A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA GANG VIOLENCE

AND JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 1998

 Beatriz Jimenez

California State University, Long Beach

May 2012

Introduction & PurposeGang violence and crime is a serious and widespread problemA “trend of ‘get tough’ laws being enacted throughout the nation” in the 1990s (Cruz, 2002, p. 29) was fueled by the notion that juvenile crime was growing and the juvenile justice system was too lenientIn 2000, 62% of Californians voted to pass Proposition 21, also known as the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act., which, among other punitive changes, allowed teenagers age 14 or older to be directly tried in adult court for murder or serious sex offenses (Bhimji, 2004)The goal of decreasing juvenile crime does not appear to have been achieved by the law, and minority youth have been the most adversely affectedThe purpose of this policy analysis was to examine the background and history of the policy, as well as its effectiveness and short and long-term impact

Social Work RelevanceProposition 21 and its effects can have several implications to the field of social work. The analysis of this policy can help social workers in gaining a better understanding regarding the dynamics of the law and both its direct and indirect impact on youth, as well as, families, and communities. Increased understanding of the law and its impact can help social workers be better equipped to provide treatment, prevention, or advocacy services.

Literature ReviewIt was not until 1899 that a juvenile court was first established in Chicago, applying the notion of parens patriae or the notion that the state has the authority and responsibility to protect children’s well-being (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). The aim of these early entities was to use treatment in order to rehabilitate delinquents instead of focusing on the punishment of crimes committed (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). However, eventually changes to the juvenile justice system led to a shift towards more punitive means and easier access of transfers to criminal court.Drastic increases in serious and violent crimes during the 1970s and then mid 1980s fueled motivation behind legislation throughout the nation that decreased restrictions on transferring cases to juvenile court based on the age of offenders and the severity and type of crime (Fagan,1996).In the 1990s, policy changes throughout the nation continued and were even more drastic (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).

Methods This policy analysis of Proposition 21 was conducted using

components of David Gil's social policy analysis framework (1992).

The components of the framework that were utilized in this analysis include a description of the social problem and the key issues the policy addresses, the objectives, value premises, theoretical positions and effects of the policy, and implications of the policy for social structure and the social system.

This study used both primary and secondary sources as data to analyze Proposition 21.

Primary sources included public and government records addressing the policy.

Secondary sources consisted of journals, newspapers, and databases. For example, peer-reviewed journals were utilized, such as, the Law and Society Review, Law and Human Behavior, Crime and Delinquency, and the California Law Review. Statistical information was gathered from sources like California’s Criminal Justice Statistics Center.

Policy AnalysisNature, Scope, and Distribution of the Issues It was estimated that 28,100 gangs and 731,000 gang

members were found in the United States in 2009 (Egley & Howell, 2011).

In 2008, approximately 2.11 million juvenile arrests were reported (Puzzanchera, 2009).

Causal Theories or Hypothesis Concerning the Issues Juveniles are particularly vulnerable to external

influences and factors that increase their likelihood of committing offenses, including peer, family, and neighborhood influences (Slobogin & Fondacaro, 2009).

Overt Objectives The general overt objective of California’s Proposition

21 was to reduce gang violence and crime committed by youth. As argued by those in favor of Proposition 21, it was expected it would “toughen the law to safeguard you and your family” (Elvey, Trask, & Tefank, 2000, para. 2).

Policy AnalysisUnderlying Theories In the proposition it was argued that the rehabilitative or treatment theories

were initially implemented in juvenile court “at a time when most juvenile crime consisted of petty offenses [and that the court was] not well-equipped to adequately protect the public from violent and repeat serious juvenile offenders” (California Secretary of State, 2000, Findings and Declarations section, para. 9).

Target Segment The target population directly affected by Proposition 21 is youth age 14 or

older who have committed a serious or violent offense in California, as well as, adults who have committed a gang-related offense (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000).

Effects The short term, intended effect of the policy is that gang members and

youth responsible of violent and serious offenses received harsher punishment, including being sent to adult prisons (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000). Although the number of felony arrests had been decreasing in previous years, after 2000 they continued to decrease slightly(Brown et al., 2007).

However, there were several unintended effects that resulted from the enactment of Proposition 21. In fact, by being sent to prisons with adult criminals it was expected that youth would learn to become “better criminals” (Taylor, 2002, p. 992).

SummaryFindingsPublic concern of the drastic increases in serious and violent crimes beginning in the 1970s fueled motivation behind legislation throughout the nation that has shifted the system back to a more punitive one and the state of California has not been the exception (Fagan,1996; Stahlkopf et al., 2010). Proposition 21 and other punitive policies were passed despite the likelihood that minority youth would continue to be the most affected by them, at that time minority youth in California were already over twice more likely to be sent to adult court than White youth and over eight times more likely to be sentenced to adult prison (Macallair & Males, 2000).Proposition 21 was passed despite the fact that abundant research had found that youth who are sentenced by adult court tend to be more likely to reoffend and return to prison than those who are kept in juvenile court and sentenced to juvenile facilities (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000).

LimitationsLack of continued research and literature examining the specific effects of the policy from its enactment to recent timeDoes not appear to be a clear consensus on how to specifically and comprehensively measure the level of effectiveness of the proposition in decreasing gang violence and juvenile crimeStatistics specific to gang membership and gang activity in California is not available

REFERENCES

Bhimji, F. (2004). I want you to see us as a person and not as a gang member or a thug. Journal of Theory and Research, 4(1), 39-58.Brown, B., Cabral, E., Steenhausen, P., & Carson, D. (2007). California’s criminal justice system: A primer. Los Angeles, CA: Legislative Analyst’s Office: California’s Non-Partisan Fiscal and Policy Advisor. California Secretary of the State. (2000). Juvenile crime. Initiative statue. Text of Proposition 21. Retrieved from http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/21text.htmCruz, J. (2002). Juvenile waiver and the effects of Proposition 21. Law and Society Review, 1, 29-40.Egley, A., & Howell, C. (2011). Highlights of the 2009 national youth gang survey. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention.Elvey, M, Trask, G., & Tefank, R. (2000). Juvenile crime. Initiative statue. Argument in favor of Proposition 21. Retrieved from http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/ Propositions/21yesarg.htmFagan, J. (1996). The comparative advantage of juvenile versus criminal court sanctions on recidivism among adolescent felony offenders. Law & Policy, 18(1), 77-114.Gil, D. (1992) Unraveling social policy: Theory, analysis, and political action towards social equality (rev. 5th ed.). Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books.Legislative Analyst’s Office. (2000). Proposition 21. Juvenile crime. Initiative statue. Retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2000/21_03_2000.htmlMacallair, D., & Males, M. (2000). Color of justice: An analyses of juvenile adult court transfers in California. Washington D.C.: Building Blocks for Youth: Youth Law Center.Puzzanchera, C. (2009). Juvenile justice bulletin: Juvenile arrests 2008. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention.Slobogin, C., & Fondacaro, M. R. (2009). Juvenile justice: The fourth option. Iowa Law Review, 95, 1-62.Stahlkpof, C., Males, M., & Macallair, D. (2010). Testing incapacitation theory: Youth crime incarceration in California. Crime & Delinquency, 56(2), 253-268.