsandthecommitteesofthesebudgets.Moreover,sincethepurposeofthecitizensbudgetistoenablepeopletoparticipateindiscussionsaround thebudget, it shouldbemadeavailableandproducedassoonasthebudgetisapproved.

RefeRenCes Mali—ML–GovernanceandBudgetDecentralizationTechnicalAssistanceProject:P112821—ImplementationStatusResultsReport:Sequence03(English),ISR9806,WorldBank,Washington,DC.April15,2013,

Mali—ML–GovernanceandBudgetDecentralizationTechnicalAssistanceProject:P112821—ProjectAppraisalDocument,ReportNo.57477,April4,2011,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

Context Whenitwasenshrinedinthe1992constitution,decentralization—acentralelementofthemodernizationagendainMali—wasexpectedtoimproveallocationefficiencyinthefaceofdifferentlocalprefer-encesforpublicgoods.Inthepasttwodecades,Malihasmadesignif-icantprogressinthepostdecentralizationera,especiallywithrespecttobudgetcredibility,comprehensiveness,transparency,policy-basedbudgeting,andpredictabilityinbudgetexecutionatthecentrallevel.Moreover,severalcompetencieshavebeensuccessfullytransferredtothemunicipalities(CollectivitésTerritorialesorCT).However,thetransferofresourcesneededfortheireffectiveimplementationhaslaggedbehind.Also,severalchallengesremaintoimprovethepub-licadministration, law,and justicesystem,especiallywithregardtoaccounting and financial reporting, internal and external audit andoversight,andenhancingcapacitiesatthedecentralizedlevel.Attherequest of the government of Mali, the World Bank’s Governanceand Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance was financed tostrengthencapacityforPublicFinancialManagementattheCTlevelforimprovedbudgetarydecision-makingandenhancedtransparencyandoversight.Oneofthethreecomponentsofthetechnicalassis-tance(TA)—ExternalOversightandCommunityParticipationwithabudgetofUS$1.7million—is supportingcapacitybuilding forfidu-ciaryoversightandparticipationbycommunities.

ACtions (2011–14) • The specific subcomponent related to budget transparency

andmonitoringprovides support to establish a framework for effective participation of key stakeholders, including womenandyouth,inthemonitoringandevaluationoftheallocationanduseofpublicresources.

• Guidelines for citizen budgets are being prepared and civilservants, elected officials, and civil society members are beingtrainedtopreparecitizensbudgetsaswell

• Consultantsarepreparing studies and providing input for the drafting of procedure manuals onthecollectionandtreatmentoffinancialdatatoinformcommunitysurveillancecommittees,theywillalsoprovidetrainingontheuseofsuchmanuals.

• Study visits are being organized so that officials and commu-nitymembersacrossCTsinthecountryandintheWestAfricanEconomic and Monetary Union countries can learn from eachotheraboutbudgetmonitoring.

A1.15. Monitoring Budgets to Improve Service Delivery After Decentralization

Country:MaliSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(Decentralization)Level:LocalName of Project:GovernanceandBudgetDecentralizationTechnicalAssistanceAreas of Engagement:BudgetMonitoring;CapacityBuilding;CitizensBudgets

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Results • Introduction of a Citizens Budget. Theministryoffinancehas

embarked on producing a leaflet entitled “A Citizen’s Guide totheNationalBudget”containingannualpublicspendingandrev-enueinanutshellandactivelydistributingitasasupplementtonewspapersandviatheInternet.

• Improved Open Budget Index (OBI) ranking. Namibia’s rank inthe 2012 Open Budget Survey went from 53 to 55 and is nowrankedsecondinAfrica,suggestingthatmoreuser-friendlybud-getinformationisnowavailabletothegeneralpublic.

• Uptake of IPPR’s suggestions by the government. Theministryoffinancehastakenupmanyoftherecommendationscontainedinthebudgetanalysis,includingathree-yearrollingbudget,fiscaltargets,disclosureofcontingentliabilities,futureprojections,andimprovementofbudgetdocumentsanddata.

• Suggestions for improved budget transparency and citizen engagement. IPPRresearchisreadandusedbythegovernmentbutisnotinstitutionalizedinanysense.Moreover,IPPRresearchsuggeststhat,inorderforNamibiatogetascorebetween61and80ontheOBI(whereincitizensgeta“substantialpeek”intostatecoffers), more must be done by the government (for example,holdingapre-budgetbriefingbeforeitistabledinparliament,amid-termbudgetreviewinordertoassesstheexecutionofpro-gramsandprojectshalfwaythroughthefinancialyearandinformcitizensabouttheprogressmade.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms In countries with low state capacity for quick uptake, high-qualitybudgetanalysisneedstobebackedbycapacity-buildingefforts.

RefeRenCes IPPRWebsite:http://www.ippr.org.na/?q=news.

allAfrica.2013.“Namibia:NationalBudgetRatedVeryHighly.”http://allafrica.com/stories/201304030716.html.

Context TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(IPPR) isanonprofitorgani-zationdedicatedtoenhancingbudgettransparencyatthenationallevelinNamibia.Itwasfoundedin2001inacontextoflimitedbud-get analysis within and outside the government as well as limitedcivilsocietyparticipationinnationalbudgetformulation.Theprob-lemwasnotoneof limited information.As IPPRnotes,therewereaplethoraofbudgetdocumentsthatcouldbereadilydownloadedfromtheirwebsite.Instead,theproblemwasthatthequalityofthedocumentsdidnotkeepupwiththequantity.Therewereplentyofdiscrepanciesinestimates,eachdocumentwasmorethan800pageslonganddifficultforthecasualreadertonavigate,letaloneunder-standthefinerdetails.Therefore, IPPRaimedtomakethenationalbudgetaccessibletothegeneralpublic,toprovideaccessibleinfor-mationandanalysistopolicymakers,andtoassesswhetherthebud-getmetstatedpolicyobjectives.

ACtions (2009–pResent)• IPPRconducts the Open Budget Survey for Namibia,andhelps

produce general budget commentary byapplyinggeneraleco-nomic principles to assess the extent to which the budget isbeingusedtomeetnationaldevelopmentobjectives.

• BecausetheexistingNamibianbudgetdocumentsaredifficulttonavigate and often use somewhat technical language, the need for a Citizens Budget was expressed;thiswouldallownotonlyalargershareofNamibianstounderstandthebudgetandmaketheirvoices heard, butwould also address key questions, such as thegovernment’soverallstrategywiththebudget,howthebudgetcanhelpduringtheeconomiccrisis,andwhatitisbeingspenton.

• IPPRalsoappealed to the ministry of finance to involve ordinary citizens in the budget formulation process.

A1.16. Making National Budgets Accessible to Citizens through Budget Analysis

Country:NamibiaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level:NationalImplementing Organization:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchAreas of Engagement:BudgetAnalysis;CitizensBudgets;Simplification

Africa

Accessisopentothegeneralpublicandincludesstandardweb-site tab displays and an open source library. The participatory,analytical, and technical pages on the portal are focused on generating procurement reports, offering online procurement training, and providing procurement-related legal advice;accessisrestrictedtoverifiedprocurementmonitors.

• To ensure that procurement information can be reported withuniformity, a standard checklist was developed based on the benchmarks in the Public Procurement Act andinconsultationwithrepresentativesfromthevariousidentifiedstakeholders.

Results • Better dissemination and scrutiny of public works. Over120citi-

zenmonitorstrainedaspartoftheprojectarenowactivelytrack-ingpublicworksacross thecountry.Thewebsitehasgone liveandisfullyfunctioning,anditservesasanimportanteducationaltoolforcitizensinterestedinaccessingreportsandguidelines.

• Created an active online portal. Citizenmonitorshavegeneratedandsubmitted135reportsthroughtheonlineportal.

• Greater state-society coordination on issues of corruption. Theproject has successfully fostered a strong working relationshipbetween CSOs and government enforcement agencies aimedateliminatingcorruption.Citizenmonitorsfilereportswhilethebureauofpublicprocurementensuresthatappropriatefollow-upactionistaken.

impliCAtion foR pRojeCt teAmsLessonslearnedfromtheNigerianexperiencetodateindicatethattheuseofinformationandcommunicationtechnologybycitizens—such as the website—hasmuch room for improvement. It cannotbeassumedthatcitizenswillautomaticallyuseavailabletechnology;incentives shouldbeoffered toencouragepeople to fullypartici-pateinmonitoringprojectsthatusetechnology.Moreover,thereisagrowingunderstandingthatinformationmightneedtobepresentedorganizedbysectorssothatcitizenscanmonitorareasofparticularinteresttothem;peopletendtofinditeasiertomonitorprocure-mentinsubjectmattersthattheyarealreadyinterestedin.

RefeRenCe ProcurementMonitoringPortalObservatoryWebsite:http://www.procurementmonitor.org.

Context Afteryearsofscandal,Nigeriahasstruggledtorestorepublictrustinthegovernmentandridthepublicsectorofpersistentcorruption.Thisismostapparentinthegovernmentprocurementprocess,whereapproximately70percentofgovernmentactivityseemstakesplacebehindcloseddoors.Complicatingmatters,public-servicecontract-ing is often highly technical, making it arcane and difficult for theaveragecitizentotakeadvantageofrecentlawsallowingcivilsocietytoobserveallstagesoftheprocurementprocess.Asaresult,citizensareoftenunabletomonitorandprovidefeedbacktothegovern-mentaboutthisprocess.Inordertostrengthenthefeedbackloopin energy sector investments, the World Bank is working with thegovernmentofNigeriaaswellaslocalCSOstotraincitizenmonitorsthat can ensure accountability and effectiveness of expenditures.UndertheNigeriaProcurementMonitoringProject,theWorldBankprovidedtechnicalassistanceoncontractmonitoringbydrawingonlessonslearnedfromprocurementsystemsaroundtheworld.Withinthegovernment,theprojecthasworkedprimarilywiththebureauofpublicprocurement,theregulatoryagencyforgovernmentpro-curement.TheprojecthasalsoestablishedavoluntarycoalitionofNigeriancivilsocietyorganization(CSOs),ledbytheNigerianPublicandPrivateDevelopmentCenter.Othermembersof thecoalitionincluderepresentativesfromtheextractiveindustriesandthemedia.

ACtions (2009–pResent) • The design of the procurement portal observatory is innova-

tive;careful thoughtandconsiderationwasput intotheneedsofthevariousstakeholdersintheprocurementprocessincludinginvestigativejournalists;CSOs;professionalbodies(procurementobservers);thebureauofpublicprocurement(regulators);federalministries, departments, and agencies (procuring entities); con-tractors,suppliers,andbidders;developmentcommunities,andNigeriancitizens.

• During the development phase of the procurement portalobservatory, advocacy toward and capacity-building activities for various stakeholders—CSOs, professionals, regulators, pub-lic procurement officers, and legislators—were undertaken toensure that the system and design framework could meet theinformationneedsofvariousstakeholdersandthat itcouldbescaledup.

• Theportal isbroadlycategorized intodescriptivepages (open)andparticipatory,analytical,andtechnicalpages(restricted).Thedescriptivepagesaremainlyforreceivingandsharinginformation.

A1.17. Citizens Training Toward Better Procurement Monitoring

Country:NigeriaSectors:Mining;PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:ProvincialName of Project:NigeriaProcurementMonitoringProjectAreas of Engagement:Anticorruption;BudgetDisclosure;CapacityBuilding;ICT;Monitoring;Procurement

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Results • Limited impact on increasing transparency.Whilecivilsociety’s

understanding of Public Financial Management systems and itsabilitytoanalyzeandcritiquegovernmentplanningandbudget-ingprocesseshasincreased,thisawarenesshasnotyettranslatedintoimprovedtransparencyandaccountabilityofresourcereve-nuesorincreasedgovernmentcapacityandperformance.Aweb-site—http://bayelsa.gov.ng/beiti—hasbeencreatedbutisrarelyupdated.

• Failure to pass BEITI bill. BecauseBEITIwashousedinthebureauofdueprocessande-governmentthatlacksitsownlegalframe-workandonlyrecentlybecameafull-fledgedagencyofthegov-ernment,passageofthebillwasdelayed.ThisdelayevokedCSOadvocacyandlobbyingledbyBANGOF,butdespitebestefforts,thebillwasnotpassed.

• Limited gains on challenging top-down structures. Despitetheboldstepofincludingcivilsocietyinthemultistakeholderwork-inggroup,coloniallegaciesoftop-downgovernanceprovedhardtochallengeintheshortrun.

• Small wins. Nevertheless,thereisevidencethattheattempttodevelopand institutionalize the initiativehasproduced lessonscriticaltoreplicationeffortselsewhereinthecountry.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Ideally,asubnationalprojectshouldbeembeddedwithinthestategovernment’sdevelopmentstrategyandviewedasakeyaspectofPublicFinancialManagementreform. Intermsof institutional loca-tion,subnationalinitiativesarebetterplacedwithinoneofthecorefinanceagencies,ministriesordepartmentsbeforetheytrytoacquiretheirownlegalframeworkandmeasuresofindependencefromthegovernment. Only then can a more transparent and accountableapproachtogovernanceworkitswaythroughthegovernmentviaaneffectivecommunicationsstrategy.

RefeRenCes RevenueWatchWebsite:http://www.revenuewatch.org.

Weate,Jeremy.2012.“AnUphillStruggle:OilWealthandthePushforTransparencyintheNigerDelta.”CaseStudy,RevenueWatchInstitute,NewYork,NY.

Context Likemanyresource-richcountries,Nigeriapassesagreatportionofitsoilwealthdirectlytooil-producingregionssuchasBayelsaState—anunderdevelopedregionthatwasthesiteofNigeria’sfirstoildis-coveryin1956).Butwithoutcarefulmanagementandoversight,suchincreased revenuescanundermine localeconomicstability, reduceaccountability, and increase conflict. In fact, the state governmentisfrequentlyaccusedoffinancialrecklessnessandmindlessextrava-gance. Paradoxically, Bayelsa State is the only state in Nigeria thatis implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative atthe state level. The Bayelsa Expenditure and Income TransparencyInitiative (BEITI), is a multistakeholder initiative inaugurated by thegovernment and supported by the United States-based RevenueWatchInstitute(RWI).Launchedin2008,BEITI’smainaimistoinstitu-tionalizetransparencyandaccountabilityandenhancecitizenpartic-ipationinthebudgetprocess.ItwasinitiatedbyexecutivegovernorofBayelsatodemonstratehiscommitmenttorunninganaccount-ablegovernmentthatseekssustainabledevelopmentforitscitizensbeyondoil,andthatseekstodecreasevulnerabilitytoconflictandsocial violence.However,despitebeing thefirst state in theNigerDeltatopublishitsbudgetandrevenueallocation,whatbeganwitha“bigbang,”hascooleddownovertime.

ACtions (2008–11) • SoonafterBEITIwasestablished,thegovernorbrought together

a multistakeholder working group comprised of top govern-mentofficials,includingcommissioners,directors,thedirectorofdueprocessande-governance,oilcompanyrepresentatives,theprivatesector,andcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)whoworkedcollectivelytoopenupthebooksofthestatetothehighestlevelof scrutiny in an attempt to position Bayelsa as Nigeria’s mosttransparentstategovernment.

• RWIprovided technical assistance totheministryof justiceto help draft the BEITI bill (intended to improve regional trans-parency and citizen participation in the budget process, andBANGOFhashelped gather local groups to issue joint calls for quicker action (forexample,toexpeditethepassageofthebillintolaw).

• RWIhasalsofunded and provided training to several CSO plat-forms—suchastheNigerDeltaCitizensandBudgetPlatformon budget and project monitoring atthecommunity level; italsofunded and provided reports of its findings and its efforts toincreaseaccountabilitymechanisms.

A1.18. Attempting to Work with Multistakeholder Groups to Institutionalize Budget Transparency

Country:NigeriaSector:MiningLevel:ProvincialImplementing Organization:RevenueWatchInstituteAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;CapacityBuilding

Africa

• LACSOP’sanalyses of the education budget helped launch their budget series,whichincludesanalysesofthehealth,infrastruc-ture, and poverty-alleviation sectors. In turn, this research hasdeepened their engagemens with the executive and legislativebranchesofgovernment.

Results • Input for the education sector strategy. The executive asked

LACSOP to contribute to the development of the EducationSectorMediumTermSectorStrategy2013–15.Thestrategypro-cesshadnotbeenpreviouslybeenopentopublicparticipation,buttherecommendationsofLACSOPwereeventuallyadoptedbytheministry.LACSOPexpectstoseethesechangesreflectedinthe2013budget.

• Input for 2013 budget proposal. Followingengagementswiththelegislature, LACSOP’s researchoneducationbudgetspromptedpromisingreactionsfromtheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesof the Lagos state government, including an invitation by thestate legislature toprovide technical support for reviewing theexecutivegovernor’sbudgetproposalpriortothepassageofthe2013appropriationlaw.Thisrequestwasconsideredasignificantbreakthroughgiventheone-partynatureofthestate’spoliticalterrainandthe legislature’s reputationfornotwantingto“rocktheboat.”

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms In addition to the executive branch and the national legislature,engagementwithprovinciallegislaturesandexecutivescanprovidecriticalentrypointsforengagingCSOsinthepromotionofbudgettransparency.TheyshouldbeconsideredkeystakeholdersinBT&Mactivities.

RefeRenCes LACSOPWebsite:http://www.lacsop.org.

Kadiri,Dede.2012.“CivilSocietySpeaks;DoesGovernmentListen?”International Budget Partnership e-Newsletter68(September-October).

Omankhanlen,Odidison.2012.“Budget:LagosLegislaturePartnersCivilSociety.”Nigeria Tribune24(September).

Context During2012,intheirlatestdrivetopromotecitizenengagementandaccountabilityinthebudgetprocess,theLagosstatehouseofassem-blyandtheexecutivebranchhaveencouragedpartnershipswithcivilsociety.Establishedin2007,theLagosStateCivilSocietyPartnership(LACSOP)isacoalitionof47majorcivilsocietyorganizationsthathasbeenworkingto institutionalizeparticipatorygovernanceandsus-tainablepro-poorservicedeliveryinLagosstatethroughcollabora-tiveinterventionswiththeexecutive,legislature,andmediaandbyconductingindependentassessmentsofgovernmentperformance.

ACtions (2007–pResent) • LACSOP’sresearch on the government’s budget priorities in the

education sector hasfocusedonteacherquality,theconstructionandrehabilitationofschoolfacilities,andtheprovisionoftuition-freeeducationatalllevels.Intheirbudgetanalyses,LACSOPcon-sideredeconomicindicators,includingnominalgrowthratesandthepercentageoftotalexpendituresthatarebudgetedforedu-cationcomparedtocurrentpolicycommitments.

• In one example, LACSOP investigated the quality of school instructional materials like textbooks, which are crucial bothto building teacher capacity and supporting student learning.Analysisrevealedthatexpendituresforexaminationswereover50timesgreaterthanthefundsallocatedtobooksunderthecur-riculumservicesdepartment.Whileexaminationsareimportantformeasuringstudentlearning,LACSOParguedthatbooksshouldbe prioritized over exams—without adequate budget supportforbooks, thequalityofeducationandgovernmentefforts tomeeteducationcommitmentsriskedbeingcompromised.

• Inotherinstances,LACSOPexamined the annual growth of cer-tain budget items andidentifiedatroublingtrend:from2009to2010,theshareoftotaleducationfundingbudgetedfor“specialduties”morethandoubled,from4to8.6percent.However,themeaningof“specialduties”wasnotclearlydefined,allowingfortheinefficientandpotentiallycorruptuseofeducationresources.LACSOP‘sbudgetreportstatedthatunlessspecialdutiescanbeshowntoplayamajorroleinfulfillingpolicycommitmentsandimprovingeducation, sucha considerable increase in allocationcouldbebetterusedforitemsthathavethepotentialtoimpactchangeandpromotesustainableresults.

A1.19. Collaborating with the Provincial Government to Promote the Transparent Utilization of the Budget

Country: NigeriaSector:EducationLevel:ProvincialImplementing Organization:LagosStateCivilSocietyPartnershipAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Legislatures;Monitoring

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Results • Mobilization of CSOs. CSOsnowmobilizeandcoordinatetheir

engagementwiththepublicsectoronaccountabilityandtrans-parency using the free and open software made available byPPDC.

• Detection of misuse of funds. Reportsfromtheportalplacedonthelistserv,guideregulatorstoareasofconcernandsupporttheirabilitytoprevent,detect,andinvestigatewrongdoing.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms LessonslearnedtodatefromtheNigerianexperienceindicatethatcitizen use of information and communication technology, suchas the website, leaves much room for improvement. It cannot beassumedthatcitizenswillautomaticallyusetechnology.Thereshouldbeincentivestoencouragepeopletofullyparticipateinmonitoringprojects that use technology. Moreover, there is a growing under-standingthattheinformationpresentedmayneedtobeorganizedbysectorsothatcitizenscanmonitorareaswheretheyhaveapar-ticular interest; it was noted that people find it easier to monitorprocurementinsubjectmattersthatalreadyinterestthem.

RefeRenCe WorldBank.2012.“DevelopingtheNigerianProcurementMonitoringPortal

Observatory.”PublicandPrivateDevelopmentCentrefortheProcurement

InnovationChallengeCaseStudy.WorldBank,Washington,DC.

Context TheNigerianProcurementMonitoringPortal isanexampleofhowcivil society organization (CSO) monitoring coupled with a robustweb-basedmechanismcanbeeffectiveatencouraging,promoting,andsupportingcitizenparticipationinthepublicprocurementpro-cess.Itsobjectiveistopromotetransparent,accountable,andeffi-cientpublicprocurementthatdeliversvalueformoneyandincreasesthequalityofservicesdelivered.TheportalisoperatedbythePublicandPrivateDevelopmentCentre(PPDC),aCSOthatbringstogethertheinterestsofbothcitizensandtheprivatesectortoimprovepro-curementinNigeria.Thefollowingarethekeyfeaturesoftheportal:tosupportcitizenmonitoringoftheNigerianfederalprocurementprocesstohold itaccountabletostatutoryobjectivesoftranspar-encyandaccountability;toprovidecitizens,media, regulatory,andoversightstakeholderswithevidence-basedreportsthat,whenmon-itored,canprovideearlywarningsignalsofprocurementthatislikelytofail;andtosupportcompliancebygovernmententitiesthroughpublicdisclosureandaccesstoinformation.

ACtions (2001–pResent) • Theportalisseenasalegitimatesourceforadviceandinforma-

tion. This information and communication technology-basedobservatory is being deployed to provide virtual access for sub-mission of monitoring reports by CSO representatives andotherinterestedstakeholdersbasedonsimplifiedstandardchecklists,tosupportautomatedanalysisanddisseminationofsuchreports.Theobservatoryalsoprovides daily legal advice for investigative journalists, and other interested observers through blogs.

• CSOsuse submitted reports to carry out evidence-based advo-cacy tofederalministriesonthechallengeofaccessingprocure-ment information, which has led to the creation of guidelinesfor accessing procurement information that, for the first time,outlines how CSOs, professional bodies, and other interestedmembersofthepubliccanplaymoreeffectiverolesinthepublicprocurementprocess.Thisisnowontheportalalongwithotherprocurement-relatedresourcesforvariousstakeholders,includingprocurementtrainingtoolsandmanuals.

• Reportsfromtheportalplacedonthelistserv,guide regulators to areas of concern and support their ability to prevent, detect, and investigate wrongdoing.

A1.20. Engaging Civil Society Partners to Ensure a Transparent Procurement Procedure

Country: NigeriaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevels:National;ProvincialImplementing Organization:ThePublicandPrivateDevelopmentCentreAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;CapacityBuilding;Monitoring;Procurement

Africa

• Nonstate actor oversight, suchasassistingthedevelopmentofanalyticanddisseminationcapacityofnonstateactorstoscruti-nizetheuseofpublicresources.

Results (pReliminARy) • Online budget dissemination. The 2012 national budget has

beenpublishedon theMoFEDwebsite.ACitizensBudgetwaspreparedanddisseminatedin2012and2013.

• Dissemination of income and expenditure data. Theaccountantgeneral’s department publishes income and expenditures on aquarterlybasisthroughthenationalgazetteandontheMoFEDwebsite. The national public procurement authority also pub-lishescontractsissuedontheirwebsite.

• Dissemination of data on central allocations for education. Localcouncilsdisplayfundsfromcentralgovernmentquarterlyallocationsthatare included inthenationalannualbudgetandavailableforprimaryhealthcareandschools.

• Improved oversight by non-state actors. Fifteennonstateactororganizations from the four regions of the country have beenawardedgrantstothetuneofUS$472,919forprojectsthatpro-moteongoingPublicFinancialManagementreformefforts.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Inlow-capacitycontextslikeSierraLeone,anincrementalapproachthatbeginswiththebasics, i.e.strengtheningthecredibilityofthebudgetandfinancialaccountability,ismorelikelytobesuccessfulintheend.Sustainablepublicsectorreformsalsorequirestronggov-ernmentownershipaswellasfinancialcommitmentsfromandday-to-dayinvolvementintheworkbydevelopmentpartners.Finally,amultidonor approach is preferable in these low-capacity contexts.IntheparticularcontextofSierraLeone,theideaofsupportbeingprovidedthroughseparatebilateralagreementswasconsideredbutdropped.Low-capacitygovernmentsrequireadditionalexternalsup-portatthelocalleveltofacilitateregularsetsofdisbursement,finan-cialmanagement,procurement,andreportingrequirementstoavoidprolongingthemodernizationprocessandtoensuretransparency.

RefeRenCes SierraLeone—IntegratedPublicFinancialManagementReform:P108069—ImplementationStatusResultsReport:Sequence07,ReportNo.ISR10116,May24,2013,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

SierraLeone—IntegratedPublicFinancialManagementReformProject(English),ReportNo.46166,ProjectAppraisalDocument,May8,2009,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

Context Sincetheendofthecivilwarin2002,SierraLeonehasmadesignifi-cantprogress inbuildingpeace,achievingmacroeconomicstability,reestablishing democratic institutions, strengthening core systems,and bringing decisions and resources closer to citizens through amajor decentralization initiative. The government’s new povertyreduction strategy paper sets the direction and development pri-orities for thenewadministrationbasedona foundationofgoodgovernancethatincludesstrengtheningthecivilservice,fightingcor-ruption,andstrengtheningPublicFinancialManagement(PFM).TheIntegratedPublicFinancialManagementReformProjectsupportsthegovernment’sintegratedPFMprogramwithinterrelatedcomponentsincludingonethatsupportscapacitydevelopment,monitoring,andoversightofPFMbynonstateactors(nongovernmentalorganizationsandcivilsociety).Thevarioustechnicalactivitiesbeingundertakencontributetothree“platforms”—credibleandtransparentbudgets;improvedallocationofallavailableresources;andgreaterefficiencyandprobityinresourceusethatleadstoimprovedservicedelivery.

ACtions (2009–13) Activitiescanbedividedintofourrelevantcomponentsthatrelatetoimprovedbudgetmanagementandservicedelivery:

• Strengthening macrofiscal coordination and budget manage-ment by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development(MoFED). This includes improving budget credibility associatedwith a more developed and appropriately-managed aggregatefiscal position by establishing a macrofiscal division in MoFED;implementing the International Monetary Fund-styled financialprogrammingandpoliciesmodel system (SLIMM);developingamedium-termexpenditureframework;andstrengtheningbudgetprocessinministries,departments,andagencies(MDAs).

• Reinforcing the control system for improved service delivery. Thisinvolves19localcouncilsandworkingtowardarobustpublicprocurementcadre,normsandpractices, tightenedpayroll andcompensationcontrols,improvedaccountingreportingandpro-cedures,andfurtherpublicationofthepublicexpenditurestrack-ingsurvey;

• Strengthening central finance functions, which primarilyincludes the rollout of the Freebalance system, a new govern-mentresourceplanningtechnology,in12MDAsandallaspectsoftrainingandhumanresourcecapacitydevelopmentrequiredtosupportthemainPFMfunctions;and

A.21. Enhancing Service Delivery by Including Nonstate Actor Oversight in Public Financial Management Reform

Country:SierraLeoneSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJustice(PublicFinance)Level:NationalName of Project:IntegratedPublicFinancialManagementReformProjectAreas of Engagement:BudgetDissemination;CapacityBuilding;Procurement

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established in all regions. Theyparticipateinannualbudgetdis-cussionswhentheministriesanddepartmentsdefendtheirpoli-ciesandbudgetproposalsanddiscussactivitiescarriedoutinthepreviousyear.Thebudgetdiscussionsarealso attended by rep-resentatives of local and international nongovernmental organi-zations aswellasrepresentativesoftheirdevelopmentpartnersinthecountrytoinformthemofthegovernment’sdevelopmentactivitiessoastoavoidoverlappingorduplicatingdevelopmentefforts.Anothertaskofthecommunitybudgetoversightcom-mittees is tomonitor budget implementation in their respec-tive regions ordistricts,complementingthePETStaskteam.

Results • Reduction in leakages of school budget allocations as a result

of PETS. NewPETSreportsoneducationandessentialdrugswerecompleted.Theformerledtoreducedleakagesinresourcestrans-ferredtotheprimaryschoolsystem.Overall,PETShasstrength-ened the accountability framework for the government—thepresident’snationalpolicyadvisorycommittee, auditorgeneral,andanticorruptioncommissionagreedthatthePETSreportwasan important sourceof information for theirwork.Apart fromhighlightingthe leakages, ithasalsopinpointedthe importanceofstrongplanningnormsforbudgeting.

• Increased awareness of financial management problems and documentation of their sources. PETS reports arediscussed inthecabinetandarevaluedbythepresident’snationalpolicyadvi-sorycommittee,theauditorgeneral,andtheanticorruptioncom-mission.Seniorpublicservantsnowhaveincreasedawarenessofthehighdegreeofnoncompliancewithbudgetexecutionguide-linesandofthelowlevelsofcapacity,especiallyinbookkeepingskills,incostcentersatalllevels.

• Active participation of civil society organizations. Civilsocietyorganization representatives actively participate in the annualpolicy hearings and budget discussions when line ministriesand departments defend their budget policies, proposals, andactivities.

Context Acoupleofyearsafteremergingfromtheendofabrutalcivilwarthatlastedmorethantenyears,SierraLeonemadegradualbutsig-nificant progress in reestablishing peace and security and promot-ing social and economic security for its people. In particular, thegovernment has made significant progress in strengthening publicexpenditure management under reforms aimed at strengtheningbudgetimplementation,monitoring,andexpenditurecontrol.ThesereformshavebeensupportedbytheWorldBankthroughERRCIandII,animportantcomponentofwhichwastheinvolvementoflocalcommunities inthebudgetprocess. Infact,fiscal2002witnessedasubstantive increase inparticipationbycivil society inbudget for-mulation,withconsultativeworkshopsandsectordiscussionshelp-ing identify expenditure priorities and allocation of resources. TheRepublicofSierraLeoneexpresseditsintenttomaintainthispartici-pativeprocess;oneofthemainaimsoftheERRCIIIwastoassistthegovernmentwiththisprocess.

ACtivities (2004–05) Toensure the transparent andaccountablemanagementofpublicexpenditures,thefollowingactionsweretaken:

• Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) were used to exam-ine the flow of funds from the center to frontline delivery units inordertoexploreandunderstandthelackofcorrespondencebetween increased allocation of government resources andimprovements in the social sectors. In its second phase, PETSprovidedquantitativeevidenceofbudgetexecution;leakagesinnonsalaryrecurrentexpendituresatthecentralministry,district,andfacility level;anddiagnostic informationoncriticalpovertysectors.

• Community and civil society participation in budget prepara-tion and execution was encouraged to enhance the participa-torynatureofthebudgetprocess.Thegovernmentestablishedbudgetcommitteestoreviewandendorsealloftheobjectivesand policies stated in strategic plans and to participate in theexecution of the budgets of the ministries, departments, andagencies.Community budget oversight committees have been

A1.22. Enhancing Participation in the Monitoring and Execution of the Budget in a Post-Conflict Situation

Country:SierraLeoneSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalName of Project:EconomicRehabilitationandRecoveryCreditIIIAreas of Engagement:Monitoring;ParticipatoryBudgetPlanning

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RefeRenCes SierraLeone—ThirdEconomicRehabilitationandRecoveryCreditProject—English.ImplementationCompletionandResultsReport,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

SierraLeone—ThirdEconomicRehabilitationandRecoveryCreditProject—English.ProgramDocument,ReportNo.25812,WorldBank,Washington,DC.,April23,2012.

Wallace,Lindsay,JimEdgerton,RichardHarris,andErisaOcheing.2003.“SierraLeone:PublicExpenditureTrackingSurveys(PETS)ReviewFinalReport.”CaseStudy,DFIDandWorldBank,Washington,DC.

Addison,Douglas,andRenatoVillela.2004.“SierraLeone:HIPCExpenditureTracking,AssessmentandActionPlan.”PreparedbytheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFundincollaborationwiththeAuthoritiesofSierraLeone.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms InSierraLeone,theaftermathofthecivilwarweakenedtraditionalaccountability mechanisms, as is the case in any postconflict andfragilesituation.Theauditorgeneral’soffice,theinternalaudit,andparliamenthadbeensignificantlyweakened,butPETSwereabletofillthisaccountabilityvacuum,eventhoughthiscreatedasignificantamountofpressureonandexpectationsfromPETSthathadtobemanagedbytheteam.

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Results • Provision of funds for janitorial services. TheCityofCapeTown

introduced a janitorial service for regular maintenance of flushtoilets and standpipes. This service also provided jobs for 500unemployedpeople.Thecitypromisedtofundthisserviceeveryyear.

• Improved maintenance of sanitation facilities. The city nowtakesitsmaintenanceresponsibilitiesmoreseriously.Forexample,inNovember2011,itrepaired256toiletsinKhayelitsha.

• Successful access to janitorial service contracts. SJCfoundthatthe city spent 11 percent of its operational budget to contractprivate companies to perform functions like servicing chemi-caltoilets,butthecompaniesdidnotcleanthetoiletsasoftenas agreed, and the city did not monitor them properly. Afterrepeatedrequests,SJCwasgivencopiesoftheagreementswiththeprivateserviceproviders.Accordingtothelaw,theseagree-ments should be on municipal websites, but SJC only receivedthemaftertherewasmediaadvocacyandathreatoflegalaction.SJC used the agreements to show that the providers were notcomplyingwithallrequirements.

• Tagging of GPS coordinates for public toilets. TheSJCconvincedthe city to tag each toilet with its GPS coordinates to enablerepair teams to find them easily when problems are reported.TaggingisnecessarybecausemanystreetsinKhayelitshadonothaveformalnamesandnumbers.

• Establishment of complaint hotlines. The City of Cape Townagreedtoinstallfreephones,whichresidentscanusetoreportproblems directly to the water and sanitation technical opera-tionscenter.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Integratinghigh-qualitytechnicalanalysiswithtargetedadvocacyofkeydecisionmakers,publicmobilization,andtheuseofthemediacanresultinpro-poorchangesinbudgetallocationsaswellasmoretransparencyregardinghowthesefundsarespent.

RefeRenCes Website:http://www.sjc.org.za.

InternationalBudgetPartnership(unpublished).“SouthAfrica:AccesstoSanitationinInformalSettlements.”CaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

SocialJusticeCoalition.2012.“MonitoringoftheCityofCapeTown’sJanitorialServiceforCommunalFlushToiletsinInformalSettlements.”

Context TheSocialJusticeCoalition(SJC)isacoalitionofcivilsocietyorgani-zationsintheinformalsettlementofKhayelitshainCapeTown.Soonafteritwasformedin2008,SJCreceivedreportsfrommanyresidentsthat the lack of adequate toilet facilities resulted in people beingassaulted,raped,andmurderedwhenrelievingthemselves.SJCesti-matedthatatleast500,000residentsofinformalsettlementsinCapeTowndidnothaveaccesstoadequatesanitation.Therefore,in2010,SJC launched theCleanandSafeSanitationCampaign,whichaimsto ensure that the City Council properly maintains existing toiletsandprovidesadditionalcleanandsafesanitationfacilitiesininformalsettlements.

ACtions (2008–pResent) SJCusedvariousstrategiestolaunchandimplementtheCleanandSafeSanitationCampaign.

• SJCdidsomebudget work,but itwasnotable tofindreliableinformationonhowmuchthecityspendsonKhayelitshaoroninformal settlements in general. It therefore started mobilizing public support for its goals by raising awareness. For instance,SJClinedupatpublictoiletsinplacesfrequentedbythemiddleclasstorepresentthemanySouthAfricansstillwaitingforaccesstocleanandsafesanitationfacilities.

• SJC also endeavored to create a better relationship with the city.ThecitylistenstoSJCbecauseofitslargecommunity-basedmembershipanditspartnershipswithothersectionsofcivilsoci-ety. SJC’s partners range from religious leaders to professionalsandorganizationsthatoftenhaveskillstohelpSJCputforwarditsargumentsanddemands.SJChasencouragedthecitytomakeincrementalchangestoimprovesanitationinCapeTown’sinfor-malsettlements.

• SincethemayorofCapeTownconcededtoSJC’sdemandsandcommitted to the provision of improved sanitation servicesby June 30, 2012, SJC has monitored these commitments. Forinstance,SJCvisitedtensitesoverthreemonthsandfoundmanyproblems.

A1.23. Advocating to Increase Access to Sanitation in Informal Settlements

Country:SouthAfricaSector:Water,Sanitation,andFloodProtection(Sanitation)Level:LocalImplementing Organization:SocialJusticeCoalitionAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Dissemination;Monitoring

Africa

seven schools that were willing to legally confront the educa-tiondepartment,despiteaperceivedthreatfromtheprovincialhead office. To mitigate the risk, each school established an infrastructure crisis committee composedofparents,students,andcommunitymemberstoactasplaintiffsinthecase,shield-ingstaffandschoolboardmembersfromrepercussions.TheLRCalsoselected largerschoolstopreemptthepossibilitythattheeducationdepartmentwouldshutdowntheschoolsandtransferthechildren,resortingtoeconomies-of-scalearguments.

• Thecomplaintfiledagainst theEasternCapeprovinceand thenationalgovernmentmadethreepoints.First, itcited the con-stitutional right to education and numerous government policies and legislation atthenationalandprovincial levelthataimedtoeradicatemudschools.Second,thecomplaintdetailedthe efforts made by each of the schools to communicate their needs, including petitions and correspondence. Finally, itstressed the lack of transparency by theEasternCapeeduca-tiondepartmentindesigningitsplansforimprovingeducationalinfrastructure.

Results The Amasango Case• Lack of compliance with court ruling.Thecourtruledthatthe

EasternCapeeducationdepartment’s failure toprovideappro-priateandadequate school facilitiesatAmasangowas “uncon-stitutional,unlawful,and invalid.” Itorderedthedepartmenttodevelopandimplementaplanforimprovingtheschool’sfacilitiesandtoreportbacktothecourteverythreemonthsonitsprog-ress.Unfortunately, thecourthasbeenunable toensurecom-pliance.Todate, and incontraventionof thecourt ruling,onlytemporarystructuresfortheAmasangoschoolhavebeenputinplace,andanewschoolhasnotbeenbuilt.

The Seven Schools Case• Legal commitment to replace inadequate school structures.

The government of South Africa committed R8.2 billion ($US1billion) to replace inadequate educational structures nation-allyover the following threeyears.Allocations foreachof thesevenschoolswere includedinamemorandumofunderstand-ing (MOU) signed by the national government and other par-ties involved in the case.Additionally, the provincial educationdepartmentwasinstructedtoputinplacetemporarymeasuresforthesevenschoolswithintwomonths.Temporarystructureswere in factconstructed,andsomeof the sevenschoolshavesincebeenrebuilt,althoughtheconstructionofsomehasbeendelayedbecauseofdifficultieswithtendersandcontractors.

Context OneofSouthAfrica’spoorerprovinces,theEasternCape,spends45percentofitstotalprovincialbudgetoneducation.Oftheeducationdepartment’stotalbudgetofR26.2billion(approximatelyUS$2.6bil-lion)for2012–13,81percentwasallocatedforpersonnel,leavingfewresources fordesperately-needed investments suchas safe schoolstructures. Despite promises by politicians to ensure safe schoolstructuresintheprovince,theEasternCapestillhad572mudschoolsin2004–05.In2009,theeducationdepartmentstatedthatR23billionwouldberequiredtoeradicateallunsafestructures,includingmudstructures, but the total education infrastructure budget for thatyearwasonlyR981million.

ACtions The Amasango Case (2008–11)• DesperateforanewbuildingforAmasangoSchool,theschool’s

governing body (SGB) lobbied the education department for years in repeated meetings, letters, and phone calls, butwithnoresults.Therefore,theSGBset up a task team toaddresstheissue,includingpolice,laborunionrepresentatives,municipaloffi-cialsandpoliticians,membersoftheschoolmanagementteam,andparents.Ontherecommendationofthistaskteam,in2008,SBG,incollaborationwiththeLegalResourcesCentre(LRC)andthePublicServiceAccountabilityMonitor(PSAM),pursued legal action againsttheeducationdepartment.TheSBGbaseditscaseontheargumentthatthefailuretoprovideadequatefacilitiesforAmasangowasaviolationoftheconstitutionalrequirementforthegovernmenttoprovideappropriateandadequateeducationforallchildren.

• Theeducationdepartmentbacktrackedonits initialofferforasettlement,arguingthatAmasangowasalreadyonthelistofpri-orityschoolsandthatresourceswereinsufficienttoaddressallneeds simultaneously. PSAM’sbudget analysis helped to rejecttheeducationdepartment’sargumentbydemonstratingthattheeducation department had been under-spending its infrastruc-ture budget and that aspart of theprovincialbudget process,under-spent budget lines are routinely adjusted downward. Ifsufficientfundswereunavailable,thiswaspartlytheresultofthedepartment’sfailuretospenditsresources.

The Seven Schools Case (2009–11)• TheLRCidentified 25 mud schools intheEasternCape—allwith

poorbuildings,alackofaccesstowater,andshortagesofdesksandchairs,amongotherdeficiencies.LRC then supported each school in building their cases. Theprocess resulted ina listof

Country:SouthAfricaSector:EducationLevels:Provincial;LocalImplementing Organizations:LegalResourceCentre;PublicServiceAccountabilityMonitorAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Infrastructure;Legislation

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A1.24. Using Budget Analysis and Litigation to Eradicate Mud Schools

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• Establishment of the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative (ASIDI) by the national department of edu-cation in 2011. ASIDIwasfundedbytwoconditionalgrantsfromthe national department of basic education, which providedtwo major dedicated funding streams for the eradication ofmudschools:theEducationInfrastructureGrantandtheSchoolInfrastructureBacklogsGrant.Bothwereintroducedinthe2011–12budget,whichwas tabledby thenationalminister in the samemonththattheMOAonthesevenschoolswassigned.

• Establishment of Precedent. More recently, Equal Education, acommunity and membership-based education nongovernmen-talorganization,madeadeliberateeffort tochallenge the sys-temic issuesplaguingtheeducationsystembyaskingthecourtto require the minister to set minimum norms and standardsforschoolinfrastructurethatwouldapplycountrywide.ShortlybeforeMarch2013,theministerconcededtothisdemand.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • Inadditiontostrategicpublicinterestlitigation,acomprehensive

campaign that includesgrassrootsmobilization andcommunityownership,aplanforobtaininghigh-levelpoliticalsupport,andadeliberatestrategytoharnessthemediaareoftennecessarytoconvertcourtvictoriesintomeaningfulpolicychanges.

• Itistheworkintheseotherareasthatoftenpreparescivilsoci-etyorganizations(CSOs)forsuccessfullitigation.TheAmasangoandseven-schoolcasesdevelopedasaresultofcommittedCSOsbeing prepared to respond to legal opportunities when theyarose,andthatpoiseandpreparationwasaconsequenceoftheirpreviouseffortsinthefieldofeducationaljustice—effortsthatforPSAMhadincludedbudgetmonitoringandevaluation.

RefeRenCes InternationalBudgetPatrnershipWebsite:www.internationalbudget.org.

Tshangan,AlisonHickey.2013.“TheImpactofLitigationbytheLegalResourcesCentreforAdequateClassroomInfrastructureinSouthAfrica.”IBPCaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,InternationalBudgetPartnership,CapeTown,SouthAfrica.

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problem—i.e.,childrenqualifiedforthegrantatthestartofeachphase-inyearofthegrantbutthen“felloff”thesystemwhenthey were a year older. The CSO coalition recommended thatanychildbornafterApril1994beeligibleforagrantduringeachofthephasedextensions,regardlessoftheirageandthecurrentstageofthegrantrolloutprocess.

• Morerecently,anincreasinglydiscomfitedcivilsocietyhasresortedtoinstigating litigation supportedbyevidence-basedresearch.

Results • Increase in the grant amount. TheCSGwasintroducedin1998at

R100permonth,increasedagaintoR110inJuly2001,andwasthenincreasedeveryyearatarateequaltoorslightlyhigherthaninfla-tion.Becauseoftheseincreases,budgetallocationtowardCSGshavegonefromR2.4billion(approximatelyUS$315million)toR14.4billion(approximatelyUS$1.89billion)between2001and2008.

• Increase in coverage. Changesintheagecohorthavealsotakenplacesince1998,increasinggraduallyfromchildrenunder7yearsoldtoaphased-inextensiontochildrenandyouthsupto18thatbeganonJanuary2010.ThisextensionwassettobenefitafurthertwomillionchildrenatanestimatedadditionalcostofR7.4billion(US$970million)overthethreeyearsofphasedextension.

• Resolution of “start-stop” issue. InresponsetotheCSOsubmis-siontotheDSD,aneligibilitydatewaschosenthatwillpreventchildrenfrom“fallingoff”theCSGsystem.

• Changes to means test to qualify for grant. CSOlitigationhasresultedinchangestothemeanstestthathasledtoincreasedgrantapplicationsandtheimplementationofregulationsreduc-ingthedocumentburdenonapplicants.

• Acknowledgment of CSO research support. Governmentoffi-cials have recognized the value of CSO research that providesevidenceofthepoverty-fightingvalueoftheCSG. Ithasbeenacknowledged that this evidence-based research was regularlyusedbytheDSDandthatithasledto“generalsupport”withinthetreasuryfortheCSGtobeexpandedasfaraspossiblegiventhegovernmentfinances.

Context In1996,aspartoftheSouthAfricangovernment’scommitmenttorealizetherightofthepoortosocialsecurity,theLundCommitteewastaskedwithassessingtheexistingsystemofsupportforchildrenandfamiliesknownastheStateMaintenanceGrant(SMG),andwithdevelopingapproachestotargetchildrenmoreequitablybutwithintheSMGbudget.TheSMGdidnotreachthepoorestwomenandchildren—approximately45per 1,000 Indianand“colored”childrenreceivedthegrant,whileonly2per1,000Africanchildrenreceivedthegrant,despitethefactthatthereismoreextensivepovertyinblackcommunities.AspertherecommendationsoftheLundCommittee,theSouthAfricancabinetagreedtophaseouttheSMGinfavorofanewChildSupportGrant(CSG)thatwouldcovermorechildrenatalowermonthlygrantpaymentofR75(approximateUS$8)pereligiblechilduptotheageofseven.Civilsocietywaslargelyexcludedfromthe deliberations and recommendations of the Lund Committee.However,oncethisinformationbecamepublic,nationalcivilsocietycalledonthegovernmenttoincreasetheamountandtheagecapofthegrantandtoimproveitsadministration.

ACtions (2001–09) • Akeyaspectoftheeffortsofcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)

was to undertake extensive evidence-based research. In 2000,forexample,researchconductedbytheInstituteforDemocracyinAfrica(IDASA)andtheChildren’sInstitutedemonstratedhowthevalueofthegranthadfalleninrealtermssinceitsintroduc-tionin1998.Thisevidencewasusedinanumberofsubmissionstorelevantgovernmentdepartmentsandlegislativecommitteesin2000and2001. Such researchwasalsoused todemonstratethatthereweresufficientpublicresourcestofinanceanexten-sionoftheCSGtochildrenandyouthupto18yearsofage,andtoassess andmonitor service-deliveryproblemsaswell as thevalueoftheCSGasaneffectivetooltoaddresspoverty.

• SincetheearlydaysoftheCSG,CSOshaveorganized marches and filed petitions aimed at the Department of Social Development (DSD), parliament and specific members of the government, and participated in policy processes. Forinstance,whenthegovernmentpublisheddraftregulationsforaproposedextensionoftheCSGforchildrenandyouthuptotheageof18years,civilsocietymade a joint submission to the DSD toaddresskeyconcernswiththeregulations.Oneissuewasthe“start-stop”

A1.25. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve Child Support Grant Budget Allocations

Country:SouthAfricaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalImplementing Organizations: AllianceforChildren’sEntitlementtoSocialSecurity;BlackSash;Children’sInstitute;InstituteforDemocracyinAfricaAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis,Children’sBudgets;CoalitionBuilding;Litigation

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impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • Inadditiontostrongresearch-basedevidence,high-qualityCSO

engagementsustainedformanyyears(inthiscaseformorethanadecade)canresultindesiredfiscalpolicychanges.

• Atthesametime,whilelitigationcanachievedesiredoutcomes,rampingupincidencesoflitigationbycivilsocietycouldencouragethegovernmenttobecomemoreconservativeinitspolicymaking,

andwhilelitigationmaysuccessfullyexpandtheresponsibilitiesofthestate,thereisoftennocorrespondingexpansioninthestate’sabilitytodeliverintermsofadministrationandfinances.

RefeRenCe Overy,Neil(unpublished).“SouthAfrica:CivilSocietyUsesBudgetAnalysisandAdvocacytoImprovetheLivesofPoorChildren.”IBPCaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

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• To promote its civil disobedience campaign while contendingwithgovernmentdelays in implementingtheagreeduponNTP,TACinfluencedthemediaandpublicopinionbyleakingacopyofthereportfromtheJointTreasuryandHealthTaskTeam.Thisreportdemonstratedthat,contrarytothegovernments’claims,an ARV treatment plan was affordable and that it would savethousandsoflives.

Results • Increase of budgetary allocations for HIV/AIDS programs. In

2007,theSouthAfricancabinetendorsedtheHIV&AIDSandSTI(sexually transmitted infections) Strategic Plan for South Africa(2007–11), which committed the government to spending R45billion(US$6billion)onHIVandAIDSpreventionandtreatmentoverafive-yearperiod.

• Expansion of HIV/AIDS programs.By2010,thePMTCTinitiativecoveredover80percentofallpregnantwomenandtheARVpro-gramallowed 1.2millionSouthAfricans to receiveantiretroviraltreatmentthroughthepublichealthsector.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • High-qualitytechnicalanalysis is invaluabletoeffectchanges in

budgetaryallocationsandkeytocrediblyengagingwithgovern-ment representatives, influencingpublicopinion,or taking legalactions.

• Demandsforrevisedbudgetallocationsbasedonacost-benefitanalysisandaccompaniedwithawell-researchedactionplanaremorelikelytohaveafavorableimpactbecausegovernmentsarealreadycopingwithissuesofallocativeefficiency.

RefeRenCes Overy,Neil.2011.“IntheFaceofCrisis:TheTreatmentActionCampaignFightsGovernmentInertiawithBudgetAdvocacyandLitigation.”IBPCaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,No.7(August),InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

Friedman,S.,andS.Mottiar.2006.“SeekingtheHighGround:TheTreatmentActionCampaignandthePoliticsofMorality.”InVoices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Scottsville,editedbyR.Ballardetal.,pp.23–24.

Context InSouthAfricaattheturnofthemillennium,eventhoughtheHIV/AIDSepidemichadreachedepicproportions,theSouthAfricangov-ernmentallocatedamereR214million (approximatelyUS$28.5mil-lion)toimplementHIV/AIDSpreventionandtreatmentregimes.Thegovernment’sreluctancetoincreasebudgetallocationsforHIV/AIDSprograms stemmed from its skepticism regarding the linkbetweenHIVandAIDSand,toalargerextent,thehighcostofprocuringdrugsandrollingouttreatmentplans,particularlyinthecontextofthelim-itednationalhealthbudget.Launchedin1998tocampaignforequi-tableaccesstohealthcare,theTreatmentActionCampaign(TAC)anditspartnerorganizationsusedanumberoftacticstoaddressthelackofgovernmentactiontodealwiththishealthepidemic.

ACtions (1998–07) Intheearly2000s,TAClaunchedthePreventionofMother-toChildTransmission (PMTCT) Campaign and the Antiretroviral MedicineCampaign (ARV)toconvincethegovernmenttoexpandbothpro-grams.Bothcampaignsinvolvedfourkeystrategies:

• Tocounterthegovernment’sargumentthat implementingHIV/AIDS programs was unaffordable, TAC conducted an in-depth review of the government’s budget documents anddrewatten-tiontothe2001IntergovernmentalFiscalReview,whichreportedthatprovincialdepartmentsofhealthhadactuallyunder-spenttheirbudgetsbyR473million(US$63.1million).

• TAC utilized the expertise of health economists and medical professionals toproduceadraftNationalTreatmentPlan(NTP)basedontheanalysesofnecessarydeliverysystemsandmedi-cines and their associated costs. This NTP was used to engagewith government representatives as well as labor and businessleaders at the National Economic, Development and LaborCouncilbecausetheministerofhealthwasunwillingtoengagewithTAC.Forbothcampaigns,TACcommissionedresearchthatproved that public funds expended on these programs wouldactuallyleadtomeasurablecostsavingswithinfiveyears.

• Theresults of TAC’s budget analysis were used during the pro-ceedings of the case that it filed—and won—inthehighcourtagainst the government, enjoining it to introduce a full-scalePMTCTprogram.

A1.26. Using Budget Advocacy and Litigation to Advocate for Improved Allocations for HIV/AIDS Treatment

Country:SouthAfricaSector:Health(HIV/AIDS)Level:NationalImplementing Organization:TreatmentActionCampaignAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Dissemination;Litigation

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• Whenthecitycouncilrefusedtonegotiateandengageinspiteofthesefindings,theassociationresortedtocivil disobedience,refusing to pay any tax until the council agreed to meet withthem.Finally,inDecember2008,thecouncilagreedtomeetwiththeassociation.

Results • No increase in fish market levy. The fish market levy was not

increased,andtheassociationwas invitedtoparticipate in theplanningandbudgetprocessbytheMwanzaCityCouncil.

• Budget allocation for fish market infrastructure. Anallocationwasincludedinthe2009–10citybudgettorehabilitatetheinfra-structureatthefishmarketasperinstructionsfromthenationalministryoflivestockdevelopmentandfisheries.

• Issuance of government directive on unspent funds. PolicyForumhasusedtheevidencefromtheselocalmonitoringinitia-tivestoinformitsnational-leveladvocacy.Forexample,itnotedthatinalldistrictswheresocialmonitoringwasconducted,therewereunspentfundsthatwereneitherreallocatednorreturnedtotheministryoffinance.Basedonevidencethat itprepared,in September2009, theministryoffinance issuednewcouncilfinancial instructions to all district councils, which emphasizedthat they must either reallocate or return to the Treasury allunspentfundsattheendoftheyear,andthatdisciplinaryactionwouldbetakenifthiswasnotdone.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms It is useful while undertaking BT&M projects to take into accountthatwhencommunitymembersareinvolvedingeneratinginforma-tionthatsolvessomeoftheirconcreteproblems,theyhaveagreaterincentivetomakethenecessaryefforttoaccesssuch informationandtolearnhowtorigorouslyanalyzeit.Eventhen,however,changeisoftengradualandittakestimeforresultsofsocialaccountabilityexercisestomaterialize.

RefeRenCes InternationalBudgetPatrnershipWebsite:www.internationalbudget.org.

Mugizi,Gertrude.2010.“MwaloniFishMarketAssociation—CaseStudy.”PresentedatPublicHealthWatchSkillsBuildingConferenceincollaborationwithMwanzaPolicyInitiative,CentreforSocialAccountability,Budapest,Hungary,March23–25,2010.

Context In July 2008, Policy Forum entered into an agreement with theMwanza Policy Initiative (MPI), a civil society network operatingin Tanzania’s Mwanza Region, to jointly develop a social monitor-ingprogram.Amonitoringteamwasformed inMwanzacitycom-prisedofstaffmembersandvolunteersfromlocalcivilsocietyandcommunity-based organizations that were members of MPI. TheMwaloniFishMarketAssociation,amemberofMPIwhosemembersarefishermenandfishsellers, identifiedthefirstissueformonitor-ing.InSeptember2008,theMwanzaCityCouncilannouncedthatitplannedtoincreaseitslevyontheMwaloniFishMarketAssociationby100percent,effectivethatmonth.Theassociationfeltthatthiswasunfairbecausetheywerealreadyheavilytaxed,whiletheplumb-ing inthefishmarkethadbeenbrokenforseveralyears.The localgovernmenthadyettofixtheplumbingdespitethefactthatpoorsanitationatthefishmarketcontributedtothecholeraandtyphoidoutbreaksthatwerearegularoccurrenceinthecity.

ACtions (2008–10) • The monitoring team started by collecting the city council’s

budget and planning documents, a challenging task becausethe information was either not produced or not accessible tocivilsociety.However,afterthreemonths,theteamwasabletoobtainthestrategicplan,medium-termexpenditureframework,annualplanandbudgetsfortwoyears,andtheannualauditor’sreport.

• PolicyForumassistedMPI’smonitoringteamtoanalyze the bud-get documents, whichproducedthreekeyfindingsthathelpedthemaddressthetaxhike.First,theydiscoveredthat,despitethefish market contributing three percent of total revenue to thecity’sbudget,theywereexcludedfromthecitycouncil’spartici-patoryplanningandbudgetingprocess,whichwasaccessibletocivicactorsbyinvitationonly.Second,incontrasttothe25per-centallocatedtotherenovationofthecounciltreasurer’soffice,therewasnoallocationinthe2007–08capitalbudgettorehabili-tatethefishmarket’swaterandsanitationinfrastructure.Lastly,there was a discrepancy of approximately 10 million Tanzanianshillings(US$8,000)betweentheamounttheyrecordedashavingpaidthetaxcollectorandtheamountthecouncilreportedithadreceived.Theseconclusions were shared with relevant govern-ment officials and local councilors at a public hearing aswellaswiththewiderMPInetwork.

A1.27. Using Budgets to Facilitate Social Monitoring

Country:TanzaniaSector:WaterandSanitationLevel:LocalImplementing Organization:PolicyForumAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Disclosure;Monitoring

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Results • Decline of budgetary allocations for unnecessary expenditures.

Between2009and2011,theprimeminister’sdirectivewastakenseriouslywithregardtotrainingandignoredforvehiclepurchases,hospitality, travel, and the like. In 2009/2010, overall “unneces-saryexpenditure”categoryallocationsdecreasedby22percentthroughcutsintrainingsandworkshops.In2010/2011,therewasanominalincreaseintotalunnecessaryexpenditures.Duringbothfiscalyears,spendingontrainingandworkshopsdeclined,whileexpendituresinothercategories,suchasallowances,increased.

• Increased awareness of budgetary issues and processes. TradeunionsusedSikika’sanalysistoargueforwageincreasesbycuttingexcessive allowances. Other civil society organizations (CSOs),includingTwawezaandPolicyForum,publishedananalysisofpub-lic sectorallowances inSeptember2009.Donorsbecamemoreconsciousoftheuseofaiddisbursements,whichresultedinthemtakingatougherstandtoremovehiddenwagecosts.ThroughtheSocial Services Parliamentary Committee and other select MPs,SikikaeffectivelyassistedMPsinanalyzingbudgetsandproposingrevisionstotheministryofhealthandsocialwelfare.

• Establishment of presidential commission on public service sal-ary enhancement. Thegrowingpublicdebateonallowancesandpublicservicepayissuesledtotheestablishmentofapresidentialcommissiononpublicservicesalaryenhancement in2006.Thiscommission reportedly recommended significant reductions inexpendituresonallowancesandseminarsandworkshopsaswellas the taxing of allowances.However, the commission’s report,thoughsubmittedtothePresidentinJanuary2007,hasyettobereleased.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms High-quality technical analysis is necessary but not sufficient toeffectchangesinbudgetaryallocations.Anapproachthatintegratesanalysiswithtargetedadvocacyofkeydecisionmakers,publicmobi-lization,anduseofthemediaismoreeffective.

RefeRenCes SikikaWebsite:http://www.sikika.or.tz/en.

Bofin,Peter.2012.“FreeingFundstoMeetPrioritiesandNeeds:Sikika’sCampaigntoCurbUnnecessaryExpenditureinTanzania.”IBPCaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,Study,No.8(September),InternationalBudgetPartnership,WashingtonDC.

Twaweza,Uwazi,andPolicyForum.2009.“ReformingAllowances:AWin-WinApproachtoImprovedServiceDelivery,HigherSalariesforCivilServantsandSavingMoney.”Brief9.09,PolicyForum,November30,2009,DaresSalaam.

Context WhilecivilservantshaverelativelylowsalariesinTanzania,someben-efitfromvariousadditionalallowanceswhentheyattendtrainingsorstudytoursandarethereforekeentoreceivethisadditionalincome.Since2006,Sikikahasbeenanalyzingthegovernment’shealthbud-getincollaborationwithlike-mindedcivilsocietypartners,andpre-sentedthefindingsofthisanalysistotheannualhealthsectorreviewattended by government, donors, and civil society organizations.Basedonitsanalysisofthehealthsectorinthe2008/2009budgetproposal,Sikikafoundthathealthsectorallocationsforunnecessaryexpenditures such as allowances, workshops and training, overseasandlocaltravel,andvehiclesaddeduptoTshs34.2billion(approxi-mately US$21,034,367). Sikika argued that this money should bemoreefficientlyallocatedtootheritemsthatwouldimprovehealthcare. The issue captured the attention of the prime minister, whoannouncedthatfuturegovernmentexpendituresonworkshopsandseminarshadtobeapprovedbyhisofficeandthatexpendituresonnewvehicleswouldberestricted.Theprimeminister’sdirectivesledto revised budget guidelines in 2009, but these guidelines did notincludespecifictargetsforreducingunnecessaryexpenditures.

ACtions (2007–10) Sikika monitored adherence to the prime minister’s commitmentby launching a national “unnecessary expenditures” campaign between2009and2011.Thiscampaigninvolvedthreekeysteps:

• Sikikadeveloped a framework to analyze “unnecessary” expen-ditures acrossallgovernmentoperations.Thisincludedexpendi-turecategoriesallowingforanappropriatelevelofanalysisthatwouldbeeasilyunderstoodandthatwouldbecomparableovertime.Becauseactualexpendituredatawasunavailable,Sikikaana-lyzedbudgetallocationsratherthanactualexpenditureamounts.

• It used its analysis of the national budgets for 2009/2010 and2010/2011 to identify unnecessary allocations fornewvehicles,seminars, and conferences and to lobby key stakeholders togarner their support for reducing these expenses. This analysisprovidedavaluablemeansofengagingwithmembersofparlia-ment(MPs)andmembersoftheSocialServicesCommitteeinthecontextofoversightandbudgetplanning.

• Sikikamadeaconsciousefforttofirstidentify and engage with potential agents of change, includingtheadministration,politicalcircles,thedonorcommunity,andtradeunions.FromApril2010onward, it disseminated its findings through the media. Withheadlineslike“GovernmentusesTZS176milforallowances”and“Government shooting itself in the foot on allowances,” Sikikaclearlyhitanervewithitsfocusonwastefulexpenditures.

A1.28. Curbing Unnecessary Expenditures to Meet Public Needs and Priorities

Country:TanzaniaSector:Health;PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalImplementing Organization:SikikaAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Dissemination

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• Even though the government initially reacted strongly againstHakiElimu’s campaign by issuing an interdict against it inSeptember2005,HakiElimucontinuedtoengage with different parts of the government, either face-to-face or in stakeholder consultative meetings with theprimeminister, theMinistryofEducation,andtheministryoffinance,amongothers,toobtaintheir inputonhowtoendthedelaysofgetting teachers theirsalariesandhowtoimprovetheirwelfare.

Results • Increase in the minimum wage. InJanuary2007,thegovernment

increasedtheminimumwageforteachersfrom80,000Tanzanianshillings(US$60)to100,000Tanzanianshillings(US$75)permonth.

• More timely distribution of wages. Since 2007, teachers havereceivedtheirsalariesbeforetheendofmonthandwithfewerhassles.

• Improvement in teacher–pupil ratio. The number of teach-ersemployed inprimaryschools increasedfrom135,013 in2005to 154,895 in 2008, while the number of government primaryschools increased from 14,257 to 15,673, and secondary schoolsfrom 1,202 to 3,039. The teacher–pupil ratio in primary schoolsimprovedfrom1:56in2005to1:52in2006.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms • It isuseful tobuildgrass rootsawarenessandsupport forbet-

ter utilization of public resources while advocating for policyreforms.

• Itisalsohelpfultotaketimingandpoliticalprioritiesintoaccount.In this case, when the Mkapa government banned HakiElimuactivitiesin2005,thecountrywasapproachinggeneralelectionsand the ruling party was planning to use enrollment gains as acampaignissue.

RefeRenCes HakiElimuWebsite:www.hakielimu.org.

InternationalBudgetPartnership.Unpublished.“QualityofEducationReforms:TheCaseofHakiElimu’sCampaignof2005–07.”IBPCaseStudySeries:FromAnalysistoImpact,InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

Context While the government of Tanzania had made significant strides inincreasingprimaryschoolenrollment,particularlybetween2004and2007, Tanzania continued to face complex challenges in providinghigh-qualityeducationforitspeople,includinganaverageteacher–pupil ratioof 1:52 inprimaryandsecondaryschools.HakiElimu isacivilsocietyorganization(CSO)inTanzaniathatworkstoensurethatallthecountry’schildrenreceivehigh-qualitybasiceducation.Whendevelopingitsprogramstrategyfor2004–07,itnotedimprovementsinenrollmentlevelsbutidentifiedalackofattentiontoeducationalquality.Basedontheseconcerns,itcraftedandimplementedacam-paignthatledtosignificantimprovementsinTanzania’sschools.

ACtions (2005–07) • HakiElimupartnered with the Tanzania teachers’ union to sur-

vey teachers on their living and working conditions.Theresult-ing report, “The Living and Working Conditions of Teachers inTanzania”(2004),identified key problem areas in the education system, includinglowmoraleduetolowpayandpoorqualityofteachersandworkingenvironments.

• HakiElimu mobilized the countrywide Friends of Education Network, a national network of citizens concerned about thestate of education in Tanzania, to ask questions, write to thegovernment,andadvocateforqualityeducationandresponsiblemanagementofeducationalfunds.

• It also used popular media to educate the public and fosterdebateonTanzania’sschoolsystem.Itproduced dramatic radio spots on the delays in payment of salaries andotherissuesthatteachers had to endure to receive their salaries. It produced 44 popular publications and widely distributed them, ulti-mately sending out 1.8 million copies of these publications toapproximately24,000FriendsofEducation,CSOs,andindividualTanzanians.

A1.29. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve the Quality of Education

Country:TanzaniaSector:EducationLevel:NationalImplementing Organization:HakiElimuAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Dissemination

Africa

Country: TanzaniaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalImplementing Organization:TanzaniaGenderNetworkingProgramAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Dissemination;GenderBudgets

Results • Direction provided for the preparation of budget guidelines

with a gender focus.Thegovernmentrecognizedtheimportanceofgenderbudgetingand includedgender inthebudgetguide-lines.In2001,budgetguidelinesfurthermandatedthatallministry,department,andagencybudgetsubmissionshadtobepreparedwithagenderfocus.

• Institutionalization of gender mainstreaming in selected sectors.– Theministryofwaterandirrigationhasapolicythatdirects

theestablishmentofwatercommitteesmadeupof50per-centwomenatalladministrativelevels.

– The government training of budget officers for the newrequirementsoftheMediumTermExpenditureFrameworkalsoincluded gender issues. Training on gender budgeting is nowrequired,andtheTGNPcoalitionisthemainproviderofit.

– ThegovernmentanddonorsinvitedTGNPanditspartnerstoparticipateinapublicexpenditurereviewandintheTanzaniaCountry Assistance Strategy processes. As a result, TGNPcould provide input during the consultations and advocatefortransparencyandaccountabilityofgovernmentactorsandthe inclusionofavarietyofgenderperspectives ingovern-mentdecisionmaking.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Efforts to assist with mainstreaming gender budgets in the PublicFinancialManagementcycleshouldbeginwithamappingofgender-relatedbudgetsandpilotexperienceswithselectedministries,sec-tors,orprojects.

RefeRenCes TNGPWebsite:www.tngp.org.

SouthernAfricanGenderProtocolAlliance.2011.“GBIInitiativeinTanzaniaisbearingfruit.”SouthernAfricanGenderProtocolAlliance.http://www.genderlinks.org.za/article/gbi-initiative-in-tanzania-is-bearing-fruit-2011-09-30.

“GBI:TheCaseofTanzania.”CaseStudypreparedforCourseonIntroductiontoGenderMainstreamingandGenderAnalysis,ModuleII,WorldBank,Washington,DC.

Context InitiatedbytheTanzaniaGenderNetworkingProgramme(TGNP),theGenderBudget Initiative (GBI)has itsroots inthe lackof informedparticipationandfeedbackofcitizengroupsforthepovertyreduc-tionstrategiesandstructuraladjustmentprogramsofthe1980sthatleftwomenandchildrenonthemarginsofeconomicdevelopment.InspiredbyboththeSouthAfricanandAustraliangenderinitiativesandusingfundingprovidedbySwedish InternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency,TGNPpioneeredtheGBIin1997alongwith20other like-minded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) unitedunder theFeminismActivismCoalition. Itskeyobjectives includedpromoting the examination of policy, decision-making processes,andresourceallocationandutilizationwithagenderperspectiveaswellasthedesignandadoptionoftoolsforgendermainstreamingofbudgetpoliciesandbudgets.

ACtions (1997–01) • TGNPcollected and analyzed budget data withagenderlensin

selected ministries, including education, health, agriculture, andindustriesandcommerce.TGNPteamedupgovernmentofficialsfrommostsectorswithnongovernmentalresearchersandcom-missionedagender-activistuniversityprofessortosupervisetheresearch.Thisapproachwaspartoftheirstrategyofreaching key actors, creating openings, and building alliances.

• TGNP’s analysis concentrated on the main direction of policydevelopment,planning,andbudgeting,thedecision-makingpro-cesses,sourcesofincome,andtheactualallocationofresourcesbothtosectorsandspecificprograms.TGNPpublishedtheresultsofthisresearchinabookletthatwasalsotranslatedintoKiswahili.Thefindingsofthisexercisewereshared in public forums with a broad range of stakeholders,includingcivilsociety,government,donors,andmembersofparliament.

• Disseminationactivitieswerecomplementedbyefforts to build the capacity of coalition members, other NGOs, Community Based Organizations, and key government actors. Theseincluded: alternative gendered budget guidelines; checklists fortheministryoffinancetofacilitategendermainstreaminginbud-getprocesses;andguidelinesfortheroutinecollectionofgen-der-disaggregateddataforbudgetingpurposes.

A1.30. Using Budget Analysis and Pilots to Mainstream Gender Considerations in Fiscal Policies

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Sanctions include suspensionofdisbursement to local govern-mentsandcommunitiesfoundtobeinviolationofprojectrulesand guidelines. The approach focuses on both preventive andenforcement measures. Preventive measures include routinemonitoring,inspections,education,andraisingawarenessamongcitizens;enforcementmeasuresincludetheinvestigationofcom-plaintsaboutNUSAF2projectsand,whennecessary,thepros-ecutionofcriminalacts.

Results • Improved utilization of community funds. The direct involve-

mentofcommunities inmonitoringenhancedsubprojectcom-pletionratesandpromotedtheutilizationandsustainabilityoftheinvestments.

• Reduced leakage in funds. Thestrengthenedcapacityofcom-munities to perform oversight functions helped to minimizesomeformsofmalpracticeatthecommunitylevel,suchascor-ruption,elitecapture,andwasteofcommunityresources.

• Increased responsiveness of local governments. Despitevaria-tionsincapacitiesacrossandwithindistricts,localgovernmentsatthedistrictandsubcountylevelhavebeenresponsiveaboutappraisingsubprojects,providingtechnicalsupportduringimple-mentation, and supporting thecertificationandcommissioningoffundedcommunityinvestments.

• Enhanced capacity for grievance redress. Atotalof3,695socialaccountability committees have already been instituted andtrained in subproject implementation and grievance-handling;31percentof thecommitteememberswerewomen.TheSMSCorruptionReportingSystem(Report2IG),whichwillenableciti-zenstosendSMStextmessagestoreportcasesofcorruption,hasbeendevelopedandtested.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Whenplacingmoneyinthehandsofcommunities,transparencyandaccountability in handling of subprojects and investments can bea challenge, especially in hard-to-reach areas. However, combiningeffortsatincreasingtheparticipatoryinvolvementofcommunitiesinsubprojectmanagement,publicsharingofexpendituresatthelocallevel,andfollow-uponthemisuseoffundsappearstohavesuccess-fullyenhancedlevelsoftransparency.

RefeRenCes Uganda—NorthernUgandaSocialActionFundProject,ImplementationCompletionandResultsReport,ICR1211,December30,2009.

Uganda—NorthernUgandaSocialActionFundProject,ProjectAppraisalDocument,23855,April13,2002.

Context NorthernUganda’seconomicstagnationaroseoutofmorethantwodecadesofbrutalconflict.Theinsurgencyintheregiontookatollonboththepopulationandtheeconomysuchthat,bytheendof2005,anestimated1.6millionpeoplehadbeenforcedtoleavetheirhomesinNorthernandEasternUgandaoutoffearofbeingattackedorabductedbyrebelstoliveincampsforinternallydisplacedper-sons.Thecommunitysafety-netsystemsandthetraditional socialandeconomicfabricofthepeopleofNorthernUgandahadbeengreatlydisruptedandweakenedbythearmedconflict.Inresponseto these factors, the government of Uganda, under the coordina-tionoftheprimeminister’soffice, initiatedthe implementationoftheNorthernUgandaSocialActionFund(NUSAF)project,withtheaimofempoweringcommunitiesin18districtsofNorthernUgandabyenhancingtheircapacitytosystematicallyidentify,prioritize,andplanfortheirneedsthroughsubprojects; implementingsustainabledevelopment initiatives to improve socioeconomic services andopportunities;andbyplacingmoneyinthehandsofcommunities,contributingtoimprovedlivelihoods.NUSAF2furtherstrengthenedbottom-upaccountabilitywithasupportprogramprovidedaspartofaTransparency,Accountability,andAnti-CorruptionProgram.

ACtions (2009–pResent) • NUSAF 1 made an effort to build the capacity of community

project management committees and community procurement committees in their core duties, including conducting execu-tivecommitteeandgeneralcommunitymeetings;selectingandundertakingviableprocurementoptions;monitoringtheprogressofsubprojectimplementation;andmanagingcontractors.Theseeffortswereallgearedtowardensuringhighsubprojectcomple-tionratesandpromotingtheuseandsustainabilityofcommunityinvestmentsortheirspin-offbenefits.

• Inabidtoenhancetheinvolvementofcommunitiesinmonitor-ingtheirsubprojects,theprojectheld trainings with subcounty technical staff.Inturn,thetrainedstaffmentoredlocalcommu-nitymembersinbasicmonitoring.

• NUSAF 2 instituted social accountability committees with theprimaryresponsibilityofhandlinggrievancesatthegrassrootslevel.Thesecommitteesarealsotrainedtousecommunityscorecards—aqualitativetoolusedforlocal-levelmonitoringofhowinputsandexpendituresmatchwithentitlementsandbudgetallocations.

• Support has been provided to investigative arms of govern-ment carryingoutinvestigationsofreportedcasesofcorruption,poor accountability, and abuse of office during project imple-mentation, includingviolationsofprojectrulesandprocedures.

A1.31. Building the Capacity of Community Procurement Committees in Fragile Areas to Enhance Transparency in Community Subproject Investments

Country:UgandaSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:LocalName of Project:NorthernUgandaSocialActionFundProjectAreas of Engagement:Anticorruption;ICT;Monitoring;Procurement

Africa

Results UDN’sactionspromptedtheprimeminister’sofficetoconductaninvestigationthatconfirmedUDN’sfindings,identifiedseriousflawsinthetenderingprocess,andsubsequentlyledtotheintroductionofmeasureswithinSFGtopreventtheabuseoffunds,including:

• Appointment of a new engineer. ThedistricttenderboardwasdismissedandanewdistrictengineerwasappointedtooverseetheSFGprojectsinthedistrict.

• Rebuilding of classrooms. The contractors responsible for thepoor construction of school buildings were ordered to rebuildtheclassrooms.

• Revisiting quality assurance procedures. The government ofUgandaalsorevisedtheSFGguidelinesandintroducedprovisionstoensurethatconstructionofschoolbuildings,classrooms,andtoiletsmaintainedhighquality standards.For instance,contrac-tors are now required to submit performance guarantees thatthattheywilldoqualityworkandensuretimelydelivery.Further,banksare requiredtoprovideguaranteesonanyadvancesthatarereleasedtothecontractorswhoneedtodemonstratesomeprequalificationbeforetheyareallowedtobidforlocalgovern-mentcontracts.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Strategiclinkageswithseniorgovernmentofficials,parliamentarians,andthemediaareessentialtobuildanti-corruptioncoalitions.InthiscasemuchofUDN’ssuccesswasdeterminedbyitscapacitytoiden-tifykeyalliesindifferentsectionsofsocietyandcultivatetheserela-tionshipsbydemonstratinghowitsgoalswerealsointheirinterest.

RefeRenCeRenzio,Paolode,VitusAzeem,andVivekRamkumar.2006.“BudgetMonitoringasanAdvocacyTool:UgandaDebtNetwork.”LessonsfromCivilSocietyBudgetAnalysisandAdvocacyInitiativesresearchprojectcasestudy,InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.

Context TheSchoolFacilitiesGrant(SFG)isaUgandangovernmentprogramthat has assisted poor school communities since 1998 by fundingtheconstructionofnewclassrooms,furniture,toilets,andresiden-tial housing units for teachers. Funds released under the SFG aremonitoredbycivilsocietyorganizationsinsomedistricts,particularlynongovernmentalorganizationssuchas theUgandaDebtNetwork(UDN).UDNwasformedin1996asacoalitionofadvocacyandlob-bying organizations campaigning for debt relief, but it eventuallyexpanded its scope to ensure that any public spending increasesowedtodebtcancellationandincreasingaidflowswerechanneledtoprioritysectorsandeffectivelyutilizedallthewaydowntheser-vice-deliverychain.UDN’sworkrevolvesaroundfourthematicpro-grams:CommunityParticipationandEmpowermentProgram,PolicyAnalysis and Socio-Economic Research Program, Budget AdvocacyInitiative Program, and Governance and Rights Program. Under itsBudgetAdvocacyInitiative,oneofUDN’skeycontributionshasbeentohighlightamajormisuseoffundsfromtheSFGinKatakwidistrictintheTesoregionofeasternUganda.

ACtions (2000–03) • UDN organized workshops and conferences during which it

identified and trained community members on anticorruption activities.

• UDNassistedinestablishingtheTesoAnti-CorruptionCoalition(TAC),whichbroughttogetherrepresentativesofcommunitiesinthedistrictsofSoroti,Katakwi,Kaberamaido,andKumitoiden-tify instancesofcorruption.TAChighlighted a major abuse of funds from the SFG intheTesoregion.

• UDNpublisheda report andproduced a documentary on the misuse of funds thatreceivedwidemediacoverageanddrewtheattentionoftheprimeminister’sofficeinUganda.

A1.32. Building Anticorruption Coalitions to Monitor Misuse of Education Grant Funds

Country: UgandaSector:EducationLevels:Local;ProvincialImplementing Organization:UgandaDebtNetworkAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Monitoring

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Results • Worked toward a progressive tax system. Inresponsetopressure

towardamoreprogressivetaxsystem,thegovernmentraisedtheminimumtaxthreshold(theincomelevelatwhichpeoplemustbegintopaytaxes)in2001andintroducedamoreequitabletaxcodein2004.

• Pushed for legislative change in extractive industries. In2008,inresponsetotheCaritascampaignforawindfallprofitssurtaxonZambianextractiveindustries,thegovernmentfinallystartedtoapplythecountry’sprogressivetaxregimetotheextractivessec-torandpassedtheMinesandMineralsDevelopmentAct,whichincreasedthemineralroyaltyrateto3percentandallowedtheministryofminesandmineralsdevelopmenttoenforcea“useitorloseit”principlewithregardtoexplorationlicenses.Thegov-ernmentalsosetuparevenueresourceaccount—aspecialfundtobeusedfornewsocialprograms—especiallyintheeducationsector.

• Government incorporated Caritas’ suggestions in the budget. WhenCaritasdemandedthatthegovernmentimplementcertaincomponentsofits“PovertyReductionStrategyPaper,”thegov-ernmentrespondedbyadoptingsomeofthesuggestedstrate-giesinZambia’s2002budget.

impliCAtions foR pRojeCt teAms Outreachtothecommunity, inconjunctionwithacomprehensivepublic communication campaign and media strategy, has raisedawarenessofthe importanceofusinggainsfromnatural resourcesforsocialdevelopment.

RefeRenCes InternationalBudgetPartnership.2011.“PartneringtoMakeBudgetsWorkforthePeople.”PartnershipInitiativeCaseStudyonCaritasZambia,InternationalBudgetPartnership,Washington,DC.http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Profile-of-CARITAS-Zambia-2011.pdf.

Context Caritas Zambia (Caritas) is a faith-based civil society organizationbasedinLusaka,whichwasfoundedin2001.ItworkstoimprovethelivesofallZambiansthroughitsfourkeyprograms:theInstitutionalDevelopment Programme, the Sustainable Livelihoods Programme,theEconomicandEnvironmentalJusticeProgramme(EEJP),andtheGovernanceandHumanRightsProgramme.UndertheEEJP,Caritashasbeenastrongvoiceonbudget-relatedissuesformanyyearsandiswidelyrecognizedasoneoftheleadingorganizationsconductingbudgetanalysisandadvocacyinZambia.Infact,theEEJPpredatestheformingofCaritasandhasbeendoingbudgetworkformorethan15years.

ACtions (2001–pResent) • StaffmembersofEEJPhaveconsistently advocated for the gov-

ernment to increase public investment in social infrastructure.Continuing this work, Caritas recently submitted proposals toparliamentarycommitteesandthecentralbudgetofficeoftheministryoffinanceandnationalplanningtoincreasefundingforkeyagricultural,educational,andhealthcareprograms.

• Caritas has also made monitoring the extractive industries inZambiaacorepartofitswork.Increaseddemandforandextrac-tionofminerals,particularlycopper,hasledtoaboominindustryprofits.CaritashaslobbiedpolicymakerstoensurethatminingforZambia’scopper isconducted inaresponsibleandenviron-mentallysustainablemannerandthatallZambiansstandtoben-efitfromtheuseoftheircountry’snaturalresources.

• Caritas’workonPublicFinancialManagementhasincreased the interest in budgeting among civil society organizations and the general public.Theorganizationoccasionallyholdsbudgetforumstodisseminateinformationoncurrentbudgetproposalsandsolicitopinionsfromcitizensonwhatprioritiestheywouldliketoseereflectedinfuturebudgets.

• Caritasalsoadvocates for a more progressive tax system aswellas a more comprehensive poverty reduction strategy for thenation.

• Caritasfirststartedcampaigning for a “windfall profits” surtax onZambianextractiveindustriesin2006.

A1.33. Monitoring the Extractives Industry to Encourage the Use of Resources for the Public Benefit

Country: ZambiaSector:MiningLevel:NationalImplementing Organization:CaritasZambiaAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy;Analysis;Disclosure;Monitoring

Africa

• BothNANGOandZWRCNmake oral and written submissions and hold meetings with government officials and policy mak-ers to share specific recommendationsonissuesthatwillmakethe national budget more responsive to the challenges facingwomenandchildren.Theyhavemobilizedvariousstakeholderstoformstrongcoalitionsforchild-responsiveandgender-sensi-tivebudgeting.

Results • Increases in budgetary allocations. Inadditiontotheintroduc-

tionofnewbudgetlineitems,suchasthe“ChildreninDifficultCircumstances” line item under the “Ministry of Public Service,Labor and Social Welfare,” by 2007 there was a nearly 50 per-cent increase in budget line items such as the Basic EducationAssistance Model, Children in Difficult Circumstances, publicassistance,andothersocialprotectionprogramsasapercentageofthetotalnationalbudget.

• Increased transparency and accountability. In response to astrongcampaignbyNANGOandZWRCNforincreasedtranspar-ency in thedistributionanduseof resources set aside forHIVandAIDS,forinstance,itisnowcommonforanewspapertorunafull-pagelistofquarterlybeneficiariesofthesefunds.

• Democratization of budget debates. Parliamentary portfoliocommittees, includingthebudgetcommitteethatreviewssub-missionsoflineministriesandstakeholdersonpolicyissuesandallocations,havebeenestablished.

impliCAtions foR BAnk opeRAtionsUsing targeted and informed advocacy to increase budget alloca-tionsforvulnerableand/ormarginalizedgroupsishelpfulinleadingtopositiveoutcomes.

RefeRenCes WebsiteforZWRCN:http://www.zwrcn.org.zw.

McNeil,Mary,andCarmenMalena.Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa. 2010.WorldBank:WashingtonDC.

Context Between 1999 and 2007, Zimbabwe’s political and economic chal-lenges imposedsignificantfinancialpressureonhouseholdsandonthenationasawhole,makingbudgetingdifficult.Inaddition,back-ground research conducted separately by the Zimbabwe Women’sResourceCentreandNetwork(ZWRCN)andtheNationalAssociationof Non Governmental Organizations (NANGO), revealed that theneedsandinputofwomenandchildrenwerenotrepresentedwhenthenationalbudgetwasformulated.

ACtions (2002–07) Since 2002, the Child-Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI)launchedbyNANGOandtheGenderResponsiveBudgetingProject(GRBP)headedbyZWRCNhaveadoptedthefollowingstrategiestoholdthegovernmentaccountableforresourceallocationanduseforthebenefitofwomenandchildren.

• Desk research as well as multistakeholder consultative work-shops and focus group discussions with women and children,which bring together beneficiaries and policy makers to shareviews and expectations regarding gender-sensitive and child-friendlybudgetingandtoinformthepoliciesandbudgetsofkeygovernmentministries.

• Toinfluencefundallocations,independent budget analysis iscon-ductedbeforethenationalbudgetiscraftedandafterpresenta-tionofthebudgetstatements.Post-budget analysis workshops helptoidentify,plan,andimplementadditionalaction-orientedresearchandadvocacyactivities.Parliamentarians,policymakers,and budget makers are invited to participate so that they canheartheundilutedviewsofwomenandchildren.

• Capacity-development programs have been launched, whichincludebudgetliteracyandanalysistrainingworkshopsthatusea“traineroftrainers”approach;theyalsouse“nontraining” capac-ity-building methodologies,includingtrainingmanuals,informa-tion and educational materials that government officials, civilsociety, and other development actors can use independently.Workshops are conducted for the public and for members ofparliament,thewomen’sparliamentarycaucus,andgovernmentpolicymakers.

A1.34. Using Budget Analysis to Improve Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly Budgeting

Country:ZimbabweSector:PublicAdministration,Law,andJusticeLevel:NationalImplementing Organizations: NationalAssociationofNonGovernmentalOrganizations;ZimbabweWomen’sResourceCentreandNetworkAreas of Engagement:BudgetAdvocacy,Analysis;CapacityBuilding;Children’sBudgets;GenderBudgets

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