A Review & Elucidation of Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Responsibility for Believing’ - Allen

8/16/2019 A Review & Elucidation of Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Responsibility for Believing’ - Allen

1/12

May 2010

A Review and Elucidation of Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Responsibility for believing’

Luke Allen

Abstract. The cardinal objective of this paper is to establish that the article

“Responsibility for believing” (2007), by Dr. Pamela Hieronymi, redefines one’s

notion of responsibility and uses an older notion of “the will” to gain a, otherwise,

controversial claim: “One is most fundamentally responsible for one’s beliefs.”

First, I explain what it is to be responsible, according to “Responsibility for

believing”. I then provide a basic, yet precise, version of Hieronymi’s argument that

concludes: we are more fundamentally responsible for our beliefs. Second, I, in

response to her argument, clarify any possible confusion by providing and

discussing a simple, yet accurate, version of her argument, which exactly captures

her argument’s claims and displays them in an uncontroversial conclusion. Third, I

present what it is to be responsible in today’s world and how the notion ofresponsibly is betrayed within Hieronymi’s paper. Ultimately, I plan to convey that

“Responsibility for believing” does not hold as much weight as one might believe.

Introduction

The article “Responsibility for believing” (2008), by Pamela Hieronymi, states that one

can be responsible for what is not voluntary. But, as Hieronymi previously claimed, it seems that

one cannot believe at will only by the desire to believe a proposition, viz., it seems that doxastic

voluntarism is false. Thus, the rejecting doxastic responsibility directly calls into questions one’s

responsibility for one’s beliefs. 1

First, I explain the given notion of responsibility. Second, I present Hieronymi’s

argument in a small simple extraction. I then explain how the argument is earned only attributing

a new definition to our, among others, notion of responsibility. Third, I supply a version of

Hieronymi’s argument in which, I believe, captures the essence and of “Responsibility for

believing”.

1 Pamela Hieronymi (2006) ‘Controlling Attitudes,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87: 45-74.


2/12

Criticism and revision of Hieronymi Luke Allen

"

To be Responsible

The thesis contained in “Responsibility for believing” is that the assumption that one can

only be responsibility for what is voluntary is false. Hieronymi suggests that the notion of

answerability be considered a minimal notion of responsibility. She takes answerability to mean

that one can [rightly] be asked the reasons, if any, for why one believes P . One can regard P to

be any proposition that one believes, e.g., the belief that “I’m 20 years old”, “The moon is made

of cheese.” or “George Bush is a fabulous specimen of American Values.” Note that believing P

can be understood as settling (or having settled) for oneself (positively) the question of whether

P —the question on which one’s considerations for believing P will bear. The phrase “settling the

question”, is meant only to convey the uncontroversial conceptual connection between a belief,

P , and the answer to some question (whether or not P ).2

It is also important to note that Hieronymi states [one must not have a reason for every

belief], which is to say, that one can still rightly be asked why one believes P for which one has

no reasons that will bear on P . To better understand the concept of “being rightly asked”

consider the following example: Suppose one is asked “How much money do you have in your

pockets?” Any of the follow answers are sufficient responses to have been rightly asked : “A

lot.”, “Some.”, “A little.”, “I don’t know.”, and “None.”

To compare, suppose one is asked: “Why do you believe P ?” Any of the follow responses

can be accepted in order for the question to have been rightly asked: “I believe P because of x.”,

“I’m not sure, there must be a reason.”, “I don’t remember.”, “I don’t know.”, and “I don’t have

a reason.” Of course a plethora of answers are acceptable; my only concern here is to give one

" #$%&&'()* &+% ,-%.&(/)0 (. )/& 1%2)& &/ ()&3/4-5% 2 )%6 1%)&2' .&2&% /3 %7%)&8 9: #.%&&'()* &+% ,-%.&(/)0

;(%3/):1( 4/%. )/& 1%2)< %8*8< 5/).5(/-.': %)&%3&2()()* &+% ,-%.&(/)8 =+% 1%)&2' .&2&% /3 %7%)& &+2& 5/33%.>/)4.

&/ #.%&&'()* &+% ,-%.&(/) 6+%&+%3 !0 (. )/&+()* /&+%3 &+2) ?%'(%7()* !8


3/12


@

the general idea of what it is to be rightly asked and to display that a broad range of answers are

sufficient.

Only when the assumption (the assumption that one believes P , not the assumption that

one has reasons) is false the question is not rightly asked. To clarify, once again consider the

question: “How much money do you have in your pockets?” This aforementioned question is

refused by the response “I don’t have pockets.” The assumption, that one has pockets, is false.

To compare, go back the question “Why do you believe P ?” This question is refused by the

answer, “I don’t believe P .”

I have given a clear definition of what it is to be responsible. That definition being one

can rightly be asked. In the next section I will provide, and discuss, the argument used to gain the

claim one is most responsible for one’s beliefs.

Fundamentally Responsible

Given that we have an operational definition of responsibility, able to be rightly asked, I

feel it is appropriate to give an extraction from “Responsibility for believing”. I believe this

argument captures the essential gist of Hieronymi’s central argument:

1. We are responsible for what is not voluntary. (Basic)

2. Beliefs are not voluntary. (Basic)

3.

Beliefs constitute our moral personality. (Basic)

4.

Thus, one is most fundamentally responsible for one’s beliefs.

Premise (1) certainly holds a significant amount of weight. Premise (1) begs the question:

how is one responsible for what is not voluntary. The answer for that question rests in the


4/12


A

definition of responsibility. Here responsibility is understood as able to be rightly asked one’s

reasons, if any, that bear on whether P . If beliefs are not directly voluntary we then have a clear

case in that one is responsible for what is not voluntary. This leads to premise (2).

Premise (2), beliefs are not voluntary, is widely held to be true among philosophers and

seems obviously basic (at least to me and any individuals I have encountered). Hieronymi

purposes an activity is voluntary just in the case one decides to do the activity for reasons one

takes to settle the question of whether to do the activity, therein intend to do the activity, and,

providing all goes well, do the activity by executing that intention. For example: I cannot directly

voluntarily form the belief, at will, just like that, that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard

only for the reason I want to believe that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard. Further in

my paper, I provide an argument of Hieronymi’s that, according to which, believing is not an

action and thus cannot be directly voluntary.

Consider the claim premise (3) made: Beliefs represent one’s moral personality. Premise

(3) may be unclear or intuitively contradictory. Suppose there are two adults. Adult One has the

belief abortions are morally impermissible from conception. Adult Two has the belief that

abortion is morally permissible from conception. On Hieronymi’s view, each adult’s belief

represents that which is part of one’s moral personality. Are the contrasting beliefs to display

something of the adult’s moral personalities? I do not believe so. Precisely because there are

certain non-moral disagreements between the adults and the non-moral disagreements do not

reflect on morality. Assume each adult holds the same fundamental moral belief that “causing

physical pain to live, innocent, young human beings is morally wrong.” However, assume that

Adult One believes abortion is morally impermissible because abortion causes physical pain to

the fetus. Adult Two believes abortion is morally permissible, but Adult Two is a future scientist


5/12


B

that knows the fetus (up to a certain point) is not actually alive and thus the fetus feels no pain

and therefore abortion is morally permissible.

Hieronymi, regardless of today’s sense of morality, holds to the conclusion that beliefs

represent one’s moral personality. Premise (3) is rationalized by redefining moral personality:

By settling certain questions for oneself, by having a take on what is true, what isimportant, and what is to be done, one thereby constitutes those bits of one’s mind

relevant to the quality of one’s relations with others—and so establishes what wemight call one’s moral personality, or, in an older but apt phrase, the quality of

one’s will.

Hieronymi (2008: 361) denotes that on the older notion of “the will”, one’s will is one’s “rational

appetitive faculty,” and so encompasses (some of) one’s desires or appetites. The older notion of

“the will” is discussed by Robert Adams (1985: 6) whom Hieronymi cites. Adams elucidates that

the “rational appetitive faculty” responds to intellectual data.3 Essentially, when Hieronymi

mentions moral personality she refers to something closer to the broader, older, notion of the

will, i.e., rational appetitive faculty. The rational appetitive faculty is understood to represent a

subjects take one some object, the subject’s answers to some question(s).

To further illustrate, assume one has the belief that the sky is blue or whether a certain

claim is true or false or even the belief that perfect spheres are smooth, round and circular.

Beliefs constitute ones rational appetitive faculty, which in turn represents one’s “will”. One’s

will represents ones “moral” personality. Thus, it should now seem clear that every belief

represents that which part of one’s moral personality. Premise (3) now is basic by definition. MY

discussion now turns to the conclusion (4).

Premise (4), as responsibility and moral personality are defined here, should seem

significantly less controversial. Although, the phrase “most fundamentally responsible” remains

3 Robert Adams (1985) ‘Involuntary Sins’ The Philosophical Review 94: 6.


6/12


C

to be explained. However, if one considers that one’s moral personality is comprised of one’s

beliefs, it is permissible to say: beliefs are an integral component of a moral agent. Thus, premise

(4) is true.

Therefore, Hieronymi’s argument holds. In the next section I will discuss how the notion

of responsibility has been betrayed.

Betrayal of a notion

The way in which Hieronymi uses the term ‘responsibly’ betrays the general connotation

of what is widely understood when an individual claims that “one is responsible for x.” To

illustrate, consider the follow two thought experiments. The first thought experiment:

Implemented beliefs. Imagine a world in which God exists and He is the creatorof the universe. Then imagine that he creates the earth, plants, water, animals and a

full grown man named Chad. Chad can be understood as a body of specifically placed molecules and atoms functioning in a particular way. At the precise moment

God created Chad, God also caused it that Chad obtained certain beliefs. Beliefssuch “I (Chad) am the only living human.”, “Some actions may be morally

impermissible.”, and also simple beliefs such as “Healthy grass is green.”Additionally, suppose at the same precise moment, Chad has yet to form any sense

kind of autonomy. Free will has not come into play for Chad. Assume, God directlycontrols the actions, thoughts and beliefs of Chad. In other words, God directly and

completely controls Chad. (At least until the point God chooses to attribute free willto Chad.)

In the “Implemented beliefs” thought experiment, according to Hieronymi, Chad is

fundamentally responsible for his beliefs. Chad is responsible only because he can

rightly be asked his reasons for his beliefs. Chad does in fact hold his own beliefs (his

own beliefs simply referring to that which Chad believes.) Chad can rightly answer with

responses such as “I don’t know, P must be true.”, or “God has shown me that P .”, et

cetera.


7/12


D

Certain objections may be voiced against the thought experiment. A possible objection

might be that in order for an individual to be right asked: the individual must had obtained free

will. And if that individual (the individual in question) has not obtained free will the individual

cannot rightly be asked his reasons for his belief. Hieronymi intends to relate her term of

responsibility to the individual with free will.

My reply: Objections that free will is criterion to be rightly asked might at first, prima

facie, seem valid point. However, since we are using responsible interchangeably with “able to

rightly be asked” I see no relevant distinction as to why it is permissible to attribute

responsibility to the free willed individual, (D1), and it is impermissible to attribute

responsibility to the completely controlled, non-autonomous, individual, (D2). D1 and D2 can

each equally believe any given proposition and can each equally be asked ones reasons for one’s

belief. It is permissible to conclude that in regards to responsibility there is no relevant difference

between D1 and D2.

A further objection to my reply: D1 and D2 can each equally believe any given

proposition P . However, in the case that D2 is asked his reasons for believing P , it would be the

case that the God directly causes D2 to answer and therefore God is indirectly answering the

rightly asked question of “Why do you, D1, believe P ?” Therefore, God is rightly answering and

it is not the case D1 is rightly answering.

My reply: This objection is blocked simply by the definition of responsibility. To

reiterate, once again, the definition of responsibility according to Hieronymi: to be responsible is

for one to be able to be rightly asked which considerations, if any, bear on one’s belief P . Thus,

the assumption (that one has the belief P ) made in the question “why do you believe P ?” is not


8/12


E

rejected because D1 and D2 actually hold belief P . Thus, D1 and D2 are each responsible for

their beliefs.

Throughout my essay I run the risk of over emphasizing, exactly, at least according to

“Responsibility for believing”, what it is to be responsible. On our definition thus far it should

seem clear that one can be responsible for what is voluntary. Responsibility is not widely

understood as simply being able to be rightly asked. The word ‘responsibility’ is used in such a

broad sense in “Responsibility for believing” that the argument ultimately fails to assert anything

short of a tautology.

I purpose an account, in form of a thought experiment and discussion, of what is

generally understood by the notion of responsibility. Consider:

Deadline. Assume that a talented writer has formed and signed a contract with a book publisher. The contract is mutually agreed upon and absent of any kind of

coercion. The contract states that the author is to have completed a book by thedeadline of some future date. Upon completing and legally transferring the book to

the publisher, the publisher is to pay the author some significant amount of money.The author and publisher agree that the allotted amount of time provided is an

extremely gracious time period. The author then begins writing his book. However,the author then feels he would rather play video games than work on his book. The

author then plays video games rather than work on his book. Time passes and thedeadline soon approaches. The author still plays videogames rather than write. The

deadline passes and the author informs the publisher that the book is not completed.

The thought experiment, Deadline, is aimed at providing a case of what we seem to mean when

we utter the phrase that one is responsible for something.

To be responsible is widely, roughly, understood to mean that one caused (or could

prevent) X (X being some state of affairs). The author in Deadline failed to complete his

obligation concerning the contractual agreement. The author is responsible for the state of affairs

that he produced, namely, failure to complete the book by the deadline.


9/12


F

I have just shown how Hieronymi definition of responsibility misleads and how

responsibility is generally understood. In the next section I supply a premise-by-premise

formatted version of Hieronymi’s argument in less controversial terms, which earn the

equivalent of Hieronymi’s thesis.

To be rightly asked

I have, I believe, captured the essence of “Responsibility for believing” into three simple

arguments. The following arguments assume that an individual holds a belief, P , where P can be

taken as any proposition. Hieronymi does not seem to consider “indirectly voluntary” in the

same class as “voluntary”, because this I choose to substitute her use of “voluntary” to mean

strictly “directly voluntary.” This does not change or compromise the arguments. Hieronymi

simple asserts one must allow that there are “other forms of control”. The following arguments

are extracted from “Believing for responsibility”:

5.

Assume setup. (Assumption for conditional proof.)

5.1. In either intending to act or acting intentionally (where the action may be as complex as

you like) you are [able to be rightly asked for] the reasons that you take to show

something good about so acting. (Basic)

5.2. In believing you are [able to be rightly asked for] your reasons that you take to show the

belief true. (Basic)

5.3.

If believing brings its own distinctive form of [being rightly asked], then believingcannot be understood as an action. (Basic)

5.4. Believing and either intending to act (or acting intentionally) brings their own distinctive

forms of [being rightly asked]. (From 5.1, 5.2)

5.5. Believing cannot be understood as an action. (Modus ponens 5.3, 5.4)


10/12


GH

5.6. If believing cannot be understood as an action, then believing cannot be an action.

(Basic)

6. Thus, believing cannot be an action. (Modus ponens 5.6, 5.5)

6.1. If believing is directly voluntary then, believing is an action. (Basic)

7. Thus, believing is not directly voluntary. (Modus tollens 6.1, 6.2)

7.1 One has settled the question of whether or not P . (From 5)

7.2 If one has settled the question of whether or not P , then one is [able to rightly asked for

one’s reasons] on accounts of one’s belief P . (Basic)

7.3 Thus, one is [able to be rightly asked for one’s reasons] on accounts of one’s belief P .

(Modus ponens 7.2, 7.1)

7.4 Thus, one can be [rightly asked for one’s reasons] for one’s belief P and one’s belief P is

not directly voluntary. (Conjunction introduction 7.3, 7)

8. If setup holds, one can be [rightly asked for one’s reasons] for one’s belief P and one’s belief

P is not directly voluntary. (Completes conditional proof 7.4)

Premise (5) simply means this argument is a strict conditional and that an individual has

the belief P . Premise (5.1) and (5.2) may seem complicated.4 I will try to clear up any confusion.

Premise (5.1) states that “in intending to perform some directly voluntary action” or “doing or

having done a directly voluntary action” one can rightly be asked the reasons that show it good

to have intended to act or to have acted intentionally. Premise (5.2): if one has a belief one can

4 (Hieronymi 2008) states “[B]elieving could not be understood as an action because believing brings with it its own

distinctive form of answerability. In believing, you are answerable for reasons that you take to show the belief true.

In contrast, in either intending to act or acting intentionally (where the action may be as complex as you like), you

are answerable for reasons that you take to show something good about so acting. If we were to try to make belief

into an action, one would have to be, in believing, answerable for reasons that one takes to show something good

about believing.”


11/12


GG

rightly be asked for one’s reasons for that belief. But that is not to say every belief needs a

reason.

Premise (5.3) asserts that if believing has a distinctive form of rightly being asked than

that of an action then believing simply can’t be an action. Premise (5.4) shows that believing and

acting intentionally do indeed have distinctive forms of answerability. And, thus, leads us to

premise (5.5), then believing cannot be an action. Premise (5.6) seems basic, yet an air of

questioning might lie within: just because something cannot be understood as an action, does that

mean it is not an action? The simple answer is “Yes.” I choose not to go further into premise

(5.6) as it is taken for granted in the original argument. Thus, premise (6), believing is not an

action.

Premise (6.1) asserts that if believing were to actually be directly voluntary then

believing would be an action. We have concluded that believing is not an action. Thus, premise

(7), believing is not directly voluntary. One must simply allow that there are other forms of

control.

In our setup in which an individual has a belief, premise (7.1), is earned by the definition

of “to believe P ”: one has settled the question of whether P . Premise (7.2), if one has settled the

question of whether or not P then one is able to be rightly asked for ones reasons for belief P .

Thus, premise (7.3), one is able to be rightly asked for one’s reasons on accounts of one’s belief

P . Thus we come to the conclusion, premise (8), that one can be rightly asked for one’s reasons

for one’s belief P and one’s belief P is not directly voluntary.

Premise (8), one can be [rightly asked for one’s reasons] for one’s belief P and one’s

belief P is not directly voluntary, is conceptually identical with the conclusion:


12/12


G"

Beliefs, then, are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are mostfundamentally responsible most fundamentally responsible, in part because they

are the sort of things which could not be voluntary. (Hieronymi 2008: 372-373)The inclusion of the word “fundamentally” may be questionable but I believe the addition of

“fundamentally” may be at least permissible, if not appropriate. Given that we said early

mentioned that beliefs represent one’s take on things, i.e., one’s take on the world, it seems

reasonable to suppose that sense beliefs are a fundamental characteristic of thinking being. It is

in the sense that beliefs “fundamentally” represent one’s take on the world.

I have just explained in uncontroversial terms exactly how Hieronymi has earned the

conclusion we are most fundamentally responsible for what is not voluntary.

Conclusion

We have learned, according to Hieronymi, what it is to be responsible. We then earned

her argument for her paper in a simple and short four premise argument. However, it turned out

that redefinition was needed to earn the arguments coherence. We then discussed how the

argument betrays our notion of responsibility. I then supplied Hieronymi’s argument in a simple

and uncontroversial manner to display the argument clearly. (Hieronymi, 2008)

Documents

A Review & Elucidation of Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Responsibility for Believing’ - Allen