U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoirby Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

he race to the Yaluwas on. General ofthe Army DouglasMacArthur's strategictriumph at Inchon

and the subsequent breakout ofthe U.S. Eighth Army from thePusan Perimeter and the recaptureof Seoul had changed the directionof the war. Only the finishingtouches needed to be done tocomplete the destruction of theNorth Korean People's Army.Moving up the east coast was theindependent X Corps, command-ed by Major General Edward M.Almond, USA. The 1st MarineDivision, under Major GeneralOliver P. Smith, was part of XCorps and had been so since the 15September 1950 landing at Inchon.

After Seoul the 1st MarineDivision had reloaded into itsamphibious ships and had swungaround the Korean peninsula toland at Wonsan on the east coast.The landing on 26 October 1950met no opposition; the port hadbeen taken from the land side bythe resurgent South Korean army.The date was General Smith's 57thbirthday, but he let it pass unno-ticed. Two days later he ordered

ON THE CoviR: In this poignant pho-tograph by the peerless Marine andLife photographer, David DouglasDuncan, the dead ride in trucks, legsbound together with pack straps.Photo by David Douglas DuncanAT LEFT: A cold and exhaustedMarine light machine gunnerclimbs resolutely toward a ridgeline.National Archives Photo (USAF)342-FH-37885

Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.,47, to move his 7th MarineRegimental Combat Team northfrom Wonsan to Hamhung. Smithwas then to prepare for anadvance to the Manchurian border,135 miles distant. And so beganone of the Marine Corps' greatestbattles—or, as the Corps wouldcall it, the "Chosin ReservoirCampaign." The Marines called itthe "Chosin" Reservoir becausethat is what their Japanese-basedmaps called it. The South Koreans,nationalistic sensibilities disturbed,preferred—and, indeed, wouldcome to insist—that it be calledthe "Changjin" Reservoir.

General Smith, commander ofthe Marines—a quiet man andinveterate pipe-smoker (his fa-vorite brand of tobacco was SirWalter Raleigh)—was not the sort ofpersonality to attract a nickname.His contemporaries sometimesreferred to him as "the Professor"but, for the most part, to distin-guish him from two more seniorand better known General Smiths inthe World War II Marine Corps—Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smithof famous temper and mild-man-nered Julian C. Smith of Tarawa—he was known by his initials "0. P.,'

Across the Taehaek (Nangnim)Mountains, the Eighth Army,under Lieutenant General WaltonH. Walker, was advancing up thewest coast of the Korean peninsu-la. Walker, a short, stubby man,was "Johnnie" to his friends,"Bulldog" to the press. In WorldWar II he had commanded XXCorps in General George S.

1

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A88898

Ma/Gen Oliver P "OP." Smith com-manded the 1st Marine Divisionthroughout the Chosin Reservoir cam-paign. A studious man, his quietdemeanor belied his extensive combatexperience. His seemingly cautiousstyle of leadership brought him intofrequent conflict with MajGenEdwardM. Almond, USA, the impetu-ous commanding general of X CoJTps.

Patton's Third Army and had beena Patton favorite. But these cre-dentials held little weight withGeneral Douglas MacArthur. Hehad come close to relievingWalker in August during the worstof the situation in the PusanPerimeter. Relations betweenAlmond and Walker were cool atbest.

MacArthur had given Almondcommand of X Corps for theInchon landing while he contin-ued, at least in name, asMacArthur's chief of staff at FarEast Command. Almond, an ener-

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getic, ambitious, and abrasiveman, still nominally wore bothhats although his X Corps com-mand post in Korea was a longdistance from MacArthur's head-quarters in Tokyo.

"General Almond in 1950 and1951 in Korea had several nick-names," wrote Roy E. Applernan inhis Escaping the Trap: The U.S.Army X Corps in Northeast Korea.

'enerally, he was known to hisfriends and close associates asNed. Other names were 'Ned, theAnointed,' which meant he was afavorite of General MacArthur's,and 'Ned, the Dread,' whichreferred to his power, his brusquemanner, and sometimes arbitraryactions."

Many persons, both then andlater, thought that X Corps should

2

have now been subordinated tothe Eighth Army. But on the 28th ofOctober, "0. P.,, Smith was lessconcerned with these higher-levelcommand considerations than hewas with events closer to his head-quarters at Wonsan. The 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, sent south ofWonsan to the coastal town ofKojo-ri, at the direction of XCorps, to protect a Republic ofKorea supply dump had beenroughly handled by a surprisinglystrong North Korean attack. Smiththought that the battalion com-mander "was in a funk and it

would be wise for Puller to godown and take charge." ColonelLewis B. "Chesty" Puller, the regi-mental commander of the 1stMarines, left late that afternoon byrail with the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, "to clear up the situa-tion."

On the following day, Smithwas annoyed by an order fromAlmond that removed the 1stKorean Marine Corps (KMC)Regiment from his operationalcontrol. The two commandersconferred on Monday, 30 October.Almond agreed to the return ofone KMC battalion in order toexpedite the move of the 5th and7th Marines to Hamhung. Aftermeeting with Almond, Smith flewby helicopter down to Kojo-ri andfound that Puller indeed had the sit-uation well in hand.

Tensions and differences be-tween Almond and 0. P. Smithwere no secret. Almond had firstmet the Marine commander onSmith's arrival in Japan on 22August 1950. As Almond stillasserted a quarter-century later: "Igot the impression initially (and itwas fortified constantly later) thatGeneral Smith always had excusesfor not performing at the requiredtime the tasks he was requested todo."

With the 1st Marine Division

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 421392

Six weeks after the successful assault fInchon, the 1st Marine Division made adelayed but unopposed landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1.950. Heavy miningof the sea approaches with Soviet-made mines caused the delay.

After landing at Wonsan, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was sent south to thecoastal town of Ko/o-ri. Here it was savaged by an unexpectedly strong NorthKorean attack. MajGen Smith sent ColLewisB. "Chesty"Pullersouth with the2dBattalion, 1st Marines, to "take charge."

Photo by CpI W T. Wolfe, Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC) A4323

3

assigned as part of X Corps,Almond was Smith's operationalcommander. Smith's administrativecommander continued to beLieutenant General Lernuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., commanding gener-al of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,with headquarters in Hawaii.While not in the operational chain-of-command, Shepherd was re-sponsible for the personnel andlogistical support of the 1st MarineDivision. This gave Shepherd, anold war-horse, an excuse for fre-quent visits to the battlefield.Fifty-four-year-old Shepherd and57-year-old Almond got alongwell, perhaps because they wereboth Virginians and both gradu-ates of close-knit Virginia MilitaryInstitute—Almond, Class of 1915and Shepherd, Class of 1917. "I

liked him," said Shepherd of

LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., left,arrives at Wonsan Airfield on 31October for one of his frequent visitsand is greeted by MajGen Edward M.Almond. The two generals got alongvery well, perhaps because they wereboth Virginia Military Institute grad-uates. Both are wearing cufid Armycombat boots, a jbotgearfiivored byall those who could obtain them.

l'hoto by Cpl Jack Nash, National ArchivesPhoto (LiSA) 111-SC351739

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may have concerned Walker, hut itdoes not seem to have botheredAlmond—nor their common com-mander, General Douglas Mac-Arthur, many miles away in Tokyoin what he liked to call his "GHQ."

General Shepherd arrived atWonsan for one of his periodic vis-its on Tuesday, 31 October. Nextmorning Shepherd flew down toKojo-ri to visit Puller and on hisreturn to Wonsan he and Smithflew to Hamhung to see Litzen-berg. That night Smith entered inhis log:

Almond at VMI, "but I really can'tsay he was one of my closerfriends." Shepherd had had reasonto expect command of X Corps forthe Inchon landing, but MacArthurhad given command to his chief ofstaff, Almond. Shepherd exhibitedno visible grudge and Almond, inturn, always made Shepherd wel-come on his visits and he oftenstayed with Almond in his mess.Years later, Shepherd, who consid-ered Almond an excellent corpscommander, said of him: "He wasenergetic, forceful, brave, and inmany ways did a good job undermost difficult conditions."

Concerning Almond's relationswith Smith, Shepherd said: "Heand 0. P. just didn't get along,from the very first. They're twoentirely different personalities.0. P. [was] a cautious individual, afine staff officer who consideredevery contingency before takingaction. On the other hand Almondwas aggressive and anxious for the

X Corps to push ahead faster thanSmith thought his division should.Smith wisely took every precau-tion to protect his flanks during hisdivision's advance into NorthKorea, which slowed him downconsiderably. I'm sure Almond gotinto Smith's hair—just like I'm surethat I did too."

As a glance at a map will con-firm, North Korea is shaped like afunnel, with a narrow neck—roughly a line from Wonsan west toPyongyang—and a very widemouth, the boundary with RedChina and a hit with the SovietUnion on the north, formed by theYalu and Tumen Rivers. Becauseof this geographic conformation,any force moving from the north tosouth had the advantage of a con-verging action. Conversely, forcesmoving from south to north mustdiverge. As Walker and Almondadvanced to the north, the gapbetween Eighth Army and X Corpswould grow wider and wider. This

4

Litzenberg is concernedover the situation. He hasmoved up behind the 26th

('ol Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., com-manding officer of the 7th Marines,was known to his troops as "Litz theBlitz, "more.for the alliteration than hiscommand style. At the outbreak of thewa Litzenberg was in command of the6th Marines at Camp Lejeune. InAugust 1950, the 7th Marines washurriedly re-activated at CampPendleton using cadres drawn fromthe 6th Marines.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4719

Photo by cpl Jack Nash, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC351740

Using a map spread out on the hood of a jeep, MajGen EdwardM. Almond briefsLtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd on his arrival at Wonsan on 31 October. At theextreme left is MajGen WilliamJ. Wallace Director ofAviation at HeadquartersU S. Marine C'ops, who accompanied Shepherd. MajGen Oliver P Smithstands behind Shepherd and Almond. MajGen Field Harris is on the extreme right.

ROK Regiment and willrelieve them tomorrow. TwoChinese regiments have beenidentified to the front. TheROK regiment is very glad tobe relieved by the Marines.The ROKs apparently haveno stomach for fightingChinese.

Most Chinese historians nowassert, and most Western histori-ans are now ready to believe, thatChina entered the Korean Warreluctantly.

In 1948, Kim Ii Sung, then 37,had emerged under the patronageof the Soviet occupation as theleader of the so-called DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea with itscapital in Pyongyang. In the Westhe remained a shadowy figure.Reputedly he had been a success-ful guerrilla fighter against theJapanese. He had returned toNorth Korea at World War II's endas a hero.

With the civil war against theChinese Nationalists at a successfulclose, Mao in late 1949 and early1950 released four divisions madeup of soldiers of Korean origin toreturn to Korea. These Kim, underSoviet tutelage, reorganized intomirror images of Soviet rifle divi-sions in equipment and training.Early on Kim Ii Sung learned howto play Mao Tse-tung againstStalin. For more than a year, Kim IiSung zigzagged back and forthbetween Moscow and Peiping (notyet known in the West as"Beijing") seeking Stalin's and thenMao's support for an overt inva-sion of the South.

Both Stalin and Mao were atfirst skeptical of Kim's ambitions.Stalin cautioned Kim that heshould cross the 38th Parallel onlyin a counteroffensive to a SouthKorea invasion of the north. Mao

advised Kim to be prepared forprotracted guerrilla warfare andnot to attempt to reunify Korea byforce.

For Mao, Kim's ambitious planswere a distraction. He was muchmore interested in completing hisvictory against the ChineseNationalists by "liberating" Xing-jiang, Tibet, and, most importantly,Taiwan. But in the spring of 1950Stalin, playing his own game, gave

5

Kim a qualified promise of Sovietsupport with the proviso that theNorth Korean leader consult withMao. Accordingly, Kim went againto Peiping in mid-May 1950, puton a bold front and told Mao thatStalin had agreed with his plan toinvade South Korea. A cautiousMao asked the Soviet ambassadorto confirm Kim's assertion. A slyStalin replied that while heapproved Kim's plans, the deci-

Area of Operations1st Marine Division

October-December 1950

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sion to invade South Korea was adecision to be made by China andNorth Korea. Until then Mao'sposition had been that Taiwan'sliberation must have priority overKorea's unification. Reluctantly,Mao reversed these priorities butcautioned Kim on the strong pos-sibility of intervention by theUnited States on the side of SouthKorea. Mao had almost no regulartroops in northeast China. He toldKim that he would move troopsinto Manchuria, poised to crossinto Korea, but that they wouldnot enter the war unless Americantroops crossed the 38th Parallel.

The concentration of Chineseforces along the Yalu did not real-ly begin until mid-July 1950 with theformation of the NOrtheast ('hinaBorder Defense Force, about260,000 troops. By mid-AugustMao was certain that the UnitedNations forces would land at

Inchon. On 23 August, the sameday that MacArthur was wrestingfinal approval for Inchon at a con-ference in Tokyo, Mao was meetingwith his political and military lead-ers in Peiping. They were orderedto complete all preparations by theNortheast China Border DefenseForce for war. The Ninth ArmyGroup, which had been poisednear Shanghai for the invasion ofTaiwan (still known to the Westernworld as "Formosa"), was one ofthe major units ordered to movenorth.

The Inchon landing gaveurgency to Chinese preparationsto enter the war. Two days afterthe landing on 15 September 1950,a liaison party was sent toPyongyang. Meanwhile, Kim IiSung had asked Stalin for help,including putting pressure onChina to send troops. Stalin con-sidered the most acceptable assis-

6

tance by Chinese armed forceswould be in the form of "people'svolunteers." In a telegram to Maoon 1 October, Stalin advised: "TheChinese soldiers may he consid-ered as volunteers and of coursewill be commanded by theChinese." Mao responded the nextday that this was his intention.

For many years Western histori-ans supposed that Lin Piao, a leg-endary Chinese Communist leader,commanded Chinese forces inKorea. They were wrong. At a 4October conference in Peiping, LinPiao argued strongly against send-ing troops into Korea to fight theAmericans and refused to lead theintervention, using the subterfuge ofpoor health. Lin went off toMoscow for medical treatment andMao named Peng Dehuai, a toughold revolutionary, to take hisplace. Peng, born in Hunanprovince of peasant stock, hademerged as a senior commanderin Mao Tse-tung's famed LongMarch in 1934-1935. Peng arrived inPeiping too late for the 4 Octobermeeting but met the next day withMao who directed him to be readyto enter Korea by 15 October. On8 October, Mao officially orderedthe creation of the ('hinesePeople's Volunteers, which wouldbe the expeditionary element ofthe Northeast China BorderDefense Force, with Peng as bothmilitary commander and politicalcommissar.

That same day, 8 October, Maosent his adroit vice-chairman andforeign minister, Zhou Enlai, to theSoviet Union to discuss with Stalinthe provision of air assistance andmilitary equipment. Zhou met withStalin at his Black Sea resort. Stalinwas noncommittal and said that hewas not yet ready to provide airsupport. In Manchuria, PengDehuai was furious when helearned this. He stormed hack toPeiping to meet again with Mao.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

Peng Dehuai, left commander of the Chinese Communist Forces meets withKim Ii Sung, premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Peng later wasChina 's Minister of National Defense but because of his criticism of the Great LeapForward he was dismissed. During the ('ullural Revolution he was arrested,imprisoned, tortured, and died in 1974 from a lack of medical care. He was posthu-mously rehabilitated as a "great revolutionary fighter" and loyal party member

Meanwhile Kim Ii Sung was press-ing for immediate Chinese help.

In early October, Zhou Enlaiinformed the Indian ambassador inPeiping, Kavalam M. Panikkar, thatif the United Nations forcescrossed the 38th Parallel, Chinawould send troops to defendNorth Korea. This warning reachedWashington through diplomaticchannels in New Delhi and Lon-don. Substantiating reports camethrough Moscow and Stockholm.The warnings were forwarded toMacArthur's GHQ in Tokyo.

On 15 October, the famousWake Island meeting of PresidentHarry S. Truman with GeneralMacArthur took place. Truman'slater blunt, hut inadequate, expla-nation for the conference was "Iwanted to have a personal talkwith the General." A waryMacArthur perceived the meetingas a presidential ambush primarilydesigned to reinforce theDemocratic Party's chances of suc-cess in the upcoming congression-al elections. According toMacArthur, the possibility ofChinese intervention came upalmost casually. He stated in hisReminiscences that the generalconsensus was that China had nointention of intervening. Trumanwould later say in his Memoirs thatthe threatened intervention inKorea was a prime reason for themeeting. He wanted MacArthur's"firsthand information and judg-ment."

What Truman took away fromWake Island was that the war inKorea was won and that theChinese Communists would notattack. Asked about the chances ofChinese intervention, MacArthur,according to Truman, replied thatthere was very little chance thatthe Chinese would come in. At themost they might be able to get fiftyor sixty thousand men into Korea,but since they had no air force, "if

the Chinese tried to get down toPyongyang, there would be thegreatest slaughter."

MacArthur remembered the con-versation quite differently. Hewould later say that it was a "pre-varication" that he had predicted,"that under no circumstanceswould Chinese Communists enterthe war." He characterized hisWake Island view on the possibili-ty of Chinese intervention as"speculative." His own local intelli-gence, filtered through to him by hislong-time G-2, Major GeneralCharles A. Willoughby, USA, toldhim that large numbers of Chinesetroops were massed across theYalu, but his estimate was thatAmerica's virtually unopposed airpower would make large-scaleintervention impossible.

Four nights after the WakeIsland meeting, on 19 October, theChinese in massive numbers begancrossing the Yalu.

The entry of Chinese troops inforce into North Korea was notpicked up by United Nations intel-ligence, neither visually by aerialreconnaissance nor audibly byintercepts of radio signals. Innortheast Korea, Almond contin-ued his advance with great confi-dence. Almond's over-ridingambition was to heat his rival,General Walker, to the Yalu. His XCorps included two strong U.S.divisions—the 1st Marine and the7th Infantry—and two Republic ofKorea or "ROK" divisions—theCapital and 3d—and there weremore troops on the way. With theexpected arrival of the U.S. 3dInfantry Division the total wouldcome up to 102,000, about two-thirds as many troops as Walkerhad in his Eighth Army.

The two ROK divisions, orga-nized into the ROK I Corps, could

From left to right: MajGen David G. Barr, commanding General, 7th InfantyDivision; MajGen EdwardM. Almond, Commanding General, X Corps; and CviHerbert B. Powell, Commanding Officei; 17th Infantiy. After Barr's division madean unopposed landing at Iwon on 29 Octobei; Almond pushed Barr to get to theYalu. Powell's regiment was the spearhead for the advance.

Photo b)' cpl Alex Klein, National Archives Photo (IJSA) 111-SC351957

7

best be described as light infantry.They had no tanks and their onlyartillery were obsolescent 75mmhowitzers. Almond's optimisticassessment of the ROK corps'fighting capabilities was "that theywere a good deal better than thepeople they were chasing, the dis-organized, disabled North Koreanforce."

"I realized," said Almond yearslater, "that we were scattered allover the landscape, but the gener-al deployment was controlled bythe terrain of the area in which the[X] corps was to operate." Almondshould also have realized thatthere were strings tied to hisemployment of the 1st MarineDivision and its companion 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. Shepherd, inHawaii, was watching the use ofthe Marines very closely and sowas the Commandant of theMarine Corps, General Clifton B.Cates, in Washington.

Army Major General David G."Dave" Barr's 7th Division hadloaded out from Pusan on 19October as a follow-on to the 1stMarine Division at Wonsan. Barrhad been the chief of staff of severalcommands in Europe during WorldWar II. After the war he had head-ed the Army Advisory Mission inNanking. At the war's beginninghis 7th Division had been strippedto provide fillers for the 24th and25th Divisions, the first divisions tobe deployed to Korea. The 7thDivision, before following theMarines ashore at Inchon, hadbeen hurriedly brought to warstrength with untrained SouthKorean recruits—the so-calledKATUSA or "Korean Augmenteesto the United States Army."

Now, when the Marine landing atWonsan was delayed, Barr's desti-nation was changed to Iwon, 75miles northeast of Hungnam. Iwonwas still theoretically in "enemy"

8

territory, but it had good beachesand was known to be free ofmines. Barr reloaded the 17thRegimental Combat Team underColonel Herbert B. Powell intoseven LSTs (tank landing ships) tobe used in an amphibious assault inthe event that the beaches weredefended. They were not. As atWonsan, the South Koreans hadalready taken the port from theland side. Powell's RCT-17 landedunopposed on 29 October andplunged ahead in a dash forHyesanjin on the Yalu River. Bythe end of the month Powell's leadbattalion was in a bitter four-dayfight with the beaten, but still stub-born, North Koreans at Pungsan.In the days that followed, theremainder of the 7th Division cameashore, The 31st Infantry beganlanding on 3 November with themission of moving in on the leftflank of the 17th Infantry. The 32dInfantry followed on 4 November

and went into bivouac northeastof Hungnam. On 8 November, the31st Infantry ran into Chinesetroops on the slopes of Paek-san, a7,700-foot peak. In what was the7th Division's first contact with theChinese, the regiment reported atleast 50 enemy killed.

Almond considered his controlover the ROK I Corps to be no clif-ferent than that he had over the1st Marine Division and the 7thInfantry Division. Not all wouldagree, then or now, that his com-mand of the ROK units was thatcomplete. Their more bindingorders came from President Syng-man Rhee. While the landings atWonsan and Iwon were still inprospect, the ROK Capital Divisionhad marched steadily up the coastroad to Iwon. The ROK 3dDivision, meanwhile, had movednorthwest from Hamhung towardthe Chosin Reservoir.

On the Eighth Army front, theChinese, whose presence in Koreahad been doggedly denied atGHQ Tokyo, had by late Octobersuddenly surfaced in formidablenumbers. By the end of themonth, the Chinese had defeatedthe ROK II Corps on the rightflank of the tighth Army to thepoint of disintegration, exposingthe next unit to the left, the U.S. ICorps. General Walker ordered ageneral withdrawal to theChungchon River. The Chinese didnot pursue but broke off theiroffensive as suddenly as it began.

Separating the right flank ofEighth Army from X Corps was theTaebaek mountain range, thespine of the Korean peninsula andsupposedly impassable to any sig-nificant number of troops. East ofthe Taebaek Mountains thingsseemed to continue to go well forGeneral Almond and his X Corps.Almond did not appear to be per-turbed by General Walker's prob-lems.

Because of the widely dispersedmissions assigned his 1st MarineDivision, General Smith had divid-ed his command into regimentalcombat teams built around histhree infantry regiments. RCT-5,under Lieutenant Colonel Ray-mond L. Murray, was assigned azone behind Litzenberg's RCT-7.RCT-1, commanded by the leg-endary "Chesty" Puller, already theholder of four Navy Crosses,would remain for the time being inthe vicinity of Wonsan fighting theremnants of one or more brokenNorth Korean divisions struggling toget north.

All three regimental comman-ders had been successful battalioncommanders in World War II.Moreover, Puller had commandedthe 1st Marines at Peleliu. Now inthis new war, Murray, 37, hadbrought the 5th Marines to Korea ina pell-mell rush to play a fire-brigade role in the defense of thePusan Perimeter. Puller, 52, hadarrived from Camp Pendleton withthe 1st Marines in time for theInchon landing. Litzenberg hadformed the 7th Marines at CampPendleton, California, in a matter ofdays and had gotten to Korea intime to join in the battle for Seoul.Litzenberg was called "Litz theBlitz" by some, but this was morean alliteration—and maybe a littlederisive at that—rather than a

description of his command style,which tended to be cautious andbuttoned-up. Because of his close-ly cropped prematurely white hair,some of his irreverent young lieu-tenants, and perhaps a few of hiscaptains and majors often referredhim to, as the "Great WhiteFather."

Murray, the junior regimentalcommander, was simply known as"Ray." Among Marines, who like toargue over such things, Murray's

9

5th Marines, with the highest per-centage of regulars and thelongest time in the fight, wouldprobably have rated highest incombat effectiveness. The 1stMarines, with Chesty Puller as itscommander, most likely wouldhave rated second. The 7thMarines, last to arrive and with thehighest percentage of reserves,still had to prove itself and wouldhave come in third.

Smith had a strong divisionstaff: some members were alreadyserving with the division when hetook command and some that hehad subsequently asked for. At theoutbreak of the war Colonel AlphaL. Bowser, Jr., 40, had just beenassigned as Force Inspector, FleetMarine Force, Pacific. GeneralSmith asked General Shepherd forhis services as G-3 of the division.Shepherd assented and Bowserhad become Smith's operationalright-hand man. Bowser, NavalAcademy 1932, had an enviablereputation in the Corps as aQuantico instructor, staff officer,expert in naval gunfire, andartillery battalion commander atIwo Jima. He said later: "One ofthe major problems of the entireoperation to the north of Wonsanwas our open flank to the west.We never established contact withthe right flank of the Eighth Army,and we had a great void out therewhich I at one time estimated to besomewhere in the neighborhoodof 85 to 100 miles."

In a 1971 interview by D.Clayton James, noted historian andbiographer of MacArthur, Bowsergave his considered opinion ofAlmond's leadership:

General Almond was prob-ably one of the most aggres-sive corps commanders I

have ever seen in action. Hewas aggressive almost to afault in my estimation. From

awards were made inJanuay 1951.

the standpoint of his ownpersonal comfort and safety,he never gave it a thought.He was up at the front a greatdeal. He was what wereferred to as a "hard charger."

However, Bowser went on tosay:

I questioned his judgmenton many occasions. . . . Ithink that General Almondpictured this [campaigni in hismind's eye as a sweeping vic-tory that was in his grasp. Buthe gambled and he lost. . . . Arather vain man in manyways. Ambitious. Could be avery warm personality as apersonal friend. If he had oneglaring fault, I would say itwas inconsistency.

Bowser was not the only starplayer on Smith's team. Virtuallyall of the senior members ofSmith's general and special staff

were combat-tested veterans ofconsiderable reputation.

Brigadier General Edward A.Craig, Smith's assistant divisioncommander, now 54, had beencommissioned in 1917, the sameyear as Shepherd and Smith.During the World War I years,while Smith was in garrison onGuam and Shepherd was winninglaurels in France, Craig was fightinga kind of "cowboys and Indians"bush war against bandits in Haitiand Santo Domingo. In World WarII he commanded the 9th Marines,first in training on Guadalcanaland then in combat on Bougain-ville and Guam—for the last hehad a Navy Cross. He left the clivi-sion in the summer of 1950 tocommand the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade in its adventures inthe Pusan Perimeter, but rejoinedthe parent division in time for theInchon landing. Like Smith, Craigwas tall, slim, and prematurelywhite-haired. Smith, perhaps re-calling his own troubled period as

10

the division's assistant divisioncommander at Peleliu and beingvirtually ignored by the divisioncommander, Major GeneralWilliam H. Rupertus, used Craig'sservices wisely and well, particu-larly as a roaming extension of hisown eyes and ears. But Craigwould be at home on emergencyleave at a critical time in the cam-paign.

Smith's chief of staff, ColonelGregon A. Williams, 54, had joinedthe division at Camp Pendleton inJuly. Before that he had been chiefof staff of Fleet Marine Force,Pacific. A short, erect man,Williams had the reputation ofbeing a "mean SOB." He had hada remarkable—but not unique foran officer of his vintage—career.He had enlisted in San Diego atthe outbreak of World War I, but didnot get to France, serving, in duetime, in Santo Domingo, China,

('ol Gregon A. Williams; shown here asa brigadier general was Smith's chiefof staff Seldom seen in the field by thetroops, Williams ran the division slajfand headquarters with an iron hand.Li/ce many senior Marine officers, hehad had considerable service inChina, both before and during WorldWar II.1)epartment of Defense Photo ([JSMc) A42833

National Archives Photo (IJSMC) 127-N-A5895

For his brilliant staff work as division G-3, ('ol Alpha I. Bowser would later receivea Legion of Merit from Ma/Gen Smith. Standing to Bowser's right is Col BanksonT Holcoinb, Jr., the division G-2, who received a similar decoration. These

tz.

Haiti, and Nicaragua. As a sergeanthe had been in the DominicanGuardia Nacional as a local lieu-tenant. A young Dominican lieu-tenant, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo,who would be the country's long-time dictator, became Williams'life-long friend. (The writer recallsthat at the 1959 New Years recep-tion at the presidential palace, inwhat was then Ciudad Trujillo, thesingle ornament on the grandpiano in the ballroom was a silver-framed photograph of ColonelWilliams.) Service in Nicaraguabrought him a Navy Cross. At thebeginning of the Pacific War, as anassistant naval attaché in Shang-hai, he was taken into custody bythe Japanese and held as a prison-er until August 1942 when he wasrepatriated because of his diplo-matic status. Undaunted, hereturned to China to the newNationalist capital in Chungkingwhere he became involved in thesupport of guerrilla operations. Inthe summer of 1944 he was sent tothe Pacific to take command of the6th Marines, then involved inmopping-up on Saipan. He was aconsummate chief of staff al-though not much loved by thosewho had to work for him. He gotalong famously with contempo-raries such as Craig, but he terrifiedjunior officers. Bowser, after somerough spells, said that, "He and Icame to a perfect relationship."According to Bowser, Williams"took no guff" from Almond orAlmond's chief of staff. Williamsstayed close to the command post.Murray recalled seeing him onlyfive or six times during theirrespective tours in Korea and thenonly at the division headquarters.

Much more visible to the com-mand than Williams—and muchbetter liked—was the deputy chiefof staff, Colonel Edward W.Snecleker, 47. By training a com-munications officer, Snedeker had

been Craig's chief of staff during thefighting by the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade in the PusanPerimeter. Snedeker, Naval Acad-emy 1926, had distinguished him-self in World War II with a SilverStar from Guadalcanal and a NavyCross from Okinawa where hecommanded the 7th Marines.Smith's personal relationship withSnecleker was much closer than itwas with Williams.

The G-1 (Personnel), LieutenantColonel Harvey S. Walseth, 39,Naval Academy 1935, had served inChina before World War II andwas a tank officer at Guadalcanaland Iwo Jima.

The G-2 (Intelligence), ColonelBankson T. Holcomb, Jr., 42,movie-star handsome with histhin, clipped mustache and some-thing of a hon vivant, was an oldChina hand. The cousin ofThomas Holcomb, who was the

Commandant of the Marine Corpsduring World War II and the firstMarine to reach the grade of four-star general, Bankson T. Holcomb,Jr., had graduated froni highschool in Peiping in 1925 andserved two years as an enlistedman before going to the NavalAcademy, Class of 1931. Hereturned to China in 1934 as anassistant to the naval attaché andChinese language student, fol-lowed by two years as a Japaneselanguage student in Tokyo. Hisspeaking and reading ability inboth Chinese and Japanese wasrated as "excellent." He was atPearl Harbor as an intelligenceofficer in December 1941 whenthe Japanese struck. In 1943 hereturned to China once again, thistime to operate out of theNationalist capital of Chungkingwith Chinese guerrillas.

The G-4 (Logistics) Colonel

InJanuay 1951, ('ol Edward W Snedeker would receive a second Legion qfMeritfrom MajGen Smith for his outstanding performance of duty as the division sdeputy chief of staff Earlier, in the Pusan Perimeter, he had been chief of stallof the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-M897

11

'

TI

Francis M. McAlister, 45 and NavalAcademy 1927, had fought as anengineer at Bougainville, Guam,and Okinawa. Like most Marineofficers of his generation, he hadserved in Nicaragua and China.

Walseth, Holcomb, Bowser, andMcAlister were the four pillars ofthe division's general staff. Bow-ser, the operations officer, andMcAlister, the logistics chief, had aparticularly close working partner-ship.

The much larger special staffranged in grade from second lieu-tenant to colonel, from SecondLieutenant John M. Patrick, thehistorical officer, to Colonel JamesH. Brower, the division artilleryofficer. Most of the special staffwere double-hatted; they alsocommanded the unit composed oftheir specialty. Brower commandedthe division's artillery regiment,the 11th Marines, with threeorganic battalions of 105mm how-itzers, a battalion of 155mm how-itzers, and a battery of 4.5-inch

Col James H. Brower was the divisionartillery officer and commandingofficer of the 11th Marines. He fell ill atHagaru-ri and was replaced in com-mand by his executive officer, LtCol('arIA. Youngdale.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4696

multiple rockets. Brower, 42, was aVirginia Military Institute graduate,Class of 1931, who trained as anartilleryman at Fort Sill. DuringWorld War II he served as a staffofficer with amphibious forces inthe invasions of Sicily and Italy,but arrived in the Pacific in time forOkinawa.

Forty-four-year old LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge, as thecommander of the 1st Engineer

12

Battalion, was the division engi-neer. His engineers would workprodigies during the campaign.Partridge, Naval Academy 1936,had been with the 4th MarineDivision at Roi-Namur, Saipan,Tinian, and Iwo Jima.

Smith and his staff, and his sub-ordinate commanders and theirrespective staffs, worked their waythrough new sets of maps, analyz-ing the terrain and divining lines of

communication. Hamhung andHungnam, then and now, areoften confused. Hungnam is theport; it lies on the north side of theSongchon River where it emptiesinto the Japanese Sea. Yonpo, withits airfield, which would provecritical, is on the south side of theestuary. Hamhung is the inlandrail and highway nexus, straddlingthe main rail line from Wonsannorth. A narrow-gauge (2' 6") linealso started at Hamhung toChinhung-ni. From there itclimbed by cable car, now inoper-ative, to a plateau in the shadow ofthe Taebek Mountains. A road par-alleled the narrow-gauge line. Thiswould be the main supply routeor "MSR" for the Marines' advance.The dirt-and-gravel road stretched78 miles from Hamhung toYudam-ni, which, as yet, was just aname on a map. "In only a fewweeks," says the Corps' officialhistory, "it would be known tothousands of Marines as the MSR, asif there never had been another."

RCT-7—with the 1st MotorTransport Battalion and DivisionReconnaissance Company attach-ed—received a partial issue ofcold weather clothing before mak-ing the move north by truck and railduring the last three days ofOctober.

Major Henry J. Woessner, 30,

Naval Academy 1941, and opera-tions officer of the 7th Marines,was at X Corps command post inWonsan on 30 October whenGenera! Almond, standing beforethe Corps situation map, briefedGeneral Barr on the upcomingoperation. Barr's division was topush north to Hyesanjin on theYalu. The 1st Marine Division wasto reach the border by way ofChinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and Hagaru-ri. After describing this twin-pronged thrust to the Yalu,Almond again turned to the situa-tion map. "When we have clearedall this out," he said with a broadsweep of his hand, "the ROKs willtake over, and we will pull ourdivisions out of Korea."

Before leaving the commandpost, Woessner talked to an Armyliaison officer who had justreturned from the ROK 26thRegiment up near Sudong. TheArmy officer told him that theROKs had collided with a Chineseforce and had been driven back.Colonel Edward H. Forney,Almond's Marine Corps deputychief of staff, arranged forWoessner to fly over the objectivearea in an Air Force NorthAmerican T-6 Texan. Woessner sawno enemy on the flight to and overHagaru-ri, but the rugged nature ofthe terrain impressed him.

13

Woessner, on his return thatafternoon to the 7th Marines com-mand post, made his report toColonel Litzenberg who in turncalled in his officers and noncom-missioned officers and told themthat they might soon he fightingthe first battle of World War III."We can expect to meet ChineseCommunist troops," he said, "and itis important that we win the firstbattle."

RCT-7 was scheduled to relievethe ROK 26th Regiment, 3dDivision, in the vicinity of Sudongon 2 November. Litzenherg on 31October cautiously sent out recon-naissance patrols from Hamhungto explore the route northward.One of the patrols from the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines—CaptainMyron E. Wilcox, Jr., two lieu-tenants, three jeeps, and a fireteam—reached the command postof the 26th Regiment near Sudong.Wilcox reported to Litzenberg thatwhile there they had seen aChinese prisoner. The SouthKoreans to!d Wilcox and his patrolthat they had taken 16 Chineseprisoners and had identified themas belonging to the 124th ChineseCommunist Force (CCF) Division.The prisoners said they hadcrossed the Yalu in mid-October.

Further interrogation of the 16prisoners had yielded that theywere members of the 370thRegiment of the 124th CCFDivision, which along with the1 25th and 126th Divisions, madeup the 42d CCF Army. Roughlyspeaking, a Chinese army was theequivalent of a U.S. corps. Onarriving from the Yalu, the 124thhad deployed in the center todefend the Chosin Reservoir, the126th had moved east to the vicin-ity of the Fusen Reservoir, and the125th to the western flank on the

Distances in Road Miles

Hungnam to HamhungHamhung to Oro-riOro-ri to Majon-dong

8

Majon-dong to Sudong.Sudong to Chinhung-ni

7

Chinhung-ni to Koto-riKoto-ri to Hagaru-ri .

.14

Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni

10

.6

11

TOTAL

.14

.78

V •

"t— —'—a .1'....

-w 1itfr

Airfield, five miles southwest ofHungnam.

right of the 124th Division.Continuing the northward

movement of his division fromWonsan, Smith ordered Murray toadvance a battalion of the 5thMarines to Chigyong, eight milessouthwest of Hamhung. Murraysent his 1st Battalion underLieutenant Colonel George R.

Newton. Newton, 35, NavalAcademy 1938, had been a com-pany commander in the EmbassyGuard at Peiping in 1941 andspent World War II as a prisoner ofwar. Now, as a battalion comman-der, he had done well at Pusanand Inchon. One of Newton'scompanies was detached torelieve a company of the 7thMarines that was guarding Yonpo

As yet the Marines had encoun-tered no enemy anywhere alongthe MSR from Wonsan north toHamhung; but Litzenberg was cer-tain that he soon would be facingChinese adversaries. On the fol-lowing day, 1 November, he sent astronger patrol from the attacheddivision Reconnaissance Companyto reconnoiter the Huksu-ri areaabout 45 miles northwest ofHungnarn. This patrol, mounted in21 jeeps and under FirstLieutenant Ralph B. Crossman,after running into a small NorthKorean guerrilla force about threemiles short of its objective, dug infor the night.

Meanwhile, the Marines beganhearing rumors that the EighthArmy's 1st Cavalry Division—which they had last seen when the1st Cavalry passed through theMarine lines north of Seoul headedfor the successful capture ofPyongyang, the North Korean cap-ital—was in serious trouble. Ifdivision headquarters had more

I'hoto by Cpl Alex Klein, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC351718

Marines on 31 October saw for themselves the first C'hinese prisoners taken by ROKI Coips. These prisoners, identified as belonging to the 124th CCF Division, arewearing padded winter uniforms that offered little or no protection for the feetand hands, and the weather was about to turn cold.

A 3.5-inch rocket section with Company 6', 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, holds aposition outside Hamhung on 31 October. The next day the 7th Marines wouldbegin its march northward to relieve the 26th ROK Regiment near Sudong-ni.

Photo by C21 Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A5129

14

a;

ti1 4IWC Q

.tQL

—

November, the South Koreans

Marine is wearing a parka.

definitive information, it did notfilter down to the troops. Some 60miles to the Marines' west in theEighth Army zone of action, theChinese had roughly handled the8th U.S. Cavalty Regiment and theROK 6th Division during the lastdays of October, but this had littleor no effect on Almond's plans.Litzenberg's orders to advanceremained unchanged. His firstobjective was to be Koto-ri.

During the day on 1 November,the 7th Marines made a motormarch from Hungnam to anassembly area behind the ROK26th Regiment, midway betweenOro-ri and Majon-dong, withoutincident. Nevertheless, a cautiousLitzenberg ordered LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis, 35,Georgia Tech 1938, to make areconnaissance-in-force to SouthKorean positions north of Majon-dong with his 1st Battalion, 7thMarines. In World War II, Davishad commanded a heavy weaponscompany at Guadalcanal and an

infantry battalion at Peleliu. Thelatter battle brought him a NavyCross.

Late in the afternoon the regi-mental combat team curled upinto a tight perimeter for the night.As part of RCT-7, Litzenberg hadMajor Francis F. "Fox" Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines; the divi-sion Reconnaissance Companyunder Lieutenant Crossman; Com-pany D, 1st Engineer Battalion,Captain Byron C, Turner; Com-pany E, 1st Medical Battalion,under Lieutenant CommanderCharles K. Holloway; detachmentsfrom the division's Signal Battal-ion, Service Battalion, and MilitaryPolice Company; and most of the1st Motor Transport Battalion,Lieutenant Colonel Olin L. Beall.

The ROK 26th Regiment, await-ing relief, had withdrawn to aposition about four miles south ofSuclong. Early on the morning of 2

15

were probed by a CCF combatpatrol estimated to he about twoplatoons in strength. Later thatmorning, Davis' 1st Battalion ledthe way out of the 7th Marines'perimeter toward the ROK lines atMajon-dong. Major Webb D."Buzz" Sawyer, 32, followed withthe 2d Battalion. A graduate of theUniversity of Toledo, Sawyer hadbeen commissioned in 1941.During World War II, as a captainand major he served with the 4thMarine Division at Roi-Namur,Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima.Afterward, as an instructor atQuantico, he was known as anexpert in the reduction of fortifiedpositions.

Corsairs from Marine fightersquadron VMF-312 flew cover forwhat was essentially a paradenorthward. The passage of lineswith the ROKs was over by 1030.The point, Company A, underCaptain David W. Banks, tooksome scattered long-range fire andsuffered a few casualties. Resis-tance thickened.

Major "Fox" Parry, 32, com-manding the 3d Battalion, 11thMarines, was a Naval Academygraduate, Class of 1941. He hadbeen the executive officer of anartillery battalion during Okinawaand immediately before Korea hehad taken the yearlong AdvancedArtillery Course at Fort Sill. Atnoon Battery I of Parry's artillerybattalion fired the first of 26 firemissions covering the advance thatwould be shot during the day.

VMF-312, commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel J. Frank Cole, flew12 close air support missions and,as the light failed, night-fightersquadron VMF(N)-513, underMajor J. Hunter Reinburg, deliv-ered a few more.

Both Cole and Reinburg wereexperienced squadron comman-ders. Cole, 35, had entered the

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4525

The 7th Marines began its motor march north from Hungnam on 1 NovembeiA cautious ('ol Homer Litzenberg ordered LtC'ol Raymond G. Davis, command-ing officer of the 1st Battalion, to reconnoiter to hisfront. Davis'Marines movedforward on foot. A crackle of small arms /ire caused the column to halt momen-tartly. A fill issue of cold-weather clothing has not yet been received. Only one

'iii u rsd av, 2 \oVcI11 her

rp gc--I-. rL1

U- 'L r

j,l Ii.'

artillery missions, shot on 2 November,by Marine Corsairs.

Marine Corps from the University ofNebraska in 1939 and had com-manded fighter squadron VMF-111in the Central Pacific and VMF-312at Okinawa. Reinburg, 32, was thestepson of Marine Corps aviationgreat Lieutenant General ClaytonC. Jerome. Reinburg had enlisted inthe Naval Reserve in 1936 andtransferred to the Marine Corps asan aviation cadet in 1940. Flying asa captain in the Solomons hebecame an ace, shooting downseven Japanese planes anddestroying seven more on theground. Before taking commandof VMF(N)-513 he had spent ayear as an exchange pilot flyingnight fighters with the BritishRoyal Air Force. Technically,Marine fighter-bomber squadronsdesignated as "VMF(N)" were all-weather squadrons, but the "N"universally caused them to becalled "night fighters." Reinburg'ssquadron flew twin-engine Grum-man F7F-3Ns Tigercats

a mile south of Sudong, stretchingacross the valley from high groundto high ground. Behind him wasSawyer 's battalion similarly dis-posed. Sawyer was responsible forthe high ground on both sides ofthe line of march. Captain Milton A.Hull, 30, commanding CompanyD, had some problems going upHill 698 on the left hand side of theroad. (Hills and mountains—bothalways called "hills—were desig-nated by their height in metersabove sea level. Thus Hill 698would be 698 meters or 2,290 feetin height.) A ROK company hadprecipitously given up its hillsideposition. The South Koreans, asthey passed hurriedly southward,pointed back over their shouldersexclaiming "Chinese!"

Hull, a University of Floridagraduate, had been commissionedin 1942 and had spent a good partof the war in China with the guer-rillas, possibly with some of thesame Chinese soldiers he was nowfighting. Easy Company, underCaptain Walter D. Phillips, Jr.,passed through Hull's DogCompany to complete the fight,getting almost to the crest just

ColHomerLitzenberg called his road march a "walking perimeter. "Here apartof the column pauses off the road, while Marine artillery and air pound the hillsahead. At nightfall on 2 November, LtCol Ramond Davis' 1st Battalion, lead ele-ment of the main body, halted one mile short of Sudong.

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A4498

Photo by CpI Peter W. Mcl)onald, Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A4549

Guns of Maj Francis F. "Fox" Parry's 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, covered theadvance of the 7th Marines to Sudong. Here a 105mm howitzer from CaptSamuel A. Hannah's Battery G, laidfor high-angle fire, awaits afire mission. First

alternated with close air support strikes

The main body of RCT-7, movingalong the road in what Litzenbergcalled a "walking perimeter," hadadvanced just short of a mile bynightfall. Davis' 1st Battalion'snighttime positions were less than

16

ft

4.I

— -t

midday on 2 November with his1st Battalion. The 2d Battalioncame back from Kojo-ri the fol-lowing day. The 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, was still heavily engagedat Majon-ni, 26 miles west ofWonsan.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4438

These Marines are members of Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. By 2November, LtCol Raymond L. Murray's regiment had moved up by train toHamhung with orders to patrol between Hamhung and Chigyong. Two days laterthe 3d Battalion was positioned near Oro-ri and the 2d Battalion was sent intoSinhung Valley. The 1st Battalion remained at Chigyong.

before midnight. (Rifle companieswere almost invariably called bytheir name in the phonetic alphabetof the time: "Dog," "Easy," "Fox,"and so on.) Farther to the rear wasMajor Maurice E. Roach's 3dBattalion, in a perimeter of itsown, protecting the regimentaltrain.

That morning, 2 November,Smith had met again with Almond.The 2d and 3d Battalions of the5th Marines were moving by trainto Hamhung. The 1st Battalion hadalready gone northward. Smithpointed out that the main supplyroute from Wonsan would be leftexposed to guerrilla attack.Almond was not disturbed. Hesaid that patrols could handle theguerrilla situation. Puller's 1stMarines, supported by elements ofthe 1st Tank Battalion, was giventhe responsibility from Wonsannorthward to as far as Munchon.Murray's 5th Marines would patrolsouth from Hungnam to Chigyong.This left 54 miles from Chigyongsouth to Munchon uncoveredexcept for light patrolling by

Litzenberg did not know it, huthe was two-thirds surrounded bythe 124th CCF Division. The 371stRegiment was in the hills to hisnorth and west. The 370th Reg-iment was to his east. Somewherebehind these assault regiments,the 3 72d Regiment stood ready inreserve.

By midnight on 2 November the1st and 2d Battalions of the 7thMarines were being probed. Anhour later both battalions werebending back from the weight ofassaults on their flanks andMarines became acquainted withthe Chinese habit of using flares

Almond's Special OperationsCompany and a handful of SouthKorean counterintelligence agents.

Puller returned to Wonsan at

By 3 November, the 7th Marines was surrounded on three sides by the Chinese124th Division. Fighting grew fierce and casualties mounted. A sturdy mason-ry building in the shadow of high-tension lines coming down from the hydroelectricplant on the Changjin plateau became a battalion aid station.

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4541

17

F-t—

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4489

MajGen Smith used his assistant divi-sion commander, BGen Edward A.Craig, as his roving eyes and ears.Here, on 3 November, Craig, left,checks with Col Litzenberg whose 7thMarines had just made its first solidcontact with the Chinese. Litzenberg isdigging away at a half-size can of C-ration, probably canned fruit, a

favorite.

and bugle calls to signal theirattacks.

On the MSR, the roadblock infront of Able Company let a T-34tank go by, thinking it was afriendly bulldozer. The single tankpushed through the companyheadquarters area and on throughthe battalion's 81mm mortar posi-tion, reaching Davis' commandpost. The startled Marines engagedthe tank with rocket launchers andrecoilless rifles; the tank took oneor two hits and then turnedaround and headed north.

All three of Davis' rifle compa-nies suffered heavy casualties asthe night went on. The Chineseattackers got down to the road andwedged their way between the 2dand 3d Battalions. The regiment's4.2-inch Mortar Company wasoverrun and lost one of its tubes.When morning came a confusedsituation faced the Marines. TheChinese were still in the valley.

Getting rid of them would be an all-day effort. At first light Cole'sVMF-312 came overhead with itsCorsairs and was joined in mid-morning by Reinburg's Tigercats,pounding away with rockets, frag-mentation bombs, and cannonfire. Parry's howitzers renderedyeoman service; before the end ofthe day his 18 guns had fired 49missions delivering 1,431 105mmrounds. At closer range, Marineriflemen flushed Out the Chineseenemy, fragmented now into indi-viduals and small groups.

This would be Reinburg's lastshow. On 4 November he relin-quished command of VMF(N)-513to Ohio-born Lieutenant ColonelDavid C. Wolfe, 33, Naval Acad-emy, Class of 1940. A big, athleticman, Wolfe had taken flight trainingas a captain and had commandedscout-bomber squadron VMB-433in the Southwest Pacific duringWorld War II.

The 1st Battalion counted 662

18

enemy dead in its zone of action.The 2d Battalion did not make aprecise count but could not havebeen far behind. When Marinetrucks came up with resupply,they carried back to I-Iungnamabout 100 wounded Marines.Total Marine casualties for the twodays—2 and 3 November—were44 killed, 5 died of wounds, 1missing, and 162 wounded, most ofthem in the 7th Marines.

As recorded in the official histo-ry by Lynn Montross and NicholasA. Canzona, a tactical principlewas emerging: "To nullify Chinesenight attacks, regardless of large-scale penetrations and infiltration,defending units had only to main-tain position until daybreak. Withobservation restored, Marine fire-power invariably would meltdown the Chinese mass to impo-tency." It was a principle thatwould serve the Marines well, timeafter time, in the coming severalweeks.

1)epartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A4501

Chinese prisoners, taken by Col Litzenberg 'S 7th Marines in the 3-4 November fight-ing, were identjied as being members of the 370th and 371st Regiments of the124th Division. Chinese Communist "volunteers"Jbught well, but were surpris-ingly docile and uncomplaining once captured.

,p' J•.

c;zfi

Photo by CpI L. B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4463

BGen Edward Craig, on the left and wearing a Marine 'fore-and-aft" cap, andMajGen Edward Almond, on the right with map case and wearing an Army cap,went forward to the 7th Marines command post to see jbr themselves the Chineseprisoners that had been taken. ('01 Homerlitzenberg, the regimental comman-der, is talking with BGen Craig.

ing the night of 3-4 November.The perimeters were pepperedlightly, but there were no furtherChinese assaults. Later it was

Wounded Marines arrive at the battalion aid station of Maj Webb D. 'Buzz"Sawyer's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Helicopter evacuation was still the exceptionrather than the rule. Most wounded Marines were hand-carried down to the clos-est road and then moved by jeep to the nearest aid station. Here they would besorted out ("triage") and sent to the rear for more definitive treatment.

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4546

learned that the 370th and 371stCCF Regiments were withdrawing toa defensive line, established by the3 72d Regiment about two milesnorth of Chinhung-ni, stretchingfrom Hill 987 to Hill 891.

Litzenberg ordered increasedpatrolling to the north to begin atdawn on 4 November. Marinesfrom Davis' 1st Battalion patrolledto the edge of Sudong, met noresistance, and returned to theirperimeter. Crossman's Reconnais-sance Company moved out in itsjeeps at 0800. First LieutenantErnest C. Hargett took the pointinto Sudong and met a party ofChinese in the middle of the town.Hargett's men killed three andtook 20 more as willing prisoners.Crossman now put Second Lieu-tenant Donald W. Sharon's 2d pla-toon into the point with the 1stBattalion coming behind them intoSudong.

The North Korean People'sArmy (NKPA) skeleton 344th TankRegiment, down to five Soviet-built T-34 tanks and apparentlyunable to negotiate Funchilin Pass,had been left on the low ground tofend for itself. One T-34 was aban-doned after being damaged in itswild one-tank attack against the7th Marines command post. Theremaining four tanks took coveredpositions off the road. Sharonpassed by the first hidden T-34 butbumped into the second. He andtwo of his Marines damaged thetank with hand grenades. CharlieCompany, 7th Marines, with itsown 3.5-inch rockets and rein-forced with a section of 75mmrecoilless rifles, came on the sceneand finished off the second tank. Athird tank emerged from athatched hut. Engaged by bothrocket launchers and recoillessrifles, the tank continued to moveuntil stopped by the 5-inch rocketsof a flight of Corsairs. The Marinesnow found the bypassed first tank.

The 7th Marines' positionsremained essentially the same dur-

19

7t rI

After receiving fire, the crew sur-rendered their tank and them-selves. The fourth tank, nowalone, surrendered without a fight.The 344th NKPA Tank Regimentwas no more. Litzenberg, havingadvanced almost four miles bymid-afternoon, ordered his regi-ment to halt for the night in a tightperimeter at Chinhung-ni.

For the first 43 miles north fromHungnam the 1st Marine Di-vision's MSR was a two-lane high-way passing through relatively flatterrain. At Chinhung-ni the roadnarrowed to one lane as it wentup Funchilin Pass, climbing 2,500feet in eight miles of zigzaggingsingle-lane road clinging to thesides of the mountains; "a cliff onone side and a chasm on theother" as the official historydescribed it. The narrow gaugerailroad was operable as far asChinhung-ni and it was decided toestablish a railhead there.

The division ReconnaissanceCompany was ordered to move

forward another mile, on up intoFunchilin Pass, and outpost thesouthern tip of Hill 891. With

Second Lieutenant Charles R.

Puckett's 3d Platoon out in front,the reconnaissance Marinesmoved almost into the saddle sep-arating Hills 987 and 891, alreadyinconveniently occupied by theChinese. A firefight developed.The company held its ground butlost two Marines killed, fivewounded, and two jeeps des-troyed.

On 4 November, Smith shiftedhis command post from Wonsan toHungnam, occupying an aban-doned engineering college on theoutskirts of the city. In reconnoi-tering for the site, Smith's assistantdivision commander, BrigadierGeneral Craig had been treated tothe sight of 200 dead Koreans laidout in a row, executed by theCommunists for no apparent rea-son. Smith flew to Hungnam byhelicopter and occupied the newcommand post at about 1100. Mostof his headquarters arrived by railthat evening, an uneventful tripexcept for a few scattered rifle

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald National Archives Photo (USMC) I 27-N-A4496

Bodies of dead Marines, covered with ponchos and shelter halves, await furtherdisposition. The 7th Marines fight at Sudong lasted three days, 2-4 November.Division casualties for the period, nearly all of them in the 7th Marines, totaled61 killed in action, 9 died of wounds, 162 wounded, and 1 missing in action.

The 7th Marines entered Sudong on 4 November. Beyond Sudong the main sup-ply route began its climb into Funchilin Pass. Here, a Marine patrol, troubled bya sniper, searches out a hamlet of thatched-rooftd, mud-wattle huts.

l)epartment of Defense Photo (U5MC) A4537

20

-Hz-.t

rtA

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Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

A Marine sniper draws a bead on a distant Chinese enemy. This sketch, andnumerous others that follow, are by Cpl (later Sgt) Ralph H. Schofield, a talent-edMarine Corps reservist from Salt Lake City, who served as a Leatherneck mag-azine combat artist. A seasoned veteran of World War II, Schofield had foughtas an in/àntryman in the South Pacific.

shots. The larger part of his head-quarters would remain in place inHungnam for the duration of theoperation.

To the south of the 7th Marines,the battalions of Murray's RCT-5were having their own adventures."Our first assignment was to go tothe east side of the reservoir,"remembered Murray. "I wondered,why are they splitting us up likethis?" By 4 November, the 1stBattalion (Lieutenant ColonelGeorge R. Newton) had been leftbehind at Chigyong and detachedto division control. The 3dBattalion (Lieutenant ColonelRobert D. "Tap" Taplett) was posi-tioned near Oro-ri. The 2dBattalion (Lieutenant ColonelHarold S. Roise) had been sentinto Sinhung Valley, five milesnorth and 15 miles east of the 7thMarines, to relieve the ROK 18thRegiment. The relief was accom-plished without incident. Roise,34, from Idaho, had spent World

War II in the battleships Maryland(BB 46) and Alabama (BB 60).The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, washis first infantry command and hehad done well with it at Pusan,Inchon, and Seoul. His missionnow was to block the Sinhung cor-ridor and to find a northerly routeto either the Chosin Reservoir or tothe reservoir known to theMarines by its Japanese name"Fusen." The Korean name was"Pujon." Roise's mission carriedhim away from 1st MarineDivision's axis of advance and intothe zone of the 7th InfantryDivision.

Early on Sunday morning, 5

November, the Major Roach's 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, passedthrough the 1st Battalion to con-

SSgt Meyer Rossum triumphantly displays a poster of Soviet dictatorJoseph Stalinfound in a by-passed Chinese bunker in the vicinity of Funchilin Pass. Marineswould learn that the Chinese, desp ite problems of weather and terrain, were aviddiggers and experts at field fortification.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 1 27-N-A4807

21

tinue the advance up FunchilinPass. Hargett's reconnaissance pla-toon led the way. Rounding a hair-pin turn, Hargett ran into Chinesefire and had four more Marineswounded. The 3d Battalion movedinto the attack. Item Company wasgiven Hill 987 and George Com-pany Hill 891 as their objectives.Both were stopped by mid-morningby heavy small arms and machinegun fire. For the rest of the day thebattle continued as a duel betweenParry's 105mm howitzers andChinese 120mm heavy mortars.From overhead, the Corsairs ofVMF-312 delivered 37 close airsupport sorties.

At the top of the pass the roadflattened onto a plateau and ranfor two miles until it reached the vil-lage of Koto-ri where it rejoinedthe now-abandoned narrow gaugerailroad. During the day GeneralSmith gave Litzenberg the objec-tive of reaching Koto-ri.

Roach's 3d Battalion continuedthe attack the next morning. HowCompany, under First LieutenantHoward H. Harris, was to passthrough George Company andmove up the southern tip of Hill891. Item Company, under FirstLieutenant William E. Johnson,was to continue its attack againstHill 987. Both attacks went slowly,with the assaults not gettingunderway until mid-afternoon.

Second Lieutenant Robert D.Reem, leading one of How Com-pany's platoons in the final assault,threw himself on a Chinesegrenade and was killed. Harrisradioed Roach that his companywas exhausted. Roach relayed thereport to Litzenberg who orderedthe company to disengage andwithdraw. Next morning, 7November, Roach's battalion againmoved up the slopes of both Hills891 and 987, and this time foundthem empty of enemy. TheChinese had disappeared during

the night. For most of the nextthree weeks traffic northward onthe MSR would be unimpeded.

Meanwhile, in accordance withAlmond's decision on 3 Novem-ber, X Corps troops and the 1stMarine Division continued toshare the responsibility for theWonsan-Hungnam MSR. Ope-ration of the Wonsan-Hamhungrail line came under X CorpsRailway Transportation Section.The division began sending sup-ply trains north daily fromWonsan. For two days they gotthrough unmolested, but on thethird day, 6 November, the trainwas halted at Kowan by torn-uprails. North Korean guerrillas thenattacked the train, which wasguarded by 39 Marines fromCharlie Company of the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion. Ta-ken by surprise, eight Marineswere killed, two wounded, at theoutset. Six more Marines werewounded in the ensuing firefight.The guard then broke off actionand found protection within theperimeter of an Army artillery bat-talion.

Smith was promised the use ofthe Army's newly arrived 65thRegimental Combat Team to guardbridges and other key points alongthe route. Rail service fromWonsan to Hamhung was resumedon 9 November with the cautionthat passengers were to ride only inopen gondola cars. Their steelsides promised some order of pro-tection from small arms fire andmortar fragments. While Marinesrattled northward in gondola cars,MacArthur on 9 November in-formed the Joint Chiefs of Staffthat complete victory was still pos-sible and reiterated his belief thatU.S. air power would prevent the

22

Chinese from crossing the Yalu indecisive numbers.

The Army's 3d Infantry Division,its ranks hastily filled out withSouth Koreans, began arriving atWonsan in early November. MajorGeneral Robert H. "Shorty" Soule,the division commander, was aparatrooper who had fought withthe 11th Airborne Division underMacArthur in the Southwest Pa-cific. The first regiment of Soule'sdivision to land was the 65thInfantry, made up largely ofPuerto Ricans, on 5 November.Almond came, looked, and said he"didn't have much confidence inthese colored troops."

During World War II, Almondhad commanded the U.S. 92dInfantry Division which hadalmost all white officers but blackrank-and-file. The division hadturned in a mixed performance inItaly. Almond's prejudices weretypical of his generation andSouthern background. The regi-mental commander, Colonel Wil-liam W. Harris, West Point 1930,protested that most of his menwere not "colored," but "white."Almond, unconvinced of the 65thRCT's reliability, told Harris that hewas going to send the regimentnorth to Yonghung and then westacross the mountains to make con-tact with the Eighth Army's rightflank. Harris was appalled bythese orders.

The 1st Shore Party Battalion,under command of legendaryLieutenant Colonel Henry P. "Jim"Crowe, 51, stayed behind atWonsan to help the 3d InfantryDivision land and unload. Crowehad enlisted during World War Iand had a fabled career as footballplayer, team shot, and bandit fight-er, reaching the highly prized war-rant grade of Marine gunner in

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1934. He had a Silver Star fromGuadalcanal and a Navy Crossfrom Tarawa where he command-ed a battalion as a major. Hethought Soule "one of the finestmen" he ever met, but he foundAlmond "haughty."

There was now clear evidencethat the Chinese, and some NorthKoreans, were out in front ofRoise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, inSinhung Valley but keeping theirdistance. Northwest of Sinhungitself and about 10 miles due east ofKoto-ri, Dog Company captured astray Chinese soldier found sleep-ing in a house. He proved to be awealth of information. He said thathe belonged to the 126th CCFDivision. He asserted that six CCFarmies had arrived in North Koreaand that a total of 24 divisions hadbeen committed to the interven-tion. He had learned this in aseries of lectures given by politicalofficers to his regiment after it hadcrossed the border.

Smith conferred with Almondon the afternoon of 7 November."He apparently has been some-what sobered by the situation onthe 8th Army front, which is notvery good," Smith entered into hislog. Almond promised Smith that hewould let him concentrate the 1stMarine Division.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,remained at Chigyong. On 7November, Major Merlin R. Olson,32, the battalion's executive offi-cer, with Companies A and Breconnoitered in force west ofOro-ri to Huksu-ri. On the 8th, stillshort of his objective, Olson raninto a North Korean force, estimat-ed at 2,000, and was recalled.

Meanwhile, Roise's patrols hadfound no useable road to eitherChosin or Fusen Reservoirs but

units—at fighting strength.

had learned that the road leadingnortheast to the Manchurian border,into the zone assigned to the U.S.7th Infantry Division, could bearmilitary traffic. One of his patrolstouched a patrol from the 31stInfantry on 8 November. Smithhad an understanding withAlmond that if the 5th Marinescould not get to the FusenReservoir by road, Barr's 7thInfantry Division would attempt toreach it from the east.

On 8 November General Al-mond visited the 7th Marines. Onlearning that Captain Thomas E.Cooney, commander of GeorgeCompany, had been twice slightlywounded on Hill 891, he awardedCooney an on-the-spot Silver Star.His aide was caught without asupply of medals. Almond scrib-bled a note on a piece of paper—"Silver Star for Gallantry inAction"—and pinned it to Coon-ey's jacket.

A patrol of 15 Marines under

23

First Lieutenant William F. Gogginof the 2d Battalion left Chinhung-niat noon on 8 November, reachedKoto-ri, and next evening returnedunscathed to the lines of the 3dBattalion. Next day, 10 Novemberand the Marine Corps Birthday,the 1st Battalion passed throughthe 3d Battalion and an hour-and-a-half later entered Koto-ri.

X Corps issued an order attach-ing the 65th Infantry and the ROK26th Regiment to the 1st MarineDivision. Two battalions of SouthKorean Marines were also to beattached. On receiving the orderSmith learned that he was respon-sible for making contact with theEighth Army. He gave orders tothat effect to the 65th Infantry andwas annoyed to find that Almondhad already given the regiment'scommander, Colonel Harris,detailed instructions down to thecompany level as to what to do.Something of the same happenedwith regards to the mission of theROK 26th Regiment. "Such a pro-cedure, of course, only createsconfusion," Smith fussed in hislog. "It was this type of procedure

Photo by cpl L. B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (uSMc) 127-N-A4620

LtC'ol Raymond Davis' 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, occupied Koto-ri on theMarine Corps Birthday, 10 November, against no resistance. A day later need-ed replacements arrived. One or two battalion-sized replacement drafts arrivedin Korea each month to keep the division ranks—particularly the infantry

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Photo by Sgt John Babyak, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4562

At division headquarters at Hamhung, MajGen Smith observed the Marine Co;'psBirthday in traditional fashion. He read the birthday message from the MarineCorps Manual and then cut the somewhat meager cake with a Korean sword. Astradition prescri bes, the first slice went to the oldest Ma rifle present; BGen Craig.

which I protested to GeneralAlmond in connection with directorders given to my regiments." ToSmith's further annoyance, he wasordered to provide a rifle companyto guard X Corps command post atHamhung. The order was passed tothe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, forexecution. Taplett received it with"surprise and disgust," not under-standing why a headquarters withabout 2,000 troops needed extrasecurity so far behind the lines ofadvance. He detailed Item Com-pany under Captain Harold G.Schrier to do the job—the sameSchrier who as a lieutenant hadtaken his platoon up MountSuribachi on Iwo Jima to raise thefirst flag.

That evening there was aMarine Corps Birthday party inGeneral Smith's mess attended byhis staff. Punch and cake wereserved. Smith entered in his log: "Iread the paragraphs from theMarine Corps Manual and then cutthe cake with a Korean sword."

The weather had turned terrifi-

Koto-ri, a hapless little hamlet. Asthe official history observed, thecold seemed "to numb the spirit aswell as the flesh." On the 11th,Company C, 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, had a fight in which itlost four Marines killed, fourwounded, and claimed 40 enemycasualties. Otherwise the enemyseemed to have vanished.

Murray received orders on 9November to concentrate his regi-ment on the MSR leading toChosin Reservoir. Newton's 1stBattalion, coming out of Chigyongon 10 November, was to move toMajon-dong. A patrol sent forwardfrom Newton's battalion wasambushed and had to be rescuedwith a battalion-sized attackbefore the battalion could get tothe village. On the 13th, anotherpatrol from the 1st Battalion, 5th

cally cold up on the plateau, wellbelow zero at night. Platoonwarming tents were set up in

Col "Chesty" Puller cuts the Marine 6'orps Birthday cake on 10 November at his1st Marines regimental headquarters outside Wonsan where the weather was stillpleasant. Far to the north, on the Chosin plateau, the 7th Marines was alreadyencountering sub-zero temperatures.

Photo by Cpl W. T. Wolfe, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4571

24

I

1' boxes freezing up. Smith bor-rowed a jeep from Taplett anddrove on up to Koto-ri.

By now MacArthur had toaccept that the Chinese were inKorea in strength, perhaps asmany as 100,000 of them, but hewas still of the opinion that Chinawould not make a full-scale inter-vention.

Almond had moved his head-quarters on 11 November from

ters, would become a huge problem.

Marines, ran into a company-sizedgroup of Chinese that killed sevenMarines and wounded three morebefore withdrawing.

Roise's 2d Battalion came out ofSinhung Valley on 13 Novemberwith orders to relieve the 7thMarines of the responsibility ofdefending Koto-ri. Along the wayRoise's Marines picked up oneChinese and 12 North Korean pris-oners. An airstrip capable of han-dling light aircraft was opened atKoto-ri that same day. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, was now atChinhung-ni. Taplett, 32, fromSouth Dakota, had spent most ofWorld War II on sea duty with thecruiser Salt Lake City (CL 25). The 3dBattalion was his first infantrycommand. He was not always aneasy personality, but his perfor-mance at Pusan, Inchon (where hehad led this battalion ashore in thesuccessful seizure of Wolmi-do inthe opening phase of the landing),and Seoul had been outstanding.Still stiffer fights were ahead ofhim.

Wonsan to Harnhung with plans tomove his command post farthernorth to Hagaru—ri. Almond musthave reflected that 11 Novemberwas Armistice Day from the FirstWorld War. Many of the seniorleaders in Korea had fought in thatwar, including MacArthur as abrigadier general and Almond as amajor. Almond had served withdistinction in the U.S. 4th InfantryDivision as commander of the 12thMachine Gun Battalion. Armistice

(Continued on page 34)

The wreath with "Merry Christmas, "perhaps some Ma rine's idea of humor, is mis-leading. The photo was probably taken at Chinhung-ni in mid-November. At leftis LtC'ol Robert D. Taplett, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, andat right is his executive officer, Maj John j. Canny, who would die at Yudam-nitwo weeks later.

Smith, making his own road

25

Department of Defense Photo (VSMC) A4628

On 12 November the villagers at Koto-ri were informed that they have been "lib-erated" and were now free to elect their own village officials. The large numberof Korean civilians, who would later crowd into the Marines' defensive perime-

reconnaissance of Funchilin Pass,took a helicopter as far asChinhung-ni. Helicopters at thattime, because of the cold and alti-tude, were not going farther north;there being problems with gear

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A7349

How cold was it at the reservoir? MostMarines "knew" that the temperature wentdown to about 25 degrees below zero at

night, but how many Marines had a thermometer intheir pack?

The cold was no great surprise, unless, perhaps,you were like one Marine from Samoa who hadnever seen snow before. The division staff knew bylate October or early November that Hagaru-ri hadthe reputation of being the coldest place in NorthKorea, with a recorded temperature of 35 degreesbelow zero. The climate is roughly like that ofMinnesota or North Dakota. The winter of 1950was a cold one, but not unusually so. The powersthat he had adequate warning that it was coming andconsiderable preparations had been made.

Those at the top, and some at other levels in the1st Marine Division, had had some experience withcold weather operations, if not by participation, atleast by observation and a bit of training.

The division's commanding general, MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, had gone with the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade to Iceland in August1941 to relieve the British garrison, as a major in

command of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Heremembered Iceland as a "bleak and ruggedisland—mountains, cliffs, no trees—not a tree" andmost of all the violent, never ceasing wind.

There were others, besides Smith, in the divisionwho had also been in the Iceland expedition. Oneof them was Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L.Murray, commander of the 5th Marines. In Icelandhe had been a captain and commander of amachine gun company. He had also served inPeiping in North China before World War II. He didnot find Iceland as rugged as Korea: It was not ter-ribly cold. I don't think it ever got much below 10above zero."

The Marines suddenly on their way to Iceland didnot, at first, have any specialized winter clothing.They wore their wool kersey winter service uniformsincluding their woolen overcoats, supplemented bysome items bought on the open market, notablysome short, sheepskin-lined, canvas coats pur-chased from Sears Roebuck and carried as organi-zational property. Another much-favored additionwere pile-lined hats with ear flaps, such as Marineshad worn in North China.

The Marines in Iceland did not live in tents or in

26

Coping with the Cold

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-424584

These Marines, looking very fresh, pause en route toYudam-ni on 27Novemher to heal their c-rations over anopen fire. They are wearing the newly Lcsued shoe-pacs withboot socks folded neatly over the tops. At the far left theMarine appears to be wearing old-fashioned galoshesover field shoes or boots, a better combination against thecold than the shoe-pacs.

Cold was all-pervasive, even at Hamhung, whtch with itsnear sea -level elevation was much milder than up on theChangjin plateau. Here Marines at Hamhung, probablymembers of a combat service unit, cook bacon andbeans on top of a stove made from a gasoline drum.

Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC) A4617