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NICMAR GOA CAMPUS
A STUDY ON PERFORMANCE, EVALUATION &
RISK INVOLVED IN BOT PROJECT
Guided By
Dr. Prof. Indrasen Singh
Submitted By
Abhijit Jadhav (G03124) Vijay Kene (G03128)
Rahul Wankhede (G03162)PGP ACM 3rd Batch
(2009- 2011)
A Project seminar submitted in partial fulfillment of the Academic requirements of the Post Graduate Programme in Advanced Construction
Management
(PGP ACM)
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CONSTRUCTIONMANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH
GOA CAMPUS
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DECLARATION
We declare that the project seminar entitled “Performance, Evaluation &
Risk Involved in BOT Project” is the bonafide work carried out by me/us, under the
guidance of Dr. Prof. Indrasen Singh, further we declare that this has not been previously
formed the basis of award of any degree, diploma, associate-ship or other similar degrees
or diplomas, and has not been submitted anywhere else.
Date: 5th April 2010
Submitted By
Abhijit Jadhav (G03124)
Vijay Kene (G03128) Rahul Wankhede (G03162)
PGP ACM 3rd Batch
(2009- 2011)
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CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the project seminar entitled “Performance, Evaluation
& Risk Involved in BOT Project” is the bonafide work of Mr.Abhijit Jadhav
(G03124), Mr. Vijay Kene (G03128), Mr.Rahul Wankhede (G03162) in partial
fulfillment of the academic requirements for the award of Post Graduate Programme in
Advanced Construction Management (PGP ACM). This work is carried out by them,
under my guidance and supervision.
Date: 5th April 2010
Guided by:
Prof. Dr. Indrasen Singh
Dean NICMAR Goa Campus
Countersigned by:
Prof. Dr. Indrasen singh
Dean NICMAR Goa Campus
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It gives us a great pleasure to submit our Project Seminar titled “Performance,
Evaluation & Risk Involved in BOT Project” We acknowledge with the assistance
received from our faculty in completion of this work .
Foremost I would like to thank my project Seminar guide Dr. Prof. Indrasen Singh for
his continuous support, encouragement, critical guidance, and suggestions in making
this Mini Thesis Possible.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. M. G. Korgaonkar, Director
General, NICMAR for giving us an opportunity to undertake this topic.
We also thankful to Librarians of NICMAR, Goa for giving us access to the valuable
facilities.
We would like to thank our family and friends who encouraged us constantly throughout
the research period.
Abhijit Jadhav (G03124)
Vijay Kene (G03128)
Rahul Wankhede (G03162)
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER – 1.0: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Objective of the study 6
1.3 Scope of the study 7
1.4 Need of the study 8
1.5 Methodology 9
CHAPTER – 2.0: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 Problems in current scenario 11
2.3 Need for private participation 13 in road projects
2.4 Frame work of private sector participation 14
2.5 BOT model 16
2.6 Peculiarities in financing private 16
Participation projects in the road sector
2.7 BOT financing using structure financing 18
- Special purpose vehicle (SPV)
2.8 Current scenario 20
2.9 Support and incentives 27
CHAPTER – 3.0: PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION
OF BOT PROJECT
3.1 Introduction 28
3.2 Study of various issues to be considered for 28
Making BOT project successful
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CHAPTER – 4.0: RISKS INVOLVED IN BOT PROJECTS
4.1 Introduction 36
4.2 Types of risk 38
4.3 Risk factors 43
4.4 Risk analysis 44
CHAPTER – 5.0: CASE STUDY
5.1 Coimbatore bypass project 47
5.2 Mumbai-Pune expressway 51
5.3 Noida toll bridge 55
CHAPTER – 6.0: CONCLUSIONS 62
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 1
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
India has more than 3.30 million km of road network, making it one of the largest
in the world. However, the quality of the roads is inappropriate and cannot meet the needs
efficient and fast moving transportation. National Highways that are the prime arterial
route span about 57,737 km throughout the country and cater to about 45 per cent of total
road transport demand. NH percentage is about 2.5% of total length. It's important give
important to construction procedure as well as maintenance during service life. Now the
government realizes that good roads are intrinsic to rapid progress. Funding problem is
solving by the Private Sector Participation (PSP) with the help of Build-Opera Transfer
(BOT), BOOT Contracts.
The main idea of BOT concept itself is funding, and all the construction and operation
time-cost overrun and associated risk is taken care of by the entrepreneur. It is hence
necessary that the entrepreneur and his associated builder has to accountant for many
risks as under, some can be foreseen and some cannot be foreseen and reasonably
accounted for. India has one of the largest road networks in the world (over 3 million km
at present). For the purpose of management and administration, roads in India are divided
into the following five cate.gories:
1. National Highways (NH)
2. State Highways
3. Major District Roads (MDR)
4. Other District Roads (ODR)
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Table 1.1 Road Lengths
CATE.GORIES LENGTH
(KM)Primary road system covering National Highways 38,445
Secondary road system covering State Highways (SH) 1,33,000
Other roads including major district roads (MDR) other district roads |
ODR) & village roads (VR)
28,46,400
Source:
The details of various roads & its length are shown in Table 1.1 above.
Total road length in India is more than 2.25 million kilometers today, of which
half is paved. This compares favorably with the U.S. that has 6.24 million km
of total mad length (3.63 million km paved). Compared to this, China has a
total road length «f 1.03 million km out of which only 170,000 km is paved. In
terms of road length per square km, the connectivity in India (68.4 km per sq.
km) is hence much higher than china (10.7) and comparable to the U.S. (66.5).
However, most roads were built with the primary aim of moving passenger
traffic. With demand outstripping the supply and due to changes in nature of
goods moved, the modal share of road transportation has increased
substantially. This has led to introduction of new, larger capacity, rocks. Most
highways do not have the adequate bearing capacity for multi-axle and tandem
trucks. This has led to rapid deterioration of road surface quality in many
areas. A look at the levels of road traffic indicates that there is a great potential
for increase in this area, which is similar to the case of rail-based freight
transportation.
There is a considerable progress in the roads sector. The Central Road Fund
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Ordinance, 2000 was promulgated on November 1, 2000 to give statutory
effect to the creation of Central Road Fund. The bill to replace the said ordinance
has been passed by the two houses of the Parliament. Assured user charges in
terms of additional cess are being levied on petrol and H:gh Speed Diesel. An
additional cess of Re. 1 per litre was levied on petrol with effect from June 2, 1998
and similar additional duty of Re. 1 per litre on imported and domestic High Speed
Diesel Oil was levied with effect from March 1, 1999
Levis are to accrue to a dedicated Central Road Fund. 50 per cent of the cess on
High Speed Diesel Oil will be allocated for the development of Rural Roads. The balance
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of amount of 50 per cent on High Speed Diesel Oil and entire cess collected on petrol will
be allocated for the development and maintenance of National Highways (57.5 per cent),
for construction of road over/under bridges and other safety works at unmanned rail road
crossing (12.5 Per cent) and development and maintenance of State Roads including roads
of economic importance (30 per cent). The fund will be non-lapsable and will be used to
fund the development of the total hierarchy of roads, right from National Highways
through State Highways to Rural Roads. It has been assessed that an amount of about Rs.
6,000 crore would have been generated from the cess on petrol for the period from June 3,
1998 to March 31, 2000 and cess from diesel for the period from March 1, 1999 to March
31, 2000. During 2000- 2001, an amount of Rs. 2,010 crore has been allocated for
development of National Highways. Out of this Rs. 1,800 crore has been given to NHAI
for NHDP. Further an amount of Rs. 990 crore has been earmarked for development of
State Roads through the Central Road Fund.
1.1.1 Current Status of Transport
The current status of rail-road transportation is mentioned below in the table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Current Status of Rail-Road Transportation
Road Railways
Passenger 80% 20%
Freight 60% 40%
Source: NHAI Report 2007
However, road development has been ignored in most of the development plans of India.
National & State highways comprise around 5.9% of the total 3.1mn kms of road
network. National highways, which carry 40% of the total traffic, comprise just 2% of the
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total road network of the total 182,000 km of state and national highways only 1%) is four
lanes, 34% is two lanes. Around two thirds is still one lane. The poor state of road
infrastructure has badly affected the transportation in our country. Our commercial
vehicles are able to make only 250-300 km in single day against 500-600 kms in
developed countries. This shows the poor state of road infrastructure, one of the most vital
elements in for economic growth.
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The Objective of the study is:
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1) To study and evaluate the critical factors on which the success and performance
of a BOT project largely depends
2) To identify risk at each stage of a BOT project
3) To Study how these risk factors hamper the progress of a BOT project & suggest
some remedial measures for efficient execution of the project.
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
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1) The scope of the project is limited to the study of BOT projects involved in
highway sector
2) Studying BOT basis highway projects to understand on what factors the success of
these projects depend and also the risk involved in executing such projects on the
part of the contractor by evaluating the milestones these BOT projects have to
face.
3) To have a better preview of these performance factors and risk involved in BOT
projects by carrying out a case study on Mumbai-Pune Expressway which has
been executed under BOT basis.
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1.4 NEED OF THE STUDY
The main reason for unsatisfactory state of our road/highway network has been the
inadequate flow of funds for this sector. The public sector plan expenditure on the road
sector has been on a declining proportion of the National Public Sector Plan expenditure.
The road sector expenditure as proportion of the country's national income has also shown
declining of funds. The financially constrained situation of the road sector has a risen
largely because of the difficult financial position of the central and state governments.
The gap between existing infrastructure support and the minimum expected infrastructure
required for the vibrant economy causes the participation of private entrepreneurs.
To knowledge: As the BOT is An important concept to the Construction Industry. This
study will help in attaining the knowledge of conceiving and executing of a BOT project
to study its performance and risks involved
To practice: This study will form a base for analyzing any BOT project's performance.
To People: This study will help various public & private organization in understanding
the basic concepts of BOT and then in adopting a new strategy to make a BOT project
successful
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1.5 METHODOLOGY
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PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
Analyzing the various factors affecting performance of BOT Projects & risk involved in executing the projects.
CASE STUDY
ANALYSIS & DATA INTERPRETATION
Finding out an approach for increasing performance & reducing risks
LITERATURE REVIEW
Studying the various remedies to minimize the risk involved in BOT projects & factors to improve the
performance of BOT Project.
CONCLUSIONS
NICMAR GOA CAMPUS
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 HISTORY BEHIND BOT
The principle of procurement and operation of infrastructure through private financing is not
new and could be traced back to the year 1820 when Erie Canal in new York was successfully
built. As a result of this there was boom for canal building on this concept across the mid-Atlantic
and New England coast during 19th century. Canal, railroad, and power plants were procured and
got operated in most countries of Europe and North America by mobilizing money through capital
markets.
The French experience is also very old as in the mid 19th century also public infrastructure
was built and operated by private companies. However, the private companies in France accepted
this concept for taking up such projects if there were sufficient guarantees of return from the user
fees together with an appropriate contractual and other related schemes where public service
activities came to be managed by private or semi private companies. The concession schemes were
widely used in France for many public infrastructures involving the payment of user fee such as
ports, airports, highways, toll bridges and urban services. It would therefore be worth sharing some
of the benefits and pitfalls of France and other countries.
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2.2 PROBLEMS IN CURRENT SCENARIO
Despite the publicity of the economic reforms introduced by our government, the inflow of
foreign investment in India was about US$ 1 billion in 1994, though the reform was introduced in
1991. In 1997, the investment has been around US$ 3 billion which is also negligible. In order to
meet infra structural requirements and improve the growth of our economy to an 8% level we need
to attract foreign investment to the level of US$ 10 billion from foreign investors and more than this
amount from domestic investors for the period of next 10 years
The main reason for limited success may be attributed to the following
i. High abortive bidding/tendering cost.
ii. Hesitation on the part of government to agree for balance sharing of risks.
iii. Complexity of negotiation and documentation, the lack of skilled and experienced
negotiators in public sector and inadequacy in co-coordinating the efforts of different
parties.
iv. Bureaucratic attitude and time taken in government decision making.
v. Higher amount of equity inputs insisted upon from the sponsors/promoters.
vi. Construction cost and time over run and refinancing at a later stage.
vii. Lack of sufficient safe guards in guaranteeing the rate of return and maintenance of
revenue value due to inflation.
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viii. A number of clearances from government departments/agencies are involved and one-
window clearance system not yet established.
Other risks — Technological/obsolescence risks, accuracy of revenue projection, political
risks, foreign currency exchange risk.
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2.3 THE NEED FOR PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN ROAD PROJECTS
India's road network has not kept pace with the growing needs of its economy. Through
the 2 million Km road network in India makes it the third largest in world, the population
supported by it burdens. From 1954 to 1998 passenger and freight traffic has increased 65 times
and the numbers of vehicles have increased 90 times. In contrast the road network has increased
only 5 times during the above period. Today the National Highway constitute '.% of the entire
"cad network (of which only 5% is four lane) and it carries approximately 40% of entire traffic
volume. Apart from the inadequate capacity of roads, the quality of the existing network is poor
due to deterioration from lack of timely maintenance.
The inadequacy of road network has contributed to low bearing capacity, longer time
required for travel (commercial vehicles in India run half the average distance/day vis-a-vis
developed countries) and increased vehicles operation costs. These results in huge economic
losses estimated to be in order of Rs. 200-300 billion per year. Air pollution and increasing
numbers of accidents are other social losses due to the poor condition of roads.
Until recently, the responsibility of creating proper infrastructure services had been entrusted to
public sector, which has faced many problems like inefficiency, lack of accountability, poor
management, over employment etc. The immediate solution is involving the private sector to
pool resources to meet the demand. Various privatization schemes are being floated, but it is
necessary to realize that no private entrepreneur would venture into such untreated path unless
such projects are made financially viable, profitable & bankable. A number of loose end ends
are yet to be tied up to make these projects attractive and successful
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2.4 FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Participation by the private sector in infrastructure projects is being increasingly adopted in
many countries through what is called as "concessionaire' approach. In this approach the government
and private sector enters into an agreement for design, construction, financing, operation &
maintenance of the infrastructure facility. For the success of these projects it is necessary to define
such issues like responsibilities, liabilities, ownership and allocation of risks clearly to all parties
involved. Though these allocation varies from project to project according to nature of project. These
frameworks for private participation are applicable to most infrastructure projects, including bridge
projects.
Some of the more common and accepted framework for private participation:
1. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
An infrastructure project is said to be a “build-operate-transfer " when the host
government assigns the financing and construction of the infrastructure facility to a private
entity. The entity is given the right to commercially operate the facility for a certain period
(know as concession period) at the end; facility is transferred to host government. During the
concession period investor can recover the costs of construction, debt servicing, maintaining
and operating the facility by collecting toll from the users. Usually the host government holds
the title to the facility and the land on which it is built. This scheme is the most widely used
technique to develop country’s highway/bridge network and has been the most popular mode
for Private participation in the road projects in India.
2. Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)
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This scheme is similar to the BOT model in all aspect except that the ownership of the
facility until it is transferred to the government rest with the private entity.
3. Build-Own-Operate (BOO)
Build-own-operate is same as BOOT model ian all aspect, except the private entity
permanently owns the facility and its assets and is not under an obligation to transfer it back to the
host government.
4. Build-Operate-Lease-transfer (BOLT)
It is similar to BOT model, except the private entity leases the physical assets on which the
facility is located to the government for the duration of the agreement.
5. Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO)
Like BOT, DBFO does not entail ownership of the infrastructure facility by the private
sector. In the DBFO scheme the private sector is given the additional responsibility of
designing the facility apart from its financing, construction, operation and maintenance.
BOOT, BOO, BOLT, DBFO etc are not common in India.
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2.5 BOT MODEL
Amongst the above models describe above the BOT model is the most commonly used
framework for private participation in infrastructure projects. As mentioned earlier BOT
projects involve a private company (also known as concessionaire ) usually a joint venture
company or a consortium which finances, build and operates an infrastructure system for a
fixed time during which the government has a regulatory and oversight role.
The responsibility of financing the project will remain the obligation of the consortium.
The BOT projects are designed to generate enough revenues to cover the project company's
investment and operating costs plus an acceptable return on capital. At the end of the project,
which is usually in 15 to 30 years, the system is transferred back to the government. BOT
projects were originally received to transfer commercial risks to the private sector and free
government lures for other uses.
2.6 PECULIARITIES IN FINANCING PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PROJECTS IN
THE ROAD SECTOR
The difficulties in financing of any BOT project varies from project to project but the
main and common reasons for such peculiarities are as following
i. Finances for road projects are characterized by large capital outlays & long gestation
periods.
ii. After the completion of a BOT bridge/road projects the inflow of revenue starts.
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iii. High capital costs coupled with long gestation period's lead to long payback periods
leading to higher debt maturities.
iv. Also by virtue of the intrinsic nature of the projects, the investment is invariably
location specific. And the government is the owner of main underlying asset
(bridge/road).
v. As a result financing for bridges/roads projects is restricted to limited recourse/non-
recourse financing with no significant underlying asset cover.
vi. Road projects are susceptible to demand risks since the Indian user is not accustomed
to paying tolls and the facility being a non-marketable facility the decision of using
the facility is entirely dependent on the user.
vii. Inadequacy of traditional financing approaches
The traditional approach to financing, which involves term loans from financial
institutes and equity offerings in the capital market, would be inadequate to match the risk-
return profile and payback periods of infrastructure (road) investments. The first hurdle here
would be the size of investments required for highway/ bridge projects.
With the absence of a track record, the scope of equity financing in such investments
would be limited. The next consideration would be the long payback periods for road projects.
The term lending institutions in India (which extend loans for5-7 years) would find extremely
difficult to visualize lending horizons of 15-25 years.
More importantly, none of these traditional sources of finances contribute as a risk-
mitigating measure for infrastructure projects. These inadequacies in the traditional
financing perspective draw attention to structured financing" options as a means for meeting
the capital requirements of the infrastructure sector.
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2.7 BOT FINANCING USING STRUCTURE FINANCING : SPECIAL
PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV)
The essential element in a structured financing option is that the investment in a project
is directly linked to the revenue generating capability of the project i.e. it is seen that the
project cash-flows are adequate to meet the debt obligations. in addition, the projects assets are
extended as recourse security to the lender. This implies that in case of default, the debt
holder's recourse would be limited to the underlying assets. In case the bridges/roads, the asset
itself has no intrinsic value and this lead to additional problems.
Usually a SPV is created, which brings together the private sponsors and the concern
government agencies for setting up the project. The equity Component is brought by the private
sponsor and government agencies. The debt component, consisting of instruments floated by
SPV which is serviced by the revenue generated from that facility.
In road projects lender considers the cash flow and other recourse able security, which
inadequate to meet the comfort level. Financial market have now a days a growing experience
of non - recourse financing, Where the focus is not to tie down the balance sheet of promoters
or investors. So in case of bridge/road projects, Credit enhancement measures like
guarantees/counter guarantees and rights for development of facilities to supplement incomer
cash-flow to improve the overall credit quality of the project and gain the confidence if the
lenders.
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Credit enhancement can be done by
i. Government equity-e.g.: 30% equity of government in Moradabad road
toll Ltd.
ii. Land credit - e.g.: Taj express highway where 2,500 acres of land is
given to lender to develop.
iii. Annuity- e.g.: Palsit - Panagesh highway (west Bengal)
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2.8. CURRENT SCENARIO
2.8.1 INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INVESTORS IN ROAD PROJECTS ANNOUNCED
The Union Government announced major concessions for private investors in road
projects including permission to collect toll tax on all vehicles plying on newly widened four-
lane highways, expressways, major bridges new bypasses and tunnels. The private investors will
also be allowed to undertake housing and other development projects along the roads and will
enjoy further tax concessions extending over a period of 20 years. The fresh incentives package
has now opened the way for the development of new roadside townships by private
entrepreneurs willing to invest in the construction of - highways.
The Government had approved the maximum fee to be charged from various vehicles on
existing roads which are widened from two-lane to four-lane. The maximum toll rate for cars,
jeeps and vans has been fixed at Rs.0.40 pa se per km, for light commercial vehicles at Rs.0.70
paisa per km, trucks and busses will be charged at Rs.1.40 paise per km while heavy construction
machinery will attract an import of Rs.3 per km. As part of the further tax concession for
highway projects the income-tax exemption of 100 per cent in the first five years and 30 per cent
concession in the next five years can now be availed of in 20 years instead of the earlier period of
12 years.
Under the new incentive package the National Highways Authority of lire a has been
permitted to provide capital grants of BOT projects for national highways up to 40 per cent of
the project cost to enable leveraging of private investment in the highway sector. Earlier this
limit had been fixed at 30 percent.
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TABLE 2.1 List of BOT Project Awarded as on 01/03/2009
PROJECT NAME
NH
STATE KM CRORES ACTUAL SIGNING
LIKELY COMPLETION
STATUS
Thane-
Bhiwandi
byepass
3 & 4
Maharashtra 24 103 12/9/95 31/12/2001 In Progress
chalthan Road over Bridge
8 Gujarat 1 -4Lane
10 10/09/96 15/07/1998 Completed
Udaipur 8 Rajasthan 11 24 July-1996 22/04/1998 CompletedConstruction of six Bridges
5 Andhra Pradesh
6 Nos. Bridges
50 9/04/1997
08.06.2001 In Progress
Coimbatore byass
47 Tamil Nadu 33 90 3.10.97 03.12.99 In Progress
Durg Byepass
6 Madhya Pradesh
18.4 68 5.11.97 5.05.2000 In Progress
Narmada 8 Gujarat 6 113 21.11.97 21.12.2000 In Progress
Nardhana ROB
3 Maharashtra 13 34 25.11.97 25.11.2000 In Progress
Patalganga bridge
17 Maharashtra 1 ROB 33 29.11.97 29.08.2001 In Progress
Hubli Dharwarbypass
4 Karnataka 30.35 68 5.2.98 5.11.2001 In Progress
Nellore by pass
5 Andhra Pradesh
18 73 17.2.98 17.02.2001 Concession Agreement signed. Construction commence
Koratalaiyar Bridge
5 Tamil nadu NA 30 28.10.98 Oct, 2000 In Progress
Khambatki Ghat tunnel & road
4 Maharashtra
8 37.8 16.11.98 Nov.,2000 In Progress
Nasirabad ROB
6 Maharashtra 30m 10.45 16.11.98 Nov.,1999 In Progress
Wainganga Bridge
6 Maharashtra 530m 32.6 16.11.98 May,2001 In Progress
Mahi Bridge
8 Gujarat NA 42 16.11.98 July, 2000 In Progress
ROB atKishangarh bypass
8 Rajasthan NA 16.66 27.11.98 25.04.2000 ConcessionAgreementsigned.
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Construction yet to
Bridge across river Watrak
8 Gujarat NA 48.2 01.03.99 31.12.2009 ConcessionAgreementsigned.Construction yet to
TOTAL 888.71Km
Original work since completed and opened for traffic. Widening to four lanes is in progress.
completed and opened to traffic.
source: MOST ,www.nic.in/indiainfra/CHAP6.ht
The projects taken up for BOT in the state highway, Expressway, Road over Bridges
are shown in Table 2.2, 2.3 , 2.4 consecutively.
TABLE 2.2 PROJECTS TO BE TAKEN UP UNDER B.O.T.LIST OF STATE
HIGHWAYS
Sr.
No
Name of the Corridor Name of the District
Leng th (in Kms)
Approxim ate Traffic (PCU)
Cost
(Rs. In Million)
1 Bypass to Madanapalli Town on Ananthapur-Paiamaneru
Chittoor 7 2500 CVD 27.6
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TABLE 2.3: EXPRESSES WAYS
Name of the Corridor Length (in Kms)
Cost (Rs. In millions)
Hyderabad - Vijayawada Machilipatnam
335 26800
- Chennai-Visakhapatnam 765 61200
P Hyderabad -Tirupati-Chennai 905 72400
Hyderabad-Bombay-Road upto State Border
121 9680
Hyderabad-Bangalore road upto State Border
445 35600
Hyderabad Bye pass 220 17600
Vijayawada Bye pass 180 14400
Total 2971 237680
TABLE 2.4 ROAD OVER BRIDGES
Package No. Name of the Road Over Bridge (ROBs)/Bridge
Name of the District
Traffic (PCU)
Approximate Cost(Rs.Millions)
1 ROB at North Cabin of Duwada Railway in lieu of L-C at Km. 2/666 of road Leading to Export processing zone railway km. 762/1
Visakhapatnam 1998 54
2 ROB at Parvathipuram at km 112/6 of Kalingapatnam-
Vizianagaram 2370 39
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Srikakkulam-Parvathipuram Road - Railway km 387/398-405 of Rayagada-Vizianagaram Section
3 ROB at Narasaraopet near Lai Bahadur Market at Km.246/8 on Kurnool - Guntur Road Railway km 630/6-7 between Narasaraopet Sattulur road
Guntur 4069 75
4 ROB at Chirala at Km. 7/0 on Odaveru - Narasaraopet Road - Raiway km. 340/12-14 between Chirala - Jandrapadu
Prakasam 5351 48
5 ROB at Kovur at Km.0/2 on Neilore - Bellary - Bombay Road Railway Km. 176/13-15 between Neilore Padugupadu railway stations
Neilore 10931 84
6 ROB at Tadipatri on Tadipatr Ananthapur Road
Ananthapur 2209 36
7 Km.0/0 in lieu of L.C.No.129/2 Railway Km. 528/32 o
119 911 48
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8 ROB at Vengoda village Km. 0/2-4 of Mahaboobnagar road
Mahaboobnagar 1191 24
9 ROB at Gadwal at Km. 0/2-4 of Gadwal - Rangapur road
Mahaboobnagar 5416 24
10 ROB along with approach roads connecting Warangal and Khammam Road crossing Kazipet Railway Junction.
Warangal 15006 96
11 ROB at Warangal at Railway km.374/4 on Road Connecting Hunter road km 3/4-6 and joining at km. 10/9 of Hanumakonda -Khammam road
Warangal 15439 78
12 Puligadda Bridge Across River Krishna
Krishna 8000 480
Bridge across Godavari River
i (a) Kotipally
East Godavari 17987 690
(b) Bodaskurru - Vainatheyam
East Godavari 11255 275
branch of Godavari
Bridge Across River Krishna at
Nalgonda 5362 170
N.S.D/s
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Source: Andhra Pradesh Road & Buildings Department , 1999-2001
Other Real Estate Development Options Include
i. Loading and unloading terminals for cargo
ii. Warehouses
iii. Vehicle repair facilities
iv. Vehicle component shops
v. Restaurants
vi. Hotels, motels
vii. Insurance and medical facilities
The developers are required to bear the cost of the land needed for these
facilities, but the IA will assist in have to be approved by the IA as per parameter stated
in the bidding documents. The IA may opt to undertake this type of real estate
development itself as part of the project and use the income generated to subsidize toll
charges that may otherwise seem unsustainable. It can also assign real estate
development to a third agency on the basis of competitive bidding. Acquiring the land.
The layouts for the facilities prepared by the developers.
In addition to the toll, the developer will be permitted to allow advertisement
displays/ billboards within the right-of-way and outside
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2.9 Support and incentives
i. The roads sector .has been declared an industry to facilitate commercial
borrowings.
ii. The Government will provide financial support to help the developer overcome problems of
short-term repayment and debt servicing.
iii. To encourage private sector participation, the NHAI has been empowered to pick up
equity in the projects.
iv. The NHAI will also consider providing traffic support to projects by way of revenue shortfall
loans.
The foreign exchange risk sharing pattern is in the process of being evolved.
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CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE & EVALUATION OF BUILD-OPERATE-
TRANSFER (BOT) PROJECT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Discussing about the various factors involved for the successful existence of a BOT
project. This chapter, therefore provides a summary list of le.gal aspects such as guarantees
agreement etc. the risks involved in the project and the financial structure of the BOT project.
the significance of BOT project related to the both the private investor and the promoter/
government.
3.2 STUDY OF VARIOUS ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED FOR MAKING BOT
PROJECT SUCCESSFUL
3.2.1. The project must be financially sound, feasible and affordable.
The project must be financially and economically sound. Secondly, it must be feasible
from a practical standpoint. Thirdly, the costs of the service or the fees charged must be
affordable for the users. A feasibility study must therefore conclusively demonstrate the
financial and economic viability of the project under different scenarios.1 Assumptions used
in the feasibility study, including demand estimates, inflation rates and interest rate
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projections, must be realistic and, where possible, supported by detailed historical or
comparative data,
ii. There must be strong government support
Government support is essential to any BOT project. The private sector's interest in
financing such a project will be considerably strengthened if the host government has
announced that it wishes to promote public-private partnerships and that it will allow certain
infrastructure sectors to be privately implemented under BOT schemes. Since moving public
functions into public-private ventures can be difficult politically, the host government's
commitment to a BOT policy is critical.
3.2.2 Criteria for selection of BOT projects
It is necessary to understand that BOT concept is not suitable to all types of projects.
BOT projects should be those which will make a fundamental contribution to economic
growth and which will ensure a reasonable return to the promoters and backers and which will
have a substantial retaining life at the end of the concession period. Facilities which are time-
expired at the end of the concession period, for example, a project with a high proportion of
mechanical and engineering component may not have desired residual value and substantial
amount may have to be spent to update such mechanical/electrical installation. Similarly, the
projects which are mainly required from social consideration and there is very little hope in
realizing the money invested, will not be suitable for BOT approach of development. Such
infrastructure requirement should be met with from public funds by government.
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3.2.3 Adoption of a win-win approach for every participant
A win-win approach is where an entrepreneur can finance, provide, operate and
maintain some facility for the use of which he can charge fee. Upon expiry of concession, the
government acquires a substantial infrastructure asset free of charge, the customer receives the
use of facility that the government cannot otherwise afford to provide and the promoters and
backers receive fair return on the capital invested.
3.2.4 Rate of Return and Concession Period
Investors are increasingly seeking ways to safeguard their returns. One way is to
evolve the mechanism for increasing toll during the period of concession. On the other hand
government may like to fix the toll levels and also to keep it low to protect public interests and
safeguard itself from public criticism, in this situation, the sponsor who finances and operates
the project may have considerable difficulty in maintaining the value of their revenue in the
face of high inflation.
The rate of return depends upon the growth of economy and political stability and on
various risk factors. Normally the return on BOT investment is between 14-18% on road
projects in developed countries, but in developing countries it is between 20-25%. The
concession period shall depend upon the amount invested, the rate of return and the level of
toll taxes proposed to be charged for the services provided. The concession period on BOT
projects, generally vary between 10-30 years and even longer. The recovery of the money
invested can be in the form of toll collection during the concession period or there can be
shadow tolling mechanism on the basis of actual measured traffic flow and an agreed schedule
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of charges set out in the contractual arrangement. In the latter case the government recovers
the cost through general taxation. So far as our country is concerned, it would be more
appropriate that instead of increasing taxes which will help the government to escape political
criticism from public, it will be better if the realization period is kept as large as possible so
that the charges which a consumer has to pay are kept at a reasonable level.
3.2.5 Sponsor's Role
BOT involve the stages of pre-investment, implementation, construction, operation and
transfer. The sponsor has the following role at different stages:
a. As a consultant to carry out the feasibility study during the Pre-investment stage and
engineering design during the Implementation phase.
b. As project sponsor to negotiate agreement with the Government and as a project
promoter to raise equity and borrow loans.
c. As a contractor to execute the project usually at fixed price on turnkey basis during the
construction phase.
d. As an operator and owner of the facility using the project revenue to realise the
investment during the operation phase.
In short, the role of a sponsor can be described as that of a design and build contractor and that
of the provider of services.
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3.2.6. Government Role
The role of government in BOT infrastructure is both complex and multifaceted.
Sound understanding of government role is therefore essential. The government's role may be
involved as regulator/investor/facilitator/protector of public interest/guarantor/promoter/agent
of economic change. The importance of each role depends mainly upon the social and
economic factors and political will. Some of the roles may conflict with each other, for
example: government role as an agent of economic change may conflict with its role as
protector of public interest, such as environmental protection and control Such potential
conflicts must be resolved and government must be prepared to be a willing and active partner
if BOT process is to be made successful.
The legal framework must be stable,An appropriate and stable le.gal framework that clearly
sets forth which government agencies are authorized to develop BOT projects and
the laws and regulations that will apply to sponsors and lenders in such areas as foreign
investment, corporate law, security legislation, taxation, intellectual property rights etc. is
widely recognized as essential for a successful BOT policy. That some developing countries
have enacted special legislation to address BOT matters reflects the importance and urgency
of this requirement.
3.2.7 The administrative framework must be efficient
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Complicated bureaucratic procedures are often citied as a serious obstacle to BOT
projects. Seeking approvals from many different ministries and local authorities is very time-
consuming and creates uncertainties for private sponsors. The host government should
therefore offer an efficient administrative process or entity for dealing with the various
authorities who grant approvals, permits and licenses throughout the construction and
operating period such approvals permits and licenses must be granted in a fair and objective
manner, based on laws and regulations ascertainable at the outset of the project development.
3.2.8The bidding procedure must be fair and transparent.
The bidding procedure is a very important part of a country's BOT policy. Private
sponsors cannot be expected to invest time and resources in the developing of bids if the
process for awarding a BOT project is not reasonably orderly, fair and transparent so that the
chances for success are predictable. The bid evaluation criteria must be clearly defined and the
bids must be evaluated in a public and objective manner.
Although some early BOT projects were awarded after direct negotiations with a
chosen sponsor, experience with competitive bidding systems shows that the latter usually
lead to terms and conditions more favorable to the national interest. An orderly and
transparent bidding procedure should also win public support for private sector participation in
infrastructure projects.
3.2.9 THE SPONSORS MUST BE EXPERIENCED, HAVE SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL
STRENGTH AND RELIABLE.
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The technical ability, experience and financial strength of the private sponsors is of
paramount importance and must be clearly established. Lenders to a BOT project place great
weight on the choice of sponsors and their ability to manage and support and BOT project,
BOT projects must be structured so that the sponsors have the capacity to absorb financial
risks and the incentives to do everything reasonably possible to make the project a success. A
BOT project should therefore not be awarded to the lowest bidder unless that bidder also
satisfies the other essential criteria.
3.2.10 THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT
EXPERIENCE AND RESOURCES
The lenders will insist that the prime contractor, preferably selected on a competitive
basis, has the technical and managerial competence, staffing and financial strength to fulfill its
contractual responsibilities. Although ultimate responsibility for the performance of the
contractor rests with the sponsor group, the failure of a prime contractor can be a serious
setback for any BOT project. A similar scheme providing for liquidated damages, a
performance bond and construction and equipment warranties,
xiii. The project risks must be allocated rationally among the parties.
The rational allocation and management of project risks is another factor critical to a
successful BOT project. Simply stated, this means that
(a) all major risks are identified,
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(b) the identified risks are allocated to the parties most able to bear them in terms of
cost and control
(c) the allocated risks are managed in a rational way, usually by a combination of
contractual arrangements and financial commitments.
It is advisable to address the risk problem at an early stage of BOT development. All
too often the private sector is so concerned about reducing its exposure and the host
government so concerned about trying to transfer all risks to the private sector that the parties
lose sight of how much the project is actually paying for a particular risk allocation. Every
transfer of risk has a price associated with it and is only as meaningful as the assets that
underwrite it.
xiv. The financial structure must provide the lenders adequate security.
The ultimate success or failure of a BOT project revolves around the sponsors' ability
to arrange financing. Lenders require that the project will pay off the loans as they become due
and that adequate security is provided in case of default. Various techniques to protect the
lenders against non-payment of their loans must therefore be built into a BOT arrangement.
Such techniques will normally include safe.guards such as a real estate mortgage, completion
and equipment guarantees, take-or-pay contracts, stand-by credit arrangements, reserve
accounts to cover future debt service, assignments of the benefits of all project contracts,
insurance, and a power of attorney or trust arrangements that allow lenders to take over and
exercise the rights of the sponsors well in advance of a default under the loan agreements.
CHAPTER 4
RISKS INVOLED IN BOT PROJECTS
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4.1 Introduction
A risk is defined as any unintended or unexpected failure or outcome of a decision or
course of action13l. The writer defines a risk in BOT project as any unintended or unexpected
changes or events which:
1) Delays the schedule of the project or stops the project completely;
2) Causes a cost overrun or revenue shortage of the project;
3) Deteriorates the quality or reduces the quantity of the final output of the project.
Various risks are existing throughout the each phase of BOT project development from
the construction until transferring to the host government with the expiration of the
concession period. For a BOT project to be successfully achieved, these risks must be properly
considered and reduced and sometimes avoided in its feasibility stage. After the
commencement of the construction, these risks must be carefully monitored and managed.
Figure 4.1Hierarchical Structure of Risks in BOT projects
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4.2 TYPES OF RISK
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(1) ECONOMIC RISK
Economic risk is defined as a risk caused by the unexpected changes of external market
conditions in certain country or re.gion where the project is located. Three factors for the
economic risk have been identified.
1) severe pricing war with both domestic and international competitors;
2) decrease of consumption due to the economic re.gression;
3) decrease in the number of users due to the migration or population reduction.
(2) FINANCIAL RISK
Financial risk is defined as a risk caused by the unexpected change of the financial
conditions which can affect the cash flow adversely in direct. Four factors for the financial risk
have been identified.
1) higher inflation rate than forecasted one;
2) exchange rate (currency rate) variation;
3) interest rate fluctuation 4) tax rate variation.
(3) POLITICAL RISK
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Political risk is defined as a risk which is caused by the unexpected change of the
political system or the foreign policy of the host country. Sovereign risk is included in the
political risk. Five factors for the political risk have been identified.
1) War, revolution, political takeover or coup d'etat;
2) Expropriation or confiscation;
3) Embargo or restriction on exports/imports;
4) Breaking the contract or agreement by the government authority or sovereign power;
5) Difficulties in land acquisition for the project.
(4) LE.GAL RISK
Legal risk is defined as a risk which is caused by the unexpected change of the le.gal
system or unnecessary requirements of the le.gal procedure in the host country or pertinent
jurisdiction. Three factors for the le.gal risk have been identified.
1) Availability of numerous permits and licenses;
2) Change of law, standard or regulation;
3) Requirement of the public hearing or dispute.
(5) SOCIAL RISK
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Social risk is defined as a risk caused by the unexpected social, cultural behavior, habit
or customs of the host country or local community. Five factors for the social risk have been
identified.
1) Strikes of work force or union;
2) Public discrimination;
3) Ethical or religious strife;
4) Different working condition such as language, climate or weather;
5) Dishonesty, bribe or fraud.
(6) ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
Environmental risk is defined as a risk caused by the potential or perceived ne.gative
influence on the surroundings or ecosystems. Three factors for the environmental risk have
been identified.
1) Ecological damage;
2) Pollution including air, water pollution and dirt or noise;
3) Nuisance.
(7) TECHNICAL RISK
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Technical risk is defined as a risk which involves the issues associated with design,
engineering, construction and operation of the project. Four factors for the technical risk have
been identified.
1) Defects in design;
2) Unsuitable construction method;
3) Different site condition;
4) Unproven or too difficult technology in operation.
(8) MANAGERIAL RISK
Managerial risk is defined as a risk caused by the lack of business technique or
inadequate management by the promoting companies or joint venturing companies. Three
factors for the managerial risk have been identified.
1) Incapability to raise the funds to finance the project;
2) Inadequate communication or ne.gotiation skill;
3) Incapability to supply the inputs for the project such as labor, material, equipment and
energy.
(9) PHYSICAL RISK
Physical risk is divided into two factors.
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1) Natural disaster;
2) Man-made disaster. Natural disaster includes floods, earthquake, landslides, etc. Man made
disaster includes fire, safety accidents, system breakdown by the human error.
4.3 RISK FACTORS
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The main idea of BOT concept itself is funding, and all the construction and operation
time-cost overrun and associated risk is taken care of by the entrepreneur. It is hence
necessary that the entrepreneur and his associated builder has to accountant for many risks as
under, some can be foreseen and some cannot be foreseen and reasonably accounted for.
Various types of risk are:
i. Availability of land devoid of encumbrances,
ii. Rehabilitation measures in time,
iii. Removal or realignment of utilities by various agencies such as electricity,
telephone, sewers, water supply, drainage etc.
iv. Permission of forest department,
v. Environment Clearances.
vi. Permission from railways for underpass/ over bridge,
vii. Permission from Mining department for quarrying,
viii. Permission from pollution control board. \
x. Delay in decision or approval of design at various stages.
x. Periodical cost escalation of labor/material,
xi. Escalation due to additional taxes during the process of execution by various tax
imposing authorities,
xii. Soil changes/ parameters needing, increased or changed foundation and cost thereof.
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xiii. Time over run cause cost over ran for the work, overheads and plants/machinery.
xiv. Time over run, invites damages/penalty from employer besides lessening of revenue
recovery period.
4.4 RISK ANALYSIS
4.4.1 OPERATIONAL RISK
i. Traffic not materializing as projected,
ii. Traffic using the alternate but longer route available.
iii. Mind set of people not to pay toll or periodical increase in
toll.
iv. Increased cost, lower revenue, making the profit unviable.
4.4.2 RISK INVOLVE IN STAGES
i. Political risk
ii. Policy Risk
iii. Disputes not solved quickly, causing heavy costs.
iv. Non-coordination and co-operation among various operators such as Employer.
Entrepreneur, Consultant, financer, road user.
v. National clematises causing heavy damages without full compensation
4.4.3 THE RISK PERCEPTIONS DURING OPERATION OF BOT PROJECT
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4.4.3.1SPREAD OUT SERVICES
A transport project creates services all along its route in various forms, which
are to be used at that place only. Therefore, the disturbance caused by the transport
project should not exceed the minimum acceptable level of interference to public life in
terms of pollution and safety. It should also be hazard free at all times, meaning
consistently high standards of operation and maintenance.
4.4.3.2DISTRIBUTED CLIENT
In a transport project, every user is directly a client of the operator. Therefore,
achieving customer satisfaction becomes a tiresome and difficult affair given the diversity of
perception and the exceptions of the customers of various social strata.
4.4.3.3 OPERATING COSTS
In a transportation project, the capital cost is veiy high as compared to the maintenance
and /or operation coat per unit of throughout. Thus the fare structure formulation will have
clear linkage with this aspect of cost. A built in feature for periodic /requirement based
revision is also an added necessity.
4.4.3.4 FINANCIAL RETURNS
The operator acts as public interface, and therefore, the accuracy of cash flow
projection and revenue generation is largely dependent on the performance of the operator. In
effect return on investment becomes an implicit function of the operator's efficiency.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY
5.1 CASE 1: COIMBATORE BYPASS PROJECT, INDIA
Project Brief:
The project consists of:
• A road 27.67 kms in length and 40-45 m wide
• A bridge over the Attupalam Bridge on NH47 with in the City outskirts
• A road over bridge (ROB) on NH-209
• A bridge across Noyal River
Public Party:
Ministry of Surface Transport (MoST)
Government of TamilNadu (GoTN)
Private party: L&T Transport Infrastructure
PPP scheme: BOT basis
Project cost: The cost of the project including the bridge was estimated to be Rs.90
crores.
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Concession period:
• 21 years for the bridge and
• 32 years in the case of the bypass to collect toll.
Toll structure:
The following Toll structure was fixed initially in the concession agreement.
Cate.gory of Vehicle Toll on the bridge
for Old and New
Toll on bypass for
part use Rs/trip
Toll on bypass for
full use Rs/trip
Car/Van/Jeep 5.00 7.00 19.00
LCV 15.00 10.00 28.00
Bus/Truck 15.00 20.00 56.00
MAV/Heavy Trucks 23.00 30.00 84.00
Auto rickshaws, two wheelers and slow moving vehicles were exempt from paying tolls.
The work on the project was commenced on December 1997 and Attupalam Bridge was
opened for transport in December 1998 and the bypass was opened to traffic on 2000.
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What Went Wrong in Coimbatore bypass project?
L&T started collecting tolls from the day of commissioning (tolls were collected both
on the new as well as old bridge). The major problems which led to the failure of
successful completion of project are as follows:
Private Participant Interests taken care
• Only L&T bidded for the project with the condition that the Attupalam Bridge
should also be bundled with the project though the bridge is geometrically not a
part of the bypass to make it financially feasible.
Uncertainty about Toll collection system
• The state transport corporations together with the local truck and taxi owners have
expressed their unwillingness to pay toll on the bridge.
• They were demanding concession rates for frequent users and opposing the tolling
of old bridge.
• L&T made several representations to the government re.garding their loss due to
poor compliance.
• The state government in an attempt to resolve this issue proposed introduction of
concessional rates Rs.50 per day for government and private buses and Rs.300 per
month for all non-commercial vehicles in January 1999.
• The suggestions were not accepted by L&T and it insisted on retaining the old
rates as agreed in the original agreement.
• agreed to the subsidized toll rate of Rs 50 per day per bus of TN Transport
Corporation irrespective of the number of trips the buses will do provided the state
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government compensated the revenue losses sustained by the company
• The company is said to have made a loss of Rs 20000 per day on government
buses alone during 1999.
• Financial losses turned out to be 9 crores per year including interest charges.
• Financial institutions which had lent 60 crore to L&T started putting pressure on
L&T
• L&T expressed its inability to enforce toll collection and on request the State
police was deployed.
• This didn't improve the toll collection in any significant way and L&T reported a
loss of Rs.7.4 crores in June 2000 and requested for compensation.
Issues:
• Public consultation: No study for demand or willingness to pay was carried out
before deciding to include the bridge also in the project. Nor were there any public
consultation or discussion with opinion makers were carried out.
• Delays due to toll collection: The tolling has increased traffic delays and public
look upon this as a hindrance rather than any improvement of service.
• Local Traffic: Since the bridge is within the city limits there is huge local traffic
and therefore repeat trips are high. This has made the toll collection difficult
because the agreement provides for toll collection on every trip and the public is
not willing to pay on each and every trip.
• Toll on existing bridge: The agreement provides for toll collection on the old
two-lane bridge also. After the completion of the new bridge, each bridge is now
being used uni-directionally. This has resulted in public objection for tolling the
old bridge for which L&T has not made any investment.
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5.2 CASE 2: MUMBAI-PUNE EXPRESSWAY INDIA
Project Brief:
• An 85 km dual three-lane expressway taking off from Kon near Panvel and ending
on the westerly bypass outside Pune at Dehu Road.
• 10 km panvel bypass road
Project required 646 ha of land for Rights of Way, and 455 ha for quarrying and dumping
area.
Property development on 1338 ha land in the vicinity of the expressway is a possible
source of subsidy for the project.
Public Party:
Ministry of Surface Transport (MoST)
Government of Maharashtra (GoM)
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• Maharashtra State Road development Corporation (MSRDC)
Private party:
The following table shows the final section wise details of the PMC's and Contractors
(Table No
TABLE NO. List of PMC & Consultants
Section Description Technical Consultants ContractorSection 'A' (KontoChowk) 13.232 km.
Stup Consultants with Hyder Consulting Ltd. U.K.
IJM/SCL Joint Venture
Section 'B'(Chowk to Adoshi) 16.629 km.
Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. India
Hindustan Construction Co. Mumbai
Section 'C Frishmann Prabhu (India) Larsen and Toubro Ltd.(Kusgaon to Ozarde) 22.995 km.
Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai
Section 'D'(Ozarde to Dehu Road) 16.150 km.
Sir Owen Williams Innovestment
V.M. Jog Engineering Ltd. Pune
Ghat Section Package -1Adoshi to long tunnel 7.13
Consulting Engg. Service (India) Ltd.
Shapoorji Pallonj & Co. with Lighten Asai Jt. Venture Larson & Toubro Ltd. Chennai
Ghat Section Package - IILong tunnel to Lonavala bypass 8.28 km.
Consulting Engg. Service (India) Ltd.
Shapoorji Pallonj & Co. with Lighten Asai Jt. Venture Larson & Toubro Ltd. Chennai
Panvel Bypass Package -10 0 to 8/200, 8.20 km.
Technogem Consultants Thane
PBA - PCEC (JV) M. Venkat Rao Visakhapatnam
Panvel Bypass Package - II* 200 to 9/750, 1.550 km
Technogem Consultants Thane
PBA - PCEC (JV)M. Venkat Rao Visakhapatnam
Tunnel Work5 Twin Tunnel 5724 m. Tunnel Length
Kokan Railway Corp. Ltd.
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Operation & Maintenance: Ideal Road Builders (IRB)
PPP scheme: BOT basis
Project cost: The total cost of the project was Rs 2136 crores.
Concession period: 30 years
Toll structure:
The toll rates proposed were as follows:
Type of Vehicle Toll for full Length Toll for Interchanges Panvel Bypass
Car 80 50 15
LMV 135 80 20
Truck 190 115 40
Bus 270 160 40
2 3 Axle container 450 270 90
Trailer Truck 600 360 120
What went wrong in Mumbai-Pune Expressway Project?
1. Failure in involving full private participant.
The aim of involving a full private participant failed in this case as not even a single
international infrastructure company bid for the project and only one Indian company,
fiance bid for the project inspite of many incentives provided by the government like
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the guaranteed 20% return on investment, a promise of rapid and single window
approval, tax incentives and reduced duties on imported equipment for all investments
in industry, and, allowing up to 40 per cent government support to the project.
Total annual toll collection was not as expected.
~ compliance of the following estimation with the reality resulted into less toll faction
than expected:
• The toll collections were estimated considering that around 40 -50 % of the traffic on
the NH4 would divert to the expressway
• The majority of users were expected to be trucks and Multi axle vehicles and they
would contribute a significant amount of revenue.
• It was widely perceived that in addition to the current users of the roads, there would
be growth on account of extensive containerization at the JNPT and that most MAV's
would use the expressway instead of the existing road.
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5.3 CASE 3: NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE, INDIA
Project Brief
The Delhi Noida Bridge Popularly known as the DND flyway, the bridge is 552.5
meters long and has eight lanes with a capacity of around 222,000 vehicles per day
aimed to reduce time, distance and fuel consumption for travellers between South Delhi
and Noida.
Public Party & Private party
• Concedent: NOIDA
• Concessionaire: NTBCL/DND Flyway Limited
• Sponsor: IL & FS PPP
scheme: BOOT project
Project cost: Initial capital cost of Rs. 408 crore had risen to Rs. 953 crore.
Concession period: 30 years initially contemplated in the agreement, since the contract
provides for the term of the concession to be extended until the concessionaire recovers
the total cost of the project and returns it is now entitled to hold the concession for a
period of 70 years
Toll structure: The concessionaire has been given the power to "determine, demand,
collect, retain and appropriate" the fee for use of the Noida bridge in order to recover
the :otal cost of the project and returns thereon
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What Went Wrong in DND flyway?
The Delhi Noida bridge project has several features that appear to weigh the contract in
favour of the private partner and that, from a public policy viewpoint, depart from best
practice contract design. The major issues were as follows
• Development Rights
• Termination payments
• Multiple roles of the sponsor
• Independent Auditor and Independent Engineer
• Selection of Project Oversight Board
• Fees
• Other issues
Guaranteed returns on total project cost a)
Base upon which the return is calculated
• The project cost is defined ex post - once construction and commissioning have
been completed - and the contract does not put a cap on project cost and total cost
of the project. 11 This means the magnitude of the financial commitment being
made by NOIDA, and whether it is "reasonable," are not known up front.
• The agreement does not provide a tight definition of what items are allowable as
costs (see, for instance, the definition of "Other Costs of Commissioning" in
footnote 10) - so costs are effectively open-ended
• If the toll revenues of a given year do not generate such returns, the deficit is
added to the Total Cost of Project and the enhanced Total Cost of Project forms
the base for calculating the return of 20% in subsequent years. 15 The inclusion
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of shortfalls in the recovery of returns in total cost of project now substantially
removes traffic risk from the concessionaire, but could be expected to result in
very significant increases in the total amount due to the concessionaire.
There is no incentive to minimize costs since costs are completely passed through to
consumers. O&M expenses are taken "off the top" when determining the surplus
available for appropriation to recover project costs and returns
The absence of an incentive to control O&M expenses is again likely to result in a
longer time being taken to recover the requisite returns, pressure from the
concessionaire to adjust tolls upward, and pressure for the grant of Development
Rights.
b) Justification for the level of return awarded
1. The return can be judged to have been justified only if it was the outcome of
competitive bidding for the contract. However, the concession for the Delhi
Noida bridge project was not awarded competitively
2. High returns are also considered a reward for high risk. In this concession
agreement, however, the guarantee of a return means that the concessionaire does
not bear any significant commercial risk.
Development Rights
• Criteria, duration, and value of developments rights to be granted to the
concessionaire is not known
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• The concession agreement should have been transparent about the criteria for
award and the way in which Development Income would be applied towards
reducing total project costs of NTBCL
• The concession agreement provides no information on the principles or rules to
be followed by the Independent Auditor when concluding that Development
Rights should be granted in lieu of an extension of the concession period where a
high transparency and specificity is needed.
• The concession agreement also does not state how the Development Income
generated would be monitored in the absence of an escrow account, by whom it
would be monitored and what role, if any, the Independent Auditor would play in
this.
Conditions in the contract are so drafted that a concessionaire can raise claim for the
conditions like trade union, environmental group challenge which is beyond the control
of either party.
A very open-ended obligation for NOIDA, in order to facilitate the process of achieving
Financial Closure.
The concession agreement does not spell out the penalty payments or sanctions for not
adhering to performance specifications/standards.
The concessionaire has been given the right to mortgage its interest in the project assets,
including the project site.
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Termination payments
• Termination payments are due when there is a transfer of project assets from the
concessionaire to NOIDA because of termination of the concession contract due
to Precedent conditions not fulfilled by any party o Default by either party/
force majeure
• If NOIDA repudiate the agreement, it has to pay the concessionaire an amount
equal to the total project cost and returns thereon outstanding till the termination
date.
• Construction completion risk, which should more appropriately fall to the
concessionaire, is substantially shifted to NOIDA.
• There should be costs to unilateral abrogation of any contract; the size of the
penalty imposed on the public partner in this case seems disproportionate to the
risk of capricious repudiation by the public sector.
Multiple roles of the sponsor
• The involvement of the project sponsor in designing the structure and setting the
technical specifications of the project would be considered a clear conflict of
interest under best practice norms of public sector contracting.
• The potential tie-breaking role of IL&FS in these selection processes could result
in both the Project Oversight Board and the Fee Review Committee being
perceived as weighted in favour of the interests of the private partner.
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Independent Auditor and Independent Engineer
The contract accords substantial discretion and decision-making power to the
Independent Auditor and Independent Engineer
The Delhi Noida bridge contract, the process or principles to be followed in the
selection of the Independent Auditor and Independent Engineer are not specified
and the qualifications for each post are left vague
Selection of Project Oversight Board
• The Project Oversight Board is a single member body whose role is "to resolve
any dispute that may arise in relation to any decision or findings of the
Independent Engineer or the Independent Auditor.
• The fact that the lenders may have the final say in selection of the Board is not
ideal in view of the fact that IL&FS, the project sponsor, is also included among
the lenders. This could result in a perception that the Board is biased towards the
private party.
• In view of the power and discretion provided to the Board, a well-specified and
transparent procedure for selection of the Board would be good practice.
Fees
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Concessionaire has the power to determine the user fee which is in contrast to
the general practice in the case of national and state highways where the power
rests with the government.
Conditions in the contract are so drafted that a concessionaire can raise claim for the
conditions like trade union, environmental group challenge which is beyond the control
of either party.
A very open-ended obligation for NOIDA, in order to facilitate the process of achieving
Financial Closure.
The concession agreement does not spell out the penalty payments or sanctions for not
adhering to performance specifications/standards.
The concessionaire has been given the right to mortgage its interest in the project assets,
including the project site.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. A successful BOT projects needs a large amount of vehicle population, So the project
should be so identified at the high corridor of traffic population.
2. Private sector participation in the development of Highway projects on BOT basis is
fairly logical to the users as they are getting a good quality bridge and can travel in a
reasonable short period and saving operating cost, travel time and accident cost.
3. By adopting far and transparent bidding process and close collaboration between the
various parties involved, the BOT concept should be a grand success in contributing to
the development of Highway sector.
4. The Government alone cannot meet the growing demand of more and better Highway
project and its effects in this re.gard need to be supplemented by theprivate sector. So
there is an urgent need to further promote the private sector participation in Highway
development.
5. If the project is not placed within the frame then the value of the financial cost
and revenue of the project cannot be measured so the project has to be conceive,
planned, implemented and operated within the time frame to measure the success of the
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future of the project.
6. Lot of risks are involved in BOT projects. Hence we shall have to consider the
various risks involved in the whole process of assessing the cost, political interference,
policy change, "delay in commencement of revenue, force majeure, important aspect of
traffic forecast, various le.gal aspect, time and cost overrun, delay in various approvals
etc. for successful implementation.
7 .Participation of private sector in the development of highway project on BOT basis
will increase the efficiency effectiveness, greater levels of innovative ideas, transfer of
effective technology promotion of completion more employment etc. This will certainly
helps in development of highway projects.
8. Success of BOT projects in highway sector needs public awareness, education,
setting up various committees for planning monitoring and review of policy
decision/re.gulation for implementation of the projects
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REFERENCES
1. Dr. Kreydieh Ahmad, Thesis on Risk Management in BOT Project Financing,
MIT, May 1996, Pg.No.15
2. Dr. S. arunchalam, ‘’Progress of Privatization in Highway ’’ Civil Engineering
Review &Construction Review,Dec.2005,Vol.No.12,pp57.
3. Prof S.S Jain, “Performance based Maintenance Contract for road” Civil
Engineering Review & Construction Review,Nov.2005,Vol.No.18,pp 42-51.
4. An article, “Performance Based Maintenance Contracts” Indian Infrastructure,
Aug.2005,Pg No.44-48.
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Build-Operate-Transfer
6. http://www.irb.co.in/toll_mp.asp
7. http://circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/6841
8. http://circle.ubc.ca/search
9. http://www.irb.co.in/toll_operational.asp
10. http://www.projectsmonitor.com/detailnews.asp?newsid=7213
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