A Macroregional Europe in the Making

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University USA, Neill Nugent, Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges and Honorary Professor, University of Salford, UK, and William Paterson OBE, University of Aston, UK.

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Carolyn BanMANAGEMENT AND CULTURE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMISSIONFrom Diversity to Unity?

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Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli (editors)RESEARCH DESIGN IN EUROPEAN STUDIESEstablishing Causality in Europeanization

Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern (editors)A ‘MACRO-REGIONAL’ EUROPE IN THE MAKINGTheoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence

Eli GatevaEUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

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A ‘Macro-regional’ Europe in the MakingTheoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence

Edited by

Stefan GänzleUniversity of Agder, Norway

Kristine KernLeibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, Germany, and University of Potsdam, Germany

Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern 2016Individual chapters © Respective authors 2016Foreword © Dirk Ahner 2016

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A ‘macro-regional’ Europe in the making : theoretical approaches and empirical evidence / [edited by] Stefan Gänzle, University of Agder, Norway [and] Kristine Kern, Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, Germany, and University of Potsdam, Germany. pages cm. — (Palgrave studies in European Union politics) Summary: “European Union (EU) macro-regional strategies, such as the ones composed for the Adriatic Ionian, Alpine, Baltic Sea and Danube regions, aim to improve transnational cooperation and coordination in a ‘territorially defined’ setting. These strategies propose an integrated framework for cooperation involving a wide range of EU member states, regional organisations, sub-national authorities, civil society organisations as well as non-EU partner countries. The contributors question whether macro-regional strategies are helpful instruments for improving actor-policy linkages at the European, member/partner countries, and sub-national levels, and whether the objective of social, economic and territorial cohesion can be fulfilled through these strategies”— Provided by publisher. ISBN 978–1–137–50971–0 (hardback) 1. Regionalism—European Union countries. 2. Regional planning—European Union countries. 3. Regionalism (International organization) I. Gänzle, Stefan, 1970– editor. II. Kern, Kristine, editor. JN34.5.M37 2015 341.242’2—dc23 2015018570

E-ISBN: 978–1–137–50972–7

Contents

List of Illustrations vii

Foreword ixDirk Ahner

Acknowledgements xvi

Notes on Contributors xviii

List of Abbreviations xxii

Part I Introduction 1

1 Macro-regions, ‘Macro-regionalization’ and Macro-regional Strategies in the European Union: Towards a New Form of European Governance? 3Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern

Part II Development of EU Macro-regional Strategies 23

2 From Subregionalism to Macro-regionalism in Europe and the European Union 25Martin Dangerfield

3 Macro-regions and the European Union: The Role of Cohesion Policy 47Irene McMaster and Arno van der Zwet

Part III Theorizing Macro-regionalization and Macro-regional Strategies in Europe 73

4 Exploring European Union Macro-regional Strategies through the Lens of Multilevel Governance 75Simona Piattoni

5 Macro-regional Strategies: Agents of Europeanization and Rescaling? 99Dominic Stead, Franziska Sielker and Tobias Chilla

vi Contents

Part IV Governance Architecture and Impact of Macro-regional Strategies in Europe 121

6 The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 123Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern

7 The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region 145Attila Ágh

8 The European Union Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region 169Battistina Cugusi and Andrea Stocchiero

9 The European Union Strategy for the Alpine Region 189Jörg Balsiger

10 A North Sea Macro-region? Partnerships, Networking and Macro-regional Dimensions 215Mike Danson

11 The Atlantic Arc: A Macro-region in the Making? 243Mark Wise

Index 269

vii

List of Illustrations

Figures

1.1 Overview of European macro-regions 7

6.1 Territorial coverage of the Baltic Sea macro-region 124

7.1 Territorial coverage of the Danube macro-region 146

8.1 Territorial coverage of the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region 171

9.1 Territorial coverage of the Alpine macro-region 190

10.1 Potential territorial coverage of the North Sea macro-region 218

11.1 Potential territorial coverage of the Atlantic Arc macro-region 244

11.2 Atlantic Arc Commission members (1995 and 2014) 254

11.3 Regions of the Atlantic Area (1997–2006 and 2007–2013) 256

Tables

1.1 Macro-regions: hybrids between territorial and functional regions 5

2.1 Subregional groupings in Europe 29

3.1 EUSBSR links to selected territorial cooperation programmes 56

3.2 The governance architecture of EU macro-regional strategies 64

5.1 Conceptualizations of Europeanization in social science studies 104

6.1 PAs and HAs of the EUSBSR (State: June 2015) 127

7.1 The Priority Areas of the EUSDR 154

viii List of Illustrations

8.1 EUSAIR Working Groups for the consultation phase 178

9.1 The proposed pillars of the EUSALP governance architecture 199

10.1 Comparison of priorities 233

11.1 State participation in Atlantic Area programmes: 1995–1999 and 2000–2006 (total number of projects in which countries participated, with number of times as project leader number shown in brackets) 259

11.2 Regional participation in Atlantic Area programmes: 1995–1999 and 2000–2006 (total number of projects in which regions participated, with number of times as project leader number shown in brackets) 260

11.3 Members of MERiFIC (Marine Energy in Far Peripheral and Island Communities) 264

ix

Foreword

It started with the macro-regional strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. I first learnt about it when the initiative was presented by a few Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in a meeting with the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Development. The underlying idea was simple and persuasive: the countries and regions around the Baltic Sea face a number of common problems and chal-lenges which they can best address together. There have already been attempts in the past to improve the connections between the Baltic Sea countries through multilateral information, communication and exchange, and a number of institutions had been created to stimulate, support and coordinate these processes. However, apart from a limited number of smaller projects, most of them had not led to major action on the ground. In the view of the MEPs involved in the initiative, the time was ripe for a new step – a ‘qualitative jump’ – in the coopera-tion of the countries around the Baltic Sea. With the exception of the Russian territories, the Baltic Sea was now surrounded by EU members. A decade after the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the integration and the development of the new Member States in the area had proceeded well and they all could gain from joining forces to overcome problems of common interest like fighting the pollution of the sea, strengthening maritime safety, improving infrastructure networks and promoting the economic development of the area as a whole.

Of course, there was the question of the Russian Baltic Sea regions. The view of the initiators was that Russia should be informed and asso-ciated through the existing institutional structures, in particular the so-called ‘Northern Dimension’, but that the strategy should be an ‘EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)’.

The main focus of the strategy should be on concrete, common (inte-grated, joint or coordinated) action on the ground in order to mobilise synergies between what was undertaken in terms of development in the different countries and regions, and to realise economies of scale. Indeed, the lack of common action was seen as the major shortcoming of earlier attempts at cooperation in the area.

This new cooperation was seen as one between Member States and/or regions around the Baltic Sea, not as an EU initiative to be proposed by the Commission and embedded in EU regulations. However, the

x Foreword

common strategy should be approved by all Member States of the EU, and the Commission should play the role of a secretariat for the prepa-ration of the strategy as well as for coordination, communication and reporting. Moreover, existing institutional structures at the regional level could be used to address specific questions of their competence. Apart from this new (supplementary) use of existing institutional struc-ture, no new institutions were seen necessary to implement the strategy.

Since the initiative was mainly based on intergovernmental coopera-tion, no new EU legislation was deemed necessary. However, there was a common understanding that the implementation of the strategy could well lead to the adoption of existing or the creation of new national legislation (e.g. in order to impose restrictions beyond EU standards to fight pollution of the sea).

There was also agreement among the initiators of this idea that no additional EU funds were required to develop and implement the strat-egy. The challenge was much more that of a better, more efficient use of existing funds from EU and national, regional or local sources, through better coordination in the framework of a macro-regional development strategy to be agreed commonly for the whole area.

These initial reflections led to the principle of the ‘three No’s’ (no new institutional structure, no new EU legislation and no new EU funds) which was later on transferred to the other macro-regional strategies.

The MEPs tested these ideas at an early stage with the services of the Commission in order to examine some technical aspects. Of course, the idea of using the existing funds and institutional structures more effi-ciently to achieve better results was tempting for us, not only in terms of economic and social development but also in terms of governance and political integration within the macro-region. The initiative came at a time of financial crisis and criticism that the money of the EU’s Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) was not spent efficiently and that there was too much bureaucracy. In this respect, the principle of the ‘three No’s’ fitted well. Moreover, in addition to a better coordination of EU instruments on the ground, the intergovernmental approach could allow cooperation also in fields which were not of EU competence and use instruments which were not under EU rule.

A successful macro-regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region could also inspire other countries and regions in geographical neighbourhoods to follow the example of closer cooperation and integration in the frame-work of a commonly developed and agreed strategy to solve common challenges. On the other hand, we saw a risk that closer cooperation and integration within the macro-region could lead to increased demarca-tion from other countries and regions in the EU. We were also afraid

Foreword xi

of not having sufficient human resources to respond to the demands of technical support for preparation, coordination and communication generated by the new initiative, in particular if it would be followed by other initiatives of the same type for other macro-regions.

Despite these uncertainties and hesitations, the perceived advantages of the proposed approach appeared to largely outweigh the disadvan-tages, and we were prepared to support the idea within the limits of our competences and possibilities. To be able to do this, an official request from the Member States concerned was needed. The MEPs had already had some contacts with national governments and con-tinued to promote the idea very successfully with ministries of foreign and/or European affairs, and in some cases even with prime ministers’ offices. These efforts resulted in a request by the European Council to the Commission to prepare a macro-regional strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The strategy was finally endorsed under the Swedish Presidency of the Council in October 2009 and is now being implemented for a bit more than five years. In the meantime, two more macro-regional strate-gies have been adopted, one for the Danube Region and one for the Adriatic and Ionian Region. A fourth one is currently under preparation for the Alpine Region. In all these cases, the initiatives came directly from (some of) the Member States concerned and, in procedural terms, basically followed the model of the EUSBSR.

One of the hopes linked to the macro-regional strategies was that they would lead to a more efficient use of EU (as well as other) funds through more cooperation and better coordination. As concerns the EU funds, the main funding instruments were (and still are) the ‘ESI Funds’: the Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF), the Social Fund (ESF), the Agricultural Rural Development Fund (EARDF) and the Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).

All these funds are under shared management, that is, a division of responsibilities, competencies and tasks between the EU (represented by the Commission) and the Member States or Regions. In addition, there are funds available under direct management of the EU, for example, for research and innovation or for trans-European transport infrastructures, which also serve development purposes, and there are national, regional and local funds used for the co-financing or the supplementary funding of investment projects. They all enter more or less directly into the local, regional or national development equation.

In the case of EU funds under shared management, Member States or Regions are responsible, among other things, for selecting investment projects within the limits of agreed annual financial envelopes for a pro-gramming period of seven years. They do this in line with the agreed

xii Foreword

priorities and objectives of their operational programmes and national/regional development strategies. The national development strategies and the operational programmes are elaborated in dialogue with and approved by the European Commission.

In addition to the ‘big’ mainstream operational programmes for a given region or country, there are specific operational programmes for ‘European Territorial Cooperation (ETC)’, which are much smaller in financial terms. ETC is an explicit objective of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. It consists of three components: ‘Cross-Border Cooperation’ (between regions on the two sides of a borderline); ‘Transnational Cooperation’ (within large areas such as the Baltic Sea Region, involving national, regional and local partners) and ‘Inter-regional Cooperation’ (thematic cooperation, networking and exchange between regional and local authorities across the whole EU).

Operational programmes under ETC are co-financed by the ERDF. However, the funds available for them are small – in the current pro-gramming period some €8.95 billion, that is, 2.75 per cent of the total ERDF allocations. They are mainly dedicated to the cross-border com-ponent. Only some €1.8 billion or 20 per cent of the ETC allocation is earmarked for Transnational Cooperation ‘with a view to achieving a higher degree of territorial integration of those [larger transnational] ter-ritories’. For the 2007–2013 programming period 13 such ‘larger trans-national territories’ had been defined. They cover the whole area of the EU and overlap in parts.

Themes covered under Transnational Cooperation during that period included spatial development (e.g. sustainable urban development, polycentric development), international business and research linkages, the development of more viable and sustainable markets, innovation, protection of the environment, flood management, adaptation to cli-mate change, accessibility and the completion of communication net-works and corridors.

Because of the limited amount of money available, it is mainly used to exchange information, experience and ideas, to develop a common analysis and understanding of problems and opportunities, to elaborate common concepts and practical guides for the development of the area, and to promote the creation of networks between universities, research institutions and enterprises in the area.

Still today, there is sometimes confusion between cooperation in the framework of macro-regional strategies and ETC. Indeed, both concern territorial cooperation. Moreover, Transnational Cooperation, one of the ETC components, covers large geographic areas, involving several coun-tries. And, indeed, these geographic areas can be identical with those

Foreword xiii

covered by macro-regional strategies, as is the case for the Baltic Sea Region. Finally, many themes addressed under macro-regional strategies are not very different from those covered under Transnational Cooperation.

Yet, there are important differences. Macro-regional strategies are not a component of ETC. They do not have their own operational programmes. They have no extra financing. They represent intergovernmental coop-eration to coordinate national and/or regional development efforts in line with commonly agreed objectives and priorities in order to mobi-lise synergies to the benefit of all. They are not only about ideas, con-cepts, guides or networks, but also – and in particular – about important investments in infrastructures, in the protection of the environment, in research and innovation, in human capital and in enterprises. They can use all the instruments available (EU ones as well as national or regional ones) to support projects which serve this purpose in order to make development happen on the ground. This implies that a macro-regional strategy can be implemented, for instance, through projects under main-stream programmes in combination with projects under the different components of ETC programmes, projects supported only nationally or regionally, projects supported under an EU research programme and pro-jects benefiting from a loan of the European Investment Bank.

The underlying understanding of the functioning of the whole pro-cess is that the common objectives and priorities of the macro-regional strategy are also in the interest of each partner and are therefore also part of each national or regional development strategy. After all, they have all agreed to pursue these objectives, with the additional endorse-ment by all other Member States of the EU.

As far as the use of EU instruments, especially the ESIF, is concerned, projects have to contribute to the achievement of the thematic objec-tives of the operational programme under which they are submitted for support. These thematic objectives are selected from a limited number of thematic objectives decided at EU level for the intervention of the ESIF. In principle, this should not represent a problem, since the the-matic objectives of the macro-regional strategies correspond to a large extent to those for the ESIF.

Since the main intention behind macro-regional strategies is to make change happen on the ground, implementation is the decisive key to their success or failure. And when it comes to implementation, the cru-cial point is to stimulate and monitor the development, the submis-sion, the selection and the realisation of projects which effectively contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the macro-regional strategies, and to do this in a coordinated way. Coordination in this context can take different forms. In many cases, it may be sufficient that

xiv Foreword

the competent authorities in the partner countries and regions inform themselves mutually and talk about projects of common interest to them within the framework of the strategy in order to ensure that these projects are in line with each other and converge towards the achieve-ment of the strategy’s objectives. In other cases, it may be more efficient to start to coordinate the promotion of projects at an early stage in order to ensure complementarity and synergies, even if the projects remain independent from each other. Finally, in a few cases, partners may wish to go as far to develop joint projects, financed in common.

Contrary to an occasional misunderstanding, however, coordinated and even joint actions do not imply per se an obligation for a partner to ‘spend his money on projects in other countries or regions’. This is possible (under certain conditions and within limits as far as EU Funds are concerned) and can make sense if a partner expects a benefit for the development of its own country or region from such an investment. However, it is in no way an obligation.

Implementing a development strategy is always a challenge. This holds even more so when different countries or regions are involved. An early difficulty which occurred with the implementation of the Baltic Sea Strategy (and at least to some extent also the Danube Strategy) was that the strategies had been developed and promoted mainly under the auspices of the ministries of foreign or European affairs. This appeared to be logical and in line with normal procedures. In a few cases, even prime ministers’ offices were directly involved. However, there had only been little involvement – if at all – of those authorities which, at a later stage, were meant to implement the strategies in the framework of the EU, national or regional programmes for which they were responsible, most of the time without any additional money or human resources. This led in a number of cases to a lack of ownership and initiative on their side. On the other side, the ministries of foreign affairs have in gen-eral only limited means and competencies to impose the way in which the new strategies should be treated and integrated in the already exist-ing national or regional strategies, programmes and procedures. This is mainly a competence of the programme authorities (e.g. ministries of economy, of regional development, of transport, of environment). One lesson to be learnt from this is certainly the importance of an involve-ment from the very beginning of those authorities which will be respon-sible for the implementation of the strategies.

When the Baltic Sea Strategy as the first macro-economic strategy was endorsed by the European Council in autumn 2009, the 2007–2013 pro-gramming period for the ESIF had already been running for three years.

Foreword xv

Adding to this the fact that a number of minor practical handicaps (e.g. finding within existing budgets some money for coordination meetings and for stimulating project generation) had to be overcome, it was not surprising that it took some time before the implementation of the new strategy – apart from a few projects which had been prepared under other strategies and programmes, and were well in line with the objectives of the new macro-regional strategy, and could therefore be presented as contributions to the achievements of its objectives – was under way. Since what could be done under the 2007–2013 programming period remained relatively limited, a lot of hope and expectations were linked to the preparation of the new period (2014–2020), even more so as in the meantime other macro-regional strategies had been endorsed by the European Council or were in preparation.

In the meantime, most operational programmes for the new period have been adopted and now enter into their implementation phase. The Baltic Sea Strategy is in its fifth year of implementation, and the Danube Strategy enters its fourth year. Implementation of the Adriatic and Ionian Strategy has just started and the endorsement of the Alpine Strategy is expected in the middle of this year. In other words, by June this year all but nine Member States (i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta) are likely to be participating in one or several EU macro-regional strategies.

This is therefore a good moment to take stock, to analyse what has happened so far, to look at the theoretical foundations of the approach, to identify and discuss its weaknesses and the strengths, to look at the way in which it has been implemented and to examine its impacts. It is also a good moment to look forward. What opportunities are there for further improvement of the existing strategies and the development of new ones? Are we going towards a ‘macro-regionalisation’ of the EU, and what does it imply?

These and a number of other questions are addressed by the authors of this book. I wish them many readers of their contributions. And I wish us all an open and informed debate about this relatively recent develop-ment in European cooperation. This book gives us a good starting point and basis for such a debate.

Dirk AhnerUniversity of Strathclyde

Director-General, DG Regio, European Commission (2007–2011)

xvi

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of our shared interest in the EU’s macro-regional strategies as new tools of EU cohesion policy – with potential repercus-sions on the EU that reach far beyond the scope of territorial coopera-tion. It seems that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘macro-regional Europe’, not in the narrow sense of adding yet another layer of govern-ance to an already complex system of multilevel governance but rather as flexible and sometimes experimental forms of EU governance. EU macro-regional strategies seek to tackle specific place-based needs of ter-ritories, such as environmental pollution of the Baltic Sea, by combining top-down and bottom-up perspectives for furthering the inclusion of organizations as well as actors and stakeholders at the macro-regional level.

The project started life with a workshop at the University of Agder (UiA) in Kristiansand, Norway, in 2012, followed by two more authors’ workshops in Potsdam, Germany (2013), and Kristiansand (2014). As with all collaborative efforts this book would not have been possible without the assistance of many organizations and individuals. We are more than grateful to acknowledge the generous support of UiA, Leibniz-Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS), E-ON Ruhrgas Foundation, the Norwegian Research Council and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

Many individuals have offered invaluable input on various drafts of the chapters. We have benefited from discussions with colleagues and friends, not just at our workplaces: Stefan Gänzle wishes to thank his colleagues at the Institute for Political Science and Management at the UiA – in particular Dag I. Jacobsen, Gjermund Haslerud, Thomas Henökl, Morten Øgard, Anne E. Stie and Jarle Trondal – as well as Øyvind L. Laderud, Lukas Wedemeyer, Per S. Sørensen and Jan Beyers for their insights, suggestions and support. Katja Vonhoff, Franziska Sielker and Johann-Jakob Wulf documented the discussions at our authors’ work-shop in Potsdam. Daniel Matthews-Ferrero, a graduate student from the University of Kent and participant of the 2014 European Integration Summer School at UiA, was helpful not only in bringing the style into line with the publisher’s requirements, but also as an invaluable reader and commentator of the contributions. Most of all, we are grateful to our

Acknowledgements xvii

authors, who were always supportive in converting this project into its final product. At Palgrave Macmillan, we are grateful to Jemima Warren, Dominic Walker, Ian Evans and Hannah Kaspar who have navigated us through the publication process, and, of course, we have benefited from the comments and suggestions of several reviewers. We also appreciate the work of our publisher’s copy-editor, Kannayiram Ganesh.

The maps, designed by Franziska Sielker, were produced at the Department of Geography of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg using the publicly available templates of Eurogeographics.

One final vote of thanks is to our partners and families, who sup-ported us in many ways through the days of the book’s production.

Stefan Gänzle, University of Agder, NorwayKristine Kern, Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS) and University of Potsdam, Germany

xviii

Notes on Contributors

Attila Ágh is a professor at Budapest Corvinus University, Head of the PhD School and Director of the Research Centre ‘Together for Europe’. His major research interest is comparative politics in terms of Europeanization and ‘linkage politics’, that is, the relationship between external and domestic factors in the Hungarian and East–Central European developments.

Jörg Balsiger is Professor of Sustainable Development at the Department of Geography and Environment of the University of Geneva. His work examines various aspects of regional environmental governance, cur-rently with a special focus on transboundary mountain regions in Europe. He has co-edited special issues on regional environmental governance and published several articles and working papers on the subject.

Tobias Chilla is Professor of Geography at the Institute of Geography, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg. His research focuses on regional development, in particular with regard to the ter-ritorial dimension of European integration and the field of applied geography. He has held postdoctoral positions at the Universities of Luxembourg, Bamberg and Cologne. Before joining the Erlangen University, he had been involved in a series of European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) activities, including the ESPON Contact Point of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

Battistina Cugusi is a senior researcher at the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI) of Rome. She graduated at the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium) with an MA in European Political and Administrative Studies (2004). Her main areas of research are EU territorial cooperation, multilevel governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Since 2014 she has been involved in the EU-GEMS project ‘Environmental Governance and European Macro-regions’, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (2014–2016).

Martin Dangerfield is Professor of European Integration and Jean Monnet Chair in the European Integration of Central and Eastern Europe at the Department of History, Politics and War Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton. His research interests include EU–Russia relations, the European Neighbourhood Policy and

Notes on Contributors xix

subregional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe with particular emphasis on the Visegrad Group.

Mike Danson is Professor of Enterprise Policy at Heriot-Watt University, UK. He has researched widely on urban and regional economics with 13 books and over 200 papers published. He is a frequent commentator on economic and social issues and has acted as advisor to the Scottish and UK governments and parliaments, to development agencies and other bodies, including the OECD and European Commission. He has been Treasurer of the Academy of Social Sciences, chair of the Regional Studies Association and an active member of local, national and inter-national bodies.

Stefan Gänzle is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder, Norway. He was a senior researcher at the German Development Institute in Bonn, a DAAD assistant professor at the University of British Columbia and a research fellow at the University of Jena. His interests include the international relations of the European Union and regionalism in world politics. His publications have appeared in, among others, African Security, Cooperation and Conflict, Europe-Asia Studies, Higher Education, International Journal, Journal of Baltic Studies and Public Administration.

Kristine Kern is Professor for the Governance of Urban Infrastructure and Global Change, Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS) and University of Potsdam. She has previ-ously held positions at the WZB Berlin Social Science Research Center, the University of Minnesota, Södertörn University and Wageningen University. Her research interests include (environmental) governance in multilevel systems, sustainable cities and regions, climate and energy governance, the governance of regional seas and EU macro-regional strategies.

Irene McMaster is a senior research fellow at the European Policies Research Centre of the University of Strathclyde. She specializes in regional economic development and policy in Europe, in particular cross-national research on INTERREG and transnational cooperation. In this capacity, she has led a series of major evaluation studies of EU territorial and spatial development policies, including the North Sea Region Programme, Northern Periphery and Northern Periphery and Arctic Programmes. She participated in the OECD territorial review of the NORA region (2011). She also managed the contribution of the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) to the ESPON project ‘European Territorial Cooperation as a Factor of Growth, Jobs and

xx Notes on Contributors

Quality of Life’. As well as carrying out comparative research for a vari-ety of national governments and the European Commission, she has published on European territorial cooperation and regional economic development policy.

Simona Piattoni is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy, and an adjunct professor (‘professor II’) at the University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. Previously, she has held positions at the Universities of Innsbruck and Tromsø. She is currently Chair of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and of the Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society. Her research agenda focuses on multilevel governance, EU democracy and political clientelism. She is the author of The Theory of Multi-level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges (2010) and The European Union: Democratic Principles and Institutional Architecture in Times of Crisis (2015).

Franziska Sielker is a scientific assistant and PhD student at the Institute of Geography at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg. Her dissertation is on rescaling processes in macro-regional strategies. She holds a degree in Spatial Planning from the TU Dortmund University. She was formerly a trainee at the ESPON Coordination Unit in Luxemburg and obtained a scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to prepare her diploma thesis on macro-regional strategy in the Danube region at the TU Vienna. Her research focuses on the field of European regional policy and governance, Europeanization and (re-)territorialization, as well as macro-regional strategies and regional development.

Dominic Stead is Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Development at Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. He has researched and published widely on a range of issues related to urban and regional governance, including more than 60 journal articles, 25 book chapters and 4 edited books. He has previously held positions at HafenCity Universität, Hamburg (as visiting professor), University College London (as senior research fellow) and the University of the West of England (as associate lecturer and researcher). He is a member of the editorial board of four international journals: European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, European Planning Studies, Journal of Planning Education and Research and Planning Practice and Research.

Andrea Stocchiero is research coordinator of the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI) in Rome. He is an economist with 20 years of professional experience in development economics at international and

Notes on Contributors xxi

local levels (territorial development, aid and regional policies, trade, foreign direct investment, technological flows, migration and develop-ment). He has coordinated and carried out several research projects on EU territorial and development cooperation in the Mediterranean and Balkan region with particular attention to the role of civil society organi-zations and local authorities in the multilevel governance.

Arno van der Zwet is a research fellow at the European Policies Research Centre of the University of Strathclyde. His research mainly focuses on the design, management and implementation of EU cohesion policy programmes, EU macro-regional strategies, economic and regional development in Western Europe, territorial politics in multilevel politics and territorial identities.

Mark Wise is the retired Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies (ad personam) at Plymouth University where he remains a Research Fellow. His doctoral research examined the nature of the poli-cymaking processes producing the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy. At the Plymouth University he developed an interdisciplinary and interna-tional degree programme in European Integration Studies and Modern Languages involving geographers, political scientists, economists, law-yers and linguists. His publications relate to various aspects of European integration including fishery, regional, social, cultural and language policies.

xxii

List of Abbreviations

AAC Atlantic Arc CommissionAEM Association des Elus de la Montagne

(Association of Elected Representatives from Mountain Regions)

AER Assembly of European RegionsAII Adriatic–Ionian InitiativeARLEM Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local AssemblyATNESC Atlantic Transnational Network of Economic and

Social CouncilsBALTFISH Baltic Sea Fisheries ForumBC Baltic CooperationBEAC Barents Euro-Arctic CouncilBDF Baltic Development ForumBEU Benelux Economic UnionBSEC Black Sea Economic CooperationBSRP Baltic Sea Region ProgrammeBSR INNONET Baltic Sea Region Innovation Network BSSSC Baltic Sea States Subregional CooperationBTI Bertelsmann Transformation IndexCAAC Conference on Atlantic Arc CitiesCARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction,

Development and StabilisationCBC Cross border cooperationCBR Cross-border RegionCBSS Council of the Baltic Sea StatesCC Carpathian ConventionCEC Commission of the European CommunitiesCEE Central and Eastern EuropeCEI Central European InitiativeCEFTA Central European Free Trade AgreementCELIB Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison des Interêts Bretons

(Committee for the Study and Liaison of Breton Interests)

CEMR Council of European Municipalities and RegionsCIPRA International Commission for the Protection of

the Alps

List of Abbreviations xxiii

CLLD Community-led Local DevelopmentCoR Committee of the RegionsCOREPER Committee of Permanent RepresentativesCOTRAO Communauté de travail des Alpes occidentales

(Western Alps Working Community)CPMR Conference of Peripheral Maritime RegionsCSF Common Strategic FrameworkCSO Civil Society OrganizationDATAR Délégation interministérielle à l’Aménagement du Territoire et

à l’Attractivité Régionale (Interministerial Delegation for Regional Planning and Regional Attractiveness)

DEFRA Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in UK

DG Directorate GeneralDG Mare Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and FisheriesDG Regio Directorate-General for Regional PolicyEESC European Economic and Social CommitteeEFTA European Free Trade Areae.g. for exampleEGI European Governance InitiativeEGTC European Grouping for Territorial CooperationEIB European Investment BankEIU Economist Intelligence UnitEMFF European Maritime and Fisheries FundENP European Neighbourhood PolicyENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership InstrumentEP European ParliamentERDF European Regional Development FundESDP European Spatial Development PerspectiveESIF European Structural and Investment FundsESF European Social FundESPON European Spatial Planning Observation NetworkETC European Territorial CooperationEU European UnionEUSALP European Union Strategy for the Alpine RegionEUSAIR European Union Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian RegionEUSBSR European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea RegionEUSDR European Union Strategy for the Danube RegionFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFH Freedom House

xxiv List of Abbreviations

FMR Functional Macro-RegionGES Good Environmental StatusGDP Gross Domestic ProductGU(U)AM Georgia, Ukraine, (Uzbekistan,) Azerbaijan and Moldova HA Horizontal ActionHAL Horizontal Actions LeadersHELCOM Helsinki CommissionICPDR International Convention for the Protection of the

Danube RiverIFI International Financial InstitutionIGO Intergovernmental OrganisationIMP Integrated Maritime PolicyINTERREG Interregional cooperationIPA Instrument for Pre-accession AssistanceISCAR International Scientific Committee on Alpine ResearchITI Integrated Territorial InvestmentIUCN International Union for the Conservation of NatureJTS Joint Technical SecretariatsKIMO Kommunenes Internasjonale Miljøorganisasjon

(Local Authorities’ International Environmental Organisation)

LEADER Links between the rural economy and development actions

MA Managing AuthorityMDG Multidimensional GovernanceMED Ministry for Economic DevelopmentMEP Member of the European ParliamentMERiFIC Marine Energy in Far Peripheral and Island

CommunitiesMFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMFF Multi-annual Financial FrameworkMLG Multilevel GovernanceMSFD Marine Strategy Framework DirectiveNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNC Nordic CouncilNCP National Contact PointND Northern DimensionNDEP Northern Dimension Environmental PartnershipNGO Nongovernmental OrganisationNIT Nations in TransitNMS New Member States

List of Abbreviations xxv

NOP National Operational ProgrammeNSC North Sea CommissionNUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for StatisticsPA Priority Area (since 2015: Policy Area)PAC Priority Area Coordinator (since 2015: Policy Area

Coordinator)PACA Provence-Alpes-Côte d’AzurPAFG Priority Area Focal GroupPPS Purchasing Power StandardOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOP Operational ProgrammeOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation EuropeRCC Regional Cooperation CouncilRDAs Regional Development Agencies in UKREACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of

ChemicalsROP Regional Operational ProgrammeRSA Regional Studies AssociationSBS Sea basin StrategySEBA South Eastern Baltic AreaSECI South-East European Cooperation InitiativeSEE South-East EuropeSEECP South-East European Cooperation ProcessSME Small and Medium-sized EnterpriseSP Stability Pact for South-Eastern EuropeSRG Subregional GroupingTEN-T Trans-European Transport NetworkTiPSE The Territorial Dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion

in EuropeTR Transition RegionUBC Union of the Baltic CitiesUfM Union for the MediterraneanUKIP United Kingdom Independence PartyUV Union ValdôtaineVASAB Vision and Strategy around the Baltic SeaVG Visegrad GroupWEF World Economic ForumWFD Water Framework DirectiveWWF World Wildlife Fund for Nature

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Part I

Introduction


3

‘Macro-regionalization’ and the making of the European Union’s ‘macro-regional’ strategies

With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 – the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) – the European Union has started to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy. Subsequently, other ‘macro-regions’ have begun to self-identify – such as the Danube (2011), the Adriatic–Ionian basin (2014), the Alpine (2015) and the North Sea regions1 (see European Parliament, 2015) – and are in the process of developing similar strategies of their own, often drawing on ‘the inspiration from the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region’ (North Sea Commission, 2011, p. 2). These developments suggest that some parts of Europe, if not the entire EU, could come to be covered by some kind of macro-regional strategy. Indeed, in 2013, the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council proposed a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council, 2013, p. 9) and an ever-increasing area has been described as having suc-cumbed to a kind of ‘macro-regional fever’ (Dühr, 2011, p. 3). Such obser-vations and the concrete developments that underpin them warrant a critical assessment of this ‘“nouvelle vogue” of transnational coopera-tion’ (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012), which has also been depicted as a new ‘tool of European integration’ (Dubois et al., 2009, p. 9; see also Bellini and Hilpert, 2013).2

According to a widespread definition first put forth by the then EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, Paweł Samecki, a ‘macro-region’ refers to ‘an area including territory from a number of different countries

1Macro-regions, ‘Macro-regionalization’ and Macro- regional Strategies in the European Union: Towards a New Form of European Governance?Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern

4 A ‘Macro-regional’ Europe in the Making

or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 1, original in bold). Consequently, such regions are socially construed and ‘demarcated’ by ‘flexible, even vague’ boundaries (European Commission, 2009, p. 8; see Table 1.1). This is not to say that historical and cultural commonalities do not matter at all in the formation of such regions, but macro-regions are both ‘imagined’ and ‘manufactured’ by the need for functional coopera-tion around, for instance, a common regional sea, mountainous area or river system, which ‘transcend[s] all territorial frontiers’ (Forsyth, 1996, p. 29). Turning to the notion of ‘strategy’, it is conceptually useful to maintain that a macro-regional strategy ‘(1) is an integrated framework relating to member states and third countries in the same geographical area; (2) addresses common challenges; (3) benefits from strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3). The concept is based on five core principles construed around the need to integrate existing policy frame-works, programmes and financial instruments; to coordinate between sectorial policies, actors or different tiers of government; to cooperate between countries and sectors; to involve policymakers at different lev-els of governance; and to create partnerships between EU member states and non-member countries (see European Commission, 2013a, p. 3). EU macro-regional strategies are neither single-issue focused in terms of policy nor exclusively or primarily limited to the realm of intergovern-mental collaboration. Rather, they frame ‘a bigger picture’ and aim at mobilizing existing funding schemes, tapping on the expertise of exist-ing epistemic communities and stakeholders from all tiers of the EU’s multilevel system. EU macro-regional strategies seek to provide a stra-tegic platform or framework of reference for existing actors that would allow them to adjust to the activities of other stakeholders. EU macro-regional strategies refer to the objective of integrating different policy sectors that influence one other, such as land-based versus sea-based sources of pollution. While none of these dimensions are anything new in themselves, their systematic integration in a comprehensive and evolving new governance architecture at the macro-regional level is. We must therefore be drawn to contemplate whether this new development has been successful to date and whether it does or might trigger tangible changes on its macro-regional constituencies. It is the core goal of this edited volume to find an answer to this question.

In the words of the European Commission, macro-regional strat-egies account for no less than ‘regional building blocks for EU-wide policy, marshalling national approaches into more coherent EU-level

Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern 5

implementation’ (European Commission, 2013a, p. 5, emphasis added). These ‘regional building blocks’ aim to foster a genuinely transnational perspective, to draw functional cooperation and territorial cohesion closer together, and to encourage collective action between public and private actors across all levels of EU governance in areas such as transportation, infrastructure, economic development, public health and environmental policy. Macro-regions or subregions are not new phenomena per se. In contrast, hybrid forms of functional–territorial regions or, alternatively, ‘soft spaces’ (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012; Stead, 2011, 2014) that cut across national boundaries of existing political entities have existed before (see Joas et al., 2007). Terms such as ‘macro-’ and ‘meso-regions’ (Christiansen, 1997) have been used before to depict ‘both globally significant groups of nations (the EU, ASEAN etc.) and groupings of administrative regions within a country’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 1), such as, for instance, Romania’s four mac-roregiune as features of the country’s territorial organization. In short, a macro-region refers to a meso-level bringing together a group of units that are at the same time part of (or related to) a more comprehensive political entity. Yet, macro-regions constitute a novel development in that they seek to systematically enhance European or generally global

Table 1.1 Macro-regions: hybrids between territorial and functional regions

Territorial regions Macro-regions Functional regions

Space(s) Territorial space(s)Defined by political and

administrative territories

Functional space(s)Defined by functional relations

Boundaries Distinct and stable boundariesShift of competences between levels

(devolution, decentralization)

Shifting/fuzzy boundariesMay differ from territorial

boundariesIntersecting memberships

Institutions Multi-functional institutionsCompetences and responsibilities

clearly defined

Task-specific institutionsInstitutions may differ between

policy areas (such as the pillars of macro-regional strategies)

Governance Traditional forms of regional governance

New forms of regional governance such as public–private partnerships

Intermunicipal and interregional cooperation (within and beyond nation states)

Source: Compiled by authors, drawing from Hooghe and Marks (2003, 2010).


policies in the functionally defined territory of a macro-region by using existing institutional structures in a comprehensive, coordinated and cross-sectoral way. Building on functional commonalities of a given macro-region, macro-regional strategies aim at minimizing the transac-tion costs of collective action and provide for better and more effective regulation:

[F]or most environmental problems the EU is not an optimal regula-tory area, being either too large or too small. In a number of cases – for example, the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, or the Rhine – the scope of the problem is regional rather than EU-wide, and is best tackled through regional arrangements tailored to the scope of the relevant environmental externality. (Majone, 2014, p. 319)

Because macro-regional strategies come as a rather new addition to the EU Commission’s toolbox of concepts and ideas, they should be approached with due caution and in a critical manner. With this caveat in mind, and with the aim of distinguishing ‘macro-regions’ from previous developments such as those mentioned above, we suggest the concept of macro-regionalization (Gänzle and Kern, 2011, p. 267; Salines, 2010, p. 27), as it allows us to capture dynamics that have not yet resulted in the elaboration of a macro-regional strategy, but which are ultimately comparable. This will allow us to also discuss the cases of the North Sea and the Atlantic Arc regions. Hence, we define macro-regionalization as processes, eventually underwritten by macro-regional strategies and underpinned by a single strategic approach. This approach must aim at the construction of functional and transnational spaces among those (administrative) regions and municipalities at the subnational level of EU member and partner countries that share a sufficient number of issues in common. In contrast to previous attempts at forging territorial cohesion in the EU, macro-regionalization is a much more comprehen-sive approach across policy sectors, and as an EU-wide process, it can be conceived as a de facto (but not de jure) prototype of territorial differen-tiation in European integration (see Dyson and Sepos, 2010; Gänzle and Kern, 2011) – at its very early stage, if at all (Figure 1.1).

With respect to the composition and number of countries involved, macro-regional strategies differ quite significantly from each other. The EUSBSR, for instance, targets eight EU member states – Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany (specifically: Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland – as well as two ‘partner countries’ in northeastern Europe – Norway and the Russian Federation – and can almost be conceived as an EU internal


Figure 1.1 Overview of European macro-regions

© University of Agder, S. Gänzle© EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries Cartography: F. Sielker, University of Erlangen 2015

BALTIC SEA REGION

DANUBE REGIONALPINE REGION

ADRIATIC-IONIAN REGION

Potential NORTH SEA

REGION

Potential ATLANTIC-ARC

REGION

Baltic Sea Region

Danube Region

Alpine Region

Adriatic-Ionian Region

Potential North Sea Region (with Iceland)

Potential Atlantic Arc Region

0 400km

EU macro-regions


strategy (see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 6 in this volume), while the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) is far more diverse, exhibiting a strong external focus that covers fourteen countries in total, from the source of the river to its estuary (see Ágh, chapter 7 in this volume). It brings together nine EU member states and five accession, candidate and partner countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – along with the corresponding subnational authorities thereof.3

Although macro-regions can be traced back to various subregional schemes of intergovernmental cooperation – most of which mush-roomed in the 1990s – the EU’s successive enlargements in 2004 and 2007 certainly served as the point of departure for the EU strategies in the Baltic Sea and Danube regions (Ágh, 2010; Beazley, 2007). With the accession of Poland and the three Baltic States in 2004, along with Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the situation in the Baltic Sea and Danube regions changed fundamentally and increased quite substan-tially the EU orientation of the countries making up the Baltic Sea and the Danube regions. Although the first steps in initiating a Baltic Sea Strategy were taken by the European Parliament (Antola, 2009, p. 5; Schymik, 2011), the launching of both the Baltic and Danube strate-gies involved the member states and certain subnational authorities (notably, Baden-Württemberg) playing a pivotal role. The development of the Danube Strategy also indicated a shift of power and influence from the European Parliament to the European Commission, since the Commission facilitated and later actively shaped the process of devel-oping the macro-regions, while pursuing an independent and holistic approach compatible with existing policies.

The emergence of macro-regions in their current form has been prompted by a number of exogenous factors primarily instilled at the EU level, and at the level of the macro-regions themselves. There are several important drivers from the EU level. First, the Treaty of Lisbon’s objec-tive is to achieve territorial cohesion, alongside social and economic cohesion. Hence, Art. 174 of the Treaty on the EU stipulates:

In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.

This objective requires the mainstreaming of the territorial dimen-sion in future EU policymaking and implementation. Second, severe


budgetary constraints have (and continue to) fundamentally limited the assistance that the EU is willing to provide to macro-regions. These constraints have primarily emerged from the ongoing economic and financial crisis afflicting the EU and its member states. At the same time, the crisis encourages greater efficiency in the use of resources through cross-policy coordination. Some EU countries participating in the two foundational macro-regions – the EUSBSR and EUSDR – have been par-ticularly affected by the credit crunch; examples are Latvia and Hungary. Third, EU enlargement in combination with a growing heterogeneity of the EU, as well as the increasing economic (inter)dependencies among the territories within any given macro-region, has further supported the emergence of macro-regional approaches which encompass old and new member states as well as non-EU countries, including candidate countries. Finally, EU macro-regional strategies provide a framework for pursuing strategic narratives of the EU, such as Europe 2020, and for testing a new ‘governance architecture’ (Borrás and Radaelli, 2011) in the context of a functionally defined territorial scale below the EU level (see also Piattoni, chapter 4 in this volume).

The shaping of macro-regional strategies involves a number of endogenous factors that have been triggered by the very nature of the macro-regions themselves: First, the emergence of actual macro-regions has been conditioned by the biophysical characteristics of these regions, particularly in the case of regional sea areas, river systems and mountain areas, which constitute common pool resources and so appeal to col-lective action in order to effectively govern a common pool resource (see Ostrom, 1990, 2010). Second, pre-existing common historical and cultural heritages of territories included within macro-regions, such as the Hanseatic tradition in the Baltic Sea Region, serve as a useful nar-rative for a renewed macro-regional epos in cultural terms. Finally, it is strong, well-established and active subnational authorities, munici-palities and/or civil society organizations that take action at the macro-regional scale in a bottom-up manner in a way that can encompass the entire macro-region. It is fair to assume that the constitutionalized regions within member states participating in EU macro-regional strate-gies – with guaranteed access rights to EU decision-making and strong regional lobbying capacities and sufficient resources – are likely to use macro-regional strategies as a platform for furthering their paradiplo-matic activities (Blatter et al., 2008).

The EU, in particular the European Commission, has responded to these initiatives in a cautious way by emphasizing that macro-regional strate-gies should create an ‘integrated framework’ (European Commission,


2013b, p. 2). This is envisioned as being able to create the capacity to effectively respond to specific concerns without requiring the establish-ment of new institutions, legislation or funding – the so-called ‘three No’s’. This volume will demonstrate that any increased coordination of actors and policies that is implemented has significant repercussions for the existing institutional capacities within any given macro-region. EU macro-regional strategies influence both the implementation of EU legislation and existing regional institutions, such as the Alpine Convention, the North Sea Commission, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the International Convention for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) and the Helsinki Commission to name but a few. Ultimately, macro-regional strategies are a new tool for the alignment of projects funded through the EU Structural Funds to concrete and func-tional objectives as expressed in the strategies themselves.

Hence, we see that the process of macro-regionalization not only presents a comprehensive and (increasingly) EU-wide process but also triggers a significant impact on its constituent macro-regional parts. While it is yet too early to accurately predict the long-term impact of EU macro-regional strategies, it is definitely possible and very timely to analyse and evaluate the effects triggered by EU macro-regional strate-gies thus far. Before that, we shall briefly turn to subregionalism, as the immediate predecessor of macro-regionalization in Europe.

From grass-roots federalism to subregionalism in the EU and EU macro-regional strategies

Doyens of European federalist and regionalist thinking, such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Denis de Rougemont, have typically argued in favour of strengthening regions as a means of safeguarding the princi-ples of subsidiarity and democracy within larger federal entities. Both these political philosophers were also adamant that citizens’ access to decision-making at the federal level should be guaranteed, and hence advocated a bottom-up approach in the organization of federal political entities. Over time, the concept of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (see Ruge, 2003, for a thorough discussion of the intellectual roots of this idea; Elias, 2008) emerged to grasp these considerations. Politically, the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ implies that regions could ultimately chal-lenge the central position of the nation state in the political order of Europe.

With the emergence of the single market programme and subse-quent Community legislation that fundamentally challenged the


competences of the ‘third level’ in the EU in the 1980s, some regions – particularly in Germany and Belgium – made a lobbying effort at both the national and European levels to ensure that their voices be heard ‘in Brussels’. In response to these growing demands, the EU and its member states took steps to embrace regions and municipalities in specific areas of EU policymaking and, in general, to ensure that the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht be made ‘region-friendly’. Hence, a number of provisions and institutional arrangements – such as the Committee of the Regions (CoR), a consultative body composed of representatives from regions and municipalities of EU member states – have been intro-duced. Since the establishment of the CoR in 1994, regional and local representatives provide opinions on policy matters of regional concern, such as transport policy and regional economic development (Warleigh, 2001, pp. 177ff.). Subsequently, the concept changed to the idea of a ‘Europe with (rather than of) the Regions’ (Borrás-Alomar et al., 1994, p. 27; Hooghe and Marks, 1996). In a nutshell, a ‘Europe of/with the Regions’ creates awareness of the increasing capacities, which some regions of the EU marshal to conduct autonomous action within (and beyond) the EU, a process which has subsequently been complemented by closer links between national, regional and local actors.

More recently, Claus Leggewie has conspicuously argued that ‘regional associations’ rather than regions themselves (should) ultimately serve as important cornerstones for a new type of European federalism:

A Europe of the Regions has so far been envisaged and arranged on far too small a scale, as a provincial prop for a large quasi state ruled from Brussels and legitimised from the capitals. Regional associations may revive the good old principle of European federalism – they rise above the nations that often operate today as blockading powers, but they are also still near enough to the cultural characteristics and networks of the people of Europe. (Leggewie, 2012)

Hence, Leggewie suggests using macro-regions as transnational build-ing blocks for fostering citizens’ participation if not democracy in the EU – an argument that will be critically addressed by Piattoni in this volume (chapter 4). Historically, ‘a Euro-Mediterranean Union, a Baltic Sea Union’ (Leggewie, 2012; see also Frey, 2012) and other cooperative regional blocks – involving the EU, its members and partner countries – started to emerge after the end of the Cold War and particularly involved those countries in the immediate vicinity that were adamant to become members of the EU (see Dangerfield, chapter 2 in this volume). Already


at the beginning of the 1990s, the European Commission’s ‘Europe 2000’ report on the future of the then European Community’s territory endorsed the idea of ‘regional groupings’ such as the one constituting the Baltic Sea Region. Darrell Delamaide went so far as to speculate about the ‘rise of superregions’ (1994, p. 4) within and beyond the territory of the EU. Towards the end of the 1990s, collaboration among countries in the Baltic Sea region was eventually captured by the label of Europe’s ‘new subregionalism’ (see Cottey, 1999; Dangerfield, 2009, 2010; Dwan, 2000; Herolf, 2010) or ‘peripheral subregionalism’ (Hubel and Gänzle, 2002; Johansson, 2002) – as opposed to older forms of subregional-ism, such as the kinds of cooperation that emerged in the Benelux and Nordic regions around the 1940s and 1950s (see Groenendijk, 2013).4 The established track record in cooperative efforts across various levels of governance in the Baltic Sea Region5 has hitherto informed the EU’s approaches to the region.

A framework for analysis: multilevel governance, rescaling and Europeanization

Macro-regions are deeply embedded in the EU’s system of multilevel gov-ernance (MLG) and can therefore be interpreted from multilevel, multi-sector and multi-actor perspectives (Hooghe and Marks, 2010; Piattoni, 2010). From a holistic perspective, the process of macro-regionalization can be conceived as a shift from territorial towards functional regions, with significant implications, in particular vis-à-vis to the spatial dimen-sion, boundaries, institutional set-up and the way macro-regions are gov-erned (see Table 1.1). This is not restricted to changes of powers across levels of government but also implies territorial ‘rescaling’ (Keating, 2009), that is, new scales of intervention, new actor constellations, and variable geometries of governance (Stead, 2011, p. 163). Although the precise number of countries and subnational entities has been defined by EU macro-regional strategies, the boundaries of macro-regions in sensu stricto remain somewhat nebulous and varying depending on the nature of the policy field the macro-regional strategy concerns itself. Since the boundaries which are, for example, relevant to some specific environmental policy (such as drainage areas) may differ considerably from those required to deal with some issues relating to soft security, integrating macro-regional strategies and developing appropriate insti-tutional structures present a real challenge. Policy integration can be achieved by improving vertical and horizontal interplay across policies and actors, involving the political mobilization not only of EU actors


but also of those relevant actors from civil society and (sub)national authorities in both EU member states and partner countries.

Although the concept of MLG has become a buzzword in the field of European Studies and International Relations, its meaning and usage is still useful and appropriate. In a nutshell, MLG can be defined

as an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a mul-tiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private or public – at different levels of territorial aggrega-tion in more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implemen-tation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels. (Schmitter, 2004, p. 49)

Most importantly, MLG considers governance with regard to the local, national, regional and international levels, taking geographical scales into consideration and immediately directing our ‘attention to three novel developments of contemporary political life’ (Piattoni, 2009, p. 2): political mobilization within and across institutional boundaries, policy-making that blurs the lines between policymakers and policy-receivers and, ultimately, polity that produces policy decisions that are less and less understandable as fixed and established (see Piattoni, 2009, 2010; chapter 4 in this volume).

We hypothesize that the governance of multilevel systems functions most effectively in the following circumstances: (1) It happens when there is horizontal interplay – with, for example, the mobilization of action between EU institutions, regional organizations, international sea and river conventions, and corresponding action plans – such as the ‘Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube’ (Danube River Protection Convention, 1994) and the ‘Baltic Sea Action Plan’ (2007) – leading to synergies. Yet, one should not overlook the difficulties and disruptions that horizontal interplay can provoke due to the challenges of complex coordination (see Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; Van Leeuwen and Kern, 2013) – as much as any positive synergies. (2) MLG is most effective when there is vertical interplay, which in turn, deals with the mobilization of sustainable and cooperative relations involving institutions at different levels of gov-ernance. In view of this, macro-regionalization provides new political opportunities for subnational authorities and civil society. If, for exam-ple, subnational authorities establish Transnational networks, these networks may subsequently turn themselves into constitutive parts of


the macro-regions. The main goals of such transnational networks are, first, representation and lobbying in the macro-region and beyond (viz. in Brussels and the national capitals); second, funding common activi-ties (e.g. through membership fees or EU funding); and third, best/good practice transfer and learning among the networks’ constituent members in the macro-region (Kern, 2001; 2011; 2014; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009). (3) As macro-regionalization transcends EU borders, MLG embraces both EU member and non-member states alike. With the exception of the Atlantic Arc (see Wise, chapter 11 in this volume), the inclusion of non-member states is a common feature among all macro-regional strategies to have been developed or proposed so far. With respect to non-member states, it can be argued that macro-regional cooperation, in particular the establishment and consolidation of macro-regional institutions, is con-ducive to processes of socialization at the level of transgovernmental networks that consequently emerge (Gänzle, 2014, p. 14).

Studying the impact of the EU’s macro-regional strategies

Although the establishment of new institutions is not intended within the framework of EU macro-regional strategies a priori as a result of the ‘three No’s’, the strategies do affect existing institutions at the macro-regional level and stimulate the creation of new forms of interinstitutional com-prehensive points of reference for pre-existing institutions operating at the macro-regional level. The combination of vertical and horizontal interplay with those organizations, regimes and conventions mentioned above appears to be very important for the implementation of aspects of a macro-regional strategy, such as for the establishment and imple-mentation of priority areas and so-called flagship projects. These forms of coordination and institutional interplay across several layers of EU governance were summarized by the CoR as the ‘coordinated action of the various levels of government, on the one hand, and the coordina-tion of policies and instruments, on the other hand, [that] are vital to improve European governance and the implementation of Community strategies’ (Committee of the Regions, 2009, p. 21).

This edited volume provides an in-depth introduction to the develop-ment of EU macro-regional strategies to date. Drawing on both political science and political geography, it explores the history and current state of affairs of macro-regional strategies in the EU. It seeks to come to grips with a relatively recent phenomenon in EU territorial cooperation and provides a theoretically informed and consistent approach to analysing


individual macro-regions. The purpose is threefold: first, to analyse the development of macro-regions as well as the place of macro-regional strategies in contemporary EU cohesion policy; second, to discuss the-oretical approaches based in political science and planning – such as MLG, Europeanization and rescaling – relevant to the understanding of macro-regions in Europe; and third, to provide a thorough assessment of the impact of existing and emerging macro-regional strategies as well as processes of macro-regionalization in Europe more broadly.

Our guiding questions are: How can we capture these policy processes theoretically? How can we theorize ‘macro-regionalization’? What are the cultural, historical, socio-economic and political drivers underpin-ning these processes? Who are the main institutional actors? What are the effects in general and vis-à-vis existing regional regimes and actors? How are different stakeholders being integrated into the governance set-up of a macro-region? How are third countries integrated into macro-regional strategies?

In chapter 2, Martin Dangerfield prepares the ground by tracing back the historical roots of macro-regional strategies to the pre-existing sub-regional organizations. This chapter provides a survey of the various subregional groupings operating in and around the EU when the EU’s ‘macro-regional region project’ took shape. As well as examining the main roles and limitations of these subregional groupings, this chapter also identifies some key distinctions between them. Dangerfield argues that these differences are important because they can be used to explain the differing extents to which such subregional groupings contribute towards the agenda of macro-regional strategies.

Irene McMaster and Arno van der Zwet review in chapter 3 the role of EU macro-regional strategies as an instrument of EU cohesion policy, as well as their design and implementation to date, and the theoreti-cal and policy issues surrounding their use. They argue that, in theory, these strategies represent a new MLG instrument providing an oppor-tunity for new thinking about spaces, opportunities, challenges and forms of intervention. However, McMaster and van der Zwet explain how in practice there have been difficulties in reconciling the different visions and interests of stakeholders, and the breadth of strategic objec-tives and priorities in relation to the available resources. Conceptually, macro-regional strategies have also been criticized as incoherent, possess-ing only a questionable legitimacy and being ineffective.

Having contextualized EU macro-regional strategies in terms of both their historical evolution and current place in EU cohesion policy, the volume moves on to situate the phenomenon and concept of EU


‘macro-regionalization’ in a broader theoretical context by acknowl-edging the more recent literature on the (new) regionalism. In chap-ter 4 Simona Piattoni discusses some of the empirical features of EU macro-regional strategies through the lens of the main integration theo-ries – neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, neo-institutionalism, constructivism and ‘Europe as empire’ – but dwells in particular on MLG theory. The chapter argues that governmental and non-governmental actors – normally at state, but possibly also at substate, level – get mobi-lized in order to defend or promote their interests as they are identified through the discussion of concrete policy initiatives. Interests are con-structed in the process of mobilization and are adjudicated by the exist-ing institutions. The ultimate impact of this policy-oriented political mobilization is often polity restructuring. The chapter then concludes by arguing that the conventional understanding of legitimacy – as the existence of matching and unbroken chains of delegation and account-ability between national principals and supra-, sub- or infra-national agents – is no longer useful in the context of heightened interdepend-ence and shows how even legal doctrine is struggling with, but also equipping itself to theorize, the intensified cross-border cooperation that takes place also within macro-regions. Dominic Stead, Franziska Sielker and Tobias Chilla complement this perspective by addressing in chap-ter 5 EU macro-regional strategies through the lens of Europeanization, arguing that Europeanization almost always has implications for policy rescaling in some shape or form. This can include the rescaling of poli-cymaking agendas, processes, networks or powers, or alternatively the rescaling of policy ideas, narratives, norms or justifications. In many cases, these processes have a territorial dimension. This chapter reflects on the development of European macro-regional strategies and the implications they have for Europeanization and policy rescaling from a territorial perspective.

In chapter 6, which opens the section containing various case studies of macro-regionalization and EU macro-regional strategies, Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern study the impact of the EUSBSR, the first macro-regional strategy of its kind. This chapter provides a thorough assessment of the main achievements and shortcomings of the Strategy. Although the EUSBSR has made significant progress since its inception, some impor-tant issues – in particular vis-à-vis the governance architecture, political leadership and added value of the Strategy – still remain to be tackled. In chapter 7 Attila Ágh assesses the institutional and governance struc-ture of the EUSDR and the impact this triggered on wider cooperation in the region. In chapter 8, Battistina Cugusi and Andrea Stocchiero focus


on the drafting of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian area, which is currently under way, a process which has seen a strong coalition forged between the member states bordering the Adriatic Sea coupled, at the same time, with the entrepreneurship and proactiveness of Italian Adriatic and Ionian Regions. In chapter 9, Jörg Balsiger explores the state of the macro-regional strategy for the Alps which received an endorsement from the European Council in December 2013. He suggests that nascent forms of regional governance are not above the national state but rather instantiated within it. The last two chapters explore EU macro-regions in the making which have not yet been embraced by macro-regional strategies. In chapter 10, Mike Danson explores the North Sea Region while considering the existing initiatives and plans for the macro-region and by looking at the experiences in other parts of Europe where such transnational platforms have been implemented. Danson examines the tensions between the aspirations and opportuni-ties of the regions and communities bordering the North Sea on the one hand and the core regions of Europe (as well as those within each of the participant countries) on the other. In chapter 11, Mark Wise eventu-ally charts the contours of the Atlantic Arc ‘macro-region’ that emerged from the idea that a distinctive area extends along Europe’s western maritime fringe linked by common socio-cultural characteristics and a shared political-economic interest in resisting ‘peripheralization’ within an EU progressively enlarging north, south and eastwards.

This introductory chapter has raised the question whether we are wit-nessing the emergence of a new form of EU governance. The answer to this question needs to take at least two dimensions into account. First, if we perceive of governance or modes of governance in terms of, for exam-ple, ‘coercion, voluntarism, targeting and framework regulation’ (see Treib et al., 2007 for an overview), the answer would presumably be ‘no’, since processes of macro-regionalization in general and macro-regional strategies in particular do not embrace any new features of EU govern-ance. Second, if, in contrast, we perceive of governance as an intermedi-ary level of the EU’s MLG system, the answer is ‘yes’, as macro-regions seem to be ‘a new and complementary layer of integration in Europe [. . .] that is not an isolated phenomenon but indicates a general process of territorial restructuring or spatial reconfiguration which essentially changes Europe’s existing geography’ (Nagler, 2013, p. 56). Clearly, our answers are very tentative at this early stage of macro-regionalization and macro-regional strategies. With a view to the recent development across the EU’s Eastern borders – in particular the Ukrainian, if not Russian, crisis – some of the features of EU macro-regional strategies


presented here, such as the relative openness vis-à-vis non-EU partner countries, are by no way irreversible. Still, from our perspective, first and foremost, it is important to see that EU macro-regional strategies seek to establish a strategic framework in favour of comprehensive, cross-sectoral and transnational approaches across all levels of the complex EU MLG system (including its immediate neighbourhood) with a view to tackling common challenges and concerns in a given functional and cultural space. It is an interesting question for future research to see what precisely the relationship between ‘functionality’ and ‘culturality’ is as a precondition for effective cooperation. Second, we argue that macro-regional strategies aim at supporting global EU policies and nar-ratives – such as the broader ramification of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy (most recently Europe 2020) – in more narrowly confined geographical context appropriate to functional cooperation. Third, macro-regional strategies and macro-regionalization affect the existing governance architecture of regional cooperation in macro-regions. Despite the man-tra of the ‘three No’s’, EU macro-regional strategies do have a significant impact on existing institutions, legislations and funding schemes.

Notes

1 On 14 December 2012, the European Council called upon the Commission to elaborate ‘subject to the evaluation of the concept of macro-regional strate-gies [. . .] a new EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region before the end of 2014’ (European Council, 2012, p. 11). On 15 May 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of an Alpine macro-regional strat-egy (European Parliament, 2013), and the European Council of 20 December 2013, eventually invited ‘the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, to elaborate an EU Strategy for the Alpine Region by June 2015’ (European Council, 2013, p. 25). In the same vein, the European Parliament, at its plenary meeting on 23 October 2013, endorsed and approved a budget line of €250,000 in 2014 for a preparatory action to study the feasibility of a North Sea Strategy.

2 Macro-regional Strategies are part of several innovations in European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). Amongst others, the European Regulation on the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) was introduced in 2006 (and revised in 2013), in order to provide territorial cooperation with a legal personality and to make cross-border cooperation more stable and long-term oriented.

3 Germany (i.e. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro as well as Moldova and the southwest-ern part of Ukraine.

4 Subregional cooperation has been referred to as ‘a process of regularised, sig-nificant political and economic interaction among a group of neighbouring


states [. . .] between national governments, local authorities, private business and civil society actors across a wide range of issues’ (Dwan, 2000, p. 81).

5 With regard to the place of the Baltic Sea Region – increasingly represented with a capital ‘R’ – in the system for European multilevel governance, Thomas Christiansen has already referred to this particular part of Europe in terms of a ‘meso-region’ (Christiansen, 1997) located between the European and the member states’ level.

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Part II

Development of EU Macro-regional Strategies


25

Introduction

Though the concept of macro-regional strategies that emerged in 2004/2005 was a new programme for the EU itself, the form and con-tent of envisaged activities were not exactly a novel development within Europe. A plethora of multilateral cross-border cooperation platforms already existed in the form of the so-called subregional groupings (SRGs) that had proliferated in Europe after 1989. Every state currently included in one or more of the three EU macro-regions presently in action – the Adriatic and Ionian, the Baltic Sea and the Danube Region (or in advanced planning) the Alpine Region – was and remains a part-ner in one or more SRGs. Most SRGs have traditionally had, and continue to have, cooperation agendas that resemble the goals and activities of EU macro-regions. They also occupied, in whole or in part, the same territorial spaces. This was the case for the Baltic Sea macro-region and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and the first draft of the Danube Basin macro-region was more than reminiscent of the Trieste-based Central European Initiative (CEI) in terms of not only its member countries but also its portfolios of activity.

SRGs were, however, clearly unable to take on the role envisaged for macro-regional strategies. As independent and autonomous in their own specific identities, they could not have been simply ‘taken over’ for an EU agenda. Besides, macro-regional strategies are different in some fundamental ways. So far they have been formed in territorial spaces based on a significant geographic/physical characteristic, for example, the Danube Basin and Baltic Sea. They are also tightly linked to aspects of the European integration agenda such as the goal of territorial cohe-sion. Perhaps more importantly, they are of a vastly greater magnitude,

2From Subregionalism to Macro-regionalism in Europe and the European UnionMartin Dangerfield


both in terms of the cooperation agenda’s substance and scope and in terms of the resources they can draw on (e.g. EU structural funds). Macro-regional strategies are also distinctly transnational in character, whereas SRGs are primarily intergovernmental arrangements, although non-state actors do deliver some of their agendas. SRGs should, nev-ertheless, certainly be recognized both as important antecedents that undoubtedly helped germinate the idea of the EU macro-regional approach and as prototypes for the envisaged kinds of cross-border collaboration. Moreover, certain groupings participated in the design and planning stages of macro-regional strategies and, from the outset, clearly planned to take part in their implementation and delivery. Some of them appear to have done so. As Cugusi and Stocchiero (chapter 8 in this volume) show, the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (AII) is an outstand-ing example, having played a key role in bringing the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region (EUSAIR) into fruition. The CBSS has also been a key player in both the development and, in particular, the operationalization of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Finally, it is interesting to note that the 2014–16 Action Plan of one of the very earliest post-Cold War groupings, the CEI, declares its capacity to ‘play a bridging role between European Macro-regions’ (CEI Action Plan, 2014–16, 3).

This chapter provides a survey of the various SRGs operating in and around the EU when the EU’s macro-regional project began taking shape. The first section describes the broad characteristics of SRGs and identifies the main European groupings. The second section explores the role, functions and limitations of SRGs, stressing that they were in no way comparable to the main intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in Europe. The third section focuses on the dynamics of subregionalism in Europe, emphasizing the crucial role of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement processes. The fourth section discusses some important differences among the European SRGs, since despite being part of the same ‘genus’ of organization, some crucial dis-tinctions have undoubtedly affected the extent to which they have been involved in the EU macro-regional strategy. This will lead into the final part of the chapter which is an initial exploration of the relationship between SRGs and EU macro-regional strategies. It focuses on the role played by certain SRGs in both the development and delivery of EU macro-regions and highlights some interesting differences between the EUSBSR, where SRGs are playing leading roles, and the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), where SRGs have been rather marginalized. This raises an interesting question about whether results

Martin Dangerfield 27

of macro-regional strategies to date might be connected to the kind of foundation of subregionalism that was already in place.

Subregionalism in Europe

Subregional cooperation has been defined as ‘a process of regularised, significant political and economic interaction among a group of neigh-bouring states [. . .] between national governments, local authorities, private business and civil society actors across a wide range of issues’ (Dwan, 2000, 81). Though varying between groupings, one could dis-tinguish between the political dimension of cooperation, which often drew accusations that SRGs were essentially mere ‘talking shops’, and practical, project-based or thematic elements (e.g. trade liberalization schemes). Agendas and activities of SRGs concern mainly practical cross-border cooperation in various spheres, including economic devel-opment, EU pre-accession support, education, transport, tourism, cul-ture, science and technology, environment, organized crime and border management. By targeting issues that were necessarily multilateral but were either outside the direct concern of larger regional entities or con-nected to the EU’s pre-accession agenda, SRGs have been a clear case of multilevel governance at work. Minić’s recent study of subregional cooperation in the Western Balkans illustrates very well the typical role of SRGs and also the difficulty of monitoring the plethora of activity they generate. She cites a 2011 analysis by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), which identified ‘302 regional events, mostly organised by different regional initiatives, but also by some other partners in the region, primarily from the EU. These events included those of economic and social development in the region (51), justice and home affairs (39), energy and infrastructure (36), security cooperation (32), high profile political meetings (31), the building of human capital (21), and so on. According to the RCC’s estimate this represents only about half of the regional events, or events devoted to the region, this year – i.e. those for which there were available data’ (Minić, 2013, 31).

Scholarly focus on subregionalism in Europe remains modest and only really got underway in the mid-1990s, stimulated by the arrival of many new SRGs onto the European scene after the fall of communism. Those post-Cold War groupings ‘share the experience of having been developed along the old “East-West” dividing line’ (Bjurner, 1999, 10) and can be considered as ‘new’ subregionalism.1 The Benelux Economic Union (BEU) and Nordic Council (NC) are by contrast exclusively West European formations established in the Cold War context.2 The BEU,


formed in 1944, pre-dated the EU’s forerunner institutions, providing these with a model for economic integration. Both the BEU and the NC introduced various forms of cross-border cooperation and integra-tion (e.g. police cooperation and passport-free travel) before they were incorporated into the EU. Thus, Inotai (1997) considers the BEU and NC as examples of ‘pioneering’ subregional cooperation, something which would clearly not apply to the post-1989 SRGs.3 Yet broad parallels do exist between ‘old’ and ‘new’ subregionalism in that both generations have played a role in the evolution of the European integration process in their respective historical settings.

Table 2.1 lists the main SRGs that were operating in and around the EU at the time of the launch of the macro-regional strategy. They tend to be concentrated in Europe’s north, centre, southeast (Balkans) and east. Numerous states belong to two subregions and several (including Albania, Croatia, Moldova, among others) to even three. Some incor-porate both EU member and non-member states; others are exclusively groups for future EU members (see Table 2.1). This list should be treated with caution as it may not be exhaustive and other scholars might legiti-mately prefer an expanded list. The approach taken here (and also in previous such studies by the author) is to stay in line with the few, albeit rather substantial, academic studies in the field. Certain groupings or entities are excluded because they are either: associated with EU regional frameworks (e.g. the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean); contain states, predominantly or partially, that are not European and/or not included in EU macro-regions (e.g. the Arctic Council, Union of Arab Maghreb, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation); have a single, distinct or thematic agenda (Helsinki Convention); or the areas cov-ered correspond with what have been convincingly labelled ‘substate regions’ whereby such cooperation between two or more contiguous states has been referred to as simply ‘transfrontier’ or ‘cross-border’ (see Cottey, 1999). Deas and Lord (2006) identify some 145 examples of this type of cooperation, which they call ‘non-standard regionalism’ and which, when mapped, reveals an elaboration of ‘confusing, overlapping boundaries, reflecting both the infancy of many of the initiatives, their often-experimental nature and, in many cases, their continuing struggle to establish legitimacy and permanency’ (Deas and Lord, 2006, 1850–1). The list could be longer if the vast number of spin-off and thematic schemes of certain SRGs were included. For example in the Western Balkans, more than 50 different organizations, initiatives and networks spanning a large variety of common concerns are currently in operation (Minić, 2013). Indeed, due to the density, diversity and sheer plethora


of cross-border cooperation activity in the Western Balkans, Stubbs and Solioz (2012) suggest that what exists there is ‘open regionalism’ con-sisting of ‘multi-actor and multi-scalar processes producing a complex geometry of interlocking networks’. Whatever classification is chosen, it is clear that subregionalism has become an increasingly widespread and significant feature of post-Cold War Europe, and that macro-region strategies therefore represented a potential incursion into what many regarded as an already ‘crowded playground’.

Table 2.1 Subregional groupings in Europe

Name and founding year Members 2014 Website

Adriatic–Ionian Initiative, 2000

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia

http://www.aii-ps.org/

Baltic Cooperation, 1992

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania http://baltasam.org/en/

Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 1993

Denmark, EU, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden

http://www.beac.st/in-English/Barents-Euro-Arctic-Council

Benelux Economic Union, 1944

Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands

http://www.benelux.int/

Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 1992

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine

http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx

Central European Initiative, 1989

Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

http://www.cei.int/

Central European Free Trade Agreement, 1993

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia

http://www.cefta.int/

Council of the Baltic Sea States, 1992

Denmark, Estonia, EU, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden

http://www.cbss.org/

(continued )


Finally, terminological ambiguity has persisted due to the frequent tendency for these European groupings to be referred to alternatively as both subregional and regional. Flexibility and interchangeability of labels are to be expected, but for the entities under scrutiny here, ‘sub-regional’ seems most apt. As Petritsch and Solioz point out, ‘while some authors treat “regional cooperation” and “subregional cooperation” as synonymous, others distinguish between (broad) regional and subre-gional cooperation: the first referring to wider regional processes (at the level of the EU or at the pan-European level of the Council of Europe and the OSCE); the latter to cooperative schemes in a distinct and limited

Name and founding year Members 2014 Website

Nordic Council/Nordic Council of Ministers, 1952

Denmark, Finland, Iceland (plus the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland), Norway, Sweden

http://www.norden.org/en

GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, 1997

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

http://www.guam organization.org/en/node

Regional Cooperation Council 2008

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey (and various other partners including the EU)

http://www.rcc.int/

South-East European Cooperation Initiative, 1996

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey

http://www.secinet.org

South-East European Cooperation Process, 1996

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey

http://rspcsee.org/en/pages/read/about-seecp

Visegrad Group, 1991

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia

http://www.visegradgroup.eu/

Source: Author’s compilation.

Table 2.1 (continued)


area’ (Petritsch and Solioz, 2008, 19–20). Similarly, but also acknowledg-ing that territorial contiguity is not the only criterion, Cottey took the line that ‘Europe is a “region” of the world [. . . and] sub-regional refers to a geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area within the OSCE space as a whole. The term is not exact, since it is clear that the definition of any sub-region (like that of a region) reflects not only geography, but also history and politics – often making the issue conten-tious’ (Cottey, 1999, 5–6). The introduction of ‘macro-region’ appears to enhance confusion. Yet since there are cases where the same set of countries could be regarded simultaneously as a subregion and macro-region, it seems more than reasonable – from the perspective of territo-rial criteria at least – that these two terms should simply be regarded as interchangeable as well.

The role and limitations of subregionalism in Europe

As the cooperation themes noted above demonstrate, a ‘low politics’ agenda has been and still is a key defining characteristic of multilateral subregional cooperation.4 Thus, the role and significance of SRGs were never remotely comparable to the ‘larger’ pan-European/Euro-Atlantic entities (EU, NATO and OSCE). The latter are of a completely different magnitude in terms of mission, geographic reach, resources, depth of political commitment invested, global as well as regional resonance and so on. As Cottey (1999, 3) observed: ‘Sub-regional groups have received relatively little attention and are often perceived as weak. They lack the economic power of the EU, the military power of NATO or the norma-tive standard-setting role of the pan-European OSCE.’ It is important to remember the overwhelming conviction of political elites that NATO and EU membership was necessary to guarantee their security needs and economic development aspirations. It was in this context that participa-tion in SRGs was pursued to facilitate accession strategies, and utilized to overcome the lack of enthusiasm, or even mistrust, among former Eastern Bloc states in building networks of cooperation. As Machowski (1997, 9) explained, the ‘economic and political joining together of the Central and East European countries continues to be heavily bur-dened by post-war history: the ‘Yalta Syndrome’ and the ‘Comecon Syndrome’ are still, in the seventh year following the social-political revolution, considerable hindrances to a thriving neighbourhood in this region’. Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), for example, only really came about because of European Commission pressure on the Visegrad states to start mutual trade liberalization (Dangerfield, 2004). The difficulties of engaging ex-Yugoslav countries in mutual subregional


cooperation have also been very well documented.5 The Baltic states were in a somewhat different situation, as their subregional choices included the opportunity to cooperate with EU members and other Nordic states. This not only promised assistance with their EU pre-accession process but also, via the CBSS, provided a platform through which the Baltic states could develop cooperative relations with Russia on a less asym-metrical footing (Stålvant, 1999).6 Thus, a key point seems to be that sustainability and success of subregional cooperation in part benefited from avoidance of any EU- or NATO-like agendas of their own. Rather the focus was to be on shared challenges and opportunities within the subregion which the larger regional bodies did not address while mak-ing sure to keep any sensitive issues (such as minorities) off the agenda and to otherwise treat them as vehicles to support Euro-Atlantic integra-tion aspirations.

The more prominent early studies (Cottey, 1996, 1999; Bailes, 1997) emphasized stabilization and security-building properties of the post-1990 SRGs. Rather than the traditional realm of security cooperation (military alliances, arms control agreements and so on) the focus was on subtler, less ‘hard’ security functions. According to Bailes (1997, 30):

[The] largest contribution all these groups make to security is probably at the unexpressed, existential level: the mere fact that their members belong somewhere, that they understand each other, that they can talk about their worries in the corridors, that they have telephone numbers to dial in a crisis. Beyond this, all the groupings under study have made some strides (whether they recognize it or not) in soft security, by easing human and economic exchanges across frontiers and thus helping to build wider social foundations for stability and understanding.

It was no coincidence that interest in subregional cooperation grew at the very time of serious moves forward in EU and NATO eastward expan-sion, implying potential new rifts that were a serious worry to many observers. Thus, there was ‘growing political and institutional recogni-tion in Europe of the value of these existing sub-regional groups, fuelled by interest in their capacity to cushion or mediate the tensions of NATO/EU enlargement’ (Bremner and Bailes, 1998, 133). As well the ‘dividing line’ aspects of EU and NATO enlargement agendas, SRGs developed the role of supporting those post-communist states that had realistic ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Direct contribu-tions to this were anticipated, should suitably cognate groupings agree


to ‘adopt a joint pre-accession strategy and work together to try out, or approach by stages, the standards and mechanisms of the target inte-grated group’ (Bailes, 1997, 30).

The EU enlargement process in particular has been a key driver of the shifting landscape of subregional cooperation during the post-Cold War period. Accession has led to the abolition of some entities, reconfigura-tion of the membership of others and adjustment of the nature and pur-pose of yet others to the post-accession environment. All SRGs, whether they directly intended it or not, contributed to the EU pre-accession process via the help they gave in achieving the ‘baseline’ conditions for engagement with the EU and NATO in the form of the stabilization and security-building effects already noted. Additionally, some groupings (such as CBSS, CEI) were able to include transfer of accession-related know-how to EU aspirants. Some SRGs were essentially dedicated pre-accession instruments. The Visegrad Group (VG) focused on political cooperation to support EU and NATO ambitions and had a range of use-ful results, though its contributions during the actual EU pre- accession process were rather negligible. CEFTA and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA) are better examples of useful practical and political inputs to the EU entry endeavour.7 These included market integration and mutual trade growth, gathering experience of intergovernmental cooperation and an opportunity to explore other avenues of EU pre-accession coop-eration. This model could also accommodate states at different stages in the EU accession process, as the steady expansion of CEFTA from its VG roots clearly demonstrated. While the level of economic integra-tion which could be achieved was ultimately to remain at the rather basic level of trade liberalization with deeper integration to be achieved only in the context of EU membership, the CEFTA and BFTA experiences genuinely assisted the EU accession preparations and also sent out a message to other subregions that this model of cooperation in no way hindered EU membership prospects (see Dangerfield, 2004). All these experiences reveal that subregional cooperation has also been a tool for ‘Europeanization’, be it in the form of developing the baseline condi-tions for engagement with the European integration process proper or playing an effective role in the EU pre-accession process itself.

Assessment of subregionalism is obviously a difficult exercise. There are many SRGs with varied functions and many different branches of activity. Charges of such groupings ultimately constituting unproductive ‘talk-ing shops’ or opportunities for ‘diplomatic tourism’ and well-paid sine-cures no doubt have some validity, but this validity is not generalizable, being as variable as the wide differences among the nature and scope of


the SRGs themselves. Moreover, most of them have attempted to signifi-cantly switch focus and resources towards more practical, project-based activity. Even then there are clear problems with any attempt to evalu-ate such disparate and disaggregated activities. Positive rhetoric from the partner countries might be expected, but most SRGs have now sur-vived for over 20 years or more, suggesting that they have demonstrated their overall value. The participating states have remained willing to continue to invest money, human resources and political capital in these groupings and external agencies have entrusted them with public funding, both of which are further signs that a positive assessment is valid. Scholarly assessments tend to be somewhat cautious but gener-ally regard SRGs as worthwhile. Despite his reservations about tenden-cies towards ‘rhetorical regionalism’, Cottey (2009) identifies four main roles for subregionalism in Europe: bridge-building between EU/NATO members and non-members; an ‘integrative function’ supporting EU and NATO aspirant members; a framework to tackle transnational policy challenges; and supporting (economic, political, institutional) reform in participating states. The extent to which these roles apply across the whole range of SRGs will vary over time and according to specific organ-izations, but the overall verdict is that despite being overshadowed by the main European IGOs, their influence has been positive, albeit rela-tively modest.

Dynamics of ‘new’ subregionalism in Europe

The European subregional cooperation landscape has not been static, either in terms of the number and geographic location of SRGs, their membership or in terms of their missions. As Table 2.1 shows, with the exception of the Western Balkans, most ‘new’ SRGs formed in the early 1990s were concentrated in Northern and Central Europe. SRGs have experienced ongoing adaptation quite closely tied to the broader evolu-tion of the EU and NATO, though some territorial specifics have been very important too. As noted above, the EU enlargement process has been a particularly strong dynamic (applicable to NATO as well, though to a lesser extent due to its narrower reform agenda). The post-enlargement era has been an equally significant phase, especially as this has coin-cided with the rise of subregional cooperation in the Western Balkans and the emergence of a new agenda for much closer relations with the neighbours of the expanded EU, especially in Eastern Europe.

The 2004 eastward EU enlargement deleted the accession-related func-tions of numerous SRGs. The BFTA was abolished and the membership


of CEFTA seriously depleted following compulsory withdrawal of the Visegrad states and Slovenia. CEFTA is now a wholly Southeast European entity. There were also important implications for those SRGs – most notably the CEI and CBSS – that had originally combined EU mem-bers with various categories of non-member and which had included pre-accession assistance in broader multifaceted cooperation agendas. In those cases, the EU integration assistance programmes were either no longer needed internally (CBSS) or re-focused onto the next batch of future EU members or new neighbours (CEI). Members of VG and the Baltic Cooperation (BC) all joined the EU together, so with the original missions now completed, both organizations had to overcome question marks over their future viability and develop important post-accession roles. The VG has strengthened and developed internal cooperation, pursues well-developed, albeit flexible, cooperation in the EU, and has grown a foreign policy cooperation agenda vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, and especially the EU’s eastern neighbours. It has cooper-ated increasingly with other SRGs (BEU, NC, GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development [GUAM]) in the so-called V4+ format. The BC also developed its post-accession role but arguably as a less distinct identity in that the ‘centre of gravity of their coopera-tion has increasingly shifted towards cooperation with the entire Nordic region, especially within the framework of the NB8 format, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the EU Baltic Sea Strategy’ (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Though the Dayton Agreement marked the effective starting point of subregionalism in the Western Balkans, regime changes in Croatia and Serbia have been the major stimulant in shifting the EU’s enlargement focus to this region. The Western Balkans has been the site of the most intensive involvement of the international community (and especially the EU) in the subregional cooperation process. This included pressure to develop and sustain multilateral cooperation, provision of funding and an active role in the design and delivery of the programmes. The Western Balkans is therefore the outstanding example of externally driven and imposed subregional cooperation, yet the sense and real-ity of local ‘ownership’ has genuinely grown. Minić (2013) identifies the following three interrelated core functions of subregional coop-eration in the Western Balkans: fostering reconciliation, stability and prosperity; meeting EU conditionality; and supporting socio-economic development. She also structures the subregional cooperation architec-ture into three main components as follows: ‘(1) the SEECP as a strong regional promoter of stabilization and reforms, covering the whole of


the Balkans and fully regionally owned from the very beginning; (2) the Stability Pact for SEE has been transformed into the regionally owned Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which in 2013 celebrated its fifth anniversary as an effective operational arm of the SEECP and the main regional coordination mechanism, and (3) over 50 different regional organizations, initiatives and networks operating in the wide spectrum of areas of common interest for the countries in the region. Most of them have been established by the interested stakeholders in the region, or in cooperation with external partners and, in some cases, by the EU or other international agencies/organizations’ (Minić, 2013, 25).

The proliferation of subregional cooperation in the Western Balkans has created both opportunities and threats for other SRGs. The VG has focused its foreign policy cooperation in part on the Western Balkans and offered support at the political and practical (project-based) level.8 The CEI on the other hand feared marginalization in the subregion it regarded as its core arena of work. Indeed, a major internal reflection and review of the CEI in 2002 was the result of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SP) that gave the EU and other partners an externally funded and ‘hands-on’ role in West Balkan subregional cooperation, and not the result of EU enlargement. One consequence of that review was that the CEI would focus much less on the declaratory and politi-cal level in its work and much more on concrete project-based activity with an increased effort to tap external funding (see Dangerfield, 2005). Finally, increased EU attention to its eastern ex-Soviet neighbours, the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 and subse-quently of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), has influenced the cooperation agendas of SRGs in Northern and Central Europe. As noted already, the VG is certainly a definite player in the EU’s ‘eastern’ policy, sometimes in partnership with the NC and BC which also cooperate intensively in that realm.9 As will be discussed later, macro-regional policy is of course the latest EU development with significant consequences for the role and relevance of SRGs.

Varieties of subregionalism

When it comes to important differences between the various SRGs in Europe, the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ subregionalism has already been mentioned. This section will concentrate on the new SRGs, as they are clearly more relevant to the macro-regional issue, and while there are just two real examples of ‘old’ subregionalism, at least twelve different organizations sprung up after 1989. The generic features of


‘new’ SRGs include their post-Cold War identity, tendency to be located around the 1989 EU borderlands, common ‘soft’ security-building capa-bilities, similar and often overlapping fields of practical cooperation and some form of connection to the EU enlargement process. Yet there is also significant diversity. First, the EU has direct participation in some groupings only, which are the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), CBSS, RCC and Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) (as observer). Some groupings combine EU members and non-members (such as BEAC, CBSS, CEI and BSEC), while other groupings consist of exclu-sively non-EU members (such as CEFTA and GUAM) or exclusively EU members (BEU, BC and VG). Second, the groupings can also be classified according to their core goals and cooperation agendas. Whereas most groupings have rather flexible and broad-based, ‘loose’ portfolios of cooperation, a few have had much narrower agendas, usually connected directly to EU pre-accession preparations, for example, CEFTA. Third, while most groupings have permanent institutions such as a Secretariat, others manage without any. Fourth, some groupings (BEAC, CBSS and BSEC) are arguably ‘more “natural” subregions than those defined by the Visegrad Group, CEFTA or the CEI, with deeper and more sustain-able subregional identities. This geography in turn creates substantial interdependence, particularly in terms of the environment, which means that the countries of the subregion face certain shared problems (environmental degradation, infrastructure and transport) which can only be resolved through cooperation’ (Cottey, 1999, 247). Less ‘natu-ral’ subregions therefore have to be ‘created’ and perhaps sustained with external pressure, especially where there is strong initial reluctance and a residual commitment deficit. Finally, a distinction can be made between first-generation groupings, which include all those mentioned so far, and the second-generation groupings that appeared in the mid-to-late 1990s in South-East Europe (SEE). The South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) are mainly focused on the former Yugoslavia, which explains why they were slower to evolve and only became seriously active after 2000.

Differentiated relations between SRGs and the EU, which has been a relevant influence on the development and dynamics of subregional cooperation and are generally mutually supportive, merit some further discussion.10 So far, as noted above, the EU has only participated directly in certain SRGs. This could be explained by various factors, including the predominance of EU members in CBSS and BEAC, the connection with major EU initiatives (in particular the Northern Dimension) and the importance of EU programmes (such as INTERREG and TACIS) in


promoting integration and tackling acute problems of interdependence. The presence of Russia in CBSS, BEAC and BSEC was also relevant. The CEI has a large and diverse membership, but the EU is not directly involved. As well as a lack of EU initiatives equivalent to the Northern Dimension, the CEI represents a less coherent geographic subregion with a much smaller natural cross-border cooperation agenda in soft security. Equally, if not more importantly, the CEI is a rather specific example of an SRG founded and sponsored in order to serve the foreign policy goals of two dominant members: Italy and (to a lesser extent) Austria. SRGs consisting of new or future EU member states have experienced EU ‘sub-region-building’ activities. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the EU’s relatively low-profile role in promoting subregional cooperation involved low-key political pressure for the Visegrad states to cooperate among themselves, first and foremost, in the realm of economic integration. The EU engagement in SEE, which took off fully after 1999, has fea-tured a much more comprehensive, ‘hands-on’ approach.11 Western Balkan states came under strong pressure to cooperate intensively across several themes, ranging across trade liberalization, return of refugees, border management, combating organized crime, energy security, trans-port infrastructure and so on. This cooperation requirement has been firmly embedded in EU conditionality and implemented not only via EU agreements and through financial/technical assistance instruments, but also in tandem with other bodies sponsored by the broader inter-national community, most notably the SP and its successor, the RCC. Despite differing intensities of the EU’s ‘subregion-building’ role in CEE and SEE, both cases represent examples of the more explicit links between subregional cooperation and EU integration. This is, in turn, part of a triangulated relationship between subregional cooperation, EU enlargement and EU security policy, especially in SEE where subregional cooperation was ‘engineered from outside and approached as a peace project from a neo-functionalist viewpoint. [And where f]irstly, coopera-tion had to be established through the promotion of cross-border activi-ties such as transport, trade, production and welfare; and secondly, this cooperation process was supposed to guarantee security and stability’ (Petritsch and Solioz, 2008, 18).

The differences highlighted above not only are important for under-standing the nature and functions of subregional cooperation as a phenomenon, but also seem to be relevant to connections between subregionalism and EU macro-regional strategies. For many SRGs, EU macro-regional strategies have presented an opportunity to cement their place as permanent players in the European political landscape.


These numerous cross-border cooperation platforms represented impor-tant pre-existing resources and repositories of relevant expertise and experience that could be harnessed in order to help maximize the effec-tiveness and efficiency of macro-regional strategies. In other words, positive synergies between SRGs and macro-regional strategies could be envisaged from the start.

Subregional cooperation and EU macro-regions

Since the relevant chapters of this volume provide details of the role of specific SRGs in the different EU macro-regions, this final section con-centrates on some general observations about links between subregion-alism and macro-regional strategies. To begin with, it should be noted that the extent of subregionalism already in place during the launch of the EU macro-regional strategy was an important reason why the maxim ‘no new institutions’ was rapidly accepted as a core principle. Europe was already littered with many SRGs that in some cases actually corresponded (more or less) with the territorial formulations of the first wave of macro-regions. Even those that lacked formal institutions were of such a nature that they required upper echelon political figures from the member states to attend official gatherings and devote other govern-ment resources to various meetings and events. The crucial role of SRGs in the development of the EUSBSR further reinforces this point.

While SRGs have certainly been engaged in both the preparatory/con-sultative and operational phases of macro-regional strategies, participa-tion has been somewhat uneven. Most SRGs have had at least some involvement, though a few are conspicuous by their absence, including CEFTA, probably because it is essentially a focused single-issue coop-eration framework; GUAM, which has no EU members and lies outside of any macro-region; the BEU and VG, both smaller groupings inside the EU which focus on internal cooperation agendas or, in the case of the VG, on specific areas of foreign policy cooperation.12 SRGs with involvement in macro-regional strategies tend to have the following characteristics: territorially cognate memberships; broad-based coopera-tion agendas; well-established and leading agency role in pre-existing cross-border cooperation processes; interest in accessing additional funding, containing secretariats that help drive the changing agendas of the organization and are motivated to ensure longevity and adaptation (possible examples of ‘new institutionalism’ at work).

As far as the role of SRGs in the preparatory/consultative phase of macro-regional strategies is concerned, it is well established that the


CBSS was a key actor in the case of the EUSBSR. The latter was a standing item on every executive meeting of the CBSS during the Danish presi-dency of 2008–09. Also the ‘European Commission’s delegate has kept the CSO (Committee of Senior Officials – author’s interview) updated on the development of the strategy. The CSO Chairman attended the first Stakeholder Conference in Stockholm on 30 September 2008’ (Council of the Baltic Sea States, 2009, 10). In June 2011, the European Commission reported that the ‘Nordic Council of Ministers, the Baltic Council of Ministers and the CBSS give prominence to the Strategy on their political agendas, and by organising common events. Also, the offi-cial web-pages of Norden Cooperation note that the “Nordic Council of Ministers” focuses first and foremost on development and growth in the Baltic Sea Region and, in the years to come, will play an impor-tant role in the implementation of the EU’s strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.’13 As noted in the introduction, the AII more or less took the lead role in pushing for the establishment of the EUSAIR. In the case of the EUSDR, it was more a case of SRGs involving themselves in the consultation process, and demonstrating their willingness to engage. The CEI, for example, showed a strong interest and pushed (unsuc-cessfully) for a significant role. In 2010, its officials held meetings with the then European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn, and other DG Regio (Directorate General of Regional Policy and Urban Policy) representatives in order to obtain a role in the elaboration of the EUSDR Action Plan and also attended various stakeholder conferences.14 SECI, in its 2009 annual report, called for that year to be remembered ‘as the Danube year, since in this year the long awaited result for bring-ing the Danube countries closer together as one unique and specific macro-region, has become more tangible. SECI closely followed the con-sultation processes at all levels and supported the Danube countries and the relevant stakeholders in taking active participation in this policy development process. Specific activities were developed in the area of the transport and navigation infrastructure development, where the role of the private sector and the affected industry representatives in specific infrastructure projects has been closely examined’ (Southeast Europe Security Initiative, 2009). The RCC also stresses that its Secretariat, ‘in bringing the wider regional perspective, mobilising local authorities and civil society, promoting inter-sectoral cooperation and integrated approach etc., was recognised in preparation and implementation of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EU SDR). There is still room to improve coordination between different initiatives and projects, in order to avoid overlapping and duplication of efforts and save the scarce funding available’ (Regional Cooperation Council, 2013, 31).


SRGs’ involvement in the delivery phase of macro-regional strate-gies is most prominent in the EUSBSR. The CBSS has continued its leading role with its Secretariat, having taken on one Priority Area Coordinator (PAC) role, three Horizontal Action Leader (HAL) roles and also acting as the EUSBSR’s task force for communications. The Nordic Council of Ministers shares one HAL role with the CBSS. SRG involve-ment in the EUSDR is far less prominent, but the EUSDR’s ‘Who Is Who?’ section lists the following ‘relevant institutions’: AII, BSEC, CEI, RCC, SECI and SEECP. Staying with the EUSDR, Austria took over the annual CEI presidency in January 2014 with the slogan ‘CEI as a Bridge between European (Macro) Regions/Synergies with other International Organisations’ (Reference). The first meeting of the national CEI coor-dinators was held under this motto in Vienna on 24 January (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2014).15 Yet this idea has no formal status in any macro-regional strategy, and, as noted, the CEI had no role in the elaboration of the EUSDR Action Plan. It remains on the fringes of the EUSDR with just some informal contacts with some PACs and no pro-ject involvement.

Conclusions

EU macro-regional strategies are continuing an established tradition of cross-border cooperation in Europe that has operated alongside, though separately from, the European integration process. In many ways, the subregional cooperation platforms discussed in this chapter can be considered as the precursors of macro-regionalism in the EU. Several EU member states that were designated participants in the first wave of macro-regional strategies were also actively involved in at least one (usually more) of the extant SRGs. Furthermore, whilst SRGs each had distinct characteristics in terms of their origins, purpose, degree of institutionalization, scale and scope, relationship to the EU and the accession process, resources and so on, they nevertheless all shared the fact of being engaged (to varying degrees) in the kinds of cross-border cooperation activities envisaged for EU macro-regions. Moreover, many groupings were involved with, or at least attempted to take part in, the early discussions about the scope, role and operational characteristics of macro-regional strategies, and indeed, several of them are now relevant actors in the actual running of these realized macro-regions.

The planning of macro-regional strategies had different approaches to the utilization of SRGs with the relevant organizations having heavy involvement in the EUSBSR and (at least initially) in the EUSAIR. The main SRG already in operation in the Danube region, the CEI, was,


however, rather sidelined. This has been reflected in the operational phase as well. Pre-existing SRGs (CBSS and NC) have core/executive roles in the delivery of the EUSBSR. In the EUSDR, all PAC roles are occupied by government bodies, usually ministries (including those at the subnational level in the case of the German Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), with the exception of PAC 10 (Institutions) which are assumed by the city of Vienna. This raises two issues. First, how relevant were the pre-existing differences in the prevailing sub-regional cooperation in these two macro-regions? The EUSBSR region had a long-established tradition of subregionalism that was dense and effective, with genuine common agendas. It was based on developed and prosperous states, a majority of which are EU members with good governance and considerable homogeneity in that respect. This was not the case for the EUSDR, where the tradition of subregionalism was: not so well established, less territorially coherent, focused strongly on EU accession, included many relatively poor and underdeveloped states with weak governance and combined sets of states that had dif-ficult/tense relations with each other. Second, the results of the EUSBSR are so far more positive than the EUSDR; so does the performance of macro-regional strategies therefore depend at least in part on whether these strategies were underpinned by effective, pre-existing subre-gional cooperation? This intriguing question is beyond the scope of this chapter. What does seem beyond doubt is that the SRGs of Europe are both precursors of and active participants in EU macro-regional strategies, and that the clear significance of their roles merits further investigation.

Notes

1 This of course follows the lead of the literature on comparative regionalism which distinguishes between, say, the EU as ‘old’ regionalism and the numer-ous examples of ‘new’ regionalism which flowered in the post–Cold War/glo-balization context.

2 One organization – the CEI – actually straddled the two eras because even though it was formally created on 11 November 1989, its roots go back to the ‘Alpe-Adria Working Group’ set up in 1978. See Dangerfield (2005).

3 For more examples of ‘pioneer’ developments, see their respective websites listed in Table 1.1. See also euobserver (2009).

4 A major project of the East-West Institute and Carnegie Corporation of New York entitled ‘Multi-Layered Integration – The Sub-regional Dimension’ played


a key role in putting a spotlight on subregional groupings and establishing that they had more than a token role in the unfolding ‘new Europe’. The comprehensive volume yielded by the project (Cottey, 1999) remains the standard reference point for those studying and researching in the field.

5 See, for example, Petritsch and Solioz (2008), Uvalic (2001) and Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002).

6 Cottey (1999, 244) noted that the BEAC and CBSS had achieved ‘substantive’ security-related cooperation by 1997.

7 CEFTA and BFTA were particularly affected by the eastward EU enlargement as mutual trade of new members now fell under Single Market rules. Thus in 2004, the BFTA disappeared naturally and CEFTA downsized drastically and lost its genuine Central European focus with the automatic withdrawal of the VG and Slovenia (see Dangerfield, 2006).

8 See the websites of the VG (www.visegradgroup.eu/) and International Visegrád Fund (http://visegradfund.org/)

9 The VG even has its own ‘V4 Eastern Partnership’ (V4EaP), launched in 2011.10 See Bertrand in Cottey (1996, 21).11 Western Balkans subregional cooperation has been, at least in its early phase,

a clear example of ‘a process that is mostly defined from abroad and increas-ingly led by the EU, with very limited regional ownership’ (Anastasakis, 2008, 35).

12 In 2009/2010, there were some suggestions, coming from Slovakia, that a VG macro-region might be proposed. The programme for the 2010/2011 Slovak VG Presidency Program stated that ‘the V4 group will promote further dis-cussion on the Visegrad region as one of the prospective as a prospective new EU macro-region’ (Visegrad Group, 2010).

13 See http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/international-co-operation, accessed 2 September 2014.

14 I am grateful to Alessandro Lombardo, Executive Officer of the CEI, for this information. He also confirmed that the CEI Secretariat believed that a key role for the CEI was justified by the significant overlap with the EUSDR in terms of both member states and fields of cooperation.

15 The Action Plan is not specific on what this bridging role might be, although it does refer to an intention to ‘promote the role of Macro-regions for enhanced strategic planning in rural development’.

References

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Institute for EastWest Studies).Cottey, A. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in A. Cottey (ed.) Sub-regional Cooperation in the

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Petritsch, W. and Solioz, C. (2008) ‘Beyond Sovereignty: Integration and Connectivity’, in W. Petritsch and C. Solioz (eds.) Regional Cooperation in South East Europe and Beyond. Challenges and Prospects (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).


Regional Cooperation Council (2013) Annual Report 2012–2013 (Sarajevo: RCC).Southeast Europe Security Initiative (2009) Activities Report for 2009 and Challenges

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(Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).


47

Introduction

‘Macro-regions’ are an established concept in economic and political geography, as well as in spatial planning (Smith et al., 2002; Pain and van Hamme, 2014). As such, they are widely applied in a range of contexts. However, following the adoption of EU macro-regional strate-gies for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), the Danube Region (EUSDR) and the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), as well as an agreement in the European Council for a strategy to be developed for the Alpine Region (EUSALP), the concept of macro-regions has gained increased promi-nence in contemporary policy practice and debates. Under EU Cohesion Policy, a ‘macro-regional strategy’ is defined as ‘an integrated framework endorsed by the European Council, which may be supported by the European Structural and Investment Funds among others, to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical area relating to Member States and third countries located in the same geographical area which thereby benefit from strengthened cooperation contributing to achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (CEC DG Regio, 2014). In theory, EU macro-regional strategies are a new multi-level governance instrument providing an opportunity for new think-ing about territorial spaces, the opportunities and challenges in these spaces and new thinking on forms of intervention. However, in practice, there have been difficulties in reconciling the different visions and inter-ests of stakeholders, and the breadth of strategic objectives and priori-ties in relation to the available resources. Conceptually, macro-regional strategies have also been criticized for their incoherence, questionable legitimacy and effectiveness (Bengtsson, 2009; Mirwaldt et al., 2010; Stocchiero, 2010). This chapter will review the development and role of

3Macro-regions and the European Union: The Role of Cohesion PolicyIrene McMaster and Arno van der Zwet


macro-regional strategies as an instrument of EU Cohesion Policy, their design and implementation to date and the theoretical and policy issues surrounding their use.

The chapter begins with an introduction to the overall concept of macro-regions and how this fits in with evolving thinking on EU Cohesion Policy. The following section examines key characteristics of the macro-regions currently in place and how these align with Cohesion Policy programmes, noting areas of complementarity and areas and issues where cooperation has proven more contentious or challenging. The conclusion notes that the relationship between macro-regional strategies and Cohesion Policy programmes is still comparatively new and subject to change. Thus, while macro-regions are an increasingly embedded part of Cohesion Policy, looking to the future, the learning and adaptation process will be ongoing and evolutionary.

Policy background

Historically, the term ‘macro-region’ has mainly been applied descrip-tively to a geopolitical subdivision that encompasses several tradition-ally or politically defined regions. However, in the EU context, this concept has developed into something more concrete and operational. As identified by Mirwaldt et al. (2010), a number of factors are driving this development.

Theoretical debates

Since the 1990s, there has been a surge in interest in territorial coopera-tion (Perkmann, 2007; Scott, 2002). Greater freedom of trade and inte-gration of markets and major development challenges, such as climate change, are reshaping how borders are viewed. Rather than barriers, bor-ders are increasingly being redefined as bridges, communication chan-nels and areas for joint action and collaboration (OECD, 2009).

Associated with these shifts are the concepts of functional regions, with interdependent territories spanning political–administrative boundaries and place-based policymaking, grounded in an awareness of the specific resource endowments, growth potentials and vulnerabili-ties of different regions. Working across borders is viewed as a way to create synergies and to stimulate development by encouraging mutual assistance between stakeholders. Related, place-based policy approaches put emphasis on regions identifying and exploiting their territorial capi-tal, that is to say, the comparative advantages that allow them to grow (Davoudi, 2003).

Irene McMaster and Arno van der Zwet 49

Policy debates and approaches

Since the late 1980s, the need for a greater commitment to balancing regional disparities was recognized, reflecting a growing sense that ‘some sort of spatial justice’ should be promoted at the European level of govern-ance (Doucet, 2007; Jouen, 2008, 2). The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), agreed in May 1999, was a non-binding framework aiming to streamline those policies that have a differential spatial impact in European cities and regions. Related, territorial cooperation was seen as a useful tool to coordinate sectoral policies and to ensure consistency. Thus, spatial planning coordination in such areas as the Baltic Sea or North Sea Regions was praised as a way of reaching this goal. However, the intergovernmental process stalled not long after completion of the ESDP linked to a range of competence issues (Schön, 2005; Zonneveld et al., 2012). In contrast, when the Commission published its Second Cohesion Report, this heralded a period of much greater Commission activism in promoting and encouraging territorial cooperation.

Increasingly, territorial cooperation across various regional scales became central to addressing the European Commission’s objective of territorial cohesion. Based on a large-scale Member State consultation, the Commission’s (2008) Green Paper defined territorial cohesion as three interrelated goals: achieving balanced and harmonious develop-ment, overcoming divisions and territorial inequalities, and assisting regions with specific geographical features (CEC, 2008).

These goals were to be achieved through investments in infrastructure, horizontal policy coordination and, above all, territorial cooperation at all geographical scales and across borders, also involving neighbouring countries and larger regions. ‘While the macro-regional approach is not an alias for territorial cohesion it is clear that there are significant syn-ergies between the two concepts. Each is place-based, inclusive and, in principle, prepared and implemented on a multi-level basis’ (Samecki, 2009, 3). Thus, the macro-regional concept is part of an emerging trend towards place-based approaches, which include Integrated Territorial Investments (ITI) and Community-led Local Development (CLLD), and which, despite operating at different levels of the multilevel govern-ance system, aim to coordinate and integrate funding streams and claim bottom-up approaches.

Development and evolution of policy interventions

As well as being informed by academic and policy debate, the macro-regions need to be understood against a background of evolving policy practice. In the EU context, Cohesion Policy is the key driver behind


territorial cooperation (CEC DG Regio, 2007). Mainstream Cohesion Policy programmes are required to integrate the theme of territorial coop-eration. However, the interregional cooperation programme (INTERREG) has had the greatest impact by providing dedicated resources to territo-rial cooperation initiatives and embedding institutionalized networks of cooperation involving public administration from local, regional, national and EU levels (OECD, 2009). Cooperation in macro-regions shares many of the aims of territorial cooperation in the EU. Having such close links means valuable lessons can be drawn from past and current experiences of implementing INTERREG programmes. However, it also poses questions and challenges in terms of coordination of resources, scope for collaboration and avoiding overlapping activities, as will be discussed in the following sections.

The potential development gain from territorial cooperation within macro-regions is an important element of recent policy debates, for example, in relation to reducing barriers to economic growth, pur-suing the EU objective territorial cohesion and developing effective policy instruments to maximize the impact of territorial cooperation at this level.

The EU macro-regions and Cohesion Policy

The EU macro-regional strategies offer a ‘new way of supporting territo-rial cooperation, representing a joint response to common environmen-tal, economic or security related challenges in a particular area’ (CEC, 2014a, 185). The macro-regions are developed based on three policy principles: the so-called ‘three No’s’.

(1) No new institutions: Before the establishment of the Baltic Sea Region as a macro-region under the EU umbrella, a plethora of institu-tions already existed in the Baltic Sea Region, including the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Helsinki Commission, the EU’s Northern Dimension and the Nordic Council. None of these institutions took an integrated approach to coordinating all the sectoral policies that are relevant to the Baltic Sea Region. Nevertheless, it was felt that adding another administrative layer would not succeed in integrat-ing this institutional network. Instead, it was decided to build the Baltic Sea Strategy using only pre-existing institutions, notably those of the EU and the Northern Dimension, for cooperation with the external partners such as Russia or Norway. Similarly, the pro-posed Alpine Strategy would also operate in a dense institutional


environment (see Balsiger, chapter 9 in this volume). In principle, all macro-regional strategies must therefore rely upon pre-existing institutions.

Crucially, the European Commission made it clear that they did not want to manage the strategy directly, due to a lack of resources on their part and sufficient resources and local knowledge available at the macro-regional level. Instead, a governance model involv-ing institutions and organizations from the participating regions should be applied. Such an approach may be more challenging in regions where institutional density is less thick, or where there is a lack of institutionalization at particular levels. For example, in the North Sea Region and the Atlantic Region, there is no body in which state-level actors meet regularly (see the contributions by Dangerfield [chapter 2], Danson [chapter 10], Wise [chapter 11] in this volume).

(2) No new legislation: The macro-regional strategies have taken the form of ‘communications’ issued by the European Commission and endorsed by the European Council. The Member States decided to implement the strategies, but no binding regulations have been issued.

(3) No new funding: On the one hand, it was recognized that achiev-ing concrete goals requires funds to match policy priorities. On the other hand, it was felt that better coordination of the consider-able existing resources was more important. These include, above all, EU Structural Funds, Member State resources and funds from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international and regional financial institutions, such as the Nordic Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Thus, no new funding has been allocated to the EU macro-regional strategies. However, the strategies may well encourage stakehold-ers to identify and employ additional resources, for example, from International Financing Institutions. The key emphasis is on aligning existing resources available at the EU, national, subnational and/or local level, using both public and/or private resources – established under diverse policy themes and territories to develop jointly agreed actions and projects.

The ‘three No’s’ mean the macro-regions lack a distinct institutional, legislative and financial presence, arguably making the strategies more difficult to engage with. However, these principles also had their ben-efits, as the negotiations were ‘unencumbered’ by complex negotiations on funding, regulations and structures, thus allowing the focus to fall on areas of agreement, such as the benefits of coherence and coordination.


The principles also set the macro-regions apart from pre-existing forms of cooperation and development programmes; key amongst these are the Cohesion Policy programmes. As will be detailed, unlike the macro-regional strategies, the Cohesion Policy programmes do have institu-tional frameworks attached to them; they do have specific legislation and regulations shaping their management and implementation; and they do have funding. These factors set the two systems apart, yet they also bind the fortunes of Cohesion Policy programmes and the macro-regions.

EU Cohesion Policy has its origins in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which was established in 1975. An overarching Cohesion Policy, including the ‘Structural Funds’ (ERDF and European Social Fund), was developed based on key principles, including multi-annual (seven-year) program-ming, strategic orientation of investments and involvement of regional and local partners.

EU Cohesion Policy programmes

Cohesion Policy supports job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life and sustainable development. It is the EU’s principal investment tool for delivering its Europe 2020 goals: creating growth and jobs, tackling climate change and energy depend-ence and reducing poverty and social exclusion. More than one- third of the EU’s budget is devoted to Regional and Cohesion Policy. Assistance is provided through seven-year programmes using a multi-level, partnership-based approach. In the 2014–20 period, up to €351.8 billion will be made available from the ERDF, European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund.

A key element of Cohesion Policy is to encourage regions and cities from different EU Member States to work together and learn from each other through joint programmes, projects and networks (CEC, 2014b). The European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) objective of Cohesion Policy covers three types of ‘INTERREG’ programmes: cross-border coop-eration programmes along internal EU borders; transnational coopera-tion programmes covering larger areas of cooperation such as the Baltic Sea, Alpine and Mediterranean Regions; and the interregional coopera-tion programme. Additionally, there are three networking programmes (ESPON, URBACT and INTERACT) covering all Member States of the EU and providing a framework for exchanging experiences between regional and local bodies in different countries.

As Cohesion Policy evolved, territorial cooperation increasingly became a core aspect of the policy. Building on a basis of established


cross-border cooperation,1 INTERREG I was introduced in 1990. INTERREG introduced an international dimension to Structural Fund programming and, in the context of the single market, was a tangible expression of the objective of European integration. The initiative was both expanded and diversified for the 1994–99 programming period. INTERREG retained a high level of political importance in the 2000–06 and 2007–14 periods, providing an instrument which promotes the deepening of European integration in tangible ways, at different scales and in different fields. In 2007, a number of changes were introduced which have been reinforced for the 2014–20 period: a fundamental change is a shift in the status of INTERREG from a Community Initiative to the ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ objective, which gives the cooperation element ‘higher visibility’ and a ‘firmer legal base’ than in the past, as well as a more strategic approach to programming.

The evolution of INTERREG has been accompanied by a number of other developments and initiatives. In contrast to the macro-region con-cept and INTERREG, the European regulation on the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), introduced in 2006, is important for having put territorial cooperation on a legal footing and personality. The EGTC was developed to make territorial cooperation more strate-gic but simultaneously more flexible and simple. In theory, the EGTC regulation should reduce the difficulties encountered by Member States and, in particular, by regional and local authorities when implementing and managing cooperation activities in the context of differing national laws and procedures.

Although not formally part of Cohesion Policy, also of note are the instruments available to the EU to support regional development along its external borders with countries that are either candidates for EU mem-bership or potential candidates and also with so-called third countries (i.e. non-EU members) (CEC, 2014c). The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is based on partnerships with the EU candidate coun-tries. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) promotes cooperation and economic integration between the EU and partner countries. Included are 14 cross-border cooperation programmes which operate along EU external borders.

EU macro-regional strategies are distinct from this policy background. Yet, they are operating within an already complex and congested policy arena. The strategies cover large geographic areas and many individual countries. As a consequence, there are an enormous number of relevant EU territorial frameworks, strategies and policies for them to consider. The current macro-regional strategies cover areas relevant to a significant


number of Cohesion Policy programmes. The Danube Strategy, for example, covers an area with 91 Cohesion Policy programmes.

Links to Cohesion Policy programmes, especially INTERREG, are of particular importance. Cohesion Policy programmes are required to complement and be ‘coherent’ with relevant ‘external’ strategies, such as macro-regional strategies. The expectation is that linkages and engagement between the programmes and strategies should become strong and, crucially, productive. For the macro-regional strategies, the programmes are a potential source of funding. For the programmes, the expectation is that the relationship and engagement with macro-regional strategies should create added value. In some instance, some programmes are so closely linked to the strategies that they have an emerging role in terms of governance.

The remainder of this section examines these relationships and how they have evolved into the 2014–20 programming period for Cohesion Policy programmes. The analysis focuses on key characteristics of the macro-regional strategies, how they ‘fit’ with Cohesion Policy pro-grammes and how the relationship between Cohesion Policy pro-grammes and the macro-regions is evolving.

Strategic and thematic focus

The macro-regions have at their heart a ‘Strategy’, backed by action plans. The Strategy documents explain and justify the selection, prioritization and sequencing of selected actions. Action plans, structured around pil-lars, and priority areas help to convey high-level strategies into action and, ultimately, results. So-called flagship projects are distributed over the identified actions in order to implement them. By focusing on spe-cific issues, the expectation is that not only will the strategies deliver results but also value will be added to existing interventions through coordination and cooperation to the benefit of the region. However, it is also possible that by resolving or addressing a concern within a smaller group of countries, solutions will be applied elsewhere, or that work-ing practices will be extended to other fields of activity, with working together becoming a ‘habit and skill’ (CEC, 2009a). In particular, this new, innovative and integrated way of working across a wide number of sectors may offer significant opportunities for specialization, coopera-tion and greater efficiencies (e.g. through networking) (ibid.).

In terms of strategic and thematic links to Cohesion Policy pro-grammes, in the case of the established macro-regions, these are enter-ing a new phase.The Baltic and Danube macro-regional strategies were launched midway through the life cycle of the 2007–13 Cohesion Policy


programmes in the regions. The aims of territorial cooperation pro-grammes, and especially transnational cooperation, were close to the actions envisaged in the strategy; for example, see Table 3.1. On this basis, the relevant programmes were requested to report on their contri-bution to the macro-regional strategies (Table 3.1).

Yet, for such closely planned, structured programmes, working with projects running over a number of years, accommodating a new approach at a strategic level was challenging and will be an issue that new macro-regional strategies have to take into account. The Commission and programming authorities proved generally willing to fine-tune aspects of the programmes to make them more compatible with the strategy, for example, by modifying the programme, chang-ing allocation criteria and facilitating selection of relevant projects through targeted calls, proactive project stimulation or giving prefer-ence to certain types of projects (CEC, 2009a; Schwartz, 2010). However, not all programmes were willing to ‘divert’ funds to the macro-regions. For example, some transnational territorial cooperation programmes are only partly covered by the macro-region and some partners remain reluctant to tie already comparatively limited resources to a small part of their programme area.

For the forthcoming round of Cohesion Policy programmes in areas where macro-regional strategies are in place, strategic and thematic links were something that had to be built in from the outset and which will consequently be embedded to a greater extent than in the past. A number of inclusions in the regulations for the 2014–20 Cohesion Policy programming period also facilitate such links. First, the Common Strategic Framework (CSF), which establishes strategic guiding prin-ciples to facilitate the development of the 2014–20 Cohesion Policy programmes process and the sectoral and territorial coordination of interventions, involved establishing priority areas for cooperation activ-ities under Cohesion Policy funds, ‘where appropriate, taking account of macro-regional and sea basin strategies’ (CEC, 2014b). Second, part-nership agreements between the European Commission and individual EU countries set out national authorities’ plans on how to use funding from the European Structural and Investment Funds. A key focus is the main priority areas for cooperation, taking account, where appropriate, of macro-regional strategies and sea basin strategies (CEC, 2014b). Third, where Member States and regions participate in macro-regional strate-gies, the relevant programme is required to set out the contribution of the planned interventions to those strategies (CEC, 2014b). Implementation reports should identify the contribution to macro-regional and sea basin


Tabl

e 3.

1 EU

SBSR

lin

ks t

o se

lect

ed t

erri

tori

al c

oop

erat

ion

pro

gram

mes

I

En

viro

nm

enta

l su

stai

nab

ilit

y II

P

rosp

erit

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strategies. Fourth, particular references are made to macro-regional strat-egies in the specific regulations covering territorial cooperation pro-grammes, acknowledging the key role for territorial cooperation in the development and coordination of macro-regional and sea basin strate-gies under transnational cooperation (CEC, 2014c). Finally, provisions were made for transnational territorial cooperation programmes to specifically devote resources to ‘enhancing [the] institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient public administra-tion by developing and coordinating macro-regional [. . .] strategies’ (CEC, 2014c).

The very strong emphasis of the EU regulations for the 2014–20 period – regarding clear actions, outputs and results – also complements the ‘action orientation’ aimed for in the macro-regional strategies. Thus, through the macro-regional strategies, there is scope for Cohesion Policy pro-grammes to deliver larger-scale projects with greater impact, link to new and additional sources of co-funding, upscale and extend projects, and engage more actively in the wider policy environment. For exam-ple, as well as thematic links in terms ‘capacity for innovation’, ‘effi-cient management of natural resources’ and ‘sustainable transport’, the Baltic Sea Region Programme for 2014–20 has a specific ‘priority axis’ devoted to the macro-regional strategy. One of its four main priority axes is ‘Institutional Capacity Building for Macro-regional Cooperation’ which offers support to the stakeholders of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Assistance to the Priority Area Coordinators and Horizontal Action Leaders, seed money projects of the EU Strategy, organization of Strategy Forums and other implementation tasks (BSRP, 2014). National Partnership Agreements are being established between the European Commission and EU countries and set out the national authorities’ plans on how to use Cohesion Policy funding between 2014 and 2020. As part of this process, Member States involved in the Danube Strategy aimed to identify priorities that require cooperation and to link these to the aims of the EUSDR, including them in the Partnership Agreements and accompanying programmes (Agerpress, 2014). However, how to relate to/engage with the macro-regional strategies is still an issue of debate for some programmes, especially those with only part of the programme area covered. On a practical level, the programmes may undertake a range of initiatives which link well to the strategies’ goals. However, committing at a strategic level, setting targets in programming documents and plan-ning explicit links are something that some programmes have been cau-tious about for a number of reasons. First, there is a reluctance to take on any additional administrative burdens involved in monitoring links to macro-regions. Second, some programmes perceive macro-regional


strategies as being of limited relevance to the programme area as a whole. Third, the increasingly narrow focus required of Cohesion Policy programmes may constrain their capacity to build thematic links and contribute to macro-regional strategies.

Financial resources

Funding is one of the issues that has triggered the most animated debate. The obvious question was how macro-regional strategies could achieve any of their goals without any designated funding. However, a range of funds is usually available from the member countries, the EU and other supranational or international organizations. Macro-regional strategies partly seek to coordinate policy activities and thus simply allocate exist-ing funds more effectively than before.

EU Cohesion Policy has been a key source of funding for the macro-regional strategies. Cohesion Policy contributed more than €50 million to the Baltic Sea Region between 2007 and 2012 (Bengtsson, 2009). The text of the EUSDR stresses the ‘funding already available via numer-ous EU programmes (for example €100 billion from Structural Funds 2007–13, as well as significant IPA and ENPI funds)’ (CEC, 2010a, 11). As Cohesion Policy is a key source of funding, the 2014–20 budget negotiations can have a significant impact on Strategies.

Given the obvious strategic and financial overlaps, macro-regional approaches featured prominently in debates on the future of EU Cohesion Policy after 2013. Paweł Samecki, the then European Commissioner for Regional Policy, suggested that a share of Cohesion Policy funds could be allocated to macro-regions (CEC, 2009b). An early indication of the European Commission’s thinking on the funding of macro-regional strategies was gained from the Fifth Cohesion Report, which states: ‘Macro-regional strategies should be [. . .] supported by a reinforced transnational strand, although the bulk of funding should come from the national and regional programmes co-financed by Cohesion Policy and from other national resources’ (CEC, 2010b, xvi).

Despite these statements and even though territorial cooperation is universally accepted as adding value to Cohesion Policy, there has been a general trend for cooperation funds to be reduced in relative terms whenever the budget is decided. Moreover, the lion’s share of territorial cooperation funding is reserved for cross-border rather than transnational cooperation. This raised question marks over the feasi-bility of funding macro-regions using INTERREG/territorial coopera-tion funds.

The February 2013 European Council Agreement on the EU’s Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014–20 and the subsequent


agreement with the European Parliament in July 2013 ended a lengthy period of intense negotiations on the size and shape of the long-term budget of the EU, the Cohesion Policy budget for 2014–20 declined by 8.4 per cent (Mendez et al., 2013). Most countries have seen a decrease in their budget, and for some Member States that are part of a macro-regional strategy, the decrease has been considerable. For example, in Germany (which is part of EUSBSR, EUSDR and EUSALP), the budget is estimated to have decreased by 39 per cent (Wishlade, 2013). The overall implications of budget reductions on macro-regional strategies are not yet clear. In relative terms, the ETC budget lost out the most from the negotiations, with almost a quarter being cut from the Commission’s plans. However, the overall budget remained at comparable levels to 2007–13. On the one hand, this implies little, if any, increase in Cohesion Policy resources available for the macro-regional strategies. On the other hand, the increased familiarity with the strategies and how they work, the reference made to the strategies during programming, and ongoing project developments, all imply that a greater proportion of funding could end up going to the strategies.

Coherence and coordination

Better coordination and a more strategic use of resources are identi-fied as key ingredients to the success of the macro-regional strategies. In particular, the European Commission stressed the importance of the strategic use of Community programmes. In the case of the Baltic Sea Strategy, the Commission has even put in place requirements for rel-evant EU programmes (such as INTERREG) to report on how they are responding to the Strategy and helping to meet its objectives. Sensitivity to the territorial impact of policies and the need for improved coordina-tion were also stressed in the European Commission’s Fifth Cohesion Report. Yet at the same time, the large number of different cooperation arrangements as well as links between and across regions, and the poten-tially diverse institutional, economic and political priorities in place, all indicate that the distinct ‘drive’ and ‘rationale’ behind macro-regions need to be clear. It is important that efforts are not duplicated and that existing programmes of support are not inappropriately undermined.

The 2010 Annual Report from the European Commission on the imple-mentation of the Baltic Sea Strategy highlights examples of this more territorially coordinated approach to the application of Community pol-icies. The report identifies significant progress in gaining a new momen-tum for existing projects, the creation of new macro-regional networks in areas previously dominated by national approaches, the extension of


networks in otherwise established areas and the establishment of macro-regional dialogues (CEC, 2010c). In addition, key flagship projects were launched, in line with the Strategy’s action plan.

From the point of view of Cohesion Policy programmes, there have also been notable gains. For example, the Baltic Sea Region Programme notes that in the programming period between 2007 and 2014 ‘the Strategy and the Programme have mutually benefited. The Baltic Sea Region Programme offered a functioning instrument to finance flagship projects of the Strategy and to get the Strategy’s implementation started. At the same time the Strategy offered new platforms to increase the visibility and relevance of the Baltic Sea Region Programme projects’ (BSRP, 2014). In line with the new requirements for Cohesion Policy for the 2014–20 period, ‘within the limits of the ERDF, the programme has been thematically even more aligned with the objectives of the Strategy to maximize the synergies and leverage effects on other financ-ing sources in the programme areas’ (BSRP, 2014, 5). Even programmes with only peripheral geographical connections to the macro-regions have taken the strategies into consideration during their planning and preparation. For example, the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme transnational cooperation programme is noted as having monitored the development and progress of macro-regional strategies (McMaster et al., 2014). Possibilities to identify and report on its links to existing macro-regional strategies were noted by evaluators. However, it was also stressed that in this case the programme has to keep in mind its own goals, objectives and the specific needs (McMaster et al., 2014).

There have also been challenges in building and maintaining policy coordination and coherence. Cooperation in the macro-regions does not always fit neatly with other forms of policy coordination in the EU. In practice, the Commission has found that the alignment of Structural Funds programmes with the implementation of the Strategy has ‘gener-ally proven to be more challenging than expected’ (CEC, 2010c). While there have been notable exceptions, ‘the readiness to engage in dialogue on how to focus future funding in line with the Strategy’s objectives var-ies, and there is insufficient discussion among the different programme authorities on finding complementarities with respect to their funding decisions’ (CEC, 2010c). As previously mentioned, from the point of view of established programmes, requirements to ‘adapt’ to a ‘new’ strat-egy midway through their own programming period and undertake an additional form of reporting have not always been welcome.

For the 2014–20 Cohesion Policy programming period, policy ‘coherence’ is something that should be at the heart of developing


the new programmes. Programmes are expected to consider potential links and overlaps with existing policies, frameworks and strategies, with macro-regions being key among these. This process reveals that transnational and macro-regional cooperation have as much potential to complement each other as they do to cause clashes, since overlaps exist between their core concerns such as innovation, environmental protection and sustainable transport. The focus of the macro-regional strategies fit neatly with the EU’s Europe 2020 objectives of smart, inclu-sive and sustainable growth which inform Cohesion Policy programmes. The focus of the strategies on concrete actions and scope to extend and amplify the results of interventions over larger areas fits well with the demands being placed on Cohesion Policy programmes, as well as meet-ing the objectives of the strategies themselves.

Inclusive and flexible framework

It is argued that the strengths of the EU macro-regional strategies are the high level of political commitment and the wide involvement of EU and national institutions in their development and implementation. From the start, the need for a consensual approach was a key driver in the preparation of the strategies. In order to ensure that the result would gain the full commitment of the widest possible range of actors, open consultation processes were launched. Particularly through stakeholder conferences and Internet consultations, virtually all institutions and organizations active in the region, and a number of individuals, were able to contribute to the processes at an early stage. Regions and com-munities such as cities and associations of municipalities were particu-larly encouraged to contribute.

The approaches also have an inherent flexibility in them. For exam-ple, while the macro-region will maintain a consistency, thanks to the common features or challenges, it is not essential that the limits of the region be precisely defined (CEC, 2009c). It is recognized that a defi-nition should not be rigid but rather functional, so that the proposed policies and projects can be applied to the areas for which they are most applicable. In other words, the strategy should be place based rather than administratively organized, so that it addresses the real needs of the identified locations.

This has led to the principle of flexible membership: ‘the frontiers of a macro-region do not have to be precisely defined. Moreover, there is no requirement that any given territory be part of only one macro-region’ (CEC, 2009c). Thus, the physical boundaries of the target area may vary


according to the relevance of the policy area in question (CEC, 2009c), so that some policy areas may take the macro-region in its loosest sense, involving all peripheral and core territories alike, while other policy areas might be applied with far more geographic specificity, in some cases even centring on the local level. In this sense, macro-regional strat-egies encourage policy to focus more on functional regions based upon added value, rather than the traditional divides of political geography.

In terms of links to Cohesion Policy programmes, the inclusive, con-sultative, partnership-based approach taken in formulating and develop-ing the macro-regional strategies is highly compatible with their systems and approaches. Indeed, Cohesion Policy programmes were themselves able to contribute to the process. However, the flexible membership and sectorally variable participation in the macro-regions add complexity to efforts to plan links with the strategies, such as in terms of eligible areas, partners and activities.

Governance

Macro-regional strategies are ‘built around a multilevel governance approach involving a huge number of stakeholders’ (Reinholde, 2010, 51). The key elements of the governance of macro-regional strategies con-sist of three levels: in terms of strategic leadership, the Member States (through the High-level group) and Commission provide the necessary political commitment; National Contact Points coordinate work at the senior administrative level; and experts responsible for thematic or hori-zontal priorities normally form steering groups (CEC, 2014d). Laboratory Groups have been established in order to facilitate coordination and provide advice. INTERACT contact points in Turku, Vienna and Valencia provide support roles and are involved in the implementation of the strategy. It should be noted that the governance approaches across the different strategies are not uniform. Table 3.2 provides an overview of key roles and responsibilities of different actors in the governance set-up of macro-regional strategies.

The current system relies heavily on the Commission for strategic leadership. This facilitates coordination through existing structures. Moreover, supranational – as opposed to merely intergovernmental – governance has been commended as a way to safeguard the common interest. In this view, the Commission acts as an independent supervisory authority and an ‘honest broker’ of the European interest (CEC, 2009c).

In terms of initiating the strategy, regional and Member State actors are a crucial driving force as shown by authors in this volume.


For example, Cugasi and Stocchiero (chapter 8) note how the Marche Region is a key driving force of the Ionian–Adriatic Region. Ágh ( chapter 7 of this volume) demonstrates that Baden-Württemberg, Austria and Romania assumed a decisive role in the case of the set-up of the EUSDR. Gänzle and Kern (chapter 6 in this volume) determine that Poland and, in particular, Sweden provided an important macro-regional ‘push’ for the EUSBSR. However, Cohesion Policy programmes, and in particu-lar transnational programmes, can also play an important role in the initiation process. For example, the Alpine Space Programme is one of the major protagonists of the EUSALP (Balsiger, chapter 9 in this volume).

Table 3.2 The governance architecture of EU macro-regional strategies

Actors Responsibilities

European Council/MS Provides mandate and endorses macro-regional strategy

Commission and High-level Steering group (officials representatives of all MS)

Preparing strategy (consultation)Promoting dialogueCoordinating at the policy levelDealing with policy orientation and prioritizationReviewing and updating action plansMonitoring

National Contact Points (NCP)

Promoting strategy, encouraging participation and ensuring visibility of activities

Updating relevant stakeholders at national level of key developments

Assisting Commission in its facilitation rolePriority Area Coordinators

(PAC), Horizontal Actions Leader (HAL) and Priority Area Focal Group (PAFG)

Ensuring implementation action plan (targets, indicators and timetables) for a priority area

Facilitating cooperation between projects, programmes and funding streams

Providing technical assistance and adviceEnhancing visibility of the strategy

Laboratory Group (think tank composed of members of national administrations, Political Action Committees, Commission and ETC programmes)

Facilitating exchange of ideas regarding operational aspects

Advising and recommending how regional programmes can contribute to strategy

Interact Promoting strategy to ETC stakeholdersEngaging in some operational aspectsSupporting coordination with Commission

Source: Authors’ own compilation.


On the other hand, the North Sea Region Programme has demonstrated a certain reluctance to support a macro-regional strategy in the region (see Danson, chapter 10 in this volume). All in all, Cohesion Policy pro-grammes can be considered key actors in shaping and implementing macro-regional strategies.

In practice, this means the European Commission is responsible for coordinating, monitoring, reporting and facilitating the implementation and follow-up of the strategy. In partnership with stakeholders, it prepares regular progress reports and uses its power of initiative to make propos-als for adaptations of the strategy or action plan when these are required (CEC, 2009a). Meanwhile, implementation on the ground is the responsi-bility of partners already active in the region, with organizations from the various Member States taking responsibility for different priority areas. By adopting this implementation approach, an additional and potentially unnecessary layer of administration and institutions has been avoided.

However, the approach to governance and implementation struc-tures has also thrown up a number of questions and challenges (van der Zwet et al., 2012). Effectively managing links with non-EU Member States has been challenging. Externally, existing frameworks are used to cooperate with third countries. In the case of the Baltic Sea Region, this includes above all Russia and also Belarus and Norway. The Northern Dimension is foremost among these, but the Council of Baltic Sea States may also be used (CEC, 2009a). This institutional arrangement ensured that macro-regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea would take place under the EU umbrella. Cooperation with Russia then takes a bilateral, rather than regional, form. In other words, the decision to make Baltic Sea cooperation an internal EU matter effectively led to a ‘decoupling of internal and external policy spheres’ (Bengtsson, 2009). Other macro-regions, notably the Danube and Adriatic–Ionian Regions, are bound to include a greater number of non-EU member countries and will face related challenges, while the Alpine, North Sea and Atlantic Regions would largely lack this external dimension.

The strategies have been criticized as lacking clear ownership and leadership, and the need for new institutions to more effectively admin-ister and implement the strategy has been highlighted (Antola, 2010). A recent report on the governance structures of macro-regional strategies identifies EU transnational cooperation programmes as key resources to support the strategies. An identified weakness of the strategies is that they ‘lack professionalism and durable support on a day-to-day basis’ (CEC, 2014d). A possibility is that key transnational programmes could assist with the implementation and coordination of the strategy. To an


extent, the programmes already have an important role in the govern-ance framework, as is, for example, the case with the Baltic Sea Region Programme. The establishment of a new Danube Region transnational INTERREG programme in the 2014–20 period appears to be partly driven by a desire to have a single transnational programme that covers most of the strategy geographically in order to assist with day-to-day implementation. Similarly, the Alpine Strategy largely overlaps with the already existing Alpine Space Programme, and also in the case of the Ionian–Adriatic Strategy, a new transnational INTERREG programme is proposed. In practical terms, this means that transnational programmes can assist in supporting the work of key implementers, both in terms of practical ways and in terms of data collection; offering analysis and advice; providing a platform for the involvement of civil society, and regional and multi-governance levels, as well as fostering parliamentary debate; and facilitating the Annual Forum (CEC, 2014d).

Complementing a clear leadership, it is equally important to have bottom-up initiatives and ideas, especially for an organization that focuses on the specific needs of the territory. Building awareness and dis-semination activities amongst key actors in the region is also something that has to be continually revised and updated, taking into account changing policy frameworks and objectives. To facilitate this process, it is necessary to build in lesson-learning, follow-up strategies for projects and events and to monitor and evaluate activities. Such processes will provide evidence about the results, impact and influence of coopera-tion in the region, which can be disseminated and used to develop new ideas in the future and perpetuate productive cooperation. However, for a strategy that as of yet possesses no dedicated financial resources, a balance needs to be struck between monitoring/regulation and keep-ing the administrative burdens of cooperation in check. Also, in this case, transnational territorial cooperation programmes can be a valu-able resource. However, further integrating transnational programmes in the governance structures of macro-regional strategies poses some important challenges. For instance, it does not resolve the issue of full integration of non-EU members; indeed in some cases, it may make it more difficult. Furthermore, governance frameworks for macro-regional strategies and transnational programmes differ in terms of approach and stakeholders. Macro-regional strategies are organized largely in a top-down fashion and high-level central state actors are heavily involved. Transnational cooperation programmes operate at a regional level and tend to have a more bottom-up approach. Integrating these two different approaches into a single governance framework may prove challenging (van der Zwet et al., 2012).


Conclusion: macro-regions as an embedded element of EU Cohesion Policy?

Various EU institutions assume a strong role in the macro-regions, and the strategies are endorsed by the European Council. The European Commission plays a supportive role and acts as a facilitator of the evaluation process, ensuring coherence with EU policies and positions. The concept of macro-regional cooperation is also becoming an embed-ded aspect of EU Cohesion Policy.

The financial relationship between macro-regions and Cohesion Policy funds has been a widely debated issue (EUObserver, 2010). Nevertheless, in practice, the EU Structural Funds are a key funding source for macro-regional cooperation. Quite apart from the funding question, macro-regions are increasingly discussed as important tools of Cohesion Policy delivery. For example, the Fifth and Sixth Cohesion Reports published by the European Commission establish a link between the goal of territorial cohesion and macro-regions. Thus, ‘further work on new macro-regional strategies should be based on a thorough review of existing strategies and the availability of resources. Macro-regional strategies should be broad-based integrated instruments with support from a reinforced transnational strand, although the bulk of funding should come from the national and regional programmes co-financed by Cohesion Policy, and other national sources’ (CEC, 2010b).

Significant additional resources for transnational territorial cooperation did not materialize, due to challenges faced in EU budget negotiations. Nevertheless, Cohesion Policy programmes, in particular territorial cooperation programmes, have experience as active partners in coop-eration and have a key role to play in the success of the macro-regional strategies. In particular, macro-regions are place-based policies that seek to promote development in functional regions, based on the strengths of these regions and involving policy coordination at multiple levels. As such, they fit neatly with the EU’s Europe 2020 objectives of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, while recognizing the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as well as the specific focus of individual Cohesion Policy programmes. The focus of the strategies on concrete actions and creating the scope to extend and amplify the results of interventions over larger areas fits well with the demands being placed on Cohesion Policy programmes, as well as meeting the objectives of the strategies themselves.

However, the relationship between macro-regional strategies and Cohesion Policy programmes is still comparatively new and subject to change, most notably linked to new Cohesion Policy regulations


and the launch of new programmes and projects. Cohesion Policy pro-grammes in areas covered by macro-regional strategies have to adapt to a new policy environment and new demands in what were already complex programmes. Looking to the future, the likely extension of the macro-regions concept to new spaces means that this learning and adap-tation process will inevitably be ongoing and evolutionary.

The experiences across macro-regions have inevitably been, and will continue to be, varied, due to the different challenges that they aim to address and the different institutional environments in which they operate. However, a number of shared challenges in relation to Cohesion Policy can be anticipated. First, budget constraints and fis-cal consolidation can be anticipated to have a Janus-like effect on Cohesion Policy programmes. On the one hand, co-financing has become more difficult, making implementation of Cohesion Policy programmes (and macro-regional strategies) more challenging. On the other hand, macro-regional strategies may potentially become increas-ingly reliant on Cohesion Policy funding as other resources dry up. Second, the involvement of external partners in macro-regional strate-gies can be difficult from a Cohesion Policy perspective. As programme objectives need to be closely linked to the overall Community strat-egy (Europe 2020), external partners can get the impression that the macro-regional strategies, which rely on cohesion strategy, are too EU-centric. Particularly, in the context of increasing geopolitical ten-sions (as is the case with Ukraine crisis), this may put external partners’ willingness to actively engage and contribute to the strategy under pressure. Third, one of the key weaknesses of macro-regional strate-gies has been a perceived lack of professionalism and consistency in day-to-day implementation. Transnational programmes that cover the whole of the macro-region can assist in this process. However, consid-ering they are often already stretched to capacity, this raises challenges. Furthermore, only the Baltic Sea Region and proposed Alpine Region have established transnational programmes that cover the whole macro-region.2 New transnational programmes are planned in the Danube and Ionian–Adriatic Regions, and although these programmes can build on the experiences of their predecessors, it will take time for them to become established, potentially delaying or limiting the role they can fulfil in their respective macro-regions. Nevertheless, it is clear that Cohesion Policy programmes do and will continue to have a key role to play in the future development and implementation of macro-regional strategies.


Notes

1 Looking beyond Cohesion policy, ETC has a lengthy history and has involved a wide range of policy initiatives. In 1958, the first ‘Euroregion’, EUREGIO, at the German–Dutch border was established. Unlike the macro-regions, Euroregions’ work is generally limited to the competencies of the local and regional authorities which constitute them. They do not correspond to any legislative or governmental institution or have direct political power. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, institutional cross-border cooperation continued to develop, in particular along the Rhine in the west and northern Europe (INTERACT, 2010). A cross-border cooperation devel-opment strategy in EUREGIO received financial support from the European Economic Community as early as 1972.

2 The North Sea and Atlantic Regions have also established transnational pro-grammes, but in these cases, the adoption of macro-regional strategies is more doubtful (see Danson [chapter 10] as well as Wise [chapter 11] in this volume).

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Part III

Theorizing Macro- regionalization and Macro-regional Strategies in Europe


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What regions? Which regionalization?

The term ‘region’ is normally used to denote a subnational authority located between the national centre and the local periphery, but it is also (with increasing frequency) used to denote a space of varying size with economic, social and cultural significance. Institutional regions have precise boundaries, defined powers and belong to nation states. Spatial regions, in contrast, have fuzzy borders, informal or derivative powers and may span across nation states. ‘Regionalization’ – the pro-cess through which regions develop or acquire new prominence – is therefore a polysemic word. Regionalization can denote the process of creating free trade areas, common markets and monetary unions among sovereign states (so it is synonymous with regional integration); it can indi-cate the process of political or administrative devolution to institutional tiers located below the national centre (as in regional decentralization); and it can indicate the creation of intermediate entities among sovereign states and subnational governments in order to jointly carry out certain activities (also denoted as sub- or macro-regionalization, see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume). Finally, it can indicate more bottom-up processes that do not generate any new institutional structures but are nevertheless characterized by intensified economic, social and cultural exchanges between the people living in contiguous or distant places (Fioramonti, 2012a, 2012b). This broader phenomenon is loosely indi-cated as ‘cross-border cooperation’ (CBC), regardless of whether such cooperation gives rise to mere agreements, working communities or novel institutional tiers. In all cases, the aim is to reap material and symbolic benefits.

4Exploring European Union Macro-regional Strategies through the Lens of Multilevel GovernanceSimona Piattoni


This fact alone demonstrates that regions are not easily identifiable entities and that regionalization is not a simple process to capture. Both territorial and functional top-down and bottom-up dynamics must be taken into account when analysing processes of regionalization. Unsurprisingly, then, this phenomenon has given rise to a vibrant lit-erature and several strands of theorization. In the past, regionalism (from the bottom) was contrasted to regionalization (from the top) to distin-guish between spontaneous, socially generated instances of regional resurgence and planned, political processes of creation of regions from the top. Michael Keating offers the following definitions:

Regionalism refers to three distinct elements: a) movements demand-ing territorial autonomy within unitary states; b) the organization of the central state on a regional basis for the delivery of its policies including regional development policies; c) political decentraliza-tion and regional autonomy. The first may be seen as ‘bottom-up’ regionalism, the second as ‘top-down’ regionalism and the third as a response to the first. (Keating, n.d.)

It is noteworthy, however, that these definitions are not universally accepted, and, in fact, ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’ are attributed reversed meanings by Söderbaum (Schouten, 2008). The debate has lately been enriched by the further distinction between old regionalism and new regionalism (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000; Hettne, 2005; Berkkan et al., 2009) – the former being mostly European, engineered and aimed at regulating markets, the latter being supposedly mostly non-European, spontaneous and driven by neoliberal market forces. The same distinc-tion is sometimes also captured by the notions of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ spaces, which highlight the distinction between precisely identified and institutionalized spaces and loosely identified and non-institutionalized ones (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012; Stead, 2014). Another concept that is offered in this debate is that of meta-regionalization (Buzan and Wæver, 2003), which is equivalent to ‘flexible territoriality’ coupled with a ‘pool-ing of sovereignty’ which ‘does not merely replicate on a larger scale the typical modern political form’ (Berkkan et al., 2009, p. 10). The risk of getting lost in these theorizations is even bigger if we consider that the EU itself has, during the post-war period, been considered as one of the most remarkable instances of regionalization (as regional integration) and has, in its turn, favoured the emergence of a plethora of intermediate regional agreements and structures (perhaps instances of sub, new and meta-regionalism). We must therefore ask ourselves whether 50 years

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of European integration theory cannot help us understand EU macro-regions and if we should instead resort to these newer strands.

It is argued here, as it was by Alex Warleigh-Lack (2006), that the dif-ference between new and old regionalism is not so great as to prevent a fruitful dialogue between the two as well as between the new region-alism approach and integration theory in general. The relevance of spontaneous versus designed aggregation, the relative presence of soci-etal and economic or political and institutional actors, the presence or absence of a sense of regional identity and the ‘Europeanness’ or ‘non-Europeanness’ of these processes are accessories to the broader notion of regionalization, so that they do not identify distinct paradigms, but identify sub-paradigms within the same paradigm (Warleigh-Lack, 2006, pp. 756–7). After all, these theories all point to ‘an explicit but not nec-essarily formally institutionalized process of adapting participant states’ norms, policy making processes, policy styles, policy content, political opportunity structures, economies and identities (potentially at both elite and popular levels) to both align with and shape a new collective set of priorities, norms and interests at the regional level, which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach stasis’ (Warleigh-Lack, 2006, p. 758).

EU macro-regions are an instantiation of this phenomenology serv-ing fairly material and specific goals: increased trade, better integrated transportation networks, improved environmental conditions, intensi-fied cultural exchanges and strengthened security are some of the mate-rial benefits most frequently pursued through macro-regional strategies (for a general definition and description of macro-regions, see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume). The states and regions which par-ticipate in these agreements normally share more than just geography or common problems: they often share a past history, sometimes a com-mon identity, and they also perceive their future as somehow belonging together. EU macro-regions enlist existing governmental authorities at different levels – subnational, national and supranational – and set up coordinating structure to oversee this intensified cooperation. They are certainly designed from the top, but bank on existing economic, social and cultural commonalities often favoured by natural geographical features (sea and river basins, mountain ranges, coastal areas); seek coordination among existing policies, but shy away from the creation of a new permanent institutional layer; are inspired by a drive towards free trade and neoliberal economies, but also seek to control and regu-late pollution, illegal trafficking and other threats to regional security. The question, therefore, is how to interpret this process and which theo-retical approaches to mobilize.


The literature sketched above has explored the drivers of regionaliza-tion under several theoretical rubrics which are also present in this vol-ume: as ‘shifting’ or redrawing of institutional boundaries (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000; Keating, 2009; see McMaster and Van der Zwet, chapter 3 in this volume), as ‘rescaling’ of spaces, identities, rights and powers therein exerted (Stead, 2011, chapter 5 in this volume; Bialasiewicz et al., 2013), or as an attribution of new meaning to exist-ing forms of human association (Salines, 2010; Balsiger, chapter 9 in this volume). This literature captures some of the main drivers of macro-regionalism and more or less directly addresses the question of the restruc-turing and redefinition of the nation state and of what may replace it (see also Ansell and Di Palma, 2004; Bartolini, 2005; Hameiri, 2013). By coining new terms and offering new concepts, this literature discusses the forces that challenge the nation state and points to some of the tensions that arise from the mismatch between territorial, functional and institutional dynamics that have also been at the centre of European integration theory. This is why reviewing those theories is not a ritualistic exercise, but still has a lot to offer towards the understanding of the origins, nature and import of EU macro-regions.

The following sections will, first, seek to explain the process of macro-regionalization in the EU in the light of the main theories of European integration and provide an overview of the various forms of CBC cur-rently being experimented with. An interpretation of the EU’s macro-regional strategies will then be attempted through the lens of multilevel governance (MLG) theory, highlighting the institutional and political significance of the strategies. Lastly, the legitimacy of the strategies from both a democratic and a legal point of view will be considered.

Theories of European integration and macro-regionalization

As was recalled in the opening section, macro-regionalization is just one of many attempts at creating areas of cooperation across institutional regions and states. In Europe alone, there are interregional associations, such as Assembly of European Regions (AER), Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), Conference of Maritime and Peripheral Regions (CMPR); working communities, such as Association of the Alpine States (Arge Alp), Communauté de Travail des Alpes Occidentales (COTRAO); Euro-regions (more than 100, according to the Council of Europe); European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) (of which there are roughly 40); various neighbourhood frameworks,

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such as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med); and other forms of CBC. We must therefore ask: Why add yet another typology? What do macro-regions do that cannot be accomplished through these other types of cooperation?

In Europe, CBC is driven by the perception that, in the changed cir-cumstances of a globalized world, neither individual states nor a fortiori individual (sub-state) regions may compete successfully on their own. Rather, entire ecosystems – where ‘eco’ points both to an economic and an ecological dimension – must compete. Globalization makes national frontiers increasingly irrelevant and invites people to look beyond the political borders and the cultural barriers that parcel them out into dis-tinct polities (Keating, 2009, p. 38). According to this type of narrative, CBC is a spontaneous reaction to globalization, in its turn the total sum of many disparate and widespread trends. Such broad processes have multiple drivers but no specific agency. Europe would then just be one of the many places in the world where globalization upsets consolidated arrangements and triggers CBC.

Macro-regionalization, however, can also be narrated as the outcome of a specific EU strategy. According to this alternative narrative, EU institutions have a specific interest in the creation of macro-regions that implicitly and explicitly call into question the continued relevance of the nation state – specifically those of the member states with which these institutions necessarily compete in some sense for competences – in determining the scope of economic and cultural cooperation among Europeans. In this case, the objective would be the creation of a differ-ent macro-political subject (the EU) which presupposes the weakening or the redefinition of the existing subjects. However, as this cannot take the form of an outright attack on the member state, it must take the functional route in selected policy areas.

European integration is creating new territorial boundaries for some purposes but not for others so that, while states may be losing their old monopolies on power, this does not necessarily herald the emergence of an integrated space to replace them. Europe is not so much sup-pressing state borders as changing their meaning and impact, so that we are seeing a partial territorial unbundling that affects various social, economic and political systems differentially. (Keating, 2009, p. 38)

It has been particularly argued that the Commission has a specific inter-est in favouring agreements and formations that redefine the scale of economic, social and cultural integration. Historically, whenever the


process of European integration stagnated, the Commission favoured subnational or transnational formations in an effort to jump-start the process of integration again by demonstrating the continuing validity of the integration project (Tömmel, 1998). Macro-regionalization would not escape this logic and could, therefore, be rightly considered as a polit-ical project aimed at exploiting synergies among existing institutional entities around specific functional objectives with the ultimate goal of redrawing the European power map. In fact, a macro-region ‘(1) is an integrated framework relating to members states and third countries in the same geographical area; (2) addresses common challenges; (3) ben-efits from strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (European Commission, 2009 p. 3, cited in Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume).

These two largely opposed narratives are not the only possible inter-pretations of the significance of macro-regions for the EU, though. So what other theories can be mobilized to explain the creation of macro-regions? And what is the nature of the institutions or govern-ance structures that are thus created? Do macro-regions reveal a new type of development policy? Do they reveal a new territorial agenda? Do they produce a new kind of governance? European integration has been the object of a number of well-known and well-rehearsed theoreti-cal approaches which purport to explain the nature, the causes and the consequences of this remarkable process.

According to functionalism, new forms of functional cooperation are sought in order to govern specific policy areas and thus create security communities, Europe being an outstanding example of this phenom-enon (Mitrany, 1966). Neo-functionalism suggested that the new institu-tional layer that had been created in order to manage such cooperative efforts would in due course be able to attract the loyalty of social groups and reorient their expectations in its direction (Haas, 1958). Once initiated, this process would presumably have a tendency of feed-ing upon itself in cycles involving a deepening and widening of integra-tion (Schmitter, 2004). Neo-functionalism uses the idea of ‘spillovers’ to explain the trajectory of integration, whether functional, political or cultivated (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). Whenever positive or negative externalities are invoked as an explanation for the creation of a macro-region, a functionalist explanation is in fact being proposed. Whenever exploiting positive externalities or addressing negative externalities is assumed to spill from one policy area (such as traffic) to another (such as environmental policy), the existence of a functional spillover is being posited.

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However, positive and negative externalities do not manifest them-selves spontaneously; hence, their existence must be argued for. To argue for the existence of positive (opportunities to be seized) or negative (crises to be averted or problems to be resolved) externalities that call for action on a macro-regional scale is to argue for political spillovers. Finally, to mobilize various actors in favour of the creation of a macro-region is tantamount to cultivating spillovers. This would be the specific role of the supranational institutions of the EU, whose very existence is justified by the need to oversee and enforce existing agreements and to suggest further areas for future cooperation. Functionalist theories are, then, based on the assumption that carrying out certain functions at a macro-regional scale is beneficial to the participating units, but it also alerts us to the need to create agencies which can identify these externalities and actively mobilize actors in order to sustain the macro-regional project. EU macro-regions conform to a functionalist logic if the European Commission plays the role of political entrepreneur and stirs the actors of the macro-region into action on the basis of the pos-sibility to reap joint benefits from cooperation.

Intergovernmentalism as well as liberal intergovernmentalism would rather point to the national interest of the (member) states that make up an iden-tifiable region in securing the benefits from cooperation (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Different member states, how-ever, might see their national interest as leading in different directions, some emphasizing intensified trade, others stricter environmental con-trols, others still tighter security regimes. Compromises, package deals and side-payments must therefore be found in order to move coopera-tion forward, thus leading to the bundling of a number of policy areas under one institutional umbrella. Moreover, member states are wary of creating yet another institutional layer, and rather press for retain-ing control over the programmes. The national interest of the eventual third countries potentially involved in the macro-region must also be mobilized and satisfied in order to secure their willingness to cooperate. According to this theoretical approach, sovereign (member and non-member) states would consent to cooperative agreements only to the extent that the benefits surpassed the costs of cooperation and on con-dition that no permanent additional institutional layer – which could challenge their sovereignty – were created to manage them. Hence, par-ticipating states would be keen on directly managing and overseeing the entire project. They would also try to prevent the direct involve-ment of their subnational articulations (regions and municipalities) unless under their direct guidance. Moreover, macro-regions would be


expected to finance their projects through existing funds so that no additional funds must be disbursed by the participant states.

As we know, institutions are in their widest sense ubiquitous. It is practically impossible not to create at least another governance layer to manage even the thinnest of cooperative enterprises, let alone a macro-regional strategy. The new institutional layer could be conceived as infor-mal and temporary, but it would still have a certain commanding and stabilizing force. Neo-institutionalism puts institutions at the centre of its analysis and emphasizes the many ways in which patterns, roles and expectations are created. Institutions in their broadest sense encompass formal structures and procedures, informal routines and ‘ways of doing things’, expectations and relations of trust (March and Olsen, 1989). Within the EU, it often happens that new cooperative enterprises end up using procedures and formats originally resulting from experimenta-tion in other policy realms. Institutions are fungible: once they are cre-ated for a specific purpose, they lend themselves to being used for other purposes. They also tend to grow onto themselves and to become ‘sticky’. Neo-institutionalism would, for example, emphasize the institutional osmosis that ends up being created between the new macro-regions and the existing EU programmes. The new authorities created to manage the macro-regions in fact take from existing EU governance arrange-ments many organizational traits and standard operating procedures. The Union is a giant repository of governance arrangements that have been tried for a long time and that have proven to have worked, and the Commission is their trusted guardian (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, 2010). A neo-institutionalist account of macro-regionalization would also stress the slow accumulation of tacit knowledge and interinstitutional trust among national and subnational authorities that cooperate in a given geographical region: neo-institutionalists would perhaps not go so far as to call this an ‘identity’, but they would certainly point to the socializing impact of repeated and patterned interactions.

Constructivism, in turn, would instead directly point to these phenom-ena and to the social construction of macro-regions. Macro-regions do not exist as such, even though water basins or mountain chains may suggest their existence, and it is only by digging into a sometimes distant past or by foreshadowing a still-to-come common destiny that they can be brought into life. After all seas, rivers, mountains and borders divide as much as they unite. Still, the construction of a macro-region is an inescapable task regardless of what the ultimate drivers of macro-regionalization are. While it may not be necessary to posit the prior existence of a shared identity, a successful ‘brand’ must nevertheless be forged, which will then be used

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to project the macro-region outside its borders and to define the borders, however fuzzy, of the region itself. Such a construction requires a selec-tive and innovative reading of the historical record, the reinterpreta-tion of episodes of internecine wars as opportunities for exchange and periods of domination and colonization as deep cultural encounters. But even more than looking backward, it is by looking forward and by subscribing to a common developmental project that macro-regions can be justified.

There is one last theory of European integration which, while denoted by the institutional shape that the Union appears to be taking rather than by any analytical anchor, points to fairly specific territorial and functional dynamics that may be useful for our purposes: the Union as empire. In this neo-imperialist (Zielonka, 2006) or post-imperialist (Beck and Grande, 2011) scenario, many of the features and policies of the current Union that are accommodated only with difficulty in other theoretical approaches make particular sense. For example, the highly differentiated relations that exist between the ‘centre’ of the Union (Brussels) and its diverse ‘periphery’ create inner and outer circles of differentiated integration: the Euro and Schengen areas lie at its core, the rest of the EU member states form the first ring, the future acces-sion states the second ring and the states with which the EU entertains economic (European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA]) or security relations (ENP, Euro-Med dialogue, etc.) constitute the outer ring.

This variable geometry or differentiated integration, which for func-tionalism or neo-institutionalism would indicate ‘work-in-progress’, is rather one of the defining traits of a neo- or post-imperialist scenario. Emphasis on the establishment of economic relations with the EU’s neighbours, and on the EU’s preference for exerting internationally ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2011) – which from an intergovernmen-talist perspective indicates the determination of the member states to jointly pursue their economic interest while separately pursuing their geopolitical goals – makes much sense from a post-imperial point of view that sees attaining security by drawing states at the empire’s fringes within its gravitational orbit as perfectly logical. Finally, the parceliza-tion of the empire into many diverse languages, subcultures and public spheres is not the symptom of a missing EU identity, as constructiv-ists would claim, but rather the way in which different populations and social groups are loosely held together by allowing them to cultivate their cultural specificities alongside a looser but unobtrusive identifica-tion with the cultural centre. In this context, macro-regions would be just one of the looser arrangements through which the imperial centre


attempts to solicit localized cooperation towards its own broad func-tional aims.

All of these theories are partially supported by the evidence at hand. Support for a functionalist argument can be found in the very fact that macro-regions are supposed to implement a handful of very concrete pol-icies (development, transportation, environment, energy, security) that are perceived as being intimately connected to one another and as being likely to achieve effective implementation in the specific macro-region. Moreover, if one reads the programme of, for example, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) (European Commission, 2009), one realizes that these policies de facto replicate the Lisbon Agenda. This fact alone could vindicate a functionalist reading of macro-regional strate-gies based on the entrepreneurial drive of the European Commission.

Still, as long as security-related geopolitical interests prevailed, macro-regional cooperation could not take off, just as intergovernmentalism would have predicted, but as soon as these concerns began to fade, par-ticularly after Poland and the Baltic states joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization, cooperation could be projected as being primarily geared towards reaping economic benefits (for an analysis of how macro-region-alism builds on previous instances of subregionalism, see Dangerfield, chapter 2 in this volume). Hence, ‘[t]he economic rationale is clearly not a sufficient condition for macro-regional cooperation to happen’ (Salines, 2010, p. 10). What made a crucial difference, it is argued, was the involvement of the nation state. If this is true, then, intergovernmental-ist arguments are also at least partially supported by the evidence to hand. It would appear that, in the case of the EUSBSR, the Swedish authorities have played a particularly proactive role while being careful not to appear as pushing for the strategy too eagerly (Salines, 2010, p. 22). A further piece of evidence is provided by the extremely light institutional struc-ture that governs macro-regions, which carefully avoids creating yet another institutional layer between the supranational, on the one hand, and the national and subnational, on the other. The creation of coor-dinating structures could not be completely avoided, though (Gänzle and Wulf, 2014; Stephenson, n.d.). The EU does not normally proceed through institutional build-up, but by setting up flexible and temporary governance structures that nonetheless manage to shape the daily oper-ations and the long-term practices of the existing institutions, which could indicate intergovernmental prudence.

Constructivist arguments are also partially confirmed by the empiri-cal evidence. For example, while Salines (2010, p. 6) notes that ‘with

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the 1995 and 2004 EU enlargements, the Baltic Sea has become the inland sea of the EU, with almost one third of the EU’s member states on its shores’, she is also careful to remark that this fact alone, however, could probably not have sufficed to prompt the Baltic member states into action. The opportunity to create a macro-region has to be rooted in historical or cultural grounds: geographical definitions are ‘deeply embedded in history, culture and politics’ (p. 12). Such a construction must not be taken for granted and cannot be expected to necessarily lead to a common identity. Rather, it can lead to a common ‘branding’ (p. 16), which is a working compromise between a cultural identity and a marketing device. In other words, what is created is a way to iden-tify the area without necessarily superimposing a cultural identity on it. Mare Balticum is a sufficiently uncontroversial ‘discursive product’ that helps identify the macro-region and its policies without exposing it to supranational incorporation or neocolonial ambitions. As a privileged witness interviewed by Salines (2010, p. 15) stated: ‘There is no Baltic Sea identity as such. But we feel interconnected.’ This was due not only to the previous cooperation experiences, but also to initiatives such as Intergroup ‘MEPs from the eight member states surrounding the Baltic Sea and some others from further afield formed’ in the European Parliament with a view of discussing current and future EU policy towards the region (Beazley, 2007, p. 14).

Neo-institutionalist arguments can also contribute to an account for the development of macro-regions, particularly in the case of the EUSBSR. The EUSBSR could build on an exceptionally developed web of trans-national societal and intergovernmental networks. The Nordic coun-tries created an inter-parliamentary Nordic Council in 1952 and later established a Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971. Both operated in low politics areas in a ‘pragmatic and depoliticized way’ (Salines, 2010, p. 18). It was based on ‘cooperation and not on integration, thereby not encroaching upon the sovereignty of the participating nation-states’ (p. 19). In 1992, this model was extended to the other countries on the Baltic rim (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland and Germany) to create the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in which the EU rep-resented by the European Commission (the European External Action Service after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon) also participated. This Council is and remains strongly intergovernmental, functioning like a classic international organization. A Baltic Sea States Summit brings together the heads of state and governments, presided by a troika with a rotating presidency. In 1998, a coordinating Secretariat was established


in Stockholm, without a budget of its own. While largely symbolic, these forums allow for the growth of reciprocal knowledge and trust. In 2008, it was decided to revitalize the CBSS, in part thanks to the intensified leadership of the European Commission. This revival also occurred thanks to the vibrancy of transnational cooperation. The list of civil society initiatives reported by Salines (2010, pp. 21–3) among subnational authorities, economic, public and private entities, environ-mental organizations, institutions of higher education and so on is truly impressive. A particularly telling precedent was established in the field of technological innovation through the Baltic Sea Region Innovation Network (BSR INNONET), which quickly took off, thanks to the vision and leadership of the European Commission which ‘played the role of a facilitator by accelerating and guiding the development of cooperation within the BSR’ (Salines, 2010, p. 26).

Finally, evidence from the EUSBSR, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region (EUSAIR) (see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 6; Ágh, chapter 7; Cugusi and Stocchiero, chapter 8, all in this volume) points to the importance of securing, through a web of economic and regulatory policies, the outer fringes of the empire, thus guaranteeing the security of an area which Brussels cannot and does not want to patrol with conventional police and military forces. Whether this strategy is successful remains to be demonstrated (as the Ukrainian and Libyan crises make abun-dantly clear). The capacity of the EU to attract the populations of peripheral regions to its sphere of influence through stronger or weaker forms of ‘conditionality’ clashes with competing imperialist projects, and the economic force of attraction that the EU emits with the offer of access to and inclusion in its market can still be easily silenced in many cases by nationalistic and religious appeals. Still, the presence of security concerns within macro-regional strategies signals an increased awareness in the EU that its outer borders, however fuzzy and differen-tiated, need to be secured.

In summary, (neo-)functionalist, (liberal) intergovernmentalist, con-structivist, neo-institutionalist and post-imperialist theories can all con-tribute towards explaining the creation and the distinguishing features of macro-regions, but the real meaning of these formations can perhaps only be decided by looking at their ultimate impact on the participating entities. We will now turn to one last theory of European integration that could prove particularly helpful in making sense of the political and institutional impact that macro-regions are having; this is the the-ory of MLG.

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The political and policy consequences of macro-regional strategies: the theory of MLG

The main traits of macro-regionalism will be explored here with the help of MLG theory. Contrary to many approaches (see, e.g. Keating, 2009, p. 41), it is argued here that MLG has a theoretical core that can explain not only many policy developments in the EU (Piattoni, 2010a, Part II), but also many mobilization and institutional developments. Departing from the seminal works of Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe (Marks, 1992, 1993, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 2003), we can con-struct a three-dimensional analytical space that can account for most EU dynamics (Piattoni, 2010a, Part I). This space is formed by three axes of mobilization which challenge the sovereign member states: an axis of international cooperation, an axis of subnational articulation and an axis of transnational mobilization. This is a space, first and foremost, for political mobilization (politics) occasioned by policymaking (policy) which is then likely to have repercussions on the institutional set-up of the Union and the member states (polity).

In the EU, the first movers are often the member states which decide to jointly regulate certain policy areas. However, mobilization may also come from other institutional and non-institutional actors – subnational authorities and societies, and transnational societal groups – to which member states then react. MLG is thus characterized by the ‘simultane-ous activation of governmental and non-governmental actors at various jurisdictional levels’ (Piattoni, 2010b, p. 159). It is relatively unimpor-tant which level or which type of actor jump-starts MLG dynamics by mobilizing around a certain policy issue: political mobilization induces institutional and non-institutional actors to interpret, narrate and pro-mote their interests and to press for institutional solutions that will hopefully strengthen their position in the next round of mobilization and, therefore, also set in motion political and institutional dynamics.

In this sense, MLG theory bypasses the controversy between intergov-ernmentalists and neo-functionalists as to whether the initiators of inte-gration are necessarily national governments or societal forces. They can be both, but, once started, the process tends to activate other actors as well as other levels of government which, depending on the nature of the arrangements that are thus created, in turn provoke reactions and counter- mobilization dynamics. MLG also goes beyond the more restrictive view of neo-institutionalism by pointing not only to the ways in which existing institutions shape current mobilization dynamics and policy solutions, but also to how institutions themselves become objects of


contention. Finally, MLG suggests a broader understanding of poli-tics (that integrates some suggestions from constructivism) as capable of forging interests during the process of identification, narration and adjudication (Hall et al., 2014), and draws attention to the fact that, in Europe, these dynamics tend to have an impact on the relations among member states, between the national centres and their subnational articulations, and between state and societal actors at whichever level (Piattoni, 2010a, 2014).

How can we use MLG theory to make sense of EU macro-regional strategies? The first thing to notice is that macro-regions are joint endeavours among territorial authorities at different levels of gov-ernment (subnational, national and supranational); hence they are decidedly multilevel. Moreover, they tend to give rise to governance arrangements – ‘no new institutions’, as is reported in the official com-munications – which, however, inevitably tend to institutionalize con-sultation patterns, decision-making procedures, administrative roles and behavioural expectations, some of the defining traits of institutions. Therefore, macro-regional strategies provide the opportunity for govern-mental and non-governmental actors to mobilize in defence of their own interests, as they get interpreted and narrated during mobilization, and to forge policies and institutions that will accommodate them. Policies and institutions are thus shaped by politics, including electoral and partisan politics (an aspect all too often ignored in EU studies, one of the origi-nal and most compelling intuitions of Gary Marks’ (1996) ‘actor-centred’ approach to EU integration).

The main drive of macro-regions is the implementation of a num-ber of interconnected policies, which were originally pursued sepa-rately in response to distinct societal pressures. For example, the Baltic Development Forum (BDF) and the Swedish Nature and Baltic Sea Programme of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) have been among the early initiators of a more encompassing EUSBSR. Thanks to their efforts, all other policies have been reoriented towards making sus-tainable development possible. Clean shipping, containment of climate change and protection from land and sea emergencies, all concern the strategy along with its aims at job growth and support of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). All these policies have a clear territo-rial component, but their strong interconnection is somewhat new and appears to be the real value added of macro-regionalization. Around the time when the EUSBSR was approved, the Committee of the Regions approved an important text – the White Paper on Multi-Level Governance (Committee of the Regions, 2009) – in which it argued for the role of

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(subnational institutional) regions in implementing ‘territorial cohe-sion’, a principle recently enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Braun and Kovács, 2011). The Commission clearly jumped at this opportunity, supporting this process and in fact trying to mainstream it throughout the Union in order to address other areas of potential multidimensional cooperation.

In terms of the institutional structure which it generates, MLG can be conceptualized as a form of governance which mixes and matches two ideal-typical institutional constellations in new ways: hierarchi-cally nested general-purpose political institutions (Type I MLG), at one extreme, and overlapping single-purpose functional jurisdictions (Type II MLG), at the other extreme (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). We need to look at the governance structure of the EUSBSR in order to decide whether MLG can capture its essence. Certainly, macro-regions do not fall neatly under either ideal-type, rather seeming to straddle the two. On the one hand, they are certainly not single-purpose func-tional jurisdictions because, in fact, several functions are carried out (by different constellations of actors) within the same territorial space. On the other, they are not, nor do they seem to want to become, general territorial jurisdictions with competence over a most complete set of functions. Clearly, EU macro-regions partake in both Type I and Type II MLG. Their governance structure can indeed be described as multilevel, because it encompasses territorial institutions at different jurisdictional levels as well as functional non-governmental organizations.

It could also be suggested that macro-regions are meant to allow the Commission to test, on a smaller scale and among willing participants, some of the strategies that it has sought to implement across the Union but that for whichever number of reasons it did not succeed in pushing through. When one looks at the set of goals pursued through the EUSBSR – prosperity, competitiveness, sustainability, accessibility, security – and the way in which they are presented as interconnected with one another, one cannot avoid noting the resemblance with many of the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. But even if this were the case and the only objec-tive of the Commission were simply to achieve the goals of the Lisbon Strategy without creating any new institutional layer, macro-regions would not for this very reason be self-executing. Macro-regions could in this case be interpreted as a new type of ‘governance architecture’ (Borrás and Radaelli, 2011) which does not necessarily consolidate any general-purpose (Type I MLG) or single-purpose (Type II MLG) jurisdic-tion above and beyond those ‘service structures’ that the EU continu-ously assembles and disassembles in order to implement its policies and


strategies. Nevertheless, macro-regions are prime examples of MLG. This point will be illustrated with reference to the actual operation of the EUSBSR, which takes inspiration from the essential organization of the Structural Funds, particularly from its territorial cooperation strand.

As Berkkan et al. (2009, p. 42) also remark: ‘The EUSBSR and the posi-tion paper on macro-regional strategies outlined by the Commission do not provide [. . .] any attempt to change the existing level of jurisdic-tion. [. . . N]o new institutions have been created with the Strategy. [. . .] However, it can be argued that a new level of governance is introduced with the EUSBSR and macro-regions’ (emphasis added). These authors refer to the High Level Group through which representatives of the member states secure, together with the Commission, ‘progression with the implementa-tion of the Strategy’ (p. 42). They also argue that this should represent ‘a new kind of mixture stretching across MLG Type 1 and 2’ (p. 43), but this is where the argument presented here diverges. MLG Types I and II are ideal-types that are never observed in reality in their pure forms. To argue that real-world governance structures share elements of both types is, in itself, nothing new or particularly enlightening. Formal responsibilities capture only one aspect of MLG, and not necessarily the most interest-ing: what matters is the dynamic that it sets in motion (Piattoni, 2010a). Which institutional and non-institutional actors are thus mobilized? Do they pursue institutional empowerment – the attribution of formal powers and competences – or do they seek to contribute to the success of the policy and thus obtain political empowerment?

In this respect, the EUSBSR has sought to enlist not just member states and subnational regions, but also non-governmental organiza-tions and civil society associations towards the success of the Strategy: ‘many different stakeholders have been involved in the composition of the Strategy and development of the Action Plan through the public consultation process and stakeholders meetings with the Commission’ (Berkkan et al., 2009, p. 42). The ultimate goal of the Strategy is to ‘strengthen the role of the Union’, to ‘make it more relevant for the citizens, businesses and organizations of the Baltic Sea Region’ (p. 44). The success of this Strategy, then, will not so much depend on the establishment of a clear and strong high-level management structure, as the authors suggest, but on the activation of ‘street-level operators’ (Stephenson, n.d.).

To conclude this section, the significance of macro-regions from an MLG perspective lies in their capacity to mobilize institutional and non-institutional actors towards policy goals that have been identified as central to the Union since at least the late 1990s, but which had

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somehow escaped the reach of the Union. The significance of macro-regions also lies in other areas, such as in their capacity to recombine the institutional structures that have been created at various levels to manage and implement these policies in novel but fluid ways. The next section will conclude by discussing whether macro-regions produce legitimate decisions.

Outlook: are macro-regions legitimate?

MLG arrangements are often considered as being only dubiously legiti-mate (Blom-Hansen, 2005). According to the principal–agent model of democracy, the legitimacy of decisions made at the EU level depends on their being made by institutions composed of the legitimate repre-sentatives of national constituencies, which are the ultimate principals of the EU polity. This chain of delegation must be matched by an equal chain of accountability running in the opposite direction, so that agents can be held to account by their immediate principals (Curtin, 2007). Needless to say, in governance arrangements which involve many differ-ent levels of government and many non-governmental organizations, the chain of delegation gets blurred and the chain of accountability is eventually and inevitably broken (Scharpf, 2009). Placing the Managing Authority (MA) in a specific member state establishes formal responsi-bility and may give the impression that the legitimate representatives of the national principals are in fact in charge, but it does not for that matter place responsibility for the ultimate success of the policy or strat-egy at that level. Moreover, this (apparently clear) chain of delegation is not matched by any corresponding chain of accountability flowing in the opposite direction because the ultimate success of the policy depends upon the concourse of many non-delegated actors. More radically, when one looks at the actual management structure of the macro-regions (and other forms of CBC), one discovers that even the principal–agent model is unable to account for the complex and interrelated chains of delega-tion that exist at EU level.

The complex chains of delegation that underpin the governance of cross-border regions, programmes and strategies does not allow one to identify with any precision where responsibility for the implementation of the given regional policy or strategy lies and does not allow to estab-lish an unbroken chain of accountability. Rather, agents create further agents whose task is ultimately to supervise the principals and help them attain their desired goals. Much of the confusion in using the principal– agent model derives from interpreting national representatives as


principals no matter what role they play in the governance process. This is a logical mistake. When national authorities decide the EU budget, they indeed act as ultimate principals (although they are the agents of their respective national constituencies); but when they are in charge of MAs for INTERREG (interregional cooperation programme) projects or when they coordinate the macro-regional action in a given policy area, they are not principals but agents of this particular governance structure. Similarly, the fact that the Joint Technical Secretariats (JTSs) of INTERREG programmes are located in a given member state and are entrusted to a given subnational authority does not make them any more ‘national’ or ‘regional’ than if they were located in (supposedly neutral) Brussels. In both cases, MAs and JTSs are multinational agen-cies which act independently of the authority which hosts them and whose task is to assist and monitor the principals. Placing MAs or JTSs in a particular national or subnational location may facilitate commu-nication with governmental and non-governmental actors and make the programme or strategy seem more transparent and proximate, but it does not bestow any particular sovereignty to the host.

Accountability of these complex governance structures does not, then, lie in any unbroken chain of delegation, but in the horizontal accountability that can be established among actors each contributing to the success of a given policy or strategy. While this notion is com-monplace in governance studies, it still upsets legal reasoning grounded on a vision of the legal order as founded on the sovereign state. Also in legal studies, however, there are scholars that dare take a ‘heretic’ stance by looking beyond the limits of their discipline (Strazzari, 2011). In particular, the law of CBC between subnational and local authorizes ‘has now become a normative paradigm and has developed an autono-mous area of multilevel, transnational law’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 72). This has become an autonomous legal field, a new nomos.

The nation-state paradigm has forced cooperation within state bor-ders, leaving foreign policy to the exclusive realm of the state. Borders thus created peripheries with respect to state capitals, and peripher-ies were in principle not allowed to directly cooperate among them-selves. This exceptionality had ended first as a matter of fact, then as a matter of law. [. . . T]he amplified integration between the states and the following dilution of national sovereignty has transformed these areas from mere peripheries of the respective nation-states into ‘new centers in the periphery’, that is, integrated and more active areas from the economic, infrastructural and planning point of view,

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playing a sort of bridging role as contact areas between different sys-tems. (Palermo, 2012, pp. 73–4)

The law of CBC is procedural by nature, and it is still based mostly on private law, ‘based on the principle of the autonomy of the contracting partners’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 75). Steps forward in regulating CBC were made through the Council of Europe with the European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Madrid Outline Convention, 1980) and with the European Charter of Local Self-government (adopted in 1985), which allowed subnational authorities to cooperate through administrative legal tools (Art. 10.3). There fol-lowed the first Madrid Protocol in 1995 establishing ‘the right of territo-rial communities or authorities to conclude trans-frontier cooperation agreements with territorial communities of other States in equivalent fields of responsibility’ (p. 77), and the second Madrid Protocol of 1998 ‘extending the scope of cross-border cooperation to inter-territorial cooperation among non-adjacent territorial communities and confer-ring legal personalities to cross-border cooperation’ (p. 77). This was the legal basis upon which the Euroregional Cooperation Groupings and the EGTCs were later established.

Within the EU, forms of horizontal cooperation between member states and non-member states, which were originally grounded in private law, were later transformed into not only legal, but even binding instru-ments of trans-frontier cooperation. ‘The EGTC adds an additional layer of complexity in the overall picture of the multifaceted law of CBC; the EGTC does not mean less complexity, but more’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 80). However, herein there still lies a contradiction.

The bottom-line condition for cross-border activities is the presence of a valid legal act (legal capacity) produced by legitimate subjects (legal per-sonality) that generate mutual relations among territorial communities belonging to different countries. Legal personality and legal capacity are conferred by domestic law. Therefore, while the political dimen-sion of CBC is essentially shaped by the subnational level with increas-ing support of the supranational (European Union) and international (Council of Europe) actors, the essence of CBC law remains that of a domestic (constitutional and administrative) law relationship between subnational authorities and the central level. (Palermo, 2012, p. 82)

Also legal doctrine runs against the same problem of identifying the ultimate principal or source of authority for CBC. ‘The more the actors,


the more the sources of CBC law, and the more the sources, the less one of these can prevail over the others. CBC is carried through legal (and practical) acts of subnational authorities from different countries, directly or indirectly authorized by legal acts of the states and usually based on international (bilateral or multilateral) cooperation agree-ments or supranational law. Legal pluralism makes it all the more difficult to identify the ultimate decision-maker’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 84, emphasis added). ‘Such an approach is linked to a very statist reading of the law, in which a Grundnorm is always to be found for which one level of gov-ernment is democratically accountable’ (p. 85). ‘But the international norms cannot provide a substitute for that which they are contributing to the dissipation of’ (p. 85).

Rather, ‘hierarchy turns into cooperation, and imposition into pro-cedures, guaranteeing consultation, participation and consensus’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 85). The very essence of cooperation runs counter to the presence of an ultimate authority, and if we were to still look from a hierarchical perspective, we would still be expecting international actors to be replacing state power as the ultimate authority.

The more recent and sophisticated forms of CBC tend to balance the power of administration by establishing technical bodies in charge of the elaboration of strategies and policies of the cross-border authorities. Technical legitimacy usually ensures independent con-trol and expert advice, and contributes to a broader acceptance of the cross-border activity amongst people, particularly those directly affected. (p. 87)

By way of conclusion, CBC in its various shapes and forms – Euroregions, EGTCs, and INTERREG-funded programmes – as well as most recently EU macro-regional strategies challenge the very essence of the nation state and the notion of a sovereign and autonomous principal that owns all democratic and legal acts decided by any public and private sub-ject operating from within the borders of the state (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000). The essence of these agreements lies in their destabi-lizing effect more than in the constitutive effect of some higher demo-cratic and legal order. For the moment, it is more readily discernible what these cooperation agreements are not rather than what they are. We should therefore keep studying them with an open mind, without trying to prematurely superimpose theoretical models on them that may appear to bring order to this magmatic material while in fact blind-ing us to their yet-to-be-theorized and most innovative features.

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Introduction

The launch of the first EU macro-regional strategy in the Baltic Sea Region in 2009 marked the start of a number of similar initiatives across Europe. According to various commentators in the planning and geog-raphy disciplines, the new macro-regional strategies signal the redefi-nition of regional policy rationales, new scales of policy intervention, new actor constellations and variable geometries of governance (see e.g. Allmendinger et al., 2014; Antola, 2009; Bialiasiewicz et al., 2013; Faludi, 2012; Stead, 2011). In short, they argue that the appearance of these new strategies has created new policy arenas which exist either between or alongside formal institutions and which arise from coop-eration across various spatial scales, and involve different policy sectors and actor constellations.

Macro-regions were developed in the wake of the growing impor-tance of the spatial impacts of European policies (Chilla, 2010), and strategies for these regions combine strategic elements of spatial poli-cies with sectoral policy aims. As such, they represent an attempt to promote strategic cooperation by coordinating policies with spatial implications. They also provide a response to pan-European strategy documents such as the Lisbon, Gothenburg and Europe 2020 strategies (launched in 2000, 2001 and 2010 respectively). These strategies repre-sent the outcomes of long political bargaining processes to address spa-tial development at a European level. The beginning of discussions on macro-regional strategies can be traced back to European policy docu-ments on regional development and spatial planning such as ‘Europe 2000’ (European Commission, 1991) and ‘Europe 2000+’ (European Commission, 1994) which, according to Kunzmann (2006), served to

5Macro-regional Strategies: Agents of Europeanization and Rescaling?Dominic Stead, Franziska Sielker and Tobias Chilla


highlight a new institutional commitment at the European scale to ter-ritorial cooperation between member states.

During a large part of the 1990s, the formation of a pan-European strat-egy for territorial development through the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) led to deliberation about transnational cooperation areas, which ultimately resulted in a new strand of territorial cooperation within the interregional cooperation programme (INTERREG) from 1997 onwards (see Dühr et al., 2010; Faludi and Waterhout, 2002). The new transnational cooperation areas of the INTERREG programme under-lay the aim of promoting a form of regional development that is ‘not limited by national boundaries’ and stimulates ‘a bottom-up approach to the development of links between regions’ (European Commission, 1994, p. 69). Other relevant antecedents to the development of EU macro-regional strategies include, for example, the Territorial State and Perspectives of the EU (2005), the Territorial Agenda of the EU (2007), the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (2008), the Lisbon Treaty (which officially introduced territorial cohesion as an aim of the EU in 2009) and the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020 (2011). While the new EU macro-regional strategies all draw on important pre-existing transnational networks, many of these networks were specific to a particular policy issue or problem (such as water quality or transport links). The EU macro-regional strategies, on the other hand, can be con-ceived as formal initiatives to bridge the gap between various stakeholder groups, and various policy issues or problems in a specific territory.

The importance of macro-regions and their strategies is set to increase in future European policy on territorial cooperation (as highlighted by McMaster and van der Zwet, chapter 3 in this volume). Cohesion policy legislation for the 2014–20 period already explicitly considers trans-national programmes as a means of supporting the implementation of existing and future macro-regions as well as the sea basin strategies (European Commission, 2011). The development of European macro-regional strategies has also stimulated discussions about new forms of territorial cooperation in the EU, as well as the emergence of ‘super-regional coalitions’ (Knippschild, 2011), and shifting scales of network-ing, learning and decision-making (Stead, 2014).

In terms of governance, there are important experimental and politi-cal dimensions to macro-regional strategies that allow them to be used to test different strategies and approaches without ceding ultimate authority (Allmendinger et al., 2014). If successful, these types of ‘soft’ policy spaces can ‘harden’ institutionally (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012),

Dominic Stead, Franziska Sielker and Tobias Chilla 101

or else disappear if they become functionally superfluous through the successful completion of their objectives, or through perceived failure (Haughton et al., 2013).

It is against this background that this chapter examines the extent to which macro-regional strategies are leading to policy rescaling (including the rescaling of policymaking arenas, processes and powers, as well as policy ideas, narratives, norms and justifications). Comparing the expe-riences of the first two macro-regional strategies (for the Baltic Sea and Danube regions), this chapter highlights that macro-regions are already resulting in a certain degree of policy rescaling, albeit limited to date. We show that the strategies are not only influencing policy develop-ment at the national and subnational levels, but that the reverse is also taking place: policy development at the national and subnational levels is influencing the course of macro-regional strategies. Building on the analyses of rescaling processes, this chapter outlines tendencies of evi-dent Europeanization through these macro-regional developments.

This chapter is structured in five main parts. We reflect firstly on the Europeanization literature related to territorial development and terri-toriality, and secondly, on its relation to debates on policy rescaling. Thirdly, we consider the issue of territorial cooperation in the context of Europeanization and policy rescaling. Fourthly, we examine how macro-regional strategies, as a specific form of territorial cooperation, are being influenced or are contributing to Europeanization and policy rescaling. Finally, our conclusions provide some brief reflections on the implica-tions of macro-regional strategies for territorial development and ter-ritoriality in the future.

Europeanization

Europeanization has been considered in a variety of ways depending on different disciplinary perspectives (see e.g. Clark and Jones, 2008). For some authors, the significance of the concept lies in its diffusing state-based power and competencies, whereby state sovereignty is challenged by an emerging EU polity (e.g. Green Cowles et al., 2001; Kohler-Koch, 1999; Schneider and Häge, 2008). For others, Europeanization can be seen as quite the opposite: strengthening state-based orders and but-tressing national government (e.g. Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998). Between these two positions is a set of literature contending that Europeanization is not just a result of changes in European institutions and governance but also a response to global social transformation


(e.g. Bache, 2006; Beyers, 2007; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Hughes et al., 2005; Princen, 2007; Sifft et al., 2007; Vetik et al., 2006).

A second distinction that can be made in the Europeanization lit-erature is the direction of transformation. For example, a distinction between vertical, horizontal and circular transformations is useful. While vertical shifts refer to changes taking place within an increas-ingly complex multilevel governance system, horizontal shifts refer to changes taking place at the same spatial scale that are influenced (intentionally or unintentionally) by EU programmes, policies or pro-jects. Vertical aspects of EU decision-making include both top-down (from the EU to the national level) and bottom-up (uploading of national ideas to the EU level) influences. The circular dimension of Europeanization reflects a dynamic relationship between top-down and bottom-up changes. Horizontal shifts are primarily concerned with interactions and exchanges between states or regions, which are often (but not always) within EU borders.

Among the different directions of change, the vertical, top-down interpretation of Europeanization is perhaps the one most widely found in the literature. This includes the processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, pro-cedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process, and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourses, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2004).

Three adaptation mechanisms to EU influences can be distinguished in such a top-down conceptualization of Europeanization. In its most explicit form, European policy may trigger domestic change by prescrib-ing specific institutional requirements with which member states must comply and with community policies often explicitly directed at replac-ing existing domestic regulatory arrangements (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). Somewhat less directly, European policy or legislation may affect domestic arrangements by altering domestic opportunity structures and the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors. In their weakest form, European policies neither prescribe institutional requirements nor modify the institutional context for strategic interac-tion, but seek to trigger domestic adjustments to EU objectives indirectly by altering the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. Hence, the domestic impact of European policies is primarily based on a cogni-tive logic. It is the latter adaptation process to top-down EU influences


which may be most appropriate to describe the complex processes of transnational spatial policy-making in Europe. Stakeholders may use the EU level as a tool to influence discussions at a national level. Given the lack of a clear institutional, policy and legal framework for spatial plan-ning at EU level, processes of Europeanization often lead to different responses in different contexts, depending on the ‘goodness of fit’ of EU influences and domestic policies, and the political opportunity structure (Börzel and Risse, 2000).

Despite the increasing academic interest in Europeanization, much work still treats Europeanization as a ‘loose background concept’ (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, p. 11), rather than attempting to con-ceptualize Europeanization as ‘something to be explained’ as a con-sequence of processes that are orchestrated in Europe for particular political purposes (Clark and Jones, 2008). As Olsen (2002) recog-nizes, there is no single understanding or unifying grand theory of Europeanization. Equally, there is no particular type of transformation associated with the concept. Instead, a variety of shifts can be identi-fied that can be linked to Europeanization. These can include shifts in external boundaries, institutional changes at the European level, new divisions of responsibilities and powers between different deci-sion-making levels, exports of political organization and governance beyond the EU’s borders and shifts in relations between Europe and the rest of the world (Olsen, 2002).

A range of different theoretical approaches, empirical contexts and substantive analytical themes contained in recent social science stud-ies of Europeanization can also be distinguished. In categorizing the main theoretical approaches, Clark and Jones (2008) employ three key explanatory variables, each of which has clear political-geographic importance: (i) territory/territoriality, (ii) patterns of government and governance and (iii) constellations of power. They then use this set of three factors to organize their analysis of contemporary approaches to Europeanization (Table 5.1). Clearly, the three dimensions of territory/territoriality, government/governance and power constellations are closely intertwined, and certain conceptualizations of Europeanization do not fit neatly under one specific dimension. We return to the dif-ferent conceptualizations of Europeanization presented in Table 5.1 in the discussion on European Territorial Cooperation and the European macro-regional strategies further into this chapter (sections 4 and 5 respectively). Before doing so, we turn to the issue of policy rescaling, and its relation to Europeanization.


Policy rescaling

The work by McCann (2003) provides a useful starting point for consid-ering the various issues or dimensions of policy rescaling. He refers to ‘the process in which policies and politics that formerly took place at one scale are shifted to others in ways that reshape the practices them-selves, redefine the scales to and from which they are shifted, and reor-ganize interactions between scales’ (McCann, 2003, p. 162). McCann’s work clearly illustrates that the notion has several dimensions and out-comes, which are discussed below. One of the more frequent outcomes of spatial rescaling is the creation of new spaces or territories in which

Table 5.1 Conceptualizations of Europeanization in social science studies

Key explanatory variable Conceptualizations of Europeanization

Territory/ territoriality

Territorial propinquity – transmission of tacit knowledge between states (e.g. ‘successful’ policies, processes and procedures)

Rescaling of territorial identities and interests – bottom-up projection of national interests to the supranational scale

Government/ governance

Strengthening of supranational governance – EU institutions augmenting or challenging the pre-eminent political authority of nation states

Reconfiguration of bases of authority – resulting from top-down transfer/diffusion of policies or modes of operation from EU institutions

Multidirectional changes in governance – bottom-up projection of national interests and identities, top-down assimilation of EU policy in nations states and sideways diffusion of know-how between states

Reorganization of spatial frames of decision-making – recasting the spatial boundaries of policies to suit new global economic imperatives

Power Multidirectional processes of social transformation – resulting from closer European integration (e.g. currency, labour, markets, education)

Global projections of EU identities – ‘export’ of EU narratives, norms, procedures or modes of operation beyond EU borders

‘Smoke screen’ for hegemonic national interests – legitimizing, justifying or bolstering national (sometimes unpopular) decisions

Source: Authors’ interpretation of Clark and Jones (2008).


policymaking or programming occurs. Here, the functional, political and institutional boundaries are not always coincident. As a result, these new spaces may be contested, especially since the level at which issues are managed can affect policy outcomes by, for example, including cer-tain actors and excluding others (Keating, 2009, 2013). The contested nature of these new spaces is reflected in recent geographical studies on the politics of scale, processes of rescaling and impacts on the distribu-tion of power (see e.g. Herod and Wright, 2002; Keil and Mahon, 2008; Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). These studies illustrate how actors gain or lose influence as a result of authority being reconfigured around new spaces and territories. More importantly, some of these new policy and programming spaces may pose significant challenges for democratic legitimacy and social equity (Keating, 2009).

In Europe, processes of political, economic, social and cultural integra-tion can all be regarded as important drivers for rescaling of policies and programmes. Processes of European integration (and expansion) have created new physical boundaries for policymaking, new organizations to deal with certain policy issues (e.g. the European Environmental Agency in the case of environmental policy) and new types of policy instru-ments to tackle specific problems (such as air quality and water frame-work directives, again in the case of environmental policy). European integration and expansion has resulted in much more than the replace-ment of one scalar configuration by another: it has also altered estab-lished power geometries, where the principal beneficiaries appear to be those who are capable of acting across new policy spaces (Moss and Newig, 2010). According to Gualini, processes of rescaling are as much ‘a reallocation of formal state power’ as a ‘restructuring of modes of gov-ernance and regulation that involve shifts in the relationship between state and society and their influence on spatial relations’ (2006, p. 6). Although nation states may be losing their old monopolies on some policymaking arenas, European integration and expansion does not simply mean that powers are shifting to the European level: Europe is not so much suppressing state borders as changing their meaning and impact for different social, economic and political systems (Bartolini, 2005; Keating, 2009). European integration brings with it changes in powers across existing layers of decision-making, but also new scales in a discursive sense and new layers in a formally institutionalized sense, as well as new types of intervention and new actor constellations.

Whichever interpretation and analytical approach is employed in the study of Europeanization, there are almost always implications for policy rescaling in some shape or form. This can include the rescaling of


policymaking agendas, processes, networks or powers, or alternatively, it can include the rescaling of ideas, argumentation or identities related to policy. Processes of rescaling and Europeanization thus address similar dynamics. Both consider shifts between scales and actors as essential. Both also describe rescaling and Europeanization as processes as well as outcomes of European dynamics. They address vertical and hori-zontal shifts within policy, polity and politics over levels and between stakeholders.

Rescaling (and scale jumping) can be applied to different administrative levels and has frequently been employed in the context of globalization (e.g. Brenner, 1999) and administrative shifts within states. The concept often refers to institutional or discursive dimensions, although the con-ceptual focus can be broader (Marston et al., 2005). Whereas rescaling is understood in terms of new levels in an institutional or discursive sense, it has strong overlaps with the notion of vertical Europeanization.

Like Europeanization, rescaling can occur upwards, downwards and sideways (such as the reorganization of decision-making responsibilities to higher or lower levels of government or to other actors at the same level or the diffusion of policy ideas to other levels). In a study of the shifts in environmental governance in the Baltic Sea Region, Kern and Löffelsend (2004) suggest that governance arrangements have experi-enced rescaling upwards (to the level of international and supranational institutions), sideways (to civil actors) and downwards (to subnational actors) during the same period. Whereas narrower definitions see rescal-ing as a process that always implies the transfer of competences from one level to another (e.g. Gualini, 2004, 2006), others take a broader view in which rescaling processes can imply functional, political or institutional shifts (e.g. Keating, 2013).

The rescaling debate addresses different categories of rescaling objects. One can differentiate between the rescaling of mandates and budg-ets, dominant levels of power, spatial frames, policy networks, policy concepts, rationales, instruments, actor networks, policy agendas and national policy argumentations, policy networks, as well as a rescaling of norms, narratives, procedures and modes of operation. These are used below as an analytical tool to examine the impacts of European territo-rial cooperation processes and macro-regional strategies.

European territorial cooperation

In recent years, various planning and geography scholars have inves-tigated the Europeanization of planning and regional development


(e.g. Adams et al., 2011; Colomb, 2007; Dühr and Nadin, 2007; Farthing and Carrière, 2007; Giannakourou, 2005; Gløersen et al., 2007; Peterlin and Kreitmayer McKenzie, 2007; Waterhout, 2007; Waterhout and Stead, 2007; Zaucha, 2007). Many of these scholars have primarily employed government/governance as the key explanatory variable (following the categorization by Clark and Jones presented in Table 6.1).

Horizontal, state-to-state transfer processes can take place indepen-dently of EU influences, but the research focus is on cases where EU institutions facilitate or even trigger such learning processes. This hap-pens notably through the EU’s extensive ‘comitology’ structure, which brings national policymakers and opinion leaders into contact with each other, thus facilitating the exchange of ideas which may diffuse into national practices (Lenschow, 2006). For example, the process of draft-ing the ESDP, which was prepared by the intergovernmental ‘Committee on Spatial Development’ (CSD), has been described by Faludi (2001) as instrumental in ‘shaping the minds of actors involved in spatial devel-opment’ (p. 664). This intergovernmental process was at the same time coordinated by the European Commission and thus also had a vertical dimension. As a result, we see a clear discursive modification – domes-tic discourses that have been widened to the European dimension. However, on the institutional side, we see only an explicitly ‘informal’ intergovernmental committee adopting this document without having any ‘rescaled’ hard political mandate.

Another important stimulus for horizontal processes of the Europeanization of spatial planning is the INTERREG initiative (see e.g. Colomb, 2007; Dühr and Nadin, 2007). Although a large number of actors have been involved in cooperation projects to date, Dühr and Nadin (2007) argue that there is little evidence of learning effects in terms of a ‘rescaling’ of planning agendas from the national and regional to the transnational level. The INTERREG programmes have contributed to both horizontal and vertical forms of mutual learning, though the primary focus was on horizontal exchange. We see this, for example, in the strong role of the Commission.

The field of EU spatial policymaking is characterized by interactions between the horizontal and vertical levels. In this understanding, actors at national and subnational government levels seek to ‘upload’ cer-tain policy models and ideas to the EU, while at the same time, they ‘import’ EU influences in the pursuit of changes that suit their domes-tic political interests. The ESDP is an example of a circular process of Europeanization in which member states shaped the content of the docu-ment through the CSD during the preparation phase (see Faludi, 2004),


and subsequently applied the ideas to domestic planning systems, shaped policies and contributed to institutional change (see e.g. Davoudi and Wishardt, 2005; Shaw and Sykes, 2003). Meanwhile, Waterhout and Stead (2007) have considered the nature of these circular and hori-zontal processes of Europeanization in their analysis of the applica-tion of ESDP concepts in INTERREG programmes and projects. The INTERREG initiatives have led to the development of new intergov-ernmental committees with strong involvement by the European Commission. In terms of mandates and budgets, they are also a form of upwards rescaling. With these cooperation initiatives, new spatial frames and policy rationales were developed that influence national policy agendas.

Despite some signs of a Europeanization of planning and regional development, these are often the result of rather long-term horizontal and circular processes which affect the cognitive logic of actors involved in spatial development and transnational cooperation. The effects are generally complex, subtle and are often not directly attributable to a par-ticular initiative. Nevertheless, European territorial cooperation under the different INTERREG (and European Spatial Planning Observation Network [ESPON]) programmes is contributing to the Europeanization of spatial planning. According to some experts, the extent of change that can be expected may be more profound in the new member states than in western Europe (Batt and Wolczuk, 1999; Grabbe, 2001; O’Dwyer, 2006).

Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, ‘territorial cohe-sion’ has been an explicit objective of the EU. Although this does not imply a formal competence for Europe in the area of spatial planning, the EU exerts influence over spatial development through various strategies, programmes and projects, including European territorial cooperation. In terms of rescaling, there have been no shifts in competences. However, there are signs of the broader rescaling of policy agendas, discourses, actor networks and learning arenas.

The case of macro-regional strategies: Europeanization and rescaling

As illustrated above, processes of Europeanization frequently go hand in hand with processes of rescaling. Macro-regions have not yet devel-oped as an independently institutionalized political scale between the national and European scales with formal mandates. However, macro-regions have certainly become an important instrument for various


regional, national and multinational actors to promote their policy agen-das, and to influence mandates, budgets, spatial frames and narratives. Some forms of rescaling are similar across different regions, while oth-ers vary depending on stakeholders’ involvement and the policy fields addressed. Specific examples of rescaling processes arising from the development of the first two macro-regional strategies (for the Baltic and Danube regions) are presented according to the different categories of rescaling discussed earlier in the chapter.

Rescaling of policy agendas

Certain policy fields have received substantial political attention and support in both the Baltic and Danube macro-regions, in which an inter-nationalization of policies already took place through existing intergov-ernmental initiatives. Regional actors in certain policy fields (such as transport, energy, environment, transport and maritime policies) have enjoyed significant influence over how macro-regional policy agendas were defined. One possible reason for this is the existence of established cooperation platforms representing these issues, for example, the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC) and Via Donau. As Dangerfield observes (chapter 2 in this volume), the first draft of the macro-regional strategy for the Danube region was more than reminiscent – and in fact looked more like a duplication – of the Trieste-based CEI, both in terms of its member countries and in terms of its portfolios of activity. These institutions have used the macro-regional Priority Area (PA) committees as a platform to promote their agenda and influence policy decisions (particularly in the areas of transport and environment). As such, the cooperation platforms can be considered as the precursors of the EU macro-regional strategies. While the various actors involved have their own distinct characteristics in terms of their origins, purpose, degree of institutionalization, scale and scope, they were all engaged to varying degrees in cross-border cooperation activi-ties before the development of the EU macro-regional strategies.

While the issues and actions contained in the macro-regional strate-gies are primarily the result of a consensus and bargaining process, it is also apparent that certain issues enjoyed more support than others across the states covered by the macro-regional strategies. An analysis of the national position papers submitted during the development of the Danube Strategy reveals that issues such as transport, environmental protection and tourism featured on many national agendas from the outset, whereas other issues, such as security, featured less frequently but nevertheless still found their way into PAs for the strategy.


Rescaling of dominant levels of power

The European Commission played an important role in the initial stages of developing macro-regional strategies, in terms of shaping the devel-opment of the documents, designing the governance structure of the regional organizations and providing advice throughout the consulta-tion phase. Furthermore, in contrast to some other strategic European documents on territorial cooperation (such as the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020, published in 2011), the macro-regional strategies were drafted by the Commission itself rather than by national experts. However, the future (official) role of the Commission still only foresees its input through coordination and evaluation, rather than through any leading, decision-making role. The Commission generally highlights that the strategy and its further development is to be primar-ily carried out at the nation state level. The Commission is expected to take the strategies into account in the pursuit of other policy initia-tives, and to facilitate the implementation and updating of the action plans and strategies. This means that while the Commission does not have an official and decisive role, it occupies a central position in the decision-making process. Within the thematic macro-regional steer-ing groups, decisions are made at an intergovernmental level, with the Commission again taking an informing and supporting role. Therefore, the influence of the Commission on policy outcomes depends on the different PAs and the extent to which the projects depend on the Commission’s support.

The national ministries are reluctant to offer the European Commission more competences and influence within macro-regional development and thus emphasize the existing coordinating role of the Commission. In the different PAs, the European Commission has substantial influence on discussions as a consequence of close cooperation with all the respon-sible committees in the governance structure. The different national and intergovernmental stakeholders involved in the process (both projects and institutions) are motivated by the prospect of obtaining funding for their policy arenas. The rationales for involvement vary between policy fields and stakeholder types. These rationales are themselves determined by the stakeholders involved, existing networks and past experiences.

In terms of stakeholder involvement, it seems that relatively strong stakeholders have gained influence in steering groups by offering their expertise. These stakeholders use macro-regional strategies as a means to gain a platform and influence across different policy fields. For many supranational organizations, EU macro-regional strategies have pre-sented an opportunity to cement their place as permanent players in


cross-border cooperation activities. Cooperation platforms such as the UBC have been relatively successful in influencing agenda-setting in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). The UBC considers its participation in the implementation of the EUSBSR a key priority for its activities (as is stated explicitly in the UBC Strategy for 2010–15), which is reflected in its members’ leadership roles in various priorities, horizontal actions and flagship projects. Dangerfield’s contribution also highlights the fact that, although pre-existing supranational organiza-tions had a core role in defining the agenda and structure of the macro-regional strategies, their overall influence was greater in the case of the EUSBSR than in the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR).

In the case of smaller or less institutionally endowed NGOs, their par-ticipation and representation have been much more limited. This is in part due to their more limited financial capabilities, but is exacerbated by a number of other contributing factors. These include the short con-sultation/preparation periods for the strategies, and the limited amount of information and participation built into the drafting process (Kodric, 2011). Active participation was limited to a small number of groups, of which very few were NGOs: the majority of participants were EU member states or state institutions, and international organizations. Moreover, stakeholder participation in the annual forums on macro-regional strategies is limited to a small number of organizations with greater influence than small NGOs (Kodric, 2011).

The PA coordinators within the macro-regional governance structure have taken up a central role. Together with the European Commission and National Contact Points, PAs occupy a vital position which is responsible for the diffusion of information, decision-making and oper-ating modes. This is becoming increasingly obvious as the governance of macro-regional strategies is orientated towards existing domestic and EU political levels. For example, in the case of the Danube Region, the Coordinator of the PA for transport policy is cooperating actively with the respective national ministers. Under this PA, a Fairway Rehabilitation and Maintenance Master Plan was developed, which was endorsed by the Danube transport ministers in December 2014 (danube-navigation, undated). Another example for macro-regional governance being ori-ented towards domestic levels is an appeal of the steering group of PA 1 in 2014. This addressed national ministers concerning the imple-mentation of the Luxembourg Declaration on effective waterway infrastructure maintenance. The steering group ‘recalls to the partner Governments to take on a national level the necessary measures for the implementation’ (danube-navigation, 2013). These examples show


how the PAs address the domestic levels, thereby strengthening the intergovernmental arrangements by, for example, providing a ‘Master Plan’. The macro-regional governance thus supports a certain degree of rescaling from the domestic level as the dominant level of power towards intergovernmental arrangements (e.g. at Ministerial meetings).

Rescaling of mandates and budgets

Despite the EU mantra of the ‘three No’s’ (no new institutions, no new legislation, no new financing) associated with the macro-regional strat-egies, a certain amount of rescaling of mandates and budgets due to macro-regions can be observed. Around the same time as the launch of the EUSBSR, Paweł Samecki, then European Commissioner for Regional Policy, suggested that a share of cohesion policy funding could be allo-cated to macro-regions (European Commission, 2009). By early 2013, the European Commission’s Seed Money Facility was established, pro-viding a technical assistance budget for the EUSBSR, managed by the Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein. This initiative comes in addition to other sources of seed money which can be obtained to finance the devel-opment of projects implementing the EUSBSR, including the Swedish Institute, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers. As part of preparing the new EU programming period, costs for governing the macro-region (PA coordinators, techni-cal assistance, etc.) shall be organized as an INTERREG programme in the long term. According to a European Commission representative, the new Danube Region Strategy Point in Baden-Württemberg could be sup-ported financially through the existing European funds. Through this, a rescaling of mandates and budgets is evident towards the transnational level. To simplify, we can see a Europeanization tendency of upwards res-caling. Also, the transnational cooperation programme for the Danube Region implies an adjustment of budgets towards the macro-regional perimeter. This suggests that macro-regional cooperation might become an important parameter for EU-wide mandates and budgets.

Rescaling of policy concepts, rationales, instruments, actor networks

As Gänzle and Kern highlight in chapter 6 in this volume, there is a close interplay between regional actors and EU institutions in the case of the EUSBSR, and a possible rescaling of roles. For example, they report that, while Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) is in a position to influence decision-making in Brussels, the EU can similarly ‘utilize’ HELCOM as a regional environmental protection agency of sorts. Their conclusion


from this is that the EU has in effect co-opted a macro-regional body to implement EU legislation. As such, the creation of the macro-regions has led to hybrid arrangements of governmental and non-governmental actors. This development opens up new opportunities (such as for the direct involvement of stakeholders and the public at the macro-regional level) and also leads to new challenges (e.g. related to legitimacy and accountability).

Rescaling of spatial frames (or boundaries) of policymaking processes

Within the macro-regional strategies, the spatial coverage of individual actions and projects varies considerably, as it ‘depends on the topic’ (European Commission, 2009). In addition, the responsibility for coor-dinating the actions and projects under the PAs of each pillar is spread between different member states, and each of the actions and projects involves different constellations of actors. This situation creates a com-plex, spatially overlapping patchwork of programming/project spaces, actors and actions. Evidence to date suggests that the levels of ambi-tion between national actors, both political and administrative, have been uneven. There are also considerable differences in the working arrangements of the PAs depending on existing networks and the matu-rity of cooperation arrangements on which implementation can draw (European Commission, 2014).

Articulations of the boundaries and interests of the programmes and projects being developed in the Baltic region have remained distinctly multiple and fuzzy (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012). Official statements on regional policy in Europe suggest that the move towards these soft spaces with fuzzy overlapping boundaries appears to be intentional. Among the conclusions of a European Commission document on macro-regional strategies, for example, is the statement that ‘regions should be defined so as to maximise the efficacy of the strategy . . . [which] may well mean flexible, even vague, definitions of the boundaries’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 8).

Rescaling of narratives, norms, procedures or modes of operation beyond EU borders

One common feature that the macro-regional strategies for the Baltic and Danube regions (and also the strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region) share is that the territory that they cover extends beyond existing EU boundaries. This corresponds with the view that macro-regions repre-sent a political space or forum for joint political action and symbolize a


trend whereby borders are increasingly being replaced by spaces encom-passing areas both inside and outside the EU (Cappellin, 1998).

The importance of ‘exporting’ the ideas and initiatives contained in the macro-regional strategies beyond EU borders is highlighted in a recent commentary by Johan Friis, the Danish contact person for the EUSBSR. He states that ‘it is crucial to ensure the participation and involvement of third countries, in particular Russia, with regard to the work linked to the EUSBSR’ as ‘many of the challenges in the Baltic Sea Region are directly related to Russia’ (Friis, 2012, p. 13). Even if the case of Russia is very specific, the relevance of third countries is obvious here. The Danube Strategy, involving candidate states, places an emphasis on relations with these partners in nearly all official documents.

Conclusion

Despite trends over recent decades towards a diffusion of power, author-ity and legitimacy to other government levels and actors in the areas where macro-regional strategies have been developed, the role of the nation state remains crucial. Nonetheless, in relation to governance, the importance of international organizations and regimes on the one hand, and transnational and subnational actors on the other, has increased in different regions. This is closely related to the evolution of European transnational cooperation programmes. New modes of governance have emerged both above and below the nation state.

Analysing macro-regions under the lenses of rescaling and Europeanization provides a way of understanding how macro-regions are contributing to new modes of cooperation and forms of governance (such as stakeholder involvement). At the same time, these lenses pro-vide a means of examining processes of institutionalization at the trans-national scale arising from European policymaking.

In general, European territorial cooperation initiatives have led to the creation of new policy and programming spaces (sometimes with fuzzy and/or overlapping boundaries). They have also had impacts on policy discourses and governance processes. The macro-regional strategies have not significantly affected the importance of other levels of decision-making – much power remains at the national and subnational levels of government (Luukkonen and Moilanen, 2012). However, in certain cases and to a certain extent, these strategies may be both supplement-ing and even supplanting formal administrative territories (see also Metzger and Schmitt, 2012). Furthermore, the initiatives also imply a rescaling of resources (albeit small in relative terms) for certain policies


and programmes. Meanwhile, the inclusion of non-EU member states in the development and implementation of macro-regional strategies can be seen as a deliberate attempt to involve parties outside EU bor-ders to promote (or export) EU policy objectives. Clearly, developments immediately outside the EU’s borders are highly important for the Baltic Sea Region from economic, social and environmental perspectives: The Kaliningrad region, for example, is easily the largest metropolitan con-urbation in the Baltic Sea macro-region (it has a larger population than the countries of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania) and therefore has enor-mous potential implications for the economy, society and environment of the macro-region. The extent of these implications is closely tied to the political relations between Russian, Europe and EU member states in the Baltic Sea Region.

The European transnational cooperation initiatives examined in this chapter are archetypal multilevel governance constructions involving the European Commission, national states, local and regional authori-ties and a variety of non-governmental agencies. As such, they provide arenas for European, national and subnational actors to shape policies, programmes and actions. These initiatives have contributed to the crea-tion of new and/or more extensive actor networks (both public and pri-vate) concerned with sectoral policies and transnational programmes, and greater interaction between networks. This has resulted in a range of bilateral and multilateral strategic alliances, networks and partnerships, often overlapping in nature and scale (Scott, 2002). As a result, initia-tives such as the INTERREG transnational cooperation programmes and the EU macro-regional strategies have also helped to spread (or Europeanize) various policy concepts and norms, both within the boundaries of the EU and beyond. The principles, goals and priorities defined at the macro-regional scale (and agreed at the national level) under these transnational cooperation initiatives can (and do) have an impact at the local and regional levels in policy discourses and practices (see also Scott, 2002; Waterhout and Stead, 2007). While the impacts of European transnational cooperation initiatives on Europeanization and rescaling may currently seem small or intangible, they do exist and are likely to increase.

While European cooperation initiatives such as INTERREG or the pan-European strategies have not led to a formal rescaling of competences, they have led to the rescaling of actor networks, stakeholder relations, arenas of policy cooperation, technical assistance budgets, policy agen-das and narratives. The new type of arrangements for European territo-rial cooperation and the macro-regional strategies provide new arenas


for rescaling. Our view is that different forms of rescaling may become evident in different macro-regions. It may also be the case that different forms of rescaling are likely for different policy sectors, such as environ-ment or transport.

We conclude that processes of rescaling are different in each macro-region and in each thematic field. Most prominent alongside all the-matic fields and macro-regions are however rescaling processes in terms of actor-setting involvement in policymaking processes (e.g. through the involvement of international organizations such as the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, the HELCOM or Via Donau). Another form of rescaling taking shape relates to agenda-setting activities. New governance and policy arrangements are complementing existing structures and elements rather than replacing institutions, and mandates. Macro-regional strategies imply Europeanization by means of strategic coalitions in various thematic fields.

Employing the concepts of Europeanization and rescaling as theoreti-cal lenses to explain the dynamics of change has proven to be helpful in providing a systematic analysis of the impacts of European territo-rial cooperation initiatives, including the macro-regional strategies. We have shown how these two related concepts can be used to distinguish different dimensions and directions of policy and governance changes resulting from the introduction of European macro-regional strate-gies, and have provided a possible foundation for analysing the future impacts of existing macro-regional strategies and/or the impacts of new macro-regional strategies.

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Part IV

Governance Architecture and Impact of Macro-regional Strategies in Europe


123

Introduction

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), which was presented by the European Commission in June 2009, is the first macro-regional strategy of the EU. In the words of the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn, it was designed to serve as a ‘new model for co-operation’ and ‘to inspire other regions’ (Hahn, 2010, 2) in Europe. From this perspective, the EUSBSR has certainly provided some ‘inspi-rational successes’, almost triggering a veritable ‘macro-regional fever’ (Dühr, 2011, 3) amongst EU members and partner countries, and pushing the number of countries currently involved in the formula-tion of macro-regional strategies to 27.1 The EUSBSR targets eight EU member states – Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany, that is, the German Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Hamburg – and also two partner coun-tries (the Russian Federation and Norway) (Figure 6.1); hence, it can almost be conceived as an internal strategy of the EU (European Commission, 2009). In contrast, both the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region are far more diverse in mem-bership and exhibit a strong external focus (see Gänzle, forthcoming; Ágh, chapter 7, Cugusi and Stocchiero, chapter 8 this volume).

Six years after the launch of the Strategy – ‘the first of its kind in the EU’ (Rostoks, 2010, 9) – implementation of the ‘macro-regional project’ is certainly most advanced in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) receiving fur-ther momentum from two Baltic EU Council Presidencies (Lithuania in 2013 and Latvia in 2015). Lithuania declared the EUSBSR to be one of the main objectives of its Presidency of the EU Council and advo-cated for a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU

6The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea RegionStefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern


Figure 6.1 Territorial coverage of the Baltic Sea macro-region


GERMANY

ESTONIA

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

DENMARK

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

RUSSIA

POLAND

0 400km


Council, 2013, 9). Towards this background, three central objectives are pursued in this chapter: first, to analyse the evolvement of the EUSBSR’s governance architecture in light of the so-called ‘three No’s’ declared in 2009, which limit macro-regional strategies by demanding that they come at virtually no additional costs or funding, and do not result in the establishment of new institutions and legislation; second, to assess the impact of the EUSBSR from the perspective of multilevel govern-ance (MLG) by grasping its impact on existing, well-established organi-zations of regional cooperation, for example, Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) (horizontal interplay); also to discuss the role of subnational authorities and civil society in the EUSBSR (vertical interplay) and to assess the external impact and governance of the Strategy with regard to third states, in particular the Russian Federation; third, to discuss the major achievements and shortcomings of the EUSBSR in the conclusion. Although the EUSBSR has not (yet) led to the establishment of new insti-tutions, new legislation or new funding schemes, we argue that it has generated a sui generis governance architecture that has started to affect existing institutions at the macro-regional level.

The development of the EUSBSR

Collaboration in the BSR is deeply entrenched in a long historical tra-jectory of regional – or, for that matter, macro-regional – cooperation dating back to the Hanseatic era and, more recently, the formation of international regimes and organizations, such as the HELCOM, to address issues of ecological degradation of the Baltic Sea, even during the East–West conflict (see Gänzle, 2011). Obviously, EU cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation programmes are a rather new phenomenon, as most countries in the Baltic Sea area have only been members of the EU since 2004 (with the important exception of the Russian Federation). Yet, already by the beginning of the 1990s, the European Commission had issued its ‘Europe 2000’ report on the future of the then European Community’s territory, endorsing the idea of ‘regional groupings’; as one example thereof, the BSR was singled out (European Commission, 1991, 55ff.; Delmaide, 1994). Towards the end of the 1990s, collaboration amongst countries in the Baltic Sea Region was eventually captured under the label of Europe’s ‘new sub-regionalism’ (Cottey, 1999; Antola, 2009, 21ff.) or ‘peripheral sub-regionalism’ (Hubel and Gänzle, 2002). Since then, the established track record in cooperative efforts across various levels of governance has been complemented by EU approaches towards the region, ranging from the


‘Union Approach towards the Baltic Sea Region’ of October 1994 to the Northern Dimension (ND) of 1997/99 and, most recently, the EUSBSR (see Herolf, 2010, 6ff.).

The Strategy for the BSR started life in the European Parliament: a Euro-Baltic Intergroup consisting of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from member states in the BSR presented the Strategy to European Commission President José Manuel Barroso in 2005. The core idea of the initiative was to maximize the potential of the reunited BSR (see Beazley, 2007, 14), and to lobby for a consolidated EU pillar of Baltic Sea states within the ND. Following a mandate given by the European Council in 2007, the European Commission subsequently took up the initiative and considerably de-emphasized the external dimension of the Parliament’s original proposal.

A public consultation process among different stakeholders in the region took place between August 2008 and February 2009 (see Bengtsson, 2009, 3; Rostoks, 2010, 15ff.). Schymik and Krumrey (2009, 15) conclude that ‘the European Commission has by and large been able to draft an Action Plan that captures the essence of public opinion in the region’. This particular instrument of stakeholder participation was perpetuated by a so-called Annual Forum for the EUSBSR, the first of which was held in Tallinn in 2010, followed by annual fora in Gdansk (2011), Copenhagen (2012), Vilnius (2013), Turku (2014) and Jurmela (2015). By bringing both policymakers and stakeholders together, these meet-ings provided a platform for networking, discussion and an exchange of views about the Strategy and its implementation.

Eventually, the EUSBSR, presented by the European Commission in June 2009, was adopted by the European Council in October of that year. The Strategy was based on the assumption that macro-regional strategies would: (1) not create new institutions, but be supported by a multilevel, multi-actor and multi-sector governance approach; (2) not generate new legislation for developing and implementing macro-regional strategies, with the strategies to be driven instead by regularly updated action plans; and (3) not lead to new funding schemes, with the EUSBSR instead being expected to utilize and combine extant schemes (European Commission, 2013b, 10).

The EUSBSR was accompanied by an Action Plan which proposed the establishment of four pillars. These pillars aimed to (1) improve the environmental state of the Baltic Sea, (2) promote more balanced eco-nomic development in the region, (3) make the region more accessible and attractive and (4) make it a safer and more secure place. These areas have been broken down into 15 different so-called Priority Areas (PAs) and have been assigned a set of highly relevant projects (also known as


flagship projects), which served as a showcase for the EUSBSR. The Action Plan was conceived as a ‘rolling’ plan, which implied that it was designed in order to quickly absorb any ‘lessons learnt’; as such, it was revised in 2010, 2013 and 2015 (European Commission, 2013c, 2015). As a result, the Strategy’s original four overarching pillars have been condensed into three objectives, which are (1) to save the sea through fostering environ-mentally protective measures, (2) to connect the region through bol-stering cooperation on transportation infrastructure and (3) to increase economic prosperity. But at the same time as the overarching scope of the Strategy was being condensed, the number of PAs rose from 15 to 17, but in the latest Action Plan from June 2015 it was reduced to 13 (now called Policy Areas). The Horizontal Actions (HAs) (cross-cutting themes) have been reduced quite significantly from 13 to 4 (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 PAs and HAs of the EUSBSR (State: June 2015)

Coordinator(s)Number

of actions

Number of ongoing (completed)

flagship projects

Policy Areas (PAs)Save the seaPA Bioeconomy – agriculture,

forestry and fisheriesFinland, Lithuania,

Sweden, Nordic Council of Ministers

8 7 (2)

PA Hazards – reducing the use and impact of hazardous substances

Sweden 4 2 (7)

PA Nutri – reducing nutrient inputs to the sea to acceptable levels

Finland, Poland 6 6 (4)

PA Safe – to become a leading region in maritime safety and security

Denmark, Finland 7 9 (7)

PA Secure – protection from land-based emergencies, accidents and cross-border crime

Sweden, Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

8 1 (6)

PA Ship – becoming a model region for clean shipping

Denmark 3 6 (7)

Connect the regionPA Energy – action plan for

competitive, secure and sustainable energy

BEMIP (Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan); Denmark, Latvia

6 ?

(continued )


Coordinator(s)Number

of actions

Number of ongoing (completed)

flagship projects

PA Transport – improving internal and external transport links

Lithuania, Sweden 4 8 (4)

Increase prosperityPA Culture – culture & creative

sectorsSchleswig-Holstein

(Germany), Poland4 1 (2)

PA Education – education, research and employability

Hamburg (Germany), Norden Ass. (Sweden)

4 4 (2)

PA Health – improving and promoting people’s health, including its social aspects

Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being

6 3 (4)

PA Innovation – exploiting the full potential of the region in research, innovation and SME

Sweden, Poland 1 6 (1)

PA Tourism – reinforcing cohesiveness of the macro-region through tourism

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

2 2 (?)

Horizontal Actions (HAs)HA Capacity – capacity

building and involvementBaltic Sea NGO

Network, Union of the Baltic Cities, Swedish Institute

2 ?

HA Climate CBSS 2 6 (2)HA Neighbours – creating

added value to the Baltic Sea cooperation by working with neighbouring countries and regions

City of Turku (Finland), CBSS

5 4 (5)

HA Spatial Planning – encourage the use of maritime and land-based spatial planning in all member states around the Baltic Sea and develop a common approach for cross-border cooperation

VASAB, HELCOM 2 (1)

Source: Based on European Commission (2013b, 42); European Commission (2015).

Following an interim implementation report in 2010, the first major assessment report was drawn up in June 2011. The Commission found that the EUSBSR’s overall impact had been successful; in particular, it ‘has led to concrete action, with a more streamlined use of resources. New working methods and networks have been established, and many

Table 6.1 (continued)


initiatives developed’ (European Commission, 2011, 3). Clearly, as the EUSBSR was launched in the midst of the 2007–2013 funding period, a great deal of financial resources had already been earmarked for other projects. Nonetheless, a number of new projects were launched, such as the Baltic Deal, whereby members would work ‘with farmers across the Region to reduce nutrient run-off, and therefore eutrophication’ (European Commission, 2011, 2). This project is often referred to as an exemplary case of successfully enhancing awareness across different policy sectors and communities in the region.

In 2013, the European Commission carried out an evaluation exercise which utilized an extensive survey of more than 100 key stakeholders, as well as independent assessments by external experts. The evaluation con-cludes that macro-regional strategies have triggered clear results ‘evident in terms of projects and more integrated policy making, although further improvements are essential in implementation and planning’ (European Commission, 2013a, 11). At the same time, the document identifies a set of problems, particularly the lack of leadership in some parts of the macro-region. While a lack of administrative capacities and national resources may account for political disinterest in some countries, the complexities of the EUSBSR’s governance architecture have deterred both EU members and partner countries alike from welcoming the new initiative wholeheartedly.

Assessing the impact of the EUSBSR

Although the establishment of new institutions within the framework of EU macro-regional strategies is not intended, the EUSBSR affects existing institutions and stimulates new forms of institutional interplay. The Strategy has led to the emergence of an ‘institutional structure’ that is built into existing forms of EU governance. The institutional interplay between the EUSBSR and other organizations and conventions at the macro-regional level presents a very important aspect of the Strategy’s implementation, for example, for the establishment and implementa-tion of PAs and flagship projects. Applying an MLG lens of analysis directs our interest to processes of political mobilization (politics dimension), policymaking (policy dimension) and change of polity (polity dimen-sion) that results in permeability and fluidity between institutions, inter-nal and external policymakers and policy-takers (see Piattoni, 2009, 2010 and chapter 4 in this volume). The following sections will analyse the character of these processes of mobilization along their both vertical and horizontal axes and close with an assessment of how the boundaries of governance have been blurred with regard to Russia and in particular its northwestern region that partakes in Baltic Sea cooperation.


Evolvement of the EUSBSR’s governance architecture

Following the revisions introduced in the Action Plan of June 2015, the EUSBSR now subscribes to three core objectives, which focus on envi-ronmental protection (‘Save the Sea’), economic development (‘Increase Prosperity’) and improvement of the infrastructure (‘Connect the Region’). The three overall objectives are now linked to thirteen PAs – for instance, bioeconomy (PA ‘Bioeconomy’) or innovation (PA ‘Innovation’) – and complemented by four HAs (e.g. HA ‘Neighbours’ or HA ‘Spatial Planning’) that cut across various policy areas. Different member states or organizations are responsible for the PAs and the HAs. Several organi-zations operating at the macro-regional level – for instance, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the HELCOM and Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea (VASAB) – actively take part in the implementation of the Strategy as either Policy Area Coordinators (PACs), such as CBSS for PA ‘Secure’, or Horizontal Area Leaders (HALs), such as VASAB and HELCOM for HA ‘Spatial Planning’ (see Table 6.1).2

Each PA is coordinated by administrative managers from different mem-ber states and organizations participating in the Strategy. PACs assume a managerial role in the implementation of the Strategy, create ideas and sup-port the implementation of the EU structural policy in the macro-region alongside HALs. Whilst steering groups have been established in the EU Strategy for the Danube Region from the beginning, bringing together various interested stakeholders from other line ministries, international organizations of the region, subnational authorities and civil society, these committees are still in the process of being put together in the BSR (see Gänzle and Schneider, 2013; Gänzle and Wulf, 2014). Hence, the delivery of the strategies very much depends on the willingness and capacities of participating states. EU member states also operate the network of National Contact Points (NCPs), which assist and coordi-nate the implementation of the strategies at the national level. By and large, the commitment and willingness of member states to (re)allocate national resources for the aims of the strategies is decisive. In addition, participating countries’ public management traditions vary consider-ably and thus influence the effective implementation of the strategies. A certain degree of convergence among countries is therefore required as an institutional basis at the national level.

Apart from the increasing visibility of the member states in this process, the European Commission has maintained an important role. Together with the EU’s member states in the BSR, it has become the driving force behind the policy process leading towards the successful implementa-tion of the Strategy. It assumes an important role in preparing strategy


reviews, in monitoring its implementation and in leading the overall coordination of the rolling Action Plan. Participating states are linked to policy formulation by the so-called High Level Group (HLG), which also brings together all other member states at the EU level. EU member states that are not part of a given macro-region, however, do not actively participate in the HLG meetings (author’s interview with HAL, 30 June 2013). This could potentially change when an increasing number of EU member states are engaged in macro-regional strategies.

Impact on international organizations and conventions at the macro-regional level

The CBSS and the Helsinki Convention with the HELCOM as its adminis-trative body are amongst the most important macro-regional institutions in the BSR. Although the EU joined the Helsinki Convention as early as 1992, its influence on marine governance in the BSR remained rather limited prior to the EU’s 2004 enlargement. Similarly, the Commission’s influence was also rather marginal in the CBSS. The CBSS was established in 1992 with the aim of building trust and security, and coping with the region’s challenges after the end of the Cold War (Etzold, 2010). With the development of the EUSBSR, the European Commission gained a cen-tral, if not policy entrepreneurial, role in decision-making, while EU member and partner countries have been increasingly relegated to mat-ters of implementation. It is also evident that the Commission enjoys the role of a watchdog with regard to policy coherence.

The CBSS deals with concrete joint regional issues, but places no more emphasis on security-related ‘high politics’ than is considered necessary. Such pragmatic, functional regional cooperation could have a positive impact at high political levels, where the cooperation between EU mem-ber states and Russia is more difficult. The CBSS has outstanding exper-tise in issue areas such as civil security (e.g. children at risk, trafficking in human beings and radiation and nuclear safety), maritime economy and sustainable development. By involving Russia and the EU (European Commission/European External Action Service) as equal members, and being involved in the ND and the EUSBSR, the CBSS is in a favoura-ble position to provide a platform for cooperation at the intersection of EU internal and external policies. The CBSS plays a unique role in integrating Russia in regional cooperation, and provides a relevant link between Russia and the EU in this respect; the South Eastern Baltic Area (SEBA) modernization partnership and the Northwest Strategy of Russia (in which the CBSS is closely involved) have also fulfilled an impor-tant function. More recently, however, the Ukraine crisis as well as the


changing relationship between the EU and Russia have had a negative impact on the integrative role of the CBSS in the Baltic Sea macro-region.

The environmental objectives of the EUSBSR in general, and the PAs of this area in particular, overlap with the core tasks of HELCOM, the exec-utive body of the Helsinki Convention, which was set up in 1974 to fos-ter international environmental cooperation in the region. HELCOM’s main goal is to protect the marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution, and to restore and safeguard its ecological balance. After the convention was updated and broadened in scope, it was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 2000. The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) was adopted in 2007 (HELCOM, 2007) and has since estab-lished the framework for action (Kern, 2011; Söderström et al., 2015).

Consequently, the EUSBSR provides regional organizations with the opportunity to embed their activities in a wider strategic design and broader institutional framework; meanwhile, the EU might be able to benefit from the regional experience and expertise that these bodies have accumulated over time. Hence, the Council of the EU encouraged mem-ber states to further investigate the ‘synergy effects between the EUSBSR and multilateral cooperation structures and networks within the Baltic Sea Region [. . .] through better co-ordination and effective use of com-munication channels [. . .] to provide increased efficiency of intervention within the macro region’ (Council of the European Union, 2011, 5).

The institutional interplay and the resulting synergies between HELCOM’s BSAP and the EUSBSR are evident in the EU Strategy’s rec-ommendation for the implementation of the BSAP (European Union, 2010, 144ff.). We argue therefore that the EUSBSR supports the imple-mentation of a cross-sectorial approach to environmental issues laid down in the BSAP. This has strengthened HELCOM’s position, as well as the implementation of BSAP, which had been hampered by the influ-ence of sectorial interests because they were seen as negatively affecting the implementation of an integrative ecosystem approach (European Commission, 2013a, 5). The development of individual PAs shows that there is now a direct link between the EUSBSR and existing interna-tional organizations such as HELCOM. For the implementation of Policy Area Nutri (reducing nutrient inputs to the sea to acceptable levels), for example, HELCOM provides the technical and scientific framework (indicators and targets) for the implementation of EU Directives (EUSBSR News, May 2012, 5; European Commission, 2015).

Clearly, macro-regional strategies are rather more law-shaping than lawmaking (Schymik, 2011, 17). However, the analysis of existing envi-ronmental legislation, such as the Water Framework Directive (WFD,


2000/60/EC) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD, 2008/56/EC) on the one hand and the EUSBSR on the other, account for the close interplay between the Strategy and EU legislation (Söderström et al., 2015). Although the EUSBSR has not created any new legisla-tion, it aims to improve the implementation of existing EU legislation (European Union, 2010).

The synergies resulting from the institutional interplay between the EU and HELCOM are striking. While HELCOM is in a position to influ-ence decision-making in Brussels, the EU can similarly utilize HELCOM as a sort of regional environmental protection agency. Thus, it can be argued that the EU has started to co-op existing institutions so as to imple-ment EU legislation. However, the European Commission maintains con-trol over the EU legislation that is implemented in the macro-regions. The case of the MSFD illustrates the impact of macro-regional strategies on the institutional interplay between international institutions (such as HELCOM) and EU institutions. The MSFD has been built on the expe-rience of HELCOM’s BSAP, and the Commission uses the macro-regional approach to systematically improve the implementation of HELCOM guidelines that have thus far only been politically binding. While HELCOM guidelines and recommendations require a consensus among the cooperating countries and lack formal enforcement powers, most EU Directives are decided on the basis of a qualified majority, are binding after transposition into national law and are also subject to the infringe-ment procedure for EU member states (Wenzel, 2011; Van Leeuwen and Kern, 2013).

Involvement of subnational authorities and civil society

Macro-regional strategies provide new political opportunities for subna-tional authorities and civil society. If subnational authorities establish transnational networks, for example, they can develop into constitutive elements of macro-regions. In the BSR, institutional capacities are well established, as demonstrated by the 100-member-strong Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC) and the Baltic Metropoles Network, both of which play an active role in the implementation of EUSBSR. They have a long history of cooperation and are relatively well equipped. Cooperation between Hanseatic cities, often based on twinning relationships, even survived the Cold War period. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the UBC was soon complemented by a wider network of subregional author-ities, most prominently by the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC). Drawing on previous literature, these networks which often include cities with active sister city agreements (Kern, 2001) can be


expected to trigger a positive impact on the implementation of the EUSBSR. It is interesting to see how macro-regional cooperation is being affected in those cases where the subnational level builds on less col-laborative agreements amongst municipalities, as, for example, in the Danube Region (see Ágh, chapter 7 in this volume).

However, subnational authorities only rarely act as PACs. In the case of the EUSBSR, for example, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) is in charge of the PAC focusing on tourism. Interestingly, Brandenburg – which was not yet part of the established group of Germany’s Baltic Länder (i.e. Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) – has declared its interest in joining the EUSBSR (interview with German official, 12 June 2013). Moreover, city initiatives have become essential for the implementation of the EUSBSR, particularly the so-called ‘Turku Process’. This collaborative process was initiated by the City of Turku and the Regional Council of Southwest Finland in 2010, based on the continued cooperation between Turku and Russia’s St Petersburg, and stimulated by the onset of the EUSBSR and HELCOM initiatives. It adds the expertise and knowledge of local authorities to the EUSBSR process. Today, the process is coordinated by three partners: the City of St Petersburg, the City of Hamburg and the City of Turku (together with the Region of Southwest Finland) (EUSBSR News, March 2013, 5).

Despite these positive trends, shortcomings persist in the implementa-tion of the EUSBSR when it comes to the integration of local and regional authorities. This is problematic, since these actors could clearly assume an essential role in the implementation of macro-regional initiatives. Regions, cities and their associations could serve as PACs, which help to implement specific projects that require the cooperation of actors from different levels, and which need alignment of EU and macro-regional approaches on the one hand with national and subnational policies on the other (European Commission, 2013b, 15). A recent online survey conducted amongst PACs and HALs of the BSR, however, found that even only very few representatives from municipalities had become members of steering groups thus far (Gänzle and Wulf, 2014). In the same survey, only 1 (out of 20 participating) PAC/HALs conceded that coordination with local authorities is efficient and effective in the con-text of the Strategy.3

Moreover, the EUSBSR paves the way for a trend towards a transnation-alization of the region’s civil society. The BSR has developed into a highly dynamic area of cross-border cooperation and transnational networking (Kern, 2001, 2011; Kern and Löffelsend, 2008) that includes not only cities and subnational regions but also non-governmental organizations


covering the whole macro-region. As macro-regional governance is not restricted to the nation states, this requires the institutionalization of new forms of cooperation and collaboration at the macro-regional scale. Transnational institutions are a constitutive element of macro-regions, and include hybrid arrangements of governmental and non-govern-mental actors (Joas et al., 2007).4 The combination of these different forms produces possibilities for the direct involvement of stakeholders and the public at the macro-regional level. This development opens new opportunities, but also leads to new challenges, because stakeholder par-ticipation in macro-regions faces the same legitimacy and accountabil-ity problems as stakeholder participation at the global level. Due to a lack of capacities, stakeholder participation – for example, in the Annual Forums on the macro-regional strategies – seems to be limited to a small number of organizations which have sufficient capacities to participate in such events (Kodric, 2011). However, the HA Capacity (capacity build-ing and involvement) aims at the formation of pan-Baltic organizations and includes experts from NGOs, in particular the Baltic NGO Network, in the preparation and implementation of the EUSBSR. This requires capacity building, which would enable members of this network to coop-erate transnationally (European Commission, 2013c, 152; 2015).

Blurring the boundaries of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’: the case of Russia

Since the EUSBSR is based on activities of mutual interest to EU member states and neighbouring countries, close cooperation with non-member states, particularly with the Russian Federation, is critical to many areas of the Strategy, such as, for example, to its goals for more efficient and compatible maritime surveillance. As the EUSBSR presents an EU ini-tiative and does not commit non-member states, constructive cooper-ation with the region’s external partners is needed for the successful implementation of the Strategy (European Commission, 2013b, 31). This means that existing institutions, in particular HELCOM, CBSS and VASAB, provide the best platform for cooperation between EU member states and non-EU countries.

Although the EUSBSR is more inward-looking than the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, it seeks to draw Russia and Norway closer where appropriate, and is related to programmes such as the ND (Archer and Etzold, 2008). This programme is a common policy of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, and was set up to create a framework for coop-eration, in particular with the Russian Federation. This framework is important because it provides the basis for the external dimension of


the EUSBSR (European Commission, 2013b, 31). Hence, the Director General of the CBSS maintains:

The Strategy has improved transparency in regional cooperation, and the CBSS is together with e.g. HELCOM and the Northern Dimension one of several platforms on which EUSBSR cooperation can occur, with participation also by non-EU BSR countries. (Lundin, 2013, 15)

Since the launch of the EUSBSR, the EU has developed into a point of reference for many actors under the umbrella of the CBSS. Today, many actions and projects – for example, under the ‘Save the Sea’ objective – are implemented under the framework of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) through HELCOM, the CBSS or under new initiatives such as the Turku Process (European Commission, 2013c, 24–25). Indeed, as a reference point for cooperation in the BSR, the EUSBSR seems to be acceptable for non-EU members who cannot become fully involved in the Strategy, but who should naturally be included within any major framework of macro-regional cooperation (Etzold and Gänzle, 2012, 8).

The inclusion of some (or subnational parts of) non-member states is a common feature of all macro-regional strategies that have been devel-oped or proposed to date. This particularly applies to Russia’s Northwest Region and the subnational authorities in this part of the country. Although Russia perceives of the EUSBSR as an EU internal strategy, it launched a Northwest Strategy which de facto provides for several inter-faces with the EU Strategy (Russian Federation, 2012). Thus, we find parallel actions and initiatives for cooperation within common priority fields. This is most obvious when comparing the EUSBSR and Russia’s Strategy for Social and Economic Development of the Northwest Federal District (EUSBSR News, March 2013).

With respect to the non-EU member states, macro-regional coopera-tion – particularly the establishment and consolidation of institutions at the macro-regional level – is conducive to processes of socialization of government officials in the macro-region, including non-members such as the Russian Federation, fostering the emergence of new transgov-ernmental networks. This may also explain why Russia pursued rather different strategies in the BSR compared, for instance, with the Black Sea area (Knudsen, 2015). Although the situation has recently started to change due to the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been much more coop-erative in the BSR due to the fact that it has been part of a coopera-tive trajectory, which began with the Helsinki Convention from 1974,


and other intergovernmental institutions in the region (e.g. the CBSS or VASAB). In sharp contrast, the situation in the Black Sea has always been characterized by rivalry between Russia and Turkey as the most impor-tant geopolitical powers in the region, with the EU not wielding much influence in the region (Knudsen, 2015).

In the BSR, cooperation with Russia not only has a long history but has also become increasingly ‘subnationalized’. Under the revised EUSBSR Action Plan, the CBSS Secretariat and the Turku Process have become leaders of the HA ‘Neighbours’, which addresses coop-eration with EU neighbouring countries (EUSBSR News, March 2013). The Turku Process primarily aims for practical cooperation with Russian partners at the subnational level, and is based on long-standing ‘twin city’ partnerships. It includes a variety of actors, ranging from cities and regional authorities to businesses and their representative bod-ies, as well as civil society and research organizations. In addition, the CBSS launched a programme of modernization – SEBA – with a special focus on the Kaliningrad region (European Commission, 2013c, 157). Despite these developments, shortcomings remain when it comes to the involvement of the Russian Federation in the implementation of the Strategy, through either specific projects or existing regional frameworks and organizations (European Commission, 2013b, 31). In addition, the recent crisis in Ukraine affects not only the relationship of EU and Russia but also the integration of the Russian Federation into the Baltic Sea macro-region. With regard to the latter point, one fundamental issue is still the choice of the institutional platform for cooperation. Whereas Finland and Sweden have always favoured the ND Framework – increas-ingly supported by the three Baltic States – in dealings with (northwestern) Russia, Germany and Poland have advocated the CBSS as their favoured platform. It remains to be seen whether the EUSBSR will help establish clearer links for interaction.

Conclusion

More than five years after its inception, the EUSBSR, along with its Action Plan, has already been revised and updated several times, so that its aims are clearly still a moving target. Today, the EUSBSR is firmly anchored as a tool of European territorial cooperation within the broader set of objectives of the Europe 2020 framework that primarily aims for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth by, for example, promoting innova-tion clusters, removing obstacles to trade and facilitating green and blue growth (see EUSBSR News, November 2012, 3–4).


The Strategy has established a new governance architecture in the region, with the aim of solving problems which transcend the member state and/or EU level, and which require attention in a way that inte-grates relevant policy sectors (European Commission, 2013b, 9). For the time being, the EUSBSR seems to be successful in certain areas, while improvements are still needed in others. First, the EUSBSR affects exist-ing institutions and international conventions such as HELCOM and its BSAP. The existence of strong macro-regional bodies such as HELCOM leads to synergies because HELCOM guidelines influence EU decision-making in Brussels, and make EU legislation based on these guidelines binding for all member states. Furthermore, the Strategy improves the implementation of existing EU legislation because projects under the Strategy’s umbrella are linked to EU regulations such as Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (1907/2006/EC), Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), the WFD and the MSFD (see European Commission, 2013b, 15). Thus, the Strategy has improved the coordination of existing organizations, networks, pro-jects and financing tools (European Commission, 2013b, 74), as well as the cooperation between actors in the macro-region, including the private sector. The strategy has also initiated new projects, among which there are two that aim to reduce the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea and improve existing transportation infrastructure, for example. Nevertheless, effective integration of non-governmental actors and stakeholders still remains an important challenge.

Second, after a rather bumpy start with regard to Russia’s involvement, the Strategy has led to greater involvement of Russian partners – particu-larly subnational actors in the country’s northwest – in areas such as environmental protection, water quality and innovation. One impor-tant matter to resolve is whether the ND or the CBSS should become the principal platform for interaction. In addition, the effects of the Ukraine crisis and the changing EU–Russia relations that it has provoked remain an open question for the longer term.

Third, the Strategy has supported more than 100 flagship projects, such as the project ‘CleanShip’ which aims for a reduction of pollution from vessels, or BALTFISH (Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum) which aims for better collaboration among fisheries management. The EUSBSR has also supported projects in those areas were the BSR has an established track record of mutually beneficially cooperation that predates the Strategy itself, for example, in environmental policy. There is also some evidence that spin-off projects have been set up and project ideas taken up by other actors, such as national governments (European Commission,


2013a). It is important to note, however, that any overall success that the Strategy will enjoy over the coming years will be largely dependent on the regulations decided for the new Multiannual Financial Framework over the 2014–2020 period. In general, a better linking and streamlin-ing of resources remains a problem with regard to the financing of the Strategy’s activities (Kern and Gänzle, 2013).

Fourth, the EUSBSR’s governance architecture has been in a process of continuous refinement and improvement over the past years. This architecture now provides a common basis for cooperation and imple-mentation of the Strategy through the institutionalization of new forms of multi-sector, multi-actor and multilevel coordination and cooperation. This framework links the EU, member states and partner countries, international organizations, subnational authorities and private actors through the HLG, NCPs, PA Focal Points, PACs, HALs, Flagship Project Leaders and bodies in charge of implementing programmes/financial instruments. Capitalizing on sectoral interdependence and transgov-ernmental ties, the system of PACs and HALs constitutes an important transgovernmental network that includes partner organizations and countries. The system of co-PACs in some of the PAs – for example, in PA ‘Energy’ led by Latvia and Denmark – has triggered even closer forms of consultation and cooperation (author’s interview with PAC, 3 June 2013). However, it remains an important task to ensure that PACs and HALs are supported by determined and committed steering committees that extend the reach of the Strategy well beyond the inner circles of the EUSBSR-related offices of prime ministers and foreign ministers.

Fifth, the EUSBSR has been complemented by a monitoring and assessment system that contains realistic and feasible targets and indica-tors for the three overall objectives (including its twelve sub-objectives): ‘Saving the Sea’, ‘Connecting the Region’ and ‘Increasing Prosperity’. The member states were invited to suggest indicators and targets for individual PAs, including intermediate targets and benchmarks that would help in achieving the three objectives (European Commission, 2013a, 8–9). For example, ‘Clear water in the sea’ – which is one out of four sub-goals for the ‘Saving the Sea’ objective – is being measured by the environmental status of the Baltic Sea, in line with indicators being developed by HELCOM and under the MSFD. The aim in this area is to reach a good environmental status (GES) by 2020. Another example is the sub-objective: ‘Improved global competiveness of the Baltic Sea Region’, for which various indicators (Gross Domestic Product growth; GDP in Purchasing Power Standards, etc.) and targets have been set (higher average GDP growth by 2020; diminishing inequalities in


GDP by 2020, etc.). However, the new monitoring system, that is, the indicators and targets laid down in the EUSBSR Action Plan, needs to be incorporated in national and subnational programmes.

The European Commission argues that it will continue to play a key role in the Baltic Sea macro-region, but that its support must be complemented by leadership within the region and member countries. Thus, the ‘key to the future will be stronger leadership, reinforcing own-ership in the regions concerned, delivering clear decision-making and greater visibility’ (European Commission, 2013a, 9). Or, in other words, the participating countries – EU member states and non-EU members alike – need to develop a stronger commitment and sense of ownership. Macro-regional strategies can ‘function as building blocks in reaching European objectives’ (European Commission, 2013a, 20), and if political leadership and ownership is improved, coordination problems can be solved and implementation supported by all relevant actors, including non-EU countries and all levels of governance (European Commission, 2014). In short, the EUSBSR can develop a new transnational and flex-ible governance architecture that provides the capacities to solve com-mon problems in a multilevel, multi-actor and multi-sector setting, and which facilitates learning and adaptation to a dynamic environment. The Strategy can contribute to better implementation of EU legislation in the member states and partner countries by systematically integrat-ing EU legislation with the EUSBSR and its Action Plans. The Strategy may eventually become a solid platform for solving challenges at the macro-regional level, leading to synergies that could not be utilized by the individual member states and the EU, for example, by foster-ing institutional interplay between the EU institutions, member states and international organizations. Although there are still shortcomings with respect to the participation of subnational authorities (regions, cities), civil society and business, developments such as the Turku Process exhibit considerable improvements. In future, the Strategy will be compelled to focus even more on existing transnational networks in the macro-region, which could contribute to the implementation of the Strategy. As the BSR is likely to remain a model for other macro-regions in Europe, the success of the EUSBSR is of paramount importance to the overall success of the macro-regional idea in the EU.

Notes

This chapter builds on K. Kern and S. Gänzle (2013) ‘Towards Cruising Speed? Assessing the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’, European Policy Analysis, No. 17 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies).


1 Whereas the EUSBSR targets eight EU member, the EUSDR brings together nine EU member states and five accession, candidate and partner countries (and subnational authorities thereof) of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Germany (i.e. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, as well as Moldova and the south-western part of Ukraine. The macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian sea basin addresses Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia; the Alpine Strategy targets France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Austria and Slovenia.

2 The EUSBSR Action Plan of June 2015 changed the names of priority area coordinators and horizontal action leaders to policy area coordinators and horizontal area leaders.

3 Concerning the question of the impact of the EUSBSR on improving coordina-tion with local authorities, six PACs/HALs remained neutral, nine (strongly) disagreed and four did not make any comments (see Gänzle and Wulf, 2014).

4 According to Kern and Löffelsend (2008), there are three types of transnation-alization: (1) the emergence of transnational networks and institutions such as Coalition Clean Baltic, (2) the transnationalization of existing international and intergovernmental organizations that provide access to decision-making for non-governmental and subnational actors and (3) the establishment of new transnational institutions that are based on a multi-stakeholder approach and promote the participation of civil society from the outset.

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Introduction

Since its inception in 2011, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) has undergone a tumultuous, roller-coaster-like evolutionary path. It cannot be understood when stripped from its wider context, requiring a broader perspective, that appreciates how deeply embedded EUSDR has been and still is in the wider history of the EU and its new member states (NMS). More so, the EUSDR is inextricably linked with wider processes of globalization and can be seen as merely constituting a rather short chapter in the very complex history of the EU. Here, we will therefore examine the EUSDR within its appropriate context, which will allow us to see that there has been no linear or evolutionary process in the EUSDR’s development, with the process having instead been largely shaped by external circumstances. Despite the potential capacity that the strategy still holds to shape the future, it is enough to allude to the Ukrainian crisis (and the ‘new Cold War’ this has produced with Russia) to cast serious doubt over its future prospects. Nevertheless, the EUSDR may be on the correct side of history, as there has been a long-run ten-dency in governance for regional strategies to take hold, which has been brought about by general trends towards greater globalization, so that what has emerged can be termed ‘globalization-cum-regionalization’. Accordingly, several levels of regionalization have been organized, of which the EUSDR represents merely a part, from global mega-regions to transnational macro-regions (see Ágh, 2010, 2012a). Responding to an increasingly globalized order that causes conventional wisdoms to lose explanatory power, new analytical designs have been elaborated. The new conceptual framework relevant here is ‘new regionalism’, a recent institutional innovation in the EU focusing on strategically

7The European Union Strategy for the Danube RegionAttila Ágh


designed region-building (Warleigh-Lack et al., 2011). The constructiv-ist approach of new regionalism pays special attention to the process of strategic design and organization in the formation of these regions, focus-ing on the basic indicators of good governance and social progress. The main descriptive term for this new analytical design has accordingly been ‘strategy’.

The EUSDR targets 14 countries which are part of three ‘micro-regions’: (1) two western participants (the German Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, and Austria), (2) seven NMS countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and (3) five non-EU states (from the western Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and also from eastern Europe: Moldova and the four westernmost oblasti of Ukraine). The NMS countries are the ‘central’ participants, both territorially and socially. Given their ‘centrality’, the EUSDR is analysed in this chapter firstly from the NMS perspective (Figure 7.1).

Given all of the above, this analysis of the EUSDR must logically start with a brief overview of its historical background and of the rel-evant conceptual framework. The strategy’s history has reflected two contradictory tendencies within the EU’s development: the emerging

GERMANY

CZECHREPUBLIC

AUSTRIA

SLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

BULGARIA

SLOVENIA

UKRAINE

MOLDOVA

MONTENEGRO

SERBIA

BOSNIAAND

HERZEGOVINA

RUSSIA

CROATIA

0 400km

Figure 7.1 Territorial coverage of the Danube macro-region


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European Governance Initiative (EGI) and the widening core–periphery divide provoked by the global economic crisis. As to the positive ten-dency (as far as the macro-regional strategy is concerned), in the 2010s the EU launched two social innovations within the EGI, coming from both the institutional and policy side. This has presupposed that mul-tilevel governance (MLG) and multidimensional governance (MDG) with synergies complement one another as two sides of the same coin. There have been many references in the EU’s official documents regard-ing both the MLG and institutional levels of the European Architecture, and about the MDG as the multidimensional policy coordination struc-tures. For instance:

The Council acknowledges the multidimensional nature of govern-ance, which includes political, social, economic, security, legal, insti-tutional, cultural and environmental aspects, at all levels. All these aspects are interlinked and should be addressed in a holistic and bal-anced way. (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 1)

In fact, MLG is the key term for the EU democratic polity, while MDG is at the heart of the European policy universe in the Europe 2020 Strategy. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the EGI, since MLG and MDG are equally important both at the EU and macro-regional lev-els. EUSDR has been based on these two innovations, and it may be the symbol for change in both institutional and policy development paradigms. They provide the conceptual framework for the analysis of the Functional Macro-regions (FMR) that has been defined in other chapters of this book. Both the MLG and the MGD are based on a sys-temic approach, and through them we can see an increased possibility for the EUSDR to be considered less a cooperation framework and more an elaborate strategy, even if overall the strategy has so far struggled to move far beyond cooperation.

As to the negative tendency as regards the macro-regional strategy, the concentration on global crisis management in the EU has led to the marginalization of many vital issues, including the Danube Strategy. Moreover, during the global crisis, the NMS countries have gone through a couple of volatile years that magnified the core–periphery divide dra-matically. As will be described later in this chapter, the NMS countries have recently gone through a deep crisis resulting in an institutional and policy deficit, so that the last few years have been characterized by a decline in democracy, increasingly poor governance and a diminished capacity of public institutions (to act, e.g. due to financial limitations).


These states have correspondingly fallen in international competitive-ness rankings, and trust in their political elites has as a result evaporated. All in all, they have lost their strategic vision and they have not been able to meet the challenges that the EUSDR has presented them with. Altogether, the NMS have suffered in terms of their standing in the EU as a result of their failure to implement both the institutional MLG and the MDG development paradigms.1

The governance deficit (in terms of both MLG and MDG) has undoubt-edly been one of the main reasons for the underperformance of NMS in EUSDR, but the EU has raised this issue only recently, and only after a long delay. The basic organizing principle of FMRs is that ‘history mat-ters and regions matter’, but this can only be true if good governance and correspondingly strict regulation also matters. The main weakness of the EUSDR is poor governance and missing institutional and policy synergies among its interrelated dimensions. As a result, it has so far been a low-intensity cooperation project rather than a strategy itself. Again, one has to emphasize that the FMR has been based on a coher-ent strategy, that is to say, it is a macro-region by strategic design, not a region with traditional, routine and sluggish institutional and policy cooperation developed organically. Thus, it is indeed legitimate to raise the issue of whether it has supported socio-economic development and promoted EU integration among the NMS so far, since its nature as an artificially designed entity requires appropriate justification. This leads us to an assessment of the turbulent historical trajectory of the EUSDR up to its fourth year in operation.

The historical trajectory of the EUSDR

The EUSDR’s history has been affected by a variety of exogenous and endogenous factors. First of all, after an easy start in the 2000s, it faced increasing difficulties during the implementation phase in the 2010s. This historical trajectory may only be understood against the back-ground discussed above, of the effects of the controversial reaction to the global financial crisis and the rather varied opportunities pre-sented by EGI. In 2009–10, an optimistic mood dominated regard-ing the strategy, but this would soon change as the full extent of the global financial troubles gripped the EU in an economic, political and social crisis, and its stagnating effects became clear. MDG and MLG were elaborated in 2009–10, in parallel with the uploading pro-cess of EUSDR, so that it is not by chance that the EUSDR reflects both, even in its wording. The close connection between these two

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EU megaprojects has been assured even by the scoreboards on MLG, focusing on the Europe 2020 Strategy within the time perspective of Multiannual Financial Frameworks, first between 2006 and 2013, and later between 2014 and 2020.

The historical trajectory of EUSDR began with the Founding Paper of the Commission (EC, 2010; see also CoR, 2009). In the first document, following the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) model, the European Commission formulated its mission statement in December 2010. The General Affairs Council supported the project in April and finally the European Council endorsed it in June 2011. Its basic structure has been designed by this Founding Paper of the Commission (accom-panied by a long Action Plan) producing the ‘Charter of the Danube Strategy’. This Founding Paper has outlined the vertical and horizontal structures of the new institutions, has described their new rules and has provided a list of the common policies based on the MLG–MDG model. It has emphasized that ‘Europe 2020 is the key EU commitment to jobs and smart, sustainable, inclusive growth, which the Strategy will con-solidate. [. . .] The Strategy, with its vision for the Danube Region in 2020, reinforces this’ (EC, 2010, p. 12). The four pillars of EUSDR are (1) Connecting the Danube Region, (2) Protecting the environment, (3) ‘Building prosperity in the Danube Region’ and (4) ‘Strengthening the Danube Region’. The first three pillars reflect directly the spirit of the Europe 2020 Strategy, while the fourth pillar represents the MLG philosophy by focusing on the institution-building. There is an inbuilt contradiction between these pillars, as the first two are closer to ‘low politics’ (or soft policy) while the second two reflect ‘high politics’ (or hard policy) considerations. Such ‘technicalities’ do not constitute as much of a barrier to progress as do the difficulties represented by sovereignty-related issues.

The above-discussed vertical and horizontal institutional struc-tures correspond completely with the MLG principle. The EUSDR has three discernible levels of governance: (1) the High Level Group of all Member States (coordinated by the European Commission, though non- member states are invited as is deemed appropriate), (2) the Priority Area Coordinators (PACs), with two countries for each policy field, and (3) the National Contact Points (NCPs). The Commission is supposed assist these institutions, to organize Annual Forums and to submit Progress Reports. The Annual Forums have been in Regensburg in 2012, in Bucharest in 2013 and in Vienna in 2014 (see Annual Forum, 2014a). EUSDR has also relied on the former institutions of the Danube Region, such as the Danube Commission, and it has developed some new


‘informal’ institutions. However, it is important to note that the EUSBSR is not a model of ‘normalcy’ in this respect, since these aforementioned institutions have hitherto not come to be embedded to anywhere near the same degree as those in the Baltic Region. The institutions are either functionally limited, as is the case with the Danube Commission, or are geographically limited (such as by covering primarily the western part of EUSDR), so that their activity cannot provide a solid and holistic insti-tutional foundation for the entire strategy. The above-discussed geo-graphic limitations are not limited to institutions only existing in the western half of the region, since there are institutions in both halves2 (such as the Carpathian Convention) – rather the limitations are based around a persistent lack of institutional interconnectivity between both halves, since (for example) even though Austria has made serious efforts to connect the NUTS-2 regions3 on both sides (Centrope), its success has until now been minimal.

The main problem with regard to governance relates to the new institutions established by EUSDR, since its Founding Paper concludes with the drastic statement on the infamous ‘three No’s’: ‘No new EU funds, no new EU legislation, no new EU Structures’ (EC, 2010, p. 12). The EUSDR’s development can only be explained in light of this con-text. The simplest explanation for the drastic Commission declaration is that there was no new funding available for the 2007–13 budget period, so the drastic statement was issued out of necessity simply in order to limit spending and avoid resistance from member states not partaking in the macro-region, who would therefore oppose contribut-ing towards increased spending in an area that do not directly benefit them. Regardless of the justifications, it was still a very controversial statement, since it followed the description of the new institutional structure outlined in the Commission document. This document indi-cated clearly that the pan-European institutions with their common EU rules for all member states would not be affected by the EUSDR; the Commission even created a control mechanism that could be used by all the EU’s member states as leverage against the EUSDR if needed, via a High Level Group. Basically, this was a kind of ‘politicking’ on the part of the Commission, which sacrificed long-term goals (which include a desire to see macro-regions succeed) for short-term pre-emptive conflict management (which includes ensuring that macro-regions do not come under the kind of open attacks that could end their existence or future capabilities). Despite the Commission’s longer-term intentions, this statement has itself created confusion in the long term, since instead of addressing the issues of the countries concerned (in the macro-region)

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‘in a holistic and balanced way’, the Commission insisted on ‘three No’s’, including ‘no new institutions’, despite the fact that this one had just been created. The ill-famed ‘three No’s’ formulation has been widely discussed, but has remained an embarrassment and an obstacle to the aspirations of some governments, leading some of these governments to attempt a positive interpretation of the declaration, as ‘three soft Yes’. Furthermore, the deep confusion produced by this situation has con-tributed to the governance gap in NMS by contradicting the EGI. In the last analysis, the declaration has been counterproductive, since it has created misunderstandings and disturbed the institution-building of EUSDR ‘governance’ that could have otherwise been the key to its suc-cess in sustainability and synergy.

The series of interim reports of the Commission on the EUSDR have indicated serious problems that have been summarized in the 2014 Progress Report (EC, 2014c). Of course, all these problems could have emerged without the controversial statement made by the Commission, but it is unsurprising that these problems have been strongly con-nected with the missing governance capacity, both along MLG–MDG lines. In October 2013, the Council ‘invited’ the Commission to pre-pare a report to improve FMR governance. Finally, in May 2014, the Commission issued its major evaluation on governance. In this ‘final’ Report, the governance deficit was mentioned only generally, although it was meant specifically for the EUSDR, since it is clear that the EUSBSR has worked rather well by comparison in this capacity, and insufficient information can be yielded from the limited experiences of the two newer FMRs in order for such a criticism to be applicable. This Report has mainly offered an overview of the EUSDR, and it has demanded significant improvements in all the three levels of its institutional archi-tecture (see also Council of the European Union, 2011, 2013).

The global economic crisis has slowed the implementation of EUSDR from the early 2010s, including the more developed west of the region, which could ultimately not escape the problems of global crisis man-agement. More generally, the EU pre-accession proceedings of the west Balkan countries has been marginalized due to a growing sense of ‘enlargement fatigue’, which was already detectable after the 2007 enlargement of what were felt by some to be unprepared and relatively underdeveloped states, and which was of course only made much worse by the financial crisis. Although the west Balkan states have recently received some positive messages from the EU (most markedly in the case of Serbia), the political and economic situation in these states has dete-riorated to such an extent that any perspectives of these states rapidly


acceding to the Union (and being facilitated in this endeavour by the EUSDR) have faded drastically. Although the effects of the crisis have been clear to see, they cannot be said to be the only cause of the EUSDR’s dampened perspectives, since the NMS already possessed large govern-ment deficits that were not showing any clear signs of rapidly improving even prior to the crisis. In short, serious pre-existing issues regarding the future accession of west Balkan states to the EU were only made mark-edly worse by the onset of the financial crisis that has gone on to worsen the already (relatively) feeble position of these states.

In summary of the historical trajectory of the EUSDR, its top-down phase in the early 2010s was off to a good start with the Commission-organized ‘stakeholder conferences’ at the level of the relevant gov-ernments concerned by the strategy, starting in Ulm, followed by the Vienna/Bratislava, Budapest, Ruse/Giurgiu and Constanta conferences. However, the subsequent bottom-up phase has not functioned anywhere near as successfully due to a range of deeply engrained issues concerning the NMS, such as a relatively weak civil society, and a lack of any suf-ficient organizational capacity or funding. A successful top-down phase has not been followed by its necessary corollary: solidifying bottom-up developments. The push to activate local organizations has proven largely unsuccessful and has been slowed or even halted primarily by the over-centralized NMS. But in the last analysis, the failure of this bottom-up phase might have been largely offset by some clearer direc-tion in terms of a metagovernance strategy from the EU level, or from a much better integration of Union funds in the EUSDR itself. Despite the seeming success of the top-down phase, such improved top-down direc-tion may have made all the difference in terms of inspiring and enabling bottom-up progress in the EUSDR’s development.

The mantle of the macro-regional endeavour may be passed on to other corners of Europe, but it seems that at least the Danube’s macro-regional march has resoundingly come to a halt. The current situation is neatly summed by the declaration of the relevant foreign ministers at the Vienna Annual Forum on 26 June 2014. They reacted to the criticism of the 2014 Commission Report only in very soft terms, since fatigue with the Danube project has forced their demands for ‘further progress’ to be phrased in rather byzantine style: ‘Ministers agreed that it will be crucial in the next phase to make further progress in focusing on co-operation on policy issues of special importance ensuring efficient and effective coordination with other relevant policies, programmes and instruments’ (Annual Forum, 2014b, p. 1). It must be hoped that the Fourth Annual Forum in 2015, to be hosted in the city of Ulm, will

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address the issue, especially since Baden-Württemberg has been very active in EUSDR matters.

What the strategy would most benefit from now is a breath of fresh air and a new direction.

The ‘infantile disease’ of the EUSDR’s policies and institutions

The EUSDR governance deficit can be described in terms of the contro-versial relationship between the institutional and policy memberships. Regarding institutional arrangements, the policy fields have been grouped according to the Priority Areas (PAs) and their management has been allocated among the participants (see Table 7.1). As to the institutional memberships, the Commission has attempted to be ‘fair’ by assigning three policy fields to each participating actor, and by ‘twin-ning’ two actors to supervise each field. However, this preoccupation with being ‘fair’ has made the assignment of responsibilities over differ-ent fields rather arbitrary, when they ideally should have been assigned in a more functional manner. As a result of the Commission’s approach, some actors have been very active in organizing their policy fields while others have been much less so, since certain participants have lacked the organizational capacity and funds to manage their roles effectively. In short, the Commission’s ‘fair’ distribution of policy fields among the participating actors has produced disorder from the institutional side (since some actors are highly active while others are passive), and has been a clear case of ‘politics defeats policy’ with a rather chaotic result. Among the results of this situation is the phenomenon of many partici-pants entering other related organizations (where responsibilities were assigned less arbitrarily) with a much deeper interest or with a more intensive ownership than that which they could express with the roles assigned to them by the Commission. This has been the case with the Carpathian Convention and the Centrope interregional organization, for example, which have created an even more complicated situation regarding institutional memberships.

Altogether, EUSDR has created an institutional framework that required effective interaction with policy priorities in order to produce synergies, but this was made impossible by the aforementioned contro-versial assignment of responsibilities. All the deficiencies in the strat-egy’s implementation trace their origins to the missing application of MLG and MDG principles in Danube cooperation. This gulf has left a corresponding negative impact on the strategy from both the policy and


institutional sides. The final structure of policy and institutional mem-berships has been the result of the Commission’s aforementioned poli-ticking which has further contributed to these foundational deficiencies. The variety of policy fields covered by EUSDR has been vast, which has made the strategy quite a challenge to manage and coordinate, leading to individual policy fields being fragmented and/or departmentalized with separate management structures but lacking any common manage-ment or oversight. The result is an oversized and fragmented structure, producing a ‘systemic misfit’ which has invited failure. Under these cir-cumstances, there cannot be real coordination within and throughout the system at the metaproject level. The EUSDR was intended fit into the wider, hyperconnected world in the context of a highly complex policy universe, and was designed accordingly; nonetheless, it has in fact resulted in complexity being reduced to fragmented policy fields, in a process of departmentalization, due to the lack of appropriate manage-ment and oversight that this complex environment demands – this has been a systemic deficiency in the Commission’s metagovernance role.

The PAs are supposed to be subdivisions of the EUSDR’s four pillars but in fact they are not, being instead the result of the Commission’s

Table 7.1 The Priority Areas of the EUSDR

1a To improve mobility and intermodality: inland waterways

Austria and Romania

1b To improve mobility and intermodality: rail, road and air

Slovenia and Serbia (Interest: Ukraine)

2 To encourage more sustainable energy Hungary and Czech Republic 3 To promote culture and tourism,

interpersonal contactsBulgaria and Romania

4 To restore and maintain the quality of waters

Hungary and Slovakia

5 To manage environmental risks Hungary and Romania 6 To preserve biodiversity, landscapes and

the quality of air and soilsBavaria and Croatia

7 To develop the knowledge society (research, education and ICT)

Slovakia and Serbia

8 To support the competitiveness of enterprises

Baden-Württemberg and Croatia

9 To invest people and skills Austria and Moldova10 To step up institutional capacity and

cooperationAustria and Slovenia

11 To work together to tackle security and organized crime

Germany and Bulgaria

Source: Author’s compilation.

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plans to reach political compromises among the states concerned. The structure of PAs reflects a sharp contrast between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policy areas. The Progress Reports from the ‘soft’ areas (PA 1–6) are typically very long and indicate some success year on year, while the ‘hard’ areas (PA 7–11) are comparatively rather short and indicate far less success. The soft areas are usually less conflictual than hard areas, due to the significant national concerns that usually follow from delib-eration on sensitive matters of high politics associated with the latter areas, and due to the lack of any meaningful cooperative tradition that could foster trust in such matters. The result is that the hard areas can primarily still only be found to be taking their ‘first steps’. Success is therefore found overwhelmingly in the traditional fields of international cooperation regarding technical affairs (such as PA 11: security, and trans-national border controls relating to crime and migration). Overall, the PA reports offer an incoherent and unsatisfactory picture of the EUSDR’s development, since the reports on hard policy areas tend to simply list events rather than report on the dynamic networks of regional policy coordination. And the structure of the soft areas is moulded by organ-ized interests, often business interests. The PA 3 (‘the Danube brand of tourism’) and PA 6 (biodiversity) reports have been shorter and less suc-cessful than hard PAs even, but these have been artificially separated from the other soft areas in order to emphasize their ‘business profile’.

This sharp distinction between the soft and hard PAs has manifested not merely in their dual structure, but also to some extent in the nature of the soft policies themselves. These soft policy options offer an excuse for some NMS to avoid dealing with the entire scope of the strategy, and to instead ‘cherry pick’ among the available policy options. However, there is significant controversy in a particular case existing among the soft policies relating to water management. Water management is a very important international issue and there is a corresponding worldwide ‘Water Commons’ movement. The conflict that exists between the two principal aspects of water management: (1) water for consumption and irrigation and (2) water for shipping. The collision between these two aspects arises in the conflict between keeping water sources intact versus deepening Danube integration, for instance, by building dams in order to facilitate shipping and greater interconnection through the resulting increase in trade across the region. This conflict is most fiercely felt in the kind of ‘war’ between environmentalists and ‘shippers’. The latest major conflict has been the result of a dam-building project at Vienna–Bratislava that aims to artificially elevate water levels along sections of the Danube to ten metres in order to facilitate the passage of large cargo ships through difficult river sections during periods of low water levels


that would otherwise prevent such activities (CEE Bankwatch Network, 2014; Euractiv, 2014).

Thus, the main problem from the policy side is that the PA menu is too ambitious in scope and unbalanced in its contents. It is too ambi-tious in the sense that it contains a wide range of policy fields, including fields that already had pre-existing and established patterns of routine cooperation, and many fields that were by contrast only just beginning to see some cooperation emerge. It is unbalanced in the sense that some of policy fields are very important – even in terms of the large shares of national GDP that the fields with which they are concerned represent – while some others are completely marginal in terms of both the finances involved and their wider impact. The corollary of this variance is that some fields involve massive and powerful interest groups with solid international and domestic business interests in the fields concerned, while some other fields affect only the most minimal business interests and concern very weak interest groups. The global economic crisis has exacerbated this already stark variance by forcing budget cuts primar-ily and precisely in those areas where there is the least added value, which is to say those areas that were already relatively unimportant compared to the policy fields involving more critical economic sectors in which serious vested interests are involved (EUSDR, 2014). All EUSDR participants are in theory supposed to take part in the entire range of PAs, but in reality, the majority clearly prioritize certain areas crucial to them and ignore as far as possible areas in which they have no inter-est, or in which they have developed divergent interests. The result is a lack of ownership in many policies that have not been prioritized. Nevertheless, collecting so many diverse policy fields into a single megaproject is a remarkable achievement in itself; the issue is that this creation still requires increased sophistication and what is more a total transformation in its management in order to establish itself as a sys-tem capable of effectively coordinating all the policy fields involved to even the most minimal degree. The depth of policy convergence (from intensive cooperation through well-managed coordination to increas-ing institutional integration) has been downgraded to routine coopera-tion in many policy fields, and in some cases to some EUSDR-related coordination.

From the institutional side, the participants have also developed many conflicts that can perhaps be seen most clearly in the PA 10 group relat-ing to institutional capacity. Above all, the PA 10 group has benefited from the activity of Austria, the most pro-EUSDR state involved in the strategy. Although the general statement of the PA 10’s 2013 Progress

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Report (that will be cited at length throughout the remainder of this subsection) is very much exaggerated, the Austrian efforts still deserve much appreciation: ‘Since June 2012 the development of Priority Area 10 “to step up institutional capacity and cooperation” has been substan-tial and a number of milestones have been achieved’. Despite more than a hint of self-adulation, this report accurately indicates that Danube regional cooperation started from a very simple base, since its first task was to enlist the 71 existing EUSDR-related projects, so that the ‘PA focused in the first period on the identification of projects’. Its second task was to instil these projects with the ‘technicalities’ they required to function properly because ‘the implementation stage of most pro-jects has not evolved much’. To begin in earnest however, the project required two pilot sub-projects – the Danube Financing Dialogue and the Technical Assistance Facility for Danube Region Projects; therefore, the ‘PAC has prepared a Europe-wide tender procedure for the selec-tion of consultant services’ with ‘limited but concrete steps of actions’. It is also indicative that the attendance of 12 countries out of 14 at the meetings is considered ‘very high’, and at the attendance of 10 countries out of 14 as ‘solid’ at this elementary level of EU project organization. The report’s conclusion is that ‘some members take a rather passive role while others are very active’ and that the main obstacle for the countries concerned is their ‘low absorption of EU funds’ (EUSDR Report, PA 10, 2013, pp. 3–5, 7, 14).

Finally, as the PA 10 Report explains, the key issue has been ‘the lack of ownership of the strategy at [the] national and regional level[s]. This is characterised in different ways: limited participation in meetings, limited or absence of feedback to documents and/or requests for infor-mation, limited capacity to provide an official position in meetings, members’ turnover. These aspects have been more or less acute, and some countries are less hindered than others’ (EUSDR Report, PA 10, 2013, p. 10). The PA 10 Report finally hopes for ‘a new strategic direc-tion’ in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2014–20). In fact, the major reform of EUSDR has been connected with the activities of the PA 10 group that have developed some centrality within the over-all organizing function of the strategy as a whole. In the latest docu-ments (EUSDR Report, PA 10, 2013), there are some outlines of proposals for the relaunching of EUSDR in terms of both its institutions and fund-ing, but it remains to be seen how this new opening will be elaborated and implemented.

In summary, from the policy as well as institutional side, there has so far been a lack of ownership among many participants, and even where


‘leadership’ to initiate changes has appeared, the necessary ‘follow-ship’ required to engage in good practices and to develop a strong interest in policies and institution-building has been missing. The lack of leader-ship has certainly been felt at the EUSDR level, so that it is clear that a holistic approach to cooperation and coordination of the strategy is largely lacking, although through the PA 10 Austria has recently tried to fill this organizational vacuum. The EUSDR can be observed as hav-ing developed in the wider context of the effects of international crisis management and also in the context of the resultant fallout in terms of domestic crisis management at the national level. The far-reaching effects of this context can clearly be seen, for instance and perhaps most markedly, in the case of the deep and protracted socio-economic crisis of Slovenia, Romania and Hungary. Consideration of this wider context and its disproportionate impact on particular countries leads us neatly on to a consideration of the crucial issue of the fall in democracy that NMS have undergone.

The decline in democracy and good governance among NMS

The main cause of the infantile disease of the EUSDR is poor governance in NMS due to the deep socio-economic and political crises they have undergone. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have been pioneers in the negative tendency to diverge from mainstream EU developments, par-ticularly in the quality of democracy, and Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia been following suit. The decline of the NMS ‘deficit democracies’ has accelerated in the wake of the global financial crisis. It has now become rather difficult to find the proper descriptive term for these hybrid polities, lying somewhere between true democracy and non-democracy. The principal tendency of a growing gap between formal and substantial democracy has been hollowing out the princi-ple of democracy, and so has led to a process of de-Europeanization. This decline has been confirmed and well-documented by the promi-nent ranking institutions, such as the Bertelsmann Foundation, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the Freedom House (FH, with Nations in Transit, NIT Reports). Poor governance in policy coopera-tion and coordination during the implementation of EUSDR has been the result of the much deeper political failures at the level of a systemic decline in democracy. This severe democratic deficit (see Demos, 2013; BTI, 2014; EIU, 2014; FH, 2014) requires closer scrutiny in the con-text of the Danube Strategy, since this deficit has not been exposed to

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an appropriate degree by the EU in its official discussions of the NMS (see the edited volumes on the Ten Years of Membership by Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013; Ágh, 2014; Epstein and Jacoby, 2014; Pappas, 2014).

The demand for democratic institutional capacity-building is an old story for the EU. Following on from the White Paper on Governance (2001), the European Commission launched its Governance Initiative (2003) under the title of ‘Governance and development’, later calling it the ‘Governance in the consensus on development’ (2006). This 2006 adap-tation has specified that ‘the Commission underlines the importance of approaching governance from a wider angle, taking into account all its dimensions (political, economic, environmental and social)’ (EC, 2006, p. 1). Accordingly, the General Affairs and External Relations Council published a decision on democratic governance as a ‘European Consensus for Development’ (Council of the European Union, 2006). The Governance Initiative was reviewed in its entirety by the Council in 2009. This review emphasized the principle of MDG structures and established synergy as the key concept for good governance, since the multidimensional nature of governance presupposes the coordination and integration of all policy fields (EC, 2009). Thus, EGI has conceptu-ally prepared institutional and policy synergies for the EUSDR, both in vertical and horizontal institutional terms (MLG) and in terms of the high complexity of its policy dimensions (MDG).

Yet, in spite of strong warnings in the basic EU documents themselves, direct and strong efforts for developing increased governance capaci-ties in the NMS were not on the EU agenda for a long time. It has been indicated that the FMRs have ‘to cope with a lack of state and civil soci-ety capacity, administrative centralisation and the personification of resources at the regional level’ (CoR, 2009, p. 7), but the EU has avoided responding to any detailed criticism or to any strong pressure to improve in this direction – though the Commission has pointed out the ‘govern-ance deficit’ in the NMS several times in the EUSDR Progress Reports. It has noted ‘a need to improve the institutional capacity at all levels’ (EC, 2013, p. 2), though it has done so in vain, as it has not concluded the necessary corollary that some strong and urgent measures have to be taken. The organizational process of the emerging FMRs should ideally have emerged in parallel with efforts to regulate the (good) governance that would result from well-developed MLG–MDG structures, in order to remove the fossilized state structures presented in the NMS. EU pressure would also have been highly valuable in overcoming the resistance of over-centralized governments with national traditions of the low insti-tutional capacity. Anything approximating such an ideal effort towards


building capacity in NMS cannot be observed in the EUSDR’s develop-ment, where partnership towards progress and an EU ‘metagovernance’ framework supporting an innovative new functional strategy for gov-ernance is still largely missing.

The NMS concerned have not organized any serious MLG-style democ-racy, or any genuine NUTS-2 regions with large developmental capacities of their own. To the contrary, recently, even existing regional capaci-ties were reduced, reinforcing over-centralized state structures as the main obstacle to the EUSDR’s functional development. The Commission has for a long time failed to act appropriately on the strong connec-tion between the decline of democracy and poor governance in NMS. It was (as we now know, mistakenly) assumed that the accession crite-ria would be sufficient to ensure that NMS become and remain demo-cratic, and develop good governance. The decline in democracy that has resulted from the failure in this tacit assumption has increased the core–periphery divide as it relates to the NMS; a core negative effect of these developments has been the decidedly poor implementation of the EUSDR project in certain respects.4 In short, although the strategy is a very important issue for these countries from a historical perspective, at present it is not very high on the NMS governments’ agendas, so that the EUSDR is not currently working towards a bridging of the East–West divide in any meaningful sense.

The damage done to the EU by these developments has gone beyond the EUSDR project and has necessitated a reaction by the Commission as the launching of the Rule of Law Initiative. The European Commission, acting as ‘the Guardian of Treaties’, has established a New Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law in the EU, since the ‘recent events in some Member States demonstrated that a lack of respect for the rule of law and, as a consequence, also for the fundamental values which the rule of law aims to protect, can become a matter of serious concern . . . there is a systemic threat to the rule of law and, hence, to the functioning of the EU’. Whereas the infringement procedures are triggered ‘by indi-vidual breaches of fundamental rights’, the New Framework has been designed to address ‘threats to the rule of law (. . .) of a systemic nature’ (EC, 2014b, pp. 2, 5, 7). This Commission decision has insisted that not only the purely formal and procedural requirements but also the ‘substantive components’ of the EU regulations have to be met. These terms indicate that there is already a new thinking in the EU, in which systemic also means strategic, with a holistic approach to the member states’ developments. It remains to be seen whether the implications of this new thinking will lead to a reduction in the core–periphery divide

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and instil Democratization and Europeanization processes with the breath of new life needed in NMS so that a successful relaunching of the EUSDR can take place. The main obstacle is that, altogether, the global financial crisis has pushed trends in the opposite direction, resulting in a democratic deficit in NMS, with more administrative and political functions concentrated at the level of the central state, as well as result-ing in the increased fragility and fragmentation of civil societies, and in decreasing competitiveness due to ‘state capture’ by political–economic oligarchies (Innes, 2014).

NMS have significantly underperformed in the EUSDR over the past four years, and the lack of ownership on their side has been made palpable. The EUSDR does not figure in important government docu-ments, nor does it appear even marginally in most official discourse. In effect, well-coordinated and comprehensive national projects do not exist, with NMS merely alluding to minor acts of participation, often only undertaken as the minimal acts necessary to avoid accusations of skirting EUSDR-related responsibilities and participation. Without a vigorous political push and substantial funding for local organizations, only some small, isolated projects use the reference to EUSDR, and these are usually without any meaningful content. There are no significant bottom-up pressures either, only some sporadic, isolated and ‘tradi-tional’ coordination in specific policy fields (tourism, navigation, cul-tural exchange). Far from contributing to the EUSDR project, some NMS have confronted its very heart, both in terms of limiting its governance capacity and in terms of avoiding the social progress necessary for its development. No significant structural, political or policy reforms have so far occurred in the NMS, and the trend has in fact primarily moved in the opposite direction, since under the auspices of the global economic crisis the NMS governments have lurched towards older state models, by further consolidating what could already easily be argued to be overly centralized powers.5

Consequently, the present period of EU transformation crisis has permitted for a diagnosis of NMS problems related to both their insti-tutional deficit (leading to a governance deficit) and to their social pro-gress deficit (leading to sustainability deficit). The NMS political elites want to enjoy the advantages of EU membership, but they are unwill-ing to pay the political price (decentralization), and unable to pay the social price (human investment and social capital) for it either. The NMS governments have drastically decreased resources relating to the ‘knowl-edge triangle’, so that their actions have been described as ‘undercutting the future’ (Veugelers, 2014), and the decreased future social progress


this is likely to cause undermines the only common denominator that could create synergy across all policy fields in the EUSDR. Thus, a stale-mate has been produced, so that EUSDR activities have been reduced to the level of everyday cooperation instead of producing synergies across the system as a whole. The Danube Strategy cannot, however, merely be propped up long term as a business as usual type of arrangement, with only small steps being taken towards cooperation, because this is at odds with its basic purpose as a visionary megaproject with a long-term strategy. So far, four years into its activities, it cannot be described as much more than a modest Danube Valley cooperation project.

Conclusions: from the old dream of a Danube Federation to the Danube Strategy

FMRs present dramatic opportunities for the development of a new European Architecture. The EUSBSR has claimed the mantle of the FMR cause, serving as the archetypal model for the development of such transnational strategies. The strength of the EUSBSR is that it has been built on top of pre-existing and intensive cooperation schemes that have worked well over time, which have permitted its development into a comprehensive strategic project. EUSDR has proved an interesting experiment, and the two new FMRs, the Adriatic and Ionian Region, and the Alpine Region have recently been emerging (EC, 2014d), with some other FMRs are also in the pipeline. As a result, in the long term, the EU seems to be turning towards an FMR network. In some decades, the EU may well be covered by overlapping FMRs, which by definition prove their success through the added value they bring.

The Danube Valley is in fact very economically and politically hetero-geneous, despite being intensely interconnected (culturally and socially). The Danube Region has very wide disparities: ‘The Region encompasses the extremes of the EU in economic and social terms. From its most competitive to its poorest regions, from the most highly skilled to the least educated, and from the highest to the lowest standards of living, the differences are striking’ (EC, 2010, p. 9). Hence, as a laboratory for Europe 2020, it can prove the capacity of MLG types of democracy and MDG types of social progress by turning territorial capital into social capital. The EUSDR is connecting three very different regions into a sin-gle FMR, not only bridging the old and new member states, but in addi-tion connecting some west Balkan and east European states with the EU. Thus, EUSDR may play a significant role in this wider FMR process, since

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its comparative advantage is in building a ‘New Europe’ by integrating the respective parts of three discernible regions into one historically re-emerging FMR. The EUDSR is building a bridge between the rich and poor, and between the dynamic and laggard regions, based on a com-mon history and natural geographical ties. The NMS in-between are sup-posed to contribute to the reunification of Europe in the context of the East–West divide engendered by the Cold War period.

However, in order for this reunification to become a reality, the notion of a competitive EU and a cohesive EU has to be reconciled in a competitive–cohesive EU, since it is clear that the Union cannot remain ‘externally’ competitive in the long run without being cohesive and inclusive enough ‘internally’. In a situation of formidable and pre-existing disparities exacerbated by the global financial crisis, the EU’s 28 member states will have to simultaneously find a way of increas-ing cohesion as well as alleviating the fundamental problem of a lack of European external competitiveness. In his farewell speech, outgoing Commission President Barroso argued that recently ‘the Union’s over-all coherence’ is the most important issue for its future: ‘Now, frictions between North and South, between rich and poor, between debtor and creditor countries, between the centre and the periphery have indeed come up [. . .] Playing whatever Kerneuropa against whatever periphery will weaken both’ (Barroso, 2014, pp. 3, 14). Undoubtedly, the NMS have their own deep transformation crisis to confront, and the fate of their development will be crucial for Europe’s future as a competitive–cohesive entity. A divided Europe would be condemned to systemic instability, from populist Euroscepticism, to anti-democratic reactionary movements and a prolonged economic crisis among peripheral states. The future vision of the Europe’s member states must be to transition from ‘Growthmania’ to ‘Sustania’ within the Europe 2020 perspective; in the context of the Danube Region, this is particularly true. The EUSDR has the capacity to become one of the major vehicles in the reuniting of the EU’s 28 member states within a competitive–cohesive Europe, since it embodies the need for meaningful change from the narrow focus of saving the eurozone to a broader perspective of reuniting Europe in the spirit of integrative balancing.

As Stefanie Dühr (2011, p. 48) has predicted:

The current enthusiasm for EU macro-regional strategies does not necessarily mean that this is a suitable instrument for all parts of Europe. The rationale for transnational cooperation is crucial for the


strategy-building process and to ensure long-lasting commitment of cooperation partners. After all, macro-regional cooperation is com-plex and time consuming.

The most developed parts of EUSDR in the Upper Danube will have to initiate these changes and act as icebreakers; in turn the NMS will have to prepare the means of transformation management and the facili-tating devices to construct the ‘bridge’ between the Upper and Lower Danube; and the west Balkan and east European states at the Lower Danube have to elaborate their ‘connectivity’ not only logistically but also socially, culturally and politically. If it is to be effective, the EUSDR will have to build up its own ‘pooled sovereignty’ as well as ‘pooled soli-darity’. Otherwise, the EUSDR may fail as a strategy by design, although it may still succeed in the everyday ‘boring’ practice of pre-existing and largely (relatively) trivial cooperative activities. This mundane coopera-tive practice may be beneficial and welcome, but the EUSDR represents a big vision about a long-term strategy. Thus, the region of the EUSDR may emerge from its place as an old romantic dream in the 19th cen-tury to a 21st-century reality. In the future, neither cohesive Europe, nor the member states, nor the subnational meso-regions (NUTS-2) can offer a new, innovative principle for Europe’s future architecture and for the Europe 2020 Strategy, since the new macro-regional strategies with the renewed cohesion policy may bring the breakthrough towards ‘the Europe of the Functional Macro-Regions’ as a genuine part of Europe’s futures.

Notes

This chapter continues the author’s analysis of EUSDR in the edited volumes (Ágh, Kaiser and Koller, 2010, 2011). Our Hungarian research team completed the four-year EUSDR project on the MLG–MDG issue in 2014 (see Ágh et al., 2014). For detailed socio-economic data on EUSDR, see Dobrinsky (2012), Ágh (2013) and Mannheim University (2014).

1 The Mannheim Report (2014, pp. 7, 29) has noted – referring to the Global Competitiveness Report – that ‘the Danube Region has become less attrac-tive for investors over the last few years’, and ‘one of the main issues in the Danube Region is the still high level of corruption’ (see WEF, 2012, 2013; EC, 2014a).

2 The Danube Commission is a Budapest-based international intergovernmen-tal organization established in 1948 and centred on facilitating free naviga-tion along the Danube. The Vienna-based Council of the Danube Cities and Regions is Europe’s Urban and Regional Network for the Danube Region estab-lished in 1998 in the so-called ‘Ulm Process’. The Eisenstadt (Austria)-based Danube Civil Society Forum was established in 2011. The Region Cooperation

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Council, established in 2008, deals with cooperation in southeastern Europe. The Carpathian Convention was organized on 22 May 2003 as a subregional treaty to promote sustainable development in the region by seven states – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine – with an Interim Secretariat in Vienna; after the establishment of EUSDR, it has con-tinued its activity within this strategy in cooperation with the Committee of Regions (CoR), focusing on environmental protection and spatial devel-opment (CC, 2013). Centrope (2013) is also an Austrian-developed, Vienna-based organization for neighbouring countries.

3 According to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, it is (sec-ond-level) basic regions for the application of regional policies.

4 In fact, no concerned NMS have developed any proper NUTS-2-level insti-tutions, and the former MLG structures have been further weakened by the global crisis. In Hungary, for instance, the Orbán government has dissolved all NUTS-2-level organizations (see the Act on Territorial Development, Act CXCVIII of 2011).

5 The most problematic case is Hungary. During its EU Council Presidency, Hungary was very active in promoting the EUSDR (Ágh, 2012b), but later the Orbán government has lost its interest. The decline in Hungary’s democracy has been discussed in the European Parliament (EP), in a context that related it to all NMS (Tavares Report, 2013). For EU leaders, these developments have nonetheless been a ‘forgotten crisis’ (Handelsblatt, 2013), yet by con-trast, the decline of democracy has not gone at all unnoticed in the sphere of international political science (see e.g. Nicolaidis and Kleinfeld, 2012; GKI, 2013; Ondarza, 2013; Bugaric, 2014; Grabbe, 2014; Sedelmeier, 2014).

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169

Introduction

Since the launch of the first macro-regional strategy in the Baltic Sea Region in 2009, many other cross-border regions and macro-regions have expressed their interest in defining their own strategy, with the macro-regional vogue eventually reaching the Mediterranean area (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012). In December 2012, the EU Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was launched, and was sub-sequently endorsed by the European Council in September 2014; a debate is going on as to the possibility of diffusing such macro-regional approaches to other Mediterranean areas. However, it is not as if the expansion of projects under the banner of ‘macro-regions’ was a neat and uniform process; the origins of all existing macro-regions are highly diverse, since ‘there has been no regulation to sup-port the concept. This has meant that there is also a certain level of uncertainty amongst member states and also sub-national actors to what extent and into what direction the concept will develop’ (Van der Zwet and McMaster, 2012, p. 14). EU macro-regions are identi-fied according to a functional approach, in order to respond to com-mon cross-border challenges and opportunities that require collective action (Stocchiero, 2010a). The concept of functional macro-regions links areas according to ‘mutual interdependence’ and ‘spatial coher-ence’, meaning that factors such as specific transnational interde-pendencies, material and immaterial flows, hard and soft linkages all qualify the geographical scale and contents of a macro-region (Stocchiero, 2010a).

8The European Union Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian RegionBattistina Cugusi and Andrea Stocchiero


Macro-regions entail the coordination of diverse political actions, and are consequently conditioned to a political commitment to cooperation at different levels. It is this obvious consequence of their character that has led macro-regions to be defined as a new multilevel governance instrument (Schymik and Krumrey, 2009), in which diverse visions and interests interact with effects within and without the EU: between member states, regions and cities on the same spatial scales, and accession and neighbourhood countries outside the EU. As has been stressed relating to other macro-regions (Dühr, 2011; Stocchiero, 2010b), it is argued here that in the case of the Adriatic–Ionian area, the political commitment to work together in order to establish a macro-region is the most relevant ‘driver’ in successfully setting it up as a strategy. However, this is not a novelty in trans-frontier cooperation: regions and regionalization are always geopolitical projects of some sort and scale (Raffestin, 1984). Since this is the nature of such coopera-tion by definition, it is clear that the success of cooperative schemes should rest on the strength of the political cooperation that necessar-ily underlies them. As Perkmann already specified in the case of cross-border cooperation (CBC): ‘[I]t does not matter whether a CBC is built upon cultural or ethnic commonalities, a common historical back-ground, existing functional interdependencies or a mere community of interests, as it is precisely the process of construction that matters’ (Perkmann, 2005, p. 157).

Starting from these considerations, this chapter will investigate the macro-regional drivers in the Adriatic–Ionian area, identifying on the one hand the main issues in terms of political interests, common histor-ical and cooperative ties, and on the other hand clarifying the govern-ance dynamics emerged and set up in the drafting of the strategy. From this perspective, the main challenges to be faced by the macro-regional strategy are identified and discussed, with particular consideration to ‘governance challenges’ (Bengtsson, 2009), in terms of coordination among the actors and the available financial instruments. The EUSAIR represents a novelty among EU macro-regional strategies due to the weight of its external dimension as a result of the proportion of non-EU states involved. In addition to the EU member states Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia, the EUSAIR embraces the non-EU countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (which are all aspiring to become EU member countries). Within the wider aforementioned context, the opportunities and challenges surrounding the possible dif-fusion of future macro-regional strategies across the Mediterranean are explored (Figure 8.1).

Battistina Cugusi and Andrea Stocchiero 171

Embedding the EUSAIR in a problematic political and economic context

The establishment of the EUSAIR is tangled in a complex social and politi-cal process stretching to the dismantling of Yugoslavia in the 1990s into the diverse nation states of Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo and the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. With the exception of Slovenia, this transformative process was in each case violent, causing deep and lasting rifts among the Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, Kosovar and Albanian people. A lasting effect of this has been the treatment of the many minorities in the diverse new nation states, who are often excluded from national politics, being considered a potentially destabilizing element to the unity of the nation. Minorities often perceive themselves as culturally different to the majority in their host state, socially and politically excluded within its political workings and strongly linked to other nation states. The inevitable sense of dif-ference that social and political exclusion instils in minorities and the potentially valid reasons for the new states’ apprehensions regarding these minorities (given the scale of the ethnic bloodshed that led to the current

Figure 8.1 Territorial coverage of the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region


ITALY

GREECE

SLOVENIA

ALBANIA

MONTENEGRO

SERBIA

BOSNIAAND

HERZEGOVINA

CROATIA

0 400km


geopolitical situation) create a vicious circle that keeps nationalistic and ethnic tensions bubbling under the surface, and creating attitudes that naturally militate against regional political constructions and attempts aimed at creating common understandings and perspectives. It is in this context that the idea arose that the common aspiration of these states to join the EU could be exploited as political leverage in order to motivate political reconciliation in the western Balkans. In 2000, the EU launched a process of stabilization and association, opening the perspective of accession for the countries of this region; and in 2003, the Thessaloniki Declaration of the European Council affirmed that ‘the future of western Balkans is in the European Union’ (European Union, 2003).

The European response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia was rather poor, partly because it was weakened by divisions among member states. Some of them supported the creation of new states and were in favour of military interventions to prevent conflict escalation from the very beginning, while others were more reluctant to accept the dissolution of Yugoslavia and were against any military intervention. The EU was only successful in act-ing decisively on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, political dia-logue encouraging conflict resolution and the like. These divisions among the EU member states’ policies regarding this region naturally diminished with the end of the conflicts, although there are continued disagreements on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, for instance.

At the same time, the civil war in former Yugoslavia triggered some important effects on civil society in neighbouring countries:

Conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, affected the global consciousness like no other recent war. International involvement took various forms, ranging from a huge political effort, with talks and missions involving top rep-resentatives of all main governments, to extensive media coverage and humanitarian efforts of international and non-governmental organizations [. . .] [T]he Balkan events contributed reshaping the role and structure of the peace movement and Western civil society internal and external relations [. . .]. This was particularly manifest in Italy: its proximity to the war zone, its traditional ties to the area, the exacerbation and violence of the conflict, as well as the huge number of refugees that asked for asylum in Italy when war broke out in Croatia and, later, in Bosnia and Kosovo, raised people’s awareness and engaged people’s conscience. (Coletti et al., 2007, p. 7)

The Italian ‘Peace Movement’ gained momentum and was able to organize an important coordination of operations in former Yugoslavia.


While civil society organizations (CSOs) and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) maintained a predominant role in carrying out solidarity activities to support victims of conflict and ethnic cleans-ing, other actors (such as local institutions, municipalities and regional authorities) started acting internationally by operating humanitarian, peace-building, reconstruction and development cooperation interven-tions (Coletti et al., 2007). This ‘war at the home door’ thus marked the origin of Italian decentralized cooperation. In order to legitimize their international activity, new regional laws were enacted and specific fund-ing was allocated.

Over time, cooperation became more structured. At the transnational level, a working community was established in the early 1990s by sev-eral local authorities in the area – this developed in to the Adriatic Euro-region in 2006 – followed by the setting up of institutional networks at different levels such as the Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities and Towns, the Forum of the Adriatic and Ionian Chambers of Commerce and the UniAdrion network of universities.

The Italian government was very proactive in this process, support-ing the creation of the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (AII) in 2000. This ini-tiative is still operational and involves all the states on the shores of the Adriatic and Ionian seas in order to support policy dialogue and regional approaches in different policy sectors. Furthermore, a specific Italian law (Law 84/2001) for reconstruction and development in the western Balkans was enacted in 2001. It acknowledged the decentralized cooperation of local authorities and established multilevel organization and programming for the coordination of the projects across the entire area. Thereafter, cooperative dynamics in the area were increasingly linked to the EU integration process, offering a policy framework and funding opportunities for cooperation through external cooperation programmes, such as the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme until 2006, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) from 2007 onwards as well as territorial cooperation programmes, with particular reference to the Adriatic CBC programme.

All these actions were aimed at supporting the problematic politi-cal, social and economic transition in the western Balkans, along the path towards liberal democracy, social inclusiveness and a functioning market system – a transition that should open the way towards their integration in the EU and satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for accession. This transition is still underway and is facing difficulties, especially in consolidating the rule of law and good governance, respecting minority rights and ensuring media freedom (Balfour and Stratulat, 2011).


In order to motivate progress towards compliance with the acquis com-munautaire and general European standards, there must logically be a cred-ible prospect of accession from the perspective of those expected to carry out these changes. Until now, the enlargement process has been success-ful in integrating Slovenia (in 2004) and Croatia (in 2013). But a sense of ‘enlargement fatigue’ seems to be emerging in many (western) EU mem-ber states, which has only been exacerbated by the European financial crisis and its repercussions for less economically developed EU member states. This could potentially slow down future rounds of enlargement.

The western Balkans suffers from significant economic and spatial marginalization. Industrialization is slowing down in the wake of the fail-ures of privatization processes. The region depends strongly on foreign direct investment and productive delocalization of European enterprises in new value chains. Furthermore, the western Balkans’ dependency on the Italian and Greek markets has made them particularly vulnerable to the effects of the financial and economic crisis of southern Europe. Some analysts portray the western Balkans as the periphery of the periph-ery (Bechev, 2012) or the super-periphery of Europe (Bartlett, 2009).

In this scenario, a great political question arises about the real per-spective for peace and prosperity in the Adriatic and Ionian space. Is the promise of enlargement and Europeanization of the western Balkans fading away? The launch of the macro-regional strategy could represent a new phase in supporting integration.

The EUSAIR as a result of a multilevel coalition of actors

Subsequent to the launch of the EU Strategies for the Baltic Sea and Danube Region in 2009 and 2011, respectively, the Adriatic–Ionian Council (AIC) adopted the ‘Ancona Declaration’ (Adriatic and Ionian Council, 2011) endorsing the proposal for a macro-regional strategy, and called on its member states (Italy, Greece and Slovenia) and part-ner countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia) to work towards its adoption by the European institutions. What makes the Adriatic–Ionian case peculiar is the fact that the process of building up a macro-regional strategy has been characterized by the political entrepreneurship of the subnational level and in particular of one Italian regional authority, the Marche region located at the centre of Italy’s coastline on the Adriatic.

The reasons for the Marche region’s intense engagement in the macro-regional process for the Adriatic–Ionian area relates to the eco-nomic interest of this region in South-East European (SEE) countries.


Since 2005, the Marche region FDI in SEE has increased continuously at an average annual growth rate of 46 per cent. Today, the Marche region accounts for almost 12 per cent of total Italian FDI in the Western Balkan countries, with a particular concentration in Serbia, Croatia and Albania. It is an important investor, particularly in some of the traditional manufacturing industries typical of the Italian spe-cialization pattern. (Cutrini and Spigarelli, 2012, p. 397)

In terms of international relations, SEE countries have been considered a priority geographical area in the development of cooperation activities carried out by the Marche region. It is necessary to take into account the windows of opportunity, opened by the EU’s policy framework in the field of territorial cooperation, in order to better grasp the entre-preneurial role played by the Marche region. Shortly after the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, which offered neighbouring states the possibility to take part in territorial coopera-tion programmes as full participants, the setting up of the Adriatic Euro-region in 2006 was the first attempt to seize this policy opportunity in order to foster cooperative ties with the SEE countries on the other side of the Adriatic coast. Aware that the launch of the macro-regional approach represented another opportunity of this kind, the Marche region has favoured consensus-building around the idea of establish-ing a macro-region in the Adriatic–Ionian basin, first of all through the Ancona-based AII, directed by the former head of the region’s interna-tional department. It has also advocated the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in favouring the building of political consensus with local authorities in the area and at European level through the Committee of the Regions (CoR). For its part, the Italian MFA played a leading role in mobilizing the political commitment of the central governments in the Adriatic–Ionian area and in obtaining the green light from the European Council. Under the leadership of Alfredo Mantica, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the time, Italy assumed a critical role in build-ing a consensus among the other Adriatic–Ionian EU member states, Slovenia and Greece. As these EU member states had already established a strong collaborative experience in the framework of the AII, rallying around the idea of creating a macro-region in this area has been rela-tively conclusive, and furthered the involvement of the Balkan coun-tries at the central state level.

Italy has been particularly active since the second half of 2012, when the negotiations for the EU’s 2014–20 budget entered a new phase. The ability to influence regulations governing different European funds


presented an opportunity to support ambitions in the Adriatic–Ionian areas, as stated by the former Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Marta Dassù: ‘The Italian government is heavily committed to pursuing the goal of creating an Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, and Italy is seeking to obtain a European Council and Commission mandate in December 2012’ (MFA, 2012). The role of the member states bordering the Adriatic Sea has been key in the establishment of a consensus at EU level. Several meetings were organized in 2010 and 2011 with representatives of the European Commission. This diplomatic effort had its first success with the declaration of the European Council, which in June 2011 recom-mended to continue working ‘in cooperation with the Commission on possible future macro-regional strategies, in particular as regards the Adriatic and Ionian region’ (European Council, 2011, p. 14).

At the same time, the Marche region advocated for the establishment of the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region directly at EU level, by appropriat-ing the CoR as an institutional channel. The President of the Marche Region, Gian Mario Spacca, prepared an opinion on ‘Territorial cooper-ation in the Mediterranean Basin through the Ionian Adriatic Macro-region’ (Committee of the Regions, 2011), which was approved by the CoR. In January 2013, the decision of the CoR to nominate Gian Mario Spacca as head of the Adriatic–Ionian Intergroup of the CoR represented an acknowledgement of the pioneering role of this region in the process of establishing of the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region (Bonucci, 2013).

Governance dynamics in the drafting of the EUSAIR

In December 2012, the European Council gave the European Commission a mandate in order to present ‘a new EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region before the end of 2014’ (European Council, 2011). Since then, the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region entered its ‘pro-gramme initiation’ phase, consisting in the drafting of the strategy and in the definition of the governance framework for its implementation (Van der Zwet and McMaster, 2012). The original idea put forward by the European Commission suggested a strong link to the ‘natural axis’ of the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region, which is the sea. The report of the CoR specified that the mission of a macro-region should be to con-nect the diverse territories of the area ‘to foster its sustainable develop-ment while protecting the fragile maritime and coastal environment’ (Committee of the Regions, 2011 p. 6). This approach was confirmed by the subsequent declarations of Maria Damanaki and Janez Potoc nik – the EU Commissioners for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and for the Environment, respectively (Committee of the Regions, 2011) – and has been strongly supported by the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and


Ionian Seas,1 adopted on 6 December 2012. But the launch of the draft-ing process and the start of the negotiations among diverse actors have softened the focus on marine affairs, thereby widening the scope of the programme to other topics.

Under the supervision of the European Commission – in particular DG Regio, DG Enlargement and DG Mare – the programme’s initia-tion phase has seen cooperation between all the competent authorities responsible for the preparation of the reference document for the coor-dination of structural funds at national level, the so-called Partnership Agreement, and of the authorities in charge of the management of the IPA funds in the western Balkan area, through the coordination of National Contact Points. Italy has maintained its stimulating role, with two ministries involved: the Ministry for the Economic Development (MED) and the MFA. This choice reflects the double nature of the future macro-regional strategy, respectively: the MED is in charge of conclud-ing the Partnership Agreement covering the internal dimension and the MFA addressing the external dimension of the Strategy. In particular, the MFA has recognized the important role of coordinating the IPA National Contact Points in the Balkan area.

Under pressure from the Italian government,2 the thematic scope of the future macro-regional strategy, proposed by the European Commission through a discussion paper, has been broadened into four pillars. While the maritime dimension has been maintained in the first pillar dedicated to ‘Driving innovative maritime and marine growth’, the other pillars deal with ‘Connecting the region’ (Pillar 2), encompassing transports and energy issues; ‘Preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment’ (Pillar 3); and ‘Increasing regional attractiveness’ (Pillar 4), by strengthening the attractiveness of the area and the development of sustainable tourism and quality services. Moreover, ‘research, innova-tion and SMEs development’, as well as ‘Capacity Building’ are consid-ered as horizontal actions to take place within each of the four pillars.

The priorities were first clarified during a meeting between the relevant ministries from all the countries involved and the European Commission, organized in Rome on 12 June 2013. The process of defining the EUSAIR’s priorities was also opened to a broad range of stakeholders. At first, the Commission organized a general online public consultation on the EUSAIR between 25 October 2013 and 17 January 2014. In addition, under the coordination of the European Commission, which defined the methodology of the consultation and supervised the entire process, the different states involved were responsible for organizing a national consultation process with relevant stakeholders in their countries. In particular, one Working Group per pillar (four in total) was established.


Each Working Group was coordinated by an EU member state in associa-tion with a non-EU country (see Table 8.1).

It is worth stressing that the majority of stakeholders involved in the national consultations were public authorities at the ministerial and regional levels, with few social and economic actors participating in the process. In this sense, the definition of the strategy was more a techno-cratic exercise than a real political and democratic process. In addition, the national consultation process has highlighted a lower participa-tion of stakeholders from the Balkan area, compared, for instance, with the one undertaken in the Danube area.3 This allows us to presume a lower circulation of information and interest vis-à-vis the EUSAIR com-pared with the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and indi-cates that a greater political investment and communicative effort will be required to widen participation during the implementation phase.4 In June 2014, the European Commission presented a communication and the Action Plan concerning EUSAIR (European Commission, 2014a), which confirmed the thematic pillars already identified by the European Commission in its discussion paper and capitalized on the results of the consultation process.

Towards implementation of the EUSAIR: the governance challenges ahead

The declared added value of macro-regional strategies consists in both the coordination of different policies and the coordination of the delivery mechanisms of financial instruments that apply in the area. This is fundamental in light of the ‘three No’s’ on macro-regional strat-egies that deprive them of having ad hoc regulation, institutions and funding. The success of macro-regional strategies rests on the political will of the actors involved and on its capacity to integrate programmes

Table 8.1 EUSAIR Working Groups for the consultation phase

Pillar Working Group coordinator

1. Driving innovative maritime and marine growth

Greece and Montenegro

2. Connecting the region Italy and Serbia3. Preserving, protecting and improving

the quality of the environmentSlovenia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina4. Increasing regional attractiveness Croatia and Albania

Source: European Commission (2013).


and funds so as to present the added value needed to motivate interest in its success. In the frame of the proposed strategic and legislative pack-age for the new Cohesion Policy 2014–20, macro-regional strategies are considered an important way to deliver territorial cohesion. This implies that structural funds will represent one of the main financial resources to make macro-regional strategies operational. The Commission’s proposal for an ‘Adriatic Ionian Transnational Programme’, covering exactly the macro-regional area, represents a first important step.

While transnational territorial cooperation programmes have a clear link with macro-regional strategies, the real challenge will be to find effec-tive and innovative ways of making claims on the main structural fund programmes (i.e. the National Operational Programmes – NOPs; and the Regional Operational Programmes – ROPs) for macro-regional purposes. This implies the necessity of the complex task of mobilizing all the local, regional, national and transnational stakeholders that operate around the implementation mechanisms of policies and funding in a collaborative way. Coordination between different instruments requires coordination between different institutions (European, national, regional, etc.). All this represents, indeed, a ‘governance challenge’. To date, the effective coordi-nation of territorial cooperation programmes and structural funds’ main-stream programmes remains an aspiration (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2010).

The ex post evaluation of INTERREG III initiative (Panteia, 2010) con-cluded that although ‘transnational cooperation programmes covered very large territorial spaces and were thus by nature interacting with many Structural Funds mainstream programmes (Objective 1-3)’ coordi-nation was ensured in a ‘static’ and ‘passive’ way. This was also empha-sized by the European Parliament, which in its report (in April 2011) stressed how ‘the mainstreaming of the “territorial cooperation” objec-tive with the “convergence” and “competitiveness and employment” objectives is needed; [and called] for the programming to be better coor-dinated than it has been before’ (European Parliament, 2011).

In the Adriatic–Ionian area, the macro-regional strategy could repre-sent a step forward, by aligning the different funds towards the priorities identified in the strategy through the national partnership agreements and IPA programmes. The European Commission is monitoring this pro-cess, by ensuring that a reference to the EUSAIR is made in all the part-nership agreements. But whether coherence among funds will ensure coordination during the implementation process is uncertain. In his speech of 19 November 2012, addressing the Foreign Ministers of the eight Adriatic and Ionian Region states, the Commissioner for Regional Policy Johannes Hahn (European Commission, 2012b) while considering


that a macro-region for the Adriatic and Ionian countries could bring great advantages, stressed also that this ‘strategy will be demanding and so we would want to be sure that any preparations are taken with a full awareness of the commitment involved. Political will should be matched by the willingness to commit resources’. The Commissioner’s words sound like a warning to the countries involved. Once the strategy is defined, the multilevel coalition around the Adriatic–Ionian macro-region would need to enter into a new phase: every actor would need to contribute to the implementation of the strategy by coherently plan-ning and committing resources to the macro-regional plan of action and the flagship projects it identifies. In addition, one should bear in mind that coordination could be a very politically sensitive issue, especially when it comes to the use of structural funds’ mainstream programme resources. It should be considered that in a time of crisis when pub-lic resources are scarce to begin with and when existing EU funding acquires a strategic importance for an increasing number of actors (and so is increasingly in demand and competed over), including public insti-tutions themselves, dedicating resources to such a strategy becomes a very hard job.

Furthermore, in the case of the EUSAIR, the coordination efforts will encompass Cohesion Policy and also include EU pre-accession policies and related financial instruments (IPAs). And in the case of the EUSAIR, ‘the complexity of the coordination problem is even stronger when it also involves third countries. The success of EU macro-regional strate-gies depends firstly on the political will of member states, and secondly on the political interest of third countries to take part in this project’ (Stocchiero, 2011, p. 12). The external dimension is fundamental for the EUSAIR’s governance and efficacy because of the high proportion of accession countries participating.

The external dimension of EU macro-regional strategies in the Mediterranean

When the first EU macro-regional strategy was launched in the Baltic Sea Region, the external dimension was conceived of as being rather marginal. According to the European Commission, third-party states would be consulted and the effects on them (that actions taken through the strategy would have) considered. However, at least initially, it was best advised to focus on internal matters, even if the strategy ‘may need to be reviewed in other context’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 6). The challenge that is emerging relates to whether the external dimen-sion can be omitted while still yielding strategy efficiency. What is


particularly troublesome is that the external dimension can hardly be considered as such if (as is the case) the terms of the macro-region set out that it is to pursue functional objectives that necessarily require it to involve non-EU members.

In principle, macro-regions are not defined by administrative bounda-ries but according to functionalities. In the cases of the Baltic, Danube and also Adriatic–Ionian macro-regions, the scales are delineated pri-marily by the hydrographical basins of a sea or river. Sea and river basin macro-regions have no internal or external administrative and political delimitations. Yet even if the strategies are elaborated explicitly along the lines of functionalities, in practice geopolitical drivers matter, becoming particularly evident in external relationship dynamics. As we have already seen, the strategy is explicitly linked to European Cohesion Policy. But in an interconnected world, internal policies inevitably exhibit an external dimension. Each EU macro-regional strategy has an external side, which may acquire different meanings according to the political situations of the area concerned. In particular, EU enlargement has been the main geopolitical driver of the European macro-regional strategies. The Baltic and Danube macro-regions were launched after the accession of Central, East and South-East European states. As already underlined, the proposal to set up a macro-region in the Adriatic–Ionian area emerges from the area’s painful recent history, in the context of peace-building and reconstruction initiatives in former Yugoslavian countries, with the promise of eventual accession to the EU. This has been recognized by the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy:

The strategy will also contribute to the further integration of the Western Balkans by offering the chance to work alongside neighbours on areas of common interest. This is Europe’s third macro-regional strategy and we have learnt the importance of political commit-ment and of participating countries focusing their effort in the macro-regional approach. This will be key to this Strategy’s success. (Hahn, 2014, p. 1)

The enlargement process and institutional networks, especially the AII, set the pace for improving the transition and future accession according to a transnational and regional approach. In this sense, the macro-region may exploit and strengthen already existent political processes and coop-eration networks that are coherent with the building of a more united Europe.

During the EUSAIR stakeholders’ conference held in Athens in February 2014, the then Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle,


specified how the macro-regional strategy for the area could provide con-crete added value in terms of providing for: an exchange of know-how; a strengthening of capacities at both the political and administrative levels; adoption of the acquis communautaire; and perhaps, most impor-tantly, for a concrete contribution towards a more ‘sustainable growth model’ (which implies the increase of FDI, the free movement of people in the area concerned, among other things).5 The EUSAIR also appears to provide novel means by which to serve geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Transport corridors, energy pipelines and green energy pro-duction, trade and investment, human mobility and environmental protection are sectors where there is a need to implement flagship pro-jects with big investments. The vision is to integrate and develop an area proving strong interconnections between the Mediterranean and central Europe, eastern and western Europe generally, and linking exter-nal spaces with internal ones.

The European macro-regional strategies emerge as new regionalization processes along and beyond EU borders that should improve territorial cohesion between the internal and external sides of the EU through the act of cooperation alone, as well as through the functional nature of this cooperation. Browning and Joenniemi (2003) put forth the idea of a more decentralized, polycentric and externally opened European geo-policy in the context of a different project:

With region-building and networking high on its agenda, the Northern Dimension seems to open up for a re-conceptualization of European political space. In particular, it appears to promote a future European constellation that would be beneficial for marginal areas, such as those located in Europe’s north, by allowing and encourag-ing them to turn into meeting-places, frontiers to be explored and areas that mediate contacts, instead of merely existing as outmost edges. The underlying vision here can be conceptualized in terms of a ‘Europe of Olympic rings’, in contrast to more traditional notions of an empire-like ‘Europe of concentric circles’. It is logical, in the con-text of such a vision, that those ‘outside’ are also drawn into and pro-vided with access to the inner European circle. In this understanding, outsiders are needed as true partners – that is, actors to be provided with regulating and constituting power, rather than conceptualized as the objects of the actions of those on the inside. This is so as their active contributions are needed if the construction of a more de-centred and less security-geared Europe is to become reality. (Browning and Joenniemi, 2003, pp. 475–6)


Finally, the external dimension opens up new governance challenges for the EUSAIR. The political commitment of accession countries should be coupled by the willingness to invest resources and to dedicate appropri-ate staffing to its implementation (Hahn, 2014). IPA funds (particularly those allocated to CBC programmes) will represent the main resources to be dedicated towards implementation. But it remains to be seen the extent to which these countries will be able to allocate additional financial resources to ensure that all available financial instruments ‘fit together’ in a coherent and coordinated manner. Besides, one should consider that the EUSDR and EUSAIR partially overlap, covering the same Balkan states, including Croatia. The extent to which these countries will cope with the administrative and financial burden that these two strate-gies present will largely determine the efficiency and efficacy of both.

Some actors, especially regional and local authorities (ARLEM, 2014; Chichowlaz, 2011; CPMR, 2014), conceive of the EUSAIR as a first attempt to diffuse macro-regional strategies in the western Mediterranean. Consensus-building regarding the diffusion of the macro-regional strat-egies has been put forward by diverse local authorities, regions and provinces, through their institutional networks (Intermediterranean Commission of the Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions – CPMR – and Arco Latino) involving the European Parliament (Alfonsi, 2011) and the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

In particular, the ARLEM, during its fifth plenary session, adopted a report calling for the promotion of the macro-regional approach in the Mediterranean: ‘[T]he introduction of a macro-regional perspective for the Mediterranean should be proposed, enabling current Mediterranean cooperation within the framework of the ENP and the UfM to be carried out more efficiently, more effectively and in a more focused and coor-dinated manner’ (ARLEM, 2014, p. 18). Relating to this aim, CPMR has elaborated a road map to apply and adapt the macro-regional approach to the Mediterranean basin, according to a variable geometry, which, starting from the EUSAIR, should led to the establishment of an EU Strategy in the Western Mediterranean by 2016, one in the eastern half by 2020 and a pan-Mediterranean one in the long term (CPMR, 2014).

However, this road map immediately encounters difficulties when considering realistic prospects for its implementation for a variety of internal and external reasons. Internally, the financial crisis is ham-pering the possibility of diffusing the macro-regional strategies, since the EU’s Mediterranean members are generally disproportionately con-strained by austerity policies that reduce their capacity to support new


transnational initiatives at all levels. Externally, the political condi-tions are completely lacking for a macro-regional strategy in the area. Geopolitical divisions, conflicts and strong fragmentations, political and institutional asymmetries, and problems to articulate a multi-scalar framework between existing policy framework in a failing and contra-dictory Euro-Mediterranean policy all greatly hinder the possibility to diffuse the macro-regional strategies across the Mediterranean space (Cugusi, 2009). Ultimately, positing new macro-regional strategies in the Mediterranean can only amount to theoretical speculation and wishful thinking due the wider context, though this may of course change with time. Fundamentally, the basic political and institutional conditions are yet to be constructed.

Conclusions

The para-diplomatic entrepreneurship of a single Italian regional author-ity and the political impulse of the Italian MFA, together with a strong commitment of EU member states and Balkan countries, have all rep-resented the main political drivers in achieving this result. Pre-existing cooperation frameworks and the AII in particular have favoured the pro-cess of coalition building in order to promote the macro-regional project at the EU level.

These main impetuses are embedded in historical and context-specific geopolitical ‘meta-drivers’ that have motivated the political commitment of diverse actors as well as the political construction of the EUSAIR itself. Broadly, these core contextual drivers have been the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the memory and cooperative efforts result-ing from the ensuing violence there (including reconstruction operations, and hard and soft interventions implemented by the international com-munity) and the promise of eventual accession to the EU. In December 2012, the EUSAIR entered in the programme initiation phase, during which the strategy was drafted together with an Action Plan. The gov-ernance mechanisms set up for this phase have strongly influenced the content of the strategy and its subsequent development. Negotiations among the actors involved have softened the initial focus on the mari-time dimension proposed by the European Commission, broadening the field of intervention to four thematic priorities. Moreover, a pragmatic and technocratic approach has prevailed, focused on specific actions that could be supported by diverse programmes and funds: ‘[R]eference to EU policies is systematically made for each pillar and efforts were made to link actions and projects to existing EU programmes’ (European Commission, 2014b).


This pragmatic approach implies a ‘governance challenge’ to the future implementation of the strategy. Every participating country will have to contribute to the effective implementation of the strategy, allo-cating and devoting resources, coming from structural and IPA funds. Coordination should be ensured between the structural funds’ main-stream (NOPs/ROPs) and territorial cooperation programmes. All this represents a very sensitive issue from a political point of view. In a time of crisis, when public resources are scarce and EU funding acquires a strategic importance that increases competition for in among an increas-ing number of actors, including public institutions themselves, it could become a rather arduous task to find the political consensus and com-mitment necessary to direct sufficient funds towards the transnational strategy. These considerations apply also externally where doubts have been raised regarding the capacity of Balkan countries to manage with the administrative and financial burden that the strategy implies, as well as their willingness to invest appropriate resources to ensure that the EUSAIR is implemented effectively.

A real political commitment could be even more difficult to acquire if we consider that the macro-regional approach is but a relatively recent experiment, which consequently has not yet provided proof that it is able to fully fulfil its original mission. The increasing relevance of EU funding in a context of scarcity, especially in the EUSAIR area; the tra-ditional difficulties in implementing EU programmes in a coherent and coordinated way; and the fact that the mode of governance available lacks sufficient attributes to fully overcome the limits imposed on the macro-regional strategies by the ‘three No’s’ all lead one to realize that the ‘governance challenge’ will represent the acid test for the multilevel coalition built around the EUSAIR.

In addition, the European Commission report on the macro-regional governance published in May 2014 (European Commission, 2014c) puts forward some suggestions to improve the process, relating to political leadership and ownership, coordination, and implementation. But the recommendations appear insufficient. They put more pressure on the member states at the central level (‘Ministers hosting the National Contact Points should be the ultimate decision makers’), weakening the multilevel approach and supporting a traditional, inefficient intergov-ernmental scheme. Furthermore, they are vague on the engagement of non-EU countries (essential in the case of the EUSAIR) and on the use of existing funds.

Overcoming the acid test is also relevant to the external challenge, that is, the possibility to include neighbouring countries in the strat-egies and to diffuse these strategies across the Mediterranean basin.


The subnational authorities, especially Euro-Mediterranean regions, are trying to build a consensus on the proposal to set up a road map for the implementation of macro-regional strategies in the area. This idea has strong geopolitical relevance. It promotes an open, multilevel and par-ticipative regionalization beyond EU borders, according to the geopoliti-cal concept of a Europe of Olympic rings. But political conditions inside the EU and Mediterranean militate against this idea. In this context, effective implementation of the EUSAIR currently represents the best prospect for the future development of Mediterranean territorial cohe-sion policies. Actors in the area should concentrate their efforts on sus-taining the EUSAIR, probing its capacity to address transnational issues.

Notes

1 The Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas – the first initiative of this kind in the Mediterranean sea basin – particularly relates to the follow-ing priority areas: Stimulating the creation of maritime clusters and research networks; increasing skills and the mobility of the workforces; developing an integrated, demand-based, low-carbon maritime transport action network across the region; supporting the sustainable development of coastal and mar-itime tourism; creating new jobs and business opportunities in aquaculture through research and innovation; reducing marine litter and improving waste management in coastal areas; and modernizing fishing activities (European Commission, 2012a).

2 Authors’ interview with an Italian regional official and with a representative of Italy’s MFA (May 2013).

3 Authors’ interview with one representative of the Italian MFA (January 2014).4 As stressed by the Italian MFA during a consultation meeting organized on 23

January 2014 in Rome.5 See the speech given by Štefan Füle at the Stakeholders’ Conference on the

EUSAIR held in Athens on the 6–7 February 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/adriat_ionian/index_en.cfm (accessed 17 December 2014).

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Introduction

The emergence of macro-regional strategies on the European policy agenda is a curious development. On the one hand, the new instrument offers a promising approach to address several previous shortcomings in the implementation of the territorial cohesion objective, including the widespread shortage of meaningful policy integration and the apparent lack of coherence between numerous territorial policy initiatives. On the other hand, the EU has been cautious about actively promoting them and has emphasized that macro-regional strategies would entail no new regu-lations, no new institutions and no new financial resources. Despite this hesitation, several processes of macro-regionalization (see chapter 1 for a definition) have emerged since the Baltic and Danube strategies were adopted in 2009 and 2011, respectively. In December 2012, the European Council mandated the European Commission to proceed with its prep-aration of a macro-regional EU Strategy for the Adriatic–Ionian Region (EUSAIR), and in December 2013, it did so for an EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP). A public consultation was conducted from mid-July to mid-October 2014. Its results were examined at a conference in Milan in December 2014, organized in the context of the Italian double presidency of the EU and the Alpine Convention. If and when the EUSALP is finalized as the fourth macro-regional strategy in mid-2015, a total of 19 EU mem-bers and 9 non-members will have joined in the macro-regional ‘turn’.

Owing to the relative novelty of the macro-regional phenomenon, scholars are only just beginning to explore appropriate theoretical frame-works for analysing the drivers, dynamics and impacts of macro-regional initiatives. This chapter seeks to contribute to this exploration. It has three principle aims: (1) to sketch the origins of macro-regionalization

9The European Union Strategy for the Alpine RegionJörg Balsiger


in the Alps in the context of existing regional governance initiatives; (2) to provide an up-to-date account of the macro-regional efforts, including the role of subnational entities and civil society, and its gov-ernance architecture; and (3) to offer reflections on how to make sense of the macro-regional turn in the Alps. While macro-regionalization is a novel manifestation of EU-promoted multilevel governance, it is sug-gested here that nascent forms of supranational regional governance are not above the national state, but instantiated within it (Hameiri, 2013).1 From this perspective, the drivers of macro-regionalization in the Alps are not to be sought in Brussels, but in the political ramifications of changing relations between Milan and Rome, Munich and Berlin, or Lyon and Paris during the last three decades. Following an overview of the origins and current status of Alpine macro-regionalization, the chap-ter examines three dimensions of the regional instantiation within the nation state: the construction of the regional frontier, Alpine populism and the importance of (subnational) regional careers (Figure 9.1).

Origins and drivers of Alpine macro-regionalization

The macro-regional initiative in the European Alps emerged in the context of three separate but linked institutional contexts: the Alpine

FRANCE

ITALY

GERMANY

AUSTRIA

SLOVENIA

SWITZERLAND

0 400km

Figure 9.1 Territorial coverage of the Alpine macro-region

© University of Agder, S. Gänzle© EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries Territorial coverage as of Jan 2015 www.alpine-region.eu Cartography: F. Sielker, University of Erlangen 2015

Jörg Balsiger 191

Convention, the Network of Alpine Regions and the Alpine Space Programme (Balsiger, 2012; Debarbieux et al., 2015). Whereas the Alpine Convention is an almost purely intergovernmental affair, the Network of Alpine Regions is a purely regional initiative and the Alpine Space Programme can be considered a joint undertaking by regions and cen-tral governments.

The Alpine Convention

The European Alps are home to the oldest international treaty that specifically addresses sustainable development in a transboundary mountain range. The origins of the Alpine Convention date back to the founding of the International Commission for the Protection of the Alps (CIPRA) in the early 1950s as a spin-off of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and German environ-mental organizations. CIPRA has emphasized the environmental threats to the ecoregion, which would come to lend the convention process the environmental orientation opposed by numerous subna-tional stakeholders.

The intergovernmental treaty building process did not seriously get off the ground until February 1987, when CIPRA, then newly organized as a federation of national organizations, formally decided to initiate work on a convention. Six months later, CIPRA Germany tabled a posi-tion paper for discussion by its national counterparts. At the sugges-tion of CIPRA, Ursula Schleicher, then German member of the European Parliament and vice chair of its Environment Committee, convinced the Parliament to unanimously adopt a request to mandate the European Commission to prepare a proposal for an Alpine Convention and involve CIPRA in its drafting. In September 1988, experts and repre-sentatives of Alpine states, the Council of Europe and the EU called on IUCN and CIPRA to prepare a first draft, while the presidents of the three working communities of the Alpine region (Arge Alp, Alpen-Adria, and Communauté de travail des Alpes occidentales) decided two months later to support CIPRA and actively participate in the drafting process (CIPRA International, 2007).

The origins of the Alpine Convention are thus found in the joint efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and subnational regions. In spite of the support of the EU, however, no convention could be signed without the involvement of states. In this respect, the politi-cal breakthrough – and a turning point in Alpine governance – occurred in early 1989, when German Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer responded to a Bavarian Ministerial Decision by inviting all Alpine Environment Ministers to attend the first Alpine Conference in October 1989 in Berchtesgaden. In order to avoid a situation in which national


representatives might refuse to sign a convention prepared by an NGO, the CIPRA draft was quickly converted into a set of guiding principles, which served as the basis of intergovernmental negotiations during the following two years. The Alpine Convention was signed in Salzburg on 7 November 1991 and entered into force in 1995. What would become a major point of contention, its geographical perimeter was defined so as to approximate the mountain range by following municipal rather than regional borders, which effectively divided many of the subnational regions in the Alps and excluded major metropolitan areas.

The initial decade of the treaty’s existence saw the development and signature of thematic protocols on spatial planning and sustainable development (1994), conservation of nature and the countryside (1994), mountain farming (1994), mountain forests (1996), tourism (1998), energy (1998), soil conservation (1998), transport (2000), as well as a protocol on Monaco’s accession (1994) and one on conflict resolution (2000). During the last ten years, the parties to the Convention have focused on implementation and have begun to address new challenges by means of non-binding ministerial declarations (e.g. on population and culture, climate change), ad hoc Working Groups (WGs) (such as on transport, demography and employment) and platforms (e.g. relat-ing to water management, large carnivores), guidelines (e.g. on the use of small hydropower) and the production of scientific reports (such as on sustainable rural development and innovation). All these activities are evidence of the emergence of a transnational functional specializa-tion of policymaking among actors seeking to legitimize their author-ity through technical expertise rather than traditional territorialized demarcations.

Although diverse types of actors have been invited to participate in the WGs, decision-making in the Alpine Convention remains an exclu-sively intergovernmental affair. Indeed, it is for this reason that various governance deficits have been filled with parallel initiatives, including a network of municipalities (Alliance in the Alps), a network of protected areas (Alparc), a scientific network (International Scientific Committee on Alpine Research, ISCAR), nominations of the Alpine ‘Town of the Year’, the Network Enterprise Alps and many other initiatives that have also fostered a pan-Alpine identity (Balsiger, 2008; Debarbieux, 2009; Debarbieux and Rudaz, 2010; Del Biaggio, 2015).

Yet, it is in large part out of frustration over their lack of involve-ment, lukewarm national commitments and persistent ratification gaps (e.g. Switzerland has not ratified any of the protocols) that Alpine regions began to mobilize in support of the development of a macro-regional

Jörg Balsiger 193

strategy, as outlined in the next section. Discussing possible responses at the 11th Alpine Conference in March 2011, the Convention’s signa-tories decided ‘in view of the EU Treaty for territorial cohesion, to make its own contribution to a possible strategy for an Alpine macro-region’ while emphasizing ‘the fact that the long-term framework and juridical and political function of the Alpine Convention fully fits with the objec-tives and policies of the EU’ (Alpine Conference, 2011).

The Conference established a WG to ‘define the objectives and the main challenges of such a strategy; identify the added value that can be made by the Alpine Convention; and steer and manage the process in coordination and cooperation with other committed organisations’ (Alpine Conference, 2011; Alpine Convention, 2012a). In September 2012, the WG (chaired by Switzerland, Slovenia and Italy and consisting of members from national and regional governments, public adminis-tration, the Alpine Space Programme, civil society and research insti-tutions) presented its report, identifying key issues that it considered relevant for the development of a successful macro-regional strategy, and in which the Alpine Convention could present added value; these issues concerned natural resources and resource management (in the area of environmental challenges), and networks and competitiveness (in the area of social and economic challenges) (Alpine Convention, 2012b).

Via its Permanent Secretariat, the Alpine Convention has remained closely involved in the macro-regionalization process, notably in its joint organization (with Alpine regions and the Alpine Space Programme) of a high-level conference in Brussels, in November 2013, that sought to send the strongest possible political signal of Alpine cooperation to the European institutions. The Alpine Convention, along with the Alpine Space Programme, is also an observer in the Steering Committee accom-panying the development of the EUSALP.

The Network of Alpine Regions

Although transnational cooperation among Alpine regions predates the Alpine Convention by two decades, these regions were largely marginalized in the intergovernmental procedures of the Convention. Through three interregional working communities created with the active support of the Council of Europe – Arbeitsgemeinschaft Arge Alp in the eastern Alps, founded in 1972; Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpen-Adria in the southeastern Alps, founded in 1978; and Communauté de travail des Alpes occidentales in the western Alps, founded in 1982 – Alpine regions have long engaged in exchanging information, sharing experiences, and implementing joint projects in the context of INTERREG programmes.


Medeiros (2011) suggests that current macro-regional efforts are directly linked to the construction of Euroregions and other cross-border initiatives supported by the INTERREG programme (see also Perkmann, 1999).

The Alpine regions were not alone in their international activities, as the European political climate at the time was highly conducive to the emergence of paradiplomacy. As Bolgherini and Rieuf (2005) have argued, interregional associations, such as Alpine working communi-ties, helped regions emancipate themselves from state supervision. According to Geir (1999), the political circumstances at the start of the 1970s played an important role: the national governments of Germany and Austria turned social-democratic and that of Italy became a centre-left coalition, while the subnational governments remained conserva-tive. Arge Alp was thus founded in part to counter the left-leaning foreign national policies and to create a new field of foreign policy. Today, the organization has among its objectives the representation of Alpine-specific interests vis-à-vis central governments that are ‘often remote from the Alps’ (Arge Alp, 2012).

Macro-regional initiatives present an opportunity to cement this collaboration and to complement the activities of the Alpine Convention. In February 2009, the French Rhône-Alpes region organ-ized the first Conference of Alpine Regions, where participants com-mitted to assume a stronger role in the implementation of the Alpine Convention and, to this effect, establish the Network of Alpine Regions as a non-institutionalized platform for interregional exchange and cooperation. One year later, the regions met in Trento to reaffirm their commitment to the principles and goals of the Alpine Convention and to the creation of means and programmes for the implementation of ‘other policies for mountain areas, especially EU policies, at regional and local levels’ (Alpine Regions, 2009, author’s translation). In March 2010, the heads of regional governments (meeting in Mittenwald, Germany) issued a joint declaration calling for the development of a macro-regional strategy for the Alps.2 The Declaration’s stated aim is for Alpine regions to assume greater strategic responsibility in shaping the future of the Alpine space, and to obtain adequate representation in international treaties and initiatives (Alpine Regions, 2010).

After the Trento and Mittenwald Declarations, the governments of Alpine regions held frequent high-level meetings to elaborate an ‘ini-tiative paper’ outlining the substantive priorities for a macro-regional strategy for the Alps, and to serve as a basis for gaining support from national governments and European institutions. In June 2012, politi-cal representatives of 22 Alpine regions unanimously adopted the

Jörg Balsiger 195

Initiative Paper: ‘The Alps – Innovation and Economic Strength in an Intact Environment’. In their statements, the regions have continuously recognized the parallel existence of other processes, but suggested that many of them lack a clear orientation towards results and implementa-tion (Arge Alp, 2011). The Initiative Paper was presented to national governments and the EU at a high-level meeting in Innsbruck in October 2012. It identifies three broad substantive areas – competitive-ness and innovation, agriculture and forestry; water, energy, environ-ment and climate; accessibility, mobility and transport – and calls on the European Commission to support and accompany the elaboration and implementation of a European Strategy for the Alpine Region. At a follow-up meeting of the Alpine regions in Milan in February 2013, it was agreed to strive for an Alpine macro-regional strategy to be taken up at the European Council in December 2013. By this time, associated organizations such as Arge Alp and the European Association of Elected Representatives from Mountain Regions (AEM) had also used their con-tacts to mobilize European Parliament members in support of an Alpine macro-regional strategy.

Alpine Space Programme

The third major protagonist in the development of a macro-regional strategy is the Alpine Space Programme, which originated from a 1997–99 Joint Pilot Action Programme established under Article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund Regulation. The first transna-tional EU cooperation programme was launched for the period 2000–06 under INTERREG IIIB, followed by its IVB successor for 2007–13. Of importance for the present discussion is the fact that the coopera-tion area of the Alpine Space Programme is almost twice as large and five times as populous as that of the Alpine Convention, covering some 390,000 km2 with 70 million inhabitants and some of Europe’s most important metropolitan areas, including Lyon, Turin, Milan, Munich and Vienna. Furthermore, although the Alpine Convention has pro-vided a normative framework for regional cooperation since the early 1990s, transboundary projects on the ground have mostly been funded through the Alpine Space Programme.

In 2011, the Alpine Space Programme created an expert group with the dual objective of identifying key priorities and strategic orienta-tions for the programming period 2014–20, and contributing to the debate on a possible macro-regional strategy for the Alps (Alpine Space Programme Expert Group, 2013). This effort was prompted as much by the need to prepare for the next programming period as by assessments


finding that while the programme had financed more than a 100 pro-jects since its inception, it has struggled to develop a coherent strate-gic vision that states and regions can jointly subscribe to. Following an extended period that involved stakeholder workshops in all Alpine countries, the expert group presented its final report in May 2013. It identified a complex system of 20 ‘strategic fields of intervention’, 9 ‘clusters of fields of intervention’, 6 strategic objectives (balance and equity in access to services of general interest across the Alps; a dynamic and innovative small and medium enterprise sector and thriving entre-preneurship; enhanced capacities based on Alpine traditions and social diversity; sustainably managed biodiversity and landscapes; sustainable resource management and production; and shared responsibilities and fair cooperation among Alpine territories), as well as 39 ‘specific objec-tives’ (Alpine Space Programme Expert Group, 2013). The report advo-cates a ‘stepwise approach to an alpine macroregional strategy [. . .] to be developed in interaction with initiatives of the Alpine Space Programme, [which] implies that the Alpine Space Programme should not only trig-ger and fund projects but also needs to promote debate and dialogue on alpine strategy as well as encouraging networking among alpine stakeholders’ (Alpine Space Programme Expert Group, 2013, p. 95). As noted above, this expert report served as one of the key inputs for the Intervention Document prepared for the December 2013 Council deliberations.

The role of civil society

Civil society has traditionally played a key role in the social construc-tion of the Alps, the creation of Alpine institutions and the promo-tion of myriad activities on the ground (Debarbieux and Rudaz, 2010). As a result, numerous key organizations such as CIPRA, AEM, or Club Arc Alpin (the regional umbrella of national Alpine Clubs) have strongly pushed to participate in the preparation of the macro-regional strategy and have taken explicit positions on key aspects. While many NGOs continue to be involved in the Macro-regional Strategy WG of the Alpine Convention, however, they have been marginalized in the draft-ing of the macro-regional strategy itself (CIPRA International, 2014b).

Early on, reactions to the 2010 Mittenwald Declaration provided a case in point. CIPRA expressed surprise about the negligible role the Declaration affords the Alpine Convention, which CIPRA continued to view as its brainchild. CIPRA also criticized the heavy emphasis on regional development at the expense of important transnational issues

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such as adaptation to climate change, biodiversity conservation, sus-tainable water management and environmentally sound transportation policies. Moreover, criticizing the Declaration’s lack of a spatial referent, CIPRA suggested that cooperation with non-Alpine regions can only be beneficial when Alpine interests are respected, which the organization argues requires that the macro-region be defined in accordance with the narrow perimeter anchored in the Alpine Convention. Similarly, Club Arc Alpin declared that ‘the spatial extent of a strategy for the Alps must be limited to the territory of the Alpine Convention’ (Club Arc Alpin, 2011). According to the Club Arc Alpin, expanding the macro-region to a larger territory (corresponding to the expansion of the EU Alpine Space Programme) would mean a danger that the extra-Alpine region with its metropolitan areas and centres of industry would dominate the actual Alpine region in terms of population size and economic power. CIPRA’s support for an Alpine macro-regional strategy was immediately made subject to the condition that it not enter into competition with the Alpine Convention and that it be closely coordinated with the activities of the Alpine Space Programme.

In early 2014, CIPRA reiterated its support for a strong guiding role from the Alpine Convention. In a position paper, it declared EUSALP ‘an opportunity to make the whole of Europe aware of the issues fac-ing the Alpine Space’ but raised questions about the legal status of the Convention’s core area in the EUSALP context and about the relation-ship between the core Alpine area and surrounding regions (CIPRA International, 2014a). To this end, CIPRA proposed a ‘zoned model’ consisting of a ‘core Alpine area’ and an ‘Alpine cooperation area’, while arguing that a ‘stronger orientation of cooperation activities towards top-level functional relationships must not however mean the Alps sim-ply being tacked on to metropolitan regions as peripheral areas’. In a separate joint position paper issued on the eve of the Council Decision calling for the EUSALP, Alpine Convention observers Alliance in the Alps, Alpine Town of the Year association, CIPRA International, Club Arc Alpin, ISCAR, IUCN, proMONT-BLANC and World Wide Fund for Nature called for an active involvement of civil society as well as of organizations and networks at the interface between the Alps and the metropolitan areas (Alliance in the Alps et al., 2013). Echoing con-cerns about the growing marginalization of the Alpine Convention, they highlighted the Convention in their call for building upon exist-ing cooperative mechanisms and experiences. The position paper also proposed three main fields of action, whose headings differ significantly


from those outlined in the Intervention Document (even though the contents include many overlaps):

(i) Natural resources: preserving Alpine biodiversity and ecological connectivity

(ii) Energy: a common energy consumption and generation system must be developed

(iii) Mobility planning: reducing the negative impacts of the mobility of goods and people

In their calls for broad and active participation by all parties concerned, the position statements by civil society organizations in fact mask their dissatisfaction with the macro-regional process. This was clearest in the run-up to the October 2013 Grenoble meeting. While the French Minister for European Affairs, Thierry Repentin, invited representatives of Alpine regions and countries as well as a select number of scientists, the official observer organizations of the Alpine Convention, which see themselves as the Convention’s civil society representatives, were excluded, prompt-ing scorn and bewilderment (CIPRA International, 2013).

The emerging governance architecture

Although the governance architecture of the future European Strategy for the Alpine Region remains to be defined, it is likely to involve shared responsibility between Alpine states, regional governments and the European Commission. Collaboration between regional and central gov-ernments has already become more common, as evidenced in the elabo-ration of the Intervention Document for the December 2013 Council Meetings.

The Intervention Document was the product of a joint editorial team and was built on the Alpine regions’ initiative paper, the Alpine Convention’s WG report and the expert report of the Alpine Space Programme; the work of the editorial team was supported by the French government through the Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’attractivité régionale (DATAR). This team was announced in the Commission’s response to a joint motion submitted in May 2013 by numerous Members of the European Parliament mobilized by Danuta Hübner, Chair of the Committee of Regional Development. The French government, which had offered to coordinate the process, was asked to approach national governments at a high political level and invite them to appoint a technical member to join the editorial team.

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The document was eventually adopted at a political conference in Grenoble in October 2013. It declared: ‘The States and Regions of the Alpine region wish to jointly and actively commit to drawing up a “solidar-ity pact”’, whose main added value ‘for the Alpine region and for the whole of Europe will consist in a new relationship between metropolitan, peri-mountain areas and mountain areas’ (Intervention Document, 2013). It proposed three strategic strands for adapting smart, sustainable and inclu-sive growth in the Alpine area, which are represented in the table alongside the three EUSALP pillars as these are currently defined (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 The proposed pillars of the EUSALP governance architecture

Initiative document Current pillars and priorities

Ensuring growth, promoting full employment, competitiveness and innovation by consoli dating and diversifying specific economic activities

Fostering sustainable growth and promoting innovation in the Alps: from theory to practice, from research centres to enterprises. Priorities: (1) developing innovation and research capacity and transfer into practice; (2) improving and developing support for enterprises; (3) promoting high levels of employment, with the aim of ensuring full employment in the Region

Promoting a territorial organization that is focused on environ mentally friendly mobility and development of services and infrastructure

Connectivity for all: in search of balanced territorial development through environmentally friendly mobility patterns, transports systems, and communication services and infrastructures. Priorities: (1) betterment of overall transportation systems in terms of both sustainability and quality; (2) improvement of sustainable accessibility for all Alpine areas; (3) increasing societal connectivity the region

Promoting sustainable management of energy, and natural and cultural resources, and protecting the environment, preserving biodiversity and natural areas

Ensuring sustainability in the Alps: preserving the Alpine heritage and promoting a sustainable use of natural and cultural resources. Priorities: (1) reinforcing Alpine natural and cultural resources as assets of a high quality living area; (2) building further on the position of the Alpine Region as world-class in terms of energy efficiency and sustainable production of renewable energy; (3) establishing Alpine risk management, including risk dialogue, to tackle potential threats such as those posed by climate change

Source: European Commission (2014).


In terms of governance, the document states that arrangements would be based on the European Code of Conduct on Partnership, which is consistent with the multilevel governance approach, and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It also states that it will equally rep-resent the interests of mountain and lowlands populations, and mostly rely on existing organizations.

With the December 2013 Council Decision, a Steering Committee was established to accompany the preparation of the strategy. The Committee is equally composed of representatives from Alpine States and Regions,3 and is chaired by the European Commission; while the Alpine Convention and the Alpine Space Programme are represented as observers, NGOs have been excluded. In addition, WGs have been set up to address substantive issues related to the three pillars; governance is to be addressed as a cross-cutting issue in each WG.

The public consultation on the EUSALP scoping paper included a number of open questions relating to governance. With the majority of submitted responses coming from individuals and civil society organiza-tions, it is not surprising that an excessive focus on national solutions, insufficient weight on the regional level and lack of participation of civil society, NGO, citizens and the private sector were identified among the most prominent barriers to cooperation (European Commission, 2014). The consultation further pointed to the creation of new bodies (WGs, task forces, joint offices, agencies, networks, European Grouping of Territorial Cooperations (EGTCs), committees and regional councils); the perceived need to strengthen multilevel governance as well as the role of the regional level, civil society and NGOs; the necessity of com-mitment from higher political levels; and the desirability of increased participation by the private sector (European Commission, 2014).

Creating common ground between the strongly contrasting models underpinning the institutional history of Alpine governance will consti-tute a difficult challenge. The fairly rigid, formal and intergovernmental logic of the Alpine Convention differs fundamentally from the flexible, informal and barely institutionalized approach of the regions’ Working Communities. Although the European Commission will have a say in the governance design of EUSALP, it is the Alpine stakeholders them-selves who will ultimately have to find a compromise and define a mode of operation that best suits their needs.

Re-examining Alpine governance

In the European Alps, the push for a macro-regional strategy originally came from the Alpine regions. Although they have at times disagreed

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on key issues, these regions have found common ground in their dis-approval of the Alpine Convention’s traditional mode of governance. Also, some regions, such as Bavaria, have not forgotten that their con-tribution was necessary to get the Alpine Convention started in the first place. The current strive towards macro-regionalization, however, is a reflection of more deep-seated cleavages with origins that date back to the emergence of Alpine regions’ international ambitions and the establishment of a new regional frontier within the respective states. Just as most Alpine regions now seek to consolidate their autonomy from national capitals by means of a macro-regional strategy, the dynamics of getting a macro-regional strategy approved at the European level are extending the long shadow of these same capitals. This compels regions to work with countries at the central state level and thus opens a new chapter in the relationships between the two.

This section analyses macro-regionalization from the perspective that emergent forms of supranational regional governance are not above the national state, but instantiated within it (Hameiri, 2013; Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2011; Jayasuriya, 2008). It unpacks how macro-regionalization is illustrative of the transformation of internal structures of the state in response to the international regionaliza-tion of both territorial and functional modes of governance. First, it draws attention to the geopolitical project, underlying tensions and the implications for ‘meta-governance’ in constructing an Alpine region. Second, it links the macro-regional drivers to the phenomenon of Alpine populism under which Alpine regions, to differing degrees, seek to maximize autonomy by means of obtaining international standing. Finally, it reveals that the rising power of European regions has created important opportunities for regional political careers, which reinforces transformations within the state in response to inter-national regionalization.

Constructing a regional frontier

The three parallel initiatives outlined above – the Alpine Convention, Alpine Space Programme and Network of Alpine Regions – have tradi-tionally promoted different views and associated spatial perimeters of the Alpine region. These divergent views have been one of the major sources of conflict between the organizations, since unlike differences over the substantive orientation of an overarching Alpine strategy, the territorial scope of the Alpine region has significant implications for the implementation of any such strategy (never mind that the ‘official’ defi-nition of a macro-region eschews a fixed spatial basis, instead advocat-ing the notion of overlapping functional spaces).


The earliest conception was promoted by CIPRA, which embraced an ecoregional approach. CIPRA’s role in the emergence of the Alpine Convention ultimately helped shape the Convention’s roughly ecore-gional area of application. The Alpine Space Programme has a much larger territorial reach, encompassing major metropolitan areas as well as the transnational Jura mountain range (France and Switzerland). The Network of Alpine Regions has the most ambiguous, or flexible, conception of the region. At many of its early meetings, several repre-sentatives (e.g. from Austria) strongly felt that any macro-region should exclude major cities not located in the ‘mountains proper’. This position was initially also maintained by CIPRA, which, while itself increasingly critical of and dissatisfied with the Alpine Convention, felt strongly about the ecoregional nature of the Alpine region. In its Initiative Paper, the Network eventually adopted a compromise, arguing that a European Strategy for the Alps ought to address mountain-specific concerns as well as functional linkages between mountain regions and metropolitan areas. Following the Commission’s macro-regions concept, the Initiative Paper suggests that the geographical focus should vary by substantive policy issue.

The spatial perimeter of a future macro-regional strategy for the Alps was one of the two major points of contention in the recent European Parliament debate over the corresponding motions. An early draft of the joint motion contained a paragraph suggesting that the spatial extent of an Alpine strategy should be limited to the territory of the Alpine Convention, thereby distinguishing it from the extra-Alpine region with its larger cities and centres of industry. The second major point of con-tention concerned a paragraph highlighting: ‘the importance of aligning the content of the strategy for the Alps to the Alpine Convention and its subsequent protocols’. Many Alpine regions opposed this formulation because it would legitimate an international treaty that in their eyes has largely ignored them, because they feared that the Convention’s perceived environmental bias would colour the Alpine strategy, and, hence, that aligning the Alpine strategy with the European growth agenda would become correspondingly more difficult. According to per-sons close to the deliberations, many regions (and at least one state) fought hard to have these two paragraphs removed. Whereas they were successful in eliminating the former, the alignment with the Alpine Convention and its Protocols remained in the final resolution.

The geopolitical project of constructing an Alpine region, especially its recent Europarliamentary episode, illustrates the meta-governance stakes of the three parallel initiatives. On the surface, most actors, including

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the Alpine Convention and CIPRA, have come to agree that any future strategy for the Alps must take into account the links between mountain regions and metropolitan centres. Given the location of the capitals of Alpine regions, this should not come as a surprise. However, the pro-cess by which the three parallel initiatives were to work together on the Intervention Document was far from clear. France’s proposal, introduced in early 2012, to assign the responsibility for coordinating the process to DATAR, a unit directly under the Prime Minister, was demoted to a mandate to invite national governments to nominate members to the editorial team. The initial proposal would have undermined both the Alpine Convention and the Alpine Regions. With the EU Parliament resolution, however, the Alpine Convention has obtained formal recog-nition of its substantive scope.

Perhaps tellingly, though in line with previous references to a func-tional rather than territorial approach, the Commission’s scoping paper released in July 2014, that served as basis for the public consul-tation, avoids this awkward issue, as does the October 2013 Grenoble Intervention Document as well as the Political Declaration of Alpine countries and regions. The June 2012 Initiative Paper of Alpine regions includes a section on spatial delimitations, which emphasizes that a macro-regional strategy should address the concerns of core Alpine areas as well as their surrounding regions, and declares that perimeters should be defined in the context of specific policy fields and could there-fore vary from one issue to another. As countries are caught between their promotion of a wider perimeter in the EUSALP context and their legal commitment to a narrow perimeter as Alpine Convention signato-ries, the regional frontier most Alpine regions embrace, especially those with strong metropolitan centres outside the ‘core Alpine area’, corre-sponds to that of the Alpine Space Programme, rather than the ecore-gional delineation enshrined in the Alpine Convention and preferred by most NGOs.

Alpine populism

The geopolitical project of the Alpine construction has opened up a regional frontier in most Alpine states, with (almost all) central govern-ments tied to commitments under an ecoregionally spatialized Alpine Convention that excludes perialpine cities, and Alpine regions com-mitted to an enlarged Alpine space as a motor of European growth. Another development that has contributed to a regional cleavage within states relates to the phenomenon of Alpine populism, as described in an edited volume by Caramani and Mény (2005) on the emergence of


a transnational and supranational region in the Alps, the persistent populist/regionalist political parties reacting to consociational and cor-poratist interest intermediation, and the ‘specific (critical and scepti-cal) attitude of these parties, and Alpine culture more generally, toward European integration’ (p. 9).

Populist movements in the Alpine region have a long history that in many places is closely linked to the international activities of sub-state regional actors. International activities of substate regions do not of course always entail populist politics, as many examples demonstrate, including in the Alps. Conversely, it has been shown that regionalist politics in many parts of the Alps have a populist dimension and that these regions have been active at the international level (Caramani and Mény, 2005).

This section briefly considers the contrasting examples of Italy and France (for overviews of Germany, Switzerland and Austria, see Caramani and Mény, 2005). Already during the 1970s and 1980s, paradiplomatic frontrunners included Bavaria and (the less populist and less Alpine region of) Baden-Württemberg, the two German regions represented in the Alpine Space Programme, which like other European regions used ‘their culture and identity to put themselves on the international map’ (Duran, 2011, p. 341). According to Paquin (2004), recognition is the foundational objective of identity entrepreneurs, which is why regions seek legitimacy in international arenas (see also Giordano, 2000).

One of the clearest examples of regional populism in the Alps is found in Italy, where ‘regional leagues’ have played a major role in politics for decades. According to Tarchi (1999, p. 143), the formation of ‘leaguism’ follows the typical path of regionalist movements. At the roots of the phenomenon are the ideas of Bruno Salvadori, who was leader of the Union Valdôtaine (UV), the first of the movements to fight for ethno-linguistic autonomy in northern Italy. In 1979, the UV tried to gather all the autonomist forces under its own banner and win a seat in the first direct elections to the European Parliament. It thus sought partners from outside the region with a special status, among parties whose focus was on a centre–periphery cleavage that already existed, such as Unione Slovena, Movimenti Firuli, Südtiroler Volkspartei and Partito Sardo d’Azione.

The Lega Nord, founded in December 1989, shares many traits with its regionalist counterparts in other countries, but also a key difference, since its political project is not based on an area that has historic claims to nationhood (Giordano, 2000). Instead, as numerous authors have documented, the party has invented the existence of ‘a new political identity [. . .] complete with its own myths, symbols and rendering of

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history for the North of Italy’ (Agnew and Brusa, 1999, p. 123; see also Agnew, 1995; Diamanti, 1995).

The continued existence and relevance of Lega Nord is also evidence against the classic argument by Mény and Surel (2002, p. 18) that ‘pop-ulist parties are by nature neither durable nor sustainable parties of government. Their fate is to be integrated into the mainstream, to dis-appear, or to remain permanently in opposition’. Its first and for a long time only experience in government was as a coalition partner in the short-lived Berlusconi administration of 1994, which it forced to resign. Yet by 2001, it was back in government, having ‘managed to achieve the balancing act of being seen to influence policy on its core issues while maintaining its “outsider” identity through a series of statements and “spectacular” actions’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010, p. 1319). Returning for a third time as a junior coalition partner of Berlusconi in 2008 still did not tame its rhetoric; rather, by focusing on selected themes (such as federal reform) and policies, Lega Nord continued to enjoy elec-toral success (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010). The 2008 elections that brought Lega Nord back into Berlusconi’s governing coalition also netted important ministerial posts: Interior (Roberto Maroni), Federal Reform (Umberto Bossi), Agriculture and Forestry (Luca Zaia) and Legislative Simplification (Roberto Calderoli). Lega Nord has at various times ruled three of northern Italy’s most important regions, including Lombardy (from 1994–1995 and since 2013) and Piedmont (2010–14) as core Alpine regions. In Veneto, where Zaia was elected president in 2010, the regional council adopted a resolution in June 2014 calling for a referen-dum on independence from Italy.

The Lega Nord has been a strong supporter of a macro-regional strat-egy for the Alps. During the May 2013 EU Parliamentary debate on the Alpine macro-region, Lega Nord EU-Parliamentarian Mara Bizzotto argued that official recognition of the macro-region would finally per-mit Alpine regions to interact directly with European institutions, and manage EU financial resources independently of the central govern-ment (Lega Nord, 2013). Lombardy’s president Roberto Maroni, one of the leaders of Lega Nord and the host of the conference concluding the public consultation of the EUSALP consultation, has repeatedly stated his support, drawing particular attention to the opportunity the strategy lends for negotiating directly with Brussels. In Piedmont, Lega Nord’s Roberto Cota held the presidency during the key moments of the macro-regionalization effort. In November 2012, he suggested that ‘the macro-regional process will necessarily need to dodge a number of obstacles created by those who have not yet understood the project’s historic and


political significance or who think that Europe’s future will not be one of its people and territories, but still one of the old nation state’ (Cota, 2012, author’s translation).

In France, by contrast, the populist and separatist movement in Savoy has not achieved anywhere near the success seen by Lega Nord in Italy (Heinisch, 2003). Savoy is one of the oldest nations in Europe (it was annexed by France in 1860). Regionalist mobilization dates back to the 1960s, with several groups appearing and disappearing over the course of the following decades (Greslou, 2003). In contrast to Italy, however, the regionalist movement has not played a role in the macro-regional initiative. Instead, it has been the larger administrative regions of Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) as well as the central gov-ernment that have led macro-regional efforts in France. And, while Rhône-Alpes and PACA have participated in the Alpine macro-regional process, they have not been as active as the north Italian regions. One of the reasons stems from the more unitary character of the country’s political system. In contrast to the German Länder and Italian regions, French regions do not have access to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which prepares decisions of the Council of the EU. Instead, in order to influence European policy, they have to elaborate complex regional strategies that incorporate the state’s own regional designs (Pasquier, 2012).

The role of Italian regions in the macro-regionalization process cor-roborates Caramani and Mény’s (2005) findings about populist trends in the Alpine region. On the surface, however, the shape of dynam-ics underlying the Alpine macro-regional initiative does not fully fit with the anti-European sentiments found earlier among Alpine populist parties. For example, insofar as a macro-regional strategy is an instru-ment of European integration, the strong support for EUSALP by populist governments in northern Italy cannot be interpreted as anti-European. At the same time, such macro-regional support by populist governments is consistent with the suggestion that international regionalization becomes internalized within states. Hence, populist regional govern-ment support for macro-regionalization has as much, if not more, to do with intra-state manifestations of Alpine region building than with anti-European or anti-centralist sentiment.

Regional political careers

For more than 30 years, paradiplomatic cooperation between Alpine regions has seen the mobilization of culture and identity in pursuit of international standing. In the process, the Alps have been used to open

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a regional frontier inside countries – especially in Italy, Germany, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland – and have given rise to ‘clashes over the control of the state’s spatial organisation between regional and state-centric governance regimes’ (Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2011, p. 21).

Aside from paradiplomacy, two developments have reinforced the regionalization of state space. The first of these concerns the role of regions as a political career focus, which influences the attractiveness of, and hence commitment to, regional ambitions. According to Stolz (2003), research on political careers in federal systems has typically por-trayed regional positions as mere stepping stones on the way to federal office. Yet the growing professionalization of subnational politics and the regionalization of former unitary states suggest that the regional level is developing into a career arena in its own right, thus raising a question about the emergence of a regional political class with career interests that are different from those of national politicians.

In a study that included several countries with Alpine territories, Stolz (2003) showed that contrary to widespread assumptions, the number of politicians actually moving from the regional to federal level is generally relatively low. Italy, West Germany and Austria, in contrast to Switzerland, are characterized by low centripetal ratios, indicating distinct regional and federal career paths. Among these countries, the ratios were shown to be significantly lower among Alpine (as com-pared to non-Alpine) regions in Italy and Germany, but not uniformly so in Austria.

In Italy, this result confirms the findings of scholars of Italian regionalism who have recently noted the growth of a strong class of semi-professional politicians within the regionalist leagues (Tarchi, 1999, p. 135) and even generally about the ‘emergence at the regional level of a new class of politicians not so interested in a cursus hono-rum leading up to the national political scene’ (Desideri, 1995, p. 74). The attractiveness of regional office has further increased since 1996, when regional authorities gained permission to entertain direct rela-tions with the EU (Bolgherini and Rieuf, 2005).

In France, since regional presidents have acted simultaneously as chiefs of the executive and of the legislative branch for many years, they can accumulate extensive powers and most of them get re-elected two or three times (Thoenig, 2005). For example, the current president of PACA was first elected in 1998, before being re-elected in 2004 and 2010, while the current president of Rhône-Alpes has served since 2004. Although the French case provides some indication of a regional career track, it is important to remember that French politicians practice the


so-called cumul des mandats (meaning that they simultaneously hold multiple political offices).

The findings of Stolz fit reasonably well with other research. According to Blatter et al. (2008), for instance, regional competences to maintain autonomous foreign relations are strong in Germany, moderate in Italy and weak in Austria and France, while their rights to influence national foreign policy are strong in Germany, moderate in Austria, weak in Italy and virtually non-existent in France. The strong international role of German and Austrian regions when compared with their French counterparts evidently relates to the respective countries’ political sys-tems (federal vs unitary). However, the relationship is not as direct as one might expect. Tatham (2010, p. 83) does find a strong correlation between levels of devolution and regional mobilization, but, contrary to expectations found in the literature, that ‘greater policy, political, and law-making and fiscal autonomy at the sub-state level translates into more frequent co-operation and less frequent bypassing at the supra-state level’.

These findings confirm the growing strength of regions as autonomous actors in national and international affairs, which is reflected in the cur-rent macro-regional initiative in the Alps. Additionally, they explain some of the regional variations that can be observed in the macro-regional effort, especially the relatively strong role of the German regions compared to the less prominent position taken by French regions.

Conclusion

This chapter’s overview of the origins and drivers of Alpine macro-regionalization has emphasized the need to situate current develop-ments within a broader institutional, political and historical context. Regional governance in the Alps is characterized by a dense tapestry of coexisting initiatives, including an intergovernmental treaty, an EU transnational cooperation programme, several alliances of subnational regions, and a number of influential networks of civil society organiza-tions, municipalities and elected representatives. Within and between these initiatives, extensive multilevel governance practices have devel-oped during the last two decades.

The origins of the macro-regional turn can be found in two mutually reinforcing developments. The first consists in the strengthened politi-cal agency of regions resulting from European integration – as EU policy instruments have promoted their involvement through multilevel gov-ernance, and as regions have sought to overcome the gatekeeping role

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of their central governments. The second is the more concrete opposi-tion of regions to the Alpine Convention, which has marginalized them (even at the expense of NGOs) in its decision-making procedures and operations, and provoked a search for alternative means of becoming involved in transnational Alpine governance. The European appearance of macro-regional strategies thus offered a seemingly perfect opportunity. Alpine regions previously collaborating through subregional working communities committed to create a common network and began calling for an Alpine macro-regional strategy only months after the European Council adopted the Baltic Sea strategy. By contrast, it took the Alpine Convention another year to establish a macro-regional strategy WG.

In the run-up to the December 2013 Council Decision that officially launched preparations for the EUSALP, countries and regions were com-pelled to work together and demonstrated their partnership in a joint political declaration. France has assumed a coordinating role in the substantive alignment of priorities identified by the regions, the Alpine Space Programme and the Alpine Convention, but political leadership has mainly come from Italy, both at the national level (in view of its double presidency of the EU and the Alpine Convention in 2014) and through the active role of populist governments from economically strong regions. NGOs uneasily siding with the Alpine Convention, rather than the regions, have struggled to gain greater recognition for their contributions and commitments to Alpine governance or an invi-tation to become more closely involved in the macro-regional process.

The dynamics of macro-regional efforts during the past four years are complex, ultimately leaving ample space for conceptual interpretation. This chapter has argued that although macro-regionalization is largely a transnational trend, it relates in fundamental ways to the construction of regional frontiers within state structures. Such a frontier first emerged with the creation of the Alpine Convention, whose environmental ori-entation and ecoregional delineation privileged environmental min-istries and NGOs to the chagrin of subnational authorities. But the macro-regional turn is shifting this frontier towards a more economic view of Alpine cooperation benefits and towards a perimeter that no longer divides some of Europe’s strongest economic regions.

Notes

* Research for this chapter was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation projects ‘European Regional Mountain Initiatives’ (Nr. 137989) and ‘EU-gems: Gouvernance de l’Environnement et Macro-régions en Europe’


(Nr. 149536) and by the Swiss Network for International Studies project ‘Mountlennium: Reaching Millennium Development Goals through Regional Mountain Governance’.

1 The term ‘region’ is apt to create confusion because it can refer to subna-tional (Länder, Provinces, Cantons, etc.), transnational (neighbouring parts of at least two countries) and supranational (multiple neighbouring countries) entities. In this chapter, the meaning of the term can usually be inferred from the context. Where it is not clear, as in this instance, a qualifier such as ‘supra-national’ is added.

2 The Declaration was signed by Bavaria, South Tyrol, Graubünden, Salzburg, Tyrol, Trento, Vorarlberg and a representative of Switzerland’s Federal Office of Spatial Development.

3 The represented Alpine regions include Tyrol (Austria), Rhône-Alpes and PACA (France), Bavaria (Germany), Lombardy and Bolzano (Italy) and Graubünden (Switzerland).

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Introduction

Within the framework of Europe 2020 (CEC, 2010a), there is a stress on the territorial coverage of the regional policies and complementary EU activities. There is increasing attention on the performance and effec-tiveness of such policies, the efficiency of governance structures and implementation arrangements, and the relationship between cohesion policy and other EU structural policies. Over the last few years, there has also been a growing recognition and support for the concept of ‘macro-regions’, which some have promoted as serving to meet these objectives.1 The Fifth Cohesion Report (CEC, 2010b) broadly embraces this approach of defining geographies which extend beyond national borders and conventional ‘Territorial Cooperation’ collaborations, but within specifically defined quadrants of the continent. The future archi-tecture of cohesion policy, therefore, is likely to see demand for simi-lar strategies for parts of Europe as already apply for the Baltic Sea, the Danube and the Adriatic–Ionian area.

In anticipation of this, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) proposed a ‘European North Sea Strategy’, informed by the specially commissioned Kuhn report (2010). According to the EU’s ‘Macro-Regions’ concept, regions and countries are to cooperate on flagship cross-border projects dealing with a range of issues, such as environmental protection and transport. Within the framework of ‘Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (CEC, 2010a), this enables solutions to be found for problems that one country is unable to tackle alone and which are too specific for general EU rules. Discussions within the CoR, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the North Sea

10A North Sea Macro-region? Partnerships, Networking and Macro-regional DimensionsMike Danson


Commission (NSC) and other colloquia have confirmed broad support for this proposal across this extraterritorial region.2

Another framework push for macro-regions has come from the adop-tion of the Lisbon Treaty (CEC, 2007a) since through it the EU gained ‘territorial cohesion’ as one of its embedded central objectives (the EU ‘shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion’). Given this strong movement towards establishing a formal macro-region around the North Sea, it is interesting that other and perhaps less-well-developed proposals for the Alps and Adriatic–Ionian sea areas appear to have overtaken these plans. This chapter will therefore explore some of the motives driving this apparent paradox. In particular, it will be suggested that, far from aiding in the swift development of a macro-regional strat-egy, the common structural and institutional underpinnings of the countries and regions involved actually undermine the rationale for the development of this special vehicle, in contradistinction to the Baltic, Danube and the Adriatic–Ionian regions.

After describing recent economic performances across north-western Europe, this chapter will analyse how this proposal for a complex and multifunctional strategy could be established and operationalized within these geographical, political and policy constraints. It explores the func-tional geographies of the North Sea, bearing in mind that geographical categories can be flexible depending on their function and that the macro-regional strategy should have more than one function. This leads into a consideration of the different nuances to each stakeholder’s definitional understanding of the macro-region; that is, what they believe to be the reasonable priorities and therefore aims and objectives of any such pro-gramme of activity, and the governance structures that this would require.

This chapter will examine the literature and rationales underpinning the proposed macro-region, paying special attention to the histori-cal and geographical contexts and to the changing environments the region must contend with. Given the locations of and barriers to full involvement in many European markets, this chapter will draw on the work of the Regional Studies Association (RSA) international research network on peripherality and marginality (Danson and de Souza, 2012) to contrast the varying demands across the macro-region. The analysis is informed by theories on cohesion, coherence and partnership, all key to any such collaborative programme (Danson et al., 1999), but all the more important given the expectation that any macro-region must be constructed without any new funds or institutions just at a time when the EU’s member states are increasingly competing for the existing and limited pool of funds available. While the ‘three No’s’ are evidently important to the development of any understanding of the development

Mike Danson 217

of macro-regions, they cannot be used to explain the particular case of stalled progress in the North Sea as compared to the pace of develop-ment and successful establishment of macro-regions elsewhere, since these restrictions affect all macro-regions equally. This suggests there will need to be an exploration of the particular factors at work in this part of Europe. In particular, it will be discussed in this chapter whether the existing high levels of institutional capacity, cooperation and learn-ing across the borders of the proposed region’s economic core militate against a confirmation of the additional benefits that a new structural focus for collaboration and partnership could generate.

This chapter examines both political and economic drivers for such strategies, which it will be argued are integral to forming an understand-ing of them. Hitherto, demand for the macro-regional strategies has stemmed from the participating regions themselves, yet it will be sug-gested that to be effective there is a level of buy-in from the accommo-dating member state that is essential. So, member states need to agree to such cooperation to help drive the strategy along and carry this nomi-nal political will through to find the means to part-fund the process. Arguably, these activities may be counter-intuitive to the strategy’s cur-rent drivers, thus complicating the development of a programme for the macro-region. It will be suggested that, for this proposal to work, it would need to present itself convincingly as a meaningful collabo-ration that would lead to substantial efficiency savings in the delivery and implementation of actions under its policy jurisdiction. It will be shown that this is particularly apposite where there is evidence of the need to find added value, which is particularly pertinent in the current economic and budgetary environment.

Finally, the chapter examines the region against the strategic objec-tives of Europe 2020. This supports the argument that a North Sea macro-region might contribute significantly to meeting the goals of ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (CEC, 2010a), if obstacles to be removed and synergies realized can be identified. Specifically, the concept of ‘smart specialization’ and associated EU strategies are sug-gested as the best potential focus for a North Sea macro-region as they play to the strengths of the area while avoiding many limitations and spheres of conflict that other approaches might entail. In summary, it will be asserted that the internal contradictions can be explicitly identi-fied in the geographies of the states involved and across the relevant core–periphery divide, and it is argued that these considerations rein-force the benefits of pursuing smart specialization while simultaneously bringing into question the net benefits of a macro-region to many local and regional actors (Figure 10.1).


FRANCE

GERMANY

DENMARK

NORWAY

SWEDEN

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDSUK

ICELAND

0 400km

Figure 10.1 Potential territorial coverage of the North Sea macro-region


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Relative performances during the economic crisis

Driven by the long and sustained relative (to the rest of Europe) decline of the UK economy (Elliott and Atkinson, 2012) and deindustrialization since the 1970s, the economic performances of the parts of England bordering the North Sea (the North East, Yorkshire and Humberside, and East Anglia) and Scotland have been mediocre compared with the nearest comparable areas, and without a transformational change this is projected to continue into the future (Elliott and Atkinson, 2012; MacKay, 2011). With government limited to the local and national lev-els only, and a governance structure therefore lacking a strong regional voice complemented by the regional development agencies, abolished in recent times (Pike et al., 2012), the regions of England face challenges both in addressing the agendas of deindustrialization, recession and competitiveness and also in developing the necessary capacities to real-ize the potential benefits of macro-regional developments. By compari-son, since the Scottish Parliament was re-established in 1999, successive Scottish governments have introduced measures to address such issues, albeit constrained within the confines of devolution (Maxwell, 2012), and from 2007 constrained also by the limitations imposed in the wake of the financial crisis. The principal measures of the lagging performances among the UK’s candidate regions for a North Sea macro-region, outwith London and the South East, can be summarized as (Danson, 2012):

1. Sustained lower levels of economic growth throughout the post-war period

2. Flatlining population numbers3. Low levels of entrepreneurship4. A widening gap between rich and poor5. High levels of emigration of qualified, talented young people

Certain parts of the Netherlands and northern Germany face similar chal-lenges (TiPSE, 2014), while others are in privileged economic and geo-graphical positions (CEC, 2014a; TiPSE, 2014). The capitals and accessible regions of the Nordic countries are leading in innovation and perfor-mance (CEC, 2012, 2014a) and are able to benefit from further integra-tion on the other hand.

Despite these indicators of long-term underperformance relative to their nearest neighbours, an array of regions on the north-western periphery of Europe and bordering the North Sea do have strengths and opportunities to contrast the weaknesses and threats exposed by these statistics. In recent times, there has been much attention paid to the


importance of agglomeration economies in explaining why some locali-ties appear to attract economic activities disproportionately, and then continue to benefit from these flows and lower costs. Captured in such theoretical constructs as ‘clusters’ (Porter, 2000), proximity (Moulaert and Sekia, 2003) and agglomeration economies of scale and scope (Parr et al., 2002) with derivative strategies and policies of smart specialization (CEC, 2011; Lundvall and Lorenz, 2012), they have led to arguments in favour of the Single Market and unfettered competition policy on the one hand (Cecchini, 1988) and progressive concentration of industry, finance and commerce in the core of Europe on the other (Farole et al., 2011). Other things being equal, these centripetal forces have worked against the interests of the peripheral regions of Europe. Yet, it has been sug-gested that there are

economically successful regions with below average accessibility. Often . . . sparsely populated and remote. They can be found in the Nordic Countries, north-east of Spain, Scotland, Ireland and in and around northern Italy. Apparently, accessibility is not a decisive fac-tor for the economic development of these regions. Regions in the Nordic Countries, for example, have overcome their peripheral loca-tion by capitalising on current strengths in relation to ICT, research, educational and environmental opportunities and less on improving their accessibility. (ESPON, 2010)

For those regions around the North Sea closer to or within the core of Europe – in the Netherlands and Germany, for instance – other positive factors for competitiveness are present (CEC, 2012, 2014a), reinforcing the agglomeration and distance advantages they accrue from their loca-tion (ESPON, 2013).

So, although not co-located with the other key players in an industrial cluster (as is the case in the economic heartlands of the EU and US), net-working and a judicious use of indigenous human factors and resources have allowed the businesses of the smaller north-western nations to com-pete successfully in global markets (ESPON, 2013, pp. 20f.), although this has perhaps been to the detriment of those regions without the insti-tutional capacity to compete in this environment (Pike et al., 2012). Overcoming apparent obstacles to participating in supply chains and acting globally, therefore, has been possible, and by energizing and activating latent networks in the diaspora, there should be crucial advantages for enterprises in regions with more advanced development infrastructures (Bellini et al., 2012; Danson and Mather, 2014).

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The other principal approach to addressing the need for economic diversification following deindustrialization has been through the attrac-tion of foreign direct investment. Although inward investment by mul-tinational enterprises has been pursued for several decades and Scotland has a particularly good track record in terms of attracting branch plants (Ernst & Young, 2012), globalization and the international division of labour have increased the competition for such footloose investment. As a result, moves to embed these plants in the regional economy and to fill in the gaps in the supply chain locally have come to represent a maturing of this particular strategy. The recent economic and finan-cial crisis has exacerbated the negative forces and both undermined local economies dependent on branch plants, and highlighted the vul-nerability of small nations (Price and Levinger, 2011; Skilling, 2012). However, the degree of resilience that these peripheral locations have demonstrated lately suggests that their cohesion and flexibility have much to offer as a model for resistance and success (Martin, 2010).

The conclusions of this brief review of the development drivers for small open economies are that a capacity to participate in international markets is crucial. This is dependent on participation in global sectors and supply chains from a position of strength based on optimizing the application of high levels of human capital and skills in knowledge-based industries, and on participation in regional and international networks. Theoretical perspectives and practical experiences of what works in this competition stress endogenous growth and the pursuit of smart speciali-zation (CEC, 2011). The Nordic countries and Germany are recorded as the most innovative in the EU, and the Netherlands, Belgium and eastern regions of the UK perform above the EU average (CEC, 2012). These levels of innovation enable many of the regions in the northern periphery bordering the North Sea to overcome many disadvantages from the lack of agglomeration economies and proximity with a structural orientation of their economies to high performance (CEC, 2012; ESPON, 2010), while most of the regions of the Netherlands and Germany which fall within the territory of a North Sea macro-region by definition enjoy these locational advantages already.

Functional geographies and EU macro-regions

For most communities and regions, whether constructed specifically for the purposes of accessing EU funds or whether they possessed their own pre-existing identities, there will be experience of transnational coopera-tion programmes (CEC, 2010b; Perkmann, 2003). Although these may


have involved much stronger collaborations with similar entities out-with their own nation states than with neighbouring regions nationally, analogously to certain twinning arrangements, these may not be very deep or persistent relationships and last only as long as the EU funding demands.

It should be clear that there ought to be similar considerations in the determination of regions which cross national boundaries: so-called ‘vir-tual regions’ (described by Herrschel, 2009, as time limited and project specific, with no specific administrative structures). Such new territo-ries include those facilitated by the transformations in central and east-ern Europe which allowed former links between old regions across the East–West divide to be re-established, the opening of the Øresund Bridge between the metropolitan areas of Copenhagen and Malmö which con-nected the two city regions, building on the common cultural identity of these ‘Öresund citizens’, and the development of the Dublin–Belfast corridor. These are examples of cross-border macro-regions based on historically developed identities. Contrariwise, such transitions have also exposed the artificiality and weak resilience of some other regional forms constructed during recent times, such as those along the Atlantic edge (see Wise, chapter 11 in this volume, for an exposition).

The Commission’s standard definition of a macro-region is ‘an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions asso-ciated with one or more common features or challenges’ (Samecki, 2009, p. 1). Critically, related to considerations of the geographic coverage of the proposed North Sea macro-region, such an initiative should involve ‘several regions in several countries’ and not only do the limits of the region not need to be precisely defined but also the boundaries can vary with any specific policy area within the envelope of the macro-region programme.

In stressing that there are ‘three No’s’: no new funds, no new legisla-tion, no new institutions (Samecki, 2009, p. 5), it is clear that in prac-tice the concept is about realizing synergies. These should be gained through a broad and inclusive partnership, and approach: ‘All relevant policy areas, EU, national, regional and local should be included. IFIs, NGOs and the private sector should also be fully involved’ (Samecki, 2009, p. 5). Indeed, and particularly relevant to the North Sea, the pos-sibility that the macro-region should be extended to third countries is suggested (Samecki, 2009, p. 6). Now, it might be argued that in the con-text of the North Sea with only Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands to be accommodated (see footnote two), the establishment of a macro-region should be easier than in other parts of Europe. However, to the extent

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that the rationale from the centre (the European Commission espe-cially, CEC, 2013) for these supranational collaborations is to encourage changes towards the sorts of conditions of mutually recognized trans-actions already achieved in this area, then this becomes a redundant driver in progressing a North Sea macro-region. If the motivation is reaching out to still relatively insular regions and states in the territories of the Baltic, Danube and Adriatic–Ionian seas through the exchange of knowledge and intelligence on economic development and partnership working, to build institutional capacity to enhance and promote more rapid integration of the transition economies into the wider European project (CEC, 2013; Dubois et al., 2009), then there is little need for a macro-regional construct where these relationships are apparent and facilitated currently anyway.

In discussing the scope and content of a macro-regional strategy at the level of intervention, Samecki (2009, p. 7) argues that it must be designed to rectify market or policy failures. In the context of the North Sea, such partnerships already exist for such policies where there is evi-dence of market failures due to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (such as in the cases of fishing and oil, both involving non-EU countries), and where positive externalities mean that underproduction would result if the market was unregulated (i.e. where social and EU-wide benefits are greater than those accruing to private or national interests alone). This raises the question of what added value a macro-region would offer and what failures it would be addressing.

Therefore, the conclusions that can be drawn from Samecki’s article are that the factors underpinning a successful macro-region are about actions aimed at tangible achievements with demonstrable added value, in geographies tolerated to have ‘flexible, even vague, definitions of the boundaries’, and focused on using existing resources and funds more effectively.

There are important implications from such experiences for experi-ments in creating macro-regions across national boundaries embrac-ing communities from several countries. As Peterlin (2011, p. 2) argues: it is acknowledged in Dubois et al.’s (2009) scoping study on EU macro-regional strategies that there are still a lot of questions both on the delimitations and functionality of macro-regions and on the rationale and added value of development strategies in a macro-regional context. This confirms the significance of pre-existing and persisting transna-tional linkages and identities for cross-border regions (CBRs) to develop naturally, and to realize the potential benefits of such macro-regions. In particular, there are interesting contrasts between how the Baltic Sea


and Danube macro-regions have evolved, based on top-down initiatives emanating from the European Commission itself (Commission of the European Communities, December 2010d), and the North Sea proposals. Considering historical flows, linkages and common legacies are prereq-uisites to determining whether such plans may succeed.

Context

Historical and geographical contexts

The history and geography of this region is important, therefore, and not just the politics and policy regimes of the 21st century. A millennium ago, the North Sea and associated waterways of the North Atlantic were a well-trodden highway, with vital connections between the communi-ties on coasts and estuaries across this geography (Smith et al., 2007). These coastal communities were at the heart of not only their regions, but also of a maritime society and economy based around the North Sea.

These north-western nations are critical in the origins of important elements of European history, culture, language and identity. And, to the extent that diversity gives strength to the European community and economy, the constituent elements of this macro-region offer much to the EU’s overall competitiveness. Compared with what was histori-cally the case, transportation forms and networks are of course now dominated by air, high-speed rail and containerized cargo movements; bridges and tunnels have also changed contexts and positions so that the tendency to peripheralization and marginalization has become endemic and embedded in north-western Europe (Danson and de Souza, 2012).

There is the potential for synergies to be realized through the creation of transnational Territorial Cooperation on a larger scale than is cur-rently available through the existing programmes.3

Peripheral and marginal concepts

For the communities, regions and nations around the North Sea, many are peripheral by geography but are also peripheralized and marginal-ized within Europe, within their own nations and within their own regions (Danson and de Souza, 2012). This has been exacerbated by a reorientation of trade following entry to the EU and the completion of the common market, globalization, and associated restructuring and deindustrialization. By way of contrast, the evolution of the Single Economic Market has privileged and advantaged the southernmost areas around the North Sea (Rodríguez-Pose, 2002; Schmidt, 2011) as

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these areas occupy a key arc of the core of the European economy (CEC, 2014a). At all levels in this macro-region, as elsewhere, the competitive-ness agenda dominates so that cities/city-regions/agglomeration econo-mies are promoted, privileging the core (TiPSE, 2014; Krugman, 1991). As a result, internally and transnationally, many regions and nations bordering on this sea face peculiar difficulties in competing with the firms and communities at the core of the continent (CEC, 2008; ESPON, 2010 for discussion on principles) and so have become peripheral and marginal (Danson and de Souza, 2012) within their own member state or in the wider European context.

Recognizing the characteristics of cooperation in a discussion on macro-regional strategies and the renewal of economic policy in general, Braun and Kovács (2011, p. 81) refer positively to the Nordic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Council of the Baltic Sea States and Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation, but then raise ‘the fragmentation of the region into smaller states’ which they suggest means there is ‘still little internal competition . . . and . . . adequate economies of scale have not yet been realized against the background of globalization’. This may not be uncontested but nonetheless strengthens the arguments for look-ing at smart specialization strategies for this region.

Therefore, the evolving impacts of economic and political changes rather than history and geography can be seen as the principal drivers of these forces of peripheralization. Communities which formerly had been at the core of sea-based international networks are now relatively isolated and facing high rates of outmigration, unemployment and low incomes (Beatty and Fothergill, 2004; Lorentzen and van Heur, 2011). The characteristics of peripherality and marginality common to these regions and countries are consistent with the label accorded to the Baltic Sea members: Europe’s ‘new’ or ‘peripheral sub-regionalism’ (Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume; Hubel and Gänzle, 2002).

In this context, and in the current environment of pursuing strategies and experiences of resilience and sustainable development, the esteem in which the Nordic countries are held is notable. Especially from a Scottish perspective, looking towards Nordic economic and societal models has become almost essential for many in favour of independence (Common Weal, 2014; Nordic Horizons, 2014). Also, in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, many of those who oppose austerity budgets and deepen-ing cuts in welfare argue that the lessons from across the North Sea in these countries and the Netherlands should be important in recogniz-ing an alternative response to the crisis; such recognition is supported by the latest analysis at the European level (CEC, 2014a; TiPSE, 2014).


So, there are groups based in and around the Scottish Parliament which meet regularly to consider ‘Nordic Horizons’, and the left-leaning think tanks the ‘Reid Foundation’ and ‘The Common Weal’ are publishing series of papers based on a distinctively Scottish version of the type of society that has been achieved in the Nordic area (in Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Iceland). This argues that a ‘more Nordic’ Scotland can be envisaged by drawing from the different Nordic models (see http://reidfoundation.org/common-weal/). Interestingly, there is but limited reference to the German model in such literature or policy docu-ments outwith the labour market (e.g. CEC, 2014a; Danson et al., 2013).

These developments and the more widespread favourable comparisons made of the levels of prosperity and development in these small nations bordering the North Sea against those of the UK, Scottish and peripheral regions within member states suggest that there is prima facie evidence that governments and social partners would look to strengthen the con-cept of a North Sea macro-region. However, as will be highlighted below, the Scottish government and regional authorities (or their equivalent) in local member states initially appear to be fairly neutral if not indif-ferent to the embryonic proposals for such a collaborative framework.

Essential elements of EU Territorial Cooperation

Yet, throughout history the communities around the North Sea have made the most of its geographical handicaps (e.g. by becoming mari-time traders), although distance has always been an obstacle to benefit-ing from scale economies and economies based on the core of Europe. As a highly innovative part of the world, it has much to offer the EU in meeting the objectives of smart growth (CEC, 2010a); of sustainable growth, being the cradle for the development of renewable energies (needed of course to address climate change but also useful in terms of production, jobs and wider economic impacts); of inclusive growth, with its generally low levels of inequality and poverty; and incorporation of new technologies into old industries such as forestry, fishing, oil and gas, climate (e.g. datastores) and leisure. And, as many of these activi-ties display economies of scale, suffer from other market imperfections and failures, or otherwise offer advantages from joint actions, there is a rationale for considering a North Sea macro-region. Finally, and perhaps critically, they demonstrate the characteristics of ‘smart specialization’ which is now a priority strategy for the European Commission.

Under various EU initiatives for building partnerships and networks (including promoting the ‘Motorway of the Sea’ in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), the North Sea Grid), there should be

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potential positive impacts and synergies, extending lessons and good practices from European programmes with a transnational dimension active in the past around the North Sea (e.g. from INTERREG III, Links between the rural economy and development actions [LEADER], and EQUAL). Some of these build upon long-established fora for discussion and dialogue, the Nordic Council being the most obvious. As a note of caution, though, prior to the development of formal ‘macro-regions’ in the EU, the primacy of the member states in establishing and sanction-ing any significant cross-border region-building had been stressed by Perkmann (2003, p. 168): ‘In this sense, small-scale CBRs [cross-border regions] in particular are part of the multi-level governance structure of EU policy-making but are far from posing an imminent threat to the authority of the member-states over these policies.’

Further proposals for new macro-regions (see footnote one) have to align with the new funding period, offer flexibility in meeting challenges that only cross-national cooperation can address, and not be driven by the availability of money rather than the opportunity and need to work across boundaries. Bringing together existing funds and operat-ing on existing platforms are seen as the fundamentals for constructing a strategic plan for using the funding instruments already available to macro-regional partners. More effective and efficient ways to spend are therefore expected.

Political drivers, Europe 2020 and EU member states

There are multiple policy networks with an interest in the North Sea and the regions surrounding the North Sea. They usually take the form of col-laboration on a shared issue and range from loosely integrated issue net-works such as KIMO (Kommunenes Internasjonale Miljøorganisasjon) to those policy communities with a more integrated role in the European Commission decision-making process, such as the North Sea Regional Advisory Council for fisheries (Rhodes, 1990, 304–5). They form part of a complex ecosystem of organizations all with an interest in influenc-ing the direction of EU policymaking and, according to feedback and evaluations, perform well against various internal and external criteria (CEC, 2014b; CPMR, 2013a; Long, 2010), thus raising the question of whether disruption to their operations through transformation into a macro-region would deliver sufficient net benefits.

In contrast with the way in which the Baltic Sea and Danube Strategies developed,4 the discussion on the North Sea Strategy has come almost entirely from the regions themselves, since the Commission has not


driven or prioritized this area while member states have been conflicted in their approaches. The NSC, a geographical arm of the CPMR, has been pivotal in driving forward this debate primarily between its members, who are regions or local authorities in the countries surrounding the North Sea. The debate and discussion around the possibility of a North Sea Strategy originally could be described as ‘reactive’ in that the idea was not on the political agenda until moves were made for the develop-ment of a Baltic Sea Strategy. Ideas on the components of a strategy have evolved over the last few years and have included joint work on the impacts of climate change such as rising sea levels and flooding; protect-ing the environmental sustainability of the North Sea and its ecosystems; developing comprehensive and coherent data available across member states to enable the most effective policy decisions (particularly in the context of the Integrated Maritime Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy and Integrated Coastal Zone Management); ensuring Europe’s sustaina-ble energy supply (including the proposed North Sea Grid for Renewable Energy); and sustaining and developing Europe’s competitive advantage in the world in the field of R&D and innovation (CEC, 2014b). Two key research questions are generated by this agenda: critically, would a macro-region offer added value beyond the existing range of collabo-rative and partnership mechanisms that already claim to deliver such transnational projects, and is such a ‘shopping list’ approach merely constructed to rival the ambitions of other macro-regional strategies in existence or development?

The problem with such a position is that it becomes difficult to iden-tify the added value of a macro-regional strategy within a crowded list of desired activity and to distinguish what is different from existing EU instruments for cooperation (CEC, 2010b). There has also been much concern within the membership that some of the initial ideas were too orientated around the North Sea itself rather than around the economic development of the regions surrounding the North Sea. It has also been suggested that increased rationalization and prioritization is needed, and such a reorientation would lead to the inclusion of more prosperous regions in the Netherlands and Germany as well as some poorer regions in the UK and, potentially, Belgium.

As a result, the concept behind the idea of a North Sea Strategy has grown over time. It was rebranded ‘North Sea Region 2020’, reflecting the ambition to align any future resulting communication with the aspira-tions of the Europe 2020 Strategy and to demonstrate, through an accom-panying action plan, the contribution of the region to the delivery of the EU’s overarching strategy. There has been an increasing focus around

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five themes: increasing accessibility and attractiveness, tackling climate change, promoting innovation and excellence, sustaining communities and managing maritime space. The aspiration of this joint working now has far greater political motivation, and therefore direction, as opposed to trying to please everyone or attempting to prioritize potential activity. The motivation behind this approach could be said to be ideologically driven and could be seen as calling into question the Community way of working in the call for a North Sea Region 2020 Strategy. There is an argument that intergovernmental approaches to EU decision-making have not served the regions well and that they want a greater say in dis-cussions that affect their own territory (Keating, 2009). ‘[There is] grow-ing recognition that sectoral policies do not always take account of local challenges and opportunities and can have negative impacts on local communities and indeed other sectoral policy objectives’ (North Sea Commission, September 2009). Moves towards a macro-regional strategy therefore can be viewed as a vehicle for the local and regional political class within the North Sea to improve the partnership and governance model on a transnational scale. It meets Schymik and Krumrey’s defini-tion of ‘an innovative political experiment’: the macro-region represents a new governance level ‘located between the nation state and the supra-national community’ (Schymik and Krumrey, 2009, p. 3) occupying a ‘mezzanine position between the supranational and the national levels and the long and short term’ (Braun and Kovács, 2011, p. 91).

However, not much progress has been made since 2011 even under the Danish EU Presidency in the spring of 2012, perhaps highlighting the lack of priority given to this project, even by a key player. According to Braun and Kovács (2011, p. 80), although there have been moves by CoR to establish macro-regional cooperation among western Europe’s mari-time countries through the so-called Atlantic Strategy ‘if the Baltic Sea and Danube Strategies do not result [in] a breakthrough in the renewal of the regional policy then the development of further macro-regional strategies can also grind to a halt’.

The CoR is a consultative body and is seen as one of the main chan-nels through which local and regional authorities act as the Third Level in European decision-making (Jeffery, 1997). The CoR contributes the ‘view from below’ and as such is considered an important element of the EU’s multilevel governance (Piattoni, 2008). On 6 October 2010, their Plenary agreed by unanimity an ‘Opinion’ on ‘A Strategy for the North Sea–English Channel area’, which calls on member states, through the European Council, to task the European Commission with drawing up a strategy with an emphasis on maritime policy, the


environment, transport, industry and science. This example of lateral decision-making is complemented by a number of key individuals being involved in both the NSC and the CoR. They are central in pushing the discussion forward, so that there is ‘politician spillover’ and to some extent an ‘ideas spillover’ between the two organizations. Confirming this inclusive approach, in an ‘opinion’, CPMR has argued to the Commission that there should be involvement from the bottom-up in the preparation and implementation of macro-regional and sea basin strategies (2013b, p. 2).

The issue of a North Sea–English Channel Strategy has continued on the agenda of the CoR, and views continue to be exchanged with the European Parliament on the subject through its ‘Coastal Regions’ Inter-group. Further, they plan to maintain discussions with the NSC’s work on ‘North Sea Region 2020’ and hold discussions with Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare) on the possibility of a ‘Sea-basin Strategy for the North Sea’ (CEC, 2010c).

CPMR has proposed that the European Commission needs to be at the heart of these developments ‘to play a central role in coordinating the actions of the different stakeholders involved in the preparation and in the implementation of MRS and SBS’ and that it should also have a crucial role in ‘monitoring the implementation of the strategies’ (2013b, p. 2).

In contrast to the issue networks and policy communities around the North Sea, member states have not really engaged with the idea of a North Sea Strategy to any great degree. This initiative would involve countries having to divert and dedicate limited and scarce resources to those regions qualifying as elements of a North Sea macro-region, and so difficult internal political decisions would have to be made between con-stituencies; as a result, there may be a reluctance to commit to engage with this development for the forthcoming period. Further, without firm evidence that some of the actors involved are unconvinced of the potential being offered by the North Sea agenda beyond what can be achieved through existing channels, such propositions are necessarily based largely on speculation.

So, for instance, although the Scottish government has shown some interest in the proposals, and the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs co-sponsored a North Sea Stakeholder Conference in March 2010 with the tagline ‘Working Together to Manage the Marine Resources of the North Sea Region’, recent support has been more muted. There has been very little work at the member state level to note and certainly not on the broader idea of a North Sea Strategy

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encompassing multiple areas of activity beyond the maritime agenda. It is argued, however, that decisive factors in the successful introduc-tion of existing macro-regions ‘included the explicit political will of the national governments of the area and the promotion of consensus at diverse levels’ (Stocchiero, 2010, p. 3); this commitment may not be all that is required, but nonetheless is essential as, without it, a North Sea macro-region cannot be established.

Economic drivers, efficiency and strategic decisions

Economic drivers, efficiency and strategic decisions are essentially the three main ingredients that are needed for a North Sea macro-region to come into fruition. It needs to have member states on board or it will never get on the EU agenda properly (the European Council asked the Commission to draft both the Baltic Sea and Danube Strategies). In order to get member state support, it is important to demonstrate economic benefits/opportunities or efficiency gains which this new approach would deliver and which could not otherwise be achieved under current structures or EU Programmes.

This follows because member states have historically demonstrated that they will not usually sign up to any commitments without clear benefits. Indeed in the UK government’s response to the Fifth Cohesion Report, it was stated that ‘Macro-regional strategies will not be appropriate for all regions and the EU should not create artificial regions that do not share common features and challenges. It is crucial that they do not become an extra bureaucratic layer that does not deliver a real added value. For many regions, territorial co-operation programmes will remain the best mechanism for co-operative working’ (United Kingdom Government, 2011). The German government (both the Bund and Länder, German Federal Government, January 2011) stated that ‘the aim should be to use the existing funding more effectively and in a more co-ordinated way. The structural funds can make an important contribution towards the success of macro-regional strategies; however, the regional development strategies must continue to play the main role in determining the use of the structural funds and the selection of the projects. Bureaucratic requirements to “label” projects or to produce reports should be avoided’ (German Federal Government, January 2011). The only other member state around the North Sea to mention macro-regions specifically in its response was Sweden, which, based on its positive experience of the Baltic Sea Strategy, noted such a strategy’s capacity to be a ‘tool for joint prioritization’ (Swedish Government, 2011).


Discussion

What we have hitherto seen in EU policy and programme develop-ment is a silo approach, with activity being led by different Directorate Generals’ work. What the North Sea macro-region could offer is an alter-native way of working, more lateral and less top-down, acting as a useful coordinating tool for the interests of a number of Directorate Generals within this geography, and linking in to all levels of government and civic society (Samecki, 2009). Differences have also emerged between DG Mare and DG Regio, with the former reportedly ‘desperate’ for a North Sea Strategy for fishing and renewable energies, while the latter (and the UK government, see Wise chapter 11 in this volume) is more interested in an Atlantic Strategy. This ambivalence does not suggest any prioritizing of the North Sea within the European Commission or key member states.

In response to such ambivalence, CPMR has advocated setting up a ‘“Macro-Regions Task Force” comprising representatives from the rel-evant DGs of the European Commission’ (2013b, p. 2). However, the potential remains to create a strategy evolving into a living network. In an earlier discourse around CBRs which can be applied to macro-regions, Perkmann (2003, p. 157) concluded that: it does not matter whether a CBR is built upon cultural or ethnic commonalities, a common histori-cal background, existing functional interdependencies or a mere com-munity of interests, as it is precisely the process of construction that matters. So, strategic discussions and dialogue around the creation of a macro-region is critical with the European Commission arguing that actions, boundaries (inclusion of geographies), and constraints are the essential defining elements of a successful macro-region proposal, not a restrictive geographically bounded partnership (Samecki, 2009).

A North Sea macro-region as a ‘functional economic area’ should there-fore have no firmly established borders, rather definitions that change depending on the problem and the solution (CoR, 2011; Samecki, 2009); geography matters, but it is not necessary to constrain rigidly. Each of the three proponents of territorial collaboration around the North Sea covered in this chapter involves different geographies (CoR, NSC, UK Nordic Baltic Summit). And each has different motivations, though all recognize the importance of this region to spearhead smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, contributing to the EU’s economic strategy (CEC, 2010a). Perhaps the most confusing misalignment is between the NSC and the CoR, who represent the same interest group – local and regional authorities. In summary, they have similar priorities (see Table 10.1),

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but when we look into the details, it is clear that the CoR sees this work in terms of the sea itself, whereas the NSC has come to a broader out-look of economic development extending to the regions surrounding the sea. Crucially to understanding the differences between the stalled development of a North Sea macro-region and the progress of those in the Baltic Sea and Danube is that these latter projects were driven rela-tively more from above by the European Commission and were enter-ing fairly empty institutional landscapes. The northwest of Europe is densely wooded with institutions, vested interests, well-established col-laborations and networks so that intervening in such an environment is rather difficult. Member states’ main motivations are improving trade and knowledge exchange across areas of excellence with the view of stimulating efficiencies, and this complements the local and regional authorities’ aspirations in many ways.

Table 10.1 Comparison of priorities

Europe 2020UK Nordic Baltic Summit

North Sea Commission

Committee of the Regions

Employment Families, jobs and gender equality

Maritime safety and skills

R&D and innovation

Technology and innovation

Promoting innovation and excellence

Science, research and industry (Blue Growth)

Environment, climate change and energy

Environment and sustainability

Tackling climate change, managing maritime space

Climate change, environment, energy (North Sea Grid), maritime policy

Education Families, jobs and gender equality

Poverty and social exclusion

Families, jobs and gender equality

Sustainable communities

Increasing accessibility and attractiveness

Transport (shipping and ports)

Source: CEC (2010a) Europe 2020 Strategy; UK Nordic Baltic Summit in London (January 2011) – Discussion Groups and Pre-identified Challenges; Joint NSC Conference ‘North Sea Region 2020 – Are We prepared?’ (March 2011) – Discussion Groups and Pre-identified Challenges; CoR (2011) ‘A Strategy for the North Sea-Channel Area’.


Given that local and regional authorities already participate in the Territorial Cooperation Programmes in the North Sea Region (however defined), where is the value added? The rationale is about coordina-tion and giving a voice to this ‘functional area’, through an integrated approach at the appropriate scale (CEC, 2009, p. 5). In the existing North Sea IVB Programme, there has been experimentation with the concept of clustering projects. Projects addressing similar overarching themes could form a cluster to increase the impact of each other’s pro-jects within the framework of ‘smart specialization’ (Foray et al., 2011). The expectation is that by grouping together and using each other’s communication channels, each partner will become more visible to those they need to influence (i.e. to member states and the EU) in order to encourage policy changes in the direction they desire so that they achieve the objectives of their respective projects’ undertakings.

This type of approach offers a rationale and justification for what a North Sea macro-region could be about. Coordinating and giving a voice to wider governmental actors and sectors could lead to greater synergies on key projects. The North Sea Grid for Renewable Energy is an interesting example as it seems that all levels of government in the region are keen to see it happen (as can be seen in Table 10.1). Financing it is a greater obstacle to overcome than political will, though when the latter is confirmed, the former should follow more easily. If this pro-ject is to succeed, it will need governmental, private and research sector involvement, and the EU has a key role to play in terms of facilitating and incentivizing its funding resources. So, in other words, the North Sea macro-region could act as a ‘pooling initiative’ across the elements of the region’s triple helix (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010) for a whole host of funding options from the EU level (in various DGs) and for investors. And yet, is there presently a failure or lack of a forum to progress this project? Discussions have been underway for some considerable time (ENTSO-E, 2014; Flynn, 2014), and, while they appear to have halted, it is not at all certain that a macro-region would be able to progress past the negotiations between public and private partners.

Crucially, to date, the development of the North Sea macro-region has been driven primarily by regional and local governments seeking a greater say and influence over what happens in their areas, while the view of colleges, universities and the private sector has been largely silent. Without a full range of sectors and levels of government on board, it is doubtful whether it would be worth pursuing; after all, this area has been the crucible for the development of the triple helix con-cept (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010). Successful coordination requires time

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and resources (see footnote one), and the Commission is recognizing this in its approach to the Council of Ministers for increased support for the human capital involved in developing plans for macro-regions.

Recognizing the opportunities offered by participation in multina-tional cooperation, the Operational Programmes (OPs) for Scotland make explicit mention of these transborder strategies:

Scottish stakeholder contributions to ETC [European Territorial Cooperation] actions around the North Sea and Atlantic Strategy align with the Commission’s agenda on Blue Growth, with particular participatory strengths in marine environment, offshore renewables and coastal tourism. There is considerable scope for more strategic and coordinated efforts between ETC funds that operate within these sea basin territories, building upon strong, mutually benefi-cial relationships, shared priorities and common blue growth goals. (Scottish Government, 2013, p. 24)

These have been embedded into the OPs with the European Social Fund (ESF) to ‘make a contribution to these themes through training and diversification and business development including in coastal and marine communities and sectors’ (Scottish Government, 2014a, p. 61) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) ‘through sup-porting development in marine and off-shore energy and innovation’ (Scottish Government, 2014b, p. 66). Such sentiments, however they may be repeated in other OPs around the region of the North Sea, amount to little without express commitment in these programmes to redline funds for collaborative projects.

Conclusion

This chapter has established the theoretical, social, cultural and eco-nomic rationales for a macro-region which incorporates the nations and regions around the North Sea. It has been argued that such a geographi-cal collaboration and the prospects for its further development are aided by the strong historical links which bind most of the partners together. Further, the shared experiences, policy regimes and commitments to innovation generate an environment that is conducive to joint working and cooperation. In terms of renewable energies, maritime and other natural resources, their commonalities and complementarities argu-ably offer the opportunity to nurture this cradle of innovation more effectively to the mutual advantage of all players. Basing a cooperative


approach in the context of a smart specialization strategy would seem to play to the strengths of this region and to offer positive benefits to the EU as a whole.

However, it has also been demonstrated that there are obstacles to realizing the potential of this macro-regional partnership within the constraint of no specific EU funds being available for delivery and in the context of limited national budgets. The potential for conflicts within a macro-regional partnership has been recognized as a major obstacle to progress (CPMR, 2013b, p. 4; Dubois et al., 2009, p. 39; Schymik and Krumrey, 2009, p. 10). In an environment of such zero-sum games, it is likely that the greatest problems facing the supporters of this initiative will be within their respective nations as non-participating regions cam-paign against change.

Nevertheless, the prolonged gestation of a North Sea macro-region and the success of the established programmes for cooperation together suggest that the synergies promised may give grounds for some opti-mism that the existing partnerships may be formalized as proposed. Against this positive view, however, and despite the expected support for the concept from, for instance, the Scottish government, the initial pro-posals for applying structural funds during the next programme period make limited mention of cross-border cooperation along these lines. The draft UK Partnership Agreement now makes a reference to ‘smart specialization’ and other terms that implicitly recognize the potential for learning across and around the North Sea, but there is insufficient suggestion that synergies, joint projects or other developments might be embedded or incorporated into the OPs for 2014–20. This is in marked contrast with, for example, the enthusiasm in southern Norway for the possibilities offered by closer links and partnerships.

Indeed, in the context of a promised referendum on the UK’s member-ship of the EU, it is more remarkable that the incoming First Minister in Scotland has proposed reflecting the advantages of the Nordic Council with a Council of the (British) Isles. This would confirm the orienta-tion of Scotland along with the rest of the two member states here, not towards the North Sea, but rather towards a different and more narrowly defined macro-region of the current UK and Ireland. This generally leaves the commitment towards macro-regions among all parts of the UK somewhat confused and muted, in contrast with the activities of electric-ity suppliers and fishing interests who appear to accept the opportunities or needs to seek wider dialogues around the North Sea. The discussions on the participation around a proto macro-region along the Atlantic sea-board of Europe (Wise, chapter 11 in this volume) confirm the contested territory of north-western Europe. Whether the public sphere comes to

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promote the North Sea macro-region proposals and then leads the other social partners into this concept may become clearer over the next few months after UK and other elections. Critically, and related to these deliberations, serious doubts would have to be recognized over a North Sea macro-region which did not have the British Isles embedded at its core; a transnational initiative of the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands and perhaps Belgium would not seem to offer a cohe-sive area for development. The key sectors focused and dependent on the sea itself provide the main rationale for a macro-region, and without the proactive commitment of the governments to the west of the region, alternative instruments and fora will be required; if these could be con-sidered as suitable and effective vehicles, then does it undermine the need for a formal macro-region anyway?

Notes

1 For example, according to: Johann Sollgruber, DG Regio, European Commission, opening remarks chairing ‘Territorial cooperation: the concept of macro-regions’ session in European Commission, the Regional Studies Association and the Government Office for Local Self-government and Regional Policy in Slovenia conference ‘What Future for Cohesion Policy? An Academic and Policy Debate’, 16–18 March 2011, Bled, Slovenia.

2 Most stakeholders consider the North Sea–English Channel area to embrace the marine area of the North Sea and the passages to the Baltic Sea (Skagerrak and Kattegat), the Atlantic (English Channel) and the Norwegian Sea, as well as the coastal regions that surround it, involving the EU member states of Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK, together with the non-EU states of Norway and Iceland.

3 Two transnational cooperation (IVB) programmes and seven cross-border (IVA) programmes: Northern Periphery IVB Programme; North Sea IVB Programme; Deux Mers IVA Programme; France – Wallonie–Vlaanderen IVA Programme; Vlaanderen–Nederland IVA Programme; Deutschland–Nederland IVA Programme; Syddanmark–Schleswig–KERN IVA Programme; Sjælland–Ostholstein–Lübeck–Plön IVA Programme; Öresund–Kattegatt–Skagerrak IVA Programme.

4 The Baltic Sea Strategy was requested by the European Council following work by the European Parliament (CEC, 2010d). The Danube Strategy was initially promoted at the EU level by Romania and Austria (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2010). Once on the EU agenda, both strategies under-went public consultations which elicited a very wide and positive response from all sectors and levels of government.

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Introduction

The EU Council’s decisions to create macro-regional development strate-gies for the Baltic Sea, Danube, Adriatic–Ionian and Alpine regions stim-ulated demands for a similar approach in Europe’s Atlantic zone. Indeed, Atlantic activists, such as the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), perceive themselves as pioneers of ‘macro-regional’ strategic thinking within the EU (CPMR, 2014), pointing out that the idea of a European ‘Atlantic Arc’ region stretching from southern Portugal to northern Scotland (Figure 11.1) was conceived way back in the 1980s and has, over some 25 years, engendered numerous transnational projects within the permanent institutional framework of an Atlantic Arc Commission (AAC) and an Atlantic Area established by the EU to coordinate its regional policy in the zone. This demand for an Atlantic macro-regional entity on a par with others in the EU has been strongly supported by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR) and, most significantly, the European Parliament (EP). However, the EU Commission has hitherto resisted such a comprehensive approach for the Atlantic zone, insisting on the need to first assess developments in the initial macro-regions before adopting the same strategy elsewhere. Nevertheless, efforts to encourage an increasingly coordinated approach to developing Europe’s western maritime periphery have never ceased over the last three dec-ades, thus producing a situation where several characteristics of the official macro-regional strategies adopted for the Baltic, Danube and Adriatic–Ionian areas can also be observed in the more limited Atlantic Maritime Sea Basin Strategy adopted for the Atlantic Area. This chap-ter first describes the nature of these recent moves towards a more

11The Atlantic Arc: A Macro-region in the Making?Mark Wise


Figure 11.1 Potential territorial coverage of the Atlantic Arc macro-region


PORTUGAL

IRELAND

FRANCE

PORTUGAL

UKIRELAND

SPAIN

0 400km

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integrated developmental approach within the Atlantic zone, explain-ing how and why they differ from the more formal macro-regional approaches adopted elsewhere. It will then examine the roots of the ‘Atlantic’ idea and the contemporary strengths and weaknesses of the transnational entity it has produced before concluding with a discussion of relevance of the EU’s macro-regional strategy in the modern world in the light of this region-building experience along Europe’s western maritime periphery.

EU macro-regional and sea basin strategies and the Atlantic Area

In June 2010, the EU Council adopted a series of conclusions related to its Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), including one inviting the EU Commission in cooperation with the member states ‘to present an EU strategy for the Atlantic region’ (EU Council, 2010). This request was focused on a specific maritime sea basin dimension rather than the more general macro-regional strategies adopted for the Baltic and the Danube, which also included other policy areas. Recalling its conclu-sions reached on 17 November 2009, the EU Council thus encouraged the ‘further development of the strategic approaches to regional sea basins’ and the need ‘to address common challenges faced by the coun-tries of the (Atlantic) region, including marine research, maritime sur-veillance, environmental and economic challenges’ (EU Council, 2010). Consequently, the responsibility for the development of this strategy in the Atlantic region was given to the EU Commission’s Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) rather than to the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO). Although these two DGs, one focused on developments at sea and the other on those on land, are required to cooperate, this distinction is significant in the complex debates that have taken place in recent years about the precise nature of any European strategy for the Atlantic zone. Despite demands from some Atlantic actors to strengthen the on-land dimension of European efforts to develop their area, the EU Council and Commission have refused to adopt a more comprehensive macro-regional strategy with its stress on promoting economic, social and terri-torial cohesion within regions extending across both land and sea areas. Without dismissing the inevitable land dimension to sea-based activities (e.g. shipping and fishing vessels move in and out of ports with hin-terlands), the priority for Atlantic development focuses on the pursuit of ‘Blue Growth’ within the common framework of the ‘Europe 2020’


Strategy for EU development (EU Commission, 2012, 2014). A further dis-tinction between the EU’s macro-regional and sea basin maritime strate-gies can be detected in the governance structures envisaged to manage them. In general, the structures adopted for the macro-regions are more institutionally integrated and formally endorsed by the EU Council, whereas the sea basin strategy for the Atlantic is being developed within a looser ‘light touch’ cooperative framework (EU INTERACT, 2014).

Notwithstanding, these basic distinctions between comprehensive ‘land–sea’ macro-regional strategies and those of a more restricted maritime nature, their similarities must be noted in order to navigate a clear passage through a conceptual maze of overlapping and loosely defined terminologies. First, both approaches relate to EU member states and non-EU countries located in a broadly contiguous geographical area and seek to promote common transnational actions to deal with what are perceived as common problems straddling national and regional borders. Furthermore, there is a common concern to pursue concrete projects which genuinely add value, benefiting citizens throughout the transnational region in a conceptual framework where borders are seen as open rather than closed. In the pursuit of such objectives, both strategies have to adhere to the EU Council principles that there will be no new EU legislation, institutions or funds to support them. However, both have access to all relevant existing EU funds to finance their development programmes as well as national, regional, private and international sources of finance. Within this common framework, both approaches also stress the need to encourage cooperation among exist-ing institutions, public and private, at all levels in order to coordinate a range of policies and funds across boundaries in pursuit of common goals. This shared aim of integrating diverse actors, activities and fund-ing sources across the region in more coherent ‘action plans’ requires cross-sectorial cooperation as well as widespread consultation with key ‘stakeholders’ within transparent public ‘forums’. Finally, this common aim of pursuing more coordinated and effective transnational actions to produce concrete outcomes must be pursued with the EU’s regulatory framework for European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) for the period 2014–2020 (EU INTERACT, 2014).

With this broad context of similarities and dissimilarities, the EU Council invited the EU Commission and the member states to draw up proposals for an ‘EU strategy for the Atlantic region’ in 2010 (EU Council, 2010). The Commission’s consultation with Atlantic stake-holders during 2010 and a ‘Resolution on a European Strategy for the Atlantic Region’ adopted by the EP in May 2011 revealed a widespread

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desire to ‘shape [. . .] the EU strategy for the Atlantic region as an inte-grated strategy dealing with (both) maritime and territorial issues’ in order to benefit from the ‘the major added value of EU macro-regional strategies’ (EU Parliament, 2011). The Members of the EP (MEPs) had clearly been persuaded by the lobbying of bodies like the AAC within a supportive CPMR. However, the Commission resisted the pressure to incorporate a stronger territorial dimension into the narrower mari-time strategy requested by the EU Council and identified five main areas of Atlantic action focused on the sea by implementing an eco-system approach, contributing to reducing the EU’s carbon footprint, developing sustainable development of the seafloor’s natural resources, responding to maritime threats and emergencies, and generating sus-tainable socially inclusive economic growth and employment. On the basis of these broad aims, six more specific objectives were elaborated underlining the maritime character of this Atlantic strategy by seek-ing to protect the marine environment and biodiversity of the coastal zone, develop the fishing industry, enhance sea-based tourism and recreation, strengthen marine research and innovation, improve ship-ping communications and port facilities, and promote shipbuilding (EU Commission, 2011a).

However, the EU Commission was sensitive to the criticism emanating from the AAC, CPMR, EP and other bodies that the territorial dimension of Atlantic development was being neglected within the more limited sea basin approach demanded by the member states, not least the UK. Thus, in line with an aim common to both EU macro-regional and sea basin strategies, it advocated the coordination of the many diverse strands of various EU and national policies into a coherent action plan for the Atlantic zone in order to maximize the value-added impact of diverse initiatives underpinned by different EU funding instruments. Private enterprises were also to be drawn into such focused endeavours. To help formulate an ‘Action Plan’ for the Atlantic in time for the EU’s 2014–2020 funding period, the Commission created an Atlantic Forum to gather the views of all relevant stakeholders, public and private, in a process of both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ development. Such steps were designed to construct a sea basin strategy producing a more effective use of diverse EU funds, including the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). A more productive use of these various funds was to be achieved through coordinated action among a range of Atlantic partners, including the AAC, the Conference on Atlantic Arc Cities (CAAC), and the Atlantic Transnational Network of Economic and


Social Councils (ATNESC), as well as universities and research centres throughout the area. Thus, although DG MARE was leading the Atlantic Maritime Strategy, it was clearly directed to do so in close cooperation with DG REGIO and other relevant parts of the Commission, including the DG Environment.

Despite these efforts to maximize the scope of this proposed maritime strategy, those who wanted a fully fledged Atlantic macro-region contin-ued to press their case. Thus, the EESC’s Opinion on the Commission’s ‘Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic Ocean Area’ produced in May 2012 regretted its limited maritime dimension and proposed ‘a more ambi-tious approach [. . .] [based on] a macro-regional strategy which, in conjunction with the maritime pillar [. . .] [also] incorporates the ter-ritorial pillar’ in accordance with the developmental models adopted for ‘the Baltic Sea and Danube regions’ (EESC, 2012). The EESC reinforced its stance by arguing that ‘Atlantic cooperation has suffered from the limitations of transnational territorial cooperation in general, the lack of a strategic vision, the absence of coordination between projects and the resulting loss of synergies, and the proliferation of non-operational projects’. The EESC also argued that ‘a macro-regional strategy in the Atlantic’, including ‘the territorial dimension’, was required because ‘the maritime coast needs an active, dynamic hinterland and the syner-gies that allow for consistent development of the region as a whole’. In making these more ambitious macro-regional proposals, the EESC also argued that the EU Council’s insistence on no new EU legislation, institutions or funds for macro-regional strategies should be abandoned to ensure these policies have ‘appropriate legislation, their own funding and the necessary administrative structures’. In presenting its Opinion, the EESC was explicit in pointing out how it had been influenced by the AAC and other Atlantic stakeholders, including the CPMR as a whole, the ATNESC as well as business leaders, trades unions, chambers of com-merce and various city councils throughout the region.

The strong lobbying for an Atlantic macro-regional strategy both within the AAC and its parent body, the CPMR, also bore fruit in the EP Report on the EU ‘Cohesion Policy Strategy for the Atlantic Area’ published in July 2012 which was similarly unambiguous in propos-ing that

the Atlantic strategy should take the form of a macro-regional strat-egy in order to promote synergies among the various instruments and levels of action involved in spatial planning policies [and] . . . allow other actors on the ground (private sector, regional and local public

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authorities, civil society organisations) to be involved in defining and implementing the strategy’s objectives. (EU Parliament, 2012)

To reinforce its belief that a strategy for the Atlantic region should be based on both a maritime and terrestrial dimension, the EP Report rec-ommended its development should be built around two themes, namely:

1. maritime and terrestrial spatial planning and promotion of the land/sea interface and

2. stimulation of the economic fabric of the Atlantic regions through an industrial policy.

Despite these pressures to adopt an Atlantic macro-regional strategy, the EU Commission, acting within the policy constraints laid down by the EU Council, stuck to a more limited maritime sea basin approach in its ‘Action Plan for a Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic Area’ published in May 2013 (EU Commission, 2013). This Plan focused sharply on the ‘blue economy’ with its perceived ‘potential to provide 7 million jobs in Europe by 2020 [. . .] not only in emerging sectors, such as offshore renewable energy, but also through revitalising traditional maritime industries’. This proposed strategy sought to stimulate ‘blue growth’ while at the same time helping to safeguard ‘the environmental and ecological stability of Europe’s largest and most important ecosystem’. Bearing in mind other EU policy aims relevant to this maritime context (such as reducing the EU’s carbon footprint) the priorities of the Atlantic Action Plan were to:

1. promote entrepreneurship and innovation in marine-based indus-tries such as fisheries, shipbuilding and the exploitation of offshore/seafloor resources;

2. protect, secure and enhance the marine and coastal environment;3. improve accessibility and connectivity, especially by facilitating the

development of ports as hubs of the blue economy; and4. create a socially inclusive and sustainable model of regional devel-

opment, especially by diversifying maritime and coastal tourism products.

Not only was this Action Plan to have a clear marine focus, but, in contrast to the macro-regional strategies adopted elsewhere, it was to be adminis-tered by ‘light touch’ governance structures with Commission insisting that ‘any implementation mechanism should be light, tightly-focused


and draw on good practices that have been successful in other sea-basin strategies’ (EU Commission, 2013). Once again the Commission’s approach reflected the EU Council decision that these regional strategies must involve no new EU funds, institutions or legislation. Thus, in June 2013, the EU Council duly endorsed this Action Plan to guide, coordi-nate and stimulate development within a ‘loose’ governance framework where member states, supported by the Commission’s managing role, maintained a firm grip on policy and expenditure. Within this non-obligatory context, national governments were prepared to encourage regional and local authorities, civil society stakeholders and the private sector to seek cooperative synergies in the pursuit of ‘smart, sustain-able and inclusive growth’ using the whole panoply of existing European policies operating over the 2014–2020 EU funding period. Although the EU Council made some concession to the demands for a wider macro-regional approach with a stronger territorial dimension in expressing its desire to see an improvement in ‘the connections between Atlantic coastal regions and their hinterland’, the focus remained firmly on the ‘blue economy’ (EU Council, 2013).

The Council’s resolve to resist the macro-regional ambitions of ema-nating from the Atlantic areas was related to the determination of cer-tain member states to stabilize or even reduce the EU budget while also restraining the Union’s legislative scope. Apart from controlling govern-ment spending, the aim was also to force the EU to focus on doing fewer things more effectively in ways which clearly improved the welfare of its increasingly disenchanted citizens. In particular, a ‘eurosceptical’ Conservative Party within a coalition UK government was determined to control EU expenditure and stop the proliferation of European policy initiatives which, in its view, hindered rather than helped the pursuit of achievable, concrete aims. Although the British government was the most forceful in the drive to prune EU policies in order to do ‘more with less’, it was not alone and enjoyed varying degrees of less vocifer-ous support from other richer states in the EU Council. Similarly, to a greater or lesser extent, all member states were wary of relinquishing more powers of government or governance to local and regional bod-ies, especially those with no democratic mandate like the AAC. Since its creation in 1989, this body had pressed for more devolution of powers to local and regional governments throughout the Atlantic zone as a means of creating a new form of governance which, it argued, would fuel more effective ‘bottom-up’ endogenous development. Thus, the AAC’s comments on the Commission’s 2013 Action Plan not only called for more EU funding to finance the Atlantic Maritime Strategy but also

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expressed its ‘desire to establish real multi-level governance (for) the Atlantic Regions’ and urged the Commission ‘to think more keenly along the lines of transnational cooperation (by) encouraging local and regional authorities take ownership of the Strategy’. It insisted that this was the ‘only’ way to ‘ensure a genuine European added value to this Maritime Strategy’ (AAC, 2013). Unconvinced, the EU Council resisted these calls for new multi-governance structures within which to pur-sue a novel form of regional development, insisting instead that the Atlantic strategy must be coordinated by the Commission in the estab-lished manner under the close scrutiny of member states. They were not opposed in principle to some devolution of central government powers and welcomed the opinions of stakeholders expressed by bodies like the AAC, the CAAC and the Atlantic Forum. Nevertheless, they were deter-mined to maintain a firm national governmental grip on these emerg-ing EU macro-regional and sea basin policies. The UK government may have been the most adamant advocate of this approach, but it faced no great opposition within the EU Council. For example, despite the devolutionary zeal of regional actors in western France expressed within the AAC and elsewhere, the French government readily accepted the UK government’s refusal to accept a macro-regional strategy for the Atlantic Area. Indeed, all of the five Atlantic member states within the Council, particularly those north of Iberia, were prepared to observe how macro-regional policies developed in the Baltic and elsewhere before pressing for a similar strategy in the Atlantic Area (Wise, 2014a).

This failure to establish a macro-regional strategy for the Atlantic Area was a serious disappointment to those activists who have long sought to construct a strong transnational region along Europe’s western periph-ery and their efforts to construct one akin to those established for the Baltic and the Adriatic–Ionian sea areas seem certain to continue. An examination of the forces that have already led to the existing Atlantic regional reality extending from the Iberian islands to the Shetland Isles will help assess whether a more comprehensive EU macro-region is likely to develop in the future.

The Atlantic Arc: from idea to reality

The Atlantic Arc idea

The Atlantic Arc idea is usually attributed to Yves Morvan, a French academic and Breton regional activist. He argued that Europe’s west-ern maritime areas share similar characteristics which should underpin


a transnational organization designed to defend what he perceived to be their common interests within the EU (Morvan, 1989). Along with others, he imagined a Euro-region united by ‘Celtic’ traits, a shared maritime heritage and a common challenge to confront similar socio-economic problems associated with geographical peripherality such as low incomes and investment linked to high unemployment and emigra-tion (EU Commission, 1994a, 1994b: 23–50, 77; AAC, 1999). Although such arguments tend to crumble under critical scrutiny (Wise, 2000a), the Atlantic Arc idea took root due to the determined leadership of regional actors from North West France aided by politicians of national stature with strong influence at the centre of the French state. Let us trace its evolution and identify the arguments used by key actors to translate this idea into concrete Atlantic regional realities.

The origins of this Atlantic movement can be found within a Breton pressure group, the Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison des Interêts Bretons (CELIB). When the European Economic Community (EEC) grew from six to nine members in 1973, the CELIB created the CPMR with a per-manent secretariat in Rennes, the capital of Brittany. Its basic aim was to provide a means of resisting the marginalization of these littoral regions within a growing and increasingly competitive ‘Common Market’. Similarly, in 1989, when the EU was facing much greater enlargement towards Eastern Europe in an ever more competitive ‘Single Market’, the CPMR decentralized itself into three distinct bodies, including the AAC alongside equivalent bodies for the Baltic Sea and North Sea. Once again, the aim was to produce clearer collective voices to defend the interests of these maritime peripheral regions (CPMR, 1993). Designed to ‘set a strategy for action’ and lobby EU and national institutions in pursuit of Atlantic interests, the AAC has endured and, as we have seen above, continues to press for an Atlantic EU macro-regional strategy (AAC, 1995a, 2) The fact that these major organizational initiatives were taken at times of EU enlargement and economic liberalization reveals a major motive behind Atlantic transnational regionalism; namely, the fear that these peripheral maritime areas would struggle to cope with increasing international competition for investment, employment and government funding within an expanding EU which was dismantling its internal national economic barriers as well as opening up to global trade. Such anxieties are deeply embedded in Brittany, a region long notable for its political activism in fighting peripheralization within France, a country which has a deep tradition of suspicion of liberal economic globalization (Forrester, 1996; Jacquemin and Pench, 1997). Thus, the creation of the AAC was seen as a means for western France

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to continue lobbying effectively for EU structural funds in partnership with regions in other Atlantic countries as well as a way to foster cross-border cooperation to cope with a more competitive world order (Faro Resolution, 1989). In the pursuit of these aims, French regional activists were much assisted by support from powerful politicians of national stature in France. The first President of the AAC was Olivier Guichard, an eminent former French government minister with strong political roots in the historic Breton city of Nantes and the Pays de la Loire Region of North West France, where he was President of the Regional Council between 1974 and 1998 (Guichard, 1992). His successor at the head of the AAC was Jean-Pierre Raffarin, then President of the Poitou-Charentes Regional Council, but later Prime Minister of France from 2002 to 2005 (AAC, 1998a). This strong link between national and regional govern-ment in France helps explain why the Arc idea rapidly produced Atlantic transnational realities and is one reason why the AAC perceives itself as a pioneer in the development the EU transnational regionalism first envisaged in the ‘Europe 2000’ Report (EU Commission, 1991, 1994a). Significantly, the first EU Council meeting on the subject of such regions envisaged on a macro-scale was held in Nantes in 1989 shortly after the creation of the AAC.

From Arc idea to Atlantic realities 1989–2014

Following 1989, the AAC quickly attracted members from more than 30 local and regional governments stretching from Iberia to the Shetland Islands (Figure 11.2). Upon this broad geographical base, it established itself as a successful lobby supported by a multinational ‘Atlantic group’ of MEPs and a permanent presence in Brussels working to ensure a continuous flow of EU funds into the Arc regions during the 1990s and into the 2000s (EU Parliament, 1992; AAC, 1998a: 11–12). This financial success was in part due to the AAC’s pressure to win a change in ERDF regulations to permit funding of projects straddling marine as well as land boundaries; this was of crucial importance for a transnational region fragmented by sea areas (EU Commission, 1996). Another significant achievement of the AAC was the creation of two successive action programmes – ATLANTIS I (1993–1995) and ATLANTIS II (1996–1999). They aimed to attract funding from EU and other sources by formulating a coherent Atlantic ‘Business Plan’ focused on six spe-cific policy ‘themes’ (AAC, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d). The transport theme aimed to reduce the geographical isolation of the Atlantic zone by improving east–west communications to the political–economic core area of the EU, forging north–south travel links along the fragmented


Arc and developing its ports as ‘Gateways to Europe’. An environment theme dealt with such things as cross-border marine pollution, the pro-tection of coastal zones and the preservation of traditional landscapes, while the tourism theme promoted an ‘Atlantic Tourism product’ (AAC, 1992, 20). The research and transfer of technology theme sought to cre-ate cross-border synergies among relevant bodies in order to increase the generally low level of such activity on the Atlantic periphery (AAC, 1992, 21; EU Commission, 1994a, 101), while the companies develop-ment theme aimed to stimulate endogenous development by encour-aging cross-border trade and public–private partnerships to strengthen the region’s capacity to invest in regional industries (AAC, 1998a, 12). Finally, the fisheries and fish farming theme set up a ‘Fisheries Working Group’ to tackle the sensitive problems which brought those in the fish-ing industry into sharp conflict (over fishing rights) as well as coopera-tion (over fisheries trade) along this maritime zone (AAC, 1995b, 33). In one form or another, these themes of the initial ATLANTIS action

Figure 11.2 Atlantic Arc Commission members (1995 and 2014)

Andalucía

Alentjo

Algarve Algarve

Centro

Norte

Aquitaine

Poitou Charentes

Bretagne

WelshGovernment

Border,Midlands

& Western

Argyll and Bute

2014

South of Scotland

Andalucía

AlentjoLisboae Vale

do Tejo

Centro

Norte

Galicia Galicia

Castilla y LeónNavarra

Aquitaine

Poitou CharentesPays de la Loire

Basse-Normandie

Centre

Haute-Normandie

Bretagne

Wales

Northwest Scotland

1995

Southwest Scotland

Northwest England

Southwest England

Pays de la Loire

Basse-Normandie

Lisboae Vale

do Tejo

U K

S PA I N S PA I N

F R A N C E F R A N C E

U K

PO

RT

UG

AL

PO

RT

UG

AL

IRELAND

IRELAND

AsturiasAsturiasCantabria

VascoAsturias

Cantabria

Vasco

0 300km

N

0 300km

N

Atlantic Arc Commission Members

Mark Wise 255

plans have remained as consistent elements structuring subsequent EU development strategies for the Atlantic region, thus supporting the claims of leaders within the AAC to be leading players in the evolution of ‘macro-regional’ thinking within the EU. Similarly, their advocacy over many years of ‘bottom-up’ endogenous development strategies based on ‘a new model of development without waiting for any miracle from outside’ is referred to as further evidence of their vanguard role in this EU policy sphere (AAC, 1996).

From Atlantic Arc to Atlantic Area

Despite its ambitions, the AAC’s grip on Arc activities weakened during the 1990s as national governments reasserted their ‘top-down’ control of EU spending at the expense of more direct funding procedures between the European Commission and ‘bottom-up’ non-governmental bod-ies (Wise, 2000b). The AAC was thus obliged to pursue its ATLANTIS II programme within a much wider ‘Atlantic Area’ arena (Figure 11.3) crudely drawn by the member states to include over 76 million people often living in areas far from the Atlantic. National governments simply wanted crude spatial blocs within which they could allocate European funding under their close scrutiny as democratically elected bodies. Consequently, in 1997, a new set of cross-border projects, including those from ATLANTIS II, were funded within this larger ‘Operational Programme for the Atlantic Area’ managed by the central EU institu-tions and the member states (AAC, 1997, 1998b, 8). This vast ill-defined and centrally controlled Atlantic Area persisted as the spatial framework for the subsequent 2000–2006 Operational Programme funded by cross-border projects based on INTERREG IIIB. However, despite its amor-phous character, the rationale for this Area was still based on familiar Arc arguments about ‘handicaps of a peripheral location’, ‘weak’ levels of economic development, ‘common cultural and historical elements’ and so on (EU Commission, 2000a). Furthermore, the aims of the 2000–2006 programme continued to mirror those made by the origi-nal Atlantic Arc actors in the ATLANTIS programmes. This continuity of approach from Arc to Area programmes further entrenched the con-cept of an Atlantic region, as did the €119 million of EU funding that flowed into it over 2000–2006, a marked increase on the 4 million and 6 million Environmental Currency Unit (ECU) allocated to ATLANTIS I and ATLANTIS II, respectively (EU Commission, 2000b).

The roots of this transnational region were deepened by a renewed Operational Programme for the Atlantic Area within of the strategy for European Territorial Cooperation during the period 2007–2013


(EU Commission, 2011b). Moreover, the Area was now more sharply defined as a smaller, more genuinely Atlantic zone (Figure 11.3). Its area was reduced by about one-third as was its population, which fell to some 56 million. However, with a budget of €159 million similar to the one for the preceding Programme, this stricter geographical delimitation of the region meant that more funding was available for a smaller more authentically ‘Atlantic’ area.

This fourth programme in the Atlantic Arc/Area story – following on from the original INTERREG Community Initiatives in the period 1990–1993 and the INTERREG II and III programmes from 1994–1999 to 2000–2006 – also continued to develop familiar aims, namely to:

1. promote transnational entrepreneurial and innovation networks;2. protect, secure and enhance the marine and coastal environment

sustainably;3. improve accessibility and internal links by promoting sea, road, rail

and air intermodality; and

Figure 11.3 Regions of the Atlantic Area (1997–2006 and 2007–2013)

2007–20131997–2006

st EnSouthwes ddgo nglanandh

FR

AN

C

do Tejo

Asturias uitaine

west Scotland

S PA I N

Algarve

Castillala Mancha

Madrid

La Rioja

Extremadura

AlentjoLisboae Vale

do Tejo

Centro

Norte

Galicia

AsturiasCantabria

Castilla y LeónNavarra

Vasco Aquitaine

Limousin

Pays de la Loire

Poitou Charentes

Basse-Normandie

Centre

Bretagne

Wales

Northwest Scotland

Southwest Scotland

Northwest England

West Midlands

Southwest England

S PA I N

U K

PO

RTU

GA

L

FR

AN

CE

IRELAND

AlgarveAndalucíaAndalucía

AlentjoLisboae Vale

do Tejo

Centro

Norte

Galicia

AsturiasCantabria

Navarra

Vasco Aquitaine

Pays de la Loire

PoitouCharentes

Bretagne

Wales

Northwest Scotland

Southwest Scotland

Northwest England

Southwest England

S PA I N

U K

PO

RT

UG

AL

FR

AN

CE

IRELAND

Basse-Normandie

Haute-Normandie

0 300km

N

Regions of the Atlantic Area

0 300km

N

Mark Wise 257

4. promote transnational synergies in sustainable urban, rural and regional development.

These priorities were interwoven into the habitual Atlantic themes of enhancing the ‘maritime economy’, conserving the coastal environ-ment, developing marine energy and promoting the ‘Atlantic cultural heritage’. However, a new emphasis on ‘tangible results’ in developing a ‘knowledge economy’ based on ‘concrete achievements’ revealed a deter-mination to move beyond the prospective ‘studies’ and ‘exchanges of information’ typifying earlier projects. The member states now insisted on the need to get ‘value for money’ from the cooperative networks already established. This also led to a stress on a long-term and ‘cohe-sive’ strategic approach to development with progress being obligatorily monitored by the EU Commission at specified intervals. Such scrutiny was facilitated by the fact that national governments within the EU Council operating with the supervisory support of the Commission now dominated such transregional developments with bodies like the AAC being relegated to an essentially lobbying and consultative role. Consequently, the function of ‘Managing Authority’ for the Atlantic Area programme was delegated to an official government institu-tion within a member state, namely the Norte region of Portugal (EU Commission, 2007). Under its overall management, each member state had its own official coordinating body; thus, within the UK, the Welsh European Funding Office played this role, although overriding respon-sibility remained in the hands of the UK central government in London through its Department of Communities and Local Government.

The Atlantic regional concept continues to be embedded in the Transnational Programme for the Atlantic Area drawn up for the period 2014–2020 within the broader context of the Europe 2020 Strategy (EU Commission, 2010) and the EU Council’s endorsement in June 2013 of the EU Commission’s Action Plan for a Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic Area (see above) aimed at promoting a distinctive ‘blue econ-omy’ based upon maritime projects already supported in the Atlantic Area programme. It gave the usual ‘Atlantic’ priorities a specific mari-time character by stressing protection of the coastal environment while developing resources both above and below the seafloor in sustainable ways designed to reduce Europe’s ‘carbon footprint’. However, despite this dense web of multiple institutions and overlapping EU policies that have increasingly bound together the areas of the Atlantic rim over the last 25 years, the EU Council and Commission continue to resist the pressures from other EU institutions and elsewhere to develop a fully fledged macro-regional strategy for the Atlantic Arc area.


The Atlantic Arc: macro-regional reality or mirage?

Further light can be shed on this ongoing debate about a possible Atlantic macro-regional strategy by critically scrutinizing the idea that a coherent transnational entity genuinely exists the length of Europe’s western maritime margin. Architects of the Arc concept tended to ignore characteristics dividing the Atlantic areas when constructing their trans-national regional vision (Wise, 2000a). However, these divisions cannot obscure the fact that since the AAC was formed in 1989, a succession of five ever stronger ‘Atlantic’ programmes – from the original ATLANTIS I to the latest Atlantic Area Operational Programme – have stimulated a ferment of activity within multiple cross-border networks linking diverse organizations, both public and private, throughout the Atlantic zone and produced to a variety of substantial outcomes.

Nevertheless, despite the clear successes achieved in this process of transnational regional construction, questions remain about the long-term durability of this Atlantic entity. Is attachment to the ‘Atlantic idea’ stronger in some regions than others? Is it essentially an artifi-cial device to manage the macro-allocation of EU funds among member states which will be abandoned if these financial resources disappear? Is the unity of this would-be macro-region threatened by a political asym-metry where the national, regional and local authority powers enjoyed by bodies operating together within it vary enormously? In a globalized world of fluid, fast-changing spatial patterns of communication and ‘smart’ production, how useful is a macro-regional approach based on the somewhat ‘static’ and ‘bordered’ regional geographies envisaged by Roger Brunet in his reports for the DATAR, the powerful regional plan-ning agency at the centre of the French state (Brunet, 1989).

Brunet and other French geographers in the RECLUS group divided Europe into large transnational regions surrounding a political– economic ‘spinal’ axis zone extending from south-eastern England, through the Low Countries and down the Rhine-Ruhr axis into Northern Italy. This European ‘core’ region lay at the heart of maps which had a significant impact on the thinking of policymakers within both France and the EU. For example, Brunet’s ‘macro-regional’ thinking extended from French into wider European political circles and clearly influenced the defini-tion of the bold ‘Euro-regions’ defined by the EU Commission in its ‘Europe 2000’ Report (EU Commission, 1991; Wise, 2000a). However, critics find these vast diverse transnational spaces with their fixed boundaries excessively crude and ill-adapted to the spatial complexities of the modern world. Let us examine some of the reasons why this is

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so in the Atlantic area in order to help an assessment of whether an EU macro-region is likely to emerge and persist on Europe’s western mari-time periphery.

Geographical variations in commitment to the Atlantic Arc/Area

A rather informative measure of attachment to this regional concept has been obtained by analysing the varying participation rates of differ-ent areas in successive Atlantic programmes that have been undertaken (Wise, 2000a). Analysis of the ATLANTIS II projects incorporated into the 1995–1999 Atlantic Area programme revealed that north-western France, birthplace of the Arc concept, was the most committed region with ‘Celtic’ Ireland, Wales, Highland Scotland and other parts of the northern UK trailing far behind (Tables 11.1 and 11.2). In support of this French core area, South West England, Atlantic Spain, Portugal and South West France were also very active, often assuming the leadership role. It was also clear that the more genuinely Atlantic parts of these regions – Brittany, Galicia and the ‘Far South West’ of England – were the most engaged, while the involvement of inland areas like Castilla y Léon and the Centre region in France was almost non-existent.

These spatial variations revealed the fragile foundations of this Atlantic construction. The activism of North West France and South West England sprang from a common concern that they risked losing access to EU funding streams diverted to the poorer eastern and south-ern regions of an enlarging EU. They shared an interest in supporting a

Table 11.1 State participation in Atlantic Area programmes: 1995–1999 and 2000–2006 (total number of projects in which countries participated, with number of times as project leader number shown in brackets)

1995–1999 2000–2006

France 80 (21) Spain 232 (33)United Kingdom 61 (6) France 202 (25)Spain 45 (5) Portugal 147 (11)Portugal 33 (2) United Kingdom 94 (17)Ireland 7 (0) Ireland 58 (4)

Total projects 226 Total projects 733

Source: AAC (1995c) and Wise (2000a, 2014b).


transnational body like the AAC able to lobby for the Atlantic periph-ery and facilitate the construction of projects eligible for EU funds. French and English actors in both regions operate in essentially cen-tralized states and habitually seek ways to defend their local interests and increase their influence vis-à-vis central government. Weak local authorities like Devon County Council in South West England seized an opportunity to promote themselves and bid for EU funding via a larger regional body. The high participation of the more powerful Spanish regions in ATLANTIS II may be explained more by a determination of their autonomous governments of the Basque Country and Galicia to assert the competences devolved to them by Spain’s central government.

The varying degrees of engagement in the 1995–1999 Atlantic Area programme also revealed an Arc based more on contemporary ‘Latin’ linguistic affinities than historical ‘Celtic’ cultural foundations. With the notable exception of South West England, there was little enthu-siasm for this transnational organization in the British Isles. Always a major net beneficiary of EU funding, the Irish Republic could defend its regions through its independent national voice in the EU Council and saw little advantage in supporting a weak transnational body dominated by actors from western France. Ireland’s power in EU regional policy-making was exemplified when it obtained EU funds as a member of the Operational Programmes for both the Atlantic Area and the North West

Table 11.2 Regional participation in Atlantic Area programmes: 1995–1999 and 2000–2006 (total number of projects in which regions participated, with number of times as project leader number shown in brackets)

1995–1999 2000–2006

N.W. France 48 (13) N.W. Spain 99 (22)S.W. England 41 (6) Portugal 94 (11)N.W. Spain 39 (5) N.W. France 69 (12)Portugal 33 (2) Rest of Spain 40 (0)S.W. France 32 (8) S.W. France 39 (15)Wales 12 (0) Ireland 23 (4)Ireland 7 (0) Wales 22 (5)N.W. England 4 (0) S.W. England 20 (6)W. Scotland 4 (0) N.W. England 12 (3)Rest of Spain 6 (0) W. Scotland 8 (0)

Source: AAC (1995c) and Wise (2000a, 2014b).

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Metropolitan Area, including the UK, France, the Benelux countries and Germany (EU Commission, 1999). Northern Ireland had no need of an additional ‘Atlantic voice’ to attract funds given its status as a ‘special-case’ province benefiting from numerous forms of British, Irish and EU aid; hence its absence from Atlantic Arc ventures. The lack of enthusi-asm in Wales and Scotland for the AAC may be understood by reference to the special status they enjoy within the UK, where specific Scottish and Welsh ministers sat in central government supported by separate Scottish and Welsh Offices as well as Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies. The devolution of powers to a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999 was another step in the growing political autonomy of both countries. Unlike the feeble local governments of South West England, they felt little need for an additional ‘Atlantic voice’ orches-trated from France.

This geographical divide between a southern, linguistically ‘Latin’ part of the Arc attracted to joint Atlantic action and a more scepti-cal northern English-speaking flank also emerges from an analysis of participation in projects supported by the Operational Programme for the Atlantic Area 2000–2006 (Wise, 2014b; see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). This reveals a significant increase in the activity of the Iberian regions with genuinely Atlantic regions like Galicia and Norte being especially dynamic. The southward spread of attachment to the Arc idea can also be observed in the increased participation of Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes in France. In contrast, the response of local and regional bod-ies in the British Isles remained muted and their participation declined in relative terms. South West England maintained a more modest but still active position, while Wales increased its activities. The involve-ment of Ireland, both north and south, also grew but remained limited, albeit outstripping the lukewarm responses from north-west England and Scotland. The stronger attachment of French and Iberian actors to this Atlantic vision is also highlighted by the membership pattern of the CAAC. Only ‘Celtic’ Cardiff and Cork represent the British Isles while 21 cities are located south of the Channel. Similarly, the evolving pattern of AAC membership illustrates the fissure between the northern and southern flanks of the Arc. In 1995, the AAC claimed partners from most Atlantic regions, but membership has progressively withered north of the Channel, especially in Scotland and South West England (Figure 11.2). The causes of this decline are now examined in order to gain some indi-cation of whether the macro-regional concept is likely to develop in the Atlantic area and continue to flourish elsewhere in Europe.


Growth in Euroscepticism and economic austerity

During the 2000s, a generalized hostility towards EU policies grew in Britain, leading to demands for radical reform of, or withdrawal from, the Union. This ‘Euroscepticism’ was most evident in the increasing sup-port for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which advo-cated withdrawal from the EU, but the British Conservative Party, fearful of losing electoral support, also became increasingly ‘Eurosceptic’. In the 2009 local council elections in England, a Conservative Party highly crit-ical of the EU scored major victories across the country, while UKIP won some 25% of the vote in the 2013 English local elections. In the 2010 UK national election, the Conservatives secured the largest number of votes and duly became the dominant partner in a UK coalition government. Although its minority partner – the Liberal Democrat Party – retains its long-term commitment to EU membership, it agreed to major cuts in government spending in order to reduce the huge UK national debt caused by the global banking crisis triggered off in 2008. Thus, a pre-vailing British political national context was created which supported reductions in public spending, eradication of ‘excessive bureaucracy’ and ‘simplification’ of government at all levels.

Consequently, British local governments were obliged to diminish spending, subject their activities to rigorous cost–benefit analyses and remove what were perceived to be ‘excessive’ institutional structures. These developments reduced UK participation in transnational Atlantic regionalism. Local governments in South West England, dominated by Eurosceptic councillors since 2009, have withdrawn from the AAC (Figure 11.2) as well as the Assembly of European Regions (AER), arguing that these organizations did little to help their area, duplicated activities that were carried out more effectively by other bodies and promoted excessive ambitions not matched by concrete outputs (Wise, 2013). Driven by sim-ilar motives of cost cutting, reinforcing central governmental control of expenditure and simplification of governance, the UK government also abolished the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), including the one for South West England. This means that EU funds for the English regions are no longer managed through these decentralized bodies but are now administered through separate central government ministries: thus, the ERDF is managed by Department of Communities and Local Government, the ESF by the Department of Work and Pensions and EU funding for rural policy, and farming and fisheries by the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).

However, it is important to note that withdrawal from some trans-national bodies does not imply rejection of all such structures. Thus,

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although local governments in South West England and North West Scotland no longer belong to the AAC, they remain members of the larger CPMR that includes some 160 maritime regions containing nearly 200 million people in 28 European countries. In a process of govern-mental rationalization, they decided that the CPMR alone provides an adequate and wider transnational framework within which to pursue their EU Atlantic policy interests without additional layers of costly and complicated transnational governance. This conviction that ‘less government is better government’ also permeates arguments that spe-cific local interests are not always best pursued by cooperation with neighbours in larger organizations composed of regions with competing interests. For example, Cornwall County Council, representing one of the poorest parts of the EU, remains aware that it succeeded in obtain-ing very substantial EU Objective 1 and Convergence funding by acting independently. Cooperation with its richer neighbours in the whole of South West England would have diluted its ‘disadvantaged’ status within a larger richer entity. This inclination to ‘act alone’ also led to the aboli-tion of the South West UK Brussels Office that had been jointly created and financed by local governments in the region to act as an EU regional information and lobbying agency. Cornwall Council then set up its own specific representation in Brussels ‘free’ of other local councils with an independent EU officer working on its behalf. The contract to represent Cornwall was won by the CPMR in a way which indicates that the aims of simplifying policy networks, avoiding organizational duplication and reducing governmental costs does not imply a retreat into regional isolation (Wise, 2013). This belief that local and regional governments can pursue their specific interests more effectively by remaining free to adapt to changing circumstances in a ‘smart’ and ‘flexible’ way can also be detected in suggestions that any would-be Atlantic macro-region would be politically too asymmetrical with the inclusion of institutions as unequal as:

1. the Irish Republic and Portugal (independent member states of the EU);2. the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly (autonomous regions

within the UK);3. the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country, Galicia,

Cantabria and Asturias (autonomous nations and regions in Spain);4. the Regional Councils of Brittany, Pays de la Loire, Poitou-Charentes

and Aquitaine (significant regional powers in centralized France); and

5. County Councils like Devon and Cornwall (very limited local powers in UK).


Cooperation across flexible transnational spaces rather than within bordered macro-regions

Although local leaders in South West England and North West Scotland decline to join spatially ‘contained’ Atlantic organizations like the AAC and the CAAC, they continue to cooperate in cross-border projects across Europe and elsewhere (Wise, 2013). In a dynamic global econ-omy, they envisage more flexible ‘variable-geometry’ strategies based on multidirectional networks operating at a multitude of scales. For example, diverse regional actors from the ‘Far South West’ of England cooperate with various bodies in Brittany in the ‘Marine Energy in Far Peripheral and Island Communities’ project devoted to development of marine renewable energy (MERiFIC, 2011–13; see Table 11.3). Similarly, although Devon County Council is no longer a member of the AAC, it cooperates with other English local authorities and French regions in the spatially fragmented Channel Arc Manche transnational region (Channel Arc Manche, 2014). The members of its Assembly explicitly placed themselves within the larger context of EU macro-regionalism in stating their aim to ‘to promote the Channel area as a specific and a coherent entity for territorial co-operation at European Union level and to gain recognition from the European Institutions’ in order to intervene ‘at a political and institutional level, in the context of the preparation and implementation of European regional policy’. This organization’s supple geographical structure was illustrated by the fact that Cornwall and Dorset decided not to join this body. The Highland Council, no

Table 11.3 Members of MERiFIC (Marine Energy in Far Peripheral and Island Communities)

North West France (Brittany)Bretagne Développement InnovationConseil General du FinistèreParc Naturel Marin d’IroisePôle MerTechnopôle Brest-IroiseIFREMERSouth West EnglandCornwall CouncilCornwall Marine NetworkUniversity of ExeterUniversity of Plymouth

Source: MERiFIC (2011–13).

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longer a member of the AAC, adopts a similar open approach by cooper-ating across borders in all directions on European development projects without reference to preconceived delimited regions like the Atlantic Arc/Area. Adopting this flexible ‘variable geometry’ approach free from fixed containing borders, it cooperates westwards with its Irish Atlantic neighbours on EU funded projects and envisages future cross-border projects eastwards into the North Sea area while stretching over the European landmass to work with the EUROMONTANA association which brings together mountain regions from 14 countries both within and beyond the EU (Euromontana, 2014).

Conclusions

Since 1989, the Atlantic Arc idea has generated numerous cross-border organizations, networks and EU initiatives, weaving a mesh of interlinked projects based on both public and private enterprise along the entire length of Europe’s western periphery. Thus, a transnational regional reality has been constructed which already has many of the character-istics of an officially defined EU macro-region. Such facts form the basis of current demands for an EU macro-regional strategy for the Atlantic akin to those adopted for the Baltic Sea and elsewhere. However, the EU Council and Commission have resisted these pressures and adopted a policy of ‘wait and see’ whether or not the existing macro-regions are successful before taking any action to enlarge the scope of its Atlantic strategy beyond the more limited maritime confines of the one presently adopted. Such scepticism may be justified in that the Atlantic edifice constructed over the last 25 years could disintegrate if the relation-ships upon which it is based prove to be unsustainable as circumstances change. In particular, if EU funding for transnational projects dimin-ishes and national economic austerity programmes across the continent continue to require both reductions in government spending and a sim-plification of regional governance structures, the challenges to architects of a would-be Atlantic macro-region may prove to be insurmountable.

Furthermore, the concept of large macro-regions operating within defined borders may be increasingly undermined in a world open to multidirectional spatial interactions operating at a varying of scales from local to global within a multitude of flexible geographical con-figurations both contiguous and fragmented depending upon the pre-cise nature of the problems or aims in question. Others may conclude that spatially fixed macro-regions are ill-adapted to a fast-changing modern world where new technologies rapidly change perceptions of how local, national and international spaces should be used. They may


also become increasingly worried that too many overlapping regional structures produce duplication, cumbersome governance and excessive costs. If so, the attraction of ‘variable geometry’ systems that wax and wane and change geographical shape in order to adapt to fluctuating socio-economic conditions may grow at the expense of more static macro-regional concepts.

Faced with these somewhat contradictory trends, it remains to be seen whether the drive to create a European macro-region along Europe’s Atlantic Arc will continue into the future. The Atlantic Arc/Area expe-rience over the last 25 years and the fact that the EU has already offi-cially established four macro-regions suggest that such transnational regional ideas and realities are now firmly embedded in European soci-ety and seem likely to strengthen and spread. But if they are to do so, the Atlantic example indicates that they must remain highly flexible in character with open ‘soft’ borders which facilitate rather than hinder multiple linkages to other areas.

References

AAC (1992) Prospective Study for the Atlantic Regions, AA Chronicle, No. 6, September 1992, Atlantic Arc Commission, Nantes.

AAC (1995a) Draft of Business Plan for the Atlantic Arc Commission 1995–1999, Secrétariat de la Commission Arc Atlantique, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1995b) Business Plan for the Atlantic Arc Commission 1995–1999, Secrétariat de la Commission Arc Atlantique, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1995c) ATLANTIS II: Programme Proposal, Secrétariat de la Commission Arc Atlantique, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1995d) Résultats de l’Action-Pilote ATLANTIS I, Secrétariat de la Commission Arc Atlantique, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1996) For a Programme of Atlantic Cooperation within the Framework of the INTERREG II C Initiative, Secrétariat de la Commission Arc Atlantique, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1997) Plenary Meeting of the Atlantic Arc Commission, 9–11 October 1997, Atlantic Arc Commission, La Rochelle, France.

AAC (1998a) Bilan de la Commission Arc Atlantique 1989–98, Report presented at the plenary session of the AAC in Lisbon, June 1998, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1998b) Projet du Compte-Rendu de la Réunion du Bureau de la Commission Arc Atlantique, 22 November 1998, Brussels, Atlantic Arc Commission – CPMR, Rennes.

AAC (1999) Pour un Espace Atlantique Interreg IIIB. Note du Secrétariat Technique de la Commission Arc Atlantique – juillet 1999, Atlantic Arc Commission.

AAC (2013) Position of the Regions of the CPMR Atlantic Arc Commission on the Implementation of the Atlantic Strategy, Atlantic Arc Commission, 25 September 2013, Rennes, France.

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269

Note: Bold entries refer to figures or tables.

Index

accountabilityhorizontal, 92legitimacy, 91

Adriatic-Ionian Council (AIC), 174Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII), 26, 29,

173, 175, 181European Union Strategy for

the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 40

Adriatic-Ionian region, see European Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR)

agglomeration economies, 219–20Alliance in the Alps, 192, 197Alpen-Adria, 193Alpine Convention, 10, 203, 209

activities under, 192as driver of Alpine macro-

regionalization, 191–3origins of, 191–2territorial scope of, 202

Alpine populism, 203–6Alpine region, see European Union

Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP)

Alpine Space Programme, 64, 66as driver of Alpine macro-

regionalization, 195–6territorial scope of, 202

Alpine Town of the Year Association, 197

Ancona Declaration, 174Arco Latino, 183Assembly of European Regions

(AER), 78Association of Elected Representatives

from Mountain Regions (AEM), 195, 196

Association of the Alpine States (Arge Alp), 78, 193, 194, 195

Atlantic Arc Commission (AAC), 243, 247, 250–1

achievements of, 253advocacy of bottom-up approaches,

255ATLANTIS action plans, 253–5establishment of, 252French regional leadership, 252–3members, 253, 254, 261

Atlantic Arc macro-regionAtlantic Area, 255–7French regional leadership, 252–3geographical variations in

commitment to, 259–61(in)coherence of region, 258origins of idea, 243, 251–2: motives

for, 252potential territorial coverage of, 244regional participation in

programmes, 260; state participation in programmes, 259

resistance to macro-regional strategy, 243, 250–1, 257, 265

undermining of concept, 265–6unequal powers of institutions, 263

Atlantic Area, 255–7development of long-term

approach, 257domination by national

governments, 257geographical delimitation of, 256management by Norte region of

Portugal, 257Operational Programme for, 255programme aims, 256–7rationale for, 255regional participation in

programmes, 260regions of, 256state participation in programmes,

259

270 Index

Atlantic Forum, 247Atlantic Maritime Sea Basin Strategy,

243, 245, 257Action Plan, 249–50Atlantic Forum, 247coordination among partners, 247–8distinction from macro-regional

strategy, 245–6ecosystem approach, 247loose governance framework,

249–50neglect of territorial dimension, 247objectives of, 249pressure for macro-regional

approach, 248–9resistance to macro regional

approach, 250–1responsibility for development of,

245similarities with macro-regional

strategy, 246Atlantic Transnational Network of

Economic and Social Councils (ATNESC), 247–8

Austria, 156–7

Bailes, Alyson, 32–3Baltic Cooperation (BC), 29

post-accession role, 35Baltic Deal, 129Baltic Development Forum (BDF), 88Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA), 33, 34Baltic Metropoles Network, 133Baltic Sea region, see European Union

Strategy for the Baltic Sea RegionBaltic Sea Region Innovation Network

(BSR INNONET), 86Baltic Sea Region Programme

(2014–20), 58, 60–1Baltic Sea States Subregional

Cooperation (BSSSC), 133, 225Baltic Sea States Summit, 85–6Barents Euro-Arctic Council

(BEAC), 29, 37Barroso, José Manuel, 126, 163Benelux Economic Union (BEU),

27–8, 29Berkkan, Clara, 76, 90Bertelsmann Foundation, 158

Bizzotto, Mara, 205Black Sea Economic Cooperation

(BSEC), 29, 37Blatter, Joachim, 208Bolgherini, Silvia, 194Bosnia and Herzegovina, 171Bossi, Umberto, 205Brandenburg, German state of, 134Braun, Gábor, 225, 229Browning, Christopher S., 182Brunet, Roger, 258Bulgaria, 158

Calderoli, Roberto, 205Caramani, Daniele, 203–4, 206Carpathian Convention, 150, 153, 165nCentral European Free Trade

Agreement (CEFTA), 29, 31, 33, 35

Central European Initiative (CEI), 25, 29, 36, 38, 109

Action Plan (2014–16), 26European Union Strategy for the

Danube Region, 40, 41Centrope, 150, 153, 165nChannel Arc Manche transnational

region, 264Christiansen, Thomas, 19nClark, Julian, 103Club Arc Alpin, 196, 197Cohesion Policy (EU), 52–3

Baltic Sea Region Programme (2014–20), 58, 60–1

budget, 59–60Common Strategic Framework, 55interregional cooperation, 52, 53Lisbon Treaty, 8, 108, 216macro-regional strategies, 53–4,

67–8, 179, 181, 215: definition of, 47; differences between, 52; flexibility, 63; funding, 59–60; initiation of, 64–5; policy coordination and coherence, 60–2; strategic and thematic links, 54–9

National Partnership Agreements, 55, 58

Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme, 61

Index 271

Cohesion Policy (EU) – continuedorigins of, 52scope of, 52territorial cohesion, 49territorial cooperation, 49–50, 52–3

Coletti, Raffaela, 172Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison des Interêts

Bretons (CELIB), 252comitology structure of EU, 107Committee of the Regions (CoR), 11,

14, 176, 243proposed North Sea Strategy, 215,

229–30, 232–3White Paper on Multi-Level

Governance, 88–9Committee on Spatial Development

(CSD), 107Common Strategic Framework

(CSF), 55Common Weal, 226Communauté de Travail des Alpes

Occidentale (COTRAO), 78, 193Community Assistance for

Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS), 173

Community-led Local Development (CLLD), 49

Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), 78, 183, 215, 228, 230, 232, 243, 252, 263

Conference on Atlantic Arc Cities (CAAC), 247, 261

Conservative Party (UK), 262constructivism, and macro-

regionalization, 82–3, 84–5Cota, Roberto, 205–6Cottey, Andrew, 31, 34Council of European Municipalities

and Regions (CEMR), 78Council of the Baltic Sea States

(CBSS), 10, 25, 26, 29, 37, 85, 112, 130, 225

European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 40, 41, 131–2

revitalization of, 86South Eastern Baltic Area, 131, 137

Council of the Danube Cities and Regions, 165n

Croatia, 35, 158, 171, 174

cross-border cooperation (CBC), 75, 170, 232

challenge to nation state, 94law of, 92–4as response to globalization, 79

Cutrini, Eleonora, 175Czech Republic, 158

Damanaki, Maria, 176Danube Civil Society Forum, 165nDanube Commission, 149, 150, 164nDanube region, see European Union

Strategy for the Danube RegionDayton Agreement, 35Deas, Iain, 28Delamaide, Darrell, 12delegation, and legitimacy, 91Délégation interministérielle à

l’aménagement du territoire at à l’attractivité régionale (DATAR), 198, 203, 258

Dühr, Stefanie, 107, 163–4Dwan, Renata, 19n, 27

Eastern Partnership (EaP), 36Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),

158Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

(Euro-Med), 79Euro-Mediterranean Regional and

Local Assembly (ARLEM), 183Europe 2020 Strategy, 12, 67, 215,

228–9, 245–6, 257European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development, 51European Charter of Local

Self-government (1985), 93European Commission

Adriatic Ionian Transnational Programme, 179

Atlantic region strategy, 246–7: Action Plan, 249–50; maritime focus of, 247; resistance to Atlantic Arc region, 243

European integration, 79–80European Union Strategy for the

Adriatic-Ionian Region, 177–8, 179, 185

272 Index

European Commission – continuedEuropean Union Strategy for

the Baltic Sea Region, 126: assessment report, 128–9; evaluation of, 129; role in, 130–1

European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, 150–1; Founding Paper of the Commission, 149

Fifth Cohesion Report, 59, 60, 215, 231

good governance, 159macro-regional strategies, 4–5, 9–10,

51, 80: flexible boundaries, 113; funding, 59; role in, 65, 67, 110; Seed Money Facility, 112

National Partnership Agreements, 58

Rule of Law Initiative, 160Second Cohesion Report, 49territorial cohesion, 49

European Council, 67, 147Multi-annual Financial Framework,

59–60European Economic and Social

Committee (EESC), 243, 248European Governance Initiative

(EGI), 146–7, 159European Grouping for Territorial

Cooperation (EGTCs), 18n, 53, 78, 93

European integrationEuropean Commission, 79–80macro-regionalization, 79–86:

constructivist account, 82–3, 84–5; functionalist perspective on, 80–1, 84; intergovernmentalism, 81–2, 84; neo-imperialist account, 83–4, 86; neo-institutionalist account, 82, 85–6

multi-level governance theory, 87–8

nation state, 79policy rescaling, 105see also Europeanization

European Investment Bank (EIB), 51Europeanization, 101–3

adaptation to EU influences, 102–3conceptualizations of, 103–4

different interpretations of, 101–2direction of transformation, 102planning and regional

development, 106–8policy rescaling, 105–6subregional cooperation, 33top-down interpretation of, 102transnational spatial policymaking,

103see also European integration

European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 247

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 53

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 8, 36, 79, 175

European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1980), 93

European ParliamentAlpine Convention, 191, 195, 202,

203Atlantic region strategy, 243, 246–7,

248–9European Union Strategy for the

Baltic Sea Region, 8, 126European Regional Development

Fund (ERDF), 52, 247European Social Fund (ESF), 247European Spatial Development

Perspective (ESDP), 49, 100Europeanization, 107–8

European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON), 220

European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), 47, 55, 246

European Territorial Cooperation (ETC), 18n, 52, 69n, 106–8

budget, 60European Union (EU)

comitology structure, 107competitive-cohesive Europe, 163enlargement and subregional

cooperation, 32–3legitimacy of decisions, 91regionalization, 76

Index 273

European Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 26

Action Plan, 178, 184added value provided by, 181–2Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, 40Ancona Declaration, 174assessment of, 184–6consultation process, 177–8:

Working Groups, 178contextual drivers of, 184coordination, 179, 180, 185economic constraints, 183–4establishment of, 169: historical

background, 171–4; Italy’s engagement with, 174–6, 177

European Neighbourhood Policy, 175

external dimension of, 180–4, 185–6

governance challenges, 178–80, 183, 185

governance dynamics in drafting of, 176–8

inclusion of non-EU states, 170objectives of, 176–7political drivers of, 170, 184programme initiation phase, 176,

184territorial coverage of, 171

European Union Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP), 47, 189–90

Alpine governance, 200–1: Alpine populism, 203–6; constructing regional frontier, 201–3; regional political careers, 206–8

drivers of Alpine macro-regionalization, 190–1, 208–9: Alpine Convention, 191–3; Alpine regions, 200–1; Alpine Space Programme, 195–6; civil society, 196–8; interregional working communities, 193–4; Network of Alpine Regions, 194–5

emerging governance architecture, 198–200: challenges for, 200; proposed pillars, 199

existing institutions, 50–1

Intervention Document, 196, 198–9, 203

public consultation, 189, 200Steering Committee, 200territorial coverage of, 190:

concerns over, 197European Union Strategy for the

Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), 3, 26, 123–5

Action Plan, 126–7Annual Forum, 126assessment of, 128–9, 138–40Baltic Deal, 129Cohesion Policy, 54–5, 58:

coordination, 60–1cooperation with non-EU states, 65,

135–7Council of the Baltic Sea States,

40, 41countries targeted by, 6–8, 123development of, 125–9European Commission’s role, 130–1evaluation of, 129existing institutions, 50flagship projects, 138–9funding, 59, 112governance architecture, 130–1,

138, 139High Level Group, 131history of cooperation in region,

125–6Horizontal Actions, 127, 128, 130:

Horizontal Area Leaders, 130identity construction, 85impact on macro-regional

organizations and conventions, 131–3, 138: Council of the Baltic Sea States, 131–2; Helsinki Commission, 132, 133, 138; interplay with EU legislation, 132–3, 138

involvement of civil society, 134–5involvement of subnational

authorities, 133–4leadership, 140links to selected territorial

programmes, 56–7monitoring and assessment system,

139–40

274 Index

EUSBSR – continuedmulti-level governance, 90neo-institutionalist account, 85–6Nordic Council, 40, 41objectives of, 126, 127, 130:

monitoring and assessment system, 139–40

origins of, 8pillars of, 126Policy/Priority Areas, 126, 127–8,

130: Policy/Priority Area Coordinators, 130

rescaling processes: dominant levels of power, 111; mandates and budgets, 112; policy agendas, 109; roles, 112–13

role of subregional groupings (SRGs), 41

Russia, 65, 114, 135, 136–7, 138stakeholder involvement, 135strength of, 162territorial coverage of, 124:

divergent views on, 201–3‘three No’s’ principles, 126ultimate goal of, 90

European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), 8, 145

Annual Forums, 149, 152–3Central European Initiative, 40, 41challenges facing, 164Cohesion Policy, 54–5context of global crisis, 158countries targeted by, 146deficiencies in implementation,

153–4diversity of Danube Region, 162European Governance Initiative,

146–7funding, 59governance architecture, 149–50governance deficit, 148: structure

of institutional and policy memberships, 153–4

halting of progress with, 152–3High Level Group, 149historical trajectory of, 148–53:

Founding Paper of the Commission, 149

impact of global crisis, 147, 151–2

lack of leadership, 158lack of policy ownership, 156, 157marginalization of, 147multi-level governance, 147National Contact Points, 149New Member States: crises in,

147–8, 158; decline in democracy and good governance, 158–62; democratic deficit, 158–9, 161; governance deficit, 148, 152, 159–60; lack of commitment to, 161

objectives of, 149origins of, 8Priority/Policy Area Coordinators,

149Priority/Policy Areas, 153, 154:

inefficient assignment of, 153; over-ambitious nature of, 156; Progress Report on institutional capacity, 156–7; soft and hard policy areas, 155; unbalanced nature of, 156

Progress Reports, 151: institutional capacity, 156–7

Regional Cooperation Council, 40rescaling processes: dominant levels

of power, 111; mandates and budgets, 112; policy agendas, 109

role of subregional groupings (SRGs), 41

South-East European Cooperation Initiative, 40

territorial coverage of, 146‘three No’s’ principles, 150–1water management, conflict over,

155–6European Union Strategy in the

Western Mediterranean, 183–4, 185–6

Euroscepticism, 262

Faludi, Andreas, 107Faroe Islands, 222federalism, and regionalism, 10Former Yugoslavia Republic of

Macedonia, 171Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities

and Towns, 173

Index 275

Forum of the Adriatic, 173France

Alpine populism, 206regional political careers, 207–8

Freedom House (FH), 158Friis, Johan, 114Füle, Štefan, 181–2functionalism, and European

integration, 80–1, 84

Geir, Karl, 194Germany, 219

attitude towards macro-regional strategies, 231

globalization, cross-border cooperation as response to, 79

Gualini, Enrico, 105Guichard, Olivier, 253

Hahn, Johannes, 40, 123, 179–80, 181Hamburg, German state of, 134Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), 10,

112, 125, 130Baltic Sea Action Plan, 132European Union Strategy for the

Baltic Sea Region, 132, 133, 138Helsinki Convention, 131High Level Group (HLG), 131Hooghe, Liesbet, 87Hübner, Danuta, 198Hungary, 158, 165n

Iceland, 135, 222imperialism, and macro-

regionalization, 83–4, 86Instrument for Pre-accession

Assistance (IPA), 53Integrated Maritime Policy

(IMP), 245Integrated Territorial Investments

(ITI), 49intergovernmentalism, and

macro-regionalization, 81–2, 84International Commission for the

Protection of the Alps (CIPRA), 191, 196–7, 202, 203

International Convention for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), 10

International Scientific Committee on Alpine Research (ISCAR), 192, 197

International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 191, 197

interregional cooperation programme (INTERREG), 50, 100, 179

Cohesion Policy, 52, 53Europeanization of spatial

planning, 107Ionian Chambers of Commerce, 173Italy

Alpine populism, 204: Lega Nord, 204–6

European Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region, 177: engagement with, 174–6

involvement in western Balkans, 172–3

regional political careers, 207

Joenniemi, Pertti, 182Jones, Alun, 103

Keating, Michael, 76, 79, 105Kern, Kristine, 106Kovács, Zoltán L., 225, 229Krumrey, Per, 126, 229Kuhn Report (2010), 215

law, and cross-border cooperation, 92–4Lega Nord, 204–6Leggewie, Claus, 11legitimacy

law of cross-border cooperation, 92–4macro-regional strategies, 91–4multi-level governance, 91–2principal-agent theory, 91–2

Lisbon Agenda, 84, 89Lisbon, Treaty of, 100

European Union cohesion, 8, 108, 216

Lithuania, 123Löffelsend, Tina, 106Lord, Alex, 28

Maastricht, Treaty of (1992), 11McCann, Eugene, 104Machowski, Heinrich, 31

276 Index

macro-regionalization, 6, 75as comprehensive approach, 6definition of, 6drivers of, 78European integration, 79–86:

constructivist account, 82–3, 84–5; functionalist perspective on, 80–1, 84; intergovernmentalism, 81–2, 84; neo-imperialist scenario, 83, 86; neo-institutionalist account, 82, 85–6

implications of, 12multi-level governance: horizontal

interplay, 13; inclusion of EU and non-EU states, 14; vertical interplay, 13–14

as political project, 80shift from territorial to functional

regions, 12spillover effects, 80–1

macro-regional strategiesaction plans, 54added value of, 178adoption of, 3aims of, 5, 77antecedents of, 25–6characteristics of, 4, 25–6Cohesion Policy, 53–4, 67–8, 179,

181, 215: differences between, 52; flexibility, 63; funding, 59–60; initiation process, 64–5; policy coordination and coherence, 60–2; strategic and thematic links, 54–9

core principles, 4criticism of, 47, 65definition of, 47diversity of, 6–8drivers of: endogenous factors, 9;

European Union-level, 8–9, 99–100

European Commission, 4–5, 9–10, 51, 80: role of, 65, 67, 110

experimental nature of, 100–1external dimension of, 180–3factors affecting success of, 178–9,

180flexible boundaries, 113

flexible membership, 62–3funding, 59–60, 112governance model, 51, 63–6:

governance architecture, 64impact on existing institutional

capacities, 10implementation, 65inclusion of non-EU states, 14,

113–14, 115, 180–1: cooperation with, 65

inclusiveness, 62initiators of, 63–5legitimacy of, 91–4minimizing transaction costs of

collective action, 6multi-level governance, 47, 63–6,

88–91: governance architecture, 64; transnational programmes, 65–6

new policy arenas, 99nongovernmental organizations,

110–11number of countries involved in,

123place-based approach, 49, 62policy background, 48: evolution of

policy interventions, 49–50; policy debates and approaches, 49; theoretical debates, 48

Priority/Policy Area committees, 109, 111–12

realizing synergies, 222as regional building blocks for

EU-wide policy, 4–5rescaling, 101, 108–9, 115–16:

beyond EU borders, 113–14; dominant levels of power, 110–12; mandates and budgets, 112; policy agendas, 109; roles, 112–13; spatial frames/boundaries, 113

sea basin strategies: distinction from, 245–6; similarities with, 246

stakeholder involvement, 110–11, 135

subregionalism in Europe, 26: differences between, 25–6; role of subregional groupings, 38–42

territorial cohesion, 49

Index 277

macro-regional strategies – continued‘three No’s’ principles, 10, 14, 52,

125, 126, 150: benefits of, 51; no new funding, 51; no new institutions, 39, 50–1; no new legislation, 51

transnational character of, 26use of existing institutions, 50–1

macro-regionsdefinition of, 3–4, 222diverse origins of, 169functional identification of, 169, 181goals of, 77historical use of term, 48as hybrid form of functional-

territorial regions, 5multi-level governance, 12–13,

89–90, 170as novel development, 5–6origins of, 8overview of European

macro-regions, 7policy integration, 12–13social construction of, 82–3territorial cooperation, 49–50undermining of concept, 265–6

Majone, Giandomenico, 6Mantica, Alfredo, 175Marche region (Italy), and European

Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region, 174–6

Marine Energy in Far Peripheral and Island Communities (MERiFIC), members, 264

Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MFSD), 133

Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Sea, 176–7, 186n

Marks, Gary, 87, 88Maroni, Roberto, 205Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, German

state of, 134Medeiros, Eduardo, 194Mény, Yves, 203–4, 205, 206meta-regionalization, 76Minic, Jelica, 27, 35–6Mittenwald Declaration, 194, 196Montenegro, 171Morvan, Yves, 251–2

Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF), 59–60

multidimensional governance (MDG), 147

multi-level governance (MLG), 147conditions for effective, 13–14:

horizontal interplay, 13; inclusion of EU and non-EU states, 14; vertical interplay, 13–14

definition of, 13European integration, 87–8institutional structure, 89legitimacy, 91–2macro-regional strategies, 47, 63–6,

88–91: governance architecture, 64

macro-regions, 12–13, 89–90, 170subregional groupings, 27theoretical core, 87White Paper on Multi-Level

Governance, 88–9

Nadin, Vincent, 107Nagler, Alexander, 17National Contact Points (NCPs), 130Nations in Transit (NIT), 158nation state

challenges to, 78, 94European integration, 79

neo-imperialism, and macro-regionalization, 83–4, 86

neo-institutionalism, and macro-regionalization, 82, 85–6

Netherlands, 219, 225Network of Alpine Regions, 194–5

territorial scope of, 202New Member States (NMS)

crises in, 147–8, 158decline in democracy and good

governance, 158–62democratic deficit, 158–9, 161governance deficit, 148, 152

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and macro-regional strategies, 110–11

Nordic Council (NC), 27, 28, 30, 40, 41, 85, 112, 225

Nordic countries, influence of, 225–6Nordic Investment Bank, 51

278 Index

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 32–3

Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), 136

Northern Dimension (ND), 135–6, 137, 182

Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme, 61

North Sea Commission (NSC), 10, 215–16, 228, 229, 232–3

North Sea Grid for Renewable Energy, 226, 234

North Sea macro-region, 215–17ambivalence towards, 232broad and inclusive approach, 222clustering of projects, 234comparison of priorities for, 232–3economic performance of regions,

219–21: participation in international markets, 221

factors undermining rationale for, 216, 217: existing partnerships, 223, 233; questionable added value, 228, 234

flexible boundaries, 232future of, 236–7geographical context, 224historical context, 224inclusion of non-EU states, 222neutral attitudes towards, 226Nordic countries’ influence, 225–6North Sea Region 2020, 228obstacles to, 236peripheralization and

marginalization, 224–5policy networks in, 227political drivers of, 227–31:

Committee of the Regions, 229–30; Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions, 230; Europe 2020 strategy, 228–9; lack of member state support, 230–1; reactive nature of, 228; regional discussions, 227–8

potential components of strategy, 228, 229

potential contributions of, 226potential territorial coverage of, 218proposed, 215–16

rationale and justification for, 234, 235–6

realizing synergies, 222, 224, 234smart specialization, 217, 225, 226,

234, 236stalled progress in development of,

217, 229, 233, 234Norway, 135, 222

Olsen, Johan P., 103Organization for Democracy and

Economic Development, 30

Palermo, Francesco, 92–3, 94Paquin, Stéphane, 204Perkmann, Markus, 170, 227, 232Peterlin, Marko, 223Petritsch, Wolfgang, 30–1Piattoni, Simona, 13, 87place-based approaches, 49, 62policy rescaling, see rescalingpopulism, Alpine, 203–6post-imperialism, and

macro-regionalization, 83–4, 86Potocnik, Janez, 176principal-agent theory, and legitimacy,

91–2Priority/Policy Area (PA) committees,

macro-regional strategies, 109, 111–12

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 10

Raffarin, Jean-Pierre, 253regional associations, 11Regional Cooperation Council (RCC),

27, 30, 36, 37European Union Strategy for the

Danube Region, 40regional decentralization, 75Regional Development Agencies

(RDAs) (UK), 262regional integration, 75regionalism

distinction from regionalization, 76

old and new, 76, 77regionalization

distinction from regionalism, 76meta-regionalization, 76

Index 279

regionalization – continuedmultiple meanings of, 75regional political careers, 206–8

Regional Studies Association (RSA), 216Reid Foundation, 226Reinhode, Iveta, 63Repentin, Thierry, 197rescaling, 12, 15

contested nature of new spaces, 105creation of new spaces/territories,

104–5definition of, 104direction of, 106Europeanization, 105–6European spatial planning, 106–8macro-regional strategies, 101,

108–9, 115–16: beyond EU borders, 113–14; dominant levels of power, 110–12; mandates and budgets, 112; policy agendas, 109; roles, 112–13; spatial frames/boundaries, 113

objects of, 106policy rescaling, 104–6

Rieuf, Charlotte, 194Romania, 158Rome, Treaty of (1957), 52Rougemont, Denis de, 10Rule of Law Initiative, 160Russia, and European Union Strategy

for the Baltic Sea Region, 65, 114, 135, 136–7, 138

Salines, Marion, 84–5, 86Salvadori, Bruno, 204Samecki, Paweł, 3–4, 49, 59, 112, 222,

223Savoy, 206Schleicher, Ursula, 191Schleswig-Holstein, German state of,

134Schmitter, Philippe, 13Schymik, Carsten, 126, 229Scotland, 219, 235, 236

influence of Nordic countries, 225–6sea basin strategies, and macro-

regional strategies: distinction from, 245–6; similarities with, 246

Serbia, 35, 171

Slovakia, 158Slovenia, 158, 171, 174Solioz, Christophe, 29, 30–1Sollgruber, Johann, 237nSouth Eastern Baltic Area (SEBA), 131,

137South-East European Cooperation

Initiative (SECI), 30, 37European Union Strategy for the

Danube Region, 40South-East European Cooperation

Process (SEECP), 30, 35–6, 37Spacca, Gian Mario, 176spatial planning, Europeanization of,

106–8Spigarelli, Francesca, 175spillover effects, and

macro-regionalization, 80–1Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe (SP), 36Stead, Dominic, 108Stocchiero, Andrea, 231Stolz, Klaus, 207Stubbs, Paul, 29subregionalism in Europe, 10–12

definition of subregional cooperation, 27

distinction between regional and subregional, 30–1

eastward expansion of EU and NATO, 32–3

Europeanization, 33Europe of the Regions, 10macro-regional strategies:

differences between, 25–6; precursor to, 41; role in, 26, 38–42

new subregionalism, 27: dynamics of, 34–6; features of post-1989 SRGs, 36–7; relations between SRGs and EU, 37–8

old subregionalism, 27–8pre-accession process, 33regional associations, 11role and limitations of, 31–4subregional groupings (SRGs), 25,

26, 31: agendas and activities of, 27; assessment of, 33–4; distinction between regional and subregional, 30–1; features of

280 Index

subregionalism in Europe – continued post-1989 groupings, 36–7;

intergovernmental nature of, 26; list of, 29–30; multi-level governance, 27; post-enlargement period, 34–5; relations with EU, 37–8; role in EU pre-accession process, 33; roles of, 34; security functions, 32

varieties of subregionalism, 36–9Western Balkans, 27, 28–9, 35–6

Surel, Yves, 205Sweden, 231Swedish Institute, 112

Tarchi, Marco, 204Tatham, Michael, 208territorial cohesion, 49territorial cooperation

Cohesion Policy, 49–50, 52–3macro-regional strategies, 100

Thessaloniki Declaration (2003), 172Töpfer, Klaus, 191Trans-european Transport Network

(TEN-T), 226transnational cooperation

programmes, 100, 221–2macro-regional strategies, 65–6

Trento Declaration, 194Turku, 134Turku Process, 134, 136, 137

UniAdrion network, 173Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC), 109,

111, 133Union Valdôtaine (UV), 204United Kingdom

Atlantic region strategy, 250, 251, 259, 260, 261

attitude towards macro-regional strategies, 231

austerity, 262economic performance of English

regions, 219Euroscepticism, 262flexible transnational cooperation

by regions, 264–5reduced participation in

transnational Atlantic regionalism, 262–3

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 262

Via Donau, 109, 116virtual regions, 222Visegrad Group (VG), 30, 33

foreign policy cooperation, 36post-accession role, 35

Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea (VASAB), 130

Warleigh-Lack, Alex, 77Water Framework Directive (WFD),

132–3Waterhout, Bas, 108Western Balkans, 151–2, 172

European response to conflict in, 172–3

prospect of EU accession, 173–4spatial and economic

marginalization, 174subregional cooperation, 27, 28–9,

35–6World Wildlife Fund for Nature

(WWF), 88, 197

Yugoslaviadismantling of, 171European response to dissolution of,

172–3

Zaia, Luca, 205