A P P E A R A N C E S The Sole Member For the Tribunaljustice.ie/en/JELR/2011-12-08_-_Smithwick_Tribunal_-_Day_63.pdf/... · And I understand, in fact, that, in 1989, you wrote a

A P P E A R A N C E S

The Sole Member: His Honour Judge Peter Smithwick

For the Tribunal: Mrs. Mary Laverty, SCMr. Justin Dillon, SCMr. Dara Hayes, BLMr. Fintan Valentine, BL

Instructed by: Jane McKevitt

Solicitor

For the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana: Mr. Diarmuid McGuinness, SC

Mr. Michael Durack, SCMr. Gareth Baker, BL

Instructed by: Mary CumminsCSSO

For Owen Corrigan: Mr. Jim O'Callaghan, SCMr. Darren Lehane, BL

Instructed by: Fintan Lawlor Lawlor Partners Solicitors

For Leo Colton: Mr. Paul Callan, SCMr. Eamon Coffey, BL

Instructed by: Dermot Lavery Solicitors

For Finbarr Hickey: Fionnuala O'Sullivan, BL

Instructed by: James MacGuill & Co.

For the Attorney General: Ms. Nuala Butler, SCMr. Douglas Clarke, SC

Instructed by: CSSO

For Freddie Scappaticci: Niall Mooney, BLPauline O'Hare

Instructed by: Michael FlaniganSolicitor

For Kevin Fulton: Mr. Neil Rafferty, QC

Instructed by: John McAtamneySolicitor

For Breen Family: Mr. John McBurney

For Buchanan Family/Heather Currie: Ernie Waterworth

McCartan Turkington BreenSolicitors

NOTICE: A WORD INDEX IS PROVIDED AT THE BACK OF THIS TRANSCRIPT. THIS IS A USEFUL INDEXING SYSTEM, WHICH ALLOWS YOU TO QUICKLY SEE THE WORDS USED IN THE TRANSCRIPT, WHERE THEY OCCUR AND HOW OFTEN.

EXAMPLE: - DOYLE [2] 30:28 45:17

THE WORD “DOYLE” OCCURS TWICEPAGE 30, LINE 28PAGE 45, LINE 17

I N D E X

Witness Page No. Line No.

CHRIS RYDER

EXAMINED BY MR. VALENTINE 2 1

CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. DURACK 41 19

CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. O'CALLAGHAN 63 15

CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. COFFEY 83 25

RE-EXAMINED BY MR. VALENTINE 91 8

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Smithwick Tribunal - 8 December 2011 - Day 63

Doyle Court Reporters Ltd.

1

THE TRIBUNAL RESUMED ON THE 8TH OF DECEMBER, 2011,

AS FOLLOWS:

CHAIRMAN: Morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am sorry for

the late start, I can assure you it was very necessary.

MR. VALENTINE: Good morning, Chairman. Chairman, there

are two witnesses scheduled for today. The first of those

witnesses is Mr. Chris Ryder. Mr. Ryder is already in the

witness-box.

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CHRIS RYDER, HAVING BEEN SWORN, WAS EXAMINED BY

MR. VALENTINE AS FOLLOWS:

MR. VALENTINE: I should say at the outset, Chairman, that

there are two aspects to Mr. Ryder's evidence which relate

to lines of inquiry which the Tribunal is currently

pursuing in its ongoing concurrent private investigation,

and, in those circumstances, it would be premature to hear

from Mr. Ryder in relation to those two aspects today, but

he has kindly agreed to return for a second visit to give

that evidence in the new year, if required.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Q. MR. VALENTINE: Now, Mr. Ryder, I believe you are a 1

journalist with some 40 years of experience of covering

events in Northern Ireland. I wonder if you could just

outline to the Chairman your career history, so to speak?

A. Well, for 18 years, from about 1972, I worked for the

London Sunday Times. I was based in London, I spent most

of my time back in Belfast and Dublin. And then, after

that, I joined the Daily Telegraph in 1988 and I stayed

there until 1993, and since then I have been a freelance

writer. I have written about ten books about various

aspects of the police and military activities in Northern

Ireland over the years. I also served on the Northern

Ireland Police Authority from 1994 to 1996, and I was a

member of the Community Relations Council in Northern

Ireland from 1990 to 1996.

Q. I think it's fair to say, Mr. Ryder, that you have, in your 2

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journalistic endeavours, you have a particular expertise,

and are known to have a particular expertise, in policing

and security matters?

A. Yes, those would be the two areas in which most of my works

was focused.

Q. And I understand, in fact, that, in 1989, you wrote a book 3

called A Force Under Fire, which is considered by many to

be the definitive history of the RUC to that date?

A. Yes, that's my book.

Q. I think you have been following press coverage of the 4

Tribunal, and a number of matters which you saw arose your

interest because you had previously written certain

articles in relation to one of those. One of those is a

name that arose in the context of the Tribunal's business,

and that's the name of a businessman called Jim McCann in

Dundalk?

A. That's correct, yeah.

Q. Did you write an article in relation to Mr. McCann? 5

A. Yes. My attention was drawn to Mr. McCann's operations in

Dundalk by a source of mine at Scotland Yard, and by other

sources then in Northern Ireland once I had begun to make

inquiries. I actually vaguely knew of McCann, who had been

prominent as a boxer in Northern Ireland in the years,

about late 1960s, perhaps, at the very early stage of the

Troubles. I was then aware that he had jumped bail, but I

can't recall for what offence he was before the courts in

Northern Ireland. And then I didn't hear of him again

until this link to the gaming-machines factory in Dundalk

was pointed out to me.

Q. You knew he jumped bail. Were you aware that he had fled 6

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the jurisdiction into the Republic?

A. Yes, I discovered then, when I made some inquiries, that he

had taken up residence, I think it was at a place called

Dromiskin, just outside Dundalk, but that he was operating

a factory -- I just can't remember the precise location; it

was quite close to the railway station and near the big

Tesco store there.

Q. In Dundalk town? 7

A. In Dundalk town. It was an IDA-funded factory.

Q. And what did your contact in Scotland Yard tell you about 8

that factory or Mr. McCann's activities?

A. Well, it was pointed out to me that the factory was of

interest to them because of possible links with the

manufacture of bomb-making equipment which had been used in

London, and which was also being used in Northern Ireland,

and then when I made further inquiries, I discovered that

Mr. McCann was making gaming machines, and that at the time

I was aware that gaming machines were a source of

fundraising for republicans and indeed loyalists in

Belfast.

Q. In what way? 9

A. They were put in the drinking clubs and taxi depots, and

places like that, and they were -- the proceeds of the

machines were taken away by representatives of the IRA and

the loyalists and they were used to fund their

organisations, and they were quite a money-spinning,

lucrative activity, because the payouts were tilted in

favour of the people who operated the machines rather than

the punters who were putting the money in.

Q. So it assisted a kind of Provisional IRA fundraising or 10

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racketeering --

A. Yes, I can't remember the figures now --

Q. -- scheme? 11

A. -- but there were figures returned in some of the accounts

of the clubs which showed that there was quite a

considerable amount of money going through the machines.

Q. And did you -- when you wrote your story for the Sunday 12

Times, you dealt with these matters in this level of

detail, did you?

A. It's so long ago now I just can't remember the detail, but,

you know, we did write some articles about the IRA's

racketeering activities to make money. And then the other

side to that investigation was that the machinery, or the

equipment in the factory in Dundalk, was ideally suited to

making electronic circuitry boards for the machines, but

that was also then being used to make sophisticated

electronic timer power units for the detonation of bombs,

and I think that through the bomb intelligence network,

that the British authorities had identified components and

things of that sort which led back and pointed to McCann's

factory, and there was a man called Eoin McNamee who was

regarded as being the bomb maker, and he was subsequently

convicted in England of activities, making bombs.

Q. And this factory was receiving funding from the IDA? 13

A. Yes, I understood it was receiving funding from the IDA. I

was then, later, told by an Irish diplomat, after we had

drawn, the Sunday Times had drawn their attention to what

was really going on in the factory, that the funding was

withdrawn.

Q. And I wonder could you give the Chairman the context as to 14

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why Scotland Yard were feeding you this information?

A. Well, I think it was a common feature of the seventies and

eighties, both in Belfast and Dublin, that there was a high

degree of frustration at the level of cooperation that was

being received from the Irish authorities in relation to

disrupting and curtailing IRA activity. Politically and

publicly, the Irish authorities were committed to a

relentless campaign against the IRA, but the reality on the

ground, as it was seen from Dublin and Belfast -- or from

London and Belfast, was that those were fine words that

weren't backed up by action, and there was great

frustration over the failure of extradition cases on a

repeated basis because of the political defence that was

allowed by the courts here. There was a failure, they

believed, for real aggressive on-the-ground action against

IRA activities. You know, there were all sorts of people

on the run, operating in Dundalk and Castleblayney and

places like that. There was a feeling that there was

insufficient action being taken against them and that the

rigours of the law were not being applied, and that while

they were killing fellow Irishmen in the North, there

didn't seem to be any concern about that. Indeed, I wrote

a column once in which I said that in the political and

official establishment at Dublin, they were prawn-cocktail

Provos, as there were smoked-salmon socialists in England

who acquiesced, if not approved, of violence, because it

was going to get back the North and end partition. Now,

they would never have come out and said that, but that

attitude was how it was seen from London and Belfast,

because of the repeated lack of vigorous cooperation,

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vigorous action against the IRA, the failure to change the

extradition laws to hand people back, the failure to really

disrupt and interdict IRA operations on the southern side

of the border which were then resulting in deaths and

violence and injuries in the North.

Q. Can I turn specifically to that issue of policing of the 15

border on the southern side, and I wonder could you just,

maybe, for the Chairman, indicate what your understanding

of what more the British authorities wanted in terms of the

policing of the border or what they felt could be done on

the southern side of the border in terms of policing, that

wasn't being done?

A. I mean, I knew what the frustrations were, but from my own

individual experience, I saw the inadequacies. I remember,

once, with a great fanfare, we were provided with the

opportunity to accompany an Irish army patrol from Dundalk

to show just how vigorous they were on their side of the

border, so we were carried out in a convoy of three or four

armoured cars and there was a police car accompanying us,

and, when we got just short of the border, the lead army

vehicle stopped and he went over to the Garda car and he

had to take a radio from the Garda, because the Irish army

radio network wasn't compatible with the one used by the

Garda. So if they were going to have any activity at all,

they had to share the radio network, so that showed that

there wasn't really all that much going on. But the most

telling thing was that when my photographer colleague and I

were standing beside a soldier, he was in a cover position

in the ditch, and he said, "Are you guys going to be long?"

And we said, "Why?" He said, "Oh, we only do these sort of

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patrols when there is photographers. Friday is pay day and

we get off early." It just compounded in my mind the view

that this was just sort of for the optics; it wasn't that

there was real vigorous activity on the ground. And --

Q. A PR exercise for journalists? 16

A. A PR exercise for journalists. It was always the same.

Incidents would happen and nothing would -- nobody would

appear on the Irish side when there were incidents close to

the border, and the contacts between the two sides were

very limited. I think that was partly down to the wariness

that many RUC officers had, that the Garda didn't really

want to cooperate with them --

Q. Sorry, just to pause there. In your experience, the 17

cooperation between the RUC and the Garda Siochana was

limited; can I just clarify, firstly, what period we are

talking about here?

A. Well, through the seventies and well into the eighties.

Q. Okay. 18

A. It varied a little because, you know, when Charles Haughey

was Prime Minister, he took a very dim view of any

concessions --

Q. How many concessions -- 19

A. -- to the northern security forces, and so that political

hostility, if you like, filtered down to the people on the

ground. When Fine Gael were in power, there was a slightly

more constructive approach, but I think that there was a

general perception from the northern side and from the

British side that while there were fine words condemning

the IRA and fine words saying that we are not going to

tolerate what they do, that that was never backed, on the

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ground, by decisive action, by legal change, by aggressive

patrolling, the sorts of things that security experts in

the North believed were necessary to squeeze the IRA on

both sides. I mean, in the early 1980s, there was a

proposal - there had been a whole series of serious attacks

along the border - in the early 1980s, there was a proposal

that the British and Irish armies should jointly man posts

right on the frontier so that there was a visible deterrent

to people smuggling stuff across, and that was dismissed

entirely out of the hand by the people in Dublin. They

didn't want to know about that.

Q. How do you know that?20

A. I know that because of briefings that I was given by

various people on the military and the police side in the

North and by political sources who were party to those

negotiations, which were all around the time of the

Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Q. But the particular proposal for a joint army checkpoint on 21

the border, that predated the Anglo-Irish Agreement, did

it?

A. No, it was around that period. If you recall, there were

very intensive negotiations in and around the Agreement and

that was one of the security issues that they were very

keen on from the northern side, and, indeed, when the

Anglo-Irish Agreement was implemented without that vigorous

agreement on the part of the South, the British Army then

went ahead and they built a whole network of border patrol

bases and watchtowers along the border then to enhance the

ones that were already there.

Q. We'll come on and deal with watch towers in due course. 22

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Just arising from your description of the absence of a

radio which the Irish army and the Garda Siochana could

use, just to could be clear, are you saying that there was

a perception of a lack of resources or a lack of will on

the southern side?

A. I think it was both. There was certainly a lack of

resources because, you know, the Irish army had limited

manpower, they had limited vehicles. The Garda were

essentially unarmed and were not visible, organised or

mobile in the way that, for example, the RUC were on the

other side, or the British Army were, and there was a

feeling that if there were going to be really vigorous

cross-border security, effective cross-border security,

that both sides needed to be operating at a very high

intensity and a very much higher intensity than they were

on the southern side for virtually all of the period of the

Troubles.

Q. I think you say in your statement that you describe it 23

almost as an obsession that the British had with the

security situation along the border?

A. Well, it was, because, you know, every time an atrocity

happened, the forensic trail for the making of the bombs,

the gathering of explosives, in a very high proportion of

the cases that led back to bomb-making factories or to the

supply -- for example, the gelignite that was being used in

Northern Ireland, and indeed in Britain, was sourced to the

Enfield explosives factory here in the Republic, and there

were constant efforts made to try and persuade the Irish

authorities to tighten that up and to stop the stealing of

gelignite from there. There were constant cross-border

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attacks and, whenever those happened, I mean, UDR men who

lived in isolated farmhouses along the border were

regularly murdered by killers who made back across the

border. So the British side and the local politicians were

hearing desperate pleas from the relatives of those people

and the communities in those areas to get the Irish to take

more effective action to stop these cross-border killings.

So it was a very serious concern, because the border was a

massive assistance to the IRA in that it could move gunmen

and bombers into Northern Ireland, strike again and move

them out and they could organise and develop their

logistics in Dundalk and places like that.

Q. Did you ever, in the course of your journalistic 24

investigations, uncover much about the exchange of

information and, in particular, the exchange of

intelligence information between Garda Siochana and the

RUC, or indeed between the guards and any British security

agency?

A. Yes. The Irish were absolutely rigorous that there would

be no army-to-army contact, so that was never attempted,

except in the bomb disposals sphere when there was a

contact between the two sets of bomb disposal experts.

That was regarded as a special case. But the contact

across the border was primarily and exclusively between

police and police, and, as I said before, the level of that

varied from time to time, and it was also affected by the

level of trust that existed between the two police forces,

and there was a very strong perception on the northern side

that not all the Garda were to be trusted and that not

everything that they knew, and indeed wanted to know, could

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be discussed with the Garda, and that they were cautious

about making the Garda aware of operations in advance, and

things of that sort, and I think the Tribunal has already

heard some evidence from police officers involved that that

was the case, that, very often, they would bypass the

border stations and go straight to Dublin because of fears

about the information or activities being compromised.

Q. I think the former Deputy Commissioner Blair Wallace gave 25

evidence to that effect last week.

A. Yes, that's what I have in mind.

Q. Just on this issue of RUC wariness of An Garda Siochana, 26

were you hearing that from RUC officers themselves?

A. Yes, directly.

Q. At all levels, at senior levels, at junior levels? 27

A. Yes. I mean, sometimes I would have had contact with

officers in places like Newry or Enniskillen or the other

areas where they had a responsibility for patrolling the

border, and indeed I would often have contact with the

British Army in those locations, and it was a constant

worry about the gathering of intelligence and the exchanges

of intelligence and the effective use of intelligence to

prevent atrocities taking place, and there was -- at a more

formal level then, at the command level, if you like, there

was constant concerns and constant worries and indeed

constant representations between the two Governments and

between the two police forces for much more effective

security cooperation.

Q. In terms of the -- I think you said that there were 28

individual guards they didn't trust. Would they name these

guards to you openly? Was it discussed openly that there

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were such-and-such a guard?

A. Well, sometimes I would have had conversations in general

terms about, you know, the lack of trust in the Gardaí,

and, you know, I had heard it said, for example, that there

were some Garda who didn't even trust some of their

colleagues with sensitive information.

Q. Was that said to you by RUC or by Gardaí? 29

A. By RUC, and indeed on one occasion by a senior guard, he

admitted that to me, but that was an isolated incidence on

the part of the guard, but it was a pretty common

conversation-point with members of the RUC at lower and

higher levels.

Q. Just to be clear, what did the senior guard say to you, 30

sorry?

A. He just confirmed to me the fact that, occasionally, that

he would have had to be very circumspect about information

and activities within its own organisation because of the

delicacy of some of the things he would do and the fear

that that information might be leaked for the wrong

purposes.

Q. Who was the guard? 31

A. I'd rather not say.

Q. It's a matter for the Chairman whether he wants -- he might 32

invite you to write the name down for his attention.

CHAIRMAN: Would that be possible, Mr. Ryder? Would you be

prepared to write the name down on a piece of paper and

hand it in?

A. I'll do that.

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(Name written on paper and handed to the Chairman)

CHAIRMAN: Very good.

A. I am fairly sure that's the first name.

CHAIRMAN: That's the name of the guard who gave you the

information or the name of the suspect?

A. No, that's the name of the garda with whom I recall the

conversation about the need for being circumspect.

Q. MR. VALENTINE: Did this guard express concern about the 33

need to be circumspect in respect of any particular

individual, or was it -- there was no specificity?

A. No, that officer only spoke in the most general terms about

the need to be circumspect.

Q. But other RUC officers told you that guards had told them 34

that they were wary of some of their own people, is that

right? Did I understand you to say that, as well?

A. Yes, I mean, I think that some RUC officers had one-to-one

relationships with Garda officers that they felt they could

trust and were comfortable in dealing with and knew that

those exchanges would remain confidential. I think on

other occasions they were very concerned and very wary

about dealings with certain other guards or certain other

guards in certain locations.

Q. Were there particular Garda stations which seemed to cause 35

more concern than others to the RUC?

A. Well, I think that the most difficult area was the Dundalk

one.

Q. Why was that? 36

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A. Well, the campaign in Northern Ireland was at its most

intense in south Armagh, and therefore, the relationship

between the police and Dundalk, the police in Newry and the

Dundalk Garda, would have been the principal axis because

of all the activity in that area, and I think that was

where a lot of the trouble, a lot of the concerns focused.

Q. What did the RUC officers you spoke to, particularly in 37

Newry, or those that had to deal with Dundalk Station, what

did they tell you about dealing with An Garda Siochana in

Dundalk?

A. Well, just that they were wary, that they were very

suspicious and that there was certain information they

would withhold or there was certain things that they would

have elected to try to do but they felt that that might not

have been treated with the sensitivity it required on the

other side, and I think there was, sometimes, a frustration

that they sometimes had to let things go or they weren't

able to follow things up.

Q. Did they give you any explanation as to where the wariness 38

had come from? Did it come from specific experiences that

they had had?

A. I mean, these were the people that were at the coal face,

and the conversations that I had with them would have

reflected their experience at the coal face, the

difficulties, the problems, and, you know, they were

dealing with very sensitive matters, and they wouldn't

always have, indeed they would very rarely have spelled out

to me the whole intimate detail of some of their concerns.

But sometimes in the aftermath of a major incident, you

know, I would be trying to write a piece to explain or

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analyse what the context was, and they would say to me,

"ah, things are very bad" or "things are very difficult" or

"we can't do this" or "we'd like to do that," and it would

be in the context of that frustration that the cross-border

cooperation was not as fulsome and as honest and as

effective as they would like it to have been and it should

have been.

Q. I think, in fairness, you do give one specific example in 39

your statement, and, as I have already indicated, that's

the subject of ongoing inquiries, and we'll deal with that

on the next occasion, so to speak.

A. Yes.

Q. Did the names of any particular guards arise from your 40

discussions with the RUC?

A. I am sure they did, and I can't at this distance recall any

of them or who they were, but there was one particular name

that did arise on a regular basis and that was Owen

Corrigan. And as you will probably ask me, I had a

particular reason for remembering him.

Q. Why is that? Did you meet Owen Corrigan at any occasion? 41

A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge, I have only met him once,

and that was in the La Mon Hotel in Belfast.

Q. The La Mon House Hotel? 42

A. Yes.

Q. And when was that meeting? 43

A. I am unable to say precisely when the meeting took place,

but I do recollect that it was in the early 1970s before

the -- in the old original La Mon Hotel before the

explosion in 1978 when so many people were killed by a

blast incendiary device. I recall vividly that it was in

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the old original hotel. What happened was, I was there

with another senior RUC officer, to meet him for lunch, he

was a regular lunch companion, and when we arrived in the

hotel, there was another man there, two men I didn't

know --

Q. Just to explain to you, Mr. Ryder, just for your 44

information, the Tribunal has a policy of not naming RUC

officers who are still alive, but please feel free to name

witnesses who are dead, so I don't think there is a problem

with you naming --

A. Chief Superintendent Jimmy Crutchley, who is now deceased,

unfortunately, and at that point he was the Staff Officer

to the Chief Constable.

Q. And who was the Chief Constable at that point? 45

A. I presume it would have been Sir Jamie Flanagan, he -- but

it might just have been around the time Sir Ken Newman took

over. It certainly would have been about the '74, '5, '6

period, something like that.

Q. I think the La Mon House was blown up in '78? 46

A. Yes.

Q. So, just to be clear, you are talking about some period in 47

the four years preceding that --

A. I really can't be any more precise than that, other than

that it was before the hotel was blown up, because I do

vividly remember it was the old original hotel.

Q. It wasn't as far back as the early seventies? 48

A. No, it would have been more the sort of '5, '6 period.

Q. Sorry, I interrupted you. You were meeting Chief 49

Superintendent Crutchley, who was a lunch companion of

yours?

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A. Yes.

Q. Explain -- 50

A. We went into the hotel. There were two other people there,

I didn't know who they were, but one of them nodded at

Jimmy, and it was obvious he was another police officer

there; in fact, I think Jimmy might have said who he was.

But at any rate, I think maybe before we went in for our

meal, or at some point anyway, they came over, and I was

introduced to these two people. One of them was Brian

Fitzsimons, who was also deceased, who was then a senior

figure in the RUC Special Branch, and I was introduced to

the other man as Owen Corrigan, who was described to me as

an officer from the Garda Siochana.

Q. Who introduced you to Mr. Corrigan? 51

A. Brian Fitzsimons. I don't think Jimmy Crutchley knew Owen

Corrigan either. It was just a -- he knew -- obviously,

Crutchley and Fitzsimons knew each other. I didn't know

Fitzsimons at that stage, it was the first time I had ever

met him as well. So they went on in, I think, and had

lunch, or they may have sat on in the bar when we were

going in to lunch, I just don't remember the detail. But

later on in the afternoon, after lunch, the four of us came

together -- and there may well have been a fifth person

there, I'm not sure, or he might have been there and left

again or something, but it's really not of any

consequence -- during the course of the afternoon, there

was only very general conversation; I mean, I don't even

remember the detail of it now, but there was nothing of any

startling significance that sticks in my mind after all

this time. But during the course of the afternoon, I went

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to the lavatory, and Mr. Corrigan was in the lavatory and

we were just sort of exchanging pleasantries, as you do,

and he then said to me, you know, that if I was ever

looking for stories, to look him up in Dundalk. And he

sort of proffered his card to me, and he then said,

"There'll be a few bob in it for me, wouldn't there?" And

I was non-committal, obviously, but, immediately, all my

alarm bells began to ring because never before and never

since have I ever been propositioned by a police officer

for money for stories, and, I mean, I wouldn't even have

considered the possibility because I know my editor in the

Sunday Times in London would have been utterly opposed to

paying a police officer for information. And because of

that, you know, obviously, meeting Mr. Corrigan and being

propositioned like that, his name and his approach stuck in

my memory, and have done since.

Q. Just to be clear, you weren't familiar with his name before 52

you met him in the La Mon House Hotel?

A. No, not at all.

Q. And you say it stuck in your memory since. Did you hear 53

the name again after that?

A. Yes, periodically, yes, I would have heard his name.

Q. In what context? 54

A. In the context that, you know, he was a bit of a dodgy guy

in terms of helping the IRA and in terms of not being

trustworthy, as the RUC would have seen it, in respecting

security confidences and things of that sort. And, you

know, his name didn't come up on a regular basis, but from

time to time, if there was an incident down there, or

something, or I might be talking to somebody, and I would

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say, oh, you know, that was such-and-such or, you know,

Corrigan was involved in that or somebody was trying to get

Corrigan to do something. It was just in a very general

context. But because I remembered Mr. Corrigan so vividly

from our encounter, then, you know, whenever his name did

come up in conversation and there was inferences, sort of,

or allegations made about his conduct and his

trustworthiness, you know, I knew who they were talking

about and I knew what was involved.

Q. And you didn't meet him again? 55

A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. Do you know why he was with Brian Fitzsimons? 56

A. No idea. They had their own little huddle. They were

already engaged in a little huddle when we arrived and

their little huddle continued while we had lunch, and it

was then obviously when we had a further few drinks after

lunch, that there was just the most general social

conversation, nothing of any consequence was discussed

there, because I don't remember, indeed, what it was about.

Q. Just in relation to, this is a slight step backwards, but 57

in relation to the Anglo Irish Agreement and the British

efforts to beef up cross-border cooperation and to try and

beef up the policing of the border, did you write a story

in relation to an offer from another jurisdiction to assist

in that regard?

A. Yes. I understood from American diplomatic sources that

they judged that more effective policing on the southern

side was the key to resolving the violence in Ireland, and

they were very keen, indeed, that the Irish army, and the

Irish police in particular, would have the means to up

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their game, and they -- I understood from this American

diplomat that they were putting great pressure on the Irish

to allow them to help by providing training and equipment

and other help to the Garda and to the Irish army so that

they could play a full part on the southern side in

assisting to end the violence. And I then, with that --

armed with that knowledge then, I spoke to various sources

of mine on both the Irish side and on the British side to

try and develop and embellish that information for the

purpose of writing a story, and it was confirmed to me by

the Irish side that, yes, they were under that pressure and

that it was being considered, and it was at this point, I

think, that the offer, or the expression or the desire to

have the joint posts on the border was also discussed; it

was in that context. And I also had conversations on the

British side about that, yeah, to try and, you know, flesh

out what their attitude was to it and what they wanted to

be done.

Q. And ultimately? 58

A. Ultimately, I was told by the Irish side that they had

resisted the American pressure and the British pressure and

they had decided that they wouldn't accept either loans or

grants or any other arrangement from -- sponsored by the

United States, to try and beef up the Irish security

forces.

Q. And I think you said earlier that it was in that context 59

that the British effectively decided, well, we'll do it

ourselves and --

A. Yes, well after 1985 then, after 1985, they embarked on a

huge border-building programme of -- there had already been

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some watch towers and some covert observation posts, but

they decided then that they would create a network of very

hi-tec patrol bases and that they would increase the

visible window, if you like, from the other watch towers,

and things, so that they would have a much more

comprehensive surveillance along the border and into the

South.

Q. The Tribunal has heard some evidence in relation to the 60

capacity of the watch towers. I think you might be in a

position to assist the Chairman somewhat, because I think

you had an occasion, as a journalist, to visit one of these

watch towers?

A. Can I just say from the outset that even now, at this

distance in time, the British authorities are extremely

sensitive about discussing the capabilities and the

equipment that was in those watch towers.

Q. I think the Tribunal is very familiar with the term 61

'methodology', which seems to have caused them some

concern.

A. And I have no technical qualifications or expertise. So

anything that I would say is based on my observation of

things that I saw and conversations with people, from which

I had been able to deduce some guesstimate of, perhaps, the

capabilities of the surveillance. But I would put it in

two ways: You know, as a physical surveillance capacity,

from the top -- I mean, I visited, in fact, a number of

these bases over the years, probably the most dramatic one

was, I think it was called Romeo 14, which is the one at

Clough on the main Belfast-Dublin Road, where it overlooked

the railway line on the main Belfast-Dublin Road, and they

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had in their -- very high-powered binoculars on tripods,

which, on a clear day, had allowed them to physically look

over a huge area. There were also closed circuit capacity

televisions which allowed them to beam pictures back to

brigade headquarters and operations rooms elsewhere in

Northern Ireland. They bristled with aerials and antennae

of various sorts, and I don't know what their capacity was,

but I do know that one of the things they were

concentrating on was electronic counter-measures against

bombs, because the IRA were very technically adept and had

been developing and enhancing their capacity to use radio

control bombs and remote control bombs, and these were

being used, detonated by a variety of electronic methods

based on radio signals, and there was a constant battle

between the British bomb disposal experts and the IRA to

detect and make sure that these bombs didn't go off, and I

understood that they created waves of sound which would

have blocked the wavelengths on which the bombs could have

been detonated and I think that they also had a capacity to

detect signals in certain wavelengths if there was a bomb

in place, or something of that sort. Again, I'm not a

technical expert --

Q. I think you refer to these wavelengths in your statement as 62

electronic counter-measures?

A. They were known as the electronic counter-measures. And

there was rooms in these patrol bases and, you know, at the

base Romeo 14, and that, where a lot of this activity was

centred, or seen to be centred, and there would have been,

to my knowledge, soldiers from -- with very specialist

qualifications there from the intelligence corps, the

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electrical mechanical engineers, they were all signals,

these would have been pretty expert people in this field of

warfare.

Q. Was it your understanding that every one of the watch 63

towers had one of these rooms in it?

A. Yes. The later ones --

Q. There was a physical lookout room? 64

A. Yes, there was physical sentries and they would have

operated various cameras and things of that sort. But in

the complex, there was an operations room with all the

electronic equipment in it, and then, later on, after there

had been a number of mortar bombs and things of that sort,

they built fortified operations rooms, which were known as

the submarine, and they had big heavy double doors, and

things of that sort, so that if they were mortar-attacked

or bombed, the people inside remained safe. Again, they

were very sensitive about letting people into those and

seeing what capacity they had there. Indeed, I wrote a

book about the bomb disposal officers in Northern Ireland,

and they allowed me very great access to the way they did

their work, and that, but the one area that was taboo was

the electronic counter-measures; they wouldn't talk about

that very much at all and, even now, they are still very,

very sensitive about that.

Q. You did mention that they also had, as well as electronic 65

counter-measures, there was some monitoring capacity; the

exact extent of it was closely guarded, is that correct?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Even the capacity to pick up signals? 66

A. Yes. Even now, you know, they won't say what their

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capacity was. But it was quite clear that they had some

capacity to pick up -- I mean, walkie-talkies and CB radio,

and things of that sort, were quite common then and, you

know, I think -- I don't know much about it, but, you know,

I understood you could get scanners which you could buy in

specialist shops which allowed you to listen in on these

things. I would imagine that the army would have had much

more sophisticated scanners to monitor things of that sort.

Q. Just on the point of CB radios and the like, I wonder could 67

you just outline to the Chairman your understanding of the

IRA's technical capacity at that particular time?

A. Well, it was developing all the time. I mean, my

understanding was that the early bombs were used with

things like parking-meter timers and video timers and

things of that sort, but, as the campaign wore on, they

began to adapt these things in ever more sophisticated

ways. For example, when video recorders became popular,

they were able -- they had a capacity to set, to watch

programmes days in advance. So they were able to adapt

that timer to bury a bomb to go off in seven or eight or

ten days, and they then -- I mean, I was out in America

covering one of the arms supply trials, and one of the

pieces of evidence that was given there was that they had

prevented them from buying fairly high-powered model

aircraft, and the plan was that they would pack these

aircrafts with explosives and fly them by remote control

into heavily-guarded military bases or police stations.

That never actually happened, but that evidence was given

in the court in America, that they had been procuring radio

control equipment and model aeroplanes for that purpose.

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Q. Do you know anything about their capacity to tap phones or 68

intercept phone conversations?

A. Well, again, there was huge sensitivity to that, but there

is very strong reason to believe that they had suborned --

in Belfast they had suborned some people in British Telecom

and that there was a tap, for a period at least, on a

direct line used by the general officer commanding at army

headquarters in Lisburn which was routed to the attic of a

house in Andersonstown, which was discovered during a huge

big police investigation in Belfast. That's referred to in

my book, A Force Under Fire, and no one ever denied to me

that that telephone interception had not been in place for

some time, and there are persisting stories that there were

interceptions on other sensitive places.

Q. Do you ever hear anything about any suggestions that there 69

were interceptions south of the border by the IRA?

A. Yes, in the context of the Breen/Buchanan killings, you

know, in the aftermath of that, it was when all the

speculation and the rumours began about how the two had

been targeted and set up, there was a fairly common thread

to their stories that the Dundalk telephone lines had been

compromised to provide -- or to gain information that they

were on their way to the station. That's obviously a

matter for the Tribunal, but I'm just reporting that that

was one of the theories that was around.

Q. And from whom did you hear that theory, can you recall? 70

A. Oh, I think I probably read it and heard it from different

people. I didn't hear it in any situation that I would

regard it as authoritative or well-informed.

Q. I understand that, I think the Tribunal has seen an article 71

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written by Jim Cusack in the Cork Examiner shortly after

the murders which refers to that theory or made reference

to that possibility.

A. Yeah, I mean it was fairly widely disseminated around that

time, I am sure, that there was -- that there were people

who was postulating that theory.

Q. But you didn't hear from any persons, for example, involved 72

in the RUC investigation or any definite --

A. No. As I said, I never heard it from any source that I

would regard as authoritative or well-informed, whereas I

was told about the intercept on the army line and the

operation in the house in Andersonstown in Belfast, you

know, from an authoritative source, which is why I wrote it

in the book.

Q. In relation to the murders of Breen and Buchanan, I think 73

you knew Harry Breen, isn't that correct?

A. Yes, I had met Harry Breen on many occasions. I didn't

know Bob Buchanan.

Q. What was your impression of Harry Breen? 74

A. That he was very typical of the RUC. He was very committed

to his job, very brave man and very hard working and very

concerned -- you know, I can remember vividly meeting him

on a number of occasions at the white tape, if I may call

it, along the Killeen stretch of the road, after various

numbers of crimes --

Q. The crime-scene tape? 75

A. The crime-scene tape. I remember vividly talking to him

after the murder of Lord Justice Gibson and his wife. I

can remember talking to him on a number of occasions at

incidents along -- I particularly remember the Gibson one.

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Q. When you say you met him a few times, was it generally in 76

this context of a, at a scene --

A. Well, yes, I met him there, but I would occasionally have

bumped into him. I mean, I think I might have actually

come down to Newry to see him once in the station, I'm not

a hundred percent sure about that, but -- and sometimes

when I would be in other police company, I might have, you

know, at a conference or something, he might have been

there and I might have just passed the time of day with

him, or something like that.

Q. Do you recall the content of your conversation with him? 77

You say you have a clear recollection of talking to him at

the white tape after the Gibson killings. Do you recall

the conversation?

A. I was trying to glean as much -- I mean, that one was on a

Saturday morning, and I had to file a report by lunch time

that day, and I can remember, you know, talking to him in

detail, trying to glean as much information about what had

happened and the sequence of events, and at that stage,

early on in the morning, we didn't quite know who the

victims were, so during the course of that morning, you

know, when he would have been going backwards and forwards,

I would have had conversations with him; indeed, some other

journalists might well have done, as well.

Q. And did he express any view as to how the operation in 78

relation to the Gibsons had been carried out?

A. Just the most general information, you know, that they had

been travelling North and that the bomb had detonated and

that their car was at the side of the road and that other

people had been caught up in it. You know, just the

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general physical circumstances that had occurred at that

point, which led to the two deaths.

Q. You referred to the white scene-of-crime tape at Killeen? 79

A. Yeah.

Q. The Tribunal has heard evidence that there were, in fact, a 80

number of very significant atrocities carried out at that

spot on the border?

A. Right. I mean, there was the Brink's-MAT robbery when the

police officers were murdered; there was the Gibson

killings; there was the Hanna killings, when they were

obviously mistaken for a judge who was coming North after a

holiday; and there were regular other incidents along that

stretch of road. I mean, even in the old days when there

was a customs post there in the early seventies, I can

remember quite a number of shooting incidents and bomb

attacks along that stretch of the road.

Q. And I think the Gibson ones were killed in April '87, the 81

Hanna killing was summer '88 and the Breen and Buchanan

were March '89. I mean, in the North, was anyone linking

these incidents together and expressing a concern at a

pattern emerging of incidents at Killeen?

A. I think there was a feeling that there was some, there was

something wrong. I mean, nobody ever said to me

definitively that there was a mole or that somebody had

been betrayed, but people sort of voiced suspicions that

there was something wrong, that there was something going

wrong, that there was something leaking, that there was

something rotten there that had led to these incidents.

Q. When you say people expressed those concerns to you, who 82

are we talking about?

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A. Various police officers and army officers and people like

that. But I remember vividly, again, the afternoon after

Gibson was killed, I was driving back through Newry to go

back to Belfast, and there was -- at that stage, there was

an army post, a police army post on Downshire Road in

Newry, on the left-hand side of the road, and just as I was

going past it, because the main road went through Newry at

that time, I recognised a friend of mine from the Special

Branch in Belfast who was driving out, and he waved at me,

he recognised my car and he waved at me, and I sort of

rolled the window down and leaned over and shouted at him,

and we then agreed to go to the Sheepbridge Inn, which was

a couple of miles up the road towards Belfast. We went in

there and had a bit of a talk and he filled in some more of

the details, but he did say to me, you know, there is

something wrong here. He said, the travel arrangements of

the Gibsons must have been betrayed. He said, you know,

whether it was in Dublin or locally, or whatever, it must

have been betrayed, because the ambush was so precise, and,

you know, the inference of that was that their travel

arrangements would have been known only to a very small

number of people within the Garda, and that that was the

reason that they were so wickedly targeted, if you like,

that someone knew precisely that they were on their way up

the road and that they would be going along past there.

Q. I think it did subsequently emerge that Lord Justice Gibson 83

had booked through a travel agent in his own name?

A. Well, that wasn't known that afternoon to either of us.

But, you know, I mean, that opens up another line of

inquiry, as to whether that was the source of the leak.

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But at the time, because of that incident, and indeed over

that period when those incidents took place along that

Killeen stretch, in fact the army used to call that 'death

alley'. The suspicion was that there was something wrong,

that there was some compromise of security there. Whether

it was one person, whether it was a coincidence of other

people or a number of people, nobody was -- nobody that I

spoke to ever said definitively it's A, B or C, but there

was a general suspicion, concern, wariness, that the whole

operations in that Dundalk-Newry axis leaked like a sieve.

Q. And was there ever a movement to do something about it 84

within the RUC? Did you ever hear talk, well something has

to be done about this, we have to sort out this situation

in relation to Killeen?

A. There was, because, I mean, periodically, the two Chief

Constables would meet and, periodically, there were other

liaison meetings. Again, without knowing all the detail of

what was discussed, I mean, it was made clear to me that

there were constant representations to Dublin to do things,

to get action. I know, for example, that the extradition

laws were one particularly sore point, that people who had

been guilty of crimes, or -- people against whom there was

very convincing evidence of guilt of crimes in the North,

were able to oppose extradition on the grounds that this

was a political offence, and, because they claimed it was a

political offence, it was a tacit admission that they had

actually carried out the crimes. So, I mean, that was a

particular sore point, that they were not able to bring

those people to justice.

Q. Did you understand that there were representations -- were 85

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there any representations being made to Dublin in relation

to the concern that information was leaking like a sieve,

to use the phrase you have just used?

A. Yes, I think there were. I think there were concerns about

that in the overall context, but there was -- the

overriding impression that I had was one of frustration,

you know, that, no matter what pleas they made, no matter

what efforts they made to try and get the southern people

on side, that there wasn't the political willingness or the

physical willingness to do that.

Q. And did that postdate the Anglo-Irish Agreement as well as 86

predating it? I mean, did that continue after the

Anglo-Irish Agreement?

A. Well, the first major clash that I became aware of, was, I

mean, everybody thinks that the 1974 Workers' Council

Strike brought down the Sunningdale Agreement, but, in

actual fact, there was a deadly impasse between the two

legal establishments over changing the extradition laws in

the South that was going to bring the thing down even

without the Ulster Workers' Council Strike. So from the

early seventies on, there was a constant battle over

security cooperation, over legal cooperation. The criminal

justice extradition legislation -- or the Criminal Law

(Jurisdiction) Act was brought in in a bid to try and have

people tried in one jurisdiction for offences committed in

another, and that didn't work and that increased the

frustration. They wanted a straight change in extradition,

and they also wanted, you know, much more vigorous

cooperation, deployment, activity by the Garda on the

southern side, much more activities to cut off the IRA's

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routes up and down the border, and indeed the Enfield

explosives factory was another particular sore point. And

time after time when the forensic examination of explosive

residue was carried out, it was forensics coming from the

factory in Enfield in County Meath.

Q. And, I mean, again in relation to security cooperation, was 87

the battle raging in the -- was it still going on after the

Anglo-Irish Agreement in the late eighties?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. The Anglo-Irish Agreement didn't fix it all? 88

A. No. As I have said to you, the frustration that the Irish

didn't deliver on what was asked of them in the

negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Irish Agreement,

resulted in the British building and reinforcing their own

border operations, and the backdrop to that was that the

campaign to get much better cooperation was still ongoing.

Now, it did improve gradually, but I think that that

improvement was on the basis of one-to-ones between the

various border superintendents at a point, at which I am

not terribly sure, they formalised the liaison mechanisms

between the border superintendents and there was a much

more -- there were then telephone lines put in and that

sort of things to facilitate quick action and quick

contact, and I mean it did improve slightly but it never

reached the level that the British or the RUC or the

British Army would have considered to be ideal.

Q. In the immediate aftermath of the Breen and Buchanan 89

killings there was huge media speculation in relation to

the possibility of there being a mole which had led to the

murders and concern about a security leak from Dundalk

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Station. However, on Tuesday the 21st March 1989, both the

Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and Sir John Hermon, in

press conferences, sat on that speculation, effectively,

and ruled out the possibility of a mole. Now that was done

even though the Assistant Commissioner who had been sent to

Dundalk to investigate the circumstances and arrangements

leading to the meeting hadn't in fact commenced his report

yet, but nevertheless the Commissioner did that on the day

and Sir John Hermon did that on the day. From what you are

saying about lack of cooperation, was it one thing was

being said in public for political reasons and for the

reasons of political unity, but behind the doors the RUC

wasn't happy?

A. Yes, I would agree with that; that was the position.

Q. Why was it necessary to maintain -- why, for example, do 90

you think Sir John Hermon made that statement on Tuesday

the 21st March?

A. I think Sir John Hermon was dealing with some very

difficult problems, and he had great difficulty in the

aftermath of the Anglo Irish Agreement in settling his own

officers down. In fact there was -- it wouldn't be going

-- it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say there was a very

mutinous mood in the RUC after the Anglo-Irish Agreement

because of the violent and hostile reaction of the Loyalist

and Protestant community to the Agreement, and there were

two or three years of very difficult Anglo-Irish relations

on the back of that because of the mood among the

Unionist/Loyalist community, and I think that Jack Hermon,

being the supreme pragmatist that he was, recognised that

he had to be publicly reassuring in case those situations

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would flair up. You know, he always had to be mindful of

the fact that there could be a retaliation carried out by

Loyalists from the North. So, I think that there would

have been a high degree of public political pragmatism in

the way that he approached situations like that, while, at

the same time, privately, he would have been quite agitated

and concerned to get to the truth of the rumours, and, you

know, there was a history of difficulties on the

Newry-Dundalk axis, and I am sure that would have been, you

know, very much of concern to him.

Q. Did you know him personally? 91

A. Oh I did, yes. I was just about to say to you that, you

know, in all the years I knew Jack, I don't ever remember

him discussing Breen and Buchanan with me specifically,

but, you know, we did have many discussions about

cross-border security cooperation and things of that sort.

Q. Did he ever discuss concerns about leaks within An Garda 92

Siochana?

A. No, I don't recall him ever saying that to me or ever -- it

would have been other people, you know, in the command

circle who would have said that more, and working

detectives, things like that. Jack was, while he was quite

open and transparent in many ways, he was also very

circumspect and very -- he was old-fashioned in the amount

of things that he would disclose and he was also very

political in what he would disclose. As I said to you, he

would have been pragmatic politically for strong reasons.

He would have used people like me to send messages of

reassurance or to send messages of determination to do

something, that sort of thing. He regarded that as an

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important part of his job as well.

Q. So the fact that he made a statement a day after the 93

murders of Breen and Buchanan that there was no concern

about a leak from Dundalk Garda Station, that doesn't

necessarily, from your experience, mean that that was his

real view?

A. No. In fact if that was Jack's real view, I'd be very

surprised, because there was pretty widespread concern

among his officers about the whole integrity of the

Newry-Dundalk axis and he would certainly have been aware

of that and would certainly have been made aware of it and

would certainly have been concerned about it. But, as I

say, one of the things he would have been conscious of was

that he wouldn't have wanted to do or say anything that

might have, for example, allowed some extreme loyalist

group to do something in the Republic in retaliation and

point to his words as justification for it. That was the

kind of tightrope he had to walk in the volatile

circumstances in which he worked.

Q. Just for the sake of clarity as well, specifically in 94

relation to your conversations with Harry Breen, did Harry

Breen ever mention the name Owen Corrigan to you?

A. No, he did not.

Q. There are just a few miscellaneous matters, Mr. Ryder. 95

First of all, you expressed the sentiment in your statement

that you were always surprised by how politically

controlled An Garda Siochana were, and also how overtly

political officers were?

A. Yes, because in Northern Ireland the police were not

directly politically controlled. There was a police

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authority there as a buffer, and, for example, promotions

and things of that sort were all decided by the Chief

Constable; the senior officers were appointed by the police

authority. But down here, and the practice still exists,

there is no police authority, there never has been, and

senior appointments to the Garda are all approved at

cabinet level, and it has long been my experience that

senior members of the Garda are regarded as Fine Gael or

Fianna Fail men and those who are one persuasion or the

other tend to prosper when their own government is in

power. And that's not to say that the Garda are

politically motivated, but there is a heavy political

influence, and I think that's unhealthy myself in that --

Q. What is the effect of it? Why do you think it's unhealthy? 96

A. Because, it subjects the police to direct political control

and, you know, in the North, there are buffers to prevent

that. In the old days in the North, of course, that was

clearly the case; the Unionists worked the police with

their feet. But that was changed then, and it works quite

effectively that there is an independent buffer. There

have been several commitments down here to creating such an

independent buffer but when governments have got into power

they have quickly forgotten that promise and just

maintained the status quo. And so, you know, you would get

some officers would have been, would have been regarded as

Fianna Fail men or Fine Gael men, you know, I have heard

Garda officers described as that by their RUC counterparts.

But, knowing the way the system works here, I don't think

that that's -- it's not meant to be a criticism, it's a

statement of fact.

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Q. I think you also felt that the same was true of the Irish 97

army, is that correct?

A. No, I mean I just found it was very interesting on a number

of occasions when I had lunches with the Irish army

officers in their officers' messes, I always found them

very interesting because they were much more overtly

political about the country and about things than their

British Army counterparts would be. British Army

counterparts tended to focus on security issues and

military issues and things of that sort; their conversation

-- you know, they were very careful not to get involved in

the politics of the situation in Northern Ireland. Whereas

the Garda were much more -- or the Irish army, I found --

again it was only very limited interaction with them, but

it was just an interesting impression I had that they were

much more overtly political and much more interested in the

politics of the country.

Q. The final thing I want to ask you about, Mr. Ryder, is 98

about your knowledge you how intelligence and information

was processed, particularly two aspects. Do you have any

knowledge of how intelligence information was processed for

the Chief Constable of the RUC and also how was it

processed for the political establishment?

A. Well, there were a number of very high-powered committees.

The police had their own internal committees and the army

had their own internal committees, and then there were a

number of committees where the police and army operated

together at a very high level, and then there were other

committees where they interacted with the politicians with

the Secretary of State and his Security Minister, and they

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were the coordinating meetings where ideas and operations

and issues were all discussed and policy taken. Some of

those meetings were about policy, some of them were about

operational activity, and then ultimately you had the

Director and Co-ordinator of intelligence who was in the

Northern Ireland Office and he would have been at the top

of the intelligence pyramid, everything that the police and

army were doing and what the security services were doing

would all have ended up on his desk, and he had some staff,

and part of his remit was to provide the intelligence

summaries which went to the Prime Minister, the Minister of

Defence, the Home Secretary, the Northern Ireland Minister,

and, you know, various other people who had a locus on

Northern Ireland affairs.

Q. And was he -- what was his background or who was that 99

person?

A. Well, the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence would

normally have been someone from MI5 or MI6; from the

security services.

Q. And they were based in Belfast? 100

A. They were based in Belfast. They operated from Stormont

Castle, at the annex in Stormont Castle.

Q. And all British security agencies operating in Northern 101

Ireland reported their intelligence to them to that they

could properly be --

A. Yeah, they were at the top of the pyramid. I mean

everything that was going on between the police and the

army, and they would have had information from the security

services and they would have also probably had electronic

surveillance information from GC HQ and things of that.

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But the place that it was all pulled together and analysed

and presented, then, to the Prime Minister and senior

ministers would have been through the office of the DCOI.

Q. The DC -- 102

A. DCOI: Director and Coordinator of Intelligence.

Q. And once it had gone to that level, for example, would the 103

Chief Constable have access to the DCI's report, or was

that purely for the political establishment?

A. No, I think anything that the Chief Constable had would

have, you know, would have gone on to DCI, and the army the

same. But I mean, I think that the real substance of all

that material would have been discussed between the police

and the army, like the policy and the operations level, the

different committees that existed at that level. I know

that the Director and Coordinator was the person who, if

you like, pulled all that together and made sure that

people outside Northern Ireland were aware of it.

Q. And do you have any knowledge as to the level of 104

specificity that his reports would have? I mean, would

they deal with specific intelligence that had been received

or was it more a strategic overview of the security

operations?

A. No, those were obviously very sensitive documents, but my

understanding is that they would have contained, you know,

a lot of penetrating analysis of trends and backgrounds and

things of that sort. They would have highlighted current

and ongoing problems or upcoming problems, and that they

would have contained, when it was appropriate, you know,

quite specific information or quite important information,

and, you know, I would say that, for example, in the run-up

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to the Anglo Irish Agreement, when all these security

initiatives were being discussed, that those documents

would have been very detailed indeed because they would

have been used to brief the Prime Minister for her part in

the negotiations and for her to authorise lines of

negotiation to be carried out or lines of negotiation to be

concluded, things of that sort. So there would have been

-- the background material for the likes of the Anglo Irish

Agreement would have been very comprehensive, detailed.

Q. Was the identity of the DCI known publicly or was it 105

because it was emanating from MI5 or MI6 was it cloaked in

secrecy?

A. No, it was always cloaked in secrecy. It was only years

after we found out the names of some of them.

MR. VALENTINE: Thank you very much, Mr. Ryder. If you

answer any questions My Friends might have.

THE WITNESS WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. DURACK AS FOLLOWS:

Q. MR. DURACK: Good afternoon, sir, my name is Michael Durack 106

and I appear for An Garda Siochana. Just a couple of

matters you might help us with.

A. Yes.

Q. The last issue you were dealing with was the intelligence 107

process --

A. Yes.

Q. -- in the North. I take it you have been keeping yourself 108

up to date with what's been happening there in Northern

Ireland?

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A. Not as much recently because I am more or less retired now.

Q. I think you'll be aware that the, there have been a number 109

of reports and historic incidents in the North?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think many of them have been very critical of the 110

intelligence-gathering system by the Special Branch and, in

fact, its sharing between various, should I say, various

agencies, put it that way?

A. Oh there have been, that's right.

Q. And they have been very much criticised? 111

A. Yes.

Q. And I think that in fact, I think the Billy Wright report 112

sets out that, in fact, the Special Branch was divided into

three areas and they didn't even necessarily share

information between themselves?

A. Yes, I think that's probably correct, yeah.

Q. And not necessarily with the British Army and certainly not 113

necessarily with An Garda Siochana?

A. There are all sorts of irregularities coming to light,

there is no doubt about that, yes.

Q. And what might have appeared to be a good system, may well 114

have been so disperse that it didn't work effectively at

all?

A. I think that it's too early to draw definitive conclusions.

I mean, we are seeing some glimpses of that secret world,

that invisible front line, if you like, but I think that it

would be wrong to draw any definitive conclusions. I think

we'll have to leave that to history. It would be wrong to

say that because one particular incident or one particular

circumstance revealed weaknesses, that those weaknesses

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were systemic or endemic in the whole process. These were

things that went wrong. These were things that were stress

points. I am not necessarily arguing that the whole system

was absolutely a hundred percent right, and obviously there

were mistakes made, but I think it's far too early to try

and weigh any conclusions because we are only seeing

glimpses of some of these extreme cases and we are not

seeing all the details of the things that happened where

lives were saved, were atrocities were prevented and

indeed, I think that even history might not even see the

full story because lots of these things weren't even

written down.

Q. But certainly in many of those inquiries, rather than just 115

relating to specific incidents where there were slippages,

there were, in fact, many condemnations of the general

organisation?

A. Yes, there were, absolutely.

Q. In fact it was organisational difficulties? 116

A. It's very easy now to sit with hindsight and to criticise

people who had to take decisions that meant life and death

and, you know, a Special Branch officer with information

had to protect the source and he had to weigh up very

carefully if he acted on that information the source might

well be dead.

Q. I appreciate all of that. I am not -- 117

A. You know, I am very reluctant to make any, or to draw any

conclusions of condemnation or praise or otherwise; I think

the jury is still out on all of that. And I would agree

with you, yes, there have been mistakes uncovered, serious

faults uncovered in fact, but I think that to use that and

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extrapolate it to a general conclusion would be inaccurate

because there was much good work done and many, many

important things happened.

Q. I am not fighting about the fact that it was good work, but 118

what I am saying is that it was not a perfect system?

A. No, it was not a perfect system.

Q. And I think we heard, for instance, from a member of the 119

RUC who was dealing with intelligence, that in the ordinary

course when some written intelligence would come in, that

copies would be made of it and they would be distributed to

various files and they may or may not be distributed to

other parts of the organisation?

A. Well I mean, you know, it's pretty common ground now that

far too often the Special Branch had intelligence about the

people who committed crimes and they didn't tell the

detectives who were investigating the crimes. I mean,

there is no doubt that's the case. And, you know, they

used that -- the justification for that was they had to

protect their sources, their informers. But, you know,

when you get into that secret world there is no

accountability and no independent scrutiny of it, and it

opens a way to abuse and, you know, you can't rule out that

there was abuse, that there were people who did things for

the wrong reasons.

Q. And equally the military would have had their own 120

intelligence system which --

A. They did, they had a parallel intelligence system and quite

often they were at loggerheads with the police. I mean, I

remember being at a conference, by accident, I was in the

mess in the army office in Lisburn one day and I was with

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somebody else and another guy came in who had been at the

police army conference and he said -- my military friend

said to him "How did you get on today?" He says, "Well, we

have learned one important thing from our conference this

morning: the army hate the RUC and the RUC hate the army."

So, you know, it wasn't a perfect system and there was

rivalries in it, there were personal rivalries in it.

There was all sorts of empire building went on. You know,

that's the way of the world.

Q. And I suppose it's the same in every organisation, there 121

are rivalries, etc., and I suppose as a journalist, I take

it you would be, in the ordinary course of things people

would use you, or use a journalist in general, to get out a

point of view?

A. Oh yes, that's quite correct, and, you know, it's part of

the professional skill of a journalist to distill the

information that he gleaned to try and present it in as

balanced and informed and as fair a way as possible, and

you have to always be aware of being used for devious

reasons by someone, that's quite correct.

Q. And while your main sources are military and the RUC, they 122

have their own axe to grind in respect of individual items?

A. Oh yes, of course.

Q. And I take it, equally, that the, that while that may be 123

propaganda, that equally there would be black propaganda

operated against, by either side against the other in the

war against terrorism?

A. But again I have to say that I was always very alert to the

possibility of black propaganda and I would have been very

wary of information and would have always tried to check it

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46

independently where possible, and if there was any doubt at

all, then it just wouldn't have been printed or published.

Q. Because you are saying in relation to the Dundalk telephone 124

system, or at least the Garda telephone system, that

certainly it was put out and it was out there as a story

that it had been compromised in some way?

A. Yeah. But I mean, you could see the IRA would want to do

that for their own propaganda reasons. You would see the

authorities would want to clamp down on that for their

reason because they didn't want to admit that there is a

flaw. So that's the difficulty that a journalist faces in

a high intensive conflict, of trying to steer the middle

ground to find out where the solid ground is and where the

marshy ground is either side of it.

Q. You'll be aware, probably, that in fact this Tribunal has 125

heard much evidence from the technicians, the telephone

technicians, etc., at the time, and by and large they can

find no basis for any suggestion that the system was --

A. Yes, I am aware of that, yes. Much to the consternation of

the Phoenix.

Q. So that, in fact, things that become common beliefs are not 126

necessarily true?

A. Yes, I would accept that totally, yes.

Q. And while you, the view you have given us is, if you like, 127

a sort of a macro view about the lack of political

cooperation north and south etc., while we have had a

number of RUC officers come here and who were working in

the area and in the area of south Armagh and that

direction, most of them have said that they had very good

cooperation with their colleagues on the other side of the

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border and were very pleased with what they got?

A. Well I am a journalist and I am naturally cynical, and my

experience would be that it was a very mixed picture

indeed. That the public perception, or the public

statements were not always matched by what was actually

happening on the ground, and politicians were great ones

for putting a clause on things, even retrospectively, and

there has been some evidence given to this Tribunal that,

to put it no higher than that, caused my eyebrows to shoot

up a bit.

Q. But I suppose the point I am making is that the RUC members 128

are not compellable, nobody is compellable to come here

from outside the jurisdiction?

A. Oh, no.

Q. So the only people we are getting, in fact, are people who 129

are volunteering to come?

A. Yes.

Q. And they are not, as I say, reflecting, if you like, what 130

you describe as the macro view, that the total

dissatisfaction with work on the border, in the same way as

people told you?

A. I mean, I think many of the RUC officers would feel that

they owe it to Harry Breen and Bob Buchanan to try and

throw as much light as possible onto what happened to them.

They would feel that as fellow professional officers,

fellow professional police officers, that they have a duty

to try and help to throw as much light as possible on their

deaths and on the deaths of other innocent --

Q. The Chairman is very anxious that they would come forward 131

and give whatever information there is in relation to what

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48

the situation was on the ground at the time.

A. Yes.

Q. And I suppose, again, just talking about the IRA press 132

statements, etc., and information, very often I would

imagine that's put out there to distract from the truth

rather than to elaborate on it?

A. Yes, absolutely. They want to get their propaganda out and

present themselves in the best possible light on every

occasion. And indeed they were pretty good at it.

Q. One of the issues that arose which was concerning me was 133

the killing of the Hanna family, and, as we know, they were

-- the information appears to be that they were driving a

Shogun Jeep?

A. Yes, they were. I mean I happened to know Mr. Hanna and I

lived in the same village as he did and I use to see him in

the morning when I was getting the papers and things. I

mean I was familiar with him and his vehicle.

Q. And that the composition of his family were two persons and 134

a young boy --

A. Yes, I just can't remember the details.

Q. -- at the time. 135

A. Yeah.

Q. And that in fact the vehicle being driven by the Higgins 136

was in fact a Datsun Sunny occupied by, clearly, much older

people, and four in total?

A. Yeah.

Q. And that in fact when the bomb was set off, the vehicles 137

were seven miles south of the border, in Castlebellingham I

think, but in the immediate aftermath of the killing of the

Hannas the IRA statement was in fact they were attempting

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an attack on Crown forces?

A. Yes.

Q. And then subsequently they said that the bomb -- I mean, 138

almost immediately subsequently they said that the bomb had

been set off by the British Army electronically?

A. Yes, I mean that was the thing they frequently used; they

used that after the Enniskillen Remembrance Sunday bombing.

Q. But it was only a long time later that they discovered in 139

fact, or a significant time later when they discovered that

the Higgins were on their way that they claimed it was

aimed at the Higgins. So you can't believe what you are

told all the time?

A. No, I have just said that. I mean, as a journalist, it's

extremely difficult to work out, and that's why, you know,

given the difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland, one

always attempted to stick to facts that were verifiable.

You know, for example, the police would say, you know, that

two people have been killed, a bomb was detonated. You

know, would you then resist the temptation to go on and

embellish that information where possible in case that you

would get it wrong, or in case that you would give

credibility to one side or the other and we would always

say the IRA claimed but the security forces deny, you know,

so that you were presenting as comprehensive a picture as

it was possible to do.

Q. And in relation to the mole situation in Dundalk Station, I 140

think by and large that tended to come from politicians in

one side or the other making statements for the paper which

turned into headlines?

A. Well, these things sort of took a life of their own. You

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know, once somebody started a rumour, this took a life of

their own and then, you know, you would read it in a

magazine or a paper or some article, and then it was

accepted as fact without ever being subjected to rigorous

forensic tests as to its truth.

Q. And I think, as you very fairly said in relation to the 141

Gibsons, that in fact what you were told on the day did not

in fact turn out to be the truth in the end of the day.

That we know that the --

A. Well, I mean my friend said to me that he thought that they

had been betrayed in some way. He didn't go beyond that.

But, you know, I don't think I have ever seen it proven

conclusively the fact that they booked their ferry passage

in their own name was the reason why they were targeted.

Q. Well I think that the information the Tribunal has is that 142

in fact they booked the passage in their own name, they

booked the hotels in their own name, they paid with their

own cheques or whatever, and I think they made no attempt

to disguise themselves?

A. Yes, I accept that. But it's another thing, then, to say

that that was the sort of their betrayal. You know, I

haven't seen anything, any convincing evidence that that's

how they were targeted, by the fact that all those passages

and things were in their own name. Neither have I seen

that there was convincing evidence that they were betrayed

by a mole in Dundalk.

Q. Exactly. 143

A. I mean, I think that's one of those things, you know, that

the Tribunal is going to have to focus on and decide what's

credible and what's not credible in these very difficult

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and conflicting pieces of evidence.

Q. And certainly we know that there is information that they 144

in fact had travelled south towards the airport in Dublin

on something like I think four previous occasions?

A. Yes, I think I heard that.

Q. And they had been escorted by Gardaí from Dundalk -- 145

A. Yes, I think I heard that.

Q. -- at various stages. And I think also around that 146

particular time I think there were attacks on a large

number of judges, I think there were a number of,

certainly, magistrates as well as more senior --

A. Yes, there was a consistent pattern of attacks on the

judiciary and people associated with the legal profession.

Q. And they were very high profile and they were being 147

specifically targeted?

A. Yes. I mean, I remember one day being close to Queens

University when there was an attempt made to shoot Sir

Robert Lowry.

MR. DURACK: It's just one o'clock, if you wish to break

for lunch, sir.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think we will resume at two o'clock.

MR. VALENTINE: Just, Chairman I have been asked to clarify

one thing and it's in so far as an impression may have been

created that the Hanna family were murdered in their

entirety. I do understand that there are two older --

David, the youngest son was killed in that atrocity -- and

there are two older children who weren't travelling and are

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still alive and may well be following the proceedings.

MR. DURACK: I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN: I want to say tomorrow morning there will be,

again I am afraid, a delay in starting procedures. A

member of the bar, Mr. Hunt, has died and is being buried

tomorrow morning and he has a number of close friends

amongst the counsel appearing before the Tribunal and they

want to attend the funeral, so we will begin at twelve

rather than eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR. HAYES: Thank you very much for that, Chairman. Can I

also, just in respect of this afternoon's evidence, can I

make a brief application before you rise? Brigadier Liles

is due to give evidence this afternoon and he had

previously, of course, given evidence to you, but he is

back to give evidence in relation to matters of an

intelligence nature and they are intelligence matters which

could not be put fully in front of you were the evidence to

be taken in public, and for that reason, I would ask that

his evidence this afternoon be taken in private. But I

should make it clear that while, due to the sensitivity of

the nature of his evidence, I'd ask for it to be in

private, that as soon as can be afterwards, it is your

intention, I understand, to make as much of that evidence

as is possible to make public, and that you will publish it

within the next week or so.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, that's true. Brigadier Liles will be

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giving evidence in relation to some very delicate

intelligence matters and there will be strong

representations made that that evidence should be taken in

private. Nevertheless, I have been in touch with the

authorities who made the intelligence available and what I

will do is, I'll examine the transcripts immediately

following Brigadier Liles' evidence and it will be vetted

and, as far as possible, it will be made available to the

public, probably within a week or so.

So then I think, therefore, I should grant the application

to have the hearing in private this afternoon under that

condition. So we'll sit again -- is there anything else?

I'll sit again at two o'clock.

THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH.

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THE TRIBUNAL CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH AS FOLLOWS:

CHRIS RYDER CONTINUED TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. DURACK

AS FOLLOWS:

MR. VALENTINE: Chairman, just before Mr. Durack resumes

his cross-examination, I want to deal with one logistical

matter and it's this: because of Brigadier Liles' flight

arrangements, we will to commence his evidence no later

than 3:00. Now I anticipate that Mr. Ryder's evidence will

be finished by then but just in case it isn't, I want to

flag that now.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Q. MR. DURACK: I think all the items, Mr. Ryder, that have 148

been, if you like, associated with the mole allegation, all

occurred around the Killeen stretch?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think I'm right in saying I don't think there ever 149

was an army or a post actually on the border?

A. No, I don't think there was, not actually on the border,

that's right.

Q. And in fact, the first -- 150

A. The first one -- the nearest is probably the Dromad police

station, the little small police post just by, just on the

southern side of the border.

Q. Yes. But I think that in terms of the British Army RUC 151

presence, I think you are virtually into Newry -- sorry,

you are a mile or two down the road?

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A. You are at Clough, the permanent checkpoint was at Clough

but they regularly would have conducted snap checkpoints on

the stretch right down to the border.

Q. But the point is that that area from the border to that 152

post was, effectively, no man's land, virtually?

A. No, not at all, because it was under constant surveillance

from the towers.

Q. But nonetheless, the IRA were able to plant bombs along 153

that?

A. There is no doubt about that.

Q. That is how the incidents happened? 154

A. That's right.

Q. And I mean, I know that in some of the papers before the 155

Tribunal it's mentioned that, in fact, the army, when they

were expecting a VIP to cross the border from the south,

would actually sweep the road, I mean would check the road

to see there was nothing unusual between the border and

Clough?

A. Yes, so there was regular -- there was regular surveillance

on the road at times.

Q. And if that was so, they might well have found, if they had 156

done one, say, before the various murders we are talking

about, they may well have been in a position to prevent it?

A. It would depend whether the device was dug into the road

with the command wire or whether it was parked in a

vehicle. I mean a vehicle could be parked a very short

time beforehand, whereas if it was an improvised explosive

device that was dug in with a command wire or radio

controlled initiation, then that was detectible certainly

by a dog perhaps or...

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Q. But equally that would have taken sometime to put in -- 157

A. Oh yes, but I mean there are many occasions when they have

suspected something being in place and then they have had

to clear the area, sometimes it's taken up to five or six

days to clear it.

Q. Yes, indeed. And I think that in fact, while some of the 158

things dug into the road, some of them were vehicles just

left?

A. On the side of the road.

Q. On the side of road and gone. But again they could have 159

been seen from the tower, presumably?

A. My recollection is that there were some blind spots but, by

and large, there was pretty close surveillance of the

stretch of road.

Q. But nonetheless, it wasn't perfect? 160

A. It wasn't perfect, no. And I mean, things could be done at

night that they might not have detected, either.

Q. You were telling us about the watchtowers and what their 161

function was and that they had very strong binoculars for

long distance viewing?

A. Yes, I think they also had some night vision capability as

well.

Q. Certainly that was common at the time? 162

A. Well, it was developing, you know, I think it was one of

those technical innovations that gathered pace through the

seventies and eighties. I mean it's now very sophisticated

night vision, but I think in those days it was probably in

its infancy still.

Q. It was nonetheless, certainly within -- 163

A. Oh, there was some night vision capability, yes.

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Q. And I think in relation to CB radios and walkie-talkies, I 164

think they were very common in the seventies and eighties?

A. Yes, but that was the era before the mobile telephone and

they were easily intercepted with sophisticated scanners, I

understand.

Q. And I think they were relatively cheap too. I think every 165

trucker in the country had one as well as an awful lot

others?

A. Yes, and you could buy walkie-talkies sets easily as well

will.

Q. And they were something that could be listened to and 166

intercepted?

A. Yes, I understand that.

Q. And certainly we have heard evidence that scanners were 167

found in various suspects' houses?

A. Yes, I am sure they were indeed.

Q. That were capable of listening to both the RUC traffic and 168

the Garda traffic?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And what is your understanding about the listening capacity 169

of the towers?

A. Not very much other than that there was some listening

capacity, what the technical details are, I don't know, but

I do understand that there was some listening capacity.

Q. I often heard it said that the tower at the border, you one 170

I think you referred to as Romeo 14, that that could hear

what people were saying in motor cars that were going

through?

A. I don't know that. It's a little bit James Bond-ey. But

there was certainly, there was some capacity to intercept

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communications and there was certainly a capacity for

physical and electronic surveillance. I do know that at

one stage they introduced roadside cameras which could

focus and read the number plates of cars, there was an

operator who was able to read the number plates of cars.

There was a bump put on the road to slow the car down and

then the camera was focused so that it would get the car

number plate, and there were operators there who would type

in the car number to a computer system, and that not only

logged the movements of vehicles but it also logged the

movements of suspect vehicles and could create an alert

when a vehicle of interest to them was monitored.

Q. Yes, we certainly, the Tribunal has seen evidence of that, 171

too. And was it a fact that they had to actually type in

the numbers or were they computerised?

A. That's my understanding, that the numbers were typed in by

an operator.

Q. And I take it that all of this information could have been 172

fed -- was fed back immediately to Headquarters?

A. Well, I think it was filtered. I mean, the Brigade, the

Operational Brigade Headquarters would have had overall

responsibility in that area. More serious things would

have gone all the way back to army headquarters in Lisburn

and to police headquarters in Belfast, but things that were

just happening locally would have been dealt with in, they

were called TAORs, tactical areas of responsibility, so the

local units would have had a TAOR and they would have dealt

with things there and referred them upwards when the need

arose.

Q. The point I am making really is that they are not just 173

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isolated sitting there collecting information?

A. Oh no.

Q. They are able to pass the information in realtime if it's 174

relevant?

A. Yes, if something really important happened that would be

flashed right through the whole system right up to the top,

very quickly.

Q. And certainly if anything appeared to the IRA, activity in 175

the area or activity they couldn't account for, it could

immediately be passed on to the next responsible area?

A. Yes, and I mean, they would also have checked to see if

anybody else knew of something that was going on that they

should know about, they could then rule out perhaps if

there was some suspicious activity emerged, they could then

check back and say well, maybe somebody else is involved in

that so it's nothing to worry about or it is something to

worry about.

Q. Do you know was there ever consideration given to actually 176

having an army post on the border rather than, as I say,

leaving that Killeen stretch open?

A. No, the only way they felt that they could get away with

that was if it was jointly manned with the Irish army,

because otherwise it would have been too vulnerable and

would have been very difficult to protect. I mean, even

when the post was as far as back as Clough, it regularly

came under attack. I mean, at one stage they trundled a

bomb down the railway line and it exploded killing a

sentry, and on other occasions they used proxy vehicles to

attack it, so the fact that it would have been on the

actual border would have rendered it very vulnerable indeed

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60

and made it very dangerous for those who would have to stay

there.

Q. And I think then if you move off the road and into south 177

Armagh over towards Jonesboro and the rest of that, that

the geography there is very difficult?

A. It is, there is no doubt. That's why the hilltop

observation posts were quite important and they only moved

there by air and by foot across very carefully screened

routes because of the danger of IEDs having been planted in

the side of the road or ambushes having been set up.

Q. And I think that the evidence we have heard is something up 178

to two miles away from the border, in fact, was again

virtually no man's land and could only be entered, as you

say, with helicopters?

A. Helicopters and foot patrols, that's right. But it was

never not patrolled. It was just patrolled with great

circumspection and quite often they would have used covert

patrols lying out for days on end and watching for activity

or watching a particular premises if they thought something

was going on there.

Q. But it was because it was unable to be patrolled that there 179

was the opportunity for people to use the border as an

escape route?

A. Well, it's because of its proximity to the border that it

was used as a escape route; it was very easy to come into

Crossmaglen and attack the police army post there and

within a couple of minutes one was back across the border

in safety.

Q. I take it you would accept just in relation -- you said 180

that there was no provision for army to army --

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A. Contact.

Q. -- contact? 181

A. Yes.

Q. I think you will accept the position, of course, in the 182

south because the south wasn't in the same difficulties as

the North was at the time, that the army only worked in

assistance to the civil power rather than --

A. Well that was the legal position in the North, too. But I

don't think that was a particular cause of difficulty. I

mean, as I said to you, the bomb disposal officers worked

in close proximity to each other. I know on a number of

occasions the British army bomb disposal officers visited

the south and had regular liaison with their counterparts

here so they were able to exchange information with them

about the sort of bombs they might encounter.

Q. I think I am told that the army had direct contact with 183

London in relation to bomb disposal and that is how it --

A. It did at that level as well, that's correct, yes.

Q. But, by and large, it appears that your understanding is 184

that a lot of the, a lot of what went on actually on the

border there was a fair amount of cooperation, whatever

about the megaphone diplomacy that was going on otherwise?

A. Yes, there was some cooperation but it was pretty minuscule

when measured against the enormity of the conflict and the

toll of life in the North and the suffering and hurt that

was caused in the North by the ease with which the IRA

could come across the border and escape to virtual immunity

in the south.

Q. But isn't it also a fact that an awful lot of the trouble 185

in the North arose within the North and stayed within the

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North?

A. That's correct but --

Q. I mean what happened in Derry and in Belfast had nothing to 186

do with the South?

A. No, but there was a southern dimension to it because of the

way that the IRA operated and the way that they used this

state as a refuge, as a supply line, as an operating base,

a training base even. So, it would be wrong for anybody

here to try and wash their hands of any involvement in the

conflict.

Q. No, I don't think anybody is trying to wash their hands of 187

it, but it does appear that your sources of information are

exclusively the military and the RUC in North?

A. Not exclusively. I would have had lots of contact with

politicians, with local councillors, with people who lived

in these areas. I knew from first-hand, having visited

people in isolated border farms, in isolated rural border

communities, the peril that they felt they lived under

because of this IRA threat.

Q. I appreciate that. But your contacts were not with anybody 188

in the South?

A. I had some contacts with people in the South. I mean, I

would have had contacts regularly with diplomats and

officials and politicians in the South, and some contact

with the Garda and the Irish army, although nothing like

the intensity of the contact I would have had with security

forces in the North.

Q. Because from time to time one gets the impression that 189

journalists given a specific task or assigned to a specific

area of responsibility become virtually adopted by the

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people that they are reporting, at least whose interests

they are reporting on; one always thinks of it being

embedded with the army in Iraq, etc., and that you are

really getting a lot of one side of the story rather than

anything of the other side?

A. Well, I think if my work over the years was subjected to

any sort of forensic scrutiny, that that accusation

wouldn't stand against me.

Q. But it's, as I say, it is the way information and 190

propaganda works, isn't that right?

A. Oh, yes, that's true at a theoretical level, yes.

Q. I am not attacking you personally at all in relation to 191

this, thank you very much indeed.

THE WITNESS WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. O'CALLAGHAN AS

FOLLOWS:

Q. MR. O'CALLAGHAN: Good afternoon, Mr. Ryder, I appear for 192

Owen Corrigan. You were a journalist covering Northern

Ireland for a period of about 40 years, isn't that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And would you agree with me that being a journalist 193

covering the Troubles in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and

1980s, wasn't a particularly glamorous job?

A. Indeed not.

Q. It was a dangerous time for journalists as well? 194

A. It was a dangerous time for anybody, yes.

Q. Are you aware of that since the ceasefire a number of 195

individuals have published books about their involvement in

the Troubles and how they were centrally involved and they

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64

have made money out of these books?

A. I am aware there have been a lot of books published and I

would very much doubt if anybody has made any money out of

them.

Q. Have you read Kevin Fulton's book which is modestly 196

entitled "Unsung Hero"?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware of Kevin Fulton? 197

A. I don't know him. I know of him.

Q. Have you ever met him? 198

A. No.

Q. You never met him. When did you first become aware of him, 199

sir?

A. I think when he surfaced and began to make all sorts of

claims about his activities and his role in events.

Q. And would it be fair to say that that is around 1999, 2000? 200

A. Yes, I think it would have all have been post ceasefire.

Q. Yes, I think it is. Had you ever heard of him as a member 201

of the IRA in the late 1980s, at the time of the late

1980s?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Had you ever heard of him from your contacts within the RUC 202

as being somebody who worked for the RUC?

A. No, not that I recall.

Q. OK. Are you aware as to whether Kevin Fulton receives 203

money for providing stories to newspapers?

A. No.

Q. The reason I asked you that is you wrote an article in The 204

Irish Times on 25th of June, 2002, which was about the

ongoing dispute between Sir Ronnie Flanagan and Nuala

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65

O'Loan about the Omagh bombing, you remember that, sir,

don't you?

A. I don't remember the precise article but no doubt you will

remind me.

Q. I am not trying to trick you out, it's just you referred to 205

the response of Sir Ronnie Flanagan to Nuala O'Loan, who

had adopted certain of the propositions that were put to

her by Kevin Fulton?

A. Yes, I think he described Fulton as not being of a very

trustworthy or reliable nature.

Q. Yes. Sir Ronnie Flanagan, on behalf of the RUC, 206

effectively discredited Fulton in his response and --

A. Yes.

Q. And you published or wrote a story for the Irish Times 207

which it published on 25th January 2002, and I just want to

read out the first two sentences of it because it relates

to a matter I want to ask you about. It's entitled: "Sir

Ronnie delivers his punch and we now await the third and

final round:

Early last summer a former police informer known as

Kevin Fulton had convinced a British Sunday newspaper

that if his advance warning had been properly.

followed up, the Omagh bombing in August 1998 could

have been prevented.

However, before printing the story and handing over

£50,000, the newspaper insisted on one final check.

Contact was made with the recently retired Chief.

Superintendent Eric Anderson to check the veracity of

the story."

And then your article continues.

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A. Yes.

Q. I am just wondering, and what I am interested in is how you 208

were aware that the newspaper was offering Fulton £50,000

at that time?

A. I think the newspaper concerned was The Mail on Sunday and

I think it was pretty common currency that that transaction

was being talked about. I think at that stage, Fulton was

touting his stories around various newspapers, and I am

only reporting that third-hand. I wasn't involved in any

negotiation like that and I obviously would base that on

information that I had gleaned from, probably, Mr. Anderson

and possibly Sir Ronnie Flanagan as well, and, you know,

other people who would have, in the newspaper world, who

would have known that that was on.

Q. And you believed the information you were given to be 209

accurate, otherwise you wouldn't have put it in the

newspaper?

A. I was satisfied with what I was told by the various

sources.

Q. And are you aware of how widespread was the practice of 210

Kevin Fulton going around to newspapers trying to hawk his

stories?

A. No. I mean, as I say, I never had any dealings with him.

Q. Yes. The sum of £50,000 that a newspaper would pay an 211

individual for a story, am I naive in thinking that that is

a considerably large amount of money to be offered for a

story such as this?

A. I don't know. I was never involved in cheque-book

journalism like that so I have no idea what it was worth or

what his story would be worth, and, you know, very often

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these things were exaggerated.

Q. But your belief, in any event, is that Kevin Fulton was 212

looking for money for his story from The Mail on Sunday?

A. Yes, I mean I think it was widely known among journalists

that The Mail on Sunday was about to publish this story and

that, as a result of the last minute checks, they pulled

out of it and the last minute checks were with Sir Ronnie

and Eric Anderson, who was the investigating officer for

Omagh at that time, and I think it was quite widely known

among the journalistic fraternity, at the very least, that

this is what had happened. Newspapers keep a very close

eye on each other and what they are doing.

Q. Are you aware from your own involvement at the time, sir, 213

as to whether or not Fulton approached any of the

newspapers you were working for at the time --

A. No.

Q. -- trying to sell his story? 214

A. No, I never had any dealings with Fulton at all.

Q. Yes. But you would be aware from keeping yourself abreast 215

of what is happening --

A. Only in the most general way.

Q. Yes. But you obviously read Sir Ronnie's response to Nuala 216

O'Loan's account of Kevin Fulton and that that was what

your article was based on, isn't that so?

A. Yes, I can't remember whether that was a written statement

by Sir Ronnie or whether it was an interview he gave or...

Q. It was a detailed written statement he had prepared in 217

reply.

A. Yes, that is the suspicion I have but I am just not

entirely sure.

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Q. Like, I am conscious Mr. Fulton isn't here but he will be 218

coming to give evidence, but would you agree with me,

Mr. Ryder, that there are serious question-marks over the

reliability of Kevin Fulton's accounts of what happened in

the past?

A. I can't give any direct testimony to that because I don't

know Mr. Fulton, I have never met him, I have never

interviewed him, I have never had a chance to test his

credibility and, you know, I didn't want to make up my mind

about him unless I had personally interviewed him and

personally checked out his reports or his claims of his

activities, so I am afraid I can't help you on that.

Q. Would you regard Ronnie Flanagan as a man of integrity who 219

sought to --

A. Sir Ronnie Flanagan steered the RUC through very difficult

times in a very courageous way, and I have no reason to

doubt Sir Ronnie's veracity or integrity in any way. I

have never come across anything that persuaded me that he

did anything other than for the highest possible motives.

Q. And you may not want to comment about Mr. Fulton, but 220

certainly if Sir Ronnie Flanagan issued a public statement

raising serious question marks over the reliability of

Kevin Fulton, that's something that would have to be

considered seriously by anyone who is reflecting on

Fulton's --

A. It is. I mean Mr. Fulton has a remedy at law, if he

believes that Sir Ronnie has defamed him he has a remedy at

law, and Sir Ronnie, I think, knowing that Mr. Fulton had a

remedy at law, would not have issued that statement unless

he had compelling factual evidence to support it.

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Q. You worked, Mr. Ryder, with the Daily Telegraph until 1993, 221

I think?

A. That's correct.

Q. Toby Harnden also worked with the Daily Telegraph. Did he 222

work with the Telegraph at the same time as you?

A. No, he came to Northern Ireland when I left.

Q. Is he a friend of yours? 223

A. I know him slightly.

Q. The reason I ask, it's sometimes difficult for people who 224

are friends of others --

A. No, I know him very slightly.

Q. OK. Did you read his book Bandit Country? 225

A. I don't think I did. I think I might have skimmed through

bits of it.

Q. Yes. If you are trying to find the acorn that's given 226

growth to this Tribunal, that acorn is Bandit Country, the

book, because in Bandit Country Mr. Harnden states that

Chief Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan were

murdered as a result of a Garda tip-off. Were you aware of

that, sir?

A. I was aware of that proposition before Mr. Harnden

published his book. I mean, that was pretty common

currency among police officers and journalists and others

long before Toby Harnden published his book. He picked

that up and teased it out, then, for the purposes of

writing his book.

Q. Well, it was the immediate, I suppose, circumstance giving 227

rise to this Tribunal because it resulted in statements

being made by Jeffrey Donaldson; it resulted in articles by

Kevin Myers; the Garda investigation; and then the Weston

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Park Agreement and the Cory Report into a number of events?

A. Yes.

Q. So in that regard I was indicating that it was one of the 228

initiators of this Tribunal. Were you aware that in his

book, Bandit Country, Toby Harnden relies on two vital

pieces of information for his assertion that there was

Garda collusion, and the first was that there was technical

information that the call from Dundalk Garda Station was

made to the IRA; were you aware that he had stated that in

his book, sir?

A. I wasn't aware he had stated it in his book, but over the

years I had heard various versions of how the ambush was

mounted and how they were tipped off and that included that

the car was followed, that somebody was observing the

police station, that somebody in the police station had

telephoned. There were a whole series of theories, all of

which have been rehearsed before the Tribunal and so I

cannot -- I do not have the knowledge or the evidence or

the factual certainty to be able to say one thing or the

other, and I was just aware of all those various theories.

Q. Were you aware of the theory that there was technical 229

information available that a call from Dundalk Garda

Station was made to the IRA?

A. Yes, I had heard that claimed but, you know, I had never

heard anything authoritatively that one would have said

yes, that is the truth or that is what happened.

Q. I appreciate that, but if that evidence could be proven, it 230

would be exceptionally powerful information suggesting

Garda collusion, wouldn't it?

A. Well it would. And I mean, there is a wealth of allegation

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of Garda collusion, there is a lot of circumstantial

evidence of Garda collusion, and there are all sorts of

conflicting theories about the facts as they are known, and

you know, it's really not a matter for me, it's a matter

for the Tribunal to weigh those and decide what credibility

to give each of the factors and what credibility to give

each of the theories.

Q. I agree with that, sir, obviously, but we have somebody who 231

is expert in knowledge of Northern Ireland at this

particular time and that's why I am just trying to probe

what you know about it?

A. I mean, I think to help you, I do not know anything factual

or first-hand that would help you or the Tribunal in

relation to those specific theories or rumours. I was

privy and heard them the same as everybody else did.

Q. So I was putting to you two vital pieces of evidence that 232

Toby Harnden relied on: First, that there was technical

information that a call from Dundalk Garda Station was made

to the IRA. Did you hear that as a rumour beforehand?

A. Yes, certainly before Mr. Harnden's book came out, yeah.

Q. And a second vital piece of evidence that Mr. Harnden 233

included in his book was that he said a retired Garda

Detective Inspector confirmed to him that the tip-off had

come from a fellow garda. Like, had you heard that before,

that a retired --

A. No.

Q. You hadn't heard that? 234

A. No, I never heard that.

Q. And those two pieces of evidence together are fairly 235

significant, would you agree, in suggesting Garda

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collusion?

A. If they are true.

Q. Oh, absolutely. 236

A. Yes.

Q. If they were true, they -- 237

A. If they are true, then they would certainly point to a

degree of Garda collusion.

Q. But the reason I bring them to your attention is because 238

neither of them is true, and the Tribunal has been able to

see correspondence from the RUC dated 15th of September,

2000, where the RUC confirmed to An Garda Siochana that

there was no -- they have no technical information, they

have no evidence suggesting a call was made from Dundalk

Garda Station to the IRA.

A. Well, I can't contradict that if that is RUC evidence.

Q. Would you agree with me that that casts doubt upon what 239

Toby Harnden has said in his book?

A. I think that is for the Tribunal to decide, not me.

Q. I know it is for the Tribunal to decide that, but what do 240

you think?

A. I don't know. I mean, I am not in possession of all the

facts, and without being in possession of all the facts I

am reluctant draw a conclusion.

Q. OK. Here is another piece of information that the Tribunal 241

has: The Garda Detective Inspector who allegedly told Toby

Harnden that the tip-off had come from a fellow guard has

taken the oath in that box there and he has told the

Chairman that he never said that to Toby Harnden. Wouldn't

that cast doubt on the accuracy of what Toby Harnden is

stating?

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A. Well, on the surface, yes. But I mean the officer may well

have perjured himself, you can't rule that out, that's not

for me to decide.

Q. Well the officer has come to give evidence. We are waiting 242

on Mr. Harnden to give evidence but...

A. I think you will have to tease that out with Mr. Harnden.

I am not in position to give you a comment on that one way

or the other.

Q. You mentioned that in the 1970s and 1980s there was general 243

wariness between RUC and An Garda Siochana, isn't that

correct?

A. Yes, that would be my impression.

Q. I don't think that was a wariness that was limited to 244

police officers on the island. There would have been

wariness between politicians north and south as well, isn't

that so?

A. Certainly, yes. I mean, would have been some very critical

politicians in the North about the policies in the -- in

the implementation of security policy in the South. I

mean, some of that was exchanged in public and in very

emotional ways sometimes.

Q. Yes, yes. My client, Owen Corrigan, agrees with you that 245

there was mutual distrust between An Garda Siochana and the

RUC during the 1970s into the 1980s. Were you aware how

close my client, Mr. Corrigan, was to Brian Fitzsimons?

A. No.

Q. You met -- 246

A. Except for the one occasion in which I met the two of them

together.

Q. You met in 1978 in the La Mon Hotel. What position did 247

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Mr. Fitzsimmons have at that time, sir?

A. That was the very first time I'd met Mr. Fitzsimmons, and

my understanding was that he was a senior officer in the

Special Branch in Belfast Police Headquarters.

Q. And he was, unfortunately, killed in the helicopter crash? 248

A. The helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre.

Q. And how important, from your knowledge of him, looking back 249

on his life, how important a figure was he in the

intelligence network in Northern Ireland?

A. Well I now understand he was quite a pivotal important

figure in the senior echelons of the Special Branch all

through those years of the Troubles. I mean, I got to know

him sort of better after that and met him from time to

time.

Q. Would you have regarded him as a shrewd man? 250

A. Oh, very much so, yes.

Q. You met Owen Corrigan in 1978 and -- 251

A. No, sometime before 1978.

Q. Sorry, sometime before 1978. And he was there with Brian 252

Fitzsimons, and who else?

A. That's correct.

Q. Was it just the two of them there? 253

A. Yes, there was just the two of them.

Q. And you were there with Mr. Cruchley, isn't that so? 254

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And then you went on to state that subsequently you met 255

Mr. Corrigan in the toilet and he said if you were looking

for stories, that you could contact him?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Is there anything unusual about -- by the way, I dispute 256

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this and I will come back to that but I just want to deal

with it in the generality -- was that unusual in your walk

of life at that stage, that police officers would offer you

assistance?

A. No, it wasn't unusual that police officers would offer

assistance, what was unusual was that they asked for money.

Q. And what he said to you, your words were "there'd be a few 257

bob in it for me, wouldn't there?"

A. Words to that effect.

Q. Words to that effect. Now, I will come back to what 258

Mr. Corrigan says about that in due course. But by stating

that, that isn't evidence that Mr. Corrigan is, in some

respect, a sophisticated IRA mole, is it?

A. I never claimed he was a sophisticated IRA mole. I just

simply recounted the encounter I had with him and the

details of it.

Q. Yes. No, the reason -- in fairness, I know you didn't say 259

that but obviously the Tribunal is looking at that

particular issue here.

A. Yes.

Q. And would you agree with me it would be unusual for an IRA 260

volunteer, in effect, is what Mr. Corrigan would be if he

was working for the IRA, to be basing himself in the La Mon

Hotel with Brian Fitzsimons having a drink on an afternoon

in the mid-1970s; that's not the behaviour you would

associate with somebody who is spying for the IRA, is it?

A. Well, I don't know. I mean those were strange days and

strange times and many strange things happened. Clearly,

Mr. Fitzsimmons had some good reason to spend time with

Mr. Corrigan and speak to him. I don't know what business

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they were transacting that day and at that stage I had no

reason to suspect Mr. Corrigan of anything, but what did

shock me was that he asked me for money for stories, and

that is the extent of my allegation against him.

Q. Yes.261

A. That never before and never since has a police officer ever

asked me for money for stories.

Q. Evidence has been given to the Chairman by other witnesses 262

that Brian Fitzsimons and Owen Corrigan were very close and

that they had a close professional relationship in terms of

intelligence gathering and intelligence transfer. You have

no reason to dispute that?

A. I have no reason to -- I cannot agree or disagree with

that. All I know is that I saw them together on one

occasion.

Q. Yes. 263

A. Anything else that I would say beyond that would be

speculation.

Q. Evidence has also been given by other RUC officers, and I 264

won't go through it in detail, indicating that Owen

Corrigan provided a valuable source of intelligence and

valuable cooperation to the Royal Ulster Constabulary

during these difficult years. Do you have any basis to

dispute that, Mr. Ryder?

A. No, if that is their evidence, then that has to be taken

for what its worth. I have no evidence to dispute it or to

disagree with it.

Q. And I don't know if you are aware that one RUC officer gave 265

evidence to the Chairman that, in fact, Owen Corrigan had

saved his life from an IRA murder ambush. I don't know if

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you were aware of that?

A. No.

Q. OK. When we got your statement, I asked for instructions 266

from Mr. Corrigan as to what his response was in respect of

the allegation about the La Mon Hotel and what you say is

him seeking money?

A. Yes.

Q. And I just want to tell you what he says and then ask you 267

two or three questions on it. Mr. Corrigan recalls a night

at the La Mon House Hotel. He does not recall being

introduced to Chris Ryder. Brian Fitzsimons pointed him,

Chris Ryder out, when he was sitting at the bar. He was a

heavy-set fellow. Brian Fitzsimons told him who he was and

to be careful. He said 'he will attempt to engage you in

conversation, he is very close to MI5, be careful what you

say to him'.

So that is Mr. Corrigan's response in respect of the

introduction. I will come on to the money point in due

course.

A. First of all, it wasn't a night, it was a lunchtime.

Q. OK. You say it was lunch as opposed to a night, OK? 268

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What time did you leave at? 269

A. Oh, probably half past three, four o'clock, something like

that.

Q. And do you know whether Mr. Fitzsimmons and Mr. Corrigan 270

stayed on?

A. I can't recall, to be truthful.

Q. OK. So in fairness to him, I would have thought that that 271

isn't an issue of huge dispute between you?

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A. No, no, but it was a lunchtime, it was a late lunchtime,

yes.

Q. Yes. I suppose what Mr. Corrigan is stating, first of all, 272

is that he wasn't introduced to you, that you were just

identified by Brian Fitzsimons?

A. Well that is not true. I mean, Mr. Corrigan gave me his

card. I have turned high and low to see if I can still --

if I still happen to have the card but I haven't been able

to turn it up.

Q. I will come on to that in due course, Mr. Ryder. One of 273

the things that Mr. Corrigan will say when he comes to give

evidence is that he was told by Brian Fitzsimons that you

were very close to MI5. Were you close to MI5 at that

time?

A. No, I didn't know a soul in MI5. And that was an

allegation that was regularly made against me by people of

a Republican disposition. But someone as senior as Brian

Fitzsimons in the Special Branch and other police officers

would never have said that because they would have known it

was untrue. I had been approached many years earlier by

someone who said that MI5 would be interested in talking to

me and I made it very clear that I had no interest in

talking to them, least of all becoming a source for them.

And never again was that sort of approach made to me.

Q. Mr. Corrigan also states in respect of the, what is called 274

the restroom or the toilet encounter, that is where you say

Mr. Corrigan was in the toilet and you went in after him,

isn't that correct?

A. I can't remember. I remember the conversation.

Q. He says that what you say never happened. He says that he 275

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did not have a card with a Garda crest on it and he says

the RUC had such cards but not members of An Garda

Siochana.

A. Well, my honest recollection is that he gave me a card with

phone numbers on it and that there was a Garda crest and he

was described on it as 'Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan'.

And it was because of that encounter and the fact that he

gave me his card that I remembered his name. And for him

to say that he wasn't introduced to me is totally

incorrect.

Q. Well, I suppose in fairness to both of you, it was a long 276

time ago?

A. It is a long time ago but because it was such -- it was an

encounter that was so memorable to me because of the fact

that he asked me for money, that it stuck in my head, and I

remembered his name because of that.

Q. Well, my instructions are he denies that, and you say it 277

happened?

A. Well then the Tribunal can decide in the balance whether my

evidence is credible enough for him to accept it or whether

they prefer Mr. Corrigan's denial.

Q. OK. Well, I suppose, unlike most issues that this Tribunal 278

has to deal with, that issue is not an issue of huge

significance?

A. No, it's not of huge significance, that's right.

Q. Now, you mentioned in your evidence, and I find it very 279

interesting, you stated in respect of something else, you

said once a rumour started it took on a life of its own.

Now, obviously, during the Troubles very many rumours

started about people or about events and they gathered

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traction, such as the suggestion there that you were

associated with MI5?

A. Yes, that is quite right.

Q. So isn't it the case that in Northern Ireland, during this 280

period, rumours were put about about people that were

completely false?

A. There is no doubt about that, that is correct, that is

true. But the fact that there were unfounded rumours

flying about doesn't detract from the overall picture of

the frustrations on the British side about the lack of

security cooperation, the difficulties that they

encountered over from extradition, over activities on the

southern side designed to interdict IRA operations. You

know, that is part of the political landscape, the security

landscape that prevailed all through the Troubles period.

You know, allegations about moles and all these other

things were really only parts of that picture. The overall

picture remains that there was difficulties, there was

wariness, suspicion, all those things.

Q. Yes, and my client doesn't dispute what you say there, 281

Mr. Ryder, because another note he gave my solicitor in

respect of your statement was as follows, and I should read

this out because it accords with a lot of what you said:

He says: "There was a mutual distrust on both sides with

security forces and he, Owen Corrigan, was not encouraged

by Headquarters to be mixing with the RUC. The RUC was

bitter towards the guards and vice versa. Owen Corrigan

confined his association with the RUC to a few individuals

he could trust in An Garda Siochana." So that doesn't

necessarily --

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A. I can't contradict there that or confirm it. I mean, I

didn't have any more dealings with Mr. Corrigan other than

the one occasion on which I met him?

Q. Have you ever, in your extensive career, encountered a 282

member of An Garda Siochana with RUC officers of such a

high level in a social environment in Belfast or anywhere

else in Northern Ireland?

A. Yes, on occasion. There might have been the odd retirement

function or something of that sort.

Q. But this was an afternoon in 1974, '75, '76? 283

A. Yes.

Q. It was a difficult time. Was it usual for members of An 284

Garda Siochana to be up with members of the RUC in Belfast

at that time?

A. I know there were occasional meetings. I mean, you know,

sometimes when I would have been going in and out of places

I might have seen people arriving or going to meetings or I

might have heard afterwards that there was a meeting with

the Garda or something. Like, that but that was the only

occasion I can recall when I sort of bumped into a

Garda/RUC contact, if you like.

Q. Well, extensive evidence has been given about Mr. Corrigan 285

being quite close to Brian Fitzsimons and the RUC and he

will say, he has given evidence already but he will say

again in the future, that he actively worked with the RUC

in terms of giving intelligence on the IRA?

A. Well, you know, I can't contradict that, nor can I confirm

it because I don't have any knowledge.

Q. Your book "A Force Under Fire", that was published in 1989, 286

isn't that correct?

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A. That's correct.

Q. Did it deal in any respect, and I apologise I haven't read 287

it, did it deal in any respect with the murders of Chief

Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan?

A. No, I think that the book was written and finished before.

Q. OK. And you confirmed to Mr. Valentine that you were close 288

to Harry Breen; you knew Harry Breen, isn't that so?

A. I wouldn't say I was close to him. I knew him. I mean, I

had met him on a couple of occasions and I had met him on a

number of occasions at scenes of incidents.

Q. And he never suggested to you that he was fearful of Owen 289

Corrigan as a member of the --

A. No, no, he never specifically mentioned Owen Corrigan to me

at all.

Q. Yes. OK. Were you aware or did you cover the extradition 290

of Dominic McGlinchey to Northern Ireland?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. That was quite a significant event for a variety of 291

reasons?

A. It was, yes.

Q. Wasn't it? 292

A. Yes, it was a very significant event, yes.

Q. Do you know, Owen Corrigan has given evidence about this, 293

that he was asked to be the member of An Garda Siochana to

physically hand over McGlinchey?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware of that, sir? 294

A. Not until afterwards. I mean I was there when the handover

took place and it was an incredible scrambling match with

protesters and the Garda and RUC and whatever and I wasn't

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very close to that, the actual handover, but I do think

that afterwards, this is just coming back to me now, I

think afterwards somebody said to me that Owen Corrigan had

been the man who was, the Garda officer who physically

handed over McGlinchey.

Q. Were you aware that after he did that there was a campaign 295

launched against him by provisionals and members of the

INLA in Dundalk?

A. No, I am not aware of that but it doesn't surprise me.

Q. You weren't aware that posters of Owen Corrigan were put up 296

around saying 'wanted for treason'?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. And you weren't aware that himself and his wife were 297

assaulted one evening when they were out socially?

A. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Q. Just finally, sir, when were you asked to give evidence to 298

the Tribunal here, or did you proffer yourself as a witness

to the Tribunal?

A. No, no, Mr. McBurney contacted me and asked me if I had any

information that might be of use.

Q. OK. And Mr. McBurney is the solicitor? 299

A. The solicitor for the Breen family.

Q. Thanks very much, Mr. Ryder. 300

THE WITNESS WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. COFFEY AS FOLLOWS:

CHAIRMAN: We will finish this before 3:00?

MR. VALENTINE: The situation was, because of Brigadier

Liles' flight arrangements, he would need to start giving

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evidence by 3:00 at the latest. I think we should be OK.

MR. COFFEY: I will be brief. I am mindful of the time

considerations.

Q. Mr. Ryder, I appear for retired Sergeant Colton and I want 301

to ask a number of brief questions. First of all, how long

are you retired?

A. Probably seven, six, seven years.

Q. Six, seven years? 302

A. Yes. I still do some work but I don't work full-time.

Q. During your working life as a journalist, did you maintain 303

an archive?

A. To some extent, but I disposed of a lot of it two years

ago.

Q. Did you ever write about the particular murders the subject 304

matter of this Tribunal?

A. I don't recall. I really don't recall. I mean, I don't

have an archive. I don't have a cuttings book.

Q. I think you are due to come back to give evidence on 305

another occasion, isn't that correct?

A. Yes, I think that is the plan, yes.

Q. Yes. And I -- 306

A. I mean, I think that the murders took place after my book

had gone to press but before it was published or around

about the same time, and I don't think they are mentioned

in that book but I can check to see if they are mentioned

in any of the other books, but I certainly don't have any

cuttings or anything of that sort, and this period was

before electronic archives were available so it's more

difficult to check back.

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Q. Well, even before electronic, there was newspapers kept, 307

albums of cuttings and indeed, full editions of their

newspapers, isn't that correct?

A. Yes, but I don't have access to those. I mean, if I had

written for that it would have been in The Sunday Times or

the Daily Telegraph, the only archives of those would be in

London.

Q. I must suggest to you that most newspapers, if not every 308

newspaper and every media organisation by now has committed

its archives into electronic form?

A. That may be, yes.

Q. And I must suggest to you if you wanted to check out any 309

articles that you may have written, that that would be

readily available to you as a recognised and a very

established former employee -

A. I mean it would be if I had the reason to do it, yes.

Q. Well, from your own memory, can you recall writing 310

specifically either in The Times or the Telegraph or any

other media about these two murders?

A. Yes, I probably reported the Breen/Buchanan murders the day

after for the Daily Telegraph.

Q. That would be, am I correct, a factual account? 311

A. Yes, that is all it would have been, yes.

Q. Yes. Well, as regards a background piece or analytical 312

piece, can you recall ever writing?

A. No, I don't recall writing anything.

Q. And you would be one of the most distinguished and longest 313

serving journalist, someone like you, David McKittrick,

Eamon Malley, you have seen the Troubles from almost the

inception right up until almost the present day?

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A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Others like Jeremy Paxman, Simon Jenkins, came and went? 314

A. Yes.

Q. And I must suggest to, Mr. Ryder, that you would have been 315

one of the people who would have been best informed on this

background of the murders and any other aspects relating to

the murders?

A. Yeah, well I have given evidence about the extent of my

knowledge of the situation.

Q. Yes, but you would have had a lot of information, you would 316

have been familiar with the broader picture of Northern

Ireland and also --

A. I thought that my evidence earlier covered that quite

comprehensively.

Q. Yes. And then focusing that background knowledge into the 317

specific incident of the two RUC men who were murdered, the

subject matter of this Tribunal, is it not very unusual

that you couldn't write a piece, or didn't write a piece

about anything relating to the Tribunal in terms of alleged

collusion?

A. It's not unusual at all. You know, first of all I would

found it very difficult to write pieces that were just

based on rumours; there would have had to be some reason

for it. I haven't been writing on a regular basis for six

or seven years. For example, I wouldn't have covered this

tribunal or any other tribunals. I write very occasional

pieces now and do some broadcasting.

Q. But these murders were very high profile incidents, weren't 318

they?

A. Yeah, well I mean it's quite possible I wrote -- I

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certainly would have written about them at the time.

Q. I am suggesting to you, Mr. Ryder, that if there were 319

rumours about Garda collusion in or about '89, at the time

of the murders, or shortly thereafter or a year or three

years thereafter, that that would have been a matter of

extreme interest to somebody like you with your intense

knowledge and interest in northern affairs?

A. Well, it was of interest to me, and I have given evidence

to the Tribunal about the extent of my knowledge about the

way that I see it fitting against the backdrop, the

landscape of cross-border cooperation, all those other

things. You know, I really can't help you any further than

that.

Q. With respect, Mr. Ryder, you have given no specific 320

evidence here today about these two murders.

A. But I don't have any specific evidence about the two

murders. I mean, I know as much about them as a man who is

50 miles away. I was in Belfast and was told there had

been a shooting on the border. I remember getting into my

car and driving down and then discovering from a mobile

telephone at the scene that it was two senior RUC officers.

I didn't know the names of them for some hours after that.

Q. I am suggesting to you that if there was any substance or 321

currency about collusion in 1989, 1990, '92, 94, that that

would have been of interest to you and journalists like

you --

A. Well, it was of interest to me and I have given evidence

this morning about the way that I saw the picture as I saw

it, the way that I interpreted that picture. But, you

know, I didn't, to my recollection, write anything

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specifically about Garda moles or collusion or things of

that sort because I don't have any firm, direct knowledge

of that. I may have reflected those rumours in a balanced

way in something I have written, but over the years, God

knows how many words I have written, I can't remember them

all.

Q. Specifically -- 322

A. And I don't have an archive.

Q. Specifically about these two murders, Mr. Ryder, and again, 323

I must repeat, your inability to point to a particular

article or articles is indicative of a lack of any

substance to any allegations or rumours about collusion?

A. If you are so concerned about what I wrote, why don't you

research my articles and I will happily answer any

questions that you produce when I come back again the next

time.

Q. Mr. Ryder, you are the person who is presenting yourself 324

here as an expert?

A. I am not. I was asked to give evidence and help the

Tribunal, that is what I am trying to do to the best of my

honest ability.

Q. Is it possible that you can check out your -- 325

A. No, it's not possible because I don't possess any archive

whatsoever.

Q. And you are not willing to do that? 326

A. I am not, because I don't think that anything that -- you

know, if you raise a specific concern with me about

something I have written, I am happy to deal with it. But

I do not have the resources or the time and I am not in the

best of health and I don't really have the capacity to go

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and begin to research things for your convenience, if I may

put it that way politely.

Q. And in conclusion, then, you have nothing to say direct or 327

indirect regarding these murders; you know nothing about

them other than --

A. I have given --

Q. The murders -- 328

A. -- assistance to the Tribunal to the fullest extent of my

knowledge and experience. You know, I can't go beyond

that. I am not going to speculate about things I don't

know anything about, and I am certainly not going to give

currency to rumours or allegations to which I know -- of

which I know nothing and which I have never investigated or

checked out.

Q. And clearly you didn't check anything out about rumours of 329

collusion?

A. I don't know what the point of this is.

Q. Can we take it that you didn't check out any, you 330

personally, you did not check out any suggestion of

collusion or Garda involvement in the murder of these two

men, you yourself?

A. I certainly was interested in that but --

Q. But you yourself -- 331

A. I spoke to various people about it over the years. I was

party to conversations where it was discussed. I was aware

of all these rumours. But I heard nothing or discovered

nothing that was firm enough or hard enough or factual

enough for me to write anything about it. And that would

be the test: could I add to this story or add something

new to it beyond just giving currency to rumours? And, to

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the best of my recollection, I found out nothing that

justified writing anything more than that.

Q. And can I take it that these rumours were one of many other 332

rumours that --

A. Of course there were rumours about everything and everybody

and it was a very difficult job for a journalist like me to

distill truth from all these rumours and the claims and

counterclaims that went on.

Q. Did you ever hear a rumour, investigate the rumour, 333

establish that the substance of the rumour was correct and

then proceed to write an article?

A. I wrote many articles about many things, some of which

would have been based on something somebody said to me or

some suspicion voiced to me.

Q. And that you carried out investigations and research and 334

established the substance of the rumour or the conversation

as being accurate?

A. Yes, that was the essence of journalism.

Q. And you did that on many occasions? 335

A. Yes, on many occasions when the evidence justified it, but

there were many occasions when one attempted to tease

things out and found that either one couldn't get specific

information or just that it was untrue and then it was

forgotten about.

Q. And I am suggesting, again, Mr. Ryder, that the absence of 336

any articles that you can recall is indicative that there

was no substance to anything that you heard good, bad or

indifferent about these two murders?

A. I never claimed to have any information about the two

murders.

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CHAIRMAN: Any questions from any other party?

MS. O'SULLIVAN: No questions.

MR. VALENTINE: Just a few short questions, Chairman.

THE WITNESS WAS RE-EXAMINED BY MR. VALENTINE AS FOLLOWS:

MR. VALENTINE: We will comfortably finish, Mr. Ryder.

First, Mr. Ryder, just to follow up on Mr. O'Callaghan's

final question. He asked you when you first contacted the

Tribunal and you explained that Mr. McBurney contacted you,

but in fact we didn't actually -- you didn't address the

question which is when you first had contact with the

Tribunal counsel, just for the record, that question was

asked

A. Yes, sometime after I spoke to Mr. McBurney and yourself

and Justin Dillon asked to meet me in Belfast and we had a

conversation and as a result of that, my statement was

drawn up.

Q. And can you give the date of that meeting you had with 337

myself and Mr. Dillon?

A. It probably was about the beginning of November. I think

the statement is date about 16th November.

Q. The statement is dated the 16th? 338

A. Which was three days after that.

Q. And you can confirm you had no contact with the Tribunal 339

before the meeting in Belfast?

A. Absolutely not except for the conversation with

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Mr. McBurney.

Q. And you can confirm Mr. McBurney contacted you for the 340

first time approximately how long ago?

A. Probably a couple of weeks before that.

Q. That is just for the record. Mr. O'Callaghan also asked 341

you whether you had heard it claimed that technical

information was available which suggested that a phone call

had been made from Dundalk Station. You said you had, and

I just want to clarify whether what you heard was that the

phone call had been made or whether it was that you heard

that there was technical information available to establish

that a phone call had been made?

A. No, I think the story was that there was a phone call had

been made or that the car had been followed or things --

you know, that there was an intercept or something. You

know, it was one of a number of spurious or varied theories

about how it had been targeted.

Q. But just to be absolutely clear, did you at any point hear 342

from any RUC officer or anyone else that there was

technical information available which would confirm that a

phone call had been made?

A. No, no.

Q. In relation to Mr. Harnden, I am sure Mr. Harnden is well 343

able to speak for himself, but what are your impressions of

him as a journalist?

A. Mr. Harnden?

Q. Yes.344

A. I don't know him very well at all. He joined the Daily

Telegraph while I worked there but I was based in Belfast,

he was based in London, and after I left the Daily

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Telegraph in 1993, he came over here to Ireland to replace

me and I just had one sort of brief conversation with him

when he arrived, and then after that I would just have met

him occasionally. I didn't mix with him socially or

anything of that sort. We might have been out on a story

together or something and might just pass the time of day

with him. I wasn't a close friend of his, and in fact I

didn't even know he was writing his book until it came out.

Q. And your impressions of the book? I think in fairness to 345

you, you said you didn't read it in full?

A. I don't think I read the book fully, I think I just skimmed

through it.

Q. And you didn't form any particular impression one way or 346

the other?

A. I don't think it would be fair to say I had any impression

of the book because that would have been some time ago when

the book came out and I don't recall.

Q. In response to a question again from Mr. O'Callaghan, you 347

indicated that on one occasion MI5 had tried to recruit you

as a source, effectively?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever hear anything about MI5, or the RUC for that 348

matter, ever trying to recruit sources within the south,

and in particular within An Garda Siochana?

A. There was a case in about 1973 of a Garda officer at

Headquarters in here who was -- I just can't recall his

name -- but he had been, he had been exposed as having been

assisting the British security services and there were

always rumours after that then that the British Security

Service had people in the Republic. Indeed I know of a

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94

senior Scotland Yard officer who claimed to have sources in

the Republic and who travelled to the Republic incognito to

meet these sources.

Q. And would these be sources who were paid money or were -- 349

A. I really don't know, but I would speculate they must have

been.

Q. And did you ever hear of the RUC Special Branch having 350

sources within An Garda Siochana?

A. Not specifically. You know, you would have heard all sorts

of rumours, you know, but that all sort of became James

Bond-ey stuff and I tend to discount it.

Q. Very good. I think when you were speaking about, I 351

suppose, the public relations exercise that the RUC

performed in their public pronouncements and you made the

statement that some of the evidence given to this Tribunal

made your eyebrows rise. What evidence was that?

A. I think it was more evidence not from the RUC; it was some

of the evidence from I think John O'Donoghue, the minister,

didn't strike me as being a very credible witness; I

thought that there was a distinct sound of hand-washing,

hand-wringing going on, from what I read of his evidence.

Q. Was there anything specific that made your eyebrows rise in 352

relation to his evidence?

A. I just don't recall, but you know, the way he said -- I

think the thing is that he was so dismissive of the fact

that there could even have been collusion or a mole or

anything, you know, which I don't think was appropriate for

the Justice -- ex Justice Minister. You know, I would have

thought that something of that sort should have been taken

seriously and tunnelled down to its very roots to prove it

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95

or disprove it. He just seemed so offhand about it.

Q. Very good. Thank you very much for attending and thank you 353

for agreeing to return on another occasion.

A. There is just one other point, Mr. Chairman. This morning

I wrote down the name of a police officer for you. I

was -- that was rather sprung on me and, on reflection, I

am not a hundred percent sure that I could stand over the

name of the police officer.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A. I do recall a conversation, and I am 99 percent sure it was

in Monaghan, at which a Garda officer said to me that, you

know, we sometimes have to be circumspect within our own

organisation about how we handle things and do things.

But, on reflection, I couldn't stand over the name of that

officer as being the man --

CHAIRMAN: Very well. Thank you very much

A. -- that I had the conversation with. So, just to be fair

to him, on reflection, I don't think I could completely

stand over his name, but I do recall that I had a

conversation of that sort in Monaghan.

CHAIRMAN: You may recall as time moves.

A. Yes, well as times moves on and if I can help you further

on that, I will come back to it.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I am very grateful to you

for your help to the Tribunal, it's much appreciate. Thank

you very much indeed.

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THE WITNESS THEN WITHDREW.

MR. VALENTINE: Chairman, just before Mr. Hayes takes up

the next witness, just two things that I want to state for

the record arising from Mr. Ryder evidence. The first is

that Mr. Jim McCann was on notice of Mr. Ryder's intended

evidence in relation to him.

And the second thing is, Mr. Fulton's name arose in

cross-examination -- under cross-examination by

Mr. O'Callaghan. Mr. Fulton wasn't on notice, obviously,

that Mr. Ryder would give any evidence in relation to him

because there was nothing in his statement and no such

evidence was led, but Mr. Fulton's solicitor is on notice

that at this stage of the public hearings we cannot foresee

whether or not his client's name may come up in

cross-examination and he is on notice that for that reason

we can't eliminate the possibility that his name will come

up in cross-examination at any of the public hearings.

MR. HAYES: Chairman, the next witness is a witness in

respect of whom you directed this evidence should be heard

in a private sitting.

THE TRIBUNAL THEN WENT INTO PRIVATE SESSION.

''74 [1] - 17:17'75 [1] - 81:10'76 [1] - 81:10'78 [1] - 17:19'87 [1] - 29:17'88 [1] - 29:18'89 [2] - 29:19, 87:3'92 [1] - 87:24'death [1] - 31:3'Detective [1] - 79:6'he [1] - 77:14'methodology' [1] - 22:18'wanted [1] - 83:11

114 [3] - 22:28, 23:27,

57:2615th [1] - 72:1016th [2] - 91:25, 91:2618 [1] - 2:191960s [1] - 3:241970s [4] - 16:27, 63:23,

73:9, 73:241972 [1] - 2:191973 [1] - 93:251974 [2] - 32:15, 81:101978 [5] - 16:29, 73:30,

74:17, 74:18, 74:191980s [7] - 9:4, 9:6,

63:24, 64:19, 64:20, 73:9, 73:24

1985 [2] - 21:291988 [1] - 2:221989 [4] - 3:6, 34:1,

81:29, 87:241990 [2] - 2:29, 87:241993 [3] - 2:23, 69:1, 93:11994 [1] - 2:271996 [2] - 2:27, 2:291998 [1] - 65:231999 [1] - 64:16

22000 [2] - 64:16, 72:112002 [2] - 64:29, 65:152011 [1] - 1:121st [2] - 34:1, 34:1725th [2] - 64:29, 65:15

33:00 [3] - 54:10, 83:27,

84:1

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88TH [1] - 1:1

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Aability [1] - 88:21able [14] - 15:18, 22:23,

25:18, 25:19, 31:24, 31:28, 55:8, 58:5, 59:3, 61:14, 70:19, 72:9, 78:8, 92:24

abreast [1] - 67:19absence [2] - 10:1, 90:25absolutely [7] - 11:19,

43:4, 43:17, 48:7, 72:3, 91:30, 92:18

abuse [2] - 44:22, 44:23accept [6] - 21:22, 46:23,

50:20, 60:29, 61:4, 79:20

accepted [1] - 50:4access [3] - 24:20, 40:7,

85:4accident [1] - 44:29accompany [1] - 7:16accompanying [1] - 7:19accords [1] - 80:23account [3] - 59:9, 67:23,

85:22accountability [1] - 44:21accounts [2] - 5:4, 68:4accuracy [1] - 72:29accurate [2] - 66:16,

90:17accusation [1] - 63:7acorn [2] - 69:15, 69:16acquiesced [1] - 6:26Act [1] - 32:24acted [1] - 43:23action [8] - 6:11, 6:15,

6:19, 7:1, 9:1, 11:7, 31:20, 33:23

actively [1] - 81:25activities [11] - 2:25,

4:11, 5:12, 5:23, 6:16, 12:7, 13:17, 32:30, 64:15, 68:12, 80:12

activity [12] - 4:27, 6:6, 7:24, 8:4, 15:5, 23:27, 32:29, 39:4, 59:8, 59:9, 59:14, 60:18

actual [3] - 32:17, 59:30, 83:1

adapt [2] - 25:16, 25:19add [2] - 89:29address [1] - 91:14adept [1] - 23:10ADJOURNED [1] - 53:16admission [1] - 31:26

admit [1] - 46:10admitted [1] - 13:9adopted [2] - 62:30, 65:7advance [3] - 12:2, 25:19,

65:22aerials [1] - 23:6aeroplanes [1] - 25:30affairs [2] - 39:14, 87:7affected [1] - 11:26afraid [2] - 52:6, 68:12AFTER [1] - 54:1aftermath [5] - 15:29,

26:18, 33:27, 34:20, 48:29

afternoon [12] - 18:22, 18:26, 18:30, 30:2, 30:28, 41:21, 52:16, 52:22, 53:12, 63:18, 75:24, 81:10

afternoon's [1] - 52:14afterwards [5] - 52:25,

81:18, 82:28, 83:2, 83:3agencies [2] - 39:23, 42:8agency [1] - 11:18agent [1] - 30:27aggressive [2] - 6:15, 9:1agitated [1] - 35:6ago [6] - 5:10, 79:12,

79:13, 84:14, 92:3, 93:16

agree [9] - 34:14, 43:28, 63:22, 68:2, 71:8, 71:30, 72:16, 75:21, 76:13

agreed [2] - 2:10, 30:12agreeing [1] - 95:3Agreement [17] - 9:17,

9:19, 9:22, 9:25, 20:21, 32:11, 32:13, 32:16, 33:8, 33:10, 33:13, 34:20, 34:23, 34:25, 41:1, 41:9, 70:1

agreement [1] - 9:26agrees [1] - 73:22ahead [1] - 9:27aimed [1] - 49:11air [1] - 60:8aircraft [1] - 25:25aircrafts [1] - 25:26airport [1] - 51:3alarm [1] - 19:8albums [1] - 85:2alert [2] - 45:28, 58:11alive [2] - 17:8, 52:1allegation [5] - 54:17,

70:30, 76:4, 77:5, 78:16allegations [4] - 20:7,

80:16, 88:12, 89:12alleged [1] - 86:19allegedly [1] - 72:25alley' [1] - 31:4allow [1] - 21:3allowed [6] - 6:14, 23:2,

23:4, 24:20, 25:6, 36:15almost [4] - 10:19, 49:4,

85:29, 85:30ambush [3] - 30:19,

70:12, 76:30

ambushes [1] - 60:10America [2] - 25:21,

25:29American [3] - 20:26,

21:1, 21:21amount [4] - 5:6, 35:24,

61:21, 66:26analyse [1] - 16:1analysed [1] - 40:1analysis [1] - 40:25analytical [1] - 85:24Anderson [3] - 65:28,

66:11, 67:8Andersonstown [2] -

26:9, 27:12Anglo [14] - 9:17, 9:19,

9:25, 20:21, 32:11, 32:13, 33:8, 33:10, 33:13, 34:20, 34:23, 34:26, 41:1, 41:8

Anglo-Irish [10] - 9:17, 9:19, 9:25, 32:11, 32:13, 33:8, 33:10, 33:13, 34:23, 34:26

annex [1] - 39:22answer [2] - 41:17, 88:14antennae [1] - 23:6anticipate [1] - 54:10anxious [1] - 47:29anyway [1] - 18:8apologise [1] - 82:2appear [5] - 8:8, 41:22,

62:12, 63:18, 84:5appeared [2] - 42:21,

59:8appearing [1] - 52:9application [2] - 52:15,

53:11applied [1] - 6:20appointed [1] - 37:3appointments [1] - 37:6appreciate [4] - 43:25,

62:20, 70:27, 95:29approach [3] - 8:26,

19:15, 78:24approached [3] - 35:5,

67:14, 78:20appropriate [2] - 40:28,

94:27approved [2] - 6:26, 37:6April [1] - 29:17archive [4] - 84:12, 84:18,

88:8, 88:23archives [3] - 84:29, 85:6,

85:10area [12] - 14:28, 15:5,

23:3, 24:21, 46:28, 55:4, 56:4, 58:22, 59:9, 59:10, 62:30

areas [6] - 3:4, 11:6, 12:17, 42:14, 58:26, 62:16

arguing [1] - 43:3arise [2] - 16:13, 16:17arising [2] - 10:1, 96:6Armagh [3] - 15:2, 46:28,

60:4armed [1] - 21:7



1

armies [1] - 9:7armoured [1] - 7:19arms [1] - 25:22Army [9] - 9:26, 10:11,

12:19, 33:26, 38:8, 42:17, 49:5, 54:28

army [43] - 7:16, 7:20, 7:22, 9:18, 10:2, 10:7, 11:20, 20:29, 21:4, 25:7, 26:7, 27:11, 30:1, 30:5, 31:3, 38:2, 38:4, 38:13, 38:25, 38:27, 39:8, 39:28, 40:10, 40:13, 44:30, 45:2, 45:5, 54:21, 55:14, 58:23, 59:19, 59:22, 60:26, 60:30, 61:6, 61:12, 61:16, 62:25, 63:3

army-to-army [1] - 11:20arose [6] - 3:11, 3:14,

48:10, 58:29, 61:30, 96:10

arrangement [1] - 21:23arrangements [5] - 30:16,

30:21, 34:6, 54:9, 83:30arrived [3] - 17:3, 20:14,

93:3arriving [1] - 81:17article [9] - 3:18, 26:30,

50:3, 64:28, 65:3, 65:30, 67:24, 88:11, 90:11

articles [8] - 3:13, 5:11, 69:29, 85:13, 88:11, 88:14, 90:12, 90:26

AS [8] - 1:2, 2:2, 41:19, 54:1, 54:4, 63:15, 83:25, 91:8

aspects [5] - 2:5, 2:9, 2:25, 38:20, 86:6

assaulted [1] - 83:14assertion [1] - 70:6assigned [1] - 62:29assist [2] - 20:24, 22:10assistance [5] - 11:9,

61:7, 75:4, 75:6, 89:8Assistant [1] - 34:5assisted [1] - 4:30assisting [2] - 21:6, 93:28associate [1] - 75:26associated [3] - 51:13,

54:17, 80:2association [1] - 80:28assure [1] - 1:5atrocities [3] - 12:22,

29:6, 43:9atrocity [2] - 10:21, 51:29attack [4] - 49:1, 59:26,

59:29, 60:26attacked [1] - 24:15attacking [1] - 63:12attacks [5] - 9:5, 11:1,

29:16, 51:9, 51:12attempt [3] - 50:18,

51:17, 77:14attempted [3] - 11:20,

49:16, 90:21

attempting [1] - 48:30attend [1] - 52:10attending [1] - 95:2attention [4] - 3:19, 5:27,

13:24, 72:8attic [1] - 26:8attitude [2] - 6:29, 21:17August [1] - 65:23authorise [1] - 41:5authoritative [3] - 26:29,

27:10, 27:13authoritatively [1] - 70:25authorities [8] - 5:19, 6:5,

6:7, 7:9, 10:29, 22:14, 46:9, 53:5

authority [3] - 37:1, 37:4, 37:5

Authority [1] - 2:27available [8] - 53:5, 53:8,

70:22, 84:29, 85:14, 92:7, 92:11, 92:20

await [1] - 65:18aware [39] - 3:25, 3:30,

4:18, 12:2, 32:14, 36:10, 36:11, 40:17, 42:2, 45:19, 46:15, 46:19, 63:28, 64:2, 64:8, 64:12, 64:25, 66:3, 66:20, 67:13, 67:19, 69:19, 69:21, 70:4, 70:9, 70:11, 70:20, 70:21, 73:24, 76:28, 77:1, 82:15, 82:27, 83:6, 83:9, 83:10, 83:13, 83:15, 89:25

awful [2] - 57:7, 61:29axe [1] - 45:22axis [4] - 15:4, 31:10,

35:9, 36:10

Bbackdrop [2] - 33:15,

87:10backed [2] - 6:11, 8:30background [5] - 39:15,

41:8, 85:24, 86:6, 86:15backgrounds [1] - 40:25backwards [2] - 20:20,

28:22bad [2] - 16:2, 90:27bail [2] - 3:25, 3:30balance [1] - 79:19balanced [2] - 45:18, 88:3Bandit [4] - 69:12, 69:16,

69:17, 70:5bar [3] - 18:20, 52:7,

77:12base [4] - 23:27, 62:7,

62:8, 66:10based [10] - 2:20, 22:21,

23:14, 39:20, 39:21, 67:24, 86:23, 90:13, 92:29, 92:30

bases [5] - 9:28, 22:3, 22:27, 23:26, 25:27

basing [1] - 75:23

basis [7] - 6:13, 16:17, 19:28, 33:18, 46:18, 76:23, 86:24

battle [3] - 23:14, 32:21, 33:7

BE [1] - 54:3beam [1] - 23:4became [3] - 25:17,

32:14, 94:10become [3] - 46:21,

62:30, 64:12becoming [1] - 78:23beef [3] - 20:22, 20:23,

21:24BEEN [1] - 2:1beforehand [2] - 55:27,

71:19began [4] - 19:8, 25:16,

26:19, 64:14begin [2] - 52:10, 89:1beginning [1] - 91:24begun [1] - 3:21behalf [1] - 65:11behaviour [1] - 75:25behind [1] - 34:12Belfast [26] - 2:21, 4:20,

6:3, 6:9, 6:10, 6:29, 16:22, 22:29, 22:30, 26:5, 26:10, 27:12, 30:4, 30:9, 30:13, 39:20, 39:21, 58:24, 62:3, 74:4, 81:6, 81:13, 87:18, 91:19, 91:29, 92:29

Belfast-Dublin [2] - 22:29, 22:30

belief [1] - 67:2beliefs [1] - 46:21believes [1] - 68:27bells [1] - 19:8beside [1] - 7:28best [7] - 16:21, 20:11,

48:8, 86:5, 88:20, 88:30, 90:1

betrayal [1] - 50:21betrayed [5] - 29:25,

30:17, 30:19, 50:11, 50:25

better [2] - 33:16, 74:13between [24] - 8:9, 8:14,

11:16, 11:17, 11:22, 11:24, 11:27, 12:25, 12:26, 15:3, 23:15, 32:17, 33:18, 33:21, 39:27, 40:12, 42:7, 42:15, 55:17, 64:30, 73:10, 73:15, 73:23, 77:30

beyond [4] - 50:11, 76:17, 89:9, 89:30

bid [1] - 32:24big [3] - 4:6, 24:14, 26:10Billy [1] - 42:12binoculars [2] - 23:1,

56:19bit [4] - 19:24, 30:14,

47:10, 57:29bits [1] - 69:14

bitter [1] - 80:27black [2] - 45:25, 45:29Blair [1] - 12:8blast [1] - 16:30blind [1] - 56:12blocked [1] - 23:18blown [2] - 17:19, 17:24boards [1] - 5:15bob [2] - 19:6, 75:8Bob [2] - 27:18, 47:23bomb [20] - 4:14, 5:18,

5:22, 10:24, 11:21, 11:22, 23:15, 23:20, 24:19, 25:20, 28:28, 29:15, 48:27, 49:3, 49:4, 49:18, 59:27, 61:10, 61:12, 61:17

bomb-making [2] - 4:14, 10:24

bombed [1] - 24:16bombers [1] - 11:10bombing [3] - 49:7, 65:1,

65:23bombs [12] - 5:17, 5:23,

10:22, 23:10, 23:12, 23:16, 23:18, 24:12, 25:13, 55:8, 61:15

Bond [2] - 57:29, 94:11Bond-ey [2] - 57:29,

94:11book [28] - 3:6, 3:9,

24:19, 26:11, 27:14, 64:5, 66:28, 69:12, 69:17, 69:22, 69:24, 69:26, 70:5, 70:10, 70:11, 71:20, 71:22, 72:17, 81:29, 82:5, 84:18, 84:23, 84:26, 93:8, 93:9, 93:11, 93:16, 93:17

booked [4] - 30:27, 50:13, 50:16, 50:17

books [5] - 2:24, 63:29, 64:1, 64:2, 84:27

border [58] - 7:4, 7:7, 7:10, 7:11, 7:18, 7:20, 8:9, 9:6, 9:19, 9:27, 9:28, 10:13, 10:20, 10:30, 11:2, 11:4, 11:7, 11:8, 11:24, 12:6, 12:18, 16:4, 20:22, 20:23, 21:14, 21:30, 22:6, 26:16, 29:7, 33:1, 33:15, 33:19, 33:21, 35:16, 47:1, 47:20, 48:28, 54:21, 54:22, 54:27, 55:3, 55:4, 55:15, 55:17, 57:25, 59:19, 59:30, 60:12, 60:22, 60:24, 60:27, 61:21, 61:27, 62:17, 87:11, 87:19

border-building [1] - 21:30

box [2] - 1:10, 72:27boxer [1] - 3:23boy [1] - 48:19Branch [10] - 18:11, 30:9,

42:6, 42:13, 43:21, 44:14, 74:4, 74:11, 78:18, 94:7

brave [1] - 27:21break [1] - 51:20Breen [16] - 27:15, 27:16,

27:17, 27:19, 29:18, 33:27, 35:14, 36:3, 36:21, 36:22, 47:23, 69:18, 82:4, 82:7, 83:22

Breen/Buchanan [2] - 26:17, 85:20

Brian [13] - 18:9, 18:15, 20:12, 73:25, 74:19, 75:24, 76:9, 77:11, 77:13, 78:5, 78:12, 78:17, 81:23

brief [5] - 41:4, 52:15, 84:3, 84:6, 93:2

briefings [1] - 9:13Brigade [2] - 58:20, 58:21brigade [1] - 23:5Brigadier [5] - 52:15,

52:30, 53:7, 54:8, 83:29bring [3] - 31:28, 32:19,

72:8Brink's [1] - 29:8Brink's-MAT [1] - 29:8bristled [1] - 23:6Britain [1] - 10:26British [32] - 5:19, 7:9,

8:28, 9:7, 9:26, 10:11, 10:19, 11:4, 11:17, 12:19, 20:21, 21:8, 21:16, 21:21, 21:27, 22:14, 23:15, 26:5, 33:14, 33:25, 33:26, 38:8, 39:23, 42:17, 49:5, 54:28, 61:12, 65:21, 80:10, 93:28, 93:29

broadcasting [1] - 86:27broader [1] - 86:11brought [2] - 32:16, 32:24Buchanan [9] - 27:15,

27:18, 29:18, 33:27, 35:14, 36:3, 47:23, 69:18, 82:4

buffer [3] - 37:1, 37:20, 37:22

buffers [1] - 37:16building [3] - 21:30,

33:14, 45:8built [2] - 9:27, 24:13bump [1] - 58:6bumped [2] - 28:4, 81:20buried [1] - 52:7bury [1] - 25:20business [2] - 3:14, 75:30businessman [1] - 3:15but.. [1] - 73:5buy [2] - 25:5, 57:9buying [1] - 25:24BY [6] - 2:1, 41:19, 54:3,

63:15, 83:25, 91:8bypass [1] - 12:5



2

Ccabinet [1] - 37:7camera [1] - 58:7cameras [2] - 24:9, 58:3campaign [5] - 6:8, 15:1,

25:15, 33:16, 83:6cannot [3] - 70:18, 76:13,

96:16capabilities [2] - 22:15,

22:24capability [2] - 56:21,

56:30capable [1] - 57:17capacity [20] - 22:9,

22:25, 23:3, 23:7, 23:11, 23:19, 24:18, 24:26, 24:29, 25:1, 25:2, 25:11, 25:18, 26:1, 57:20, 57:23, 57:24, 57:30, 58:1, 88:30

car [10] - 7:19, 7:21, 28:29, 30:10, 58:6, 58:7, 58:9, 70:14, 87:20, 92:14

card [6] - 19:5, 78:7, 78:8, 79:1, 79:4, 79:8

cards [1] - 79:2career [2] - 2:18, 81:4careful [3] - 38:11, 77:14,

77:15carefully [2] - 43:23, 60:8carried [8] - 7:18, 28:26,

29:6, 31:27, 33:4, 35:2, 41:6, 90:15

cars [4] - 7:19, 57:27, 58:4, 58:5

case [10] - 11:23, 12:5, 34:30, 37:18, 44:17, 49:20, 49:21, 54:11, 80:4, 93:25

cases [3] - 6:12, 10:24, 43:7

cast [1] - 72:29Castle [2] - 39:22Castlebellingham [1] -

48:28Castleblayney [1] - 6:17casts [1] - 72:16caught [1] - 28:30caused [3] - 22:18, 47:9,

61:26cautious [1] - 12:1CB [3] - 25:2, 25:9, 57:1ceasefire [2] - 63:28,

64:17centrally [1] - 63:30centred [2] - 23:28certain [8] - 3:12, 14:24,

14:25, 15:12, 15:13, 23:20, 65:7

certainly [26] - 10:6, 17:17, 36:10, 36:11, 36:12, 42:17, 43:13, 46:5, 51:2, 51:11, 55:29, 56:23, 56:29, 57:14, 57:30, 58:1,

58:13, 59:8, 68:21, 71:20, 72:6, 73:17, 84:27, 87:1, 89:11, 89:22

certainty [1] - 70:19CHAIRMAN [15] - 1:4,

2:13, 13:26, 14:3, 14:6, 51:23, 52:5, 52:30, 54:14, 83:27, 91:2, 95:10, 95:18, 95:24, 95:28

Chairman [21] - 1:7, 2:4, 2:18, 5:30, 7:8, 13:23, 14:1, 22:10, 25:10, 47:29, 51:25, 52:13, 54:6, 72:28, 76:8, 76:29, 91:6, 95:4, 96:4, 96:22

chance [1] - 68:8change [3] - 7:1, 9:1,

32:27changed [1] - 37:19changing [1] - 32:18Charles [1] - 8:19cheap [1] - 57:6check [12] - 45:30, 55:16,

59:15, 65:26, 65:28, 84:26, 84:30, 85:12, 88:22, 89:15, 89:18, 89:19

checked [3] - 59:11, 68:11, 89:14

checkpoint [2] - 9:18, 55:1

checkpoints [1] - 55:2checks [2] - 67:6, 67:7cheque [1] - 66:28cheque-book [1] - 66:28cheques [1] - 50:18Chief [12] - 17:11, 17:13,

17:14, 17:28, 31:15, 37:2, 38:22, 40:7, 40:9, 65:27, 69:18, 82:3

children [1] - 51:30Chris [3] - 1:9, 77:11,

77:12CHRIS [2] - 2:1, 54:3circle [1] - 35:21circuit [1] - 23:3circuitry [1] - 5:15circumspect [6] - 13:16,

14:9, 14:12, 14:15, 35:24, 95:13

circumspection [1] - 60:17

circumstance [2] - 42:30, 69:27

circumstances [5] - 2:8, 29:1, 34:6, 36:19, 49:15

circumstantial [1] - 71:1civil [1] - 61:7claimed [8] - 31:25,

49:10, 49:23, 70:24, 75:14, 90:29, 92:6, 94:1

claims [3] - 64:15, 68:11, 90:7

clamp [1] - 46:9clarify [3] - 8:15, 51:25,

92:9clarity [1] - 36:20clash [1] - 32:14clause [1] - 47:7clear [13] - 10:3, 13:13,

17:21, 19:17, 23:2, 25:1, 28:12, 31:18, 52:23, 56:4, 56:5, 78:22, 92:18

clearly [4] - 37:18, 48:24, 75:28, 89:15

client [3] - 73:22, 73:25, 80:20

client's [1] - 96:17cloaked [2] - 41:11, 41:13close [18] - 4:6, 8:8,

51:16, 52:8, 56:13, 61:11, 67:11, 73:25, 76:9, 76:10, 77:15, 78:13, 81:23, 82:6, 82:8, 83:1, 93:7

closed [1] - 23:3closely [1] - 24:27Clough [5] - 22:29, 55:1,

55:18, 59:25clubs [2] - 4:22, 5:5Co [1] - 39:5Co-ordinator [1] - 39:5coal [2] - 15:22, 15:24cocktail [1] - 6:24COFFEY [2] - 83:25, 84:3coincidence [1] - 31:6colleague [1] - 7:27colleagues [2] - 13:6,

46:30collecting [1] - 59:1collusion [14] - 70:7,

70:29, 71:1, 71:2, 72:1, 72:7, 86:20, 87:3, 87:24, 88:1, 88:12, 89:16, 89:20, 94:26

Colton [1] - 84:5column [1] - 6:23comfortable [1] - 14:21comfortably [1] - 91:10coming [5] - 29:11, 33:4,

42:19, 68:2, 83:2command [4] - 12:23,

35:20, 55:25, 55:28commanding [1] - 26:7commence [1] - 54:9commenced [1] - 34:7comment [2] - 68:20,

73:7Commissioner [4] - 12:8,

34:2, 34:5, 34:8commitments [1] - 37:21committal [1] - 19:7committed [5] - 6:7,

27:20, 32:25, 44:15, 85:9

committees [6] - 38:24, 38:25, 38:26, 38:27, 38:29, 40:14

common [10] - 6:2, 13:10, 25:3, 26:20, 44:13, 46:21, 56:23, 57:2, 66:6, 69:22

communications [1] - 58:1

communities [2] - 11:6, 62:18

community [2] - 34:25, 34:28

Community [1] - 2:28companion [2] - 17:3,

17:29company [1] - 28:7compatible [1] - 7:23compellable [2] - 47:12compelling [1] - 68:30completely [2] - 80:6,

95:20complex [1] - 24:10components [1] - 5:19composition [1] - 48:18compounded [1] - 8:2comprehensive [3] -

22:6, 41:9, 49:24comprehensively [1] -

86:14compromise [1] - 31:5compromised [3] - 12:7,

26:22, 46:6computer [1] - 58:9computerised [1] - 58:15concentrating [1] - 23:9concern [13] - 6:22, 11:8,

14:11, 14:27, 22:19, 29:20, 31:9, 32:2, 33:30, 35:10, 36:3, 36:8, 88:27

concerned [6] - 14:23, 27:22, 35:7, 36:12, 66:5, 88:13

concerning [1] - 48:10concerns [6] - 12:24,

15:6, 15:28, 29:29, 32:4, 35:17

concessions [2] - 8:21, 8:22

concluded [1] - 41:7conclusion [3] - 44:1,

72:23, 89:3conclusions [4] - 42:24,

42:27, 43:6, 43:27conclusively [1] - 50:13concurrent [1] - 2:7condemnation [1] - 43:27condemnations [1] -

43:15condemning [1] - 8:28condition [1] - 53:13conduct [1] - 20:7conducted [1] - 55:2conference [4] - 28:8,

44:29, 45:2, 45:4conferences [1] - 34:3confidences [1] - 19:27confidential [1] - 14:22confined [1] - 80:28confirm [5] - 81:1, 81:27,

91:28, 92:2, 92:20confirmed [5] - 13:15,

21:10, 71:23, 72:11, 82:6

conflict [3] - 46:12, 61:24, 62:10

conflicting [2] - 51:1, 71:3

conscious [2] - 36:13, 68:1

consequence [2] - 18:26, 20:18

considerable [1] - 5:6considerably [1] - 66:26consideration [1] - 59:18considerations [1] - 84:4considered [5] - 3:7,

19:11, 21:12, 33:26, 68:24

consistent [1] - 51:12Constable [6] - 17:13,

17:14, 37:3, 38:22, 40:7, 40:9

Constables [1] - 31:16Constabulary [1] - 76:22constant [10] - 10:28,

10:30, 12:19, 12:24, 12:25, 23:14, 31:19, 32:21, 55:6

consternation [1] - 46:19constructive [1] - 8:26contact [18] - 4:10, 11:20,

11:22, 11:23, 12:15, 12:18, 33:24, 61:1, 61:2, 61:16, 62:14, 62:24, 62:26, 65:27, 74:28, 81:21, 91:15, 91:28

contacted [4] - 83:19, 91:12, 91:13, 92:2

contacts [5] - 8:9, 62:20, 62:22, 62:23, 64:22

contained [2] - 40:24, 40:28

content [1] - 28:11context [12] - 3:14, 5:30,

16:1, 16:4, 19:23, 19:24, 20:4, 21:15, 21:26, 26:17, 28:2, 32:5

continue [1] - 32:12continued [1] - 20:15CONTINUED [2] - 54:1,

54:3continues [1] - 65:30contradict [3] - 72:15,

81:1, 81:27control [5] - 23:12, 25:26,

25:30, 37:15controlled [3] - 36:27,

36:30, 55:29convenience [1] - 89:1conversation [17] -

13:11, 14:9, 18:27, 20:6, 20:18, 28:11, 28:14, 38:10, 77:15, 78:29, 90:16, 91:20, 91:30, 93:2, 95:11, 95:19, 95:22

conversation-point [1] - 13:11

conversations [8] - 13:2, 15:23, 21:15, 22:22,



3

26:2, 28:23, 36:21, 89:25

convicted [1] - 5:23convinced [1] - 65:21convincing [3] - 31:23,

50:22, 50:25convoy [1] - 7:18cooperate [1] - 8:12cooperation [20] - 6:4,

6:30, 8:14, 12:27, 16:5, 20:22, 32:22, 32:29, 33:6, 33:16, 34:10, 35:16, 46:26, 46:30, 61:21, 61:23, 76:22, 80:11, 87:11

coordinating [1] - 39:1Coordinator [3] - 39:17,

40:5, 40:15copies [1] - 44:10Cork [1] - 27:1corps [1] - 23:30correct [25] - 3:17, 24:27,

27:16, 38:2, 42:16, 45:15, 45:20, 61:18, 62:2, 63:20, 63:21, 69:3, 73:11, 74:21, 74:25, 74:29, 78:28, 80:7, 81:30, 82:1, 84:20, 85:3, 85:22, 86:1, 90:10

correspondence [1] - 72:10

Corrigan [41] - 16:18, 16:20, 18:12, 18:14, 18:16, 19:1, 19:14, 20:2, 20:3, 20:4, 36:22, 63:19, 73:22, 73:25, 74:17, 74:27, 75:11, 75:12, 75:22, 75:30, 76:2, 76:9, 76:21, 76:29, 77:4, 77:9, 77:26, 78:3, 78:6, 78:11, 78:25, 78:27, 80:25, 80:27, 81:2, 81:22, 82:12, 82:13, 82:23, 83:3, 83:10

Corrigan' [1] - 79:6Corrigan's [2] - 77:17,

79:21Cory [1] - 70:1Council [3] - 2:28, 32:15,

32:20councillors [1] - 62:15counsel [2] - 52:9, 91:16counter [5] - 23:9, 23:24,

23:25, 24:22, 24:26counter-measures [5] -

23:9, 23:24, 23:25, 24:22, 24:26

counterclaims [1] - 90:8counterparts [4] - 37:27,

38:8, 38:9, 61:13Country [4] - 69:12,

69:16, 69:17, 70:5country [3] - 38:7, 38:17,

57:7County [1] - 33:5couple [5] - 30:13, 41:22,

60:27, 82:9, 92:4courageous [1] - 68:16course [15] - 9:30, 11:13,

18:26, 18:30, 28:21, 37:17, 44:9, 45:12, 45:23, 52:17, 61:4, 75:11, 77:19, 78:10, 90:5

court [1] - 25:29courts [2] - 3:26, 6:14cover [2] - 7:28, 82:15coverage [1] - 3:10covered [2] - 86:13, 86:25covering [4] - 2:16,

25:22, 63:19, 63:23covert [2] - 22:1, 60:17crash [2] - 74:5, 74:6create [2] - 22:2, 58:11created [2] - 23:17, 51:27creating [1] - 37:21credibility [4] - 49:22,

68:9, 71:5, 71:6credible [4] - 50:30,

79:20, 94:19crest [2] - 79:1, 79:5crime [3] - 27:26, 27:27,

29:3crime-scene [2] - 27:26,

27:27crimes [6] - 27:25, 31:22,

31:23, 31:27, 44:15, 44:16

criminal [1] - 32:22Criminal [1] - 32:23critical [2] - 42:5, 73:17criticise [1] - 43:19criticised [1] - 42:10criticism [1] - 37:29cross [14] - 10:13, 10:30,

11:7, 16:4, 20:22, 35:16, 54:7, 55:15, 87:11, 96:11, 96:18, 96:20

CROSS [4] - 41:19, 54:3, 63:15, 83:25

cross-border [8] - 10:13, 10:30, 11:7, 16:4, 20:22, 35:16, 87:11

cross-examination [5] - 54:7, 96:11, 96:18, 96:20

CROSS-EXAMINED [4] - 41:19, 54:3, 63:15, 83:25

Crossmaglen [1] - 60:26Crown [1] - 49:1Cruchley [1] - 74:24Crutchley [4] - 17:11,

17:29, 18:15, 18:17currency [5] - 66:6,

69:23, 87:24, 89:12, 89:30

current [1] - 40:26curtailing [1] - 6:6Cusack [1] - 27:1customs [1] - 29:14cut [1] - 32:30cuttings [3] - 84:18,

84:28, 85:2cynical [1] - 47:2

DDaily [7] - 2:22, 69:1,

69:4, 85:6, 85:21, 92:28, 92:30

danger [1] - 60:9dangerous [3] - 60:1,

63:26, 63:27date [4] - 3:8, 41:29,

91:22, 91:25dated [2] - 72:10, 91:26Datsun [1] - 48:24David [2] - 51:29, 85:28days [9] - 25:19, 25:21,

29:13, 37:17, 56:5, 56:27, 60:18, 75:27, 91:27

DC [1] - 40:4DCI [2] - 40:10, 41:10DCI's [1] - 40:7DCOI [2] - 40:3, 40:5dead [2] - 17:9, 43:24deadly [1] - 32:17deal [10] - 9:30, 15:8,

16:10, 40:20, 54:7, 75:1, 79:23, 82:2, 82:3, 88:28

dealing [6] - 14:21, 15:9, 15:26, 34:18, 41:25, 44:8

dealings [4] - 14:24, 66:23, 67:18, 81:2

dealt [3] - 5:8, 58:25, 58:27

death [1] - 43:20deaths [4] - 7:4, 29:2,

47:28deceased [2] - 17:11,

18:10DECEMBER [1] - 1:1decide [6] - 50:29, 71:5,

72:18, 72:19, 73:3, 79:19

decided [4] - 21:22, 21:27, 22:2, 37:2

decisions [1] - 43:20decisive [1] - 9:1deduce [1] - 22:23defamed [1] - 68:27Defence [1] - 39:12defence [1] - 6:13definite [1] - 27:8definitive [3] - 3:8, 42:24,

42:27definitively [2] - 29:24,

31:8degree [3] - 6:4, 35:4,

72:7delay [1] - 52:6delicacy [1] - 13:18delicate [1] - 53:1deliver [1] - 33:12delivers [1] - 65:18denial [1] - 79:21denied [1] - 26:11

denies [1] - 79:17deny [1] - 49:23deployment [1] - 32:29depots [1] - 4:22Deputy [1] - 12:8Derry [1] - 62:3describe [2] - 10:18,

47:19described [4] - 18:12,

37:27, 65:9, 79:6description [1] - 10:1designed [1] - 80:13desire [1] - 21:13desk [1] - 39:9desperate [1] - 11:5detail [8] - 5:9, 5:10,

15:28, 18:21, 18:28, 28:18, 31:17, 76:20

detailed [3] - 41:3, 41:9, 67:27

details [5] - 30:15, 43:8, 48:20, 57:23, 75:16

detect [2] - 23:16, 23:20detected [1] - 56:17detectible [1] - 55:29Detective [2] - 71:23,

72:25detectives [2] - 35:22,

44:16determination [1] - 35:29deterrent [1] - 9:8detonated [4] - 23:13,

23:19, 28:28, 49:18detonation [1] - 5:17detract [1] - 80:9develop [2] - 11:11, 21:9developing [3] - 23:11,

25:12, 56:24device [3] - 16:30, 55:24,

55:28devious [1] - 45:19died [1] - 52:7different [2] - 26:27,

40:14difficult [16] - 14:28, 16:2,

34:19, 34:26, 49:14, 49:15, 50:30, 59:24, 60:5, 68:15, 69:9, 76:23, 81:12, 84:30, 86:22, 90:6

difficulties [6] - 15:25, 35:8, 43:18, 61:5, 80:11, 80:18

difficulty [3] - 34:19, 46:11, 61:9

Dillon [2] - 91:19, 91:23dim [1] - 8:20dimension [1] - 62:5diplomacy [1] - 61:22diplomat [2] - 5:26, 21:2diplomatic [1] - 20:26diplomats [1] - 62:23direct [6] - 26:7, 37:15,

61:16, 68:6, 88:2, 89:3directed [1] - 96:23direction [1] - 46:29directly [2] - 12:13, 36:30

Director [3] - 39:5, 39:17, 40:15

director [1] - 40:5disagree [2] - 76:13,

76:27disclose [2] - 35:25,

35:26discount [1] - 94:11discovered [6] - 4:2,

4:16, 26:9, 49:8, 49:9, 89:26

discovering [1] - 87:20discredited [1] - 65:12discuss [1] - 35:17discussed [9] - 12:1,

12:30, 20:18, 21:14, 31:18, 39:2, 40:12, 41:2, 89:25

discussing [2] - 22:15, 35:14

discussions [2] - 16:14, 35:15

disguise [1] - 50:19dismissed [1] - 9:9dismissive [1] - 94:25disperse [1] - 42:22disposal [6] - 11:22,

23:15, 24:19, 61:10, 61:12, 61:17

disposals [1] - 11:21disposed [1] - 84:13disposition [1] - 78:17disprove [1] - 95:1dispute [7] - 64:30,

74:30, 76:12, 76:24, 76:26, 77:30, 80:20

disrupt [1] - 7:3disrupting [1] - 6:6dissatisfaction [1] -

47:20disseminated [1] - 27:4distance [3] - 16:15,

22:14, 56:20distill [2] - 45:16, 90:7distinct [1] - 94:20distinguished [1] - 85:27distract [1] - 48:5distributed [2] - 44:10,

44:11distrust [2] - 73:23, 80:24ditch [1] - 7:29divided [1] - 42:13documents [2] - 40:23,

41:2dodgy [1] - 19:24dog [1] - 55:30Dominic [1] - 82:16Donaldson [1] - 69:29done [10] - 7:10, 7:12,

19:16, 21:18, 28:24, 31:13, 34:4, 44:2, 55:22, 56:16

doors [2] - 24:14, 34:12double [1] - 24:14doubt [11] - 42:20, 44:17,

46:1, 55:10, 60:6, 64:3, 65:3, 68:17, 72:16, 72:29, 80:7



4

down [22] - 8:10, 8:24, 13:24, 13:27, 19:29, 28:5, 30:11, 32:16, 32:19, 33:1, 34:21, 37:4, 37:21, 43:12, 46:9, 54:30, 55:3, 58:6, 59:27, 87:20, 94:30, 95:5

Downshire [1] - 30:5dramatic [1] - 22:27draw [4] - 42:24, 42:27,

43:26, 72:23drawn [4] - 3:19, 5:27,

91:21drink [1] - 75:24drinking [1] - 4:22drinks [1] - 20:16driven [1] - 48:23driving [4] - 30:3, 30:9,

48:12, 87:20Dromad [1] - 54:25Dromiskin [1] - 4:4Dublin [12] - 2:21, 6:3,

6:9, 6:24, 9:10, 12:6, 22:29, 22:30, 30:18, 31:19, 32:1, 51:3

due [7] - 9:30, 52:16, 52:23, 75:11, 77:18, 78:10, 84:19

dug [3] - 55:24, 55:28, 56:7

Dundalk [33] - 3:16, 3:20, 3:28, 4:4, 4:8, 4:9, 5:14, 6:17, 7:16, 11:12, 14:28, 15:3, 15:4, 15:8, 15:10, 19:4, 26:21, 31:10, 33:30, 34:6, 35:9, 36:4, 36:10, 46:3, 49:26, 50:26, 51:6, 70:8, 70:22, 71:18, 72:13, 83:8, 92:8

Dundalk-Newry [1] - 31:10

DURACK [6] - 41:19, 41:21, 51:20, 52:3, 54:3, 54:16

Durack [2] - 41:21, 54:6during [9] - 18:26, 18:30,

26:9, 28:21, 73:24, 76:23, 79:29, 80:4, 84:11

duty [1] - 47:26

EEamon [1] - 85:29early [13] - 3:24, 8:2, 9:4,

9:6, 16:27, 17:26, 25:13, 28:20, 29:14, 32:21, 42:24, 43:5, 65:20

ease [1] - 61:26easily [2] - 57:4, 57:9easy [2] - 43:19, 60:25echelons [1] - 74:11editions [1] - 85:2editor [1] - 19:11effect [5] - 12:9, 37:14,

75:9, 75:10, 75:22effective [6] - 10:13, 11:7,

12:21, 12:26, 16:6, 20:27

effectively [7] - 21:27, 34:3, 37:20, 42:22, 55:5, 65:12, 93:20

efforts [3] - 10:28, 20:22, 32:8

eight [1] - 25:20eighties [5] - 6:3, 8:17,

33:8, 56:26, 57:2either [8] - 18:16, 21:22,

30:28, 45:26, 46:14, 56:17, 85:18, 90:22

elaborate [1] - 48:6elected [1] - 15:14electrical [1] - 24:1electronic [14] - 5:15,

5:17, 23:9, 23:13, 23:24, 23:25, 24:11, 24:22, 24:25, 39:29, 58:2, 84:29, 85:1, 85:10

electronically [1] - 49:5eleven [1] - 52:11eliminate [1] - 96:19elsewhere [1] - 23:5emanating [1] - 41:11embarked [1] - 21:29embedded [1] - 63:3embellish [2] - 21:9,

49:20emerge [1] - 30:26emerged [1] - 59:14emerging [1] - 29:21emotional [1] - 73:21empire [1] - 45:8employee [1] - 85:15encounter [6] - 20:5,

61:15, 75:15, 78:26, 79:7, 79:14

encountered [2] - 80:12, 81:4

encouraged [1] - 80:25end [4] - 6:27, 21:6, 50:8,

60:18endeavours [1] - 3:1ended [1] - 39:9endemic [1] - 43:1Enfield [3] - 10:27, 33:1,

33:5engage [1] - 77:14engaged [1] - 20:14engineers [1] - 24:1England [2] - 5:23, 6:25enhance [1] - 9:28enhancing [1] - 23:11Enniskillen [2] - 12:16,

49:7enormity [1] - 61:24entered [1] - 60:13entirely [2] - 9:10, 67:30entirety [1] - 51:28entitled [2] - 64:6, 65:17environment [1] - 81:6Eoin [1] - 5:21equally [4] - 44:25, 45:24,

45:25, 56:1equipment [6] - 4:14,

5:14, 21:3, 22:16, 24:11, 25:30

era [1] - 57:3Eric [2] - 65:28, 67:8escape [3] - 60:23, 60:25,

61:27escorted [1] - 51:6essence [1] - 90:18essentially [1] - 10:9establish [2] - 90:10,

92:11established [2] - 85:15,

90:16establishment [3] - 6:24,

38:23, 40:8establishments [1] -

32:18etc [5] - 45:11, 46:17,

46:26, 48:4, 63:3evening [1] - 83:14event [3] - 67:2, 82:18,

82:22events [5] - 2:17, 28:19,

64:15, 70:1, 79:30evidence [76] - 2:5, 2:11,

12:4, 12:9, 22:8, 25:23, 25:28, 29:5, 31:23, 46:16, 47:8, 50:22, 50:25, 51:1, 52:14, 52:16, 52:17, 52:18, 52:20, 52:22, 52:24, 52:26, 53:1, 53:3, 53:7, 54:9, 54:10, 57:14, 58:13, 60:11, 68:2, 68:30, 70:18, 70:27, 71:2, 71:16, 71:21, 71:29, 72:13, 72:15, 73:4, 73:5, 75:12, 76:8, 76:19, 76:25, 76:26, 76:29, 78:12, 79:20, 79:26, 81:22, 81:24, 82:23, 83:16, 84:1, 84:19, 86:8, 86:13, 87:8, 87:15, 87:16, 87:27, 88:19, 90:20, 94:15, 94:16, 94:17, 94:18, 94:21, 94:23, 96:6, 96:8, 96:13, 96:15, 96:23

ex [1] - 94:28exact [1] - 24:27exactly [1] - 50:27exaggerated [1] - 67:1exaggeration [1] - 34:22examination [6] - 33:3,

54:7, 96:11, 96:18, 96:20

examine [1] - 53:6EXAMINED [6] - 2:1,

41:19, 54:3, 63:15, 83:25, 91:8

Examiner [1] - 27:1example [14] - 10:10,

10:25, 13:4, 16:8, 25:17, 27:7, 31:20, 34:15, 36:15, 37:1,

40:6, 40:30, 49:17, 86:25

except [3] - 11:21, 73:28, 91:30

exceptionally [1] - 70:28exchange [3] - 11:14,

11:15, 61:14exchanged [1] - 73:20exchanges [2] - 12:20,

14:22exchanging [1] - 19:2exclusively [3] - 11:24,

62:13, 62:14exercise [3] - 8:5, 8:6,

94:13existed [2] - 11:27, 40:14exists [1] - 37:4expecting [1] - 55:15experience [8] - 2:16,

7:14, 8:13, 15:24, 36:5, 37:7, 47:3, 89:9

experiences [1] - 15:20expert [4] - 23:22, 24:2,

71:9, 88:18expertise [3] - 3:1, 3:2,

22:20experts [3] - 9:2, 11:22,

23:15explain [3] - 15:30, 17:6,

18:2explained [1] - 91:13explanation [1] - 15:19exploded [1] - 59:27explosion [1] - 16:29explosive [2] - 33:3,

55:27explosives [4] - 10:23,

10:27, 25:26, 33:2exposed [1] - 93:27express [2] - 14:11, 28:25expressed [2] - 29:29,

36:25expressing [1] - 29:20expression [1] - 21:13extensive [2] - 81:4,

81:22extent [6] - 24:27, 76:4,

84:13, 86:8, 87:9, 89:8extradition [9] - 6:12, 7:2,

31:20, 31:24, 32:18, 32:23, 32:27, 80:12, 82:15

extrapolate [1] - 44:1extreme [3] - 36:15, 43:7,

87:6extremely [2] - 22:14,

49:14ey [2] - 57:29, 94:11eye [1] - 67:12eyebrows [3] - 47:9,

94:16, 94:22

Fface [2] - 15:22, 15:24faces [1] - 46:11facilitate [1] - 33:23fact [49] - 3:6, 13:15,

18:6, 22:26, 29:5, 31:3, 32:17, 34:7, 34:21, 35:2, 36:2, 36:7, 37:30, 42:7, 42:12, 42:13, 43:15, 43:18, 43:30, 44:4, 46:15, 46:21, 47:15, 48:23, 48:24, 48:27, 48:30, 49:9, 50:4, 50:7, 50:8, 50:13, 50:16, 50:23, 51:3, 54:24, 55:14, 56:6, 58:14, 59:29, 60:12, 61:29, 76:29, 79:7, 79:14, 80:8, 91:14, 93:7, 94:25

factories [1] - 10:24factors [1] - 71:6factory [12] - 3:28, 4:5,

4:9, 4:11, 4:12, 5:14, 5:21, 5:24, 5:28, 10:27, 33:2, 33:5

facts [4] - 49:16, 71:3, 72:22

factual [5] - 68:30, 70:19, 71:12, 85:22, 89:27

Fail [2] - 37:9, 37:26failure [4] - 6:12, 6:14,

7:1, 7:2fair [6] - 2:30, 45:18,

61:21, 64:16, 93:15, 95:19

fairly [6] - 14:4, 25:24, 26:20, 27:4, 50:6, 71:29

fairness [5] - 16:8, 75:17, 77:29, 79:11, 93:9

false [1] - 80:6familiar [4] - 19:17,

22:17, 48:17, 86:11family [4] - 48:11, 48:18,

51:27, 83:22fanfare [1] - 7:15far [6] - 17:26, 43:5,

44:14, 51:26, 53:8, 59:25

farmhouses [1] - 11:2farms [1] - 62:17fashioned [1] - 35:24faults [1] - 43:30favour [1] - 4:28fear [1] - 13:18fearful [1] - 82:11fears [1] - 12:6feature [1] - 6:2fed [2] - 58:19feeding [1] - 6:1feet [1] - 37:19fellow [6] - 6:21, 47:25,

47:26, 71:24, 72:26, 77:13

felt [6] - 7:10, 14:20, 15:14, 38:1, 59:21, 62:18

ferry [1] - 50:13few [7] - 19:6, 20:16,

28:1, 36:24, 75:7, 80:28, 91:6

Fianna [2] - 37:9, 37:26field [1] - 24:2



5

fifth [1] - 18:23fighting [1] - 44:4figure [3] - 18:11, 74:8,

74:11figures [2] - 5:2, 5:4file [1] - 28:16files [1] - 44:11filled [1] - 30:14filtered [2] - 8:24, 58:20final [4] - 38:18, 65:19,

65:26, 91:12finally [1] - 83:16fine [3] - 6:10, 8:28, 8:29Fine [3] - 8:25, 37:8,

37:26finish [2] - 83:27, 91:10finished [2] - 54:11, 82:5Fire [3] - 3:7, 26:11, 81:29firm [2] - 88:2, 89:27first [23] - 1:8, 14:4,

18:18, 32:14, 36:25, 54:24, 54:25, 62:16, 64:12, 65:16, 70:7, 71:13, 71:17, 74:2, 77:20, 78:3, 84:6, 86:21, 91:11, 91:12, 91:15, 92:3, 96:6

first-hand [2] - 62:16, 71:13

firstly [1] - 8:15fitting [1] - 87:10Fitzsimmons [4] - 74:1,

74:2, 75:29, 77:26Fitzsimons [15] - 18:10,

18:15, 18:17, 18:18, 20:12, 73:25, 74:20, 75:24, 76:9, 77:11, 77:13, 78:5, 78:12, 78:18, 81:23

five [1] - 56:4fix [1] - 33:10flag [1] - 54:12flair [1] - 35:1Flanagan [8] - 17:15,

64:30, 65:6, 65:11, 66:12, 68:13, 68:15, 68:21

flashed [1] - 59:6flaw [1] - 46:11fled [1] - 3:30flesh [1] - 21:16flight [2] - 54:8, 83:30fly [1] - 25:26flying [1] - 80:9focus [3] - 38:9, 50:29,

58:4focused [3] - 3:5, 15:6,

58:7focusing [1] - 86:15follow [2] - 15:18, 91:11followed [3] - 65:23,

70:14, 92:14following [3] - 3:10, 52:1,

53:7follows [1] - 80:22FOLLOWS [8] - 1:2, 2:2,

41:19, 54:1, 54:4, 63:16, 83:25, 91:8

foot [2] - 60:8, 60:15FOR [1] - 53:16Force [3] - 3:7, 26:11,

81:29forces [8] - 8:23, 11:27,

12:26, 21:25, 49:1, 49:23, 62:27, 80:25

forensic [4] - 10:22, 33:3, 50:5, 63:7

forensics [1] - 33:4foresee [1] - 96:16forgotten [2] - 37:23,

90:24form [2] - 85:10, 93:13formal [1] - 12:23formalised [1] - 33:20former [3] - 12:8, 65:20,

85:15fortified [1] - 24:13forward [1] - 47:29forwards [1] - 28:22four [6] - 7:18, 17:22,

18:22, 48:25, 51:4, 77:24

fraternity [1] - 67:10free [1] - 17:8freelance [1] - 2:23frequently [1] - 49:6Friday [1] - 8:1friend [5] - 30:8, 45:2,

50:10, 69:7, 93:7friends [2] - 52:8, 69:10Friends [1] - 41:17front [2] - 42:26, 52:20frontier [1] - 9:8frustration [7] - 6:4, 6:12,

15:16, 16:4, 32:6, 32:27, 33:11

frustrations [2] - 7:13, 80:10

full [5] - 21:5, 43:11, 84:10, 85:2, 93:10

full-time [1] - 84:10fullest [1] - 89:8fully [2] - 52:20, 93:11fulsome [1] - 16:5Fulton [20] - 64:8, 64:25,

65:8, 65:9, 65:12, 65:21, 66:3, 66:7, 66:21, 67:2, 67:14, 67:18, 67:23, 68:1, 68:7, 68:20, 68:23, 68:26, 68:28, 96:12

Fulton's [5] - 64:5, 68:4, 68:25, 96:10, 96:15

function [2] - 56:19, 81:9fund [1] - 4:25funded [1] - 4:9funding [3] - 5:24, 5:25,

5:28fundraising [2] - 4:19,

4:30funeral [1] - 52:10future [1] - 81:25

GGael [3] - 8:25, 37:8,

37:26gain [1] - 26:22game [1] - 21:1gaming [3] - 3:28, 4:17,

4:18gaming-machines [1] -

3:28garda [2] - 14:8, 71:24Garda [69] - 7:21, 7:22,

7:24, 8:11, 8:14, 10:2, 10:8, 11:16, 11:29, 12:1, 12:2, 12:11, 13:5, 14:20, 14:26, 15:4, 15:9, 18:13, 21:4, 30:22, 32:29, 34:2, 35:17, 36:4, 36:27, 37:6, 37:8, 37:11, 37:27, 38:13, 41:22, 42:18, 46:4, 57:18, 62:25, 69:19, 69:30, 70:7, 70:8, 70:22, 70:29, 71:1, 71:2, 71:18, 71:22, 71:30, 72:7, 72:11, 72:14, 72:25, 73:10, 73:23, 79:1, 79:2, 79:5, 80:29, 81:5, 81:13, 81:19, 82:24, 82:30, 83:4, 87:3, 88:1, 89:20, 93:24, 93:25, 94:8, 95:12

Garda/RUC [1] - 81:21Gardaí [3] - 13:3, 13:7,

51:6gathered [2] - 56:25,

79:30gathering [4] - 10:23,

12:20, 42:6, 76:11GC [1] - 39:30gelignite [2] - 10:25,

10:30general [15] - 8:27, 13:2,

14:14, 18:27, 20:3, 20:17, 26:7, 28:27, 29:1, 31:9, 43:15, 44:1, 45:13, 67:21, 73:9

generality [1] - 75:2generally [1] - 28:1gentlemen [1] - 1:4geography [1] - 60:5Gibson [7] - 27:28, 27:30,

28:13, 29:9, 29:17, 30:3, 30:26

Gibsons [3] - 28:26, 30:17, 50:7

given [22] - 9:13, 25:23, 25:28, 46:24, 47:8, 49:15, 52:17, 59:18, 62:29, 66:15, 69:15, 76:8, 76:19, 81:22, 81:24, 82:23, 86:8, 87:8, 87:14, 87:27, 89:6, 94:15

glamorous [1] - 63:24glean [2] - 28:15, 28:18gleaned [2] - 45:17, 66:11glimpses [2] - 42:25, 43:7God [1] - 88:4

government [1] - 37:10Governments [1] - 12:25governments [1] - 37:22gradually [1] - 33:17grant [1] - 53:11grants [1] - 21:23grateful [1] - 95:28great [7] - 6:11, 7:15,

21:2, 24:20, 34:19, 47:6, 60:16

grind [1] - 45:22ground [11] - 6:9, 6:15,

8:4, 8:25, 9:1, 44:13, 46:13, 46:14, 47:6, 48:1

grounds [1] - 31:24group [1] - 36:16growth [1] - 69:16guard [8] - 13:1, 13:8,

13:10, 13:13, 13:21, 14:6, 14:11, 72:26

guarded [2] - 24:27, 25:27

guards [8] - 11:17, 12:29, 12:30, 14:16, 14:24, 14:25, 16:13, 80:27

guesstimate [1] - 22:23guilt [1] - 31:23guilty [1] - 31:22gunmen [1] - 11:9guy [2] - 19:24, 45:1guys [1] - 7:29

Hhalf [1] - 77:24hand [10] - 7:2, 9:10,

13:28, 30:6, 62:16, 66:9, 71:13, 82:25, 94:20, 94:21

hand-washing [1] - 94:20hand-wringing [1] -

94:21handed [2] - 14:1, 83:5handing [1] - 65:25handle [1] - 95:14handover [2] - 82:28,

83:1hands [2] - 62:9, 62:11Hanna [5] - 29:10, 29:18,

48:11, 48:14, 51:27Hannas [1] - 48:30happily [1] - 88:14happy [2] - 34:13, 88:28hard [2] - 27:21, 89:27harnden [1] - 92:26Harnden [15] - 69:4,

69:17, 69:21, 69:24, 70:5, 71:17, 71:21, 72:17, 72:26, 72:28, 72:29, 73:5, 73:6, 92:23

Harnden's [1] - 71:20Harry [8] - 27:16, 27:17,

27:19, 36:21, 47:23, 82:7

hate [2] - 45:5Haughey [1] - 8:19HAVING [1] - 2:1hawk [1] - 66:21

HAYES [2] - 52:13, 96:22Hayes [1] - 96:4head [1] - 79:15headlines [1] - 49:29headquarters [4] - 23:5,

26:8, 58:23, 58:24Headquarters [5] - 58:19,

58:21, 74:4, 80:26, 93:26

health [1] - 88:30hear [14] - 2:8, 3:27,

19:20, 26:15, 26:26, 26:28, 27:7, 31:12, 57:26, 71:19, 90:9, 92:18, 93:22, 94:7

heard [32] - 12:4, 13:4, 19:22, 22:8, 26:27, 27:9, 29:5, 37:26, 44:7, 46:16, 51:5, 51:7, 57:14, 57:25, 60:11, 64:18, 64:22, 70:12, 70:24, 70:25, 71:15, 71:24, 71:27, 71:28, 81:18, 89:26, 90:27, 92:6, 92:9, 92:10, 94:9, 96:23

hearing [3] - 11:5, 12:12, 53:12

hearings [2] - 96:16, 96:20

heavily [1] - 25:27heavily-guarded [1] -

25:27heavy [3] - 24:14, 37:12,

77:13heavy-set [1] - 77:13helicopter [2] - 74:5, 74:6helicopters [2] - 60:14,

60:15help [11] - 21:3, 21:4,

41:23, 47:27, 68:12, 71:12, 71:13, 87:12, 88:19, 95:25, 95:29

helping [1] - 19:25Hermon [5] - 34:2, 34:9,

34:16, 34:18, 34:28Hero [1] - 64:6hi [1] - 22:3hi-tec [1] - 22:3Higgins [3] - 48:23,

49:10, 49:11high [13] - 6:3, 10:14,

10:23, 23:1, 25:24, 35:4, 38:24, 38:28, 46:12, 51:14, 78:7, 81:6, 86:28

high-powered [3] - 23:1, 25:24, 38:24

higher [3] - 10:15, 13:12, 47:9

highest [1] - 68:19highlighted [1] - 40:26hilltop [1] - 60:6him' [1] - 77:16himself [4] - 73:2, 75:23,

83:13, 92:24hindsight [1] - 43:19historic [1] - 42:3



6

history [5] - 2:18, 3:8, 35:8, 42:28, 43:10

hmm [1] - 77:22holiday [1] - 29:12Home [1] - 39:12honest [3] - 16:5, 79:4,

88:21hostile [1] - 34:24hostility [1] - 8:24hotel [5] - 17:1, 17:4,

17:24, 17:25, 18:3Hotel [8] - 16:22, 16:23,

16:28, 19:18, 73:30, 75:24, 77:5, 77:10

hotels [1] - 50:17hours [1] - 87:22house [2] - 26:9, 27:12House [4] - 16:23, 17:19,

19:18, 77:10houses [1] - 57:15HQ [1] - 39:30huddle [3] - 20:13, 20:14,

20:15huge [8] - 21:30, 23:3,

26:3, 26:9, 33:28, 77:30, 79:23, 79:25

hundred [3] - 28:6, 43:4, 95:7

Hunt [1] - 52:7hurt [1] - 61:25

IIDA [3] - 4:9, 5:24, 5:25IDA-funded [1] - 4:9idea [2] - 20:13, 66:29ideal [1] - 33:26ideally [1] - 5:14ideas [1] - 39:1identified [2] - 5:19, 78:5identity [1] - 41:10IEDs [1] - 60:9imagine [2] - 25:7, 48:5immediate [3] - 33:27,

48:29, 69:27immediately [5] - 19:7,

49:4, 53:6, 58:19, 59:10immunity [1] - 61:27impasse [1] - 32:17implementation [1] -

73:19implemented [1] - 9:25important [9] - 36:1,

40:29, 44:3, 45:4, 59:5, 60:7, 74:7, 74:8, 74:10

impression [8] - 27:19, 32:6, 38:15, 51:26, 62:28, 73:12, 93:13, 93:15

impressions [2] - 92:24, 93:9

improve [2] - 33:17, 33:24

improvement [1] - 33:18improvised [1] - 55:27inability [1] - 88:10inaccurate [1] - 44:1inadequacies [1] - 7:14

incendiary [1] - 16:30inception [1] - 85:30incidence [1] - 13:9incident [5] - 15:29,

19:29, 31:1, 42:29, 86:16

incidents [14] - 8:7, 8:8, 27:30, 29:12, 29:15, 29:20, 29:21, 29:28, 31:2, 42:3, 43:14, 55:11, 82:10, 86:28

included [2] - 70:13, 71:22

incognito [1] - 94:2incorrect [1] - 79:10increase [1] - 22:3increased [1] - 32:26incredible [1] - 82:29indeed [28] - 4:19, 6:22,

9:24, 10:26, 11:17, 11:30, 12:18, 12:24, 13:8, 15:27, 20:19, 20:29, 24:18, 28:23, 31:1, 33:1, 41:3, 43:10, 47:4, 48:9, 56:6, 57:16, 59:30, 63:13, 63:25, 85:2, 93:30, 95:30

independent [3] - 37:20, 37:22, 44:21

independently [1] - 46:1indicate [1] - 7:8indicated [2] - 16:9,

93:19indicating [2] - 70:3,

76:20indicative [2] - 88:11,

90:26indifferent [1] - 90:28indirect [1] - 89:4individual [5] - 7:14,

12:29, 14:13, 45:22, 66:25

individuals [2] - 63:29, 80:28

infancy [1] - 56:28inference [1] - 30:20inferences [1] - 20:6influence [1] - 37:13information [55] - 6:1,

11:15, 11:16, 12:7, 13:6, 13:16, 13:19, 14:7, 15:12, 17:7, 19:13, 21:9, 26:22, 28:18, 28:27, 32:2, 38:19, 38:21, 39:28, 39:30, 40:29, 42:15, 43:21, 43:23, 45:17, 45:30, 47:30, 48:4, 48:12, 49:20, 50:15, 51:2, 58:18, 59:1, 59:3, 61:14, 62:12, 63:9, 66:11, 66:15, 70:6, 70:8, 70:22, 70:28, 71:18, 72:12, 72:24, 83:20, 86:10, 90:23, 90:29, 92:7, 92:11, 92:20

informed [4] - 26:29,

27:10, 45:18, 86:5informer [1] - 65:20informers [1] - 44:19initiation [1] - 55:29initiatives [1] - 41:2initiators [1] - 70:4injuries [1] - 7:5INLA [1] - 83:8Inn [1] - 30:12innocent [1] - 47:28innovations [1] - 56:25inquiries [5] - 3:22, 4:2,

4:16, 16:10, 43:13inquiry [2] - 2:6, 30:30inside [1] - 24:16insisted [1] - 65:26Inspector [2] - 71:23,

72:25instance [1] - 44:7instructions [2] - 77:3,

79:17insufficient [1] - 6:19integrity [3] - 36:9, 68:13,

68:17intelligence [29] - 5:18,

11:16, 12:20, 12:21, 23:30, 38:19, 38:21, 39:5, 39:7, 39:10, 39:24, 40:20, 41:25, 42:6, 44:8, 44:9, 44:14, 44:26, 44:27, 52:19, 53:2, 53:5, 74:9, 76:11, 76:21, 81:26

Intelligence [2] - 39:17, 40:5

intelligence-gathering

[1] - 42:6intended [1] - 96:7intense [2] - 15:2, 87:6intensity [3] - 10:15,

62:26intensive [2] - 9:22, 46:12intention [1] - 52:26interacted [1] - 38:29interaction [1] - 38:14intercept [4] - 26:2,

27:11, 57:30, 92:15intercepted [2] - 57:4,

57:12interception [1] - 26:12interceptions [2] - 26:14,

26:16interdict [2] - 7:3, 80:13interest [9] - 3:12, 4:13,

58:12, 78:22, 87:6, 87:7, 87:8, 87:25, 87:27

interested [4] - 38:16, 66:2, 78:21, 89:22

interesting [4] - 38:3, 38:6, 38:15, 79:27

interests [1] - 63:1internal [2] - 38:25, 38:26interpreted [1] - 87:29interrupted [1] - 17:28interview [1] - 67:26interviewed [2] - 68:8,

68:10intimate [1] - 15:28

INTO [1] - 96:26introduced [7] - 18:9,

18:11, 18:14, 58:3, 77:11, 78:4, 79:9

introduction [1] - 77:18investigate [2] - 34:6,

90:9investigated [1] - 89:13investigating [2] - 44:16,

67:8investigation [5] - 2:7,

5:13, 26:10, 27:8, 69:30investigations [2] -

11:14, 90:15invisible [1] - 42:26invite [1] - 13:24involved [9] - 12:4, 20:2,

20:9, 27:7, 38:11, 59:15, 63:30, 66:9, 66:28

involvement [4] - 62:9, 63:29, 67:13, 89:20

IRA [36] - 4:24, 4:30, 6:6, 6:8, 6:16, 7:1, 7:3, 8:29, 9:3, 11:9, 19:25, 23:10, 23:15, 26:16, 46:7, 48:3, 48:30, 49:23, 55:8, 59:8, 61:26, 62:6, 62:19, 64:19, 70:9, 70:23, 71:19, 72:14, 75:13, 75:14, 75:21, 75:23, 75:26, 76:30, 80:13, 81:26

IRA's [3] - 5:11, 25:11, 32:30

Iraq [1] - 63:3Ireland [33] - 2:17, 2:26,

2:27, 2:29, 3:21, 3:23, 3:27, 4:15, 10:26, 11:10, 15:1, 20:28, 23:6, 24:19, 36:29, 38:12, 39:6, 39:12, 39:14, 39:24, 40:17, 41:30, 49:15, 63:20, 63:23, 69:6, 71:9, 74:9, 80:4, 81:7, 82:16, 86:12, 93:1

Irish [42] - 5:26, 6:5, 6:7, 7:16, 7:22, 8:8, 9:7, 9:17, 9:19, 9:25, 10:2, 10:7, 10:28, 11:6, 11:19, 20:21, 20:29, 20:30, 21:2, 21:4, 21:8, 21:11, 21:20, 21:24, 32:11, 32:13, 33:8, 33:10, 33:11, 33:13, 34:20, 34:23, 34:26, 38:1, 38:4, 38:13, 41:1, 41:8, 59:22, 62:25, 64:29, 65:14

Irishmen [1] - 6:21irregularities [1] - 42:19island [1] - 73:14isolated [5] - 11:2, 13:9,

59:1, 62:17issue [7] - 7:6, 12:11,

41:25, 75:19, 77:30, 79:23

issued [2] - 68:21, 68:29issues [6] - 9:23, 38:9,

38:10, 39:2, 48:10, 79:22

items [2] - 45:22, 54:16

JJack [3] - 34:28, 35:13,

35:22Jack's [1] - 36:7James [2] - 57:29, 94:10Jamie [1] - 17:15January [1] - 65:15Jeep [1] - 48:13Jeffrey [1] - 69:29Jenkins [1] - 86:2Jeremy [1] - 86:2Jim [3] - 3:15, 27:1, 96:7Jimmy [4] - 17:11, 18:5,

18:6, 18:15job [4] - 27:21, 36:1,

63:24, 90:6John [5] - 34:2, 34:9,

34:16, 34:18, 94:18joined [2] - 2:22, 92:28joint [2] - 9:18, 21:14jointly [2] - 9:7, 59:22Jonesboro [1] - 60:4journalism [2] - 66:29,

90:18journalist [14] - 2:16,

22:11, 45:11, 45:13, 45:16, 46:11, 47:2, 49:13, 63:19, 63:22, 84:11, 85:28, 90:6, 92:25

journalistic [3] - 3:1, 11:13, 67:10

journalists [8] - 8:5, 8:6, 28:24, 62:29, 63:26, 67:4, 69:23, 87:25

judge [1] - 29:11judged [1] - 20:27judges [1] - 51:10judiciary [1] - 51:13jumped [2] - 3:25, 3:30June [1] - 64:29junior [1] - 12:14jurisdiction [4] - 4:1,

20:24, 32:25, 47:13Jurisdiction [1] - 32:24jury [1] - 43:28Justice [4] - 27:28, 30:26,

94:28justice [2] - 31:29, 32:23justification [2] - 36:17,

44:18justified [2] - 90:2, 90:20Justin [1] - 91:19

Kkeen [2] - 9:24, 20:29keep [1] - 67:11keeping [2] - 41:28, 67:19Ken [1] - 17:16kept [1] - 85:1



7

Kevin [11] - 64:5, 64:8, 64:25, 65:8, 65:21, 66:21, 67:2, 67:23, 68:4, 68:23, 69:30

key [1] - 20:28killed [6] - 16:29, 29:17,

30:3, 49:18, 51:29, 74:5Killeen [7] - 27:24, 29:3,

29:21, 31:3, 31:14, 54:18, 59:20

killers [1] - 11:3killing [5] - 6:21, 29:18,

48:11, 48:29, 59:27killings [6] - 11:7, 26:17,

28:13, 29:10, 33:28kind [2] - 4:30, 36:18kindly [1] - 2:10Kintyre [1] - 74:6knowing [3] - 31:17,

37:28, 68:28knowledge [17] - 16:21,

20:11, 21:7, 23:29, 38:19, 38:21, 40:18, 70:18, 71:9, 74:7, 81:28, 86:9, 86:15, 87:7, 87:9, 88:2, 89:9

known [12] - 3:2, 23:25, 24:13, 30:21, 30:28, 41:10, 65:20, 66:14, 67:4, 67:9, 71:3, 78:19

knows [1] - 88:5

Llack [9] - 6:30, 10:4, 10:6,

13:3, 34:10, 46:25, 80:10, 88:11

ladies [1] - 1:4land [2] - 55:5, 60:13landscape [3] - 80:14,

80:15, 87:11large [6] - 46:17, 49:27,

51:9, 56:13, 61:19, 66:26

last [5] - 12:9, 41:25, 65:20, 67:6, 67:7

late [6] - 1:5, 3:24, 33:8, 64:19, 78:1

latest [1] - 84:1launched [1] - 83:7lavatory [2] - 19:1law [4] - 6:20, 68:26,

68:28, 68:29Law [1] - 32:23laws [3] - 7:2, 31:21,

32:18lead [1] - 7:20leading [2] - 33:13, 34:7leak [3] - 30:30, 33:30,

36:4leaked [2] - 13:19, 31:10leaking [2] - 29:27, 32:2leaks [1] - 35:17leaned [1] - 30:11learned [1] - 45:4least [5] - 26:6, 46:4,

63:1, 67:10, 78:23leave [2] - 42:28, 77:23

leaving [1] - 59:20led [6] - 5:20, 10:24, 29:2,

29:28, 33:29, 96:15left [5] - 18:24, 30:6, 56:8,

69:6, 92:30left-hand [1] - 30:6legal [5] - 9:1, 32:18,

32:22, 51:13, 61:8legislation [1] - 32:23less [1] - 42:1letting [1] - 24:17level [16] - 5:8, 6:4, 11:25,

11:27, 12:23, 33:25, 37:7, 38:28, 40:6, 40:13, 40:14, 40:18, 61:18, 63:11, 81:6

levels [4] - 12:14, 13:12liaison [3] - 31:17, 33:20,

61:13life [9] - 43:20, 49:30,

50:1, 61:25, 74:8, 75:3, 76:30, 79:28, 84:11

light [4] - 42:19, 47:24, 47:27, 48:8

Liles [2] - 52:15, 52:30Liles' [3] - 53:7, 54:8,

83:30limited [6] - 8:10, 8:15,

10:7, 10:8, 38:14, 73:13line [7] - 22:30, 26:7,

27:11, 30:29, 42:26, 59:27, 62:7

lines [5] - 2:6, 26:21, 33:22, 41:5, 41:6

link [1] - 3:28linking [1] - 29:19links [1] - 4:13Lisburn [3] - 26:8, 44:30,

58:23listen [1] - 25:6listened [1] - 57:11listening [4] - 57:17,

57:20, 57:22, 57:24lived [4] - 11:2, 48:15,

62:15, 62:18lives [1] - 43:9loans [1] - 21:22local [3] - 11:4, 58:27,

62:15locally [2] - 30:18, 58:25location [1] - 4:5locations [2] - 12:19,

14:25locus [1] - 39:13logged [2] - 58:10loggerheads [1] - 44:28logistical [1] - 54:7logistics [1] - 11:12London [9] - 2:20, 4:15,

6:10, 6:29, 19:12, 61:17, 85:7, 92:30

longest [1] - 85:27look [2] - 19:4, 23:2looking [5] - 19:4, 67:3,

74:7, 74:27, 75:18lookout [1] - 24:7Lord [2] - 27:28, 30:26low [1] - 78:7

lower [1] - 13:11Lowry [1] - 51:18Loyalist [1] - 34:24loyalist [1] - 36:15loyalists [2] - 4:19, 4:25Loyalists [1] - 35:3lucrative [1] - 4:27lunch [11] - 17:2, 17:3,

17:29, 18:20, 18:21, 18:22, 20:15, 20:17, 28:16, 51:21, 77:21

LUNCH [2] - 53:16, 54:1lunches [1] - 38:4lunchtime [3] - 77:20,

78:1lying [1] - 60:18

Mmachinery [1] - 5:13machines [7] - 3:28, 4:17,

4:18, 4:24, 4:28, 5:6, 5:15

macro [2] - 46:25, 47:19magazine [1] - 50:3magistrates [1] - 51:11Mail [3] - 66:5, 67:3, 67:5main [4] - 22:29, 22:30,

30:7, 45:21maintain [2] - 34:15,

84:11maintained [1] - 37:24major [2] - 15:29, 32:14maker [1] - 5:22Malley [1] - 85:29man [10] - 5:21, 9:7, 17:4,

18:12, 27:21, 68:13, 74:15, 83:4, 87:17, 95:16

man's [2] - 55:5, 60:13manned [1] - 59:22manpower [1] - 10:8manufacture [1] - 4:14March [3] - 29:19, 34:1,

34:17marks [2] - 68:3, 68:22marshy [1] - 46:14massive [1] - 11:9MAT [1] - 29:8match [1] - 82:29matched [1] - 47:5material [2] - 40:12, 41:8matter [12] - 13:23, 26:24,

32:7, 54:8, 65:17, 71:4, 84:16, 86:17, 87:5, 93:23

matters [9] - 3:3, 3:11, 5:8, 15:26, 36:24, 41:23, 52:18, 52:19, 53:2

McBurney [6] - 83:19, 83:21, 91:13, 91:18, 92:1, 92:2

McCann [5] - 3:15, 3:18, 3:22, 4:17, 96:7

McCann's [3] - 3:19, 4:11, 5:20

McGlinchey [3] - 82:16,

82:25, 83:5McKittrick [1] - 85:28McNamee [1] - 5:21meal [1] - 18:8mean [82] - 7:13, 9:4,

11:1, 12:15, 14:19, 15:22, 18:27, 19:10, 22:26, 25:2, 25:12, 25:21, 27:4, 28:4, 28:15, 29:8, 29:13, 29:19, 29:23, 30:29, 31:15, 31:18, 31:27, 32:12, 32:15, 33:6, 33:24, 36:5, 38:3, 39:26, 40:11, 40:19, 42:25, 44:13, 44:16, 44:28, 46:7, 47:22, 48:14, 48:17, 49:3, 49:6, 49:13, 50:10, 50:28, 51:16, 55:13, 55:16, 55:26, 56:2, 56:16, 56:26, 58:20, 59:11, 59:24, 59:26, 61:10, 62:3, 62:22, 66:23, 67:4, 68:26, 69:22, 70:30, 71:12, 72:21, 73:1, 73:17, 73:20, 74:12, 75:27, 78:6, 81:1, 81:15, 82:8, 82:28, 84:17, 84:23, 85:4, 85:16, 86:30, 87:17

means [1] - 20:30meant [2] - 37:29, 43:20measured [1] - 61:24measures [5] - 23:9,

23:24, 23:25, 24:22, 24:26

Meath [1] - 33:5mechanical [1] - 24:1mechanisms [1] - 33:20media [3] - 33:28, 85:9,

85:19meet [6] - 16:20, 17:2,

20:10, 31:16, 91:19, 94:3

meeting [9] - 16:25, 16:26, 17:28, 19:14, 27:22, 34:7, 81:18, 91:22, 91:29

meetings [5] - 31:17, 39:1, 39:3, 81:15, 81:17

megaphone [1] - 61:22member [7] - 2:28, 44:7,

52:7, 64:18, 81:5, 82:12, 82:24

members [7] - 13:11, 37:8, 47:11, 79:2, 81:12, 81:13, 83:7

memorable [1] - 79:14memory [3] - 19:16,

19:20, 85:17men [7] - 11:1, 17:4, 37:9,

37:26, 86:16, 89:21mention [2] - 24:25,

36:22mentioned [6] - 55:14,

73:9, 79:26, 82:13,

84:25, 84:26mess [1] - 44:30messages [2] - 35:28,

35:29messes [1] - 38:5met [20] - 16:21, 18:19,

19:18, 27:17, 28:1, 28:3, 64:10, 64:12, 68:7, 73:27, 73:28, 73:30, 74:2, 74:13, 74:17, 74:26, 81:3, 82:9, 93:3

meter [1] - 25:14methods [1] - 23:13MI5 [10] - 39:18, 41:11,

77:15, 78:13, 78:15, 78:21, 80:2, 93:19, 93:22

MI6 [2] - 39:18, 41:11Michael [1] - 41:21mid-1970s [1] - 75:25middle [1] - 46:12might [29] - 13:19, 13:23,

15:14, 17:16, 18:6, 18:24, 19:30, 22:9, 28:4, 28:7, 28:8, 28:9, 28:24, 36:15, 41:17, 41:23, 42:21, 43:10, 43:23, 55:21, 56:17, 61:15, 69:13, 81:8, 81:17, 81:18, 83:20, 93:5, 93:6

mile [1] - 54:30miles [4] - 30:13, 48:28,

60:12, 87:18military [8] - 2:25, 9:14,

25:27, 38:10, 44:25, 45:2, 45:21, 62:13

mind [4] - 8:2, 12:10, 18:29, 68:9

mindful [2] - 35:1, 84:3mine [3] - 3:20, 21:8, 30:8minister [1] - 94:18Minister [8] - 8:20, 38:30,

39:11, 39:12, 40:2, 41:4, 94:28

ministers [1] - 40:3minuscule [1] - 61:23minute [2] - 67:6, 67:7minutes [1] - 60:27miscellaneous [1] -

36:24mistaken [1] - 29:11mistakes [2] - 43:5, 43:29mix [1] - 93:4mixed [1] - 47:3mixing [1] - 80:26mobile [3] - 10:10, 57:3,

87:20model [2] - 25:24, 25:30modestly [1] - 64:5mole [9] - 29:24, 33:29,

34:4, 49:26, 50:26, 54:17, 75:13, 75:14, 94:26

moles [2] - 80:16, 88:1Mon [9] - 16:22, 16:23,

16:28, 17:19, 19:18,



8

73:30, 75:23, 77:5, 77:10

Monaghan [2] - 95:12, 95:22

money [17] - 4:26, 4:29, 5:6, 5:12, 19:10, 64:1, 64:3, 64:26, 66:26, 67:3, 75:6, 76:3, 76:7, 77:6, 77:18, 79:15, 94:4

money-spinning [1] - 4:26

monitor [1] - 25:8monitored [1] - 58:12monitoring [1] - 24:26mood [2] - 34:23, 34:27morning [12] - 1:4, 1:7,

28:16, 28:20, 28:21, 45:5, 48:16, 52:5, 52:8, 52:11, 87:28, 95:4

mortar [2] - 24:12, 24:15mortar-attacked [1] -

24:15most [14] - 2:20, 3:4,

7:26, 14:14, 14:28, 15:1, 20:17, 22:27, 28:27, 46:29, 67:21, 79:22, 85:8, 85:27

motivated [1] - 37:12motives [1] - 68:19motor [1] - 57:27mounted [1] - 70:13move [3] - 11:9, 11:10,

60:3moved [1] - 60:7movement [1] - 31:11movements [2] - 58:10,

58:11moves [2] - 95:24, 95:25MR [24] - 1:7, 2:2, 2:4,

2:15, 14:11, 41:16, 41:19, 41:21, 51:20, 51:25, 52:13, 54:3, 54:6, 54:16, 63:15, 63:18, 83:25, 83:29, 84:3, 91:6, 91:8, 91:10, 96:4, 96:22

MS [1] - 91:4Mull [1] - 74:6murder [3] - 27:28, 76:30,

89:20murdered [5] - 11:3, 29:9,

51:27, 69:19, 86:16murders [21] - 27:2,

27:15, 33:30, 36:3, 55:22, 82:3, 84:15, 84:23, 85:19, 85:20, 86:6, 86:7, 86:28, 87:4, 87:15, 87:17, 88:9, 89:4, 89:7, 90:28, 90:30

must [7] - 30:17, 30:18, 85:8, 85:12, 86:4, 88:10, 94:5

mutinous [1] - 34:23mutual [2] - 73:23, 80:24Myers [1] - 69:30

Nnaive [1] - 66:25name [34] - 3:14, 3:15,

12:29, 13:24, 13:27, 14:4, 14:6, 14:7, 14:8, 16:16, 17:8, 19:15, 19:17, 19:21, 19:22, 19:28, 20:5, 30:27, 36:22, 41:21, 50:14, 50:16, 50:17, 50:24, 79:8, 79:16, 93:27, 95:5, 95:8, 95:15, 95:21, 96:10, 96:17, 96:19

Name [1] - 14:1names [3] - 16:13, 41:14,

87:22naming [2] - 17:7, 17:10naturally [1] - 47:2nature [3] - 52:19, 52:24,

65:10near [1] - 4:6nearest [1] - 54:25necessarily [7] - 36:5,

42:14, 42:17, 42:18, 43:3, 46:22, 80:30

necessary [3] - 1:5, 9:3, 34:15

need [5] - 14:9, 14:12, 14:15, 58:28, 83:30

needed [1] - 10:14negotiation [3] - 41:6,

66:10negotiations [4] - 9:16,

9:22, 33:13, 41:5network [6] - 5:18, 7:23,

7:25, 9:27, 22:2, 74:9never [31] - 6:28, 8:30,

11:20, 19:8, 25:28, 27:9, 33:24, 37:5, 60:16, 64:12, 66:23, 66:28, 67:18, 68:7, 68:8, 68:18, 70:24, 71:28, 72:28, 75:14, 76:6, 78:19, 78:24, 78:30, 82:11, 82:13, 89:13, 90:29

nevertheless [2] - 34:8, 53:4

new [2] - 2:11, 89:30Newman [1] - 17:16Newry [11] - 12:16, 15:3,

15:8, 28:5, 30:3, 30:6, 30:7, 31:10, 35:9, 36:10, 54:29

Newry-Dundalk [2] - 35:9, 36:10

newspaper [8] - 65:21, 65:26, 66:3, 66:5, 66:13, 66:17, 66:24, 85:9

newspapers [8] - 64:26, 66:8, 66:21, 67:11, 67:15, 85:1, 85:3, 85:8

next [6] - 16:11, 52:28, 59:10, 88:15, 96:5, 96:22

night [7] - 56:17, 56:21, 56:27, 56:30, 77:9, 77:20, 77:21

nobody [5] - 8:7, 29:23, 31:7, 47:12

non [1] - 19:7non-committal [1] - 19:7nonetheless [3] - 55:8,

56:15, 56:29normally [1] - 39:18North [24] - 6:21, 6:27,

7:5, 9:3, 9:15, 28:28, 29:11, 29:19, 31:23, 35:3, 37:16, 37:17, 41:28, 42:3, 61:6, 61:8, 61:25, 61:26, 61:30, 62:1, 62:13, 62:27, 73:18

north [2] - 46:26, 73:15Northern [31] - 2:17, 2:25,

2:26, 2:28, 3:21, 3:23, 3:27, 4:15, 10:26, 11:10, 15:1, 23:6, 24:19, 36:29, 38:12, 39:6, 39:12, 39:14, 39:23, 40:17, 41:29, 49:15, 63:19, 63:23, 69:6, 71:9, 74:9, 80:4, 81:7, 82:16, 86:11

northern [5] - 8:23, 8:27, 9:24, 11:28, 87:7

note [1] - 80:21nothing [14] - 8:7, 18:28,

20:18, 55:17, 59:16, 62:3, 62:25, 89:3, 89:4, 89:13, 89:26, 89:27, 90:1, 96:14

notice [4] - 96:7, 96:12, 96:15, 96:18

November [2] - 91:24, 91:25

Nuala [3] - 64:30, 65:6, 67:22

number [27] - 3:11, 22:26, 24:12, 27:23, 27:29, 29:6, 29:15, 30:22, 31:7, 38:3, 38:24, 38:27, 42:2, 46:27, 51:10, 52:8, 58:4, 58:5, 58:8, 58:9, 61:11, 63:28, 70:1, 82:10, 84:6, 92:16

numbers [4] - 27:25, 58:15, 58:16, 79:5

OO'Callaghan [3] - 92:5,

93:18, 96:12O'CALLAGHAN [2] -

63:15, 63:18O'Callaghan's [1] - 91:11o'clock [5] - 51:20, 51:23,

52:11, 53:14, 77:24O'Donoghue [1] - 94:18O'Loan [2] - 65:1, 65:6O'Loan's [1] - 67:23O'SULLIVAN [1] - 91:4

oath [1] - 72:27observation [3] - 22:1,

22:21, 60:7observing [1] - 70:14obsession [1] - 10:19obvious [1] - 18:5obviously [14] - 18:16,

19:7, 19:14, 20:16, 26:23, 29:11, 40:23, 43:4, 66:10, 67:22, 71:8, 75:18, 79:29, 96:12

occasion [13] - 13:8, 16:11, 16:20, 22:11, 48:9, 73:28, 76:15, 81:3, 81:8, 81:20, 84:20, 93:19, 95:3

occasional [2] - 81:15, 86:26

occasionally [3] - 13:15, 28:3, 93:4

occasions [14] - 14:23, 27:17, 27:23, 27:29, 38:4, 51:4, 56:2, 59:28, 61:12, 82:9, 82:10, 90:19, 90:20, 90:21

occupied [1] - 48:24occurred [2] - 29:1, 54:18odd [1] - 81:8OF [1] - 1:1offence [3] - 3:26, 31:25,

31:26offences [1] - 32:25offer [4] - 20:24, 21:13,

75:3, 75:5offered [1] - 66:26offering [1] - 66:3offhand [1] - 95:1Office [1] - 39:6office [2] - 40:3, 44:30Officer [1] - 17:12officer [22] - 14:14, 17:2,

18:5, 18:13, 19:9, 19:13, 26:7, 43:21, 67:8, 73:1, 73:4, 74:3, 76:6, 76:28, 83:4, 92:19, 93:25, 94:1, 95:5, 95:8, 95:12, 95:16

officers [34] - 8:11, 12:4, 12:12, 12:16, 14:16, 14:19, 14:20, 15:7, 17:8, 24:19, 29:9, 30:1, 34:21, 36:9, 36:28, 37:3, 37:25, 37:27, 38:5, 46:27, 47:22, 47:25, 47:26, 61:10, 61:12, 69:23, 73:14, 75:3, 75:5, 76:19, 78:18, 81:5, 87:21

officers' [1] - 38:5official [1] - 6:24officials [1] - 62:24often [8] - 12:5, 12:18,

44:14, 44:28, 48:4, 57:25, 60:17, 66:30

OK [12] - 64:25, 69:12, 72:24, 77:3, 77:21, 77:29, 79:22, 82:6,

82:15, 83:21, 84:1old [6] - 16:28, 17:1,

17:25, 29:13, 35:24, 37:17

old-fashioned [1] - 35:24older [3] - 48:24, 51:28,

51:30Omagh [3] - 65:1, 65:23,

67:9ON [1] - 1:1on-the-ground [1] - 6:15once [8] - 3:21, 6:23,

7:15, 16:21, 28:5, 40:6, 50:1, 79:28

one [78] - 3:13, 7:23, 9:23, 13:8, 14:19, 14:29, 16:8, 16:16, 18:4, 18:9, 22:11, 22:27, 22:28, 23:8, 24:4, 24:5, 24:21, 25:22, 26:11, 26:25, 27:30, 28:15, 31:6, 31:21, 32:6, 32:25, 33:18, 34:10, 36:13, 37:9, 42:29, 44:30, 45:4, 48:10, 49:15, 49:22, 49:28, 50:28, 51:16, 51:20, 51:26, 54:7, 54:25, 55:22, 56:24, 57:7, 57:25, 58:3, 59:26, 60:27, 62:28, 63:2, 63:4, 65:26, 70:3, 70:19, 70:25, 73:7, 73:28, 76:14, 76:28, 78:10, 81:3, 83:14, 85:27, 86:5, 90:3, 90:21, 90:22, 92:16, 93:2, 93:13, 93:19, 95:4

one-to-one [1] - 14:19one-to-ones [1] - 33:18ones [5] - 9:29, 24:6,

29:17, 33:18, 47:6ongoing [5] - 2:7, 16:10,

33:16, 40:27, 64:30open [2] - 35:23, 59:20openly [2] - 12:30opens [2] - 30:29, 44:22operated [6] - 4:28, 24:9,

38:27, 39:21, 45:26, 62:6

operating [5] - 4:4, 6:17, 10:14, 39:23, 62:7

operation [2] - 27:12, 28:25

Operational [1] - 58:21operational [1] - 39:4operations [12] - 3:19,

7:3, 12:2, 23:5, 24:10, 24:13, 31:10, 33:15, 39:1, 40:13, 40:22, 80:13

operator [2] - 58:5, 58:17operators [1] - 58:8opportunity [2] - 7:16,

60:22oppose [1] - 31:24opposed [2] - 19:12,



9

77:21optics [1] - 8:3or.. [2] - 55:30, 67:26ordinary [2] - 44:8, 45:12ordinator [1] - 39:5organisation [6] - 13:17,

43:16, 44:12, 45:10, 85:9, 95:14

organisational [1] - 43:18organisations [1] - 4:26organise [1] - 11:11organised [1] - 10:9original [3] - 16:28, 17:1,

17:25otherwise [4] - 43:27,

59:23, 61:22, 66:16ourselves [1] - 21:28outline [2] - 2:18, 25:10outset [2] - 2:4, 22:13outside [3] - 4:4, 40:17,

47:13overall [4] - 32:5, 58:21,

80:9, 80:17overlooked [1] - 22:29overriding [1] - 32:6overtly [3] - 36:27, 38:6,

38:16overview [1] - 40:21owe [1] - 47:23Owen [19] - 16:17, 16:20,

18:12, 18:15, 36:22, 63:19, 73:22, 74:17, 76:9, 76:20, 76:29, 79:6, 80:25, 80:27, 82:11, 82:13, 82:23, 83:3, 83:10

own [24] - 7:13, 13:17, 14:17, 20:13, 30:27, 33:14, 34:20, 37:10, 38:25, 38:26, 44:25, 45:22, 46:8, 49:30, 50:2, 50:14, 50:16, 50:17, 50:18, 50:24, 67:13, 79:28, 85:17, 95:13

Ppace [1] - 56:25pack [1] - 25:25paid [2] - 50:17, 94:4paper [4] - 13:27, 14:1,

49:28, 50:3papers [2] - 48:16, 55:13parallel [1] - 44:27Park [1] - 70:1parked [2] - 55:25, 55:26parking [1] - 25:14parking-meter [1] - 25:14part [8] - 9:26, 13:10,

21:5, 36:1, 39:10, 41:4, 45:15, 80:14

particular [24] - 3:1, 3:2, 9:18, 11:15, 14:12, 14:26, 16:13, 16:16, 16:19, 20:30, 25:11, 31:28, 33:2, 42:29, 51:9, 60:19, 61:9,

71:10, 75:19, 84:15, 88:10, 93:13, 93:24

particularly [5] - 15:7, 27:30, 31:21, 38:20, 63:24

partition [1] - 6:27partly [1] - 8:10parts [2] - 44:12, 80:17party [3] - 9:15, 89:25,

91:2pass [2] - 59:3, 93:6passage [2] - 50:13,

50:16passages [1] - 50:23passed [2] - 28:9, 59:10past [4] - 30:7, 30:25,

68:5, 77:24patrol [4] - 7:16, 9:27,

22:3, 23:26patrolled [3] - 60:16,

60:21patrolling [2] - 9:2, 12:17patrols [3] - 8:1, 60:15,

60:18pattern [2] - 29:21, 51:12pause [1] - 8:13Paxman [1] - 86:2pay [2] - 8:1, 66:24paying [1] - 19:13payouts [1] - 4:27penetrating [1] - 40:25people [61] - 4:28, 6:16,

7:2, 8:24, 9:9, 9:10, 9:14, 11:5, 14:17, 15:22, 16:29, 18:3, 18:9, 22:22, 24:2, 24:16, 24:17, 26:5, 26:28, 27:5, 28:30, 29:25, 29:29, 30:1, 30:22, 31:7, 31:21, 31:22, 31:29, 32:8, 32:25, 35:20, 35:28, 39:13, 40:17, 43:20, 44:15, 44:23, 45:12, 47:15, 47:21, 48:25, 49:18, 51:13, 57:27, 60:22, 62:15, 62:17, 62:22, 63:1, 66:13, 69:9, 78:16, 79:30, 80:5, 81:17, 86:5, 89:24, 93:30

percent [4] - 28:6, 43:4, 95:7, 95:11

perception [4] - 8:27, 10:4, 11:28, 47:4

perfect [5] - 44:5, 44:6, 45:6, 56:15, 56:16

performed [1] - 94:14perhaps [4] - 3:24, 22:23,

55:30, 59:13peril [1] - 62:18period [12] - 8:15, 9:21,

10:16, 17:18, 17:21, 17:27, 26:6, 31:2, 63:20, 80:5, 80:15, 84:28

periodically [3] - 19:22, 31:15, 31:16

perjured [1] - 73:2permanent [1] - 55:1persisting [1] - 26:13person [5] - 18:23, 31:6,

39:16, 40:15, 88:17personal [1] - 45:7personally [5] - 35:11,

63:12, 68:10, 68:11, 89:19

persons [2] - 27:7, 48:18persuade [1] - 10:28persuaded [1] - 68:18persuasion [1] - 37:9Phoenix [1] - 46:20phone [7] - 26:2, 79:5,

92:7, 92:10, 92:12, 92:13, 92:21

phones [1] - 26:1photographer [1] - 7:27photographers [1] - 8:1phrase [1] - 32:3physical [6] - 22:25, 24:7,

24:8, 29:1, 32:10, 58:2physically [3] - 23:2,

82:25, 83:4pick [2] - 24:29, 25:2picked [1] - 69:24picture [8] - 47:3, 49:24,

80:9, 80:17, 80:18, 86:11, 87:28, 87:29

pictures [1] - 23:4piece [8] - 13:27, 15:30,

71:21, 72:24, 85:24, 85:25, 86:18

pieces [7] - 25:23, 51:1, 70:6, 71:16, 71:29, 86:22, 86:27

pivotal [1] - 74:10place [10] - 4:3, 12:22,

16:26, 23:21, 26:12, 31:2, 40:1, 56:3, 82:29, 84:23

places [6] - 4:23, 6:18, 11:12, 12:16, 26:14, 81:16

plan [2] - 25:25, 84:21plant [1] - 55:8planted [1] - 60:9plate [1] - 58:8plates [2] - 58:4, 58:5play [1] - 21:5pleas [2] - 11:5, 32:7pleasantries [1] - 19:2pleased [1] - 47:1point [22] - 13:11, 17:12,

17:14, 18:8, 21:12, 25:9, 29:2, 31:21, 31:28, 33:2, 33:19, 36:17, 45:14, 47:11, 55:4, 58:30, 72:6, 77:18, 88:10, 89:17, 92:18, 95:4

pointed [4] - 3:29, 4:12, 5:20, 77:11

points [1] - 43:3police [50] - 2:25, 7:19,

9:14, 11:25, 11:27, 12:4, 12:26, 15:3, 18:5,

19:9, 19:13, 20:30, 25:27, 26:10, 28:7, 29:9, 30:1, 30:5, 36:29, 36:30, 37:3, 37:5, 37:15, 37:18, 38:25, 38:27, 39:7, 39:27, 40:12, 44:28, 45:2, 47:26, 49:17, 54:25, 54:26, 58:24, 60:26, 65:20, 69:23, 70:15, 73:14, 75:3, 75:5, 76:6, 78:18, 95:5, 95:8

Police [2] - 2:27, 74:4policies [1] - 73:18policing [6] - 3:2, 7:6,

7:10, 7:11, 20:23, 20:27policy [5] - 17:7, 39:2,

39:3, 40:13, 73:19politely [1] - 89:2political [20] - 6:13, 6:23,

8:23, 9:15, 31:25, 31:26, 32:9, 34:11, 34:12, 35:4, 35:26, 36:28, 37:12, 37:15, 38:7, 38:16, 38:23, 40:8, 46:25, 80:14

politically [5] - 6:6, 35:27, 36:26, 36:30, 37:12

politicians [8] - 11:4, 38:29, 47:6, 49:27, 62:15, 62:24, 73:15, 73:18

politics [2] - 38:12, 38:17popular [1] - 25:17position [8] - 7:28, 22:10,

34:14, 55:23, 61:4, 61:8, 73:7, 73:30

possess [1] - 88:23possession [2] - 72:21,

72:22possibility [6] - 19:11,

27:3, 33:29, 34:4, 45:29, 96:19

possible [15] - 4:13, 13:26, 45:18, 46:1, 47:24, 47:27, 48:8, 49:20, 49:25, 52:27, 53:8, 68:19, 86:30, 88:22, 88:23

possibly [1] - 66:12post [10] - 29:14, 30:5,

54:21, 54:26, 55:5, 59:19, 59:25, 60:26, 64:17

postdate [1] - 32:11posters [1] - 83:10posts [4] - 9:7, 21:14,

22:1, 60:7postulating [1] - 27:6power [5] - 5:17, 8:25,

37:11, 37:22, 61:7powered [3] - 23:1,

25:24, 38:24powerful [1] - 70:28PR [2] - 8:5, 8:6practice [2] - 37:4, 66:20pragmatic [1] - 35:27pragmatism [1] - 35:4

pragmatist [1] - 34:29praise [1] - 43:27prawn [1] - 6:24prawn-cocktail [1] - 6:24preceding [1] - 17:22precise [4] - 4:5, 17:23,

30:19, 65:3precisely [2] - 16:26,

30:24predated [1] - 9:19predating [1] - 32:12prefer [1] - 79:21premature [1] - 2:8premises [1] - 60:19prepared [2] - 13:27,

67:27presence [1] - 54:29present [3] - 45:17, 48:8,

85:30presented [1] - 40:2presenting [2] - 49:24,

88:17press [4] - 3:10, 34:3,

48:3, 84:24pressure [4] - 21:2,

21:11, 21:21presumably [1] - 56:11presume [1] - 17:15pretty [9] - 13:10, 24:2,

36:8, 44:13, 48:9, 56:13, 61:23, 66:6, 69:22

prevailed [1] - 80:15prevent [3] - 12:22,

37:16, 55:23prevented [3] - 25:24,

43:9, 65:24previous [1] - 51:4previously [2] - 3:12,

52:17primarily [1] - 11:24Prime [4] - 8:20, 39:11,

40:2, 41:4principal [1] - 15:4printed [1] - 46:2printing [1] - 65:25PRIVATE [1] - 96:26private [6] - 2:7, 52:22,

52:25, 53:4, 53:12, 96:24

privately [1] - 35:6privy [1] - 71:15probe [1] - 71:10problem [1] - 17:9problems [4] - 15:25,

34:19, 40:27procedures [1] - 52:6proceed [1] - 90:11proceedings [1] - 52:1proceeds [1] - 4:23process [2] - 41:26, 43:1processed [3] - 38:20,

38:21, 38:23procuring [1] - 25:29produce [1] - 88:15profession [1] - 51:13professional [4] - 45:16,



10

47:25, 47:26, 76:10proffer [1] - 83:17proffered [1] - 19:5profile [2] - 51:14, 86:28programme [1] - 21:30programmes [1] - 25:19prominent [1] - 3:23promise [1] - 37:23promotions [1] - 37:1pronouncements [1] -

94:14propaganda [6] - 45:25,

45:29, 46:8, 48:7, 63:10properly [2] - 39:25,

65:22proportion [1] - 10:23proposal [3] - 9:5, 9:6,

9:18proposition [1] - 69:21propositioned [2] - 19:9,

19:15propositions [1] - 65:7prosper [1] - 37:10protect [3] - 43:22, 44:19,

59:24Protestant [1] - 34:25protesters [1] - 82:30prove [1] - 94:30proven [2] - 50:12, 70:27provide [2] - 26:22, 39:10provided [2] - 7:15, 76:21providing [2] - 21:3,

64:26provision [1] - 60:30Provisional [1] - 4:30provisionals [1] - 83:7Provos [1] - 6:25proximity [2] - 60:24,

61:11proxy [1] - 59:28public [13] - 34:11, 35:4,

47:4, 52:21, 52:27, 53:9, 68:21, 73:20, 94:13, 94:14, 96:16, 96:20

publicly [3] - 6:7, 34:30, 41:10

publish [2] - 52:27, 67:5published [9] - 46:2,

63:29, 64:2, 65:14, 65:15, 69:22, 69:24, 81:29, 84:24

pulled [3] - 40:1, 40:16, 67:6

punch [1] - 65:18punters [1] - 4:29purely [1] - 40:8purpose [2] - 21:10,

25:30purposes [2] - 13:20,

69:25pursuing [1] - 2:7put [15] - 4:22, 22:24,

33:22, 42:8, 46:5, 47:9, 48:5, 52:20, 56:1, 58:6, 65:7, 66:16, 80:5, 83:10, 89:2

putting [4] - 4:29, 21:2,

47:7, 71:16pyramid [2] - 39:7, 39:26

Qqualifications [2] - 22:20,

23:30Queens [1] - 51:16question-marks [1] -

68:3questions [7] - 41:17,

77:9, 84:6, 88:15, 91:2, 91:4, 91:6

quick [2] - 33:23quickly [2] - 37:23, 59:7quite [24] - 4:6, 4:26, 5:5,

25:1, 25:3, 28:20, 29:15, 35:6, 35:22, 37:19, 40:29, 44:27, 45:15, 45:20, 60:7, 60:17, 67:9, 74:10, 80:3, 81:23, 82:18, 86:13, 86:30

quo [1] - 37:24

Rracketeering [2] - 5:1,

5:12radio [9] - 7:22, 7:23,

7:25, 10:2, 23:11, 23:14, 25:2, 25:29, 55:28

radios [2] - 25:9, 57:1raging [1] - 33:7railway [3] - 4:6, 22:30,

59:27raise [1] - 88:27raising [1] - 68:22rarely [1] - 15:27rate [1] - 18:7rather [9] - 4:28, 13:22,

43:13, 48:6, 52:11, 59:19, 61:7, 63:4, 95:6

RE [1] - 91:8RE-EXAMINED [1] - 91:8reached [1] - 33:25reaction [1] - 34:24read [13] - 26:27, 50:2,

58:4, 58:5, 64:5, 65:16, 67:22, 69:12, 80:22, 82:2, 93:10, 93:11, 94:21

readily [1] - 85:14real [5] - 6:15, 8:4, 36:6,

36:7, 40:11reality [1] - 6:8really [16] - 5:28, 7:2,

7:26, 8:11, 10:12, 17:23, 18:25, 58:30, 59:5, 63:4, 71:4, 80:17, 84:17, 87:12, 88:30, 94:5

realtime [1] - 59:3reason [18] - 16:19, 26:4,

30:23, 46:10, 50:14, 52:21, 64:28, 68:16, 69:9, 72:8, 75:17, 75:29, 76:2, 76:12,

76:13, 85:16, 86:23, 96:18

reasons [7] - 34:11, 34:12, 35:27, 44:24, 45:20, 46:8, 82:19

reassurance [1] - 35:29reassuring [1] - 34:30received [2] - 6:5, 40:20receives [1] - 64:25receiving [2] - 5:24, 5:25recently [2] - 42:1, 65:27recognised [4] - 30:8,

30:10, 34:29, 85:14recollect [1] - 16:27recollection [5] - 28:12,

56:12, 79:4, 87:30, 90:1record [3] - 91:16, 92:5,

96:6recorders [1] - 25:17recounted [1] - 75:15recruit [2] - 93:19, 93:23refer [1] - 23:23reference [1] - 27:2referred [5] - 26:10, 29:3,

57:26, 58:28, 65:5refers [1] - 27:2reflected [2] - 15:24, 88:3reflecting [2] - 47:18,

68:24reflection [3] - 95:6,

95:15, 95:20refuge [1] - 62:7regard [5] - 20:25, 26:29,

27:10, 68:13, 70:3regarded [6] - 5:22,

11:23, 35:30, 37:8, 37:25, 74:15

regarding [1] - 89:4regards [1] - 85:24regular [8] - 16:17, 17:3,

19:28, 29:12, 55:19, 61:13, 86:24

regularly [5] - 11:3, 55:2, 59:25, 62:23, 78:16

rehearsed [1] - 70:17reinforcing [1] - 33:14relate [1] - 2:5relates [1] - 65:16relating [3] - 43:14, 86:6,

86:19relation [30] - 2:9, 3:13,

3:18, 6:5, 20:20, 20:21, 20:24, 22:8, 27:15, 28:26, 31:14, 32:1, 33:6, 33:28, 36:21, 46:3, 47:30, 49:26, 50:6, 52:18, 53:1, 57:1, 60:29, 61:17, 63:12, 71:14, 92:23, 94:23, 96:8, 96:13

relations [2] - 34:26, 94:13

Relations [1] - 2:28relationship [2] - 15:2,

76:10relationships [1] - 14:20relatively [1] - 57:6relatives [1] - 11:5

relentless [1] - 6:8relevant [1] - 59:4reliability [2] - 68:4,

68:22reliable [1] - 65:10relied [1] - 71:17relies [1] - 70:5reluctant [2] - 43:26,

72:23remain [1] - 14:22remained [1] - 24:16remains [1] - 80:18remedy [3] - 68:26, 68:27,

68:29remember [26] - 4:5, 5:2,

5:10, 7:14, 17:25, 18:21, 18:28, 20:19, 27:22, 27:27, 27:29, 27:30, 28:17, 29:15, 30:2, 35:13, 44:29, 48:20, 51:16, 65:1, 65:3, 67:25, 78:29, 87:19, 88:5

remembered [3] - 20:4, 79:8, 79:16

remembering [1] - 16:19Remembrance [1] - 49:7remind [1] - 65:4remit [1] - 39:10remote [2] - 23:12, 25:26rendered [1] - 59:30repeat [1] - 88:10repeated [2] - 6:13, 6:30replace [1] - 93:1reply [1] - 67:28Report [1] - 70:1report [4] - 28:16, 34:7,

40:7, 42:12reported [2] - 39:24,

85:20reporting [4] - 26:24,

63:1, 63:2, 66:9reports [3] - 40:19, 42:3,

68:11representations [5] -

12:25, 31:19, 31:30, 32:1, 53:3

representatives [1] - 4:24Republic [6] - 4:1, 10:27,

36:16, 93:30, 94:2Republican [1] - 78:17republicans [1] - 4:19required [2] - 2:11, 15:15research [3] - 88:14,

89:1, 90:15residence [1] - 4:3residue [1] - 33:4resist [1] - 49:19resisted [1] - 21:21resolving [1] - 20:28resources [3] - 10:4,

10:7, 88:29respect [13] - 14:12,

45:22, 52:14, 75:13, 77:4, 77:17, 78:25, 79:27, 80:22, 82:2, 82:3, 87:14, 96:23

respecting [1] - 19:26

response [6] - 65:6, 65:12, 67:22, 77:4, 77:17, 93:18

responsibility [4] - 12:17, 58:22, 58:26, 62:30

responsible [1] - 59:10rest [1] - 60:4restroom [1] - 78:26result [3] - 67:6, 69:19,

91:20resulted [3] - 33:14,

69:28, 69:29resulting [1] - 7:4resume [1] - 51:23RESUMED [1] - 1:1resumes [1] - 54:6retaliation [2] - 35:2,

36:16retired [6] - 42:1, 65:27,

71:22, 71:25, 84:5, 84:7retirement [1] - 81:8retrospectively [1] - 47:7return [2] - 2:10, 95:3returned [1] - 5:4revealed [1] - 42:30rigorous [2] - 11:19, 50:4rigours [1] - 6:20ring [1] - 19:8rise [4] - 52:15, 69:28,

94:16, 94:22rivalries [3] - 45:7, 45:11Road [3] - 22:29, 22:30,

30:5road [20] - 27:24, 28:29,

29:13, 29:16, 30:6, 30:7, 30:13, 30:25, 54:30, 55:16, 55:20, 55:24, 56:7, 56:9, 56:10, 56:14, 58:6, 60:3, 60:10

roadside [1] - 58:3robbery [1] - 29:8Robert [1] - 51:18role [1] - 64:15rolled [1] - 30:11Romeo [3] - 22:28, 23:27,

57:26Ronnie [12] - 64:30, 65:6,

65:11, 65:18, 66:12, 67:7, 67:26, 68:13, 68:15, 68:21, 68:27, 68:28

Ronnie's [2] - 67:22, 68:17

room [2] - 24:7, 24:10rooms [4] - 23:5, 23:26,

24:5, 24:13roots [1] - 94:30rotten [1] - 29:28round [1] - 65:19route [2] - 60:23, 60:25routed [1] - 26:8routes [2] - 33:1, 60:9Royal [1] - 76:22RUC [64] - 3:8, 8:11, 8:14,

10:10, 11:17, 12:11, 12:12, 13:7, 13:8, 13:11, 14:16, 14:19,



11

14:27, 15:7, 16:14, 17:2, 17:7, 18:11, 19:26, 27:8, 27:20, 31:12, 33:25, 34:12, 34:23, 37:27, 38:22, 44:8, 45:5, 45:21, 46:27, 47:11, 47:22, 54:28, 57:17, 62:13, 64:22, 64:23, 65:11, 68:15, 72:10, 72:11, 72:15, 73:10, 73:24, 76:19, 76:28, 79:2, 80:26, 80:28, 81:5, 81:13, 81:23, 81:25, 82:30, 86:16, 87:21, 92:19, 93:22, 94:7, 94:13, 94:17

rule [3] - 44:22, 59:13, 73:2

ruled [1] - 34:4rumour [7] - 50:1, 71:19,

79:28, 90:9, 90:10, 90:16

rumours [20] - 26:19, 35:7, 71:14, 79:29, 80:5, 80:8, 86:23, 87:3, 88:3, 88:12, 89:12, 89:15, 89:26, 89:30, 90:3, 90:4, 90:5, 90:7, 93:29, 94:10

run [2] - 6:17, 40:30run-up [1] - 40:30rural [1] - 62:17Ryder [26] - 1:9, 2:9, 2:15,

2:30, 13:26, 17:6, 36:24, 38:18, 41:16, 54:16, 63:18, 69:1, 76:24, 77:11, 77:12, 80:21, 83:23, 87:2, 87:14, 88:9, 90:25, 91:10, 91:11, 96:6, 96:13

ryder [5] - 68:3, 78:10, 84:5, 86:4, 88:17

RYDER [2] - 2:1, 54:3Ryder's [3] - 2:5, 54:10,

96:7

Ssafe [1] - 24:16safety [1] - 60:28sake [1] - 36:20salmon [1] - 6:25sat [2] - 18:20, 34:3satisfied [1] - 66:18Saturday [1] - 28:16saved [2] - 43:9, 76:30saw [6] - 3:11, 7:14,

22:22, 76:14, 87:28scanners [4] - 25:5, 25:8,

57:4, 57:14scene [5] - 27:26, 27:27,

28:2, 29:3, 87:21scene-of-crime [1] - 29:3scenes [1] - 82:10scheduled [1] - 1:8scheme [1] - 5:3

Scotland [4] - 3:20, 4:10, 6:1, 94:1

scrambling [1] - 82:29screened [1] - 60:8scrutiny [2] - 44:21, 63:7second [3] - 2:10, 71:21,

96:10secrecy [2] - 41:12, 41:13secret [2] - 42:25, 44:20Secretary [2] - 38:30,

39:12security [30] - 3:3, 8:23,

9:2, 9:23, 10:13, 10:20, 11:17, 12:27, 19:27, 21:24, 31:5, 32:22, 33:6, 33:30, 35:16, 38:9, 39:8, 39:19, 39:23, 39:28, 40:21, 41:1, 49:23, 62:26, 73:19, 80:11, 80:14, 80:25, 93:28

Security [2] - 38:30, 93:29

see [11] - 28:5, 43:10, 46:7, 46:8, 48:15, 55:17, 59:11, 72:10, 78:7, 84:26, 87:10

seeing [4] - 24:18, 42:25, 43:6, 43:8

seeking [1] - 77:6seem [1] - 6:22sell [1] - 67:17send [2] - 35:28, 35:29senior [15] - 12:14, 13:8,

13:13, 17:2, 18:10, 37:3, 37:6, 37:8, 40:2, 51:11, 74:3, 74:11, 78:17, 87:21, 94:1

sensitive [7] - 13:6, 15:26, 22:15, 24:17, 24:24, 26:14, 40:23

sensitivity [3] - 15:15, 26:3, 52:23

sent [1] - 34:5sentences [1] - 65:16sentiment [1] - 36:25sentries [1] - 24:8sentry [1] - 59:28September [1] - 72:10sequence [1] - 28:19Sergeant [2] - 79:6, 84:5series [2] - 9:5, 70:16serious [6] - 9:5, 11:8,

43:29, 58:22, 68:3, 68:22

seriously [2] - 68:24, 94:30

served [1] - 2:26Service [1] - 93:30services [4] - 39:8, 39:19,

39:29, 93:28serving [1] - 85:28SESSION [1] - 96:26set [6] - 25:18, 26:20,

48:27, 49:5, 60:10, 77:13

sets [3] - 11:22, 42:13, 57:9

settling [1] - 34:20seven [6] - 25:20, 48:28,

84:8, 84:9, 86:25seventies [7] - 6:2, 8:17,

17:26, 29:14, 32:21, 56:26, 57:2

several [1] - 37:21share [2] - 7:25, 42:14sharing [1] - 42:7Sheepbridge [1] - 30:12shock [1] - 76:3Shogun [1] - 48:13shoot [2] - 47:9, 51:17shooting [2] - 29:15,

87:19shops [1] - 25:6short [3] - 7:20, 55:26,

91:6shortly [2] - 27:1, 87:4shouted [1] - 30:11show [1] - 7:17showed [2] - 5:5, 7:25shrewd [1] - 74:15side [40] - 5:13, 7:3, 7:7,

7:11, 7:17, 8:8, 8:27, 8:28, 9:14, 9:24, 10:5, 10:11, 10:16, 11:4, 11:28, 15:16, 20:28, 21:5, 21:8, 21:11, 21:16, 21:20, 28:29, 30:6, 32:9, 32:30, 45:26, 46:14, 46:30, 49:22, 49:28, 54:27, 56:9, 56:10, 60:10, 63:4, 63:5, 80:10, 80:13

sides [4] - 8:9, 9:4, 10:14, 80:24

sieve [2] - 31:10, 32:2signals [4] - 23:14, 23:20,

24:1, 24:29significance [3] - 18:29,

79:24, 79:25significant [5] - 29:6,

49:9, 71:30, 82:18, 82:22

Simon [1] - 86:2simply [1] - 75:15Siochana [21] - 8:14,

10:2, 11:16, 12:11, 15:9, 18:13, 34:2, 35:18, 36:27, 41:22, 42:18, 72:11, 73:10, 73:23, 79:3, 80:29, 81:5, 81:13, 82:24, 93:24, 94:8

sit [3] - 43:19, 53:13, 53:14

sitting [3] - 59:1, 77:12, 96:24

situation [8] - 10:20, 26:28, 31:13, 38:12, 48:1, 49:26, 83:29, 86:9

situations [2] - 34:30, 35:5

six [4] - 56:4, 84:8, 84:9, 86:24

skill [1] - 45:16skimmed [2] - 69:13,

93:11slight [1] - 20:20slightly [4] - 8:25, 33:24,

69:8, 69:11slippages [1] - 43:14slow [1] - 58:6small [2] - 30:21, 54:26smoked [1] - 6:25smoked-salmon [1] -

6:25smuggling [1] - 9:9snap [1] - 55:2social [2] - 20:17, 81:6socialists [1] - 6:25socially [2] - 83:14, 93:4soldier [1] - 7:28soldiers [1] - 23:29solicitor [4] - 80:21,

83:21, 83:22, 96:15solid [1] - 46:13someone [6] - 30:24,

39:18, 45:20, 78:17, 78:21, 85:28

sometime [4] - 56:1, 74:18, 74:19, 91:18

sometimes [11] - 12:15, 13:2, 15:16, 15:17, 15:29, 28:6, 56:4, 69:9, 73:21, 81:16, 95:13

somewhat [1] - 22:10son [1] - 51:29soon [1] - 52:25sophisticated [7] - 5:16,

25:8, 25:16, 56:26, 57:4, 75:13, 75:14

sore [3] - 31:21, 31:28, 33:2

sorry [7] - 1:4, 8:13, 13:14, 17:28, 52:3, 54:29, 74:19

sort [42] - 5:20, 7:30, 8:3, 12:3, 17:27, 19:2, 19:5, 19:27, 20:6, 23:21, 24:9, 24:12, 24:15, 25:3, 25:8, 25:15, 29:25, 30:10, 31:13, 33:23, 35:16, 35:30, 37:2, 38:10, 40:26, 41:7, 46:25, 49:30, 50:21, 61:15, 63:7, 74:13, 78:24, 81:9, 81:20, 84:28, 88:2, 93:2, 93:5, 94:10, 94:29, 95:22

sorts [8] - 6:16, 9:2, 23:7, 42:19, 45:8, 64:14, 71:2, 94:9

sought [1] - 68:14soul [1] - 78:15sound [2] - 23:17, 94:20source [10] - 3:20, 4:18,

27:9, 27:13, 30:30, 43:22, 43:23, 76:21, 78:23, 93:20

sourced [1] - 10:26sources [13] - 3:21, 9:15,

20:26, 21:7, 44:19, 45:21, 62:12, 66:19,

93:23, 94:1, 94:3, 94:4, 94:8

South [8] - 9:26, 22:7, 32:19, 62:4, 62:21, 62:22, 62:24, 73:19

south [14] - 15:2, 26:16, 46:26, 46:28, 48:28, 51:3, 55:15, 60:3, 61:5, 61:13, 61:28, 73:15, 93:23

southern [12] - 7:3, 7:7, 7:11, 10:5, 10:16, 20:27, 21:5, 32:8, 32:30, 54:27, 62:5, 80:13

speaking [1] - 94:12special [1] - 11:23Special [10] - 18:11, 30:8,

42:6, 42:13, 43:21, 44:14, 74:4, 74:11, 78:18, 94:7

specialist [2] - 23:29, 25:6

specific [14] - 15:20, 16:8, 40:20, 40:29, 43:14, 62:29, 71:14, 86:16, 87:14, 87:16, 88:27, 90:22, 94:22

specifically [10] - 7:6, 35:14, 36:20, 51:15, 82:13, 85:18, 88:1, 88:7, 88:9, 94:9

specificity [2] - 14:13, 40:19

speculate [2] - 89:10, 94:5

speculation [4] - 26:19, 33:28, 34:3, 76:18

spelled [1] - 15:27spend [1] - 75:29spent [1] - 2:20sphere [1] - 11:21spinning [1] - 4:26sponsored [1] - 21:23spot [1] - 29:7spots [1] - 56:12sprung [1] - 95:6spurious [1] - 92:16spying [1] - 75:26squeeze [1] - 9:3staff [1] - 39:9Staff [1] - 17:12stage [10] - 3:24, 18:18,

28:19, 30:4, 58:3, 59:26, 66:7, 75:3, 76:1, 96:16

stages [1] - 51:8stand [4] - 63:8, 95:7,

95:15, 95:21standing [1] - 7:28start [2] - 1:5, 83:30started [3] - 50:1, 79:28,

79:30starting [1] - 52:6startling [1] - 18:29State [1] - 38:30state [3] - 62:7, 74:26,

96:5



12

statement [19] - 10:18, 16:9, 23:23, 34:16, 36:2, 36:25, 37:30, 48:30, 67:25, 67:27, 68:21, 68:29, 77:3, 80:22, 91:20, 91:25, 91:26, 94:15, 96:14

statements [4] - 47:5, 48:4, 49:28, 69:28

States [1] - 21:24states [2] - 69:17, 78:25stating [3] - 72:30, 75:11,

78:3station [6] - 4:6, 26:23,

28:5, 54:26, 70:15Station [9] - 15:8, 34:1,

36:4, 49:26, 70:8, 70:23, 71:18, 72:14, 92:8

stations [3] - 12:6, 14:26, 25:27

status [1] - 37:24stay [1] - 60:1stayed [3] - 2:22, 61:30,

77:27stealing [1] - 10:29steer [1] - 46:12steered [1] - 68:15step [1] - 20:20stick [1] - 49:16sticks [1] - 18:29still [11] - 17:8, 24:23,

33:7, 33:16, 37:4, 43:28, 52:1, 56:28, 78:7, 78:8, 84:10

stop [2] - 10:29, 11:7stopped [1] - 7:21store [1] - 4:7stories [10] - 19:4, 19:10,

26:13, 26:21, 64:26, 66:8, 66:22, 74:28, 76:3, 76:7

Stormont [2] - 39:21, 39:22

story [18] - 5:7, 20:23, 21:10, 43:11, 46:5, 63:4, 65:14, 65:25, 65:29, 66:25, 66:27, 66:30, 67:3, 67:5, 67:17, 89:29, 92:13, 93:5

straight [2] - 12:6, 32:27strange [3] - 75:27, 75:28strategic [1] - 40:21stress [1] - 43:2stretch [8] - 27:24, 29:13,

29:16, 31:3, 54:18, 55:3, 56:14, 59:20

Strike [2] - 32:16, 32:20strike [2] - 11:10, 94:19strong [5] - 11:28, 26:4,

35:27, 53:2, 56:19stuck [3] - 19:15, 19:20,

79:15stuff [2] - 9:9, 94:11subject [3] - 16:10, 84:15,

86:17subjected [2] - 50:4, 63:6

subjects [1] - 37:15submarine [1] - 24:14suborned [2] - 26:4, 26:5subsequently [5] - 5:22,

30:26, 49:3, 49:4, 74:26substance [6] - 40:11,

87:23, 88:12, 90:10, 90:16, 90:27

such-and-such [2] - 13:1, 20:1

suffering [1] - 61:25suggest [3] - 85:8, 85:12,

86:4suggested [2] - 82:11,

92:7suggesting [6] - 70:28,

71:30, 72:13, 87:2, 87:23, 90:25

suggestion [3] - 46:18, 80:1, 89:19

suggestions [1] - 26:15suited [1] - 5:14sum [1] - 66:24summaries [1] - 39:11summer [2] - 29:18,

65:20Sunday [10] - 2:20, 5:7,

5:27, 19:12, 49:7, 65:21, 66:5, 67:3, 67:5, 85:5

Sunningdale [1] - 32:16Sunny [1] - 48:24Superintendent [7] -

17:11, 17:29, 65:28, 69:18, 82:4

superintendents [2] - 33:19, 33:21

supply [3] - 10:25, 25:22, 62:7

support [1] - 68:30suppose [9] - 45:10,

45:11, 47:11, 48:3, 69:27, 78:3, 79:11, 79:22, 94:13

supreme [1] - 34:29surface [1] - 73:1surfaced [1] - 64:14surprise [1] - 83:9surprised [2] - 36:8,

36:26surveillance [8] - 22:6,

22:24, 22:25, 39:30, 55:6, 55:19, 56:13, 58:2

suspect [3] - 14:7, 58:11, 76:2

suspected [1] - 56:3suspects' [1] - 57:15suspicion [5] - 31:4,

31:9, 67:29, 80:19, 90:14

suspicions [1] - 29:25suspicious [2] - 15:12,

59:14sweep [1] - 55:16SWORN [1] - 2:1system [14] - 37:28, 42:6,

42:21, 43:3, 44:5, 44:6, 44:26, 44:27, 45:6,

46:4, 46:18, 58:9, 59:6systemic [1] - 43:1

Ttaboo [1] - 24:21tacit [1] - 31:26tactical [1] - 58:26talkies [3] - 25:2, 57:1,

57:9TAOR [1] - 58:27TAORs [1] - 58:26tap [2] - 26:1, 26:6tape [5] - 27:23, 27:26,

27:27, 28:13, 29:3targeted [6] - 26:20,

30:23, 50:14, 50:23, 51:15, 92:17

task [1] - 62:29taxi [1] - 4:22tease [2] - 73:6, 90:21teased [1] - 69:25tec [1] - 22:3technical [12] - 22:20,

23:22, 25:11, 56:25, 57:23, 70:7, 70:21, 71:17, 72:12, 92:6, 92:11, 92:20

technically [1] - 23:10technicians [2] - 46:16,

46:17Telecom [1] - 26:5Telegraph [9] - 2:22,

69:1, 69:4, 69:5, 85:6, 85:18, 85:21, 92:29, 93:1

telephone [8] - 26:12, 26:21, 33:22, 46:3, 46:4, 46:16, 57:3, 87:21

telephoned [1] - 70:16televisions [1] - 23:4temptation [1] - 49:19ten [2] - 2:24, 25:21tend [2] - 37:10, 94:11tended [2] - 38:9, 49:27term [1] - 22:17terms [11] - 7:9, 7:11,

12:28, 13:3, 14:14, 19:25, 54:28, 76:10, 81:26, 86:19

terribly [1] - 33:20terrorism [1] - 45:27Tesco [1] - 4:7test [2] - 68:8, 89:29testimony [1] - 68:6tests [1] - 50:5THE [10] - 1:1, 41:19,

53:16, 54:1, 63:15, 83:25, 91:8, 96:2, 96:26

themselves [4] - 12:12, 42:15, 48:8, 50:19

THEN [2] - 96:2, 96:26theoretical [1] - 63:11theories [7] - 26:25,

70:16, 70:20, 71:3, 71:7, 71:14, 92:16

theory [4] - 26:26, 27:2, 27:6, 70:21

there'd [1] - 75:7There'll [1] - 19:6thereafter [2] - 87:4, 87:5therefore [2] - 15:2, 53:11thinking [1] - 66:25thinks [2] - 32:15, 63:2third [2] - 65:18, 66:9third-hand [1] - 66:9thread [1] - 26:20threat [1] - 62:19three [7] - 7:18, 34:26,

42:14, 77:9, 77:24, 87:4, 91:27

throw [2] - 47:24, 47:27tighten [1] - 10:29tightrope [1] - 36:18tilted [1] - 4:27timer [2] - 5:17, 25:20timers [2] - 25:14tip [3] - 69:19, 71:23,

72:26tip-off [3] - 69:19, 71:23,

72:26tipped [1] - 70:13TO [1] - 54:3Toby [8] - 69:4, 69:24,

70:5, 71:17, 72:17, 72:25, 72:28, 72:29

today [4] - 1:8, 2:9, 45:3, 87:15

together [9] - 18:23, 29:20, 38:28, 40:1, 40:16, 71:29, 73:29, 76:14, 93:6

toilet [3] - 74:27, 78:26, 78:27

tolerate [1] - 8:30toll [1] - 61:25tomorrow [3] - 52:5, 52:8,

52:11took [9] - 8:20, 16:26,

17:16, 31:2, 49:30, 50:1, 79:28, 82:29, 84:23

top [4] - 22:26, 39:6, 39:26, 59:6

total [2] - 47:19, 48:25totally [2] - 46:23, 79:9touch [1] - 53:4touting [1] - 66:8towards [4] - 30:13, 51:3,

60:4, 80:27tower [2] - 56:11, 57:25towers [9] - 9:30, 22:1,

22:4, 22:9, 22:12, 22:16, 24:5, 55:7, 57:21

town [2] - 4:8, 4:9traction [1] - 80:1traffic [2] - 57:17, 57:18trail [1] - 10:22training [2] - 21:3, 62:8transacting [1] - 76:1transaction [1] - 66:6transcripts [1] - 53:6transfer [1] - 76:11transparent [1] - 35:23travel [3] - 30:16, 30:20,

30:27travelled [2] - 51:3, 94:2travelling [2] - 28:28,

51:30treason' [1] - 83:11treated [1] - 15:15trends [1] - 40:25trials [1] - 25:22tribunal [1] - 86:26TRIBUNAL [4] - 1:1,

53:16, 54:1, 96:26Tribunal [42] - 2:6, 3:11,

12:3, 17:7, 22:8, 22:17, 26:24, 26:30, 29:5, 46:15, 47:8, 50:15, 50:29, 52:9, 55:14, 58:13, 69:16, 69:28, 70:4, 70:17, 71:5, 71:13, 72:9, 72:18, 72:19, 72:24, 75:18, 79:19, 79:22, 83:17, 83:18, 84:16, 86:17, 86:19, 87:9, 88:20, 89:8, 91:13, 91:16, 91:28, 94:15, 95:29

Tribunal's [1] - 3:14tribunals [1] - 86:26trick [1] - 65:5tried [3] - 32:25, 45:30,

93:19tripods [1] - 23:1trouble [2] - 15:6, 61:29Troubles [8] - 3:25,

10:17, 63:23, 63:30, 74:12, 79:29, 80:15, 85:29

trucker [1] - 57:7true [10] - 38:1, 46:22,

52:30, 63:11, 72:2, 72:5, 72:6, 72:9, 78:6, 80:8

trundled [1] - 59:26trust [6] - 11:27, 12:29,

13:3, 13:5, 14:21, 80:29trusted [1] - 11:29trustworthiness [1] -

20:8trustworthy [2] - 19:26,

65:10truth [6] - 35:7, 48:5,

50:5, 50:8, 70:26, 90:7truthful [1] - 77:28try [13] - 10:28, 15:14,

20:22, 21:9, 21:16, 21:24, 32:8, 32:24, 43:5, 45:17, 47:23, 47:27, 62:9

trying [13] - 15:30, 20:2, 28:15, 28:18, 46:12, 62:11, 65:5, 66:21, 67:17, 69:15, 71:10, 88:20, 93:23

Tuesday [2] - 34:1, 34:16tunnelled [1] - 94:30turn [3] - 7:6, 50:8, 78:9turned [2] - 49:29, 78:7twelve [1] - 52:10two [46] - 1:8, 2:5, 2:9,



13

3:4, 8:9, 11:22, 11:27, 12:25, 12:26, 17:4, 18:3, 18:9, 22:25, 26:19, 29:2, 31:15, 32:17, 34:26, 38:20, 48:18, 49:18, 51:23, 51:28, 51:30, 53:14, 54:30, 60:12, 65:16, 70:5, 71:16, 71:29, 73:28, 74:22, 74:23, 77:9, 84:13, 85:19, 86:16, 87:15, 87:16, 87:21, 88:9, 89:20, 90:28, 90:29, 96:5

type [2] - 58:8, 58:14typed [1] - 58:16typical [1] - 27:20

UUDR [1] - 11:1Ulster [2] - 32:20, 76:22ultimately [3] - 21:19,

21:20, 39:4unable [2] - 16:26, 60:21unarmed [1] - 10:9uncover [1] - 11:14uncovered [2] - 43:29,

43:30under [6] - 21:11, 53:12,

55:6, 59:26, 62:18, 96:11

Under [3] - 3:7, 26:11, 81:29

understood [5] - 5:25, 20:26, 21:1, 23:17, 25:5

unfortunately [2] - 17:12, 74:5

unfounded [1] - 80:8unhealthy [2] - 37:13,

37:14Unionist/Loyalist [1] -

34:28Unionists [1] - 37:18United [1] - 21:24units [2] - 5:17, 58:27unity [1] - 34:12University [1] - 51:17unless [2] - 68:10, 68:29unlike [1] - 79:22Unsung [1] - 64:6untrue [2] - 78:20, 90:23unusual [8] - 55:17,

74:30, 75:2, 75:5, 75:6, 75:21, 86:17, 86:21

up [44] - 4:3, 6:11, 10:29, 15:18, 17:19, 17:24, 19:4, 19:28, 20:6, 20:22, 20:23, 20:30, 21:24, 24:29, 25:2, 26:20, 28:30, 30:13, 30:24, 30:29, 33:1, 33:13, 35:1, 39:9, 40:30, 41:29, 43:22, 47:10, 56:4, 59:6, 60:10, 60:11, 65:23, 68:9, 69:25, 78:9, 81:13, 83:10, 85:30,

91:11, 91:21, 96:4, 96:17, 96:20

upcoming [1] - 40:27upwards [1] - 58:28usual [1] - 81:12utterly [1] - 19:12

Vvaguely [1] - 3:22VALENTINE [13] - 1:7,

2:2, 2:4, 2:15, 14:11, 41:16, 51:25, 54:6, 83:29, 91:6, 91:8, 91:10, 96:4

Valentine [1] - 82:6valuable [2] - 76:21,

76:22varied [3] - 8:19, 11:26,

92:16variety [2] - 23:13, 82:18various [20] - 2:24, 9:14,

21:7, 23:7, 24:9, 27:24, 30:1, 33:19, 39:13, 42:7, 44:11, 51:8, 55:22, 57:15, 66:8, 66:18, 70:12, 70:20, 89:24

vehicle [6] - 7:21, 48:17, 48:23, 55:26, 58:12

vehicles [6] - 10:8, 48:27, 56:7, 58:10, 58:11, 59:28

veracity [2] - 65:28, 68:17verifiable [1] - 49:16versa [1] - 80:27versions [1] - 70:12vetted [1] - 53:7vice [1] - 80:27victims [1] - 28:21video [2] - 25:14, 25:17view [9] - 8:2, 8:20,

28:25, 36:6, 36:7, 45:14, 46:24, 46:25, 47:19

viewing [1] - 56:20vigorous [7] - 6:30, 7:1,

7:17, 8:4, 9:25, 10:12, 32:28

village [1] - 48:15violence [4] - 6:26, 7:5,

20:28, 21:6violent [1] - 34:24VIP [1] - 55:15virtual [1] - 61:27virtually [5] - 10:16,

54:29, 55:5, 60:13, 62:30

visible [3] - 9:8, 10:9, 22:4

vision [3] - 56:21, 56:27, 56:30

visit [2] - 2:10, 22:11visited [3] - 22:26, 61:12,

62:16vital [3] - 70:5, 71:16,

71:21vividly [6] - 16:30, 17:25,

20:4, 27:22, 27:27, 30:2voiced [2] - 29:25, 90:14volatile [1] - 36:18volunteer [1] - 75:22volunteering [1] - 47:16vulnerable [2] - 59:23,

59:30

Wwaiting [1] - 73:4walk [2] - 36:18, 75:2walkie [3] - 25:2, 57:1,

57:9walkie-talkies [3] - 25:2,

57:1, 57:9Wallace [1] - 12:8wants [1] - 13:23war [1] - 45:27warfare [1] - 24:3wariness [8] - 8:10,

12:11, 15:19, 31:9, 73:10, 73:13, 73:15, 80:19

warning [1] - 65:22wary [4] - 14:17, 14:23,

15:11, 45:30WAS [5] - 2:1, 41:19,

63:15, 83:25, 91:8wash [2] - 62:9, 62:11washing [1] - 94:20watch [8] - 9:30, 22:1,

22:4, 22:9, 22:12, 22:16, 24:4, 25:18

watching [2] - 60:18, 60:19

watchtowers [2] - 9:28, 56:18

waved [2] - 30:9, 30:10wavelengths [3] - 23:18,

23:20, 23:23waves [1] - 23:17ways [4] - 22:25, 25:17,

35:23, 73:21weaknesses [2] - 42:30wealth [1] - 70:30week [3] - 12:9, 52:28,

53:9weeks [1] - 92:4weigh [3] - 43:6, 43:22,

71:5well-informed [2] - 26:29,

27:10WENT [1] - 96:26Weston [1] - 69:30whatsoever [1] - 88:24whereas [3] - 27:10,

38:12, 55:27white [3] - 27:23, 28:13,

29:3whole [9] - 9:5, 9:27,

15:28, 31:9, 36:9, 43:1, 43:3, 59:6, 70:16

wickedly [1] - 30:23widely [3] - 27:4, 67:4,

67:9widespread [2] - 36:8,

66:20

wife [2] - 27:28, 83:13willing [1] - 88:25willingness [2] - 32:9,

32:10window [2] - 22:4, 30:11wire [2] - 55:25, 55:28wish [1] - 51:20withdrawn [1] - 5:29WITHDREW [1] - 96:2withhold [1] - 15:13witness [6] - 1:10, 83:17,

94:19, 96:5, 96:22WITNESS [5] - 41:19,

63:15, 83:25, 91:8, 96:2witness-box [1] - 1:10witnesses [4] - 1:8, 1:9,

17:9, 76:8wonder [4] - 2:17, 5:30,

7:7, 25:9wondering [1] - 66:2words [8] - 6:10, 8:28,

8:29, 36:17, 75:7, 75:9, 75:10, 88:5

wore [1] - 25:15Workers' [2] - 32:15,

32:20works [4] - 3:4, 37:19,

37:28, 63:10world [4] - 42:25, 44:20,

45:9, 66:13worries [1] - 12:24worry [3] - 12:20, 59:16,

59:17worth [3] - 66:29, 66:30,

76:26Wright [1] - 42:12wringing [1] - 94:21write [14] - 3:18, 5:11,

13:24, 13:27, 15:30, 20:23, 84:15, 86:18, 86:22, 86:26, 87:30, 89:28, 90:11

writer [1] - 2:24writing [8] - 21:10, 69:26,

85:17, 85:25, 85:26, 86:24, 90:2, 93:8

written [15] - 2:24, 3:12, 14:1, 27:1, 43:12, 44:9, 67:25, 67:27, 82:5, 85:5, 85:13, 87:1, 88:4, 88:5, 88:28

wrote [11] - 3:6, 5:7, 6:22, 24:18, 27:13, 64:28, 65:14, 86:30, 88:13, 90:12, 95:5

YYard [4] - 3:20, 4:10, 6:1,

94:1year [2] - 2:11, 87:4years [22] - 2:16, 2:19,

2:26, 3:23, 17:22, 22:27, 34:26, 35:13, 41:13, 63:6, 63:20, 70:12, 74:12, 76:23, 78:20, 84:8, 84:9, 84:13, 86:25, 87:5,



14

88:4, 89:24young [1] - 48:19youngest [1] - 51:29yourself [7] - 41:28,

67:19, 83:17, 88:17, 89:21, 89:23, 91:18

££50,000 [3] - 65:26, 66:3,

66:24

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A P P E A R A N C E S The Sole Member For the Tribunaljustice.ie/en/JELR/2011-12-08_-_Smithwick_Tribunal_-_Day_63.pdf/... · And I understand, in fact, that, in 1989, you wrote a