A Reassignment of the Functions of LF

A Reassignment of the Functions of LFAuthor(s): Edwin WilliamsSource: Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1986), pp. 265-299Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4178487 .

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Edwin Williams A Reassignment of the Functions of LF

In this article I will explore a modification of the model of grammar proposed by Van Riemsdijk and Williams (1981; henceforth VR&W). This model seems to eliminate the possibility of certain kinds of interaction between modules, interactions that are in fact apparently not available. It is similar in spirit to the VR&W model in that it incorporates both NP-Structure and S-Structure. It differs from that model mainly in that it lacks LF and D-Structure. Because of this difference, I will refer to it as the reduced VR&W model.

With respect to LF, the most important difference between the Government-Binding (GB) model (as in Chomsky (1981), for example) and the VR&W model is in the treatment of quantification structures. In section 1, I review the properties of the treatment of quantification in the VR&W model, reconstruct that treatment in the reduced model, and evaluate the empirical adequacy of this treatment vis-a-vis the things widely taken to validate the GB level of LF. In the reduced VR&W model quantifier scope is rep- resented in S-Structure, as it was in the VR&W model itself, even though that model had a level of LF. In section 2, I give reasons for not identifying the result of Recon- struction with LF. In section 3, I again consider what the level of NP-Structure looks like.

To appreciate my theoretical intentions, it will be useful to have in mind a number of "atomic" or minimally specified levels of representation. For example:

(1) a. D-Structure: the output of the base b. NP-Structure: the result of applying NP Movement to D-Structure c. S-Structure: the result of applying Wh Movement to NP-Structure d. Quantifier Structure (Q-Structure): the result of applying Quantifier Raising

(QR) to S-Structure e. Reconstructed Structure: the result of applying Reconstruction to S-

Structure

This article has profited greatly from comments by B. Partee, J. Higginbotham, R. May, D. Pesetsky, H. van Riemsdijk, and K. Safir. The body of this article was written in the spring of 1984 before I had seen the arguments for LF in May (1985) and Pesetsky (1985). My preliminary assessment of these arguments is contained in the appendices. Treatment of further material bearing on the LF hypothesis, especially the important work of Huang (1982), I reserve for a subsequent paper.

Linguistic Inquiry, Volume 17. Number 2, Spring 1986 265-299 ? 1986 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 265



266 EDWIN WILLIAMS

f. LF: the level that determines interpretation etc.

The question is, then, which of these levels can be fruitfully, or at least painlessly, identified with each other? I will take the position that Q-Structure can be identified with S-Structure, and Reconstructed Structure can be identified with NP-Structure. LF can thereby be dissolved, and a more systematic account of what properties hold of what levels can then be achieved.

1. Quantification Structures

1.1. Quantifiers in Situ

The GB level of LF is at least partially defined by the operation of a quantifier scope assignment rule, a rule that moves a quantified NP and adjoins it to some phrase (S and VP in Williams (1977); S in May (1977)), leaving behind a trace bound to the NP. For example, (2) is a typical quantification structure:

(2) [Every car]i [John saw ti]s

Under this view, a quantification structure consists of four items:

(3) a. a quantifier b. a restriction on the range of the variable c. a variable d. a scope

An instance of quantification consists of exactly these four things, and the interpretation of an instance of quantification depends on nothing more than these four things. In (2) the quantifier is every, the restriction is car, the variable is the position occupied by t, and the scope is S. These four things can be identified in the structure by the following definitions or criteria:

(4) a. The determiner of an NP in an A-position is the quantifier. b. The N' of the NP is the restriction. c. The trace bound by the NP is the variable. d. The S in construction with the NP is the scope.

Presumably these identifications would suffice to fully determine the interpretation of quantification structures.

In the VR&W model the same quantification structure looks like this:

(5) a. [John saw [every car]i]s:i b. [ ...p[Q N i r... rsoi

(This notation is proposed in Cooper and Parsons (1976).) We may think of this as being



A REASSIGNMENT OF THE FUNCTIONS OF LF 267

derived by assigning the index of a quantified NP to some higher containing node (the .i after the S label) (Scope Assignment) rather than by moving the quantified NP. The same four elements can be identified in this structure as in (2), but by somewhat different rules:

(6) a. A variable is an A-position with index i. b. The quantifier is the determiner in the position of the variable. c. The restriction is the N' in the position of the variable. d. The scope is the phrase bearing the index :i.

Since all of the same components of a quantification structure exist in the GB and the VR&W accounts, I will assume that interpretation of quantification structures will also be the same in the two theories; the theories differ only in the derivation of the quantification structures and in the identification of the components.1

We may think of the QR hypothesis in the GB account of quantification as the hypothesis that scope assignment is like movement in certain ways, and that variables are like (S-Structure) empty categories (ec's) in certain ways. Certain explanations in the GB literature depend on this hypothesis and hence are not available in the VR&W account, where scope assignment is not like movement and variables are not identified with ec's. These explanations were discussed in VR&W and will be discussed further here. I will reserve the term QR for the GB rule of quantifier movement and the term Scope Assignment (SA) for the VR&W mechanism for scope assignment, even though of course QR itself is simply one mechanism for scope assignment.

We may think of SA and QR as deriving LF in the VR&W and GB accounts, respectively; this was the view taken in VR&W. Alternatively, we may think of SA as a rule that derives S-Structure from NP-Structure (along with Wh Movement) and eliminate LF from the picture entirely; this is the view I take here in proposing the reduced VR&W model. LF cannot be eliminated from the GB model in an analogous way, since the output of QR is not an appropriate input to PF (the quantified NPs are not in the position in which one "hears" them).

Whether or not one regards it as appropriate to say that LF is eliminated in the reduced model depends on how LF is defined. If LF is defined as the result of applying QR or SA to S-Structure, then LF is certainly eliminated; but if LF is whatever structure it is that determines meaning, then of course LF is not eliminated; it is simply identified with S-Structure.

' A question not answered in the text is this: What happens when two NPs are assigned the same node as their scope? We might suppose that both indexes are assigned to that node, as below:

(i) [Everyonei saw someonej]s:ij A further question remains: Is the order of the quantifiers in such a case determined or free? If determined, we will want to attach significance to the order of i andj in S:ij; if not, we won't. It is difficult to find empirical data bearing on the question, partly because in the theory assumed here, all nodes are available as possible scopes, so it is difficult to create simple cases in which two quantifiers must have the same node as their scope.



268 EDWIN WILLIAMS

1.2. Wh-Structures

The principal empirical challenge in pursuing the above theory of quantification is to provide explanations for the phenomena of weak crossover and the Empty Category Principle (ECP), since these have been fruitfully analyzed within GB theory as involving conditions on LF (by Chomsky (1972) for weak crossover, and by Kayne (1981) for the ECP), where the permitted quantification structures are constrained by well-formedness conditions. The reason LF plays a crucial role in these explanations is that the conditions in question seem to constrain both wh-structures and quantification structures, and it is only at LF that these two types of structures have the same form in GB theory.

The reason that they have the same form is that QR, like Wh Movement, moves an NP and leaves a trace. In LF, traces that arise from either rule count as variables, and NPs moved by either rule count as A-binders, so generalizations common to the two sets of structures can be stated in terms of binders, traces, and variables.

The success of these explanations lies in the fact that quantification structures are held to be movement structures, an identification not available in the reduced VR&W model, where scope assignment is not accomplished by movement. However, the reverse identification may be possible: it may be possible to treat wh-structures with the same mechanisms as quantification structures.

In the typical quantification structure examined so far, the quantifier and the restrictor appeared in the position of the variable. Suppose instead that an ec appears in the position of the variable:

(7) [. .. ti. ...]s:i

The ec in such a structure can only be understood to be a free variable, since the restrictor and quantifier are not specified. In general, language does not tolerate free variables. Suppose though that the specifier and the restrictor are adjoined to the scope-then of course we have an ordinary quantification structure, interpretable in the obvious way:

(8) [[Q N'] [. .. ti ... *] s:i]

In fact, (8) can be taken as the schema of an interpretive rule. From this point of view, it seems an irreducible fact of language that it has syntactically two kinds of quantification structures: structures in which the quantifier and restrictor appear in the position of the variable, and structures in which they appear adjoined to the scope.

To complete the analogy, it is not even necessary to say that the trace in (8) is bound by the fronted NP; rather, we may say that it is bound by the :i operator on the S. The :i operator arises in the derivation of S-Structure, through the action of SA; the trace also arises in the derivation of S-Structure, through the operation of Wh Movement. In the VR&W model, where Wh Movement derived S-Structure from an LF derived by SA (not QR!), it was necessary to specify that Wh Movement had to move the wh-phrase exactly to the top of the scope of that phrase; this was called the "correspondence problem." In the reduced model, there is no such need; S-Structure representations in




which the wh-phrase has moved beyond, or short of, the top of the scope cannot be interpreted by (8). In the VR&W model there was really no reason, other than a vaguely "functional" one, for this correspondence between scope and movement, so the reduced model has a decided advantage already. In general, this is typical of the advantages that the reduced model has: various possibilities simply do not arise in the first place.

There is some evidence that it is correct to regard the index on S:i as the actual binder of the trace in wh-structures, rather than the adjoined NP. The evidence derives from the rule of Sluicing and a restriction on ellipsis first discussed in Williams (1977). The restriction says that an ellipted constituent cannot contain a free variable. But under GB theory assumptions, the LF representations of sluiced sentences seem to contain free variables, since the binder, the wh-phrase, is not contained in the ellipted material:

(9) ... but I don't know whoi [... ti ... *]

Under the assumptions of the reduced model, however, the representation of (9) satisfies the free variable restriction, since it is the S itself that binds the variable, via the :i index:

(10) ... but I don't know who [.. . ti ... ]s:i

Another fact of Sluicing is predicted: an S with a trace bound from afar cannot be ellipted, since the trace will be free:

(11) John knows how to do something, but I don't know whati [he knows howk [to do ti tk]S:k]S:i

The underlined S is correctly predicted to be undeletable, because the first t is not bound within that S. Hence, there is good reason to submit the rule of Sluicing to the free variable restriction (already shown to govern VP Deletion in Williams (1977)), and this can be done only if variable binding is accomplished by an index on a category containing the variable, as the reduced model requires.

In sum, then, language has two quantificational schemas, the in-situ schema (5b) and the adjunction schema (8).

An important difference between these two is that the in-situ schema is restricted to quantified NPs in A-positions, simply because the variable must be in an A-position, whereas the adjunction schema is not. Only the in-situ schema can give rise to quantifier scope ambiguity, since there is no fixed structural relation that must hold between the scope and the quantified NP, except that the former must contain the latter. With the adjunction schema, on the other hand, the quantified NP must be sister to its scope. This means that quantifiers in A-positions will not be ambiguous, but quantifiers in A- positions will be. This is by and large true; Kiss (1984), for example, has demonstrated that in Hungarian, quantified NPs in A-positions in S-Structure have exactly their S- Structure sisters as scope. In English the rule interpreting wh-in-situ (probably simply the in-situ schema (5b)) is restricted to applying to wh in A-positions-this is why the ambiguity found with in-situ wh is never found with wh in Comp. And we may attribute the ungrammaticality of the following example (12b) to the fact that the negative polarity



270 EDWIN WILLIAMS

item any is confined to the lower clause since it appears in an A-position, whereas negative polarity items require construal in the immediate scope of a negative (Linebarger (1980)):

(12) a. John doesn't think that Bill likes any of the furniture b. *John doesn't think that any of the furniture, Bill likes

These last points pose a problem for a GB model with QR. Why are quantifiers in A-positions not subject to QR? The account given in the previous paragraph is not available in GB theory-that account relied on the proposition that variables must oc- cupy argument positions, a proposition that derives ultimately from 0-theory and must surely be a part of either theory. But this does not suffice to explain why QR is restricted to quantifiers in A-positions-a quantifier in an A-position must bind a variable in an A-position, but this does not entail that it cannot undergo QR. A further stipulation must be made to achieve this result.

1.2.1. Weak Crossover. The definition of "variable" in the reduced model is nearly identical to the definition in GB theory (Koopman and Sportiche (1982), Chomsky (1981)):

(13) A variable is a locally A-bound category.

There is no requirement here that a variable be empty of lexical content or that it be trace or a pronominal, since of course the "variables" of quantification structures are not always empty of lexical content in the reduced model. On the other hand, locally A-bound means something slightly different in the reduced model: locally means first that the variable must be A-free, in the usual sense (not coindexed with a c-commanding A-position; see section 2 for more); but A-bound, in the reduced model, means that its index must appear as a scope marker on some containing phrase. Given these corre- spondences between old and new terminology, it is not surprising that weak crossover can take the same form in the reduced model as in GB theory (as was pointed out in VR&W); for example, the Bijection Principle of Koopman and Sportiche (1982):

(14) A quantifier may bind only one variable.

Both of the reduced model S-Structure representations (15a) and (15b) violate (14), and in the same way:

(15) a. *[Hisi mother likes [everyone]i]s:i b. *Whoi does [hisi mother like ti]s:i

In each of these cases the scope marker S:i binds two variables: his and the position occupied by everyone in (15a), and his and the position of the trace in (15b).

In section 2.2 we will return to the analysis of weak crossover, since the particular treatment of this phenomenon has a strong bearing on the "A/A" division of labor proposed there. For now, it is enough to show that the reduced model's S-Structure is




sufficient to permit a description of the weak crossover configuration, so long as the weak crossover principle, whatever it is, is stated in terms of ivariable."

1.2.2. The Extended ECP. Kayne's (1981) extension of the ECP from S-Structure ec's to variables in general was accomplished by assigning the ECP to LF, where variables are assimilated to S-Structure ec's via QR, since QR leaves empty categories in LF. The essential claim of the extension is that the scope of quantifiers in subject position must be "local" in the same way that wh-traces in subject position must be locally bound. The extension has very mixed empirical support, which I will not review here.

If the extension is rejected, as was suggested in VR&W, then the original ECP, stated in terms of S-Structure ec's, can be inserted into the reduced model without modification. Basically, the extended ECP is not compatible with the reduced model. In the reduced model's S-Structure there is no predicate that picks out just the right NPs- "empty category" picks out too small a set of items, not including the quantifiers, and "variable" picks out too large a set, including not only the variables but also nonnull bound pronouns. Since there would then be no way to designate just the quantifiers and the traces of Wh Movement, the extended ECP could not be stated as a simple law. There is nothing in the reduced model corresponding to "LF ec" in the standard model.

But of course, as noted, the extended ECP could well be wrong. The strongest cases in favor of the ECP extension seem to involve two-part quantifiers, such as ne ... personne in French:

(16) a. *Je ne demande que personne parte b. LF: Personnei [Je ne demande que ti parte] c. VR&W S-Structure: Je nei demande que t, personne parte

VR&W outline a means by which these cases can be assimilated to the S-Structure ECP cases. Basically, ne is generated next to personne in D-Structure and moved to clitic position in S-Structure, leaving a trace that would be ruled out by the unextended ECP in S-Structure (16c).

Once these cases are subtracted out, the ones that remain do not strongly support the extension. Kayne presents the following contrast involving the English quantifier not a single (1981, (10) and (11)):

(17) a. He's suggested that they write not a single term paper b. He's suggested that not a single term paper be written

In (17a) wide scope for the quantifier is possible; in (17b) it is not. This limitation on the scope of the quantifier in subject position is attributed to the ECP operating in LF after QR. I agree with Kayne's judgments, but I find the same difference in the following pair, where the ECP draws no distinction:

(18) a. In all those years, the judge wanted to execute not a single criminal (wide or narrow scope)



272 EDWIN WILLIAMS

b. In all those years, the judge wanted not a single criminal to be executed (only narrow scope)

Since the quantifier is lexically governed in both cases, wide-scope readings should be available in both. These examples suggest that there is a subject-object asymmetry that does not reduce to the ECP. It may be that wide-scope readings are best when the quantifier is in final position, which is the natural "focus" position.

Aoun, Hornstein, and Sportiche (1980) suggest that Superiority effects are to be accounted for in terms of the ECP, and again, this must be done in LF (after LF movement of wh-in-situ). Again, though, there are examples involving Superiority where the ECP is not applicable, since all positions are lexically governed:

(19) a. Who did you give t what b. *What did you give who t c. Who do you strike t as what kind of man d. *What kind of man do you strike who as t

A "small clause" an'alysis might be possible for (19a) and (19b), thus preserving the applicability of the ECP for these cases, but it is extremely implausible for (19c) and (19d).

1.2.3. Parasitic Gaps. A distinct advantage of the reduced model is that it explains why only S-Structure gaps, and not LF gaps, license parasitic gaps. In the reduced model S-Structure gaps license parasitic gaps because there are only S-Structure gaps; in GB theory, on the other hand, there are both S-Structure and LF gaps, so the fact that LF gaps do not license parasitic gaps must simply be stated and does not follow from any more basic principle of the theory.

In GB theory there are two more or less independent reasons for determining the distribution of parasitic gaps in S-Structure rather than LF. One is that quantifiers, which are not interpreted in GB S-Structure, do not license them:

(20) a. *John talked to everybody about t b. Who did John talk to t about t

If parasitic gaps were licensed in LF, then (20a) would be wrongly grammatical, having the same LF representation as (20b), except that it would contain everybody instead of who.

The other reason to license parasitic gaps in S-Structure is that Reconstruction, thought by many to derive LF, does not feed parasitic gaps:

(21) a. Whose mother did you talk to t about t' b. Whose did you talk to t mother about t'

(D. Pesetsky, cited in Chomsky (1982))




(21a), which has the LF representation (21b), means '.. . about whose mother', not '... about whom'; this can be achieved by linking the parasitic gap (t') to t in the S- Structure representation (21a), rather than to t in the related LF representation (21b).

In the reduced VR&W model the distribution of parasitic gaps must be determined in S-Structure, since there is no LF distinct from S-Structure. How might this theory explain the two facts just mentioned?

The reduced model without further elaboration does not predict that quantifiers will not license parasitic gaps. (Of course, neither does GB theory, since the fact that their distribution is determined at S-Structure does not follow from anything.) In the reduced model, if we said that a quantifier could bind two variables (or that "a scope could contain two variables"), this by itself would predict that parasitic gaps could be licensed by quantifiers. Structures in which this happened would look like this:

(22) [. . . everyonei. . . ti. . ]S:i

Such a structure could be ruled out by requiring that if one of two instances of the same variable had lexical content, they both must have it. This could be viewed as an extension of the homogeneity requirement in Safir (1984). A rationale for this homogeneity requirement might be this: when there are two variables, each must be validated inde- pendently of the other. This means that (22) is well-formed only if both of the following are well-formed:

(23) a. [... everyonei. .S:

b. [. . . ti . . .s:i

But as we have already seen, (23b) is not well-formed, since the quantification structure it represents has no quantifier or restrictor, and the trace is therefore interpreted as a free variable, which natural language does not tolerate.

As for explaining why Reconstruction does not "feed" the licensing of parasitic gaps, the reduced theory has a decided advantage. The LF representation of a relevant example, the one given in (21), is (24):

(24) [[Whosek mother]i [did you talk to ti about tYJ]S:i]S':k

There are two quantifiers, one with scope S:i, the other with scope S':k. t' can be bound only to S:i, since binding to S':k would violate the homogeneity requirement just discussed.

This discussion is reminiscent of the previous discussions of weak crossover and the extended ECP: GB theory allows for more distinctions, having the categories "LF ec," "S-Structure ec," and "LF variable" at its disposal, whereas the reduced model has only "S-Structure ec" and "S-Structure variable." Fewer distinctions means fewer possible solutions to problems, but by and large the distinctions that remain suffice.



274 EDWIN WILLIAMS

2. Reconstruction and LF

LF plays a dual role in GB theory: it is simultaneously "Reconstructed Structure" and "Quantification Structure" (Q-Structure). By "Reconstructed Structure" I mean the structure derived from S-Structure in GB theory by application of Reconstruction. For example, (25a) is reconstructed to (25b):

(25) a. Whose mother did you see t b. Whose did you see t mother

A proposal of this kind occurs, for example, in Chomsky (1981, 89) and (1982, 55). One way to view the difference between the GB model and the reduced model is

this: In the GB model LF is split into two parts, Reconstructed Structure and Q-Structure. In the reduced model the function of Reconstructed Structure is assigned to NP-Struc- ture, and the function of Q-Structure is assigned to S-Structure. LF is thereby dissolved, permitting a rational account of the functions of each level (see section 2.1). In this section I will focus on NP-Structure as Reconstructed Structure; much of the material is discussed in more detail in VR&W.

NP-Structure was defined in VR&W as the output of NP Movement and the input to Wh Movement. It is this level that the binding theory, Case theory, predication, and 0-theory are about. I will maintain this view through most of this discussion, though at the end a revision will be necessary.

2.1. The "Division of Labor" between A and A

We may sum up the relation between S-Structure and NP-Structure as follows:

(26) NP-Structure is the level at which A-positions and relations between A- positions are characterized; S-Structure is the level at which A-positions and A-binding are characterized.

Given some linguistic relation or law, then, which level that law pertains to should be determined automatically: if it involves A-positions or A-binding, then it holds of S- Structure, and if it does not, then it holds of NP-Structure. This "division of labor" tightens up the space of available theories considerably, especially by comparison with various versions of GB theory, some of which differ from each other only in how the modules are assigned to the levels. In fact, it has been suggested occasionally by GB researchers that grammars themselves might differ in the assignment of modules to levels.

So, for example, the binding theory (at least conditions A and B) applies to NP- Structure, as amply demonstrated in VR&W, since the binding theory pertains strictly to pairs of A-positions:

(27) a. Which picture of himself did John see t b. John did see which picture of himself




Here, the reflexive can be bound to a c-commanding NP in NP-Structure, but not in S- Structure. This is because the binding theory involves only relations between A-positions and thus holds of NP-Structure.

Quantification, on the other hand, is a relation between an A-position and an A- position; it therefore must hold of S-Structure, not of NP-Structure. One way to put this is to say that although Reconstruction can "feed" the binding theory (as in (27)), it cannot "feed" quantification.

This can be demonstrated by means of a feature of the quantifier each-namely, that it differs from all and every in that it must "distribute" over something. This can be accomplished in a number of ways:

(28) a. ?Each patient left (cf. All the patients left)

b. Each patient saw his own chart c. Each patient saw a different doctor

In (28b) the quantifier binds a pronoun whose reference varies as the subject of the sentence is varied; (28c) contains an indefinite subordinate to each whose reference varies as the subject is varied. In S-Structure, then, each must have in its scope something that depends on it for its reference.

The interesting thing about (28b) and (28c) is that they involve fundamentally different relations. The relation in (28b) is a relation between the A-position occupied by each patient and the A-position occupied by his-this relation is therefore characterized at NP-Structure. The relation in (28c), on the other hand, involves two quantifiers, each and the indefinite, and must therefore be characterized at S-Structure. This predicts that in cases involving Reconstruction, these two relations will behave differently:

(29) a. What each patient saw t was his own chart (NP-Structure: Each patient saw his own chart)

b. *What each patient saw t was a different doctor (NP-Structure: Each patient saw a different doctor)

(29b) is ungrammatical because each does not have a referentially dependent item in its scope: it does not have the indefinite in its scope in S-Structure, and in a somewhat different sense it does not have the indefinite in its scope in NP-Structure, since the indefinite is not assigned a scope at that level. In (29a), on the other hand, each binds his in NP-Structure, since it is in NP-Structure that such bindings are characterized.

To put this result in GB terms, Reconstruction can "feed" the binding of pronouns, but it cannot "feed" QR. A simple example that illustrates this is the following:

(30) a. Many of my friends I think Bob didn't see t b. I think Bob didn't see many of my friends



276 EDWIN WILLIAMS

(30a) is not ambiguous, but its reconstructed form, (30b), is.2 Clearly, Reconstruction does not feed QR. In the GB model it seems hard to do better than stipulatively add this to the characterization of the model. After all, QR and Reconstruction both derive LF from S-Structure-why can they not interact in this particular way? As before, the advantage of the reduced VR&W model is that the gross architecture of the theory simply prevents the possibility from arising in the first place. This is reminiscent of the deficit of the GB model discussed in section 1, where it was pointed out that there is no good reason why Reconstruction could not feed the licensing of parasitic gaps. This question haunts the GB model in general-why does Reconstruction feed exactly what it does, namely the binding theory and some related matters, but nothing else?

The A/A Division of Labor Principle answers a question raised but only partially answered in section 1.2.3-namely, why does Reconstruction not feed the licensing of parasitic gaps (example (21))? The answer is that the parasitic gap enters into only an A-to-A relation with its A-binder; no A-to-A relation must hold between the two gaps (they might need to be "connected" in the sense of Kayne (1983), but this is not an A- to-A relation). Therefore, the parasitic gap is licensed in S-Structure.

The GB model also permits QR to feed the binding theory, which it does not do. So, for example, there is not a good reason for the following:

(31) a. Mary thinks that John likes every picture of herself b. LF: Mary thinks [[every picture of herself] [John likes t]] c. Mary wonders which picture of herself John will like

Why is it not possible to "lift" an anaphor out of its governing category by QR (as in the LF representation (31b)), especially since Wh Movement can clearly do so (as il- lustrated in (31c))? As before, this can be stipulatively excluded in the GB model, but it is impossible in the first place in the reduced VR&W model, since binding is established in NP-Structure, and NP-Structure contains no information about quantifier scope or bindings; furthermore, scope assignment is not effected by movement in any case.

Similarly, why doesn't QR bleed applications of binding condition C, in the way that Wh Movement actually does do?

2 A referee pointed out that the example I originally gave to make this point was predicted to be ambiguous by my theory, since both of the quantifiers could be assigned S scope:

(i) a. Nowherei did [someonej see Bill ti]S:ij b. [Someonei saw Bill nowherej]s:i,j

Even so, the argument based on these examples retains some force, since the fact that the reconstructed form has different scope possibilities counts as an argument against reconstruction. Still, we would prefer to know why (ia) is not ambiguous. Perhaps the adjunction schema given in (8) is incorrect, and instead we should have the following schema,

(ii) [[Q N'] [. . .t, ... .]]s :i where the scope is the containing phrase instead of the sister phrase. If so, then the scope of nowhere would be S' in (ia). Then, if the scope of someone is constrained to S, the nonambiguity of (ia) will be accounted for; in (ib) both quantifiers can be assigned S scope.




(32) a. *He saw which picture of John b. Which picture of John did he see t c. *He saw every picture of John d. [Every picture of John] he saw t

Again one may stipulate that condition C applies at S-Structure, and only there, but the limitation follows from no deeper principles of the theory. (See below for more on binding condition C.)

2.2. The Binding Theory

It was proposed in VR&W that the binding theory holds at NP-Structure, since NP- Structure is "Reconstructed Structure" in the VR&W model. This is clearly true for binding conditions A and B:

(33) a. Himself I think John likes t (himself = John) NP-Structure: I think John likes himself

b. Him I think John likes t (him $ John) NP-Structure: I think John likes him

Furthermore, in the present context, it has to be true that the binding theory applies at NP-Structure, since the binding theory occupies itself exclusively with relations between argument positions.

However, allowing the binding theory to apply in NP-Structure poses two difficul- ties. First, certain instances of binding condition C seem to apply at S-Structure, instead of NP-Structure. Second, weak crossover violations, which are not ordinarily thought of as arising from binding theory violations, but rather are thought of as arising from certain properties of the quantification system, nevertheless seem to be characterizable in NP-Structure, not in S-Structure. In this section I will speculate on how one might resolve these two dilemmas. The remarks here borrow heavily from the work of Tanya Reinhart, especially (1983) and (1984).

2.2.1. Binding Condition C. Condition C posed a difficulty in VR&W, because of what Van Riemsdijk and I termed the "anticrossover" cases:

(34) Which picture of Johni does hei like NP-Structure: *Hei likes which picture of Johni

We suggested that condition C did hold of NP-Structure, but that a "readjustment" of definite NPs took place in S-Structure to handle cases like (34). I would like to pursue this view here, in light of the A/A "division of labor" described earlier, and especially in the light of Reinhart (1984).

Although definite NPs exhibit the anticrossover effect, quantified NPs do not, as



278 EDWIN WILLIAMS

pointed out in VR&W:

(35) *Which picture of everyone does he like t

This is so even when the quantified NP is in an "accessible" position, such as the English possessive position (as in (36b)):

(36) a. *Mary, everyone'si picture of whom hei liked t b. Everyone's, mother likes himi

Together, (35) and (36) show that the binding of a pronoun to a quantifier phrase does show crossover effects; why then should (33) be different?

The crux of Reinhart's view of binding condition C is that it is composed of two subcases with radically different status. The following examples exhibit the difference:

(37) a. *Hei thinks that Johni is sick b. *Hei thinks that everyonei is sick

In both cases the coindexing is unacceptable, but for quite different reasons, according to Reinhart. (37b) is ruled out because the pronoun and the quantifier are not in the configuration for bound pronoun interpretation-that configuration, to be discussed in the next section, requires the (S-Structure position of) the quantifier to c-command the pronoun. The configuration in (37a) also of course resists the bound pronoun interpretation. However, the full explanation for (37a) must involve something more, for a definite NP and a pronoun can be coreferential in a much wider range of configurations than that permitted by the Bound Pronoun Rule. Why is the same not true, then, in (37b)? Reinhart observes that the configuration in which a definite cannot be antecedent to a pronoun is exactly the reverse of the configuration in which bound anaphora obtains (that is, where the pronoun c-commands the antecedent), and she proposes that ante- cedency is blocked there for an essentially pragmatic reason: a speaker who has avoided the bound pronoun relation where it would have been possible must intend noncorefer- ence (1984, 167). See Reinhart (1984) for a very convincing case for the pragmatic nature of this rule.

Reinhart further concludes that although the Bound Pronoun Rule is a rule that determines the formal properties of some linguistic representation (LF or S-Structure) by determining what indexings are possible, the pragmatic strategy is instead a rule for interpreting a linguistic representation. Therefore, (37b) is ruled out by a formal grammatical property, and (37a) by a pragmatic interpretive strategy.

Reinhart's distinction will allow us to sharpen our view of what the A/A division of labor is about: it is about the rules that determine the formal properties of representations. The Bound Pronoun Rule, responsible for (37b), is a rule governing indexing and therefore is subject to the A/A Division of Labor Principle (its status with respect to this principle will be taken up in the next section). But the pragmatic strategy responsible for (37a) is not a part of the rules governing formal properties of representations and therefore is not assigned to any level by this principle. Although the A/A Division




of Labor Principle is now relieved of responsibility for the anticrossover cases, the question remains: Why is S-Structure relevant for the pragmatic strategy, and not NP- Structure? Perhaps this is because S-Structure is LF, in the sense of being the sole representation submitted to further interpretation. Since the pragmatic strategy is a part of that interpretation, it will apply to S-Structure.

2.2.2. The Bound Pronoun Rule and Weak Crossover. Certain ways of dealing with weak crossover are problematic for the A/A Division of Labor Principle. For example, the Bijection Principle, which accounts for weak crossover in terms of the notion "variable," would lead us to believe that this phenomenon should hold at S-Structure, since the notion "variable" is defined in terms of A-binding, and A-binding is a feature exclusively of S-Structure; we saw earlier that parasitic gaps are licensed in S-Structure, for example.

It is nevertheless possible to demonstrate that weak crossover violations must be adjudicated at NP-Structure. Examples from Engdahl (1980), discussed in VR&W, can be used to make this point:

(38) Which of hisi pictures does everyonei like t best

Let us suppose that everyone has S' scope and that it has the wh-phrase in its scope (irrelevant problems arise if we assume that the wh-phrase has widest scope). Then both his and the trace count as variables, since neither c-commands the other, so (38) should count as a violation of the Bijection Principle. However, the coindexing is good. There is some problem, then, in applying the Bijection Principle to S-Structure.

Suppose though that we could apply the Bijection Principle to the NP-Structure representation of (38):

(39) Everyonei likes which of hisi pictures best

Here, his is c-commanded by everyone and thus would not count as a variable, since variables must be locally A-free; however, it is illegitimate to identify "variable" in NP- Structure, since "variable" is defined in terms of A-binding.

We could solve this problem if we could define "variable" without reference to A- binding. Again, Reinhart has provided just the right distinction. In her view, the only coindexings allowed in grammatical representations are those arising from the Bound Pronoun Rule. That rule requires that the antecedent c-command the pronoun that it binds. Reinhart demonstrates that this relation can hold whether or not the antecedent is quantified, so it holds equally in (40a) and (40b), but it is disallowed in (40c) and (40d):

(40) a. Everyone thinks he is sick b. John thinks he is sick c. *A picture of everyone upset him d. *A picture of John upset him

Now, coreference is allowed in (40d), but this is "accidental" coreference. The two NPs



280 EDWIN WILLIAMS

just happen to refer to the same person; it is the bound pronoun relation that is barred in (40c) and (40d), not coreference per se. In (40c) there is no question of "accidental" coreference-the only way a pronoun can be "coreferential" with a quantified NP is to be bound by it.

Reinhart's account of weak crossover is based, then, on the Bound Pronoun Rule: the weak crossover configuration is a configuration in which the Bound Pronoun Rule cannot apply so as to coindex two NPs (40d). This is equivalent to the Bijection Principle as an account of weak crossover, in that the configurations in which the Bound Pronoun Rule fails to apply are exactly the same configurations in which two NPs will count as separate variables: when the first does not c-command the second.3

But there is an important difference between Reinhart's account and the Bijection Principle for the issues addressed here, for Reinhart's Bound Pronoun Rule is not tied to the notion "'variable" or A-binding; furthermore, it is strictly a relation between pairs of A-positions and therefore can hold at NP-Structure.

In fact, Reinhart makes a convincing case that the bound pronoun relation holds whether the antecedent NP is quantified or not (pp. 150-155; the argument is based on sloppy identity). (The same point is made from different considerations in Partee (1978).) The only reason that weak crossover violations are not detectable with definite antecedents is that coreference with definites does not depend on the bound pronoun relation-there is also the possibility of "accidental" coreference. There is absolutely no conflict between Reinhart's account of weak crossover, then, and the division of labor proposed here. Weak crossover arises when the Bound Pronoun Rule fails to coindex two NPs in A-positions in NP-Structure.

Two more pieces of evidence support this view of weak crossover. First, there is further evidence that the Bound Pronoun Rule applies whether the

antecedent is quantified or not. Higginbotham (1979) observes the ambiguity of the following case:

(41) They say they like each other

3 Reinhart's proposal is also equivalent in this respect to that of May (1985). May proposes that weak crossover violations are subsumed under path theory in the following way: all locally A-bound items generate paths to their A-binders. The configurations in which weak crossover violations occur always contain two paths that do not satisfy Pesetsky's (1982) Path Containment Condition. This gives the same results as Reinhart's proposal for the core cases, since the configurations in which weak crossover does not hold are ones in which the pronoun is c-commanded by the quantifier expression; in that configuration the pronoun is not locally A-bound and so does not generate a path in May's theory.

It is worth noting that May's view of bound pronouns is quite different from Reinhart's, and the difference turns on matters of fact. May's analysis does not require that a bound pronoun be c-commanded by the S-Structure position of its antecedent, and he gives examples to support this:

(i) Someone from every cityi despises iti (example (73), chapter 5)

Reinhart, on the other hand, gives almost identical cases as evidence that such pronouns must be c-commanded: (ii) *People from each of the small western citiesi hate iti

(p. 120, where many other examples are given) I myself find May's example acceptable, but I feel it is not representative and perhaps calls for special, not general, treatment.




(41) can mean either (42a) or (42b):

(42) a. They-as-a-group say "We like each other" b. Each of them says he likes the other

We may take (42b) as the reading in which the embedded they is bound by the matrix they, and (42a) as the reading in which it is not bound by it but "accidentally" coreferential with it. In fact, the ambiguity is entirely independent of the reciprocal-the same ambiguity occurs in (43a), which can mean either (43b) or (43c):

(43) a. They think they are sick b. They-as-a-group think they-as-a-group are sick c. Each of them thinks he is sick (bound reading)

If this is the correct account of this ambiguity, then it follows that the bound pronoun relation is independent of whether the antecedent NP is quantified. From this view of the ambiguity, it follows that possessive antecedents will permit ambiguity, since such antecedents are "accessible" to the Bound Pronoun Rule, for whatever reason (44b):

(44) a. Their friends say they like each other (ambiguous) b. Everyone's friends like him

However, antecedents that are inaccessible to the Bound Pronoun Rule will give rise only to the group readings:

(45) a. People that know them say they like each other (unambiguous) b. *People that know everybody like him

Clearly, this account depends on the Bound Pronoun Rule coindexing two definite NPs, thus confirming the idea that this rule is part not of the A-binding system but of the A- binding system.

Higginbotham believed that the ambiguity he observed was not an ambiguity resolved in S-Structure or LF, but rather one resolved in (truth-theoretic) interpretation of LF representations. If the above remarks are correct, then the ambiguity has the same claim to syntactic resolution that quantifier scope does.

The second piece of evidence supporting the account of weak crossover given here is based on a discussion of the following example in Haik (1983):

(46) Every man liked some symphony that he heard

The LF representation of this case, after QR, will be (47):

(47) [Every man]i [[some symphony hei heardb [ti liked tjll

This LF representation would appear to violate the Bijection Principle, since both hei and ti are bound by every man; but the sentence is grammatical. This illustrates yet again the inappropriateness of viewing weak crossover as arising from some aspect of the quantification structure. If weak crossover violations arise from the failure of the Bound



282 EDWIN WILLIAMS

Pronoun Rule to apply in NP-Structure, then we do not expect such cases to arise-the NP-Structure representation of (46) is (46) itself, and in (46) the Bound Pronoun Rule can coindex the subject NP and the pronoun, since the former c-commands the latter.

This example, together with (34), (35), and (38), makes a powerful case that the Bound Pronoun Rule applies in NP-Structure:

(48) a. Every man liked some symphony he heard (= (46)) b. Which of his pictures does everyone like best (= (38)) c. Which picture of John does he like (= (34)) d. *Which picture of everyone does he like (= 35))

To review: (48a) is well-formed because in NP-Structure every man can bind he; (48b) is well-formed because in NP-Structure everyone can bind his; (48c) is well-formed because coreference between John and he does not depend on the Bound Pronoun Rule being able to apply; and (48d) is ill-formed because in NP-Structure the Bound Pronoun Rule cannot apply.

2.4. Summary and Argument

In this section and in section 1 we have seen that the gross architecture of the GB model does not determine the answer to a number of questions about the interactions of modules. In particular, we have seen that the GB model does not predict the following facts:

(i) The failure of Reconstruction to feed QR (29b) (ii) The feeding of the binding theory, including the Bound Pronoun Rule, by

Reconstruction (29a) (and by Wh Movement) (iii) The failure of Reconstruction to feed the licensing of parasitic gaps (21)

(whereas Wh Movement does) (iv) The failure of QR to feed the licensing of parasitic gaps (20a) (whereas Wh

Movement does) (v) The failure of QR to bleed binding condition C (32c) (whereas Wh Movement

does) (vi) The determination of weak crossover violations in Reconstructed Structure

(38)

Problems like these are typically solved in the GB model by assigning modules to levels. But this kind of solution operates strictly on a case-by-case basis, yielding no general description of the "character" of the levels involved.

I have proposed a different model-a model with two levels, NP-Structure and S- Structure-and have sought to rationalize the assignment of modules to levels in the following way: those that govern A-to-A relations (such as the binding theory) hold of NP-Structure, and those that govern A-to-A relations (such as quantification and the licensing of parasitic gaps) hold of S-Structure. This division of labor accounts for the above facts.




This kind of account is not possible in the GB model, primarily because LF (and for that matter S-Structure) is a mixed bag, representing both A-to-A relations (subsequent to Reconstruction) and A-to-A relations (subsequent to QR). It is for this reason that it is necessary to dissolve LF and reassign its functions to the levels of S-Structure and NP-Structure.

The relation of the two models cannot be described as a simple relabeling of levels. Rather, it is more complex, as figure 1 illustrates.

GB Model Reduced VR&W Model

Reconstructed Structure

D-Structure Binding Theory Structure

Logically Interpreted Structure NP-Structure

S-Structure Quantification Structure S-Structure

0-Structure

LF Wh-Structure

NP-Trace Structure

Figure 1 Relation between GB model and reduced VR&W model

3. What Is NP-Structure?

In section 2 we assigned a number of functions (basically all the licensing of A-positions) to NP-Structure, but we have not yet determined how NP-Structure is either constituted or derived. These questions are not as simple as was assumed in VR&W.

3.1. What Is Reconstruction?

VR&W defined NP-Structure to be the output of NP Movement and the input to Wh Movement. There and here it has been viewed as the site at which reconstruction-type problems are solved. But these two criteria do not define exactly the same level. The set of structures defined as the input to Wh Movement is not the full range of Recon- structed structures that is needed. For example, Higgins (1972) has shown that the pseudocleft construction is not derived by movement from the trace position to the focus position, yet reconstruction effects (what Higgins calls "syntactic connectedness" effects) hold between these two positions:



284 EDWIN WILLIAMS

(49) a. What John saw t was himself I I

trace focus b. John saw what was himself c. John saw himself

The NP-Structure representation of (49a) is (49b), not a structure to which the binding theory can appropriately apply. Instead, we need (49c), but this is not the "input to Wh Movement."

In this section I will offer a redefinition of NP-Structure and a new view of its relation to S-Structure. These remarks are tentative, and they are best viewed as an effort to set boundary conditions on the correct answer to the questions posed here.

First let us inventory the cases to which Reconstruction must apply (in GB theory, say). There seem to be three central cases:

(50) a. [Comp S] (where S contains a trace of the item in Comp) Which picture of himself did [George want t]

b. [N' S'] (where S' is a relative) the [picture of himself] [that George wants t]

c. NP be [. . . S'] (where S' is a relative) This picture of himself is the picture George likes t best

Only the first case, (50a), is handled by "Reconstruction" as it is ordinarily understood: undoing Wh Movement. Arriving at the correct Reconstructed structures for (50b) and (50c) involves more than undoing Wh Movement. In (SOb) it involves moving the N' head of the NP down into the trace of the relative. In (50c) it involves moving the precopular NP into the trace in the relative of the postcopular NP.

In Williams (1982) it was proposed that the reconstruction relation-Higgins's "syntactic connectedness"- holds asymmetrically between subject and predicate in the following way: the predicate may contain binders for items contained in the subject. Re- construction, then, is a kind of lambda conversion-the subject is put into the predicate.

The last two cases of Reconstruction do look like lambda conversion. In (SOb), for example, the relative is a predicate and the N' is its "subject," in some extended sense of subject and predicate, and Reconstruction consists of putting the subject in the position of the trace by virtue of which the predicate is a predicate. (SOc) can be viewed in this way as well. With liberal coindexing, such as I have suggested elsewhere, we might represent (SOb) and (50c) as follows:

(51) a. The [picture of himselflN, [that George likes tjs, b. This [picture of himself]N, is [the one that George likes ti best]SJ NPi

In this case, Reconstruction consists simply of substituting an item coindexed with a trace for that trace, whether or not that trace arose from the movement of that item.

There is a sense in which even (SOa) is a case of lambda conversion, according to




the theory of scope mentioned earlier. Recall that S itself has marked on it the scope of the item in Comp:

(52) [Which picture of himself] did [George want t]s:i

Given this representation, we may regard the item in Comp as a "subject" and the S that follows it as a predicate (with the :i serving as abstractor). This extended notion of subject is explored in Pustejovsky (1984).

To sum up, then, Reconstruction is the substitution of an item for a trace coindexed with it or, equivalently, some kind of lambda conversion.

3.2. What Is NP-Structure?

There are three reasons not to identify Reconstructed Structure with the input to Wh Movement.

First, as we have seen in (50), two of the three positions from which items must be moved by Reconstruction are not targets of Wh Movement: N' and the precopular NP. Although Vergnaud (1974) has proposed a rule of Head Raising to cover (SOb), this presumably will not extend to (50c) and so is not sufficiently general.

Second, some sentences could involve reconstructing as many as three different items into the same trace:

(53) [That picture of himself] is the [picture of himself] which Bill likes t best

Here, the precopular NP, the N', and the which in Comp must presumably all reconstruct into the t of the relative. No known or imagined mechanism of Wh Movement combined with Head Raising could effect this.

Third, parasitic gaps, which do not arise from Wh Movement, must be reconstructed into:

(54) Whose book did Mary read before he filed t

Here, whose does not bind the trace, so disjointness from he must be determined in a structure in which Reconstruction puts whose book in the position of the trace.

These reasons are sufficient to show that Reconstructed Structure is not the structure prior to Wh Movement. In fact, (53) shows that it cannot be a well-defined structure at all: the grammaticality of (53) can be determined only with reference to a pair of Re- constructed structures, one in which the precopular NP is reconstructed into the position of the trace, and another where the N' is reconstructed into the position of the trace.

We must then define NP-Structure (qua Reconstructed Structure) as a set of structures:

(55) NP-Structure is the set of all structures derived from S-Structure by the lambda conversions described earlier.

The binding theory must be rewritten accordingly:



286 EDWIN WILLIAMS

(56) Binding Theory A. An anaphor must be bound in its governing category in some member of

the NP-Structure. etc.

We must also allow "null" lambda conversion to define a member of NP-Structure, since anaphors can be bound "in situ" (Jackendoff (1972)):

(57) John knows which picture of himself Mary likes t

This picture of NP-Structure turns everything upside down, and undoes the answers to more questions than it answers. We know what NP-Structure is qua Reconstructed Structure, but now what is S-Structure? It is certainly not derived from NP-Structure by Wh Movement. And what is NP Movement? It certainly does not derive NP-Structure from D-Structure.

The last point deserves further comment. Elsewhere (Williams (1984)) I have written that NP-trace is best viewed as not arising through movement, its distribution being adequately constrained by 0-theory and predication theory. Certain pseudocleft con- structions seem to bear this out:

(58) a. What John is is [certain t to leave] b. What John might do is [appear t to leave]

What is the D-Structure representation to which NP Movement could have applied to derive these examples? There would appear to be none, since these are exactly the cases in which Reconstruction is not simply the inverse of Wh Movement. On the other hand, these traces can be regarded as anaphors bound under Reconstruction as described earlier (or, as described in Williams (1984), bound by the containing predicates in focus position). This example simply shows how widely the reconstruction problem infects the rest of the grammar.

3.3. N' Reconstruction

The reconstruction of the head of a relative into the relative is unlike the other two cases in (50) because it is reconstruction of a nonmaximal category, the N'. It can be shown that reconstruction effects hold only for the N', and not for the determiner position. So, for example, although (59a,b) are possible, (59c) is not:

(59) a. We saw each other's pictures b. I saw the pictures of each other that John and Mary took c. *1 saw each other's pictures that John and Mary took

The determiner position is involved in the reconstruction in the other two cases:

(60) a. Mary, each other's pictures of whom Bill and Mary admire, . (Comp S)




b. The pictures Bill and Mary admire most are each other's pictures (precopular NP)

Similarly for bound pronouns:

(61) a. *1 can't imagine his memory that every soldier treasures most (N' S')

b. The Queen, his memory of whom every soldier treasures most,... (Comp S)

c. His memory of the Queen is the memory that each soldier treasures most (precopular NP)

Thus, these cases show that it really is some notion of "subject of' a lambda-abstracted S that is relevant for reconstruction, and not some other possible notions.

3.4. Reconstruction without NP-Structure

There are several proposals in the literature that achieve reconstruction effects without Reconstruction or NP-Structure. They have in common building the A-binding relation into the licensing of A-relations.

Higginbotham (1983), for example, determines the circumstances under which a pronoun can be bound by means of V-chains in LF (pp. 409-41 1):

(62) a. A V-chain is a sequence {v1,vi, . . . ,vn such that each vi is contained in the binder of vi+, .

b. A pronoun dependent on v1 must be c-commanded by v,.

Given (62a,b), we can see that the binding in (63a) (= Higginbotham's (65)) is not licit:

(63) a. Which biography of which artist do you think he wants to read b. Which artisti [[which biography of ti] [do you think hei wants to read tj]]

In the LF representation of (63a), he is bound by the variable t, but it is not c-commanded by tj, whose binder contains the variable ti. Therefore, we get the effect of reconstruction for the Bound Pronoun Rule, without having to perform the Reconstruction operation, which would derive (64):

(64) You think he wants to read which biography of which artist

The limitation of Higginbotham's reconstruction mechanism is that it is concerned solely with bound anaphors dependent on variables. As we have seen, however, reconstruction effects are not limited to this kind of case. Anaphors contained in displaced constituents, for example, show reconstruction effects:

(65) Which picture of himself does George like t

Here, it is not the antecedent that has been displaced, it is the pronoun (himself). We might extend Higginbotham's technique to these cases in various ways. Hornstein (1984)



288 EDWIN WILLIAMS

has proposed one such extension (see below). For the moment, it is sufficient to note that Higginbotham's proposal will handle only a certain type of reconstruction effect.

May's (1985) proposal is similar to Higginbotham's in that it too is limited to the "'strong crossover" reconstruction effects, where an antecedent has been moved over a pronoun. May's proposal for cases like (63) is that locally A-bound pronouns and traces alike generate paths to their binders; these paths must obey Pesetsky's Path Containment Condition, which examples like (63) will not do. Thus, the reconstruction effects are achieved without literal Reconstruction. As with Higginbotham's theory, though, this explanation is limited to the strong crossover cases and does not extend to cases like (65).

Hornstein's (1984) proposal, on the other hand, covers cases like (65), but not cases like (63):

(66) A reflexive may be indexed with an NP if the NP c-commands the reflexive, or c-commands the trace of a phrase that A-binds the trace and contains the reflexive.

Such a rule will allow reflexive binding in (65) without literal Reconstruction. The limitation of (66) is this: not only does it not handle the strong crossover cases

like (63); it does not handle the other binding theory cases either, in particular those subject to binding condition B:

(67) Him, John doesn't like t

It is important to realize that (67) violates condition B. One might think that (67) is ruled out by condition C, since him c-commands John in S-Structure. However, the binding theory holds only between pairs of A-positions, and the pronoun is in an A-position. Alternatively, one might think that (67) is barred because condition C holds between John and t; and since him binds the trace, transitivity prevents John from binding him. Two kinds of examples weigh against this idea:

(68) a. Himselfi, Johni doesn't like t b. Himi, Johni thinks that Mary likes t

In both cases the binding of the pronoun is possible, despite the fact that John c-commands the trace that the pronoun binds. These examples thus indicate that binding condition C does not hold between John and the trace (of course, as outlined above, I agree with Reinhart that there is no binding condition C in formal grammar).

Condition B might be stated in Hornstein's terms as follows:

(69) A pronoun must be free both in its governing category and in the governing category of a trace that it A-binds.

(69) must be modified somewhat, for in (70) the pronoun binds no trace (the PP that contains it does), yet condition B holds between the pronoun and John:

(70) Of him John spoke t




The modification required is given in (71):

(71) A pronoun must be free both in its governing category and in the governing category of a trace that is A-bound by a phrase that contains the pronoun.

There are two problems with (71), one factual and one conceptual. The factual problem is posed by examples like (72):

(72) Mary's pictures of him Bill likes t

(71) would rule out (72); but the binding in (72) surely should be allowed by condition B.

The conceptual problem is related: the resemblance between condition B here and Hornstein's condition A suggests that the "Reconstruction" mechanism should be shoved "upstairs" in the hierarchy of definitions that support the binding theory. Belletti and Rizzi (1981) and Roberts (1984) have developed theories of this kind. Suppose for example that Reconstruction is made a part of the definition of "c-command," in the following way:

(73) X c-commands* Y iff X c-commands Y or the trace of a phrase that contains Y.

If "bound*" and "free*" are in turn defined in terms of "c-commands*'` rather than in terms of "c-commands," then both the conceptual and the empirical problems dis- appear; the binding theory can now be stated as follows:

(74) Binding Theory A. An anaphor must be bound* in its minimal governing category. B. A pronoun must be free* in its minimal governing category.

Furthermore, (72) will be correctly treated. The binding theory as stated in (74) will also account correctly for the strong cross-

over cases, again without Reconstruction:

(75) Which picture of which man did he like t

Here, he c-commands* which man, so binding is barred. This last effort, the definition of c-command*, is the most successful at handling

the weak crossover effects without literal Reconstruction. Its status with respect to the A/A division of labor is uncertain. If only the A/A relations were defined in terms of c-command*, and the A/A relations were defined in terms of simple c-command, or not in terms of c-command at all, then the division of labor would follow-only A/A relations would show reconstruction effects.

It remains to extend c-command* to the cases that do not involve direct trace binding, namely (50b,c):

(50) b. [N' S'] (where S' is a relative) The [picture of himself] [that George wants t]



290 EDWIN WILLIAMS

c. NP be [. . . S'] (where S' is a relative) This picture of himself is the picture George likes t best

We might define "binds*" to include binding of a relative trace by (a) the head of a relative and (b) a precopular NP, and then define "c-commands*" in terms of "binds*." "Binds*" could be viewed as being defined in terms of the notion "subject of' in the general sense alluded to in connection with (50) or in Williams (1982) and Pustejovsky (1984).

Such a theory I think is indistinguishable from the NP-Structure or Reconstruction account of A-binding.

4. Conclusion

The overall model of grammar that emerges could look something like the model shown in figure 2. NP-Structure is derived from S-Structure, and S-Structure is derived from

Wh Movement

SA

S-Structure NP- Structure

Reconstruction

Figure 2 The Reduced Model

NP-Structure. This verges on circularity, but it falls short of that if we regard S- and NP-Structure to be base-generated and consider a sentence to be a pair {S-Structure, NP-Structure}, the first derivable from the second by Wh Movement, the second from the first by Reconstruction.

Obviously, Wh Movement is not defined for the NP-Structure representations that we have posited in the last section, since those structures are sets of trees. However, I think that the following definition will do:

(76) S-Structure representation SS "is derivable from" NP-Structure representation NPS iff there is a member of NPS from which SS is derivable in the usual sense.

This model allows a simple implementation of the division of labor discussed in this article: NP-Structure regulates A-to-A relations, and S-Structure regulates A-to-A relations. Semantic interpretation must be a function of both levels, unless the relations of one level are also encoded in the other.

We might simplify the model further, by collapsing NP-Structure and S-Structure.




In that case, we will instantiate the A/A division of labor by restricting c-command* to the A-binding system.

In neither case does a level of LF distinct from S-Structure play a role.

Appendix 1: Pesetsky's (1985) Argument for LF

Pesetsky's (1985) argument for LF Movement is a "fcluster of properties" type of argument: there is a cluster of properties connected with movement; the interpretation of (some cases of) wh-in-situ shows these properties; therefore, (some cases of) wh-in-situ are moved in LF. The evidence comes from a variety of languages: English, Japanese, and Polish.

The clustering properties are these:

(77) a. Non-d-linking, Superiority effects, Subjacency effects (movement, at LF)

b. D-linking, lack of Superiority effects, lack of Subjacency effects (no movement)

D-linking is the property that distinguishes which from what: which presupposes a narrow bound on the possible answers known to speaker and hearer, whereas what does not.

Of course, showing that two sets of opposed properties cluster shows only that some properties correlate; the further step of identifying one set as properties of movement and the other as properties of lack of movement cannot be justified on these grounds alone. But if we antecedently know that certain of the properties hold of S-Structure movement, and we find that they hold of certain LF relations as well, then we may conclude that those LF relations are also instances of movement. This is the gist of Pesetsky's argument.

Pesetsky first establishes that non-d-linked wh-in-situ shows Superiority effects in English, whereas d-linked wh-in-situ does not:

(78) a. *What did who see b. What did which man see

Since Superiority effects are already known to hold for S-Structure movement, it is reasonable to conciude that

(79) In English, a. d-linked wh-in-situ is moved in LF; b. non-d-linked wh-in-situ is not (necessarily) moved in LF.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that S-Structure wh in Polish looks much like wh-in-situ in English:



292 EDWIN WILLIAMS

(80) In Polish, a. d-linked wh is moved in S-Structure; b. non-d-linked wh is not necessarily moved in S-Structure.

I have given the argument in its most compact, striking form: it looks like the posited English LF representations are nothing more exotic than Polish S-Structure representations and that perhaps English and Polish differ by a parameter having to do with S-Structure versus LF. However, I believe that when the necessary unpacking is done to determine what is universal and what is particular in these descriptions ((79) and (80)), the point is somewhat more elusive.

First, if d-linking (and, consequently, non-d-linking) is to be a property of items determined at any particular level, then the determination must be made in a very particular way. In English S-Structure representations, for example, not all d-linked items are in A-positions, nor are all non-d-linked items in A-positions:

(81) a. Who saw what (unmoved non-d-linked what) b. Which man did you see (moved d-linked which man)

In LF, there is again no correlation between d-linking and appearance in A-positions because Wh Movement indiscriminately moves both. The most that can be said is this:

(82) In English, in LF, only d-linked wh's appear in A-positions.

Polish can be made to appear quite parallel to English:

(83) In Polish, in S-Structure, only d-linked wh's appear in A-positions.

Consequently, we might propose the following universal parameterized law, calling it the D-Linking (DL) Parameter.

(84) D-Linking Parameter In X-Structure, only d-linked wh's appear in A-positions.

Japanese now fits into the picture in the following way: Japanese has no S-Structure movement; LF construal of d-linked phrases is not subjacently bound; and LF construal of non-d-linked (d-free) phrases is subjacently bound. Pesetsky concludes that Japanese LF is derived by LF Movement of d-free wh and by interpretation of d-linked wh.

If we admit + S-Structure movement (SSM) as a parameter in addition to the DL Parameter, we get the following array:

(85) DL = S-Structure DL = LF

+ SSM Polish English - SSM Japanese

The one cell unfilled in this array is impossible-it represents the situation in which the restriction against d-free wh is imposed on S-Structure, but there is no S-Structure move-




ment. (It is not literally impossible, but it is impossible in any language that is to have any d-free wh at all.) So a satisfyingly symmetrical picture emerges from these two parameters.

If the position taken in the body of this article is to survive in the face of such a result, we must now answer the question, How crucial is the distinction between LF Movement and LF interpretation to the account? It seems very necessary, for two reasons. First, some distinction needs to be drawn between the two kinds of LF cases, the d-free cases that give rise to Subjacency violations and Superiority effects, and the d-linked ones that do not. Second, the particular choice of movement/nonmovement for this distinction is quite natural, because on the surface of some languages (Polish) the two kinds are indeed distinguished by movement. How much of this can be salvaged in a theory without LF Movement?

A theory without LF Movement will nevertheless need some means of interpreting unmoved wh. Let us suppose that that means is scope assignment-the unmoved wh-word is assigned some S as its scope in S-Structure:

(86) [. . . whi . .]s-- [. . . whi . . si

If a clause contains two wh's, they will both be assigned scope (possibly the same):

(87) Who saw what -> Whoi [ti saw whatj]s:ij

The binder of t and what is the index ij on the S that is the scope of these two. That is how multiple questions are interpreted.

Japanese will then be a language in which the scope assignment of d-linked wh does not obey Subjacency, and the scope assignment of d-free wh does; this distinction must be made in this theory without recourse to movement/nonmovement. Is this an ad hoc description of Japanese?

Apparently not, if one considers Romanian, in which wh-words pattern just as they do in Japanese, except that they are moved in S-Structure. In Romanian, all wh's must be moved in S-Structure; the surprising feature of this language is that d-free wh obeys Subjacency, whereas d-linked wh does not, as shown in Comorovski (1986). This means that even where overt S-Structure movement applies to all wh's, the d-linked and d-free wh's still sort out the same way, so that movement/nonmovement cannot be the right account of this distinction universally.

We will now construct a parameterized space of languages analogous to (85) in the theory without LF Movement.

Recall that natural languages have two kinds of quantification structures at their disposal:

(88) a. [Q N] [. . . ti . .]s:i (adjunction schema) b. [. . . [Q N']i . . .]s:i (in-situ schema)

Both of these are S-Structure schemas for quantification. The choice of schema is a parameter in the description of types of quantifiers. Along this parameter the languages



294 EDWIN WILLIAMS

divide as follows:

(89) Language Types of wh-phrases subject to

Adjunction schema In-situ schema

English all all Polish d-free d-linked Romanian all Japanese all

Certain possibilities are ruled out a priori-namely, those possibilities where one or another type of wh would be subject to no schema and consequently could never be interpreted.

One unattested possibility is not ruled out a priori-namely, the possibility of a language with only d-linked wh in the adjunction position and only d-free wh in the in- situ position (in other words, the exact opposite of Polish). Should such a possibility be allowed? I doubt that such a language exists, but I am not certain that a formal explanation should be sought. An analogous hypothetical situation would be that of a language that for example used heavy stress to mark anaphoric pronouns and stress reduction to mark nonanaphoric deictic pronouns (the opposite of English), or that used overt pronouns for bound variables and zero-pronouns for referential pronouns (the opposite of Japa- nese). Although such languages are formally conceivable, they strike us as odd, because there seems to be some weak intrinsic content to the signaling devices: lack of stress is weakly connected with anaphoricity, and zero-pronouns are weakly connected with binding. Likewise, it seems to me that the in-situ position weakly favors referentiality, and the adjunction position weakly favors d-freedom, so it is peculiar for a language to make exactly opposite assignments. However, any possibility other than an exactly opposite assignment is tolerated.

These last considerations must arise in any theory attempting to account for this domain of facts. They arise in Pesetsky's theory when one asks why it is d-free pronouns that are moved in LF, and d-linked ones that are not. The connection is both arbitrary and imperfect. It is arbitrary because there is no reason a priori that d-linking should be connected with nonmovement rather than with movement. It is imperfect because it does not extend to S-Structure movement, where all possibilities are attested: all wh-phrases move (Polish); some move (Polish, English); none move (Japanese).

Now, how does Subjacency fit into the picture? Because of Romanian, in which some cases of movement obey Subjacency and some do not, we want to say that Sub- jacency is not a feature of movement (in the present theory, this means that it is not a necessary feature of the adjunction schema (88a)). Furthermore, we find that in Japanese some in-situ cases obey it and others do not. These facts force us to acknowledge again a space of the following kind:




(90) Types of wh-phrases that obey Subjacency

Language Adjunction schema In-situ schema

English all none Polish all all Japanese d-linked Romanian d-free

This kind of parameterization gives up the connection that Pesetsky's theory makes between d-linking and lack of Subjacency, through movement. But it gives it up because cases like Romanian make it impossible to maintain.

In fact, other features of Romanian make the kind of connection Pesetsky seeks to establish even more implausible. Pesetsky attempts to make the connection between the property of d-linking and certain other properties via "absence of movement." One of those properties is the failure of d-linked wh to produce Superiority violations, resulting in the following contrast:

F*who (91) Who did who } see

Lwhich person

This follows if Superiority obtains only when the in-situ wh moves in LF, and furthermore, only if d-free wh moves. The alternative account is one in which the failure of d-free wh to give rise to Superiority violations is attributed directly to its d-freedom, not to its not moving.

Other features of Romanian suggest that this alternative is correct. In Romanian, recall that all wh's move, d-linked and d-free alike (though only the latter is constrained by Subjacency). Comorovski (1986) points out that d-linked wh's differ from d-free wh's in other ways as well: only d-linked wh's can be clitic doubled, and only d-free wh's give rise to weak crossover violations. Since all wh's move, neither difference can be attributed to a movement/nonmovement distinction. Instead, they must both be attributed directly to the d-linked/d-free distinction.

But it is quite natural to attribute these properties directly to the d-linkedness itself, since d-linked wh's are relatively "referential," as Comorovski puts it, and since ordinary non-wh referential NPs have exactly the same properties: they can be clitic doubled, and they do not give rise to weak crossover violations. Since we already know that Subjacency in Romanian must be keyed directly to the d-linked/d-free distinction, it appears that a sizable portion of the "cluster of properties" that defines movement (Subjacency, weak crossover violations) must be divorced from movement and instead attributed directly to d-freedom.

It remains to determine whether the Superiority Condition has anything to do with movement per se, it being the last property associated strictly with movement. The alternative, of course, is that Superiority itself is also keyed directly to the d-linked/



296 EDWIN WILLIAMS

d-free distinction, a distinction independent of movement. It is impossible to consult Romanian on this point, since it has no wh-in-situ. The Romanian example is instruc- tive, though, when we consider why it is the d-linked wh's that fail to give Superiority violations. Again, the answer may be their relatively "referential" nature-after all, referential NPs in general do not give rise to Superiority violations. If this is correct, then there remain no properties that are connected in a fixed way with movement, in LF or in S-Structure, and thus there remains no compelling argument for LF Movement.

Appendix 2: May's (1985) Argument for LF

May's (1985) argument for LF is especially intriguing, since it is based not on the analogy between the trace of QR and the trace of wh, as all the other arguments have been, but on an analogy between the position of the QRed NP and the position of Wh-Moved NPs. The facts in question are the ambiguity of (92a) and the lack of ambiguity of (92b):

(92) a. What did everyone buy t for Max b. Who t bought everything for Max

In (92a) either what or everyone can take wide scope, with a corresponding difference in the answers that are possible. If what takes wide scope, then the answers are simple: for example, "The book." But if everyone takes wide scope, then in effect we have a multiplicity of questions, and the answers must be multiple as well: for example, "Mary bought Max the book, Harry bought Max the car, etc." In (92b), on the other hand, who must take wide scope, so there is no "multiplicity of questions" interpretation.

May (1985) explores why wide scope is possible for the universal in (92a) but not in (92b). If QR applies freely, we derive the representations (93a-b) for (92a) and the representations (94a-c) for (92b):

(93) a. Whati [everyonej [tj buy ti for Max]s]s b. Everyonej [whati [tj buy ti for Max]s]s'

(94) a. Whoj [everythingi [tj buy ti for Max]s]s b. Everythingi [whoj [tj buy t1 for Max]s]s c. Whoj [tj [everythingi [buy t, for Max]s]s

May accounts for the facts as follows. (93b) is ruled out, because QR is allowed to adjoin only to S, not to S'. On the other hand, as a result of May's Scope Principle, which says that when two quantifiers are adjacent in LF, they are freely interpreted in either order, (93a) actually represents both the narrow-scope and the wide-scope readings of (92a). In other words, (92a) is ambiguous because of the Scope Principle, not because QR assigns different scopes. Now, why is (92b) not ambiguous? By the Scope Principle both (94a) and (94b) would be ambiguous, but both are ruled out. (94a) is ruled out because the subject trace is not properly governed (everything intervenes between the trace and its proper governor who). (94b) is ruled out for the same reason as (93b): QR cannot




adjoin to S'. This leaves (94c), which is uniquely the narrow-scope reading for the universal.

The important part of the argument for LF is the account of (94a)-it is the actual intervention of the quantifier phrase in LF between the trace and the wh-word that prevents this representation.4 Clearly, this account is indissolubly tied to LF Movement.

I would now like to raise some doubts about whether the phenomenon under discussion actually involves quantification. I want to suggest that in the examples in which everybody seems to have wide scope, it is really not interpreted as a quantifier.

The quantified NPs that are implicated in May's paradigm are quite limited in character-essentially, unstressed occurrences of the words everybody and everyone. Even such NPs as every girl are not given wide-scope interpretation in subject position:

(95) Who did every girl dance with t

On the other hand, nonquantificational NPs in a variety of positions appear to show the same ambiguity that everyone shows in subject position:

(96) a. Who did they dance with t b. Who t danced with them

Both (96a) and (96b) seem open to the multiple-question type of answer; that is, either could be answered with "John danced with Mary, Sam danced with Sue, etc." It would appear that any NP that refers to a group can give rise to a multiple-question interpretation.

Now, what about the asymmetry that May observes? My suggestion is that everybody and everyone can be given a nonquantificational "group" interpretation when ap- pearing in subject position. This would explain why the multiple-question interpretation is available with these quantifiers, and why it is limited to subject position.

There is further evidence that everyone can receive a "group" interpretation. Each other requires a "group" antecedent, as the peculiarity of the following example attests:

(97) *Every girl likes each other here

However, with everybody the result is much better:

(98) Everybody likes each other here

But this is because everybody, but not every girl, is subject to a nonquantificational group interpretation. (98) is slightly odd, no doubt because everybody is singular and each other likes a plural antecedent; but the difference between (97) and (98) is sufficient, I think, to warrant the conclusion I have drawn.

One of the reasons I find May's account of his paradigm in terms of scope suspect is that for bisentential cases, it requires assigning wider scope to everybody than that

' May also supplies a path-theoretic account of these facts; the objections to the account just outlined will hold against the path-theoretic account as well.



298 EDWIN WILLIAMS

quantifier can normally take:

(99) Who do you think [everyone saw t at the rally] (example (36a), chapter 2)

Here, to get the intended interpretation, everyone must be assigned scope in the matrix; but ordinarily this is not available for everyone:

(100) Someone thinks that everyone saw you at the rally

The interpretation in which everyone has scope over someone is basically unavailable in (100), but structurally this is the same as its scope in (99). This indicates that scope assignment is not the correct means of deriving the multiple-question interpretation. The scope of every as a quantifier seems to be limited to the S that immediately dominates it.

This is not to say that the wide-scope interpretation with respect to wh is not possible with quantifiers at all. Each seems to take wide scope with respect to wh in the following case:

(101) Who did each boy dance with t

But each seems to take wide scope in both subject and object position and thus does not manifest the asymmetry that May observes:

(102) Who t danced with each boy

Since no asymmetry is observed and the argument is based on the asymmetry, no argument for movement lies here. We may simply say that each can have wide scope with respect to wh.

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Department of Linguistics South College University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003



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A Reassignment of the Functions of LF