8/8/2019 A Week in the War Afghanistan Dec 29 2010_Jan 4 2011

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A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011

January 4, 2011 | 2014 GMT

A Deal in Sangin

The main tribe in a part of Sangin district has reportedly reached a deal with the Helmand provincial government to stopfighting Afghan and coalition forces. U.S. Maj. Gen. Robert Mills, commander of Regional Command Southwest andcommanding general of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), confirmed Jan. 3 news that the Alikozai tribe in theSarwan Qala area of the Upper Sangin Valley had agreed to a cease-fire. Affecting some 30 villages, the deal encompassesonly a portion of the restive district, which has been the center of some of the deadliest fighting in Afghanistan in recentmonths. The strictly verbal agreement was struck on Jan. 1 after nearly a month of negotiations at a Shura in the district capital.

The deal was reportedly made between Alikozai tribal elders and the provincial government, though the U.S.-led InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) was also involved. The agreement calls for a cease-fire, for locals to prevent non-locals(Afghans not native to the district as well as foreign insurgents) from entering the area and for area residents to renounce theTaliban. ISAF and Afghan security forces are to be called in if outsiders enter the area, though whether this will result in any

actionable intelligence is unclear. Tribal members also will be expected to help identify and clear improvised explosive devices(IEDs). This stipulation could be quite important, since local support or tolerance of IED campaigns contributes significantly totheir effectiveness. (There are also reports of weapons¶ being surrendered as part of the deal, but individuals are allowed to ownsmall arms in Afghanistan.)

Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi has denied that any such agreement has been reached or that any Taliban wererepresented in the negotiations (he may have made the latter point to clear up inaccurate reporting on the agreement, whichappears to call for tribal elders to renounce the Taliban). STRATFOR has noted that one of the challenges for a ³revolutionary´entity in a classic guerrilla scenario is maintaining internal discipline when factions and localized elements are targeted by the

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counterinsurgent force.

There have long been reports of reprisal attacks by the Taliban against those who change sides, and Mills has indicated thatsuch efforts are under way against the Alikozai leadership. But the extent to which these reprisals have inhibited defection andmaintained internal Taliban discipline is unclear. Equally unclear is the impact of an extensive campaign by U.S. specialoperations forces to capture and kill Taliban leaders to diminish the operational effectiveness and internal cohesion of an

already-diffuse grassroots movement.

Indeed, the durability of this preliminary arrangement with the Alikozai in Sangin remains to be seen. The broader strokes of the agreement will be tested in practice as the two sides reposition and interact in a cease-fire environment. No one is certain of the tribe¶s sincerity, its internal unity on the issue or whether it can deliver on its promises in the near term or over time.

But recent ISAF successes in Nawa and Marjah are now being consolidated, and in these areas ² at least temporarily ² ISAFand Afghan security forces have more room to maneuver militarily. And with that comes more room for the ISAF and Afghangovernment to establish new political and economic realities. Still, this is a very tentative phase of the counterinsurgency-focused strategy. Continuing to hamper the effort are issues of corruption, the challenges of integrating local arrangements intothe existing power structure emanating from Kabul, and the government¶s ability to deliver on promises of security anddevelopment. In much of the countryside, particularly in places like Sangin, the campaign is still mainly a military effort.

Recent development cannot be written off, however. If Sangin begins to come around as other places in Helmand already have,

it could begin to mark a positive trend across the province. It would hardly signal the defeat of the Taliban, since it is perfectlyin keeping with classic guerrilla strategy to fall back in the face of concentrated conventional force, but it would raise aquestion regarding internal Taliban discipline. As a grassroots movement, the Taliban would view the loss of tribal and localsupport in key areas from Nawa and Marjah to Sarwan Qala as a very real problem. At the very least, it would represent areduction in financial resources and fighters over the short term. If the Taliban have to temporarily surrender ground or expenda great deal more resources to remain relevant in these areas, the locals and the Afghan government, with the support of theISAF, could reach more lasting agreements and make progress in development efforts. Then, by the time the Taliban do return,their severe, hard-line Islamism may not resonate with nearly as many locals as it once did ² especially if Afghan securityforces are running the show and the ³foreign occupier´ has significantly reduced its presence.

That is precisely what the U.S.-led strategy is hoping to achieve: push the Taliban to outlying areas and reshape the military, political and economic reality before they return. A single tribal agreement in Sangin hardly validates the concept, and there aremany long-term questions and potential problems. Indeed, traditional concepts of momentum and initiative can be problematicin assessing the efficacy of a counterinsurgency campaign. But we will be watching the evolution of the Alikozai deal inSangin, and any others that follow, with great interest in the new year.

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