at least the center portion of the tent; the sidewallsof which were usually, despite the stove, rimedwith frost.

General practice was one warming tent per pla-toon, even rifle platoons. This was possible withinthe perimeters. Marines were cycled through thetents in relays as frequently as the situation wouldpermit, usually not more than six at a time nor forlonger than 20 minutes. They were not a place tosleep. Exact practices varied with location and unit.The warming tents had odd psychological effects.The canvas sidewalls seemed to shut off the war,offering a non-existent protection. Too manyMarines could not be clustered together at onetime in a tent that might be hit by a mortar shell ormachine gun fire. One common practice was tohave a communal pot—one company headquar-ters, as its most prized possession, had a stainlesssteel pail it used as such, rescued months beforefrom a hospital in Seoul—filled with stew or "slum"constantly simmering on the stove. A Marine,entering the tent, would take his share of the heat-ed slum and then replace it with the contents of oneof his C-ration cans. A favorite condiment to makethe stew palatable was Tabasco red-pepper sauce,a bottle of which always seemed to materialize.Short sections of wood were often nailed as crosstrees to the tent pole as a drying place for sweat-soaked socks and felt shoe-pac liners.

On the march there was some attempt, not verysuccessful, at having warming tents as way sta-tions. Within the perimeters other tents, protectedwith sandbags, were designated as commandposts, usual for regiment and battalion and some-times, but not often, at the company level. Eachperimeter had a field hospital of sorts, using a con-venient schoolhouse or some such building. A bat-talion surgeon might have a cluster of tents, andthere was such a thing as a hospital tent, consider-ably larger than the pyramidal tent. Company-levelcorpsmen often had a pyramidal tent to use as a sickbay for a few sick, lightly wounded, or exhaustedMarines, and as a place to stash their stretchersand medical supplies. Life-saving plasma neededwarmth in order to flow. Corpsmen working in thefield during a firefight commonly carried morphineSyrettes in their mouths to keep them warmenough for injection.

Elimination of body waste was an unendingproblem. Within the defensive perimeters atYudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni

33

there were certain niceties of expeditionary plumb-ing available to the headquarters, artillery, and ser-vice units if not to the infantry. Packing tubes frommortar and artillery shells provided alfresco urinals."Four-holers," collapsible plywood "heads" or"shitters," reportedly a Marine Corps invention dat-ing back to the Banana War days, were set up inwarming tents. These conveniences, almost never athand for the rifle units, were not available to any-one on the march out. A much-repeated dark jokeinvolved the problem of finding one's cold-shriveledpenis through the many layers of clothing. Urinefroze immediately on hitting the cold ground.Defecation was such a difficult procedure thatsome Marines simply stopped defecating. Later bat-talion surgeons and company hospital corpsmenwould have to contend with impacted colons.

By the time the Marines, after their rehabilitationat Masan, began to move north at the beginning of1951, some things had gotten better. A smallmountain-type gasoline camp stove, about the sizeand shape of a quart oilcan, was issued on thebasis of one stove to every four Marines. It largelysolved the task of heating C-rations and at thesame time produced boiling water for soluble cof-fee or cocoa. Inflatable rubber mattresses, to be usedas insulation under the much-treasured sleepingbags, also began to appear. They worked best ona canvas cot, but riflemen seldom had the luxury ofa cot even when in reserve. Not until the next year,however, would a thermal "Mickey Mouse" bootreplace the hated shoe-pac.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the MarineCorps sought a cold-weather training site inCalifornia. Big Bear was tried, but serious trainingdid not mix with a ski resort. General Smith, afterarriving at Camp Pendleton in May 1951 to be thebase commander, took an active personal interest infinding a suitable location. Reconnaissance partieswere sent out and by late summer a site was found450 miles north of Camp Pendleton in the ToiyabeNational Forest in the High Sierras. With a valleyfloor at 6,800 feet, elevations went up to more than11,000 feet. Weather records promised winter tem-peratures of 20 below zero and 20 feet of snow.Marines called it "Pickle" Meadow, but it was real-ly Pickel Meadow, named for Frank Pickel, a trap-per who had built a cabin there in the 1860s. By fall1951 all replacement drafts and other units headedfor Korea would have a week's in-the-field trainingat Pickel Meadow.

(Continued from page 25)Day 1950 was marked in X Corps bythe landing at Wonsan of the 15thInfantry, largely schools troopsfrom Fort Benning. The regiment,under Colonel Dennis M. "Dinty"Moore, was to relieve Puller's 1stMarines in and around Wonsan.Almond was not pleased to learnthat the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry,was a "Negro" unit and therefore, inhis mind, not completely trustwor-thy. The 3d Division's third andlast regiment, the 7th Infantry,commanded by Colonel John S.Guthrie, came from Fort Devens,Massachusetts, by way of Japanand would disembark at Wonsanon 17 November.

Almond celebrated ArmisticeDay with an order at midnight call-ing for an advance to the border, the

ROK I Corps on the right, the 7thInfantry Division in the center, andthe 1st Marine Division on the left.The Marines were allotted a 40-mile stretch along the Yalu as theirultimate objective. That same dayMacArthur indirectly orderedAlmond, by way of a personal let-ter from his G-3, Major GeneralEdwin K. "Pinky" Wright, to doeverything he could to assist theEighth Army in its drive to theYalu.

Almond had his staff prepare ananalysis of the Eighth Army's situa-tion. It credited Walker with having120,000 troops with which tooppose 100,000 of the enemy andhaving the advantages of airsupremacy and superior artillerysupport. Almond's study concludedthat the severing of the enemy's

MSR at Mupyong-ni by X Corpswould greatly assist Eighth Army'sadvance. Almond, in his reply toWright on 14 November, proposedthat he attack north and then westto link-up with the Eighth Army.

Peng Dehuai's chief of staff, XieFang, at about this time made hisown assessment of the situation:

Our 9th Army Group mainforces have successivelyentered Korea from J'ian andLinjiang to assume easternfront operations. . . . We haveover 150,000 men on the east-ern front, the enemy over90,000, giving us a 1.66 advan-tage over him. We have250,000 men on the westernfront, the enemy 130,000, givingus a 1.75 advantage over him.Our forces are superior on theeastern and western fronts.

34

On 16 November, Xie Fangreported: "Our forces on the easternfront abandoned Hwangch'o[Funchilin] Pass on the 7th. On the10th. . . the enemy on the easternfront continued advancing north-ward along three separate routes:From Hwangch'o Pass, P'unsan[Pungsanl, and Myongchon. . . stillfar from our pre-selected killingzones,"

Meanwhile, in a division orderdated 13 November, Smith directedRCT-1 to take Huksu-ri, RCT-7 toseize Hagaru-ri and on orderadvance on Yudam-ni, and RCT-5to protect the MSR from positions atMajon-dong, Chinhung-ni, andKoto-ri, and to be prepared to passthrough RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri andadvance to Changjin 40 miles to thenorth.

Members qf the 7th Marines "answer up" at a mail call at Koto-ri on 15November. A large amount of mail had accumulated, some of it intended forChristmas. Airmail arrived in a prompt jive or six days packages could take fiveto six weeks or longer. The tall Marine with a letter in his hand is carrying a car-bine a weapon that would prove worthless in the cold weather ahead.

Photo by cp L. B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4632

--

The road leading north fromKoto-ri to Hagaru-ri followed avalley formed by the ChangjinRiver. As Litzenberg's Marinesmoved on toward Hagaru-ri, 11miles north of Koto-ri and at thesouthern tip of the ChosinReservoir, they could see parties ofChinese in the distance.

On 15 November Rear AdmiralAlbert K. Morehouse, chief of staffof U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, vis-ited Smith. Smith, feeling he wasspeaking within the naval family,outlined for Morehouse, to bepassed on to Vice Admiral C.Turner Joy, the Commander, NavalForces, Far East, his concern overwhat he considered Almond'sunrealistic planning and tendencyto ignore enemy capabilities.Smith may or may not have shownMorehouse a letter he had justdrafted to General Cates.

Alarmed at the prospect ofattacking simultaneously in twodifferent directions, Smith hadstepped out of the chain-of-com-mand to write a personal letter tothe Commandant of the MarineCorps. In it he said:

Someone in high authoritywill have to make up hismind as to what is our goal.My mission is still to advanceto the border. The EighthArmy, 80 miles to the south-west, will not attack until the20th. Manifestly, we shouldnot push on without regardto the Eighth Army. Wewould simply get further outon a limb. If the Eighth Armypush does not go, then thedecision will have to be madeas to what to do next. I

believe a winter campaign inthe mountains of North Koreais too much to ask of theAmerican soldier or marine,and I doubt the feasibility ofsupplying troops in this area

into the hills in any great number.

during the winter or providingfor the evacuation of sick andwounded.

In conclusion, Smith under-scored his concern over "theprospects of stringing out a Marinedivision along a single mountainroad for 120 air miles fromHamhung to the border."

Asked years later to commenton this extraordinary action bySmith, Almond said tartly: "Mygeneral comment is that GeneralSmith, ever since the beginning ofthe Inchon landing and the prepa-ration phase, was overly cautious ofexecuting any order that he everreceived."

In 1952, General Shepherd, bythen Commandant, would reportto the Secretary of the Navy: "Byorders of higher authority the divi-sion was placed in a situation,which, when the Chinese struck inforce on 28 November 1950,resulted in the division being ineffect deployed in column for a

35

distance of 35 miles within enemyterritory The wide separationof elements of the Tenth Corps ofwhich the First Marine Divisionwas a part, and the gap existingbetween the Tenth Corps and theEighth Army had permitted theChinese to flow around the FirstMarine Division preparatory to anall-out attack."

MacArthur, responding toAlmond's 15 November proposal,asked Almond for an alternateplan giving priority to taking offthe pressure confronting theEighth Army. Accordingly, Almondnow visualized an attack by the 1stMarine Division on the Hagaru-ri—Mupyong-ni axis with a regi-mental combat team from the 7thDivision protecting the division'sright flank by taking Changjin.This became the operative plan.Almond recognized that extrememinimum temperatures of from 30to 40 degrees below zero wouldseverely restrict both friendly andenemy operations.

Photo by cpi Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A4875Ma rifles found the 75mm recoilless rifle, shown here in action near Koto-ri in mid-Novembei of increasing use in the mountains. It gave them a direct-fire weaponof great accuracy and lethality. But the shells were heavy and difficult to lug up

were in the south. . . . And insome cases, on the roadbetween, I guess it was justbelow Hagaru-ri a ways,there was a power plant builtright into the side of themountain, and the road ranover a part of this thing. Veryeasy to blow it up, which wasdone, done twice as a matterof fact by the Chinese lateron.

While the commanders ex-changed proposals and plans, the7th Marines occupied Hagaru-ri on15 November. The nighttime tem-perature had dropped to fourdegrees below zero. Hagaru-ri wasa medium-sized town, fairly wellflattened by bombing. Just northof Hagaru-ri in the hamlet of Sasu-ri there was a sawmill and a greatdeal of fresh-cut lumber. Oncetents began to spring up, the townreminded at least one Marine offi-cer of an Alaskan gold camp withits mud-and-snow streets, its tents,and rough construction with rawlumber. General Craig visitedHagaru-ri and recommended it toSmith as a forward base.

By then RCT-5 had its 2dBattalion at Koto-ri, its 3dBattalion at Chinhung-ni—alongwith much of the remainder of thedivision—and its 1st Battalion atMajon-dong. As Murray, the regi-mental commander, remembered:

We'd been highly successfulin the south, and we had a lot

of this carry over as we wentnorth. There wasn't anybodyany better than we were, thatwas the general feeling in theregiment. . . the hills seemedto be a lot steeper than they

Smith again visited the Chosinplateau on 16 November, this timedriving up in a heated stationwagon. At Chinhung-ni he met, bycoincidence rather than design,Major General Field Harris, 55, thecommanding general of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. Harris hadflown as far as Chinhung-ni in ahelicopter and had planned to gothe rest of the way by open jeep.Smith offered him a ride in his sta-tion wagon. They drove comfort-ably to Hagaru-ri with Smith in arare burst of jocularity promising

Photo by TSgt J. W. Helms, Jr., Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A155763

A Marine squad trudges through the snow-encrusted streets ofHagaru-ri. The 7thMarines occupied the town on 15 November. By then the weather had turned cold.Weather records indicated that Hagaru-ri could be the coldest spot in North Korea.

A tent camp sprang up at Hagaru-ri. On 18 November there was time for a briefawards ceremony. ColHomerLitzenberg, right, and LtCol Raymond G. Davis, left,Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, congratulates Cpl Earle R. Seifert, whoreceived a Bronze Star, and SSgt Earle E. Payne, a Navy Commendation Ribbon,for earlier heroism.

Photo by cpl L. B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N- A4641

36

.r'.•Ii.'.— ,_

4/'I-'a

-t V

a-vi-

ii i t' I II

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-421479

VAdm C. Turner Joy, left, is greeted at Wonsan on 19 October by MajGen FieldHarris, commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Joy, asCommander, Naval Forces, Far East, was MacArthur's naval component com-mander. No direct command line linked Harris and the wing to 0. P. Smith andthe 1st Marine Division.

Harris a station wagon of his ownin exchange for continued closeair support.

Almond had asked Field Harris toreconnoiter Hagaru-ri for a site foran airstrip long enough to handletwo-engine transports. Smith andHarris walked the ground andfound a stretch just south of thetown that seemed suitable. "Thereis plenty of room, but the soil con-sists of a thick, black loam," Smithentered in his log. "If the groundfreezes it will probably be all rightfor a strip."

On 17 November Smith modi-fied his orders to his regimentalcombat teams. RCT-7 was to protectthe left flank of the divisionbetween Hagaru-ni and Yudam-ni.RCT-5 was to pass a battalionthrough RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and

move up the east side of the reser-voir and seize Sinhung-ni, aboutseven miles northeast of Hagaru-ri.(Sinhung-ni, just east of ChosinReservoir should not be confusedwith Sinhung in Sinhung Valleypreviously visited by the 5thMarines.)

Murray had been told to nomi-nate a battalion commander forreturn to the United States. Hepicked George Newton, comman-der of the 1st Battalion. Murraysaid of Newton: "He was a verycompetent battalion commander,but he was, I felt, almost killinghimself trying to be a good battal-ion commander. He seemed tostay awake most of the time."

"George left [on 17 November]before we went all the way up,"said Murray. "Anyway, GeorgeNewton was relieved by a prettygood leader [Lieutenant ColonelJohn W. Stevens II]. But I did havegood battalion commanders. Wehad an excellent staff. The mainthing, as I say, is that we had been

An M-4A3 Sherman tank from the 1st Tank Battalion travels along a well-grad-ed but narrow road coming up Funchilin Pass on 19 November. Tanks gave theMarines enormous firepower and were useful in crushing enemy roadblocks, butweather and terrain tended to keep them road-bound.

Photo by TSgtJ. W. Helms, Jr., National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5343

37

ci—

14r'ca1

/

tion from Hungnam.

successful in the south, and all thatwas needed was to keep thisgoing." Stevens was a knownquantity. He had been the executiveofficer of the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, from Pusan on throughInchon and Seoul.

That evening Smith dined onboard the amphibious commandship Mount McKinley (AGC 7) withRear Admiral James H. "Jimmy"Doyle. Describing Doyle as "a typ-ical Irishman," Colonel Bowser,Smith's G-3, said: "He is a realfighter when it comes to theclutches. A fun guy to know—always a laugh or a joke." Smithand Doyle, alone in the admiral'scabin, in Smith's words, "let ourhair down."

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble,commander of the Seventh Fleet,had been superimposed overDoyle's Task Force 90 during theInchon and Wonsan landings.Doyle disliked Struble and, dubiousof his competence, was deter-mined to keep the Seventh Fleet

out of direct control of futureamphibious operations. After theWonsan landing, Doyle had com-plained to his old friend ViceAdmiral Joy, commander of NavalForces, Far East, that he could notand would not come under Strubleagain. He was successful in hisarguments. As commander, TaskForce 90, at Hungnam he wouldreport direct to Admiral Joy.

By now engineers hadimproved the MSR to a pointwhere armor could be sent for-ward to join Litzenberg. A tankplatoon reached Hagaru-ri on 18November. That same day Smithvisited Puller at his command postjust west of Chigyong. Smith notedthat there was snow on the moun-tains but that the road was stillopen. He was resisting an orderfrom Almond to send a battalion toHuksu-ri, about 20 miles to thenorthwest, to occupy a blockingposition. "There is no truck roadto take," said Smith in his log. "I donot intend to put Puller Out on a

38

limb where he cannot be supplied.Also I would like to close him upbehind the regiments movingtoward the Chosin Reservoir. The26th ROK Regiment is attackingtoward Huksu-ri. Possibly this willrelieve me of concern regardingthat place."

Construction of the airstrip atHagaru-ri began. Smith asked for XCorps engineers, but could getnone. The job was given toLieutenant Colonel John Part-ridge's 1st Engineer Battalion.Wind-blown Hagaru-ri was at anelevation of about 4,000 feet. Forthat altitude the engineer manualsprescribed a minimum runway of3,900 feet for C-47 transport oper-ations. The engineers crossed theirfingers and hoped that a strip asshort as 3,000 feet might do. Oncestarted, construction of the airstripproceeded 24 hours a day, withwork at night under floodlights.

Marine observation squadron,VMO-6, although part of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, was underSmith's operational control. Smithregarded the squadron as his ownprivate air force. On the 19th, hevisited the squadron's commander,Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, atYonpo airfield to discuss the prob-lems of operating helicopters andlight aircraft in the cold at high alti-tudes. Gottschalk, 31, promised toprovide solutions. He had comeinto the Corps in 1941 after gradu-ating from the University ofMichigan. For much of World War IIhe had served as Marine detach-ment commander in the light aircraftcarrier Langley (CVL 27)—after thewar came two years of flight train-ing.

Early in November, Admiral Joyhad asked Smith if he could usethe Royal Marines' 41 IndependentCommando—14 officers and 221enlisted men, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Douglas B.Drysdale. Smith replied he would

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-423190

MajGen 0. P. Smith and RAdm James H. Doyle, shown here at the time of theInchon landing, were long-time friends. Both were highly experienced inamphibious warfare. They formed an effective and compatible partnership notonly at Inchon, but also in both the Wonsan landing and the ultimate evacua-

be glad to get these fine troops,foreseeing 41 Coirnmando operatingwith the division ReconnaissanceCompany in screening the flanks ofthe Marine advance. The BritishMarines arrived at Hungnam on 20November, the same day thatAlmond passed on instructionsfrom higher headquarters that"damage, destruction or disruptionof service of power plants will beavoided." In the larger scheme ofthings, the intention was to leavethe hydroelectric generators intact.Marines would wonder why.

On 21 November the division'ssouthern boundary was adjustedto give the responsibility forHuksu-ri to the 3d Infantry Di-vision. Puller's regiment was nowavailable to fill in behind Murrayand Litzenberg.

Harris on the Yonpo airfield await-ing the arrival of the Secretary of theNavy, Francis P. Matthews. Behindhis back, Matthews was known as

LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM, and his 41 Independent Commando, RoyalMarines, were billeted briefly with the 1st Engineer Battalion in Hainhungbefore moving up to the Chosin Reservoir Diysdale's command, largely made upof volunteers, had assembled in Japan where it was re-equipped with Americaninfantry weapons.

Photo by TSgtJ. W. Helms, Jr., National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5322

"Rowboat" because of his lack ofknowledge of naval matters.Accompanying the secretary wasAdmiral Joy and Senator ClaudePepper of Florida. Arriving at theairfield at the same time wasPresident Syngman Rhee. Mat-thews had wanted to call on Rheein Seoul but could not get clearancefrom the Secretary of State, DeanAcheson, to do so. This left Smithand Harris with the ticklish problemof keeping the two high-level par-ties apart. They whisked Matthewsaway from the field before hecould learn of Rhee's presence,taking him to the division hospital.There were very few woundedMarines to visit, but Matthewsfound the Chinese and NorthKorean prisoner of war patients ofgreat interest. He seemed to havedifficulty understanding why Navypersonnel were running a Marinehospital. It was a picture-takingopportunity for the secretary fol-lowed by another picture-takingopportunity at the division ceme-tery. Next the division staff gavethe visitors a briefing followed by

Photo by Sgt John Babyak, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4683

The well-meaning, but bumbling Secretary of the Navy Francis P Matthews,greeted here by BGen 6'raig, visited the division rear area at Hamhung on 22November. At the division hospital he was surprised to learn that Navy person-nel met the Marine Corps' medical needs. Anotherpolitician accompanied him,Senator Claude Pepper of Florida.

Wednesday morning, 22 Nov-ember, found 0. P. Smith and Field

39

imental commander, ColonelPowell. We all walked behindthe lead company down theroad to the river bank. Thiswas the first element of theAmerican forces to reach theKorean-Manchurian border,although earlier elements ofthe 6th ROK Division with IAmerican Corps on the westflank, Eighth Army front,attempted to get to the riverbut did not succeed inremaining there.

lunch in the commanding gener-al's mess. The cooks had embell-ished the standard ration withbiscuits and cookies. SecretaryMatthews and Senator Pepperseemed to enjoy these immensely.Secretary Matthews was thenescorted back to Yonpo airfield.Smith again managed to keep himunaware of President Rhee whowas departing at the same time.Senator Pepper stayed on for therest of the day. He wanted to visitwith some Marines from Florida.Smith found 15 of these. He had notbeen able to find any Marinesfrom Nebraska for SecretaryMatthews.

Thanksgiving fell on Thursday,23 November. The holiday menu,accomplished by strenuous efforton the part of many hands, includ-ed shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives,roast young torn turkey with cran-berry sauce, candied sweet pota-toes, fruit salad, fruit cake,mincemeat pie, and coffee. Eventhe Marine infantry units got atleast the turkey.

Admiral Doyle sent in a cookedturkey for General Smith's mess,but Smith himself had been invitedto dinner by Almond. As Smithsaid in his log: "The dinner wascomplete with cocktails servedfrom a cocktail bar, tablecloths,napkins, Japanese chinaware, reg-ular silverware, place cards, etc.Admiral Struble and GeneralsBiederlinden (G-1 of GHQ),Harris, Barr, and Ruffner were alsopresent."

Two days before Thanksgiving,elements of the 7th Division's 17thRegiment had reached the Yaluwithout encountering a singleChinese soldier. Years laterGeneral Almond still savored thatmoment of triumph:

And on the 21st ofNovember the leading battal-ion of the 17th Infantryreached the Yalu River and Iwas present when they didso. . . . I accompaniedGeneral Barr, the divisioncommander; General Hodes,the assistant division com-mander; and General Kieffer,the artilleryman; with the reg-

40

Almond and his commanderspaused on the banks of the Yalu fora ritual urination into the waters ofthe river. Meanwhile, ColonelCharles E. Beauchamp's 32dInfantry was advancing to thenorthwest of Powell's 17th Infantrywith orders to reach Singalpajin,originally a Marine Corps objec-tive, on the Yalu. A 34-man patrolunder Second Lieutenant Robert C.Kingston (a future four-star gener-al) was sent out from the 3dBattalion, 32d Infantry. The patrolreached Samsu, 23 miles south ofthe Yalu, where it held on forthree days, and then, reinforcedby tanks, artillery, engineers, andmore infantry, plunged forward,still commanded by the 22-year-old second lieutenant. Now desig-nated "Task Force Kingston," itarrived at Singalpajin on 28November, fought a house-to-house fight with North Koreans,and then took its turn at urinatingin the Yalu. The second and lastAmerican unit to reach theChinese border, Task ForceKingston, for all of its adventures,suffered only one casualty: a soldierreportedly killed by a Siberiantiger.

While soldiers and Marineswere eating their Thanksgivingturkey, Smith again modified hisorders for the 1st Marine Division'sadvance. RCT-7 was to move on to

Photo by Sgt Peter Ruplenas, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC363307

It was a proud moment forMajGen Almond, center, when, on 21 November, sol-diers of the 7th Infantry Division reached the Yalu River. Savoring the momentwith him, from left to right: BGen Homer Kiefer, division artillery commander;BGen Henry I. Hodes, assistant division commander; MajGen David G. Barr, divi-sion commander; and Col Herbert B. Powell, Commanding Officer, RCT-1 7.

•1'l t ii I\ givi ii 2.3 \ ()V( Ill I)C

C-rations, thankfully much im-proved since World War II.Bradshaw, standing in the chowline, had sought to improvise aplate out of a piece of cardboard.Hull saw Bradshaw's plight andgave him one of his pans.Bradshaw would remember that.

The road from Hagaru-ri toYudam-ni climbed up throughToktong Pass, four miles to thenorthwest and about 4,000 feet inelevation, and then descended

Photo by Tsgt J. W. Helms, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5289

In the 1st Marine Division rear at Hambung, where the weather was still benign,members of Maj Robert L. Schreier' 1st Signal Battalion queue up forThanksgiving dinner. This battalion, responsible for both the wire and radio com-munications of the division, also included ANGLICO—the Air and NavalGunfire Liaison Company thatprovidedforward observer teams to Army and ROKelements of X Corps.

Yudam-ni. RCT-5 was to continueup the eastern side of the reser-voir. RCT-1 was to protect the MSRfrom positions at Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri,and Chinhung-ni. As Smith said inhis log:

I did not want to pushMurray too far or getLitzenberg out on a limb atYudam-ni until I could closeup Puller in rear of them.I had hoped there might besome change in the orders onthe conservative side. Thischange did not materializeand I had to direct Litzenbergto move on to Yudam-ni.

Most of the 7th Marines hadtheir Thanksgiving dinner atHagaru-ri. The 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, had set up its field mess inthe shadow of what would come tobe called "East Hill." Private FirstClass Alfred P. Bradshaw, areservist who had recently joinedCaptain Hull's Dog Company, hadlost his mess gear. The mess kits

into a narrow valley before reach-ing Yudam-ni. Smith personallygave Litzenberg orders to drop offa company at Toktong Pass.

On the day following Thanks-giving, 24 November, MacArthurcame to Korea to see the jump-offof the Eighth Army on the offensivethat was to end the war. Heannounced to the press that thewar would be won in two weeksand that the Eighth Army wouldspend Christmas in Japan. To com-plete Walker's victory, MacArthurordered Almond to execute thealready planned attack to the westso as to squeeze the Chinese

consisted of two flat aluminumpans clamped together, not muchchanged in pattern since the CivilWar. Marines in rifle companiesseldom had need for mess gear;they subsisted almost entirely on

Elements qf both the 5th and 7th Marines spent Thanksgiving within the perime-ter of the burgeoning combat base at Hagaru-ri. Every effort was made to reachevery Marine in the division with a traditional holiday dinner. Here a 5thMarines cook ladles pump kin pie mix into a piecrust spread out in a square pan.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4726

41

broadly in the background is theIngvoldstad, Jr.

between the Eighth Army and thestill-independent X Corps. Lieu-tenant Colonel John H. Chiles,USA, Almond's G-3, had carriedthe final draft of X Corps opera-tions order to Tokyo onThanksgiving Day. MacArthur ap-proved the plan on Friday.

On Saturday morning, 25November, 0. P. Smith attended abriefing at X Corps headquartersoutlining X Corps Operation OrderNumber 7. He learned that hisdivision was to be the northernarm of a giant pincer. The otherarm of the pincer would be theEighth Army. He was to sever theenemy's lines of communication atMupyong-ni and then advance tothe Yalu. He was to launch hisattack on Monday, 27 November.Concurrently, the 7th Divisionwould continue its advance north-ward to the Yalu. Almost 100 milesseparated the two divisions.Strength returns for that dayshowed the 1st Marine Division as

regimental chaplain, LtCdr Orlando

having 25,323 Americans with 110South Koreans attached, but ofthat number only about 15,000were up at the reservoir. Indeed,some units of the division were asfar to the rear as Japan. A goodlynumber of hospitalized Marine

patients were also carried in thetotal. The 7th Division strength onthe same day was 16,001 men ofwhom 6,794 were South KoreanKATUSA soldiers.

Smith estimated the road dis-tance from Yudam-ni west toMupyong-ni, over another moun-tain pass and then through a narrowvalley, as being 55 miles. The divi-sion was then to advance north-ward to the Yalu. Almond's threecolumns—the 1st Marine Division,the 7th Infantry Division, and,nominally under his control, theROK I Corps—were diverging likethe ribs of an opened fan. The 7thInfantry Division was to completeits advance to the Yalu. The ROKcorps was to advance to theChinese border from the Hapsuand Chongjin areas. To the rearthe newly arrived 3d InfantryDivision, under General Soule,was given a multiplicity of mis-sions: gain contact with the rightflank of the Eighth Army; protectthe left flank of X Corps; supportthe 1st Marine Division on order;protect the harbor and airfield atWonsan; and destroy guerrillas in itszone of action. The 3d Divisionwas also to have had the task of

Department of Defense l'hoto (USMC) A6791

Thanksgiving was a last lull before the Chinese storm broke. At Hagaru-ri,Reverend Lee In Sup, a Presbyterian pastor, and his wife joined the 5th Marinesfor Thanksgiving services. Lee thanked LtC'ol Murray, commanding officer of the5th Marines, for the liberation "of our country and our church." Beaming

By the third week in November a tent camp, mostly for combat service units hadsprung up atHagaru-ri. One observer said that the badly battered town remind-ed him of an Alaska gold-rush camp. In the foreground a bit of the narrow-gaugerailroad track that once served Hagaru-ri can be seen.

Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A4971

42

a-—

I,

Il•1' -/1 /,PAh

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC352938

Gen Douglas MacArthur came to Korea on 24 November to see the jump-off ofthe Eighth Army in the offensive that was to end the war. Two days later the EighthArmy was in full retreat. LtGen Walton H. 'johnnie" Walker, commanding gen-eral of the Eighth Army, seated behind MacArthur, would die in a traffic acci-dent one month later.

defending the area south ofHagaru-ri, but, with its other mis-sions, the best it could promise todo was take over the security of theMSR from Sudong back toHamhung. It bothered Smith thatthe 3d Infantry Division had notyet closed behind him and that hewould have to leave Puller's 1stMarines strung out along the MSR tokeep it open from Hagaru-ri southto Chinhung-ni.

Davis with his 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, had led off the advance toYudam-ni on Thanksgiving Day.He ran into a defense of ToktongPass by an estimated 150-200Chinese, but scattered it with theaid of air and artillery. The battalionpaused to celebrate Thanksgiving aday late, and then moved on intoYudam-ni on the 25th against negli-gible resistance. The 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and Litzenberg's regimentalheadquarters followed Davis' bat-talion into the forlorn village.

Smith's rough plan was to havethe 5th Marines pass through the7th Marines at Yudarn-ni and thenattack to the west. The 1stMarines, in reserve, was to occupypositions along the MSR atChinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and Hagaru-ri. Supporting this plan, Almonddecided that a regimental-sizedforce from Barr's 7th Divisionshould relieve Murray's 5thMarines on the east side of thereservoir so that the 5th Marinescould join the 7th Marines atYudam-ni. He ordered Barr tosend a regimental combat team forthis purpose by 27 November.

Barr, acting on local intelligencethat the Chinese in massive num-bers had crossed the Yalu atLinchiang and were moving intothe gap between his division and

LtCol Don C. Faith, Jr., USA, right, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 32dInfantry, 7th Division, pictured with the regiment's commanding officer ColAllanD. MacLean, in Japan in the spring of 1950. Except for limited experience dur-ing the battle for Seoul, Faith had not commanded a unit in combat prior to theChosin Reservoir.

Courtesy of Col Erwin B. l3igger, USA (Ret)

43

'I:

'I

.4

•1

I..'

the Marines, had already begunpulling together his scattered bat-talions.

RCT-31, as assembled by Barrand commanded by Colonel AllanD. MacLean, consisted of the 31stInfantry's Headquarters andService Company, the regiment's2d and 3d Battalions, the 31stTank Company, the 57th FieldArtillery Battalion, Battery D of theself-propelled 15th AntiaircraftArtillery Automatic Weapons

Battalion, and the 1st Battalion,32d Infantry, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr.

Don Faith, 32, six-feet-tall,handsome, and charismatic, wassomething of an Army golden boy.The son of an Army brigadier gen-eral, he had enlisted in 1941 andwon his commission as a secondlieutenant the following year. Forthree years of World War II, heserved first in the 82d AirborneDivision and then in the XVIII

44

Airborne Corps as an aide to MajorGeneral Matthew B. Ridgway withwhom he landed at Sicily andjumped into Normandy andHolland. Faith had worked forBarr in China. He had commandedthe 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, formore than a year. In this new warhe had been recommended for aDistinguished Service Cross for hisperformance between Inchon andSeoul.

Barr chose to pull Faith's battal-ion from the 32d Infantry andassign it to RCT-31 because it, inbivouac northeast of Hamhung,was the Army battalion closest tothe reservoir. Faith on 24 Novem-ber had a strength of 715Americans and about 300 SouthKoreans.

Most of Faith's officers werewell trained and combat experi-enced. Some had served in Europeduring World War II, some in thePacific. There was also a layer ofbattle-hardened senior noncom-missioned officers. The mix ofAmericans and South Koreans inthe rank-and-file, however, was aproblem, both in language andlack of training. The battalion, in itsequipment and preparation for awinter campaign, was about on apar with the Marine battalions, insome ways better and in someways not as good. "They wereshort of chains for their trucks.The only tentage they had weretent flies for their kitchens," saidone observer. During the previouswinter the 31st Infantry, stationed atCamp Crawford, Hokkaido, hadreceived cold-weather training.Most of the men were issued Armywinter parkas, shorter and lessclumsy than the Navy parkas wornby the Marines. They had sweatersand pile liners of various sorts andshoe-pacs which were really rub-ber-and-leather hunter's boots. Be-lieved by the troops to have beenprovided by L. L. Bean, these

S.- With the relief of RCT-5 byFaith's battalion, Marine opera-tions east of the reservoir wouldend. There was no sign of large-scale enemy activity. The soldierswere to stay under the operationalcontrol of the 1st Marine Divisionuntil the arrival of Colonel

boots had been suitable in WorldWar II in the wet cold of northernFrance and Germany. But, as theMarines were also learning, theywere worse than no good in sub-zero temperatures. Faith himselfdid not like the shoe-pacs andwore galoshes over his leathercombat boots. So did many othersoldiers and Marines if they couldget them.

On Saturday morning, 25November, Faith and his battalion,the lead element of RCT-31, startedup the icy road to the reservoir. AtHagaru-ri they took the right-handfork in the road. Some miles upthe eastern side of the reservoir

Faith met Murray, the commanderof the 5th Marines. Murray out-lined for him the disposition of histhree battalions, all of which werenow east of the reservoir. Taplett's3d Battalion, in the lead, had agood defensive position aboutfour road miles north of thePungnyuri-gang inlet. Earlier thatday, a patrol from Taplett's battal-ion had almost reached the north-ern end of the reservoir beforebrushing up against a small party ofChinese. Murray designated anassembly area for Faith's battalionnear the village of Twiggae. Faithset up his command post in a huton a lower slope of Hill 1221.

45

MacLean, the commanding officer,31st Infantry. Faith's commandrelationship to the 1st MarineDivision was not clear. He askedMurray for instructions. Murray,who did not consider Faith to beunder his command, said that hehad none, but he did caution Faithnot to move farther north withoutorders from the 7th Division. OnceMurray departed, the only radiolink between Faith and the 1stMarine Division would be thatprovided by his attached tacticalair control party, led by MarineCaptain Edward P. Stamford. Heand his four-man team had beenwith the battalion since Seoul.

Just before noon on the 26th,Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes,the 7th's assistant division com-mander, visited Faith at Hill 1221.Hodes, 51 years old, a WestPointer who had commanded the112th Infantry in Europe in WorldWar II, and a future four-star gen-eral, told Faith that MacLean andthe rest of the 31st RCT wouldsoon be arriving.

On Sunday morning, 26November, Smith visited Yudam-ni. During the night he had beeninformed that the ROK II Corps,on the right flank of the EighthArmy, had been thrown back inthe vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 airmiles southwest of Yudam-ni. Butas yet Smith had no notion of theextent of the disaster that hadbefallen the Eighth Army. BothWalker's G-2 and GHQ in Tokyohad badly underestimated the

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-Sc352537

Ill-fated RCT-31, under Col Allan D. MacLean, USA, right, followed RCT-l 7ashore at Iwon. Here, on 12 November with the weather still mild, MajGenAlmond gives MacL ean some words of advice afterpresenting him with a SilverStar. MajGen Barr, MacLean's division commander, stands stolidly in the cen-ter. Two wecs later MacL can would be dead.

HILL 1456

Hudong-ni

to Yudarn-nè East ofChosin

0 1Miles' IHagoru - riI.'

I landed at what I thoughtwas the CP of the 7th, but itproved to be the CP of the 1stBattalion, 7th. I had a visitwith LtCol Davis, the Com-manding Officer, and gotdirections from him as to thelocation of the CP of the 7th,which was about 5000 yardssouth, up the road to Hagaru-ri. In making the landing atthe regimental CP I discov-ered some of the limitations ofhelicopters. We first attemptedto land on a gentle slope nearthe CP. As the pilot put hiswheels down we slippedbackwards on the ice andsnow. After 4 or 5 tries wewent down to the floor of thevalley to land. The elevationhere was about 4000 feet. Atthis altitude the helicopterdoes not have much hoveringcapability. There was no airstirring in the bottom of thevalley and for the last 10 feetwe simply dropped. We hitwith quite a bump but nodamage was done. Had therebeen a breeze it might haveassisted us in hovering.Litzenberg's role now is tohold the Yudam-ni area whileMurray passes through him tocontinue the advance to thewestward. Litzenberg indicat-ed he would like to keep ongoing.

strength of the Chinese. One dayinto the offensive that MacArthurhad blithely informed the presswould end the war, the ChineseThirteenth Army Group with 18

divisions counterattacked Walker.From his helicopter on the way

to Yudam-ni Smith could see nosigns of enemy activity. As heentered in his log:

46

Yudam-ni lay in the center of abroad valley surrounded by fivegreat ridgelines. Moving counter-clockwise from the north, theridges were given the prosaic butuseful designations North, North-west, Southwest, South, andSoutheast. The 7th Marines held aperimeter that commanded four ofthe five ridges—all but the North-west Ridge. Yudam-ni itself was amiserable collection of mud-and-thatch houses, battered by air

;x-:c1. :c•t -

- -r

attacks and now abandoned bytheir owners. The road that wasthe lifeline of the 1st MarineDivision forked at Yudam-ni. Onefork continued to the north. Theother opened to the west, going asfar as Mupyong—ni, before turningnorth and continuing to Kanggye.

On 26 November the 7thMarines reported the capture ofthree Chinese soldiers from the60th CCF Division and learnedfrom them that the 58th, 59th, and60th CCF Divisions, making up the20th CCF Army, were in the vicin-ity of Yudam-ni.

RCT-1 had to wait several daysfor rail transport to take them the 70miles north from Wonsan toChigyong. The regiment's 1st Bat-talion relieved the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, at Chinhung-ni onThanksgiving. Two days later theregiment's 2d Battalion, along withPuller's regimental headquarters,took over Koto-ri from the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines. Smith nowhad his regiments fairly closetogether, but further movement

was hindered by a shortage ofmotor transport.

Two-thirds of the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, arrived at Hagaru-ri duringthe early evening of Monday, 26November. The battalion comman-der, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L.Ridge, 35 and University of Illinois1938, had been a naval attaché inBrazil for much of World War II buthad reached the Pacific as an intel-ligence officer in time for Iwo Jimaand Okinawa, where he was twicewounded. The motor march toHagaru-ri was uneventful exceptfor snarls in traffic. Because of theshortage of trucks, Captain Carl L.Sitter's George Company, rein-forced with a provisional platoonfrom Weapons Company, had tobe left behind at Chigyong.

Relief of Lieutenant ColonelRandolph S. D. Lockwood's 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, had to waituntil morning. Lockwood, 37, U.s.Naval Academy 1936 and Harvard1940, had just taken over the bat-talion from Major "Buzz" Sawyeron 9 November. Lockwood hadspent most of World War II as astaff officer in Hawaii. The com-bat-experienced Sawyer stayed onas battalion executive officer.

The new-arrivals at Hagaru-riwatched the engineers hack away atthe frozen earth in their effort tobuild an airstrip capable of han-dling Air Force C-47 and Marine R-4D transports. The 1st MedicalBattalion under CommanderHoward A. Johnson set up a clear-ing station close to the strip for theexpected flow of casualties. Extrasurgical teams were flown intoHagaru-ri. The hospital shipConsolation (AH 15) moved up toHungnam from Wonsan. The 1stMarine Division 400-bed hospitalat Hungnam had an annex of 150more beds at Hamhung.

Smith informed Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, and HeadquartersMarine Corps, that, unless hereceived word to the contrary, hewas sending his assistant divisioncommander, Brigadier GeneralCraig, home on emergency leave.Craig had received the bad newsthat his father had suffered a cere-bral thrombosis and that the prog-nosis was unfavorable. Craig leftfor the States on Monday morning,27 November.

The Marines were graduallylearning about the new enemy.The term used for them by the U.S.and other English-speaking forceswas "CCF" or "Chinese CommunistForces." Marines would learn that aCCF division, with its three infantryregiments and an artillery battalion(more theoretical than real in1950), numbered about 8,000 men.A CCF regiment would averageabout 2,200 men, organized intothree infantry battalions, some-times with an artillery battery,more often with a mortar company,and several meager support com-panies. In the forward areas theChinese had little or no motortransport. Things were pulled incarts by man or beast or carried on

On 25November the 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, along with Col Puller's regimentalheadquarters, relieved the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at Koto-ri. Next day, thisheavy machine gun squad, with its water-cooled Browning M191 7A1, followsbehind two well-deployed rfle platoons making a reconnaissance in forcetoward the first range of hills.

Photo by Cpl W. T. Wolfe, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4866

47

qL1Pt

4a

:1,

150,000 men.

the backs of men, either Chinesesoldiers or impressed Koreanporters. The CCF infantry battal-ion, on paper at least, lookedmuch like the Marines' own battal-iOns: three rifle companies and amachine gun or heavy weaponscompany. The rifle companiessimilarly had three rifle platoonsand a 60mm mortar section or pla-toon. The individual Chinese soldierwas physically tough, uncomplain-ing, and used to long marcheswith few if any creature comforts.Politically he had been thoroughlyindoctrinated, but once taken pris-oner that indoctrination wouldtend to crack.

Collectively, his armament was amixed bag of weapons gainedfrom the surrender of theJapanese, the collapse of theChinese Nationalist government—and its mixture of American,British, German, Czech, and otherweapons—and the more recentissue of Russian weapons by theSoviet Union. But the Chinesearmy, at least in this stage of the

war, was never equipped as uni-formly or as well as the NorthKorean army had been. For themost part, the Chinese soldierwore a two-piece padded uniformwith a cap to match, fairly ade-quate of themselves against thecold, but paired off with canvas"sneakers." They seldom hadgloves or mittens and dependedupon tucking their hands into thesleeves of their coats to keep themwarm. Signal communicationswere primitive in the extreme.Commonly the Chinese used theSCR-300, captured from theChinese Nationalists, as their back-packed radio, the same radio usedby the Marine infantry. Radio netsalmost never went below the regi-mental level. Telephone wire wasseldom strung beneath the battalionlevel. Below the battalion, com-munications was by runner sup-plemented with bugles, whistles,flares, and flashlights.

Lacking adequate communica-tions at the front, Chinese attackpatterns tended to be rigid and

48

repetitive. Once committed, aChinese battalion would usuallystay in contact until completelyshredded by casualties or until allits ammunition was used up.There was little or no battlefieldresupply.

Lin Piao had been concernedover the capability of the poorlyequipped Chinese to fight theAmericans, but Peng Dehuai ham-mered home to his senior subordi-nate officers his belief thatAmericans were afraid of closecombat, a tactic in which theChinese Communist troops ex-celled. Peng himself was a special-ist in what the Chinese called a"short attack," hammering away atenemy defenses with successivecompact combat groups, usuallynot more than a company in size,until a breakthrough or puncturewas achieved, a tactic not unlikethat used by German storm troopsin the last years of World War I.

U.S. Marines' and soldiers'imaginations sometimes magnifiedwhat they saw and heard whileunder attack. The Western presswas soon filled with fantasies of"human sea attacks" by "hordes"of Chinese. Chinese propagandaphotographs and films showingwave after wave of Chineseadvancing in line across the snowwith bravely flying red bannersreinforced these exaggerations.The truth was quite different.Hearing or reading such reports,the Marine infantry, those whowere really there, would later askderisively: "How many hordes arethere in a Chinese platoon?"

In mid-afternoon on 26November, Colonel MacLean andhis command group arrived atFaith's position on Hill 1221. Faith,ignoring Murray's caution, re-ceived MacLean's permission to

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

Contrary to popular belief the Chinese did not attack in "human waves, "but incompact combat groups of 50 to 100 men. Here one such group makes its wayup a snow-clad hill. The 1st Marine Division came into contact with the majorportion of the Chinese Ninth Army Group, which, with 12 divisions, totaled about

ah

move his battalion forward thenext morning to the position vacat-ed by Taplett's battalion.

MacLean set up his regimentalcommand post in a schoolhouse inHudong-ni, a village about a milesouth of Hill 1221. A big, robust,aggressive man, MacLean was 43, agraduate of West Point, Class of1930, and a veteran of theEuropean theater. Barr had givenhim command of the 31st Infantryabout two months earlier, replacinga commander who had not donewell in the Inchon to Seoul drive.Before that MacLean had been inthe G-3 Section of the EighthArmy. Previously, in Japan, he hadcommanded the 32d Infantry and heknew Faith well.

Of the 1st Marine Division'splanned attack to the west, RayMurray later said: "It was unbeliev-able. The more you think about it,the more unreal it becomes. Well,anyhow, those were the ordersand that's what we started to do."

All elements of Murray's RCT-5were to be relieved by Mondaynoon, 27 November, so as to takepositions at Yudam-ni preparatoryto passing through RCT-7 to lead theadvance to Mupyong-ni. Firstobjective for the regiment, once itwas altogether, was to be the roadjunction at Yongnim-dong, 27 roadmiles to the west.

By nightfall on 26 November,Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,was in its attack position atYudam-ni. His company comman-ders gathered in his blackout tent at2200 to receive the attack order.Two Corsairs from VMF-312 forclose support and a "Grasshop-per" from VMO-6 for aerial recon-naissance were promised. The 7thMarines would support Roise'sattack with patrols and a sec-ondary attack to the southwest.

The temperature at Yudam-ni dur-ing the night went down to zerodegrees Fahrenheit.

In the morning Fox Company,under Captain Uel D. Peters, ledoff the 5th Marines' attack with anadvance up the road leading west-ward. Peters' first objective was aspur about 500 yards beyond the7th Marines perimeter. Almostimmediately his Marines wereengaged by long-range small armsfire. The VMO-6 spotter plane,overhead as promised, reportedChinese positions all across thefront. At 1115, Corsairs from VMF-312 dumped rockets and bombson the Chinese emplacements infront of Fox Company. As Petersbegan his assault, Chinese soldierscould be seen fleeing to the west.Three prisoners were taken.

Dog Company, under CaptainSamuel S. Smith, had followedbehind Peters and at about noonjoined in the fight. AltogetherRoise's battalion advanced about amile. At 1430, Roise ordered Petersand Smith to break off the attack

and set up night defensive posi-tions.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, inits attack to the southwest, hadadvanced about the same distance,about a mile, before running intostiffening opposition. The battalionhad a new commander: LieutenantColonel William F. Harris, 32,Naval Academy 1936, who hadtaken over from Major Roach on11 November. He was the son ofMajor General Field Harris. As acaptain he had been serving withthe 4th Marines when it was sur-rendered to the Japanese onCorregidor in the Philippines. Hehad spent the war as a prisoner ofwar and was one of four formerprisoners to witness the Japanesesurrender on board the battleshipMissouri(BB 63). A big man with aneasy manner he was immediatelyliked by the Marines in his battalion.

At noon Taplett's 3d Battalion,5th Marines, arrived at Yudam-ni,after a hard five-hour motor marchfrom the east side of the reservoir,and was assigned an assembly area

Marines, probably members of the 5th Marines, take a roadside break while onthe march from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni on 27November. This photo shows veryclearly the nature and condition of the MSR or "main supply route" that was thedivision's lifeline from Yudam-ni back to Hungnam.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-424585

49

iIi \1arinc' 2' \vuI11 I)(r \iiick

I Iataru—ri. 27 Noviuher

west of the village where the roadforked to the north and west.Taplett understood that his battalionwas to follow Roise's 2d Battalionwhen the attack was resumed inthe morning.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,now under Lieutenant ColonelJohn Stevens, did not arrive untildusk and was given an assemblyarea east of the village.Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, was completing its motormarch, company by company, butwithout Randolph Lockwood, thebattalion's new commander, whostayed behind in Hagaru-ri.

Units of the 5th and 7th Marineswere now thoroughly intermixedand would become more so, butthere was no specific jointure ofcommand. Brigadier GeneralCraig, the assistant division com-mander, might have been givencommand of the two regimentscombined into a task force, but hewas home on emergency leave.Colonel Litzenberg was muchsenior to Lieutenant ColonelMurray, and perhaps Smiththought that was all the overallcommand authority needed.Litzenberg had positioned hiscommand post for the 7th Marinesin the center of Yudam-ni.Murray's command post for the5th Marines was some distanceaway in the northwest corner ofthe village.

During the day Almond, accom-panied by an aide and an assistantoperations officer, drove by jeepto Yudam-ni from his commandpost at Hamhung. Arriving at the7th Marines command post unex-pectedly, he found Litzenbergabsent but his executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R.Dowsett, 39, present. Tall, lanky,Dowsett briefed him on the enemysituation and the disposition of theregiment. Almond passed outthree Silver Stars, one to an officer

and two to enlisted Marines, andthen late in the afternoon beganhis return to Hamhung. The MSRwas jammed with traffic going inboth directions. In his opinion, thetraffic was poorly controlled. Thedrive took nearly five hours. Thatnight he reported to GHQ inTokyo that the strength of theenemy was considerable and thatthe disposition of the Marinesneeded to be reexamined.

At Hagaru-ri, Ridge's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, completedthe relief of Lockwood's 2d Bat-talion, 7th Marines, on the morningof 27 November. Companies Dand E of Lockwood's battalion hadalready arrived at Yudam-ni. Whilethey waited for their own battal-ion commander, Litzenbergattached the two companies toDavis' 1st Battalion.

Lockwood, in accordance withSmith's directive to Litzenberg,now led forward his remainingrifle company, Fox Company, tooccupy Toktong Pass. He gaveCaptain William E. Barber ordersto move off the road, beginningfour miles north of Hagaru, withthe mission of keeping open threemiles of the MSR. Lockwood thenreturned to Hagaru-ri where hisHeadquarters Company and theremainder of his WeaponsCompany were awaiting trucks totake them on to Yudam-ni. Thetrucks never came. Lockwoodhimself, and the remainder of hisbattalion, would never get toYudam-ni.

When Captain Barber took com-mand of Fox Company on 7November, he made a littlespeech, telling his company thathe was "an infantryman and a hellof a good one at that." Born inKentucky in 1919, he had enlistedin the Marine Corps in 1940. He

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went through parachute training,doing so well that he stayed on asan instructor. He was commis-sioned in 1943, and as a platoonleader at Iwo Jima with the 26thMarines, he was wounded andevacuated. Refusing to stay hospi-talized, he came back to take com-mand of a company. For this hereceived a Silver Star and his firstPurple Heart.

Ridge, faced with the mission ofdefending Hagaru with two-thirdsof a battalion, sent Major JosephD. Trompeter, his S-3, and MajorEdwin H. Simmons, his WeaponsCompany commander and sup-porting arms coordinator, on awalking reconnaissance. Trom-peter and Simmons found that toenclose all of Hagaru-ri wouldrequire a perimeter of four miles, animpossible task for a singleinfantry battalion at two-thirdsstrength. Ridge estimated that oneto two regiments would berequired for a thorough defense.

"Under the circumstances andconsidering the mission assignedto the 1st Marine Division,"General Smith would later com-ment, "an infantry component ofone battalion was all that could bespared for the defense of Hagaru,"adding with the benefit of hind-sight, "This battalion was very ade-quately supported by air, and hadsufficient artillery and tanks for itspurposes."

Captain Benjamin S. Read'sHow Battery, 3d Battalion, 11thMarines, which had been shootingfor the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,was already in place in the north-east corner of the sketchy perime-ter. Now it would have to divide itsfire missions between the defenseof Fox Company in Toktong Passand the Hagaru-ri perimeter and atthe same time provide its owndefense for its segment of theperimeter. "Our lives centered onour 105mm howitzers, and our

1

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S.

rfle inspection for his company.

mission was to support theinfantry," said Captain Read crisplya short time later.

Captain Andrew J. Stroh-menger's Dog Battery, 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, hadarrived at Hagaru-ri with Ridge's3d Battalion, 1st Marines. The bat-talion and battery had workedtogether before, notably at Majon-ni, and were old friends.Strohmenger's battery went intoposition on the flats just southeastof the village.

The extreme cold affected therecoil systems of the howitzersand the reach of their shells. Theguns were slow in coming backinto battery and the extreme rangewas cut down from 12,200 yards tosomething like 9,000-9,500 yards.

Not being able to be strongeverywhere, Ridge decided to con-centrate his two rifle companies,How and Item, in a salient south-west of the not yet operational,but all-important, airstrip. Theother greatest threat to Hagaru-riwas the hill mass just east of the

town that would come to be called"East 1-lill."

Beyond the airstrip, FirstLieutenant Joseph R. "Bull"Fisher's Item Company improved

the positions vacated by Barber'sFox Company by blasting deeperfoxholes with "Composition C"plastic explosive. On Fisher's leftflank, Captain Clarence E. Corley'sHow Company extended the lineuntil it tied in with the right flank ofStrohmenger's Dog Battery, 11thMarines. The frozen marsh in frontof Dog Battery was covered withfire but left unmanned. Theperimeter picked up again with aroadblock held by a portion ofWeapons Company across theroad running south to Koto-ri. EastHill remained unoccupied. Ridgeplanned to put George Companyon the hill when it arrived fromthe south. Service Battalion heldthe roadblock on the road that lednortheast of the reservoir. Some-where out there on the east side ofthe reservoir was the Army col-umn that would come to he called"Task Force Faith," named for itsdoomed commander. The rest ofthe perimeter was patched togeth-er with bits and pieces of theService Battalion, the division's

Photo by Cpl LB. snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4644

Capt William E. Barber took command of Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, on 7 November. A seasoned combat leader, he had commanded apla-toon and company at Iwo Jima. He demanded a lotfrom hisMarines and begotit. Shortly before leaving Hagaru-ri to take position in Toktong Pass, he held a

A 105mm fires a mission from its position close to the airstrip at Haga ru-ri. Thetwo batteries of artillery—Capt Benjamin S. Read's Batteiy H, 3d Battalion, andCapt Andrew J. Strohmenger's Battery D, 2d Battalion, both qf the 11thMarines—were essential to the defense of the Hagaru-riperiineter.

Photo by TSgt V. Jobs, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A 130286

51

a. . — -

— -- S -

•1 - -

—

Headquarters Battalion, and oddsand ends left behind by the 7thMarines, until it closed again onItem Company's right flank. At thenorthern-most edge of the perime-ter, Read's How Battery, 11thMarines, like Strohmenger's bat-tery, was used as a frontline unit.

Lockwood received orders fromLitzenberg to move to ToktongPass to assist Fox Company. Heborrowed a platoon from Ridge'sbattalion as an escort, but theeffort went nowhere. Tank-infantry patrols sent out to thenorth toward Yudam-ni and to thesouth toward Koto-ri were pushedback in by mid-afternoon.

East of the reservoir, Mondaymorning, 27 November, ColonelMacLean, commanding RCT-31,went forward, accompanied byLieutenant Colonel Faith, andtogether they inspected the linesvacated by the Marines. MacLeanthen selected a forward commandpost site south of Faith's intendednew position.

It was not yet known with cer-tainty, but the scattered Chineseelements encountered earlier byMurray's 5th Marines were fromthe 80th Division of the 27thArmy, Ninth Army Group. Com-manded by Sung Shih-lun, theNinth Army Group, with a total of11 and possibly 12 divisions, con-sisted of three "armies," the 20th,26th, and 2 7th, each roughlyequivalent to a U.S. corps in front-line infantry strength. Sung Shih-lunwas the equivalent of a lieutenantgeneral, but the ChineseCommunist Forces had not yetadopted Western military grades.Rank was indicated by billet held.Sung, like Peng, was his ownpolitical commissar. The NinthArmy Group had been poised toinvade Taiwan after having cap-

tured Shanghai from theNationalists. At Mao's directionPeng had brought Sung up fromthe Shanghai area and had senthim into Korea with specificorders to destroy X Corps. Peng'sheadquarters, it will be remem-bered, estimated that Sung couldbring 150,000 troops against90,000 men, a close guess at thestrength of X Corps, giving him a1.7 to 1 advantage.

Mao, in a telegram sent to Pengon 12 November, said: "It is saidthat the American Marine FirstDivision has the highest combateffectiveness in the Americanarmed forces." Sung would makethe destruction of the 1st MarineDivision, as the strongest of theAmerican divisions, his maineffort.

Sung's information as to thelocation of Marine Corps units wasexcellent. His plan, as later piecedtogether by U.S. intelligence, was asfollows: The 27th Army—exceptfor the 80th Division, which was tocome down the east side of thereservoir—was charged with at-tacking the two Marine regiments atYudam-ni. The 20th Army was tocut the MSR or main supply routesouth of Yudam-ni, includingattacks against Hagaru-ri andKoto-ri. The 26th, initially inreserve, would not come into thefight until somewhat later. Sung

52

was to launch his attack the nightof 25 November, simultaneouswith the assault to the west againstthe Eighth Army, but he was notquite ready and he secured Peng'sapproval to delay his attack fortwo days.

Early on the afternoon of 27November, Faith completed themove of his battalion into thepositions vacated by Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines. It was atypical Marine Corps perimeter,horseshoe shaped and occupyingthe high ground. Each of theexposed sides was occupied byone of Faith's rifle companies, thebattalion command post was inthe center, and the open side tothe rear was covered by elementsof his Headquarters and ServiceCompany and Weapons Company.Lacking the strength in men andweapons of a Marine battalion,Faith could not fill all the foxholes.

MacLean, who had returned toHudong-ni, was told that severalhundred Chinese had been sightedeast of the Pungnyuri-gang inlet.He sent out his Intelligence andReconnaissance Platoon to investi-gate. The platoon roared out ofthe compound in its machine gunmounted jeeps and was neverseen again.

The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry,commanded by Lieutenant Colo-nel William R. Reilly, arrived that

Chinese Order of Battle

20th CCFArmy

Ninth CCF Army Group

58th CCF Division

26th CCFArmy

59th CCF Division

76th CCF Division

27th CCFArmy

60th CCF Division

77th CCF Division

89th CCF Division

79th CCF Division

78th CCF Division

80th CCF Division

88th CCF Division

81st CCF Division

90th CCF Division

Source: Montross & Canzona, The ('hosin Reservoir campaign (1957). The fourth division ineacis army was not organic. The 88th, 89th, and 90th CCF Divisions were attached from the30th ('CF Army. Some other, later, authorities, Chinese as well as American, show the .90thCCF Division as the 94th C6FDivision from the 32d ((FArmy.

afternoon, followed by the 57thField Artillery Battalion, com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelRaymond Embree. MacLean putEmbree's battalion—which wasminus its Battery C—into abivouac area near the hamlet ofSinhung-ni, just south ofPungnyuri-gang inlet. The two fir-ing batteries were positioned onthe south side of the inlet on lowground surrounded on three sidesby ridges. Embree placed hisartillery headquarters a mile or sofarther south on the slope of Hill1456. Battery D of the 15thAntiaircraft Automatic WeaponsBattalion, with four full-track M19weapons carriers mounting dual40mm guns and four half-trackedM16 carriers bearing quad .50-cal-iber machine guns, was set upclose to Embree's headquarters.

The 31st Heavy MortarCompany, with its 4.2-inch mor-tars, moved into a position close toMacLean's forward command postand about halfway between Faith'sbattalion and Reilly's battalion.

Meanwhile, the 31st Tank Com-pany, with 20 M-4A4 Shermantanks and two 105mm howitzertanks, had reached Hudong-ni.

Thus, on the evening of 27November, elements of MacLean'sRCT-31 were stretched out on theroad for 10 miles in seven differentpositions. By nightfall, or shortlythereafter, Faith, on the northernend with his 1st Battalion, 32dInfantry, had registered hisartillery and mortar defensive fires.At about this time he receivedorders from MacLean to attack thenext morning toward Kalchon-ni.MacLean himself spent the night atFaith's headquarters.

Sung Shi-lun, it will be remem-bered, had allocated his 80thDivision to the attack east of thereservoir. Shortly before midnight afirefight developed on CompanyA's front on the forward edge ofFaith's position. The companycommander was killed. Stamford,the Marine captain, took tempo-rary command. The Chinese attackspread until it encompassed the

53

rest of the battalion perimeter.South of the inlet, the two firing

batteries of Embree's 57th FieldArtillery Battalion and Reilly's 3dBattalion, 31st Infantry Regiment,came under heavy attack from theeast. The Chinese overran the 3dBattalion's command post andboth artillery batteries. Reilly wasseverely wounded. Farther south,mortar shells began falling onEmbree's artillery headquarters.Embree, in turn, was badlywounded.

As darkness fell on the 27th atYudam-ni, Captain Wilcox'sCompany B, 7th Marines, whichhad been patrolling South Ridge,came under heavy attack.Lieutenant Colonel Davis, com-manding the 1st Battalion,received permission from Litz-enberg to take a company to extri-cate Wilcox. Davis led CharlieCompany, less one of its rifle pla-toons and commanded by Captain

LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood, Commanding Qfficer, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, had allowed his headquarters tobecome separated from his rifle companies. On 27November, on orders from Col Litzenberg, he attempted to

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4886

reach Fox Company in Toktong Pass with elements of his H&SCompany and Weapons Company shown here. The effort

failed.

John F. Morris, down the MSR topositions across the road from Hill1419. Baker Company pulled itselfloose from its engagement andDavis took it back into Yudam-ni,leaving Morris' Charlie Companyto occupy Hill 1419—about twomiles south of the incompleteperimeter. With less than a fullcompany, Morris organized a cres-cent-shaped defense on an easternspur of Hill 1419, well below thecrest.

Unknown to Litzenberg andMurray as yet was that almost sur-rounding them at Yudam-ni werethe 79th and 81st CCF Divisions.

Furthermore, the 59th CCFDivision had begun a wideenveloping movement past SouthRidge and on south to cut the MSRat Toktong Pass, held only by FoxCompany, 7th Marines.

Artillery support at Yudam-niwas provided initially by MajorParly's 3d Battalion, 11thMarines—three batteries of 105mmhowitzers, 18 tubes in all, enoughto support a regiment in a narrowzone of attack, but not enough toprovide adequate 360-degree sup-port for a sprawling two-regimentdefensive sector. Fortunately,among the Marine forces converg-

ing on Yudam-ni, during that busy27th of November, was the 4thBattalion, 11th Marines, command-ed by Major William McReynolds,with three batteries of its heavier155mm howitzers—18 more tubes.All would be in action before mid-night.

That night the temperaturedropped to 20 degrees belowzero. Northwest Ridge, the lastridge to be occupied, now had aMarine presence, a frontline offoxholes chipped out of the frozenground and occupied by tired andcold-benumbed Marines. HowCompany, 7th Marines, command-ed by Captain Leroy M. Cooke,held Hill 1403, the high point onNorthwest Ridge. On HowCompany's left flank were Easyand Fox Companies of Roise's 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, occupyingthe rest of the ridge until itdropped down to the defilethrough which passed the road tothe west. Roise had his commandpost behind the juncture of thesetwo companies. A roadblockmanned largely by WeaponsCompany covered the road west-ward. On the other side of theroad, Dog Company curled backtoward Southwest Ridge.

Taplett, uneasy with the situa-tion, turned the assembly areaassigned his 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, into its own defensiveperimeter. His command post wasin a draw behind Hill 1282. Hesent a platoon from Item Companyto outpost a spur of Hill 1384about 500 yards forward of hiscommand post. The outpost beganreceiving harassing fire at 2045.

The 89th CCF Division's attackagainst Northwest Ridge, with tworegiments, the 266th and the267th, began at about 2200. TheChinese suddenly hit all along theline with sub-machine guns andgrenades supported by machinegun fire and an intense mortar bar-

Toward the end of the day on 27 Novembei two Marines at Yudam-ni help awounded comrade reach an aid station. Heavy action at Yudam-ni had begunthat morning when elements of both the 5th and 7th Marines made an attack west-ward, were halted, and. fell back to defensive positions.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4904

54

Battle br North Ridc

sights in his Browning automatic rfle.making it an efficient substitute for a

rage. This attack apparently aimedat fixing the Marines in positionwhile a dense column of Chineseassaulted the line on a narrowfront against the boundarybetween Easy and Fox Companies.This assault penetrated theMarines' position, overrunningFox Company's right flank pla-toon. Captain Samuel Jaskilka (afuture four-star Assistant Com-mandant), commanding EasyCompany, turned back his leftflank to cover the penetration.Roise pounded the Chinese salientwith his 81mm mortars and sentup a platoon from Dog Company toreinforce Fox Company's rupturedright flank. A great number ofChinese were killed and by dawnthe break in the line had beenrepaired.

Things went less well in thefight that had begun for posses-sion of Hill 1403. Captain Cooke,How Company's commander, had

It still has its b4od,light machine gun.

deployed his three rifle platoonsin a semi-circle on the forwardedge of the crest of the hill. Hisright flank crumbled under theweight of an assault by the 266thCCF Regiment. Cooke himselfbravely led a counterattack torestore his line and was cut downby Chinese machine gun fire.Second Lieutenant James M.

Mitchell took temporary charge ofthe company until First LieutenantHoward H. Harris, who had earliercommanded the company, couldget there from battalion. Harris (norelation to Lieutenant ColonelWilliam Harris, commanding the3d Battalion) arrived at about mid-night and found only one HowCompany officer, Second Lieuten-ant Minard P. Newton, Jr., still on hisfeet. The Chinese again assaultedHill 1403 at about 0300. After anhour of pounding, LieutenantColonel Harris ordered the bat-tered How Company to withdraw to

55

the rear of the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, leaving Hill 1403 inChinese hands.

Concurrently with the assault ofNorthwest Ridge, the 79th CCFDivision, with three regiments,had moved against North Ridge,held by two widely separatedcompanies of the 2d Battalion, 7thMarines—Dog Company on Hill1240 and Easy Company on Hill1282. Separating the two hilltopswas a long saddle. (The battalion'sthird rifle company, Fox Company,it will be remembered, had beendropped off at Toktong Pass andLockwood and his headquarterswere still at Hagaru-ri.)

The 235th CCF Regimentattacked in a column of battalionsagainst Hill 1282 at about mid-night. Easy Company, underCaptain Walter Phillips, held its

This BAR-man, as sketched by combat artist Sgt Schofield,Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

Some BAR-men threw away their bipods to lighten theirload, reducing the BAR to an assault rifle.

_—.---.-- ,- —. - .- ——

-

—a-- •0•p/

'- —

a

SCIqPiLO — c'..

ground against the first attack.Simultaneously, the 236th CGFRegiment, following behind the235th, was feeling out DogCompany's position on Hill 1240.

Anticipating an attack againstNorth Ridge, Murray had movedStevens' 1st Battalion out of itsassembly area northward to thereverse slope of Hill 1282. Firstelements of Able Companyreached a spur of Hill 1282 barelyin time to reinforce EasyCompany, 7th Marines, which wasbeing pummeled by the 1stBattalion, 235th CCF Regiment.Easy Company's commander,Captain Phillips was killed andwould receive a posthumous NavyCross. His executive officer, FirstLieutenant Raymond 0. Ball, tookover command, was several timeswounded, and died in the battalionaid station. Command devolvedupon the senior platoon leader,First Lieutenant Robert E. Snyder.Easy Company had been reduced tothe size of a single platoon, and bydaylight the Chinese had taken thecrest of Hill 1282.

The crest of Hill 1240 to the easthad also fallen. Chinese from the3d Battalion, 236th CCFRegimenl,had overrun the command post ofbig, burly Captain Milton Hull, thecompany commander of DogCompany. At about 0300, Hull,wounded, counterattacked withthe few squads at his disposal,won back a foothold, and waswounded again. When dawn camehe could count only 16 Marinesleft with him, and the enemy hadhim surrounded.

During the night some Chinesehad crossed the saddle that sepa-rated the Dog and Easy Companypositions and had taken the 5thand 7th Marines' command postsunder fire. Some time before mid-night, a few half-dressed mortarmen from How Company, 7thMarines, beaten back from Hill

1403, found their way intoTaplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,perimeter. A message from HowCompany, 7th Marines—that partthat still remained on Hill 1403—reached Taplett, warning him thatthe Chinese were flanking hisposition. At about 0145, Taplett'soutpostecl platoon on Hill 1384received increasingly heavy fire.Shortly thereafter a CCF force, esti-mated at two companies, overranthe outpost. Taplett's commandpost became the bull's eye of thefight. Major John J. Canney, thebattalion executive officer and aWorld War II aviator turnedinfantryman, was killed.

At 0230, with the assaultsagainst North and NorthwestRidges at their height, the Chinesealso struck Charlie Company,under Captain Morris, on the spurof Hill 1419 two miles south ofYudam-ni. Morris' Marines held ongrimly until dawn when artilleryfire finally made the Chinese breakoff their attack. But, with a third ofhis men casualties, Morris waseffectively pinned into position byChinese fire continuing to raindown from the heights. HisMarines could do nothing morethan hold their position and hopethat help would come fromYuclam-ni.

While the 79th and 89th CCFDivisions savaged the Marines onNorthwest and North Ridges, the59th CCF Division completed itswide sweeping movement to thesoutheast, putting itself in positionto cut the 14 miles of vital MSRbetween Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.Until midnight on 27 Novembertruck traffic on the MSR was stillactive and unimpeded—mostlyempty trucks from LieutenantColonel Beall's 1st Motor Trans-port Battalion rattling their way

56

back to Hagaru-ri, having deliv-ered the last serials of the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, and the 4thBattalion, 11th Marines, to Yudam-ni.

Captain Barber had gone intoposition at Toktong Pass with anear full-strength Fox Companyreinforced with sections of water-cooled Browning machine gunsand 81mm mortars from WeaponsCompany, 2d Battalion—a total of240 officers and men. Barberchose to organize his defensiveperimeter on a hill at the mid-point of the pass. "We arrived in thelate afternoon after which weunloaded and were positioned forthe night," remembered CorporalHoward W. Koone. "Our positionwas off to the right of the road upon a saddle-like hill. The groundwas like a sheet of concrete andvery barren."

Barber's 3d Platoon, under FirstLieutenant Robert C. McCarthy,occupied the high ground at thecenter of the narrow perimeter. Atabout 0230, McCarthy's two for-ward squads were overwhelmedby a company-sized attack. Out of35 men, McCarthy lost 15 killed, 9wounded, and 3 missing. Theeight survivors fell back to thereserve squad on the reverse slopeof the hill. Barber's position wasalmost cut in half, but his twowing platoons managed to holdtheir ground. Much was owed tothe valor of three Marines: PrivateFirst Class Robert Benson andPrivate Hector A. Cafferatta of the2d Platoon under Second Lieuten-ant Elmo G. Peterson on the left,and Private First Class Gerald J.Smith of the 1st Platoon underFirst Lieutenant John M. Dunne onthe right. One party of Chinesepenetrated as far as the companycommand post and the 81mmmortar position. Fighting, some ofit hand-to-hand, continued untildaybreak when the Chinese broke

'It '?,• 44i

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;*- \L4t?SF;

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off the assault but continued tokeep the position under fire. In allBarber had lost 20 Marines killedand 54 wounded. Fox Companydid not know how many Chinese ithad killed but guesses went up to500.

Howard Koone was one ofthose wounded. He eventuallyfound himself in a Korean hutbeing used by Fox Company'scorpsmen as a sick bay. He wastold that helicopters would becoming to evacuate the woundedand that he would be third on thelist, but the helicopters nevercame.

Dawn on 28 November saw thetactical situation on NorthwestRidge unresolved. Hill 1403 hadbeen lost to the enemy. Elsewhereboth Marines and Chinese wereclinging to the high ground.Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,had a firm grip on its portion of theline. As yet there had been noorders to abandon the offensivebegun the day before. Roise hadreceived orders from Murray tocontinue the attack at daybreak.Taplett's 3d Battalion was to comeup on his right flank and add itsweight to the assault.

Murray met with Litzenberg atthe 7th Marines command post atdawn. Both regimental comman-ders agreed that the situation dic-tated that they change from theoffensive to the defensive. Murraycanceled the attacks to be madeby Roise and Taplett.

Murray barely knew Litzenberg.In the south, at Seoul, he had seenhim once or twice at divisionheadquarters. The only intimatecontact he ever had with himwould be at Yudam-ni. Never-the-less, the loose command relation-ship seemed to work. "If be hadtroops on some hills," said Murray,

then I put troops on some otherhills, so that we bad a goodperimeter defense of the area."

Murray remembered thatLitzenberg "had a reputation ofbeing sort of a fussbudget, a stick-ler . . . he seemed to be a studioustype of person, knew his business,and as far as I could tell from talk-ing with people in the 7th Marines,it seemed everyone respected himand his abilities. . . . Many peoplehave asked why he didn't justassume command up there. I can'tanswer that question definitively.After all, there was a divisionheadquarters over the hill from us,and we were still part of that divi-sion, so we had a common head.But in any case, we decided tooperate very closely together, andwe did."

Taplett had begun his counter-attack against the spur of Hill 1384at about 0300 with two platoonsof George Company led by

Lieutenants John J. "Blackie" Cahilland Dana B. Cashion. Some timeafter daylight Cahill and Cashionreached the crest of Hill 1384 withtheir platoons. About this timeTaplett received the order cancelingthe attack. He, in turn, directedCahill and Cashion to hold wherethey were until they received fur-ther orders. With their presence Ofltop of the hill, the remainder ofHow Company, 7th Marines—some 80 officers and men—wasable to complete its withdrawalfrom Hill 1403 and pass on intoTaplett's perimeter.

John Stevens' 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, spent the morning con-solidating its position on Hill 1240.His Charlie Company, underCaptain Jack R. Jones, had movedover during the night to backstopTaplett's battalion and was putunder the operational control ofthe 7th Marines. One platoon wasdropped off to rejoin its parent

A row of dead 6'hinese frozen in grotesque positions, on the high ground over-looking a command post qf the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni, mark the line cf theirfarthest advance. The burden qf the Chinese attack was borne chiefly by isolat-ed Marine rifle companies holding ridgeline positions.

Photo by Sgt Fr2mk C. Kerr, Department of 1)efense Photo (USMC) A4839

57

battalion on Hill 1240. The remain-der of the company continued onto Hill 1282. A company ofChinese from the 235th CCFRegiment had lodged itself on thehilltop. Jones led his reduced com-pany in a hand-to-hand assaultthat won back the hill.

At 1100 Murray ordered Roise topull his battalion back to

Southwest Ridge tying in withHarris' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,on his left and Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, on hisright. Early that afternoon Roisebrought his battalion back fromNorthwest Ridge a company at atime. Except for occasional harass-ing fire, the Chinese did not inter-fere.

58

Early that morning, Davis' 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, had set outto the south to relieve both Charlieand Fox Companies from theirencirclement on the MSR. AbleCompany, under First LieutenantEugenous M. Hovatter, led off,moving through a gorge separat-ing South from Southeast Ridge.Five hours of fighting found AbleCompany still a mile short ofCharlie Company's position. BakerCompany, under Captain Wilcox,joined the attack. Together the twocompanies reached Charlie Com-pany. Litzenberg, with CharlieCompany now relieved and itswounded evacuated, and notwanting to have the 1st Battaliontrapped in the gorge, orderedDavis to pull back into the Yudam-ni perimeter. By evening Stevens'1st Battalion, 5th Marines, hadrelieved the shattered remnants ofHull's Company D, 7th Marines.The two regiments at Yudam-ni,their perimeter tightened andmended, faced the night of 28November with considerable con-fidence. But Barber's FoxCompany remained alone inToktong Pass.

At Hagaru-ri, a platoon-sizedpatrol, sent out to the southwestearly on the morning of 28November from Fisher's ItemCompany, was pushed back intothe perimeter. At about the sametime as this patrol action, Ridgetelephoned Colonel Bowser, thedivision G-3 and Smith's war chief,recommending that an overalldefense commander be designat-ed for Hagaru-ri. He also request-ed that the arrival of his GeorgeCompany and the Royal Marine 41Commando be expedited. Before adecision could be reached,General Smith flew in by heli-copter at about 1100 to open his

o 500Yards I

Perimeter abandoned— — —during night

'L-

_____

- -

4

command post at Hagaru-ri. Ahalf-hour later General Almond,along with his junior aide, 26-year-old Captain Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,arrived in Almond's L-17 light air-craft, the "Blue Goose."

After meeting with Smith,Almond borrowed a Marine heli-copter to take him east of thereservoir to meet with Faith andMacLean. Colonel MacLean, it willbe remembered, had spent thenight of 27 November at Faith'sposition. MacLean thought thatFaith's battalion had come throughthe night in fairly good shape. Heknew little or nothing about whathad happened south of the inlet. Atdawn he left to return to his ownadvance command post. His shortjeep trip was not interrupted.

Almond, on arriving at Faith'sposition in his borrowed MarineCorps helicopter, airily told Faiththat there was nothing in front ofhim except scattered Chineseretreating to the north and that heshould try to retake the lost highground. As further encourage-ment, Almond informed Faith thathe had three Silver Stars to pre-sent, one for Faith himself and twomore for whomever Faith desig-nated. Faith called forward awounded platoon leader and amess sergeant. Almond pinned thethree Silver Stars to their parkas,Captain Haig noted their names inhis notebook, and the general andhis aide got back on board theirhelicopter. As the helicopterwhirled away, Faith and the lieu-tenant tore the Silver Stars fromtheir parkas and threw them in thesnow.

Stopping to see MacLean,Almond advised him that the pre-viously planned attack would beresumed once the 2d Battalion,31st Infantry, joined the regiment.This battalion and Battery C of the57th Field Artillery were maroonedfar south on the clogged MSR.

During the night, the 31stMedical Company, pushing northfrom Hudong-ni had beenambushed and badly shot up inthe vicinity of Hill 1221. Survivorsdrifting back to the headquartersof RCT-31 at Hudong-ni were thefirst indication that the road hadbeen cut.

Meanwhile, General Hodes, theassistant commander of the 7thDivision, was at Hudong-ni. Hedirected Captain Richard E. Drake,commander of the 31st TankCompany, to sally forth to thenorth to see if he could breakthrough to the inlet. Drake movedout with 16 tanks. Hodes rodewith Drake as a passenger; he didnot take tactical command.Without infantry support, thetanks could not break the Chinesegrip on Hill 1221 which effectivelyblocked the route north. Fourtanks were lost. Hodes returned toHudong-ni in a jeep, intent on get-ting back to Hagaru-ri for help. He

59

took a tank, at Drake's insistence,for transportation and got back toHagaru-ri, five miles away, with-out further incident. He neverreturned to Hudong-ni.

South of the inlet that day, 28November, the badly battered 3dBattalion, 31st Infantry, and 57thField Artillery Battalion painfullyreorganized and consolidated theirpositions. Before nightfall, theChinese came back into the attackwith the M16 and M19 self-pro-pelled guns the focal point of theireffort. The automatic 40mm and.50-caliber fire did its lethal work.The perimeter held and manyChinese died.

North of the inlet sporadic fight-ing had continued. A dominant hillposition was lost to the Chinese.Stamford ran close air supportstrikes with Marine Corsairs withlittle apparent effect. To the eastthe battalion could glimpse longcolumns of Chinese marchingsouth, some of them mounted on

Photo courtesy of Sgt Norman L. Strickhine, [iSA

East of the reservoir during 28 November, the Army's 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry,and two firing batteries of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion painfully reorganizedafter the previous night's devastating attack against their positions just south ofPungnyuri Inlet. Bodies can be seen in the foreground. Sporadic fighting con-tinued north of the inlet.

,j.n.

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Mongolian ponies, or so it wassaid. Air strikes were flown againstthem and claimed good results.

Smith had moved into aJapanese-style house, soon over-crowded with the impedimenta ofa division command post. On thewall close by Smith's field deskhung a picture of Stalin; Smith let itremain where it was. By nightfall onthe 28th Smith had officially sanc-tioned actions already taken atYudam-ni. Murray was ordered tohalt his attack to the northwest.Litzenberg was told to attack to thesouth and reopen the MSR toHagaru-ri. Together, Murray andLitzenberg were to plan for thecontinued defense of Yudarn-niand the breakout to the south. Thejoint defense plan worked up byLitzenberg and Murray providedfor RCT-5 to take over responsibil-

ity for the west and north sectors,RCT-7 for the east, south, andsouthwest.

"Although the two regimentalcommanders acted jointly," saidTaplett years later, "I harbored thegut feeling that Colonel Litzenbergand not Colonel Murray called theshots simply because of seniority. Iconfess to having more confidencein Murray."

During the afternoon, ColonelBowser, the division G-3, tele-phoned Lieutenant Colonel Ridgeconfirming his appointment asHagaru's defense commander. Bythen Ridge knew that GeorgeCompany would not he arriving intime to occupy East Hill. GeorgeCompany under Captain Carl L.Sitter reached Koto-ri that sameday. Sitter, 28, had received a fieldcommission in World War II aftertwo years enlisted service. Hefought in the Marshalls and atGuam, was twice wounded, and

had received a Silver Star. At Koto-ri it soon became obvious thatSitter's company could go no fartherwithout strenuous effort.

Colonel Brower had arrived atHagaru-ri with the headquarters ofhis artillery regiment, the 11thMarines. He set up the fire supportcontrol center in juxtapositionwith Smith's headquarters. Hisexecutive officer, Lieutenant Colo-nel Carl A. Youngdale, 48, IowaState University, class of 1936,headed the regiment's fire direc-tion center.

That afternoon, Company D,10th Combat Engineer Battalion,came in from a tent camp the engi-neer soldiers had set up just outsidethe perimeter on the road leadingsouth to Koto-ri. In his expandedrole as Hagaru-ri defense com-mander, Ridge had operationalcontrol of the company. He decid-ed to use it to fill the yawning gapon East Hill. He so informed theengineer company commander,Army Captain Philip A. Kulbes.The engineer captain protested,saying that he was at Hagaru tobuild a new command post for XCorps and that his men—77Americans and 90 SouthKoreans—had no training ininfantry combat. Aside from indi-vidual weapons, the only arma-ment the company possessed wasfour .50-caliber machine guns, fivelight .30-caliber machine guns,and six 3.5-inch rocket launchers.Ridge asked Kulbes if he wouldaccept the tactical advice of aMarine officer and Kulbes said hewould. Captain John C. Shelnutt,the executive officer of the 3dBattalion's Weapons Company,was assigned as a "liaison" officer.Shelnutt was accompanied by aradioman, Private First ClassBruno Podolak. Major Simmonsprivately advised Shelnutt that, inface of the Army captain's reluc-tance, he would have to take de

Before moving north to the reservoii the commander and staff ofthe division'sartillery regimens the 11th Marines, lined up outside their command post atHamhung for a group photograph. Standing, from left to right, are: Ma/DonaldV. Anderson, LtCol Carl A. Youngdcile, the executive officer, Col James H.Browe the commanding ofticer and LtolJames G. Appleyard. Kneeling are CaptWilliam T Phil4ps and Maj Floyd M. McCorlele.

Photo by TSgt James W. Helms, Jr., National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5264

60

I I:tarti—ri \irsLliI I )Icii

facto command. The Army compa-ny procrastinated, taking its timeto move its trucks and engineerequipment into a motor park. Atdusk the engineers started up thehill. The ascent took them throughthe roadblock facing south towardKoto-ri.

About 10 Marines underGunnery Sergeant Bert E. Elliott,the Weapons Company machinegun platoon sergeant, manned theroadblock. Reinforcements for theroadblock came late in the day inthe form of a platoon from theArmy's 4th Signal Battalion sent toinstall communications for whatwas to be General Almond's com-mand post. The Army signal lieu-tenant, First Lieutenant John A.Colborn, like the Army engineercaptain, reported that his men hadno infantry training. The 3dBattalion's Weapons Companycommander asked him if he wouldtake orders from a Marine gunnerysergeant. The lieutenant eagerlysaid that he would.

On the north side of East Hill, thecommanding officer of the 1stService Battalion, LieutenantColonel Charles L. "Gus" Banks,36, a World War II Edson's raider,was named a sub-sector comman-der. He was to coordinate hisactions with Lockwood. WhileKolbes' engineers climbed thesouth face of the hill a column ofMarines sent by Banks started upthe north face. The two columnswere supposed to meet on thecrest.

At sundown, Simmons pulledhis roadblock back about 75 yardsto what he thought was a strongerposition. With a total of about 40men Gunnery Sergeant Elliott wasable to man the roadblock with hisMarines and the knoll on his leftflank, which was the first step in theclimb up East Hill, with the Armysignal platoon. Elliott had been alieutenant during World War II and

he was determined to win back hisbars. Tough, battle-wise, and notparticularly well-liked, even by hisown Marines, he balanced his .45-caliber pistol in the palm of hishand and bluntly advised the sol-diers that if they dug in, stayed,and fought, they would be therein the morning; but if they got upto run, he would shoot them him-self.

While the two columns, Armyand Marine, moved toward thecrest of East Hill, a major Chineseattack hit the southwest quarter ofthe perimeter, fortunately strikingthe strongest segment of theMarine line, that held by Com-panies H and I of the 3d Battalion,1st Marines. The two companies,stretched thinly along the far side ofthe prospective airstrip on whichthe engineers were laboring underlights, were well dug-in. Holes hadbeen blasted through the top 8 or10 inches of frozen earth withration cans filled with C-3 explosiveso that foxholes and machine gunemplacements could be dug. Thespoil was used to fill sandbags. Ameager supply of concertina andother barbed wire was strung outwhere it would do the most good.Five-gallon cans filled with gasolinewere rigged with white phosphorusgrenades. Tied to the grenadeswere strings that could be pulled toexplode the grenades and flamethe gasoline. An earnest demoli-tions sergeant explained that thesewere French devices known as a"foo-gah-say." Three draws ledinto the Marine position; they hadbeen sown with anti-personnelmines. In all, it would be a toughnut for the Chinese to crack.

A light snow was falling. Thetwo companies were at 100 per-cent alert. At about 2230, three redflares and three blasts of a whistle

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signaled that the Chinese werecoming. Mortar shells, high explo-sive mixed with white phospho-rus, began crunching down on thefrontline positions. Marine sup-porting arms—some artillery butmostly mortars and machineguns—took the Chinese underfire, but did not stop the enemyfrom closing to within hand-grenade and burp-gun range. Theassault continued for an hour, theChinese attacking in combatgroups of about 50 men each.Most of the Marine line held, hutthe Chinese succeeded in pene-trating the center of HowCompany's position. The companycommander, Captain ClarenceCorley, pulled together a scratchsquad and tried to plug the gapbut was pushed aside. Some fewChinese broke through as far asthe airstrip where the engineerskilled them.

Ridge dispatched a mixed pla-toon of Marines and soldiers underFirst Lieutenant Grady P. Mitchell,Jr., to back up How Company.Mitchell was killed and FirstLieutenant Horace L. Johnson, Jr.,took over. Johnson deployed hismen in a ditch fortuitously behindHow Company's ruptured line.The Chinese who had penetratedthe position were milling around,seemingly more intent on lootingthe supply and cook tents thanexploiting their success. Theywere fighting for food, warmclothes, and U.S. ammunition. Atleast one wounded Marine sur-vived by feigning death when aChinese soldier stripped him of hisparka. Ridge fed in another pla-toon made up of casuals to build onJohnson's line. By about 0130 thesituation appeared to be undercontrol. The engineers relit theirfloodlights, got back on their doz-ers, and resumed work on theairstrip.

But had things were now hap-

\ulun on list I liii

pening on the other side of theperimeter.

The two columns that had beensent up East Hill had failed toreach the crest. Captain Shelnutt, invirtual command of the Armyengineers and under heavy fire,reported to the 3d Battalion'sWeapons Company commanderthat Banks' column coming up theother way did not seem to bewhere it was supposed to be.Shelnutt was told to turn back hisleft flank and hold for the night. Hewas promised that artillery firewould fill in the gap.

At about 0115, the Marines andsoldiers on the south roadblockwere treated to the sight of a com-pany-sized column of Chinesemarching up the road towardthem. Apparently the pullback ofthe roadblock earlier in theevening had caused the Chinese tothink the position had been aban-doned. The column presented thepair of Weapons Company water-cooled machine guns with a perfectenfilade target. Few members ofthe Chinese column escaped.

At Ridge's command tent heavysmall arms fire and grenades couldbe heard on East Hill itself. TheWeapons Company commanderreached Shelnutt by radio at about0200. Podolak, the radio operator,informed him that Shelnutt wasdead: "There's nobody up hereexcept me and a couple of dog-gies." Poclolak was sternlyenjoined, as a Marine, to takecharge. The next time theWeapons Company commandertried to radio him the set wasdead.

During the night, stragglersfrom the Army engineer company,mostly South Koreans, but someAmericans, streamed back off thehill and took cover in the ditches

and culverts of Hagaru-ri itself.Some few were rallied into a sup-port line, stiffened with a handful ofMarines, along the road parallelingthe base of the hill. Other soldiersstayed on the hill and foughtbravely. Most of these died.

Across the perimeter, CaptainClarence Corley, a spent bullet inhis arm, launched a counterattackat about 0430 to restore his mainline of resistance. It was successful,but the night had cost HowCompany 16 men dead and 39wounded.

Ridge's greatest concern nowwas the situation on East Hill. Ifthe enemy continued to have pos-session of the crest when daylightcame, exposing the defenses ofHagaru-ri to full view, the situationwould be critical. At 0530 hedecided that he must counterat-tack. Major Reginald R. Myers, 31,University of Idaho 1941, the bat-talion executive officer, volun-teered to lead a column up thehill. Myers had spent most ofWorld War II on sea duty butjoined the 5th Marines in time forOkinawa and North China. Therewas no tactical unit available tohim at Hagaru that could he used.The attack would have to be madeby a mixed force of servicetroops—and some stragglersfound skulking in the town—patched together into a provision-al company of about 250 men,mostly Marines hut including a fewsoldiers. Myers' improvised com-pany formed up on the road next tothe battalion command post andwas tolled off into platoons andsquads. The first platoon, made upof Marines from the 1st EngineerBattalion and under command ofFirst Lieutenant Robert E. Jochums,was the most homogenous and inthe best shape.

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Ridge delayed Myers' jump-offuntil about 0930 by which time themorning mists had cleared andCorsairs for close support could bebrought overhead. The southroadblock had held. The soldiersignalmen had stayed and foughtwell, delighting both themselvesand the Marines. Myers led his"company" upward through theirposition. Troubles began almostimmediately, if not from Chinesegunfire then from the icy slope.Men stumbled and fell, to behauled to the rear by others onlytoo willing to carry them to relativesafety. Myers' force melted awayto about 75 men. Best perfor-mance, predictably, was by theplatoon led by Jochums. He waswounded in the foot but contin-ued in command. Myers couldclaim reaching the military crest,but the topographical crest wasstill firmly in Chinese hands.

A supporting attack was to bemade by Company A, 1st EngineerBattalion, under Captain GeorgeW. King, coming up the south faceand passing through Myers' posi-tion. King started up the hill atabout noon, his 1st Platoon underFirst Lieutenant Nicholas A.

Canzona in the lead. Orders werechanged. King's company waspulled back, marched almost amile to the north, and then sent upthe north face. Like the Myersforce, he reached the militarycrest, but on the north side. Hiscompany went into a reverseslope defensive position for thenight, separated from Myers byabout 500 yards. Ridge had to besatisfied with King and Myersholding these positions. TheChinese continued to hold thetopographical crest.

Ridge planned to feed in Sitter'sGeorge Company to take theremainder of the hill when itarrived from Koto-ri. From prison-er interrogation Ridge now

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believed that the 58th CCFDivision, led by the 1 72dRegiment and followed by the1/3d, with the 174th held back inreserve, had attacked CompaniesH and I. It was not clear whatChinese force was driving west toEast Hill or when its deployment toassault Hagaru itself would becompleted.

The Corsairs from Frank Cole'sVMF-312 flew 31 sorties that dayover Hagaru most of them againstEast Hill. One plane took a bad hitfrom Chinese small arms. Thepilot, First Lieutenant Harry W.Colmery, successfully crash-land-ed inside the perimeter.

Brigadier General Hodes, theassistant division commander ofthe 7th Division, had spoken

LtCol Allan Sutter arrived at Koto-riwith the 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, on24 November. Col Puller moved hisheadquarters to Koto-ri on the sameday. With the 3d Battalion atHagaru-ri and the 1st Battalion atChinhung-ni, Puller would have hisinfantry battalions at three widelyseparated combat bases along theMSR.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5546

briefly with General Smith uponhis arrival from Hudong-ni on theevening of 28 November. At noonon the 29th of November, he metagain with Smith, informing him inmore detail of the condition ofRCT-31 east of the reservoir; that ithad taken 400 casualties and wasfalling back toward Hagaru-ri andprobably was unable to fight itsway to safety.

"The inference was that theyshould be rescued by a largerforce," wrote Smith in his log. "Ihave nothing now with which tolend a hand except the battalion atHagaru-ri and it has its hands full.I cannot see why the cutoff battal-ions cannot at least improve thesituation by moving toward us."

Barber was supposed to havebrought Fox Company off ToktongPass and, with the help of Davis'battalion, was to have marched oninto Yudam-ni. There was nochance of this. He was alreadyencumbered with 54 wounded.During the morning of 28November he had the help of aclose air strike by Australian F-51Mustangs. Later he sent out patrolsthat confirmed that he was com-pletely surrounded. He asked forresupply by air. Marine R-5D four-engine transports, the MarineCorps equivalent of the Air Force C-54, dropped medical supplies andammunition. Most fell at the base ofthe hill. Recovering them cost twomore Marines wounded.

That night the Chinese cameagain against Fox Company. Fivemore Marines were killed, 29 morewounded, among the latterCaptain Barber. Hit in the leg, hereceived first aid and stayed inaction. During the day that fol-lowed, both Marine and Air Forceplanes dropped ammunition andother supplies. A Marine heli-

63

copter made a precarious deliveryof some ammunition and much-needed radio batteries. LieutenantPeterson, already twice wounded,took a patrol out in front of FoxCompany to recover some errantmortar ammunition.

Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter's2d Battalion, 1st Marines, hadarrived at the meager village ofKoto-ri on 24 November. Hand-some, silver-haired Sutter, 36,Dartmouth 1937, had been a signalofficer at Guadalcanal, Guam, andOkinawa. Now at Koto-ri, with hisbattalion reinforced by the 105mmhowitzers of Easy Battery of the11th Marines, a platoon of 4.2-inchmortars, bits and pieces of the reg-imental antitank company, andCompany D of the 1st MedicalBattalion, he set up a convention-al perimeter defense.

A patrol from Captain Jack A.Smith's Easy Company brushed upagainst about 25 Chinese west ofthe village and brought in twowounded prisoners who said theywere part of a Chinese divisionmoving into attack positions.Chesty Puller and his regimentalheadquarters had joined Sutter atKoto-ri and in the next severaldays more Marine and Army unitsjammed their way into the protec-tive envelope of the perimeter. Onthe morning of 28 November,Smith ordered Puller to send aforce up the MSR to meet a tankpatrol coming down from Hagaru-ri. Sutter sent out Dog Companyunder Captain Welby W. Cronk,but it was stopped a mile north ofthe perimeter by a strong Chineseforce entrenched on both sides ofthe road. Dog Company withdrewunder cover of air strikes by thebusy Corsairs of VMF-312. Theday's fighting cost the Marines four

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killed and 34 wounded. Threeprisoners were taken and theyidentified their unit as the 1 79thRegiment, 60th CCF Division.

The 28th of November hadbeen a busy day for GeneralAlmond and, when he arrived at hiscomfortable headquarters atHamhung that evening, he foundurgent orders directing him toreport immediately to MacArthur'sGHQ in Tokyo. Almond and asmall staff left for Tokyo fromYonpo in an Air Force C-54. Theyarrived at Haneda Airport at 2130where Almond was told to pro-ceed immediately to GeneralMacArthur's residence at theAmerican Embassy. He learnedthat MacArthur had called hissenior commanders back to GHQfor a secret council of war.General Walker would also be pre-sent. The conference lasted twohours. In the west, Eighth Army's"Home-by-Christmas" offensivehad gone well for the first twodays. Then, on the night of 25November, Chinese bugles wereheard all across the front. By noonon 27 November, Walker hadreported to MacArthur that he esti-mated there were 200,000 Chinesein front of him, that the ROK IICorps had been swept away, andthat the U.S. IX Corps was fallingback to cover his exposed flank.Walker now informed MacArthurthat he thought he could build upa line in the vicinity of Pyongyang.Almond, in a bit of braggadocio,told MacArthur that he expectedthe 1st Marine and 7th InfantryDivision to continue their attack.However, in his own mindAlmond had come to realize thatthe greatest problem facing XCorps was its dispersion over a400-mile front. He had begun tocontemplate concentrating his

forces into a perimeter defensearound the Hamhung-Hungnamarea. MacArthur, after listening tohis field commanders, gave hisdecision: a changeover from thestrategic offensive to the defen-sive. (Some authorities believeMacArthur had already reachedthis decision before meeting withhis senior field commanders.)

The night of 28-29 Novemberwas quiet at Yudam-ni. Divisiondirected that an effort again bemade to relieve Fox Company. Acomposite battalion was pastedtogether of Able Company fromthe 5th Marines, Baker and GeorgeCompanies from the 7th Marines,reinforced with a section of 75mmrecoilless rifles and two sections of81mm mortars. Major WarrenMorris, the executive officer of 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, was placedin command. He assembled hisforce in front of the 1st Battalion,7th Marines, command post on themorning of 29 November and at0800 marched out to the south.

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Three hundred yards outside theperimeter heavy machine gun firelaced into his column. Morrispushed on. Corsairs came over-head to help and dropped mes-sages warning that the Chinesewere entrenched along both sidesof the road. At 1315, Litzenberg,warned that Morris' column was indanger of being surrounded,ordered him to return to theperimeter. Fox Company wouldspend another night at ToktongPass alone. As evening fell,Captain Barber called his platoonleaders together and told themthey could expect no immediaterelief.

During the night of 28November, Faith and MacLeantried to get some sleep in the hutthat was now their joint commandpost. By 0100, 29 November, theChinese were attacking in strengthbut were beaten off. An hour later,MacLean ordered Faith to prepareto breakout to the south with theobjective of reaching the 3d

Photo by Cpl W. T. Wolte, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4868

A company of Marines, quite possibly Capt Welby W Cronk's Company D, 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, makes a school-solution advance up a bill outside the Koto-riperimeter on 28 November. One platoon is deployed as skirmishers followed bythe other two platoons in squad column. Cronk took three Chinese prisoners, butthe Marines lost jbur killed and 34 wounded.

Battalion, 31st Infantry. All truckswere to be unloaded of cargo andgiven over to carrying out thewounded. Equipment and vehiclesleft behind were to be disabledbut not destroyed. Blackout wouldbe observed and there would be noburning of tentage and supplies.

MacLean and Faith began their

march-out at about 0600 onWednesday morning, the 29th. Itwas strangely quiet as the riflecompanies broke contact andcame down from the high ground.The truck column, about 60 vehi-cles in all, formed up and movedsouth on the road with MarineCorsairs overhead. Leading the

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way was a command party thatincluded MacLean and Faith. Asthe party approached the highwaybridge over the inlet, it cameunder fire and split into two parts,MacLean with one, Faith with theother.

A column of troops was seencoming up the road. "Those aremy boys," shouted MacLean andhe started on foot across the icetoward them. A crackle of rifle firewas heard. His body was seen tojerk as though hit several times bybullets. He fell on the ice, then gotto his feet and staggered on untilout of friendly sight. Much later itwould be learned that he wastaken prisoner, but on the marchnorth died of his wounds. Hiscomrades buried him by the side ofthe road.

Faith was now the senior sur-viving officer and the 31st RCTwould go into the collective mem-ory of the Korean War as "TaskForce Faith," although it wouldnever officially bear that name.The head of Faith's columnreached the 3d Battalion's posi-tions by 0900 and by 1300 mostelements had closed south of theinlet. Faith formed a new perimeterwith the remnants of the two bat-talions, attempting to incorporatesome of the high ground to thesouth. A helicopter sent in fromHagaru-ri by General Hodes tookout the two wounded battalioncommanders, Reilly and Embree.Air delivery of ammunition andsupplies, called in by Stamford,had mixed results. Much of whatwas dropped landed outside thenew perimeter.

Faith knew nothing of Drake'sattempt to reach the inlet with histanks. Drake tried a second time on29 November with 11 tanks and ascratch platoon of infantry drawnfrom the regimental headquarters.After four hours of effort, the tanksfell back once more to Hudong-ni.

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The night of 29-30 Novemberwas again relatively quiet atYudam-ni, but not so at ToktongPass. At 0200 a voice came out ofthe dark and in stilted English said:"Fox Company, you are surround-ed. I am a lieutenant from the 11thMarines. The Chinese will giveyou warm clothes and good treat-ment. Surrender now."

Fox Company threw up some81mm illumination shells andreplied with mortar and machinegun fire. The Chinese were caughtin their attack position, perhapsthree companies of them. Manydied but some got close enoughfor an exchange of hand grenades.Fox Company, now well dug in,lost only one Marine wounded. Atsunrise the protective Corsairscame overhead once again.

Short and feisty LieutenantColonel Donald M. "Buck"Schmuck, 35, University of Colo-rado 1938, had taken over com-mand of the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, on 8 November. In WorldWar II he had fought as a compa-ny commander at Bougainvilleand Peleliu, and later served atOkinawa. On the night of 26November the Chinese probed hisperimeter at Chinhung-ni at thefoot of Funchilin Pass with a seriesof light attacks. Patrols sent out bySchmuck the next day failed tomake contact. That night theChinese hit his perimeter withanother tantalizing, easily re-pulsed, light attack. Schmuck sentOut more patrols during the nexttwo days. What they found or didnot find caused him to concludethat a Chinese battalion thatattacked him at night and hid inthe houses to his west during the

day was pestering him.A patrol sent out from Captain

Wesley Noren's Company B on the29th more or less confirmedSchmuck's conclusion. Schmuckdecided to attack the suspectedChinese position on the followingday, using Captain Robert H.Barrow's Company A and a part ofNoren's company, reinforced with81mm and 4.2-inch mortars.Battery F, 11th Marines, under FirstLieutenant Howard A. Blancheri,laid down preparatory 105mmhowitzer fire, the infantry sweptforward, and, in the words ofMajor William L. Bates, Jr., the bat-talion's Weapons Company com-mander, "ran the Chinese right outof the country." The houses thatsheltered the Chinese wereburned. There was no more troubleat Chinhung-ni.

On the evening of 28 Novemberthree disparate units—41 Com-mando, Royal Marines; CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines; andCompany B, 31st Infantry, 7thInfantry Division—had crowdedinto the perimeter at Koto-ri after an

66

uneventful motor march up fromthe south. Puller pasted the threeunits together into a task force,giving command to LieutenantColonel Douglas B. Drysdale ofthe Royal Marines, with orders tofight his way through to Hagaru-rithe next day.

Drysdale barely had time touncrate his newly issued American81mm mortars and Browningmachine guns. He moved out at0945 on 29 November, his truck-borne column followed by a serialof headquarters troops on its way tothe new division headquarters atHagaru-ri. Drysdate's plan was forhis Royal Marines to lead off withan assault against the Chineseentrenched on the right of theroad just north of Koto-ri. CaptainCarl Sitter's George Company—reinforced with a provisional pla-toon of water-cooled machineguns, rocket launchers, and 81mmmortars—was to follow with anassault against Hill 1236, a mile-and-a-half north of Koto-ri. Thesoldiers of Baker Company, 31stInfantry, would he in reserve.

The Royal Marines took theirobjective without much trouble,but Sitter's Marines ran into seri-

Photo courtesy of Sgt Norman L. Strickhine, USA

Parachutes laden with ammunition and supplies blossom as they are droppedby an Air Force c-liP of the Far East Air Force's Combat Cargo 6'ommand to theentrapped RCT-3l east qf the reservoir. Such aerial delivery had mixed results.Much qf what was dropped fell outside American lines and into Chinese hands.

(liinhiuiig—iii \CtioIl,

2 (-31 \ovcm her

Photo by PFC C. Wchner, Jr., National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6593

LtCol Donald M. Schmuck received a Silver Star for his command of 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, at Chinhung-niJ'rom 26 November until 11 December.Making the award sometime in late winter 1951, is Col Francis A. McAlister, whohad been the division G-4 but who by this time had succeeded ('ol Puller in com-mand of the 1st Marines.

otis resistance before taking Hill1236. The British and AmericanMarines then moved togetherabout a mile farther up the roadwhere they were stopped byChinese machine gun and mortarfire coming from Hill 1182.Drysdale received a message fromPuller telling him that three pla-toons of tanks would arrive by1300 to help. The tanks—two pla-toons of Pershings from CaptainBruce W. Clarke's Company D, 1stTank Battalion, and the tank pla-toon with Shermans from the regi-ment's Anti-Tank Company—hadjust arrived at Koto-ri at noon.Drysdale ordered Sitter to breakoff the action and come backdown to the road and await thetanks.

Drysdale found Captain Clarkean "opinionated young man."Drysdale wanted the tanks distrib-utecl throughout the length of thecolumn. Clarke insisted that theybe kept together at the head of the

column to punch a way through.Resignedly, Drysdale resumed hisadvance at 1350, with 17 tanksleading the way, followed bySitter's George Company. It was apulsating advance—short move-ments followed by pauses whileChinese strong points werereduced with 90mm and machinegun fire. Progress was slow andGeorge Company took heavy loss-es.

More tanks—Company B, 1stTank Battalion—arrived at Koto-ri atabout 1500. Puller ordered theircommander, Captain Bruce F.

Williams, to leave one platoonwith Sutter's 2d Battalion and tojoin the rear of the Diysdale columnwith his remaining two platoons.Meanwhile, Puller had dispatched aplatoon from Company E, 2dBattalion, to assist in the evacuationof Drysdale's casualties. The pla-toon did not get back into theKoto-ri perimeter until about 1600.

This sketch by Sgt Schofield shows the meeting at Hagaru-ri of two U.S. Marineswith two Royal Marines of 41 Independent Commando. The professionalismand sangfroid of the British Marines impressed theirAmerican counterparts, who,in turn, impressed the British with their dogged fighting qualities.

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

67

Task Force Drysdale came to a haltabout four miles north of Koto-ri atabout the same time. Shortly there-after the Chinese began poundingthe northern face of the Koto-riperimeter with mortar fire fol-lowed by a company-sized attackthat was easily contained by EasyCompany.

Clarke and Williams, the tankcommanders, advised Drysdaleand Sitter that they thought thetanks could get through toHagaru-ri but were dubious aboutfurther movement by trucks.Drysdale put the decision of a fur-ther advance up to division. Smithordered him to continue. The

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tanks needed to refuel and thistook more time. When the columndid plunge forward unit integritywas lost and combat troopsbecame intermingled with head-quarters elements.

At the midway point to Hagaru-ri there was a valley, about a milelong, high ground on one side andthe Changjin River and more hillson the other—Drysciale wouldnanie it "Hell Fire Valley." Itbecame the scene of an all-nightfight. The column broke in half.George Company, three-quartersof 41 Commando, and a few sol-diers, led by tanks from CompanyD, continued on toward Hagaru-ri.The remainder of 41 Commando;most of Company B, 31st Infantry;and nearly all other headquarterspersonnel were left on the roadwhich the Chinese closed behindthem. The Chinese chopped awayat them. The best protection thestalled half of the convoy couldfind were the shallow ditches oneach side of the road. LieutenantColonel Arthur A. Chidester, 37,University of Arkansas 1935, theassistant division G-4 and thesenior officer in the group,attempted to turn his truncatedcolumn around and return toKoto-ri. He was wounded andcaptured. His place was taken byMajor James K. Eagan, soon alsowounded and taken prisoner.

The half-column that had beenleft behind coalesced into onelarge perimeter and three smallones strung out over a distance ofclose to a mile. Farthest north,near the hamlet of Pusong-ni, wasthe largest perimeter, a hodge-poclge of about 140 men includingAssociated Press photographerFrank "Pappy" Noel. Senior officerwas Major John N. McLaughlin, 32,Emory University 1941, an assis-tant division G-3 and a well-deco-rated veteran who had fought withthe 5th Marines at Guadalcanal,

—

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5354

The village of Koto-ri, midway between Hagaru-ri and the Funchilin Pass, washeld by the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and was the site of Col "Chesty" Puller'sregimental command post. Units moving north and south staged through here.Unseen are the fighting holes 0/the Marine infantry that encircled the camp.

Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu inWorld War II.

There was some hope that theCompany B tanks from Koto-riwould come to the rescue of thefour ragged perimeters, but thetanks were stopped by theChinese at the defile formed byHills 1236 and 1182, the same hillscaptured earlier but now reoccu-pied by the Chinese. The south-ernmost group on the roadworked its way back into theKoto-ri perimeter by 2200 withoutmuch trouble. The middle group,mostly headquarters personnel,also made it back by 0230, losingmost of its trucks along the way. Itsleader, Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S.Walseth, the division G-1, waswounded. (Lieutenant ColonelBryghte D. Godbold would takehis place on the general staff.) Bydawn all of the Company B tankshad returned to Koto-ri.

The troops remaining trappedin Hell Fire Valley and still hopingto be rescued by the tanks knewnone of this. The Chinese mean-while seemed more interested in

the other perimeters. They werebeaten back. He gathered hiswounded in a ditch and prayed fordaylight and the arrival of MarineCorps aircraft overhead. By 0200he was out of grenades. A 75mmrecoilless rifle, gallantly mannedby U.S. soldiers, was knocked outand all its crew killed or wounded.Associated Press photographerNoel and two men attempted torun the gantlet in a jeep and werecaptured.

The Chinese at about 0430 sentseveral prisoners into Mc-Laughlin's position bearing ademand that the Americans sur-render. McLaughlin and a BritishMarine went out under a whiteflag to parley. In a desperate act ofbravado McLaughlin pretendedthat the Chinese wished to surren-der to him, but the enemy was nei-ther impressed nor amused. Theygave him 10 minutes to capitulateor face an all-out assault.McLaughlin, with only about 40

looting the trucks than annihilat-ing the defenders. Major Mc-Laughlin tried sending patrolsback to the south to link up with

A gaggle of Marines, looking like giant penguins in their hooded parkas, watchwith great interest an air strike against a hill outside Koto-ri on 28 November. Thenext day these Marines very probably could have been part of Task ForceDrysdale, which would depart Koto-ri to fight its way to Hagaru-ri.

Photo by cpl W. T. Wolfe, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4865

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:..r4/;r.

able-bodied defenders and almostno ammunition, reluctantly decidedto surrender but with the condi-tion that his most serious woundedbe evacuated. The Chinese agreedto his terms. The Chinese did notlive up to their promise, but theydid, however, permit some of thewounded to be placed in housesalong the road where they mighteventually be found.

While McLaughlin was negotiat-ing his surrender, some fewAmericans and British Marines anda considerable number of U.S. sol-diers managed to slip away fromthe smaller perimeters to thesouth. This group, led largely byMajor Henry W. "Pop" Seeley, Jr.,

33, Amherst College 1939, made itsway successfully back to Koto-ri.Seeley had spent four years in thePacific during World War II andhad been well decorated for hisservice.

Drysdale had continued hisstart-and-stop progress with Com-pany D's tanks, Company G, andthe larger part of 41 Commando,not knowing what had happened tothe rear half of his haphazardcommand. One of the tanks wasknocked out by a satchel charge.Diysdale received a grenade frag-ment in the arm and deferredcommand of the column, momen-tarily, to Sitter.

Well after dark the first of

Company D's tanks, leading thecolumn, burst through Hagaru-ri'ssouth roadblock, flattening one ofWeapons Company's jeeps in theprocess. Sitter's George Companycame into the perimeter, batteredbut intact. The Royal MarineCommando, in accordance with itstraining, split into small groups.For most of the night, U.S. Marineson the perimeter were treated toEnglish accents shouting, "Don'tshoot, Yanks. We're comingthrough." Royal Marine troop com-mander Lieutenant Peter Thomassaid later, "I never thought I

should be so glad to see anAmerican." At about midnight,Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale,blood dripping down his arm,gave Lieutenant Colonel Ridge aside-winding salute and reported41 Commando present for duty.

By best estimates, Task ForceDrysdale had begun the day with922 officers and men. Somethinglike 400 men reached Hagaru-ri,another 300 hundred found theirway back to Koto-ri. Killed inaction and missing in action wereestimated at 162. Another 159 menwere identified as wounded.Forty-four Marines, originally listedas missing, were taken prisoner.Of these, just 25 either escaped orsurvived their captivity. Chidesterand Eagan were among thosewounded who died in captivity.The column had started with 141vehicles and 29 tanks. Of these, 75vehicles and one tank were lost.

Lieutenant Colonel Ridge's com-mand group had remarkably goodintelligence as to the extent of theenemy outside the Hagaru-riperimeter, the information oftenbrought in by "line-crossers,"plainclothes Korean agents whoboldly moved in and out of the

Maj John N. McLaughlin, left, taken prisoner during the disastrous advance ofTask Force Drysdale from Koto-ri to Haga ru-ri, is welcomed back from captivi-ty, still in his Chinese cap and coat, on 5 September 1953, by BGen Joseph C.Burgei then the assistant division commander 0/the 1st Marine Division.

Photo by TSgt Jack E. Ely, Department of 1)efense Photo (U5MC) A1744606.

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perimeter. The Chinese 58thDivision's reported intentions torenew its attack against Hagaru-riseem to have been thwarted bywell-placed air attacks during theday and heavy artillery and mortarfires during the night. Ridge's sup-porting arms coordinator alsoexperimented with night close airsupport, using converging bandsof machine gun tracer fire to pointout targets to the Corsair "nighthecklers" overhead.

At 0800 on 30 November, themorning after George Company'sarrival and a scant night's sleep,Ridge ordered Sitter to passthrough Myers' position on EastHill and continue the attack.Drysdale's 41 Commando washeld in reserve. This company-sized force of highly trained RoyalMarines gave Ridge a small butpotent maneuver element, farmore promising than the scratchreserve formations he had beenforced to use. Drysdale and hisofficers spent much of the dayreconnoitering possible counterat-tack routes and acquainting them-selves with supporting fire plans. "Ifelt entirely comfortable fightingalongside the Marines," saidDrysdale.

Sitter, stoic and unflappable,sent out his 1st and 2d Platoons topass through Myers' toehold onthe hill. They were then to attack onboth sides of the ridge. The 3dPlatoon and two platoons of AbleCompany engineers would followin reserve. Progress was slow andSitter used his reserve to envelopthe Chinese right flank. The attackbogged down and Sitter asked forpermission to set up defensivepositions on the ground previous-ly held by Myers who had with-drawn his meager force. Corsairswere brought in and worked overthe crest of the hill again andagain, but George Company couldnot take the contested ground.

That same day at Hagaru-ri, 30November, Colonel Brower, com-manding the 11th Marines, camedown with a serious liver infec-tion. Command of the regimentpassed to his executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel Youngdale.

Sung Shi-lun was amazinglywell informed as to exactly what hisopponents were doing. Chinesereconnaissance was good; and

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Korean civilians, including linecrossers, were at least as useful tothe Chinese as they were to theAmericans. Moreover, he appar-ently had a serviceable quantity ofsignal intelligence from radiointercepts. Stymied by the Marines'stubborn defense at Yudarn-ni andHagaru-ri, he decided to finish offthe U.S. Army forces east of thereservoir by adding the weight ofthe 81st Division to the 80thDivision already engaged againstTask Force Faith.

National Archives Photo (USAF) AC40314

Ammunition and supplies for the embattled Marines descend from a C-i 19Flying Boxcar of the Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo ('ommand. This was theonly photograph the U.S. Air Force photographer was able to take before 23 -degree-below-zero weather froze the shutter on his camera.

The curious command relation-ships at Yudam-ni continued.Without a common commander inplace on the ground, the two col-located regiments pursued theirseparate missions. Smith hadissued an order on the afternoon of29 November directing Murray toassume responsibility for the pro-tection of the Yudarn-ni area withhis 5th Marines, while Litzenbergwas to employ the entire 7thMarines in clearing the MSR toHagaru-ri "without delay."

At noon on 29 November,Almond departed Haneda airfield inJapan on his return flight from hismeeting with MacArthur. Enrouteto Yonpo he directed his G-3 andother staff members to commenceplanning the break-off of theoffensive and the consolidation ofthe corps. When Almond arrivedat his war room in Hamhung hesaw that, in addition to thepredicament of the 1st MarineDivision and RCT-31 at the ChosinReservoir, his remaining forceswere in considerable disarray.Soule's 3d Infantry Division washeaded in two different directions.A CCF column at Sachang far tothe southwest of Yudam-ni hadalready engaged the division's 7thInfantry. The remaining two regi-ments, the 15th and 65th, wereregrouping at Yonghong on thecoast preparatory to attackingwest, in accordance with orders torelieve pressure on the EighthArmy's dangling flank. In Barr's7th Infantry Division, MacLean'sRCT-31 was already isolated andheavily engaged east of the reser-voir. Barr's remaining regiments,the 17th and 32d Infantry, werepulling back to the Pungsan area.By 2100 that evening X CorpsOperation Order Number 8, pro-viding for the discontinuance of

the attack to the northwest and thewithdrawal of forces into theHamhung-Hungnam perimeter,was ready for Almond's approval.

By that order, Almond placedunder Smith's command all Armytroops in the Chosin Reservoirarea, including Task Force Faithand elements at Hagaru-ri, effec-tive 0800 the next morning. Alongwith the assignment of thesetroops came a highly optimisticorder from X Corps to Smith to"redeploy one RCT without delayfrom Yudam-ni area to Hagaruarea, gain contact with elements ofthe 7th Inf Div E of ChosinReservoir; coordinate all forces inand N of Hagaru in a perimeterdefense based on Hagaru; openand scure Hagaru-Koto-ri MSR."

At 0600, 30 November, Litz-enberg and Murray issued a jointorder for the breakout. (Smith didadmit in his log entry for 30November: "An ADC [assistantdivision commander; that is, Craig]would have come in handy at thispoint.") That same morning,Almond gave the senior membersof his staff a fuller briefing on theMacArthur decision to go over tothe strategic defensive. He made itknown that he had also issuedorders to the ROK I Corps to pullback. By this time the 3d ROKDivision was at Hapsu and theCapital Division above Chongjin.They were now to withdraw toSongjin, a deepwater port about100 miles northeast of Hungnam.

General Barr, who had estab-lished an advance command post atHungnam, was among those pre-sent. After the briefing, Barr—whether at Almond's suggestion oron his own initiative is not clear—flew to Hagaru-ri. There he metwith OP. Smith and Hodes andthen borrowed a Marine helicopterto go forward to Faith's position.Smith asked Hodes to draft a mes-sage advising Faith that his corn-

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mand was now attached to the 1stMarine Division. Barr at this pointwas out of the operational chain-of-command to Task Force Faith, butRCT-31 was still, of course, part ofthe 7th Infantry Division. Barr toldSmith that he was recalling Hodesfrom the Chosin Reservoir area toavoid any misunderstanding as tocommand arrangements. (Hodeswould pay a last visit to Hagaru-rion 2 December,)

Barr arrived at Faith's commandpost shortly before noon. He pre-sumably informed Faith of thechanged command status, either insubstance or by delivering theHodes dispatch.

On his return to 1-lagaru-ri, Barragreed with Smith that Task ForceFaith, with Marine and Navy closeair support, could extricate itselfand get back to Hagaru-ri. Almondarrived at about this time and metwith Smith, Barr, and Hodes atSmith's forward command post, afew hundred yards from whereRidge's Marines were contendingfor possession of East Hill. Almondannounced that he had aban-doned any idea of consolidatingpositions in the Chosin Reservoirarea. A withdrawal would bemade posthaste to Hungnarn.Almond authorized Smith todestroy or burn all equipment thatwould impede his movement.Resupply would be by air. Smithdemurred: "I told him that mymovements would be governed bymy ability to evacuate the wound-ed, that I would have to fight myway back and could not afford todiscard equipment and that, there-fore, I intended to bring out thebulk of my equipment."

Almond shrugged. He thendirected Smith and Barr to workout a time-phased plan to pullback the three Army battalions ofRCT-31 making up "Task ForceFaith." Furthermore, if Faith failedto execute his orders, Almond