A New Company Team

7/28/2019 A New Company Team

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Forr Leavcnworth. Kansas1997

.ApprovcJ for p ~ b l i cclcase: distriburion is unlir~iited.


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE I form ApprovedOM 8 No. 0704-0188I . . 1 7June1997 IMasta's hesis 4 Aug96-6 June 1997

TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5NEW "COMPANY TEAWARMORME- INFANTRY, . FUNDING NUMBERS

IANDATTACK AVIATION I7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8A m : ATU-SWDGDFo rt Leavenworth,Kansas 66027-1352

9. SPONSORINGIMONlTORlNG AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES1 I

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

. PERFORMING ORG ANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

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I13. ABSTRACT (Maxrmum 20 0 words)The vision o f the h e attlefieldis one o f great uncertainty and complexity. Since the wor ld is a dynamicand turbulentplace, operations may cover the full spectrumo f other than war to fullwar. The armyulllneedan organimtional strategy that maximizes flexibility, tailo rab ility and capabilities. This study examines thefeasibility o f a new Compa ny Team" composed o f Armor, Mechamzed Infantry and Attack Av iatio nCurrent Army doctrine docs not ta ~k 'o r~ ani zcviation down to company team level. In this study anevaluation is made o f h s ypothetical organization using he measures of letha lity, opternpo and mob ility .Finally this study concludes that he Army needs to develop a f lex ible approachin its force structuring that isfocused on capability based organizations capable of combined arms operations down to the company teamlcvelas required

L 14. SUBJECT TERMS I~,jdUMBEROF PAGEfuture battlefield, aviat ion 16. PRICE CODE

1 7 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECURITY CLASSIFICATIO SSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSU N m UNCLASSIFIED

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M A S T E R O F M I L I T A R Y A R T A N D S C IE NC ET HESIS APP l l O VA L PAG E

Nan& o f Candidate: Ma jor Victoria 4. CalhounT h e m Tit le : A New "Company Team" Armor. Mechanized Infantry. and M a c k Aviat ion

Approved by :

Accepled this brh day o f June 1997 by:

, Direcror. Grnduate DegreePhi l ip S.Brookes. PI1.D. Programs

The op inions and com:lusions expressed herein are those o f the studenl author and d o notnecessarily represent t!le vicws o f [he U.S. Ar m y Comm and and Gcncrnl Staff College or anyother governmental agency. (References to this trudy should include the foregoin g statement.)


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ABSTRACT

A New "Company Team" A rmor, Mechanized Infantry and Attack Aviation by MAJVictoria A . Calhoun. U SA, 64 pages.Th e vision of the future battlefield is one of great uncertainty and com plexity . Sin ce the world isa dynamic and turbulent place, operations m ay cover the full spectrum of other than war to fullwar. The arm y will need an organizational strategy that m aximizes flexibility, tailorability andcapabilities. Thi s study ,examines the feasibility of a new "Company Team" composed of Armor,Mechanized Infantry, and Attack Aviation. Current Army doctrine does not task organizeaviation down to company team level, In this study an evaluation is made of this hypotheticalorganization using the measures of lethality,optempo and mobility.Finally, this study conclu des that the Army needs to develop a flexible approach in its forcestructuring that is focused on capability based organizations capable of combin ed arm soperations down to the company team level as required.


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A C W O W L E D G M E N T SI want to thank the many people who helped m e with this thesis. First of all, thanks goes

to Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Dopf for his mentorship and support as the Comm ittee Chairman .Without his wealth of knowledge and experience I would have stalled several times.

Than ks to Dr. Arthur T. Frame, for his courage in accepting the challenge to kee p me onthe right path and for supporting my academ ic pursuits.

Thanks to Major Kevin P. Polczynski. who provided m e perspective on the issues andsupported my efforts.

Than ks to Mr . Bob Ram sey and ,Mr. L an y Gavin who provided m e with their exper tise.and support for the JANU S simulation experiment. Their professional support and tirelessefforts made the computer simulation work go extremely smoothly and 1am eternally grateful.

I especially want to thank Ma jor Kevin McEnery fo r sharing with m e his extraordinarytalents for military thinking and teaching. Only through his tremendous perspective on militaryoperations am I leaving here truly wiser not just smarter than when 1 arrived.

Finally I want to thank my family and friends for their support when I needed it.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS&

..APPROVAL PAGE ............................................................................................................. 11...ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ 111

..............................................................................................CKNOWLEDGMENTS :. ivLIST O F ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... viLIST OF TABL ES ............................................................................................................... iiCHAPTER

....... BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ I........................................................................................ LITERATURE REVIEW 10

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................................... 184. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 26. .5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................ 48

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 6 1INITIAL DISTKIBUTION LIST ..................................................................................... 64


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LIST O F ILLUSTRATIONS. .Figure Pagc

...................................................................Current and Hypothetical Company Teams 5. . .2.,Hypothetical D ~ v ~ sl o ntructure .............................................................................. 60


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LIST OF TABLESTable Page

1. Capabilities and Limitations of Company Teams ..........................................................27. .2. Battlespace Co mp ar~ s~on..................................:......................................................... 29

............................. Combat Power Analysis : ............................................................. 304 . Sustainment ....................................................................................................................1

.........................................................................................................Phase I Results .. 336. Current Company Team Janus Tabular Data ................................................................35

. .......................................................Hypothetical Company Team Janus Tabular Data 38.................................................................................. T-Tcst Rcsults Janus Tabblar Data 41

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

The Research OuestionWould the incorporation of Attack Aviation a s an integral part of a company team

in the U S . Army generate more lethality. mobility, and flexibility?

The Subordinate Q uestionsDoes the organization enhance a company's ability to maneuver and engag e enem y

forces? How capa ble is the organization in engaging the ene my 's forces? How capable is theorganization of acquiring the enem y's f orces? Does the organization support flexible forcetailoring'! Does the organization possess the capability for increased optempo, lethality, andmobility?

B;~ckcroundThe US. rmy's current doctrine routinely integrates tanks and mechanized infantry into

company task-force teams. "Thus the basic combined arms fighting element is the company taskforce."' Thi s organizational concept reduces vulnerabilities and places assets in acomplem entary environment. Even though this organization meets the definitio n of a combinedamis team its fighting ci~pabilitys limited to the ground or confined w ithin two dim ensions.Therefore this company task force organization operates and m aneuvers two'dimensionally o n athree-d imen siona l battlefield. Th e result is that terrain severe ly restricts ar.d adve rsely imp acts


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. . this organization. It has be em ai d that when task organizing "We should seek an optimum forceindicated by the terrain and mission. trying always to asscmble a force more po wed ul, mor emobile and m ore versatile than his, which would als o consist of a w orkable mix of the fourelenlents of the combat arms plus adequate air support."z Th e company view of this battlefield is

' two-dimensional and possibly results in a degradation for the areas of lethality, optempo, andmohility.

Current Army doctrine describes attack helicopters as aerial maneuver asse ts. It statesthat they are not task organized below brigade but are "normally O I'CON (operational control) tothe brigade."'.lt goes further to say that attack helicopter battaljons are an "aerial maneuv er unit

'. .usually employed as a ba tta ~io n." ~ his organizational concept supports independent aerialmaneuver against large m obile threats but does not address Army Av iation's role in otheroperation along the continuum of conflict. Descriptions of future battlcficlds describe them asvariable in nature ranging between linear and nonlinear. Enemy fo rces may range from terroristso r small organized units to state-funded national arm ies of various capabilities and threats.

. Therefore the curk nt and'popular concept of aviation deep ope rhio ns may not match therequirements for som e of the U S . Army's potential future battlcficlds.

* . Th e physical dimensions of today's battlefield have grown. A company in World War I1would occupy about a one-kilometer area, w here a company in the Gulf W ar would occupy aboutten kilometers. Today this &a may be even bigger expanding to fifteen kilometers. It seem s tofollow that if this cxpansive area is to remain the responsibility a compan y comm ander then thereis a growing need to visualize the battlefield in the third dim ension and improve his ability to seehis entire area of responsibility. Th e alternative it would seem is smaller company units with

, . smaller mo re m anageable areas of responsibility.. .


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The vision of the future battlefield is one of great uncertainty and comp lexity. Since theworld is a dynamic and turbulent place, operations may cov er the full spectrum of operationsother than w ar to full war. T o meet operational requirements in this turbulent environment, theArmy will need an organizational strategy that maxim izes flexibility, tailorability, andcapabilities. Since the company team is the cornerstone of the Army's organizational structure, itwould be appropriate to relook its structure in light of the future threat, future battlefieldconditions, and future capabilities to ensure i t can continue to meet battlefield requirements intothe next century.

Perhaps it is time for a ncw task-organized com pany structure for the future. A forcestructure strategy that is like tools in a tool box that com e together to tackle a particular job. Anorganizational strategy that organizes in light of what is known about possible enem y capahilitiesand what is known abou t U.S. Arm y capabilities. The purpose of organizing like this is to ..incorporate flexibility ;u1d tailorability to overcom e the unknowns. This new company team is

. , .'structured for better control and influence ove r a smaller area of responsibility to accomplishfuture missions despite all the variables. This new organization is a hypothetical com pany teamcomposed of armor, n~ ech ani zed nfantry, and aviation forces.

Current cavalry doctrine supports this idea of combined a rms maneu ver with armor,mechanized infantry. and aviation, but it organizes at the battalion icvel. "Division c avalry is

'unique as the only battalion level structure in the army with organic air and ground m aneuverasset^."^ ~ o d a ~ ' s . ~ r m ~eeds flexibility and capabilities that can adap t to any situation. A

. balanced company team that incorporates armor, m echanized infantry and attack aviation might: .

provide com manders with the right balance.The company team is the cornerstone of Army warfighting. It builds to create higher

echelons and supports ;he current divisional structure. To solve these dynamic ch allenge s is that


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a hypothetical orga nization is recommended (scc figure I) that combin es the capabilities ofarmor, mecha nized infantry, and attack aviation fo r the close battlc. Th e organization buildsusing mu ltiples of three for balance and sym metry and to facilitate force tailoring.

This compa ny team is innova tive and revolutionary in its organization an d possibly itsapplication. In the aggregate this organization m ight allow for a reduction in the num ber ofassets in a brigadc w ithout reducing com bat power and lethality while still providingcomm anders the flexibility to tailor forces to combat any potential thrcat. Com panies canorganize from within corps and divisional structures because they build using these m odularcompanies.

&This study purposes a new company team for the Army. It possesses three key comb at '

e l e m e n ~ srmor, mechanized infantry, and attack aviation. Each of these brings a uniquecontribution to the,tigh t. Th e armored tank possesses lethality, spee d, and protection. Th emechanized 'infantry po ssesses speed , lethality, and ability to fight in rcstricted terrain . Attackaviation p ossesses spe ed, lethality. an d freedom of movement. The three sy stems together in acompany team represent a balanced package of assets that the commander can employ to defeattiny enemy.

This could b e a stand ing structure, but realistically, it is probably a task force that is puttogether considering the factdrs of m ission, enemy, terrain, troops, and tim e available (METT-T).Task organizing may best support stationing considerations and training requirements that we notpart of this research study. Task organ izations also support missions in a world environment o f-unknown parameters by allowing commanders to arrange capabilities to meet requirements.


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F I G U R E 1C U R R E N T C O M P A N Y T E A M-

H Y P O T H E T I C A L C O M P A N Y T E A M

- - .. - - - ATTACUEDm ... . . . DIRECT S U P P O R I

ORGANIC

This compan y team oiganization cou ld allow commanders to maneuver their forces with greaterspeed, firepower, and mass. This organization cou ld allow the tactical commander greaterfreedo! of tactical maneuver than ever before and the opportunity to gain succes s acrossa wide


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and dispersed battlefield. This team could revolutionize land warfare for the twenty-firstcentury.

This organizational structure has tremendous capabilities across the possible spectrum ofconflicts. It provides fo r dispersion across great distances and facilitates great volumes of firesthrough shared targeting data from long,bow, radar systems. With the introduction of top-downmunitions fired from masked and concealed positions, this company team h as tremendouscapabilities for the comm ander to exploit on the m odem battlefield.

I m ~ o r t a n c eIt is essential that the Army o rg a n ix to maximize flexibility and capability in operations.

Today's units have limitations that capabilities-based organizations can overcome. Thes ecombined assets may produce synergistic bettlefield effects on the enemy, and they should beconsidered. Should this structure prove to be feasible, suitable, and acceptable, it might providean organizational strategy that supports future division force-structure requirements. Th equestion is; Can the Army make a small fundamental c hange that allows i t to accomplish its ..missions without abandoning everything it has learned and proven in combat over the years?

This hypothetical orga nization might be the required change. It is a simple andfundamental change that incorporates "combined arms" operations, exploits the targetingtechnology of Apache longbow for synergistic effects and generates optem po and battlefieldvisualization by raising the comman ders view of the fight abov e the ground terrain. The possibleaggregate result of this fundamental change could be a smaller combined arms combet forcecapable of producing decisive effects on the enemy.


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AssumotionsTh e following assumptions are m ade to establish the required asse ts for the

organizational research:I. Current and modernized equipment is available2. Availability on all systems is 100percent.3. Unit personnel 100 percent trained.

Key TcrmsT o establish a common understanding for this research the following key terms are

provided. Although they may be familiar to many readers they are intended to convey specificmeaning for the research.

Air Maneuver Forces. Com bat aviiition units that operate in the ground environment areair maneuver forces. They enga ge targets by fire from covered and concealed positions. Their .operations are similar to ground combat operations in that they tailor their movement to theterrain and use suppressive fires.

Battlefield. A field or area where a battle is fought.Battlesoace. Th e components are determined by the maxim um capabilities of a unit to

acquire and dominate the enem y; includ& areas beyond the area of operations; it varies overtime according to how the com man der positions his assets.

Bound. A single movement, usually from one covered and concealed position to another ,-by.dismounted troops or combat vehicles. The distance covered in one movement by a unit 'which is advancing by bounds.

Close Air Sunno rt ICAS). Air action against hostile targets that are in close proximity tofriendly forces and that requires detailed integration of each air mission w ith fire and mov ementof those forces.

7


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Close Ooerations. An elastic concept relating to forces in immediate contact with theenemy, in the offe~lse r defense.

Combat Power. The conversion of the potential of forces, resources, and opportunitiesintb actual capability through violent, coordinated action at the decisive time and place.

Combined Arm s Team. Tw o or more arms mutually supporting one another. A team. .usually consists of tanks, infantry, cavalry, aviation,-field artillcry, air defense artillery, and

engineers.Comoanv Team . A temporary grouping by attachment of platoons in exchang e for, or in-

addition to organic platoons, under one company com man der done for a specific operation ormission.

Disoersion. The spreading or separating of a force and its installations to reduce. .vulnerability to enemy action.

Firm ow er. Th e amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weaponsystem. Firepower may be direct or indirect.

,.,

Flexibility. The ability to be responsive to change; adaptable. Capable of variation o rmodification. . ,. . .lntcma tion. Th e act o; process of bringing all parts together; unify.

. Lethality. The capability to cause death., ,

,Maneuver. The ernploymcnt of forces through offensive or defensive operations to

achieve relativepositio nal ad vantage over an enemy force to achieve tactical. operational, orstrategic objeciives.m.he freedom of movement maneuver by units.Ontemno. The rate of speed of military operation. Tem po can be fast or slow, while

speed is preferred.


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Organizational Structure . The definite structure of a military elem ent prescribed by acompon ent authority such as a table of organization

Protection. Th e conservation of the fighting potential of a force.Tactics. Th e art and science of emp loying available mcans to win battles and--

engagemen ts. Tactics is the battlefield p roblem-solving-usually rapid and dynamic in nature.Tailorability. The quality of being able to make, alter, or adapt for a particular end.Targeting. A process based on friendly scheme of maneuver and tactical plan and an

assessment of the terrain and threat w hich identifies those enemy functions, formations,equipment, facilities, and terrain which must be attacked to ens ure succe ss.

Task Orgai~ni. A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particularmission. Task organization involves the distribution of available assets to subordinate controlheadquarters by attachment o r by placing assets in direct support (DS ) or under the operationalcontrol of the subordinate.

' ~ i l l i a n i . D~ ?u y . elected Paper s o f Genera l William E . D (F t ~eaven wor th , S :co mb at Studies Institute. 1994). 147.

'u. S. Army Field Manual 1-100. Army Aviation in Combat O~ er at io nsWashington,DC: Governm ent Printing Office, 28 February, 1989). 2-2.41bid. . .' ~ i e l dManual 17-95,wCavalrvO~erat ionsWashington, DC: G overnment PrintingOffice, 19'September 1991). 2-49.


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CIIAPTEK 2LITERATURE REVIEW

Currcnt doctrinal literature on ope ra[ions and m;incuver clearly scp;lrates air rnancuverfrom ground maneuver through rigid guidance and tactics ibr the employment of the variousunits. Com bined o perations in thc army today are still not routine. The v isions of airland battledoctrine as well as the organizational concc pts comin g from thc 1973 Arab-Israeli war today arestill topics of debate. Requ irements for comrnand and control, tactical man euver, sustainment.and training all come together as forces working against combined arms operations on themodern battlefield. The M arine Corps has tried to ovcrcome som e of these challenges and in theprocess developed creative approach es to combined arms operations using aviation assets. Thc setypes of solutions attempt to address currcnt and future requirements using a capability-bascd

combat strategy. Many b elieve future combat will be very different, arid envisioning it certainlyis very challenging. Today's literature articulates ;I new and different world and environment forcomb at. The c hallenge is to build flcxibility into thc orgiulization to meet all futurc requireme ntsthis nation may have.

Airland battle 2000 shaped current US Army do ctrine by defining air maneuvcr forces tostrike deep at Soviet seco nd echelon divisions. This strategy, based on the large Sovie t military

structure, develops a ca pability to take away the initiative of an attacking army to deny thcm theability to exploit success and forcing them to culminate. Th c US derived this air maneuverdoctrine primarily from the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli w ar, comb atfailures were attributed to the lack of aerial m mc uv er assets and the inability to quickly shift


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forces from one area to another.' The Israeli leadership determined air maneuver was key forfuture combat operations and incorporated it into their organizational strategy. Kegardlcss of thcproblems the Israelis had during the war, the attack helicopter had show n i t was a major force toreckon with on the modern battlefield. Thes e lessons did not go unnoticed by the US Army. TheArab-Israeli war had demonstrated in combat that all arms on the current battlefield werevulnerable to having their individual weaknesses exploite d. It was appa rent that mutuallysupporting systems were now a requirement to survive and win on the battlefield. Comb inedarms operations now wcrc a requirement to negate the threat to individual systems.

The US Army Cavalry today is an example of "combined arms." This combined arm sstructure overcomes the lessons learned in thc Arab-Israeli war by organizing the unit to exploitcapabilities and minimize the limitations of each weapons sy stem. By organizing this way eachunit experienced synergistic effecls to its overall combat power. The Cavalry organ ized to buildcombined arms at the battalion level by integrating attack aviation, mcchanized infantry andarmor forces. This organizational approach ensure s operational flexibility in the conduct of thecavalry missions of reconnaissance and security. Since the cavalry olicn faces many of theunknown s on the battlcficld, cavalry tactics, techniques, and procedures must em phasiz eflexibility and tailorability for missions. Th e weapons systems emp loy mutually suppo rting fircsand roles to achieve swift movement and positional advantages on the terrain. Thi sorganizational structure allow s the cavalry to rapidly dev elop the situation and concentrdtecombat power on the enemy.

All brigade-level doctrine for the armor, mechanized infantry, and aviation brigadehead quarte rs is confu sing and inconsistent in providing guid ance on task organization . As acomm and and control h eadquarters, armor, mechanized infantry, and aviation brigades should be


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equally capable of receiving and employing units based on mission analysis and highercomm anders' orders.

Curren t doctrine docs not articulate it this way. The aviation brigade headq uarters unlikethe armored and mechanized infantry brigade headquartcrs consists of what doctrine identifics as"similar" structures and takes on implicd responsibilities for aviation operations across the dcpthof the battlefield. Deep, close, and rear operations may be done simultancously by the aviationbrigade headquartcrs. This concept has thc potential to divert thc attention of the commanderand staff conside rably by challeng ing him with multiple tasks and purposes. Perhap s it is thisthat scts the impression that the aviation brigade comm ander might be too busy to he a con ~b inc darms task force comm ander. Conversely, armored and mechanized infmtry brigades have onlythe headquartcrs company by doctrine, and all other units arc task organized baw d on thecom man der's scheme of man euver. Unit's task organize for specific operations, and thccommander receives specific operational maneuver miwons. This doctrinal concept providesfor flexible force tailoring amo ng armor and mechanized brigades. lnconsistcncy amon g all thcdoctrine leads to confusion and impressions that som e brigades arc more suitable for maneuvercom bat operations than others. Other limitations in doctrinc consist of such things as "Divisionis the lowest level at which all of the com bined arm s are normally integrated."' It is not clcarcxactly what "all thc combine d arms" consists of and what "integrated" is, but an opinion isclear, that combincd operations bclow the brigade is not normal as articulated by doctrinc.

Tactical m aneuve r of aviation forccs is very clear in current doctrine. For deepoperations the Aviation Brigade will attack deep to strike second echelon forccs along an aircorridor that is closcly coordinated to ensure the suppression of cnemy air dcfcnse (SEAII), theintegration with Air Force operations, and the maxlm um combat pow er at the dccisive point. Forclose combat operations, attack aviation units can provide tw o types of com bat m issions:


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"Close-in fire support which is a form of close air support provided by rotary-wing a ircraft or"support by fire positions which is the establishment of an overwatch position to fix the target soanother force may ~ na ne uv er ." ~ ttack aviation units can also conduct raids, or reconnaissance,and security m issions to support the comm ander's scheme of maneuver. All of these operationsby doctrine are planned and cond ucted by the aviation battalion with coordination do ne with theother combat arms for synchronization. Because of this doctrinal concept m any mechan isms arcin place to ensure airspace co ordination, fratricide prevention, fire su pport coordinationmeasures, and, in general, command and control. This process as defined in the doctrinc buildsautonomou s units of capability and not combined arm s operations.

The doctrine for the tactical maneuver of armor and m echanized forces provides theopportunity for co nm an de rs to task organize units down to company level. Units planoperations to provide mutually supporting fires to create battlefield effec ts and maneuv er duringthe battle at the direction of the company co mma nder. At this level time and space relationshipsare at the most critical and may directly result in success or failure. Th e frictions of war are atthe most basic level, the individual soldiers. See ing the battlefield is the most imp ortant actionfor the company com mander, specifically understanding the terrain with its impact on combatoperations and the enem y. This ability to see is made m ore difficult by terrain, position, andcombat. Eyes on tracking and communications are the keys to success. Training, standardprocedures, and radio co~n~nunicationsll enable the company com mander to quickly maneuverthe unit to achieve its objective. Company level doctrine states that: "Controlling andcoordinating fires is just as vital to success of the operation as controlling and coordinatingmo vem ent. Direct fire in the right aniounts at the right times to achieve the desired results."'Thes e maneuver and fire control processes are vital to the success of the overall operation. Firesand movement o r position are key. Fires neutralize, suppress, and destroy enem y forces.


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Th e Marine Corps Gazette recently shows one way the M arine Corps is able toaccomplish their military operations in new and creative ways. The M arine Corps has exercisedthe various capabilities of ground and air combat forces in new and different methods to achievesuccess on the battlefield. Their operations recently have begun to exploit the flexibility andspeed that attack helicopters can provide to the ground battle. They have used attack helicoptersto support dismounted infantry operations on objectives by "interdicting avenues of approach anddestroying enemy units before they can engage the infantry."6 They have sought to use attackaircraft as close air support to the ground fight because the speed of the aircraft can coincide withthe ground forces they are operating with. During Desert Storm , "Marine S uperco bra pilotsdeveloped their own version of aerial refueling. Landing alongside and taking fuel from trucksused to refuel turbine powered M-1 tanks, they seldom had to leave the battle."7 Th e MarineCorps is evolving their employment of attack aviation to meet the requirements on the futurebattlefield.

Literature on the future battlefield describes a varied threat with great potential to ownthe most advanced weapon systems that money can buy. The threat could range from securityoperation s for operation s other than war, to rogue militia grou ps, all the way u p to all-out wa r asthough t of today. Som e today theorize that "smaller units are able to create decisive effects inthree ways: the first physical, more rounds, more accuracy fewer soldiers; the second, m ixingarms within a formation; the third, is maneuver; the third step will take place when land com batis waged by formations consisting of com bined arm s, airlground -based units."' Th e eme rgingtheory is that smaller units equipped with the technology and w ell trained m ay be very effective."The implications of these moves toward com pressing greater firepower in smaller unit packageswill require significant adjustments in do ctrine, leadership, organization and com man d andcontr01."~


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for division aviation brigade aircraft as well as supply and ground m aintenance. The m odulardesign of these units supports mobility and tlexibility requirerncnls for futurc sustainmentoperations.

Sustainrncnt doctrine fo r the armored cavalry rcgirncnt statcs that the regiment islogistically self-contnincd and normally receives support froni the corps support com man d.Maintenancc support teams for ground system s may be provided to the regiment and normallyare also providing support for aircraft systcms. The distance between the regiment and the corpswill provide a strain on the lines of co~nm uni cati ons nd highlights the need for modularsustainment packagcs of maneuver units.

Within the Army niany task-organized or standing unirs providc sustninmcnt for combatoperations. For example, thc currcnt doctrine for armor and m ech an i~e dnfantry cornpmiicscross-attaches support assets between the battalions. Contrary to thc apparcnt ease, the shiftingof assets is not an easy task. Thes e units as currently organized are not modules o r unitsdesigned by the army, hut are arranged by unit standard operating procedures within thebattalions. They also cxpcricnce equipm ent and personncl .\hortages as they attempt to put thcsetcams together. Av iatim units also esrahlish contact tcams to go with thc aircraft for shortduration operations away from the parent units. Thes e task-organized groups suffer fromequipment and personnel sho rtages as they take on m issions the authorization docum ents do notrecognize and do not fully resource.

Currently thc demands and organizations of sustainm cr~t upport can bc a deterrent to

task organizing, especially for aviation assets. Modularity and flexible force design arerequirements today because they fisilitate sustainm ent, comba t, and force projcction opcmtionsnow and into the future.


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CHAPTER 3RESEARCH DESIGN

Th e research m ethod used for this study was a combat simulation experiment using theJanus model. version 6, and personal interviews with senior combat arms officers. Thesimulation experiment consisted of four phases: Phase I--evaluation of synergistic effects andscenario refinement; Phase IT--establishment of baseline; Phase TIL-evaluation of the hypotheticalcompany te am; and Phase 1V--personal interviews. The purpose of the first three phases was lodetermine iapabilities and limitations ol'th e hypothetical organization measured against anestablished standard baseline. This would provide the analytical data for a comparison t odetermine capa bilities and limitations of the new organization. Th e purpose of a11 four phascswas the development of data and an evaluation of the new organization for the overall researchinto the combat effectiveness of the hypothelical com pany team .

Th e focus of this study is on the combat capab ility of the proposed organ ization using theanalytical measu res of lethality, survivability, sustainability, dectectability and subjectivemeasures of personal opinion. Th e current and hypothetical organizations will be evaluated withregard to these factors and how they improve or reduce comba t effectiveness of the unit. Theanalytical analysis is focused on the combat capabilities of the hypothetical com pany team and ifthese capabilities will change the battlefield dynam ics. The subjective analysis is focused on thepersonal opinions of senior leaders.


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&&IThe h n u s combat simulation modcl is a six-sided, closed. stochastic model. Stochastic

refers to the way the modcl determines the outcom e of certain events. In a stochastic model theoutcorne'of an event is determincd from draw ing random numbers against a probability of anevent's occurrence. o r simply by applying the laws of probability or chance. The model requiresat least two graphic monitors for a Red force and a Blue force. Red and Blue forces will~ app earon opposite screens only when delected by the opposing force. The m odel can be run in twomodes interactive and systemic mode. In the interactive mode, players can react to and redirectcertain actions for the com bat forces. Th e systemic mode player routes are input in the .initialization phase, and there is no human interaction. Th is experiment was conducted in theinteractive mode using preprograinmed movem ents.

Terrain-The geographic terrain for this scenario is Kansas and Missouri. This specific battle is

conducted northwest of Leavenwoflh Kansas. Th e terrain in this area favors mobile warfare byheavy forces, but the region is heavily cross-compartme nted with low hills and num erousstreams. There are few major terrain features in the area which permits generally good long-range observation. The heavy cross-compartmentali7;ltion in some areas can rcstrict observation.Concealmen t in the area is good and creek o r stream valleys provided excellent cove r throughoutthe area. Weather is not a factor.

Scenar io S~ ec i f ic sStart time: 0500Visibility:. unlimited


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Ceiling: clearwinds: calm

Scenario-For the experiment a "Centralia" scenario was used because it presented g enerally rollingte'rrain and because there w as a wealth of available information to build the scenario. Thefictitious nation of Centralia consists of the geographic area of Kansas. Th e country of Nebr ask ihas pursed a military buildup and appears likely to go on the offensive for a limited timc. Th cpurpose of their operation is to dcstroy Kansas City, the Cenrrailian capital, and e liminate enem yforces in an attempt to restore old borders that are favorable to them. Ther efore the enem y forcesare attacking from north to south toward K ansas City and through the Leavenworth, K ansasavenue of advance.

ForcesRed Forces

Th e Red Forc es consist of a motorized rifle battalion (B MP ) reinforced with a tankcom pany. Th e Red Forces possess the T8 0 tank and the BMP2. Th e motorized rifle battalion isattacking from north to south to defeat enemy forces in the vicinity of Leave nworth, Kansas.Listed below are the major items of equipment for the:

. .Motorized Rifle Battalion (+)Ecluioment/Item QuantityT80 10BM P 2 422S6 1SA13 4


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Blue ForcesEngineer Effort

, The scenario is a defense. Therefore engineer assets and effort were incorporated intothe scenario and used. The se assets and their execution were constant throughout theexperimen t. Listed below are the Engineer items and effort allocated:

Eaui~ment/Item OuantitvWire Obslacle 5Road craters 4Minefields 8Fighting Positions all

Current Company TeamTh e current Blue force compa ny team consists of armor and mechanized forces. They

possess the M IA 2 tank and the M 2 Bradley infintry fighting vehicle. Th e compan y team will bedefending in the south to defeat the attacking enemy forces in engagemen t area TIGER . Listed

., below are the major item s of equipment:

Epuipmcnt/ltem OuantityM IA 2 10M2 BlFV ' 4BSFV 2Stinger tm 2FIST ISmk gcn 3COLT 1GSK 1


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Hypothetical Company TeamThe hypothetical Blue force company team consists of armor, m echanized, and aviation

forces. They posscss the M IA 2 tank, M 2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the AH64Apache. The comp any team will be defending in the South to defeat the attacking enemy fo rccsin engagement area TIGE R. Listed bclow are the major items of equipment:

M I A 2M2 BIFVAH64BSFV. Stinger tmFISTSmk genC O L TGSR

Analvtical Ph asesPhase 1 is an evaluation of the synergistic effects of artillery, smoke, and hold fires and

the development of the standard scenario. Th is phase supported the tactical planning andestablished the comba t conditions. fighting positions, and engineer operations to minimize the

. variables that could insert bias to the data. Results from this phase will provide a limitedassessment of capabilities and limitations of the hypothetical comp+ ny team in a multivariablecombat environm ent. It also will establish the baseline scenario to objectively evaluate thecombat potential of the organization.

Phase I1 is to establish the baseline. The purpo se of this phase is to establish the baselineperformance standard fo r the current company team using the Janus combat simulation m odel.This phase consisted of fighting the current company team within the establishcd Janus scenario


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and obtaining the m easures of performance in regard to lethality, survivability, sustainability, anddetectability. Th es e results will then be used as the baseline to com pare the results of phase Ill.

Phase In is to evaluate the hypothetical company . The purpose of phase 111 is to obtainresults on the per forn ~an ce f the hypotheticai comp any team using the Janus combat simulationmodel. Th is phase will consist of fighting the hypothetical com pany team within the establishedscenario and obtain ing the measures of performan ce in regard to lethality, survivability,sustainability, and detectability. Thes e results will then be compared to the results of phase 11todetermine w ithin 95 percent confidence if the orgenization is as effective as the current com panyteam.

Phase IV consists of seven interviews with senior combet'command veterans whoaverage twenty-six years of experience across three combat arm s branches. Th e interviews. .focused on the m ilitary judgments of these officers as the hypothetical com pany team's"potential" t o provide improved combat performance ove r the current company team. Th e

. .results of the interviews will be used to address issues that analytics alone may not and to furtherelaborate on the organization's ability to enhance the a n of war..

Definitions of MeasureDetectabilitv. Blue Forces were analyzed for detectabiltiy using primary and secondary

senso r detection's of enemy forces. Detectability w as defined as follows:iktcctab ility = B lu e sensor detection's of Red forces

Lethalitv. Blue forces were analyzed for lethality against major enemy w eaponssystems. Lethality was defined as follows:

Lethality = R ed Losses


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The ;~r:alysis is conduc ted nr the 0.5 percent confidence interval. Therefore the fo l l o ~ in :1uo hypoth rscs were Iesrcd wirh the significan ce leve l o f :1=.05:I. h,,: pi= ill. Tlicrc 1s no \ ignifican t diffcrencc h ctwezn the groups.2. h : u 1 : Tlierc is ;I significant difference between the groups.


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A S S U ~ D ~ ~ O ~ Snd LimitationsThe following assumptions were made concerning the data collection methodology.1 . The Janus combat sim ulation model is a reasonably valid simulation of combat.2. Sam ple data from the Janus model produces "Normal" sample data following the laws

of probability and chance.3. The variance of the current company team and the hypothetical company team may .

not be equal (pl#P I ) .This study will conc lude with find ings and an assessment to address how this change in

the company team impacts combat capabilities. It will attempt to address the impact ofcompressing greater firepower and maneuver into smaller combined arms units and if the chang eproduces positive effects on the battlefield. Th e analysis of this fundamental chan ge is done toexperiment with battlefield requirements and organizational capabilities to determine if thischange could be the foundation to support the Army of the Twenty-First Century and beyond.


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CHAPTER 4ANALYSIS

. - Th is chapter records and discusses the results of the research done for this project. Itanalyzes the significance of thcse results as they pertain to the basic research qu estion.

Evaluation of Synergistic EffectdScenario Refinement . 'The m odeling evaluation of this organization is first preceded by review ing and

exam ining the docume ntation of miss'ions, capabilities, and limitations of both th e hypotheticaland current company teams. Th e work in this phase had two purposes: to support the technicalaspects of the modeling and to support the initial research of the organizations: Th e two missionstatements are as follows:

Mission Statement for Hvnothetical Comp anv Team . The company team is a flexiblemultipurpose force that is tmk organized f or a specific mission capab le of maneuvering toachieve a position of advantage and to concentrate superior comb at power to destroy, capture orrepel the enemy.

Mission Statement Current Comoanv T e r n . The company ream is task %organized for a specific m ission to clos e with the enemy by tire and m aneuver in order todestroy or cap ture him, or repel his assault by fire.'.

The hypothetical unit's mission statement attempts to incorporate m ore flexibility in thecapability to task organize as well as flexibility in the actual com bat m aneuvering and agility


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against the enemy. The current company team's mission statement incorporates flexibility by theprocesses of task o rganizing, but following that a rigidity is set by the limits on agility an d'flexibility within the capabilities of the assets. Th e current team statemen t reads as if the unit isa concrete block laying a foundation but in itself is not flexible. The h ypothetical compan y

, team's mission reads lik e the unit is a powerpoint o bject that in itself is lixed but the attributescan be enhanced and adjusted to fine-tune the picture.

Another valuable part of the research evaluated the capabilities and limitation. Theyreveal a great deal about the organizations and the changes that occur. Ta ble I lists thecapabilities and limitations of both company teams for comparison. By com paring the

Table 1. Caoabilities and LimitationsCanabilities

High degree of firepowerShock effectDestroy enemy armorSeize terrainDestroy mounted/DismountedInfantryCross country mobilityConduct continuous operations

High degree of firepowerShock effectDestroy enemy armorSeize terrainDestroy mountediDismounted "InhntryCross country mobilityOperate on a three dimensionalbattlefield

LimitationsCurrent Mvnothetical

Obstacles Endurancesustainment sustainmentOperations in builtup areas WeatherLimited Visibility


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two organizations' capabilities and limitations, clearly the hypothetical compa ny team furtherexpand the application of combined arm s operations with aviation to company level. It ;ortraysthe application of the principles of minimizing vulnerabilities and of exploiting capabilities. Th equestion remains, What are the adversc costs with doing this? Most notable within thecomparison is the possible tradeoff between ag ility and the capahility LO operate in adverseweather. Agility is a very valuable comm odity on the modem battlefield but so is assurance incapability. Th e issue of agility is itself complex and dynam ic. A comm ande r can gain agility inthree possible ways: anticipating the enemy's actions, movemcnt of assets, and ability to reacL2Th e new structure provides the comm ande r with improved agility in the speed of the AH 61 andimproved situational awareness with a new three-dimensional view of his battlespace. Th ehypothetical com pany team also provides the comm ander the ability to achieve the effects of ,maneuver while stationary or in a defensive scenario. Th e capability of the helicopter within thecompany team integrates movement and positioning of fires simultaneously throughout theoperation. Th e maneuverability and agility of the aircraft could generate a constantly changin gproblem for an enemy. Th e problems of variety and temp o may cause the enemy to select aninappropriate or ineffective response. Th is variable asymetical problem eventually could causethe enemy to fail or be defeated. All organizational stnlctures and task orglinizing should allowthe comm ander to achieve a positional advantage in time and spac e i n order to put the enemy at adisadvantage. This disadvantage is built into the plan or could be generated directly from thebattlefield fog of war which is an unpredict;ihle element. ~ h / snpredictable opportunity ifgenerated from the new organ ization could ge nerate an improved effectiveness or a requirementfor the company team to have the flexibility and agility to seize opportunities as they presentthemselves.


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Comparing the dimensions of the two units' battlespace provides tremendous evidence ofthe changes that take place. The comparison is listed in table 2.

Table 2. Battlesvace Co m~ ari so n

14 weapons systems24 Dismounts900meter front900 m eter depth48 kmph max speed.2 dimensional

I I weapons systems18 Dismounts700 m eter front1,000-5000 eter depth74 kmph max speed3 dimensional

This comparison show s the real changes that take place in the battlespace or thecompany. Th is comparison only considers the deployment of the weapons systems at standarddoctrinal dispersion distances and does not include other company assets. ,The difference indepth is very significant and could be more. This increase in battlespace is as much as five timesfor the hypothetical company team. Another remarkable difference is the change in themaximum speed for the fastest weapons platform from 48 kilometers per hour to 74 kilometersper hour: Th is could present the company com mander with a significant capability to flex assetsas the battle continues. Th es e are all tremendous changes in capability but the expansion in the Iof company hattlespace to three dimensions is tremendous. Toda y,ulthou gh the com panycomm ander is responsible for and commands the battlespace above, his limited assets andcapability to exploit the area make it an untapped resource at the company level. Army aviationassets today infrequently are asked to participate in the close fight and d o little to enha nce thecompany commander's ability to find and track the enemy. Thi s initial numerical comparisonagain reflects the tremendous potential of expanding com bined operations fu nhe r at the compa nylevel.


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A con ~pa riso n f combat power documents the potential firepower of the company teamsverses the enem y's. Listed in table 3 is the combat power analysis of the three organizations.

Table 3. Combat Power AnalvsisMRB (+) Current C o m ~ a n v eam Iivpothetical Com janv Team

MRB (BMP2) .70 l 0 M l ,2 05 17 5 M I ' 10259TankCo(T80) .26 4 M2 ,06896 3 M2 .05 1723 AH64 ,35125Total .86 ,27413 SO556

In this comparison is a portrayal of the increased firepower of the hypothetical compan yteam verses the current company team. It also provides a representation of the enem y's potentialfirepower for this modeling. The results here show the hypothetical company possessesimproved firepower by ,2314. This mathematical com parison demonstrates the potcntialfirepower harnessed by expanding com bined operations at the company level..Firepower and protection ena ble effcctive maneuver. The comparison show s thehypothetical company team possesses considerable firepower and therefore significantdestructive capabilities along with an ability to maneuver. Th e variety of available firepowerprovides the com mand er the ability to direct a variety of fires to m ass their effects to achie vecertain results. Th e integration of leap-ahead technologies and the con cept of shared firing datacreates the opportunity to achieve even more synergistic effects from these fires. Th e twoorganizations' capabilities and limitations clearly show the potential for expansion by thecontinued expansion of the combined arm's philosophy t o the company level with aviation.

Sustainment requirements are also a primary consideration for any organization.Therefore a comparison of sustainment rcquiiements was done to determine the differen& in the


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sustainment requirements for the two organizations. Table 4 lists a sustainment comparison for aone-day defensive operation and o ne hour of fuel consumption.

Table 4. Sustainment

120mm 100 rds 120mm 50 rdsTow ' . 36 rds Tow 27 rds25 mm 320 rds 25 mm 240 rdsFuel 552 gal Hellfire 60 rdsFuel 661 gal

In this comparison the most notable conclusion derived from the data is the lack of anysubstantial difference in the overall quantity of sustainment required. What this sho ws is asustainment requirement that is about the same. It is also intuitively obvio us that the locationsfor these operations maybe different with the addition of the-airc raft and forward-arming andrefueling requirements. Th is analysis revealed the fact that for this company-level operation theaircraft sustainment requirements should not exceed the onboa rd capabilities of the weaponssystems reguardless of type due to the expected duration of the operation. A sustainm ent issuethat must be addressed is aircraft maintenance. Aircraft maintenance operations is a major issueto consider due to the fact that aircraft, especially rotary-wing aircraft. are maintenan ce intensive.

,

Thes e aircraft receive support for the operation through a maintenance contact team. Anyaircraft requiring more maintenanc e capability than a maintenance contact team can providereceives maintenance back with the Aviation brigade and under the command a nd control of the .parent unit. A replacement aircraft would be assigned to the mission. For this experiment allaircraft were available and were operationally ready. Th e force structure required t o providethree operationally ready aircraft is beyond the scope of this study and will require further


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research. Another exp andin g sustainment factor to evaluate in later studies is the cost associatedwith the differing round types used and possible econom ies in comm and selected delivery ofmunitions. This issue might provide operational cost savings as well as combat benefits.Overall, the analysis show s that the sustainm ent requirement is not significantly different fromcurrent requirements and should he within the capabilities of the unit.

Th is initial analysis fiicilitated the development of the operations order, p ositioning ofthe weapons systems, sustainment requirements, and combat potential of the new organization. Italso provided a su bstantial opportunity to assess basic capabilities and limitations of theorganization. Results to this point seem to provide support already for the portrayal o f ahypothetical compan y team that could be more lethal, mobile, and sustainable in this comb atoperation than the current com pany team organization.

Phase I operations of refining the scenario and variables for the Janus database sudportedthe technical aspects of the simulation experiment and the capabilities research. T o reduce the .number of variables and cons ider their effects Janus, runs of four varying operational condition swere done on both the current organization and the hypothetical organization. The limitedoperational conditions for the runs consisted of: no holdfire; holdfire; smoke and holdfire; andartillery, smoke, and holdfire. Table 5 display s the data for these phase I runs.Th e results of this phase were m ost insightful. Th e most striking difference consistent in bothorganizations was the impact of holding fires. In both organizations the battle was lost when'theunit was allowed to engage at will. Since the effects were catastrophic and both units lost the

I '

fight with very little enemy losses, a weapons' hold condition was incorpo rated into the scenario.Th e next resul! was the lack of significant effects from indirect fires at the compan y

level. Th is result is at least intuitively due to m odeling limitations and the inherent inability tomodel humhn response. Due to its lack of significant effects in this battle, it was determined that.


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injecting artillery fires as a variable in this battle inserted unnecessary bias. heref fore th eartillery and its effects were not included as part of the m odeling.

Table 5. Phase I ResultsCurrent Hvnothetical

No HoldfireDurationFriendly lossesEnemy lossesHoldfireDuration

Friendly lossesEnemy losses

52 min 56 min14 1 I10 6

49 min 56 min.I 469 68

Smo ke and HoldfireDuration 45 minFriendly losses 5Enemy losses 69Artillery, Sm oke and HoldfireDuration 49 minFriendly losses 4Enemy losses 69

59 min0

68

55 min6

69

Another significant result was the impact of smoke on aviation operations. Th e smoke asportrayed in the model reduced the effectiveness of the aircraft to zero. Although i t can bereasoned that smo ke would imp act the ability to see, the capability of the pilot to maneu ver andeffectively use other targeting equipment within the model was caus e for bias. Therefore, theeffects of smo ke were not included as part of the mod eling.

This Janus modeling in phase one provided g reat insight into the capabilities andlimitations of both organizations as w ell as facilitating the establishment of unbiased scena rioconditions. With the model conditions established, the analytical tuns of phase 11 were begun. .


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.Establishment of BaselineTh e rcsults of the phase I1 analysis primarily established the baseline for comparin g the ,

hypothetical com pany te'am. It consisted of ten Janus model runs for the current com pany teamorganization fighting a defensive fight against a reinforced motorized rifle battalion and thcstatistical analysis of thc data obtained. Table 6 contains the data from this phase.

Th e data itself revealed capabilities and possible limitations of the current organization.~ h e k e s u l t show the current compan y team ob tains a better ratio in rounds per kill as well as a

. ,better round per minute ratio than the ~ e dnemy forces. Th e results also show enemy forceshave a significant advantage in their ability to detect with sensors the US Force. Thes e mcasureswill provide a noticeable contrast to com pare the hypothetical com pany team . Th e next result isthat ;he data show s a significant lack in capability at the company level to find and track theenemy. With both primary and secondaty senso rs the enemy's capability in this tefrain to find

, . . . , . . . .' and track Blue forces significantly exceed the Blue force's capa bility. Th e dispersion of this

detection data is also significant to note.he current company team has a significant advantage over the enem y in rounds per kill

' ' and rounds'fired per minute. Friendly forces achieve one enemy kill for every 2.7 rounds fired.,I n contrast the encrny obtains one kill for every 26.3 rounds fired. This shows the tremendousadvantage held by the current company team , but also reveals there is not a great deal of room forimprovem cnt. In the measure of rounds per minute the current company team fired at an averagerate of 8.98 rounds per minute against an enemy w ho was firing at an average rate of 5.17 roundsper minute. Th is comparison sho ws that the current company team has %significant advantageover the enemy in'rounds per kill a d ounds f ired per minute.


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Table 6.Current C o ~ n ~ a n ve a


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The analysis of the data als o reveals a significant capability limitation of the curren tcompany team to obtain a senso r detection advantage ove r the enemy . Primary se nsor detectionsby the company team w as a meager average of 1.4,while enemy forces possessed a 6.7 averagenumber of detections by primary sensors. The limitation do es not chang e considerably withsecondary sensors. Data for the secondary sensors show the enemy still holds a 2.2-to- Iadvantage. Overall, the enemy po ssesses a 2.23-to-1 advan tage in number of detections that ismitigated so mewha t by the fact enemy red forccs have mo re weapons p latforms in this fight.This fact does not change the disadvantage the currcnt company team fac es. The data reveals thecurrent company team has a significant capability limitation in obtaining a sensor detectionadvantage over the enemy.

Results of this analysis also markedly sho w there is a tremendou s lack of variance in themea sures of both friendly and enemy acquisition r'mge. Th is result could be a product ofmodeling, but could also be a product of an acquisition system that pursues range adva ntages tothe possible com prom ise of other measures. In this analysis Blue force has a ,122 average rangeadvantage over the enemy force.

Phase I1 provided two primary aspects to this analysis. First and primarily i t establishedthe baselin e data to support the phase 111 com pariso n. Seco nd i t provided insight and data todocu men t the capabilities and limitations of the current company team with this scenario. Th emeasures established in this phase provide the baseline to compare and statistically analyze thehypothetical compan y team ag ainst in phase Ill.


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Phase 111Evaluation of Hypothetical Com pany

Th is analysis establishes the capabilities and limitations of the hypothetical comp anyteam and documents the,coh pariso n between the current company team baseline data and thehypothetical compa ny team data. Th e final outcome of the simulation experiment of theis hypothetical com phny team was a "battlefield victory." Table 7 details the dat a from the tenlan us runs. The data shows a significant advantage ove r the enemy in rounds per kill and roundsfired per minute. Th e hypothetical com pany achieves one enemy kill for every 2.7 friendlyrounds fired. Enemy red forces in contrast achieve one kill for every thirty rounds fired. Th is isa significant advantage ove r the enemy fo rce. Th e hypothetical compaqy also achie ves anadvantage ove r the enemy in the me asure of average rounds per m inute of 8.43 against an enemywho achieves a 5.72 average round per minute rate. This comparison sh ows that the hypotheticalcompan y team possesses a significant advantage over the enemy force in this defensive sce nario.

Further review reveals that the hipothetical company team also possesses a slightadvantage ove r the enemy force in capability to detect enemy forces with primary sen sors. Th e. ,organization specifically achieves a 1.5-to 1.0advantage in sensor detections by primary sensors;howeve r, this quickly fades as'the enemy obtains a 2 to 1 advantage with secondary sensors.Overall, the enemy obtains a 1.71 to 1 advantage over the hypothetical compan y team w hen bothprimary and second ary sensor detections are totaled. This comparison shows that thisorganization possesses a slight advantage with primary senso rs over the enemy that mightcontribute to the success they achieve in the engagements.

Th e results of the detailed statistical analysis are derived from the Janus data. Th e dataincludes fight duration, Blue hits, Red hits, Blue ammo consum ption, Red am mo consum ption,Blue killed, Red killed, Blue Secondary sens or detections, Red second ary senso r detections and,

37


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Table 7. Hvvothetical Team

I IHYPO 99 1 I I Friend Enemy i Friend DetI . Avej Dura- I Blue Rds1RedRds Red ' Blue Rrnary 1 Seondary Enemy 1 e Rangeed ~ i t s l Fired Fired Killed 1 Killed Detec-ion , - Hits I i I : tions ! tions IDetections i Second i Friend Enemy

172.76711542.989i 0.019' 0.1382 s 1 - 3 3 ! 278.544 67.378 2941.600419.122 4.889 2.1781 33.389 lS SZ --..1972-- 16.6897 8.20841 54.237 20.472 2.211 1.476 5.7781 10.560 11.144- 9.281] T ~ ~CV 1 5.4668 10.9011 11.4642 29.381 16.339; 3.300 .-71368 15.40y. 42.5:;; -- 0.854;-5.9101.. -.-- . 5.199 12.761-79 .I 3 .5 .EDIAN : 221 151.5 38 - - - 252 2.69: 2.795MODE 21 ; 1761 280 107 69' 3 32! 32 "'k17 300 #N/A 2.49


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average engagement ranges Blue and Red. The data from the two organizations is then comparedto each oth er using the small-sample I-test using unknown an d unequal variances. Th is t-test isused to compare the interval scale of the current company team data and the hypotheticalcompany team data. Th e size of difference between the two data measurements is an importantconsideration to determine if the two organizations perform equally or with so me degre e ofdisparity. Th e size of the differen ce and if it provid es improv emen t or loss of capab ility iscritically significant to the analysis and conclusions. As the two hy potheses are tested for eachdata measure with a significance level of a =.05, zero must fall between the range indicated inthe table 8, columns CI+ and CI:. If zero is not between this range, the null hypothesis isrejected, and there is a statistically significant difference between the current company team andthe hypothetical com pany team. If zero is within the interval, the n"ll hypo thesis is not rejectedand there is no statistically significa nt difference be!ween the current comp any team an d thehypothetical company team. Table 8 shows zero falls within the confidence interval ranges forall measures but four. They are Blue hits, Sensor detections Blue primary, Sensor detections Red. .primary and average engagement range of Red force. Th is analysis indicates that there is not astatistically significant difference between the two o rganiza tion's performances in thisexperimcnt, except in four of the measures. The possible reason for this is the addition of attackhelicop ter capab ilities to the com pany team. When it is consid ered that the hypotheticalcompany team actually consists of three fewer weapons system platforms than the currentcompany team, the results are even m ore significant.

The f our data measures that are statistically different are B lue Hits, Friendly PriniaryDetections, Enemy Primary Detection and Average Range Enem y. Th e reasons for thesedifferences must be further evaluated to determine w hether it is a favorable difference o r anegative difference to the orgnniwtio n.


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Blue hits data me asure has two possible reasons for the statistical difference. First, therea i e fewer weapons systems firing through the engagement. This could account for all if not someof the difference. But another obviou s result contained in the data is a drop in the variance as

i indicated in the data table by smaller sample standard deviatio ns and a smaller coefficient ofvariation. Perhaps. the organization has improved its performance and that has caused a drop inthe number of Blue hits.3

The m easure of friendly primary detec tion's w as also outside the statistical parametersestablished and the hypo thesis was rejected. A closer evaluation of the data showsthat the performance of the hypothetical unit has improved ove r the current organization in thismeasure. Th e hypothctical company team, despite its larger standard deviation exhibits in themeasure of detections less deviation relative to its m ean than doe s the measure of d etections forthe current com pan y team relative to its mean. It can therefore be concluded that thehypothetical company team has more consistent and improved performance than the currentcompany team organization.

Enemy primary detection's statistical analysis also rejects the null hypothesis. Th isindicates that this me asure also has a statistically significant difference betwcen the twoorganizations. The total Senso r detection's Red Primary against the hypothctical com panyincreases to 24.8 from 6.70. It can therefore be concluded that the add ition of the helicopters

, .. caused this increase. Howev er even though the enemy receives beneficial effects the measure. , , . ..also experiences a larger standard deviation as well as an incre aie in the deviation relative to the. .mean. ~ he re fo re 'i t ould be concluded that the hypothetical com pany benefits more from theaddition of the aircraft than the enemy d erives from their addition. It could al so be argued thatthe enemy is limited in its ability to effectively and consistently detect the targets with their. . . . . ? . .. . ,

..prit& sensors. Th e results are provided in table 8.


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Table 8. T-Test ResultsI II df I'Is 7xr0 within1 Rejecti tv I C1+ CI- iI I I 1 CI range 1 m l= m2

Fight.... uration 115.1860 . 2 . 1 3 a 0 . 0 1 2- - -3.012- ..... ' YES NO

....I . -.Enemy PrimaryDetections 1 9.5036 2 . 2 6 i l 110.883 1 -25.3171Friendly ISecondary 2.2010 1 16.765 ! -37.565

. Detections I.. .. iDctections II2.1604 1 26.1 15 : -32.915

i-.- .A,-.ivc RangeFriend I 14,4405 1 2.1448 1.262 1 -0.1 10IAve Range

Enemy 2.2622 -0.032 1 -0.536

NO / YESYES I NO--ES ! NO... , . . . . .YES I NO.YES L NO

. ..-- YESNO

YES

YES. . . . . . .YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO-- .-- .YES

Average range enemy statistical analysis revealed a rejection of the null hypothesis. Thisindicates another statistical difference between the two organizations for this measure. Furtheranalysis indicates that the enemies average engagement range increases fr6m 2.62 to 2.906 or,286. This is a result of the increase in dispersion and standoff range of the aircraft or some ofthe targets. Obviously increased enemy engaiement range is a possible benefit as well as adetriment because prob~bility f hits can decrease with range. This fact is solidified somewhat


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by the Blue loss data remaining almost unchanged. Further analysis shows another gain for thehypothetical comp any team that of an increase in standard deviation. The enem y engagementrange measure experiences an increase in deviation relative to its mean. It therefore can beconcluded that the enemy is enga ging at a longer range and m ust do so across a more variedtarget distance. Th is dispersion is a benefit to the hypothetical compan y team and leads to aconclusion that the rejection of the null hypothesis for rhis measure is because the organization isexperiencing a significant gain in capability.

Phase IVPersonal Interviews

Ther e are certain things simulation and analytics canno t truly mzasure. There fore thepurpose of the phase IV research is to bring into corkideration the subjective opinions of sevensenior comma nders with an average of twenty-six years of experience. The participants jn thisphase consisted of one Lieutenant General, five Colonels and on e Lieutenant Colonel. Theirnames are listed in the bibliography. Thcir experience spans three comba t arms branches withthree in the armo r branch, two in the infantry branch and tw o in the aviation branch. Five of theparticipants have cavalry experience. All the participants have held command at the battalionlevel and five have held comm and of a brigade. One participant com manded a division. Thre eof the participants have comm anded in combat. The comm ents generally fell into severaloverarching categories: comm and and control; training; leadership; organizational capabilities

, .and personal willingness to organize and fight a unit like rhis. Thes e opinion s bring out thesubjective art of war and how these experienced comb at leaders feel this hypothetical compa ny .team can enhance and stress the commander's tactical operation. '

Comm and and control is the first survey category and encom passes the control functions. . ..of: airspace managemen t, maneuver control, and fire control. The majority of these leaders

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believe that the combat effe cts of this hypothetical compan y team would be significant. T oachieve these effects considerable staff planning and coordination requirements are placed on thecommand and control The respondents go on to highlight the requirements fordetailed planning and coordination that m ust be done by a battalion or brigade staff on behalf ofany company organization due to the lack of a staff planning capability within acompany.Airspace coordinntion issues alone are cited by these officers as frequent reasons why today theArmy d oes not further task organ ize attack helicopters lower than battalion. Th e aircraft cantravel distances and speed s that requires maneuver airspace to support the operation and thatairspace can not be solcly defined by company groun d maneuver graphics. Thes e issues ofairspace managem ent, maneuver control measures and fire control measures for this hypotheticalcompany team are all melding together in the geographic areas that today is company, battalionand brigade battlespace. Th is melding is exactly what makes the coordination so dem andin g forthe leaders and what m akes the organization so effective against the enemy.

The second overarching category in the survey results involves training. Thes e formercombat co mm anders highlighted that training is critical to this organization because of the twofundamental principles the organization builds upon, combined arms and task organization.

'Co mb ined arms operations, these officers point out, requires swift coordinated actions and full. knowledge and understanding of all the weapons systems. Th is understanding they say is a. . product of training. They g o on to say today's army does not effectively train organizations for

combined ar ms operations. Further they bclieve the training requirements for this type of task-organized force requires aconsistent frequency and support with resourccs that then produces thedesired coordinated battlefield effects. They em phasized their concerns that close battle usingvarying weapons systems and kapabilities requires combined a rms training as a unit. Toda y, theysay, we are frequently unab le to maintain an y consistent habitual relationships among dive rse


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units as operational mission requirements require new task organizations to meet specific'needs.The flexibility to task organize forces and the un it's ability to produce the desired combat effe ctsis a direct product of the training they receive. It is the training foundation that allowsmultifunctional capabilities of weapons platform s to be task-organized, maneuvered andeventually exploited to achieve decisive effects on the enem y. Thes e leaders believe that thishypothetical com pany team must conduct this combined arm s training together in order tosupport the development of the skills, knowledge, and proficiency to achieve success.

The third overarching category in the survey results involves leadership. Th e leaders ofthis organization, thesc former comma nders believe, must be extremely know ledgeable on thecapabilities and have experience w ith the leadership considerations fo r employment all assetsassigned t o them. Today, a few note, there is a grcat reluctance in the Army to let captain s and

- ' lieutenants make decisions. h his point gains m ore clarity as most of these officers said they feelcurrently captains and licutcnants would have difficulty if not be incapable of m anaging this typeof combined arm s organization. They highlighted the diverse complexities of fighting combinedarms organizations and synchronizing fires, sustainment, maintenance, and maneuver to supp ort '

the case that the company co mm ander may need more experience and possibly rank. To bringout som e of the divergent responsibilities for the leadership they describe the current m echanizedinfantry platoon leader. Here leadership responsibilities serve to cause the platoon leader tomaneuver the Bradley weapon s platform and a squad of solders dismounted simultaneously.This seam in responsibility makes it difficult to operate effectively within this organization bothtoday and in the future. This issue show s thc complexities of leadership within the compan yteam organization' and requires further study. Trained and exp erienced leaders are essentialwhatever the grade, on this point they were very strong. The elem ent of the third dim ension. . . .allows the compa ny com man der better ability to see and acquire targets but these leaders felt a .


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company co mm ander should not have a "deep battle." Th e focus for them was a compan y thathas one mission and on e purpose to support the overall operation. Many of these leaders hadlead small combined arm s units as captains. They described the difficulties and the issues ofdiversified weapons sysrcms but most agreed it gave them the capab ility to respond and covertheir areas of responsibility fully. Th e issue with young leaders is training and experience. Bothare, they feel, a requirement in greater measure to effectively opera te a combined an nsorganization on the modern baitlefield.

Organizational capability was the fourth overarching category in the survey. The rcsulrsof the survey outlined the opinion that this hypothetical co mpany team organizational strategyhad merit. Mo st felt it added flexibility and dram atically impr oved the ability to acquir e enem yforces. Th e majority of respondents agreed that it did enhance the company's ability to ,maneuver and supported the concept of force tailoring. The conse nsus was that the hypotheticalcompany tcam had about the sa me lethality, flexibility, and mobility as the current company tcambecause of the tradcoffs amo ng the three measures. It was also the combined op inion thattechnology could greatly enhance the ability of this unit to perform. Weather and su stainedoperations for the aircraft in comb at developed as a com mon point am ong the respondents forcurrent and future organizations. Short operations that go as planned present no problems, butissues of weather, crew endu rance, and daylnight operations alwa ys are factored into operationalanalysis and mission plann ing. Th e ability to sustain longer duration operations within thisorganization surfaced as a com mon concern regarding organizational capabilities. Thes e leadersagreed that sustainment requirements for this organization presented new and comp lexchallenges to the logistics system. Th is type of organization would need tailored support at theright time an d focused to the unit's operations on the whole.


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Personal preference was the fifth overarching category. All of these former combatcom man ders were asked if they would consider organ izing and fighting a unit like thehypothetical com pany team and all but two said they would. 'T he responses focused oncapabilities-based organizational strategy and mission requiremen ts. Most felt that thisorganization clearly possessed some unique capabilities that would be advantageous in certain ,

co m ba t operations. The organizational rcquircments and capabilities should always be aconsideration in tactical operations and are the m ain reason task organization of forces andcombined arms operations developed. Th e majority of these leadcrs and com bat veterans believethis organization's capability to bring enhanced com bined arm s capability into future combatoperations reshapes the art of warfare at the compan y team level.

This analysis has captured the personal feelings of some of the Army's senior combat' leaders with regard to capabilities, limitations, and the intangibles of com bat operations. Th e

results cover a wide rang e of issues and specific concerns, but in total, none elim inate the. organization as a p ossible organizational solution to a specific tactical problem.

Th is analyticai coinparison between a current company team an d a hypothetical compan yteam indicates that the hypothetical comp any team e xperiences a reduction in the coefficient ofvariation i n all measures. Th is indicates !hat for all the measu res the new organ ization has lessdeviation relative to their means. That is the performance of the organization is more consisten t,Consistent performance is perhaps surprising to consider in a comba t organization. Th e analysis

. .supports the conclusions that for all measures the hypothetical company team's performa nce isequal to o r bcttcr than the &rent company team organizatiori i" a defens e.

Th e analysis work established capabilities and limitations, documented the'rcsu lts of theJ am s computer simulation experiment. and developed survey data. The final outcome of the. . ., . :.. .. .simulation was a "battlefield victory" or a statistical victory. Th e final outcom e of the survey


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was favorable majority support from several com bat comm and veterans. Th e analyticalcomparison show s the hypothetical company team possesses a fighting strength at least equal toor better than the current company team organization. Th e results of the personal interviewsshows that the majority of respondents felt i t was better than the current company team. Th eresearch sho ws that a hypothetical company team that incorporates armor, mechanized infantry,and aviation generates more lethality, m obility, and flexibility.

'US.rmy Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized lnfantrv Battalion Task Force(Washington, DC: Governm ent Printing Office. 27 Sep 1988). 1-3.2 ~ . ~ .mmy Field Manual 71-1, Tank and Mechanized InfantwComvanv Team

(Washington, DC: Governm ent Printing Office, 22 Nov 1988), 1-8.'stephen Gould, Full House: The Sp re ad of Excellence From Plato To Darwin (NewYork: Harmony Books, 1996). 119.


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, C H A F E R 5CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

.. The o bjective of this study was to determine if a task-organized hypothetical com panyteam consisting of Armor, Mechanized Infantry, and Aviation would g enerate mo re lethality,mobility, and flexibility for combat operations. Th e methodology to answ er this question w as acom bat simulation experime nt using the Janus model and personal interview s. Th e researchmethodology provided the answers to the research questions and su p p o n ~ dhe experimentalanalysis extremely well. Th e results of the research show the hypothetical company teamconsisting of Armor, Mecha nized Infantry, and Aviation performed equ al to or better than thecurrent company team in both the simulation experiment and the personal interviews with seniorcom bat command veterans. Th e research shows that the hypothetical compan y team organizationcould gene rate more lethality, mobility, and flexibility fo r comba t operations and was m oreconsistent with its performance than the current company team organization.

The organizational changes within the hypothetical company team maintained theperforman ce levcl of the organization or improved the performance fo r some measures asdete 'mine d by this research. The results support the incorporation of attack aviation as anintegral part of a comp any team based on the mission requirements. Although this organization

is task organized for the situation. it does possess unique capabilities that provide the com ma nde rimprove d lethality, m obility, and flexibility to impo se his will upon the enemy.


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Does the organization enhance a comnanv's abilitv to maneuver and enga geenemv forces ?Th e proposed organization, the research indicates. does enhan ce a compan y's ability to

maneu ver and engag e enem y forces. Th e addition of the helicopter and its capabilitics within thecompan y team assembles varying and asymmetric threat. This type of asymmetric threat forcesthe enem y to attack an array of combat power deployed in depth across the battlcfield. Ma neuv erwarfare of this type cau ses a major problem for the enemy. It brings closer into balance the triadof firepower, protection and maneuv er at the company level. It generates a positional advan tagefor the company team by generating a multidimensional threat to the enem y. Th is varying thieatforces the enemy to make constant decisions and reactions to these variables. These dyn amic s allappear to have a positive influence on fire and m aneuver for the company team that supports theoverall objective of man euver warfare. Th is new m ultidimensional threat generates a position ofadvantage in time and space that supports the destruction of the enemy . Th e result is anenhanced and con sistent ability to maneuv er and engage enemy forces with fewer weapon ssystems engaged in the operation. The challenge will be enhancement of the mobility of the

a ,

organization using better comma nd and co ntrol systems to support situational awareness aridflexible control measures.

How canable is the oraanization in e neae im ene mv for-cThe hypothetical compa ny team provides a unique capability to engage enem y forces in a

three-dimensional and asymmetrical engagem ent. This lethal capability is com parab le in com bat'power to the current comp any team' organization but ch ange s the characteristics of theengagem ent significantly. It achievcs similar overall effects in lethality on the ene my as thecurrent organization, with the analytical results indicating a m ore consistent performance du ringthe various test cngagem ents. Th is finding of consistency in lethality a ppears to be a unique


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measure of effectiveness in this research. The rcseiarch says the hypothetical com pany team is aslethal as the current company team but it does not experience a s much variation in its lethaleffects. Simply stated the hypothetical com pany team killed the sam e number of enem y forces asthe current company team but did it more consistently. The re is no statistical difference in thelethality of the two units other than consistency in performance. Th is consistency i nperformance therefore supports the theory that the hypothetical compan y team is more capable inengaging ene my forces. Th is consistency measure of effectiveness brings into light a possiblenew tool to look at com bat performance and m easure it. Th is measure of consistent effectivenessalso change s the weight of "mass" as currently und,erstood, to something an alogous to a uraniumround. Th e consistency result changes the characteristics of mass making the new organ izationvery capable of acquiring encmy forces and m ore capable of achieving the expected results.

H ow c a ~ i l b ks the organization of acau irine enelnv forces?The research sh ows that the organization is more capable of detecting enem y forces with

senso rs and hum an'eye s than the current compan y team. Th e aircraft sensor and altitude

capabilities reduce som e of the effects of the terrain by creating a three-dimensional view of thebattlefield for both the com pany co mm ande r and the pilot. This ability to see the battlefieldprovides the comm ande r with important tactical information to support thc effective engagementof the enemy . Each wea pons platform provides an ability to see the enemy both electronicallyand with hum an ey es that sup port the creation of an ac curate and three-dimensional battlefieldview. This visibility sets the conditions to allow the comm ande r to shift combat power an d react

to the dynam

Documents

A New Company Team