A Look at Kidnapping, Trust and Employer – Employee Relationships

7/31/2019 A Look at Kidnapping, Trust and Employer Employee Relationships

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A Look at Kidnapping, Trust and Employer Employee Relationships in

Mexico City Households

By

Rolando OchoaDepartment of Sociology

St. Antonys CollegeUniversity of Oxford

Work in progress for discussion only, please do not cite or circulate.

AbstractThis paper presents preliminary evidence on the effect of kidnapping on

relationships based on trust, namely those between household members and

their employees, in Mexico City. Most of these relationships are of an

informal (relations-based) nature and data shows that kidnapping is

organized mostly by people in close contact with the victim (employees and

family). This, coupled with high impunity and high crime rates makes the

decision to hire someone a very delicate one. Based on extensive qualitative

research carried out in Mexico City this paper presents, first, a digested

account of the evolution of kidnapping in Mexico City with details on how it

has become a crime that has democratized and now affects a large sector

of the population as opposed to its typical wealthy victims. Second, drawing

from theories of trust, signalling and private protection this paper begins to

address some of the mechanisms which people use to determine whether to

trust someone or not, based on the example of household employees. As a

tentative conclusion I assert that the evolution of kidnapping (and crime in

general) has meant that relationships based on trust have become strained

and that the mechanisms used for the establishment of trust have also become

more and more complex as people seek to attain the highest levels of

protection.

Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 11-14, 2009


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1. Introduction

Over the last decade crime has become one of the most salient social phenomena in

Mexico (for examples of this see: Mitofski 2005; Chambre Franco-Mexicaine deCommerce et d'Industrie 2004; Jimenez Ornelas 2000). The presence of powerful drugcartels, high poverty and inequality and a weak rule of law have contributed to amonumental increase in the countrys crime rates (Davis 2006:61: Magaloni and Zepeda,2004; Bergaman et.al., 2003). Among the many crimes that affect citizens one stands outas the most commented and feared: kidnapping. Studies show that Mexico is in the topthree countries worldwide where kidnapping is more common (Briggs, 2002). In 2007there were 112 kidnappings reported to the authorities in Mexico City alone (ElUniversal, 2008). Once the sole scourge of the wealthy, recent evidence indicates thatkidnapping has been democratized and now affects large sectors of the middle andworking classes (PGJDF, 2007). It is this fact that is at the centre of this research note.

Thus, I aim to present a macro-micro analysis (Coleman, 1986) that will shed light on 1)the changing dynamics of kidnapping in Mexico City and the structural factors thatenable it, 2) the impact of this phenomenon on relationships based on trust and 3) themechanisms that the inhabitants of Mexico City use to protect themselves from crime andkidnapping in particular.

To achieve this I will address the following sociological puzzle: why have wealthy peoplein Mexico City been bypassed as ideal victims of kidnapping in favour of middle and

working class victims? This question arises due to the counter intuitive fact that wealthypeople would be ideal victims of this crime; however recent evidence points towards theopposite. A possible explanation could be that this particular social class has

implemented successful informal protection strategies, which coupled with the dynamicsof the crime itself, have allowed them to avoid victimization much more successfullythan working and middle class people. In order to feasibly address this puzzle, I willpresent preliminary evidence on the mechanisms upper-middle and upper class people inMexico City use to assess the threat of kidnapping with special reference to theirrelationships with their household employees. This relationship is important when weknow that around 70% of kidnappings in Mexico are planned or facilitated by either amember of the victims family or a close employee (PGR, 2008). To achieve this goal, Iwill use the product of over a year of in-depth qualitative fieldwork in one of the Citys16 districts that due to its historical crime rates and socioeconomic composition makesfor an ideal ground for the deciphering of this puzzle. The research was based mostly on

in depth interviews with employers and employees, kidnapping victims and theiremployees, law enforcement officials at all levels, security experts and also the gatheringof secondary evidence and data such as news reports, NGOs documents among others.

It is hoped that this paper will contribute to existing literature on crime, trust andprotection in the following ways. First, the empirical study of kidnapping in Mexico Citysheds light on the nuts and bolts of this particular crime, as well as the environmental andinstitutional factors that make it such a prevalent event. Second, it seeks to uncover thespecific mechanisms that people use to protect themselves from criminals in a situationwhere the government does not fully provide this protection. This point is of fundamentalimportance as it helps us understand what happens in a context where citizens


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protection, a governments most important task, is left unattended. Third, it seeks toexplore how people of different social class interact and how decisions of householdemployment between the employer and the employee are made, specifically how

employers screen their employees for the properties of trustworthiness and loyalty andhow prospective employees signal that they possess these properties.

The district that is the main focus (albeit not the only one) of this research, MiguelHidalgo, is located in the northwestern edge of the city. It covers an area of 42.99 kmand is composed of 95 colonias or neighbourhoods (INEGI, 2005) and has a populationof 353,534 (INEGI, 2008). This district is one of the richest ones in the country andhouses a large proportion of the citys economic elite; it is also home to many poorneighbourhoods, sometimes only separated by a few streets. It is virtually (although notformally) divided in a wealthy southern side and a working-class northern end. Both sideshave pockets of middle class neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood of Polanco, in the

southern end is known for its world class restaurants, bars and designer shops that line thewide, tree lined streets of its south-west side. It is also a high class residential area thatbegan developing in the late 1930s and has been since home to very wealthy people.Most old houses, once the majority of the buildings there, have been or are now beingreplaced with very expensive, super-safe condos. Security is such a salient issue in thisneighbourhood that in a survey of 33 buildings during fieldwork, it was found that all but5 boasted private security as a matter of course. Most news adverts for the sale of flatsand houses here also mention the security arrangements for the building in question. Onthe other side of the district, a mere two kilometres north of Polanco are a number ofneighbourhoods such as Popotla, Argentina Poniente and Tacuba. These are mostlyworking class areas, some of which are very old and most have high crime rates (District

Government, 2008). In the words of a city official those are warriorneighbourhoods(Interview, 2008). The socioeconomic differences are very striking within this territoryand are indicative of one of Mexicos greatest maladies, namely inequality. The imagesbelow give the reader a visual idea of this. In order to give an idea of the social andeconomic differences within the district it is useful to look at property values. A twobedroom flat will cost upwards of $500,000USD in the neighbourhood of Polanco whilein the Pensil Sur, barely two kilometres north, the most expensive ones sell for around$30,000USD.

The qualitative research for this project was carried out in Mexico City throughout 2008and consisted on a large number of open interviews with kidnapping victims, non

victims, and employees as well as long term observations and interviews with lawenforcement officials at all levels. These included district attorneys, policemen/women,crime victims, crime investigators and other policing actors. A database of ten years(1998-2008) of national level news reports from 2 national newspapers is also underconstruction for these same purposes.

2. Theoretical Tools

The literature on trust gives us a good framework for the analysis of the relationships Ihave mentioned in the introduction to this paper. As Seligman points out the existenceof trust is an essential component of all enduring social relationships (1997: 13). This is


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even more so in the case of Mexico. Most of the relationships I will analyse are part of aninformal relation-based economic system (Dixit, 2004), they are under no writtencontract and are shrouded in a limited rule of law (Magaloni and Zepeda, 2004). In this

situation actors must use diverse mechanisms in order to establish, and maintain,cooperative relationships. The establishment of trust among actors before entering into arelationship is one such vital mechanism.

Trust has been pointed out repeatedly as one of the key mechanisms for the betterfunctioning of society both at the interpersonal and social levels (Seligman, 1997;Sztompka, 1999). Most relationships must be cemented in some form of trust lest theybecome costly situations that can only be maintained by third-party enforcers(Seligman, 1997: 4). It has, because of this, been discussed and analysed from manyacademic fronts like anthropology, economics and sociology and using very varied toolsof analysis such as rational choice and culturalist approaches among others (Sztompka,

1999: 1). In line with Gambetta (2000: 4) I understand trust to mean:

A particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses

that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both

before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be

able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action.

A key component of trust is uncertainty about other peoples behaviours. It is related tothe limits of our capacity ever to achieve a full knowledge of others, their motives, theirresponses to endogenous as well exogenous changes (Gambetta, 2000: 4). If actorscould achieve full knowledge of the true intentions of other agents and could base their

decisions on this knowledge, trust would be rendered mostly useless. Because fullinformation is rarely (if ever) achieved in interpersonal relationships trust plays a key rolein the success or failure of these relationships. Vulnerability refers to the fact that, in arelationship, agents are to an extent free to defect upon or betray the other actor/s. Theless constrained actors are, the more freedom they have to betray. Informal relationshipsnot based on a contract and in an environment of low law enforcement have a high degreeof freedom to act. In this situation trust is needed to a high degree (Gambetta, 2000).Trust allows us to make sense of otherwise uncertain situations.

Actors planning on entering into a relationship (contractual or not) must first go through adecision making process in which they establish the trustworthiness of the other actor and

decide whether to engage with him/her or not at all. Actor A (the truster) must besufficiently assured that B (the trustee) will perform the tasks he/she is advertising orpromising; in other words A must trust B, based on information he has on both theirpayoffs for the interaction. In order to achieve this, actors must solve primary andsecondary trust problems (Bacharach and Gambetta, 1997). First, the actors mustestablish which trust warranting properties are valid for this particular interaction.These properties are any property (or combination of properties) of a trustee in a basictrust game which suffices for him to be trustworthy (Bacharach and Gambetta, 1997: 7).We must assume that the truster in the relationship knows what properties signaltrustworthiness. Good communication between actors is a very important part of this


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interaction (Good, 2000). In the specific case of the relationships described in this paperthe employer must know what properties to look for when deciding to hire a prospectiveemployee. Some of these properties might be for example, a clean drivers licence, no

criminal records, good health and freedom from addictions as well as other less tangibleones such as punctuality, discretion and efficiency. A recommendation from a closeacquaintance can be an example of a guarantee of these properties. It is important tomention that some of these qualities are not easily observable and sometimes can only beestablished after the person has been hired. There are two ways to solve this problem thatI have previously observed 1) there is a protracted hiring process that may last up to amonth which includes many interviews with different people, this can serve to look forobservable traits such as punctuality and seriousness of the candidate. 2) Once hired thereis a trial period in which the new driver is relegated to perform secondary activities thatdo not necessarily involve driving anyone or carrying out important tasks. Theseactivities include doing household chores, taking cars to maintenance, or simply being

present while other people or other employees do menial jobs. He rarely has contact withthe family during this period. This minimizes the amount of information he can gather.Until he has proven that he is reliable, efficient, very helpful and discreet by both familymembers but also, very importantly, other trustworthy employees, he can then startcarrying out more important tasks, this process may take many weeks.

Once trustworthy properties have been observed the secondary problem arises. Thetruster must establish whether those properties on display by the trustee are to be trustedas real. As these properties can be observable or not (Bacharach and Gambetta, 1997) it ispossible for an actor to copy or mimic those properties to pass off as the real thing inorder to obtain instant, raw payoffs. Bacharach and Gambetta call this person an

opportunist (1997: 10, also see Gambetta and Hamill, 2005). In order to discern mimicsfrom non-mimics, trusters must carefully analyse and weight the special properties, asseen through signs (Gambetta and Hamill, 2005) that trustees display. Costly signs willbe hard to copy and will therefore have a higher value for the truster. Personal traits suchas gender and race are virtually impossible to copy, others such as dress style will beeasier. In the specific case that concerns us, a verbal recommendation about an employeefrom a close friend or family member is virtually impossible to mimic, a written letterfrom a stranger is not, and is therefore basically worthless. A worthy letter will only bepresented when the writer knows the prospective employee personally and knows for afact that he is reliable, punctual and discreet. These cases are rare as many drivers do notleave their jobs easily (they may recommend others they know who might not be drivers)

and most recommendations are verbal in nature. An example of this would be thefollowing: When a wealthy person (W1) is in need of a driver/bodyguard he/she willcontact someone in their close social network (W2) to enquire about it. W2 will then askhis/her trustworthy employee (E1) who might recommend a family member oracquaintance (E2). It is the sum of the good reputation of W2 and E1 that counts in thistransaction. E1 would hardly recommend a defector and W2 trusts his/her employeesrecommendation enough to pass it on. While there is always a risk that the recommendedperson might be a fake this strategy assures that this risk is minimized. After this stagethe hiring process described above begins proper. With the employer probing for thequalities he wants and the employer presenting such qualities. Enforcing this kind of


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relationships is an important issue and one that usually falls within the realm of coercionor a credible threat thereof, however it falls short of being an adequate alternative totrust (Bacharach and Gambetta, 2000: 5). The threat of coercion solves the dilemma not

by bringing trust in but rather by making it unnecessary. Trust becomes necessary whenother mechanisms to ensure cooperation are not available.

It is important to understand exactly what qualities an employer looks for in an employeeand how exactly he/she can screen for them. It is also key to know how potentialemployees can present the qualities the employer wants. In Table 1 I present some idealqualities that an employer might look for in a driver as well as what might signal thisquality followed by the screening process for each. Table 2 presents the same scenariofor the employee, what signs does he need to display to be hired.

Table 1

Qualities, Signs and Screening Strategies for the Employer

Quality Sign Screening for it

DiscretionKeeping informationsecure by not divulging it.

Very hard to establish,relies heavily onrecommendations andrepeated interaction.

EfficiencyCompleting tasks fast andwithout involving many

people at low cost.

Can be screened for only

during test period.

HelpfulnessOffering to do things in thehousehold. Volunteeringfor tasks.

Only by observation

AgeMust be of a certain age,not too young (unreliable)not too old (unreliable)

Proof by observation andpapers

Presence

Certain physicalappearance. Not too short,strong looking, muscular.Clean-cut. Also formal by

wearing suit.

On observation.

Family manBy communication andofficial proof.

Asking for childrensbirth certificates, proof ofmarriage.

Knowledge of the CityGetting got places withoutasking, knowing goodroutes in the city.

Can be screened forduring test periodthrough tasks, sendinghim off to pick things upetc

No criminal record Police files Check police files


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Drivers Licence A valid licence Checking licence.

Table 2

Qualities, Signs and Presenting Strategies for the Employee

Quality Sign Presentation of Quality

DiscretionBeing quiet, not gossipy,keeping informationsecure.

By staying quiet, notgossiping with otheremployees.

EfficiencyCompleting tasks fast andwithout involving manypeople at low cost.

By voicing knowledge ofhow to carry out tasks.

Helpfulness Offering to help in otherchores and activities; beingon their feet.

Attentiveness

AgeBy appearance and birthcertificate.

Physical characteristics,hard to fake.

PresenceWearing Suits, lookinghealthy and muscular.

Wear suit, hard to fakephysical attributes.

Family manChildrens birth certificate,marriage certificate.

Producing certificates.

Knowledge of the CityBy having no problems ingetting to places. Doing

tasks quickly.

By working knowledgeof the city.

No criminal record Police filesProduce clean policereport.

Drivers Licence Producing licence Present clean licence.


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These lists are by no means complete but they seek to give an idea of what actors will be

engaged in. The signs and attitudes listed might also be subject to mimicry, some to agreater extent than others, it is very difficult to pass off as a 35 year old if you are 60, butit might be easy to obtain, with the right connections, a clean police file.

Using the analytical tools described above I expect to find that 1) employers will use ahost of strategies to screen their employees for evidence of loyalty and that they will begood protectors of information such as hiring through personal networks, hiring membersof the same family and of the same neighbourhood, namely those nearby; 2) potentialdrivers will use strategies to ensure the best employment possible such as working toestablish their reputation for being discreet and establishing family links to otherhousehold employees.

While the quantity and quality of the literature on crime and kidnapping has beenincreasing in Mexico, especially in the last few years, a study such as this one contributesto the study of the micro consequences of macro processes such as crime and a weak ruleof law. Studies of how individuals protect themselves from crime in Mexico are also rare(an exception being for example Rotker 2000). By the same token large developing urbancentres such as Mexico City have very specific socioeconomic, institutional andgeographical characteristics and thus provide a unique testing ground for theories on theformation of relationships based on trust and (private) protection.

3. Kidnapping in Mexico, a Very Brief History.

Mexico City is the capital of Mexico. It is the seat of the federal government and also thelargest urban centre in the country. The countrys population in 2005 (the last censusavailable) was 103 million and the citys was 8.7 million, a figure that climbs to around21 million people in total when the greater Mexico City area is taken into account(INEGI, 2005). The urban landscape of Mexico City is spread out over an area of 1,485kms. Its 16 districts are very different in both population size and geographicaldimensions, for example the Cuajimalpa district has 173,625 inhabitants while

Iztapalapa, the poorest district and the one with the highest kidnapping rate, has thelargest population in the city counting 1,820,888 people (INEGI, 2008).

For over ten years, crime in Mexico has been a core preoccupation for its inhabitants anda reality that has today become ever more present. Since 1994, a crime wave fuelled byan economic crisis took over the country; as it started abating in the early 2000s thegovernment decided to take on the powerful drug cartels. This has produced, especially inthe last two years, a wave of violence not seen since the Revolution of 1910. Mexico Cityhas followed the same trend. The City is the second entity in Mexico in terms ofincidence of crime with 19,663 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 (ICESI, 2005). In2007 that number raises to 25,700 which places it in the first spot in terms of crime


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incidence in the country (ICESI, 2008). By the same token data shows that localauthorities have been unable to deal with this crime wave. As it stands only 3% of crimesreported ever make it to a court resulting in very high impunity, close to 98% (Magaloni

and Zepeda, 2004; SEDESOL, 2007). The crime problem is twinned and increased withthe current war on drugs happening throughout the country. The drug trade andviolence levels in the country are heavily interconnected (Velazco, 2006). Since the late90s Mexican drug cartels have become extremely powerful in both the economic andpolitical arenas, extending their networks of corruption to the highest levels ofgovernment. In 2008, the Director of the Federal Police was forced to resign and is underinvestigation under corruption charges since he was receiving as much as USD$450,000a month in bribes from cartels looking for protection (Dresser, 2009). As far back as thelate 80s Reuter and Rondfeldt (1992) estimated that the drug trade gave Mexican drugtraffickers an income of between $2,800 and $7,200 million US dollars yearly. This wasequivalent to between 1.6% and 4.3% of the national GDP. The governments attempt to

reduce the influence and power of these criminal organizations has produced not justviolence but has also opened the door for other groups, better organized or not, tocompete for the spoils of the criminal world. This has resulted in high levels of violenceand an overall increase in violent crime rates. In 2008 a national newspaper registered inits executometer- a section that counts the number of people killed in organized crimeactivities such as revenge executions, shoot outs between gangs or between gangs andpolice/army etc. - 5,207 dead people. In the first three months of 2009, there were 1,493such killings in the country (Reforma, 2009). While these take place mostly in northernstates, they have affected Mexico City. In 2008 the same news source counts 138executions in the City (Reforma, 2009). The overall criminal environment is also affectedby this increase in organized-crime related activity, as the government uses its scant

resources to fight organized crime, it opens the door for other actors to enter into criminalactivity. As Toro (1995) argues the Procuraduria General de la Republica has basicallybecome an anti-drug agency.

As we have seen current research shows that the inhabitants of Mexico and of its capitalcity in particular live with high levels of crime and impunity. Among the many kinds ofcrime that affect citizens kidnapping stands out as one of the most feared. Historically,when this crime was less common, it targeted the wealthier members of society andseldom affected other socioeconomic classes (PGJDF, 2008). One would expect that thisclass would be targeted given their capacity to pay large ransoms. Wealthy peoplepositioned in the upper middle class and above would be ideal kidnapping victims as the

payoffs for the crime would be high, especially when there is a low risk of being caught.This sector of Mexican society has also the significant added risk of having manyhousehold employees, mostly from a working class background, such as drivers anddomestic staff. These workers have access to privileged information that potentialkidnappers might find very useful. It can be said then that their employers would be thegroup most likely to suffer from this particular kind of crime. An employee might use hisor her information, or have the information coerced out of him or her in a process thatwould result in a kidnapping. Although this would appear logical, today in Mexico City itis actually the middle class and lower middle class that appear to be targeted most by thiscrime in recent times. For example, the three districts with the highest kidnapping ratesper 100,000 people in the city are classified as middle class and below (Nilas, 2007). This


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presents an anomaly that requires careful consideration.

Mexico has the second highest rate of kidnapping in Latin America, only behindColombia. This places Mexico in the top three nations worldwide for this kind of crime(Briggs, 2002:1). Table 3 shows the number of kidnappings reported to the authorities inMexico City during the period 1997-2006. When compared to other regions in thecountry in absolute terms Mexico City has the highest rate of kidnapping in the country.With a population of approximately 9 million however, its rate per 100,000 inhabitants isnot the highest. This being said, it is important to remember this kind of crime isfrequently under-reported. While it is improbable to ever know the exact number ofkidnappings that occur it is reasonable to assume it is higher than what is reported in theofficial figures. The extensiveness of this crime and the fear it generates in the life ofMexican city dwellers generates considerable inquiry into its nature. Who are its victims?

What kind of protection do they use? Why are they chosen? These are but a fewexamples of the kind of questions this research seeks to address.

Table 3

Kidnappings Reported to the Authorities in Mexico City 1997-2007

Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Kidn

appin

gs

22 66 120 141 148 144 136 145 103 92 112

Source: ICESI, 2006, El Universal 20007

While in the past most victims of kidnapping belonged to the highest social strata, todaythis trend has changed and now the most common victims of kidnapping are middle andworking class (PGJDF, 2007). The districts of Mexico City with the highest kidnappingrates are the distinctly working class Iztapalapa and the middle class districts ofCoyoacan and Tlalpan. The wealthiest district, Miguel Hidalgo, has the second lowestrate of all 16 districts (PGJDF, 2007). It seems that wealthy people from the upper middleclass and above, the ideal victims, who can pay substantial ransoms, have been relatively

successful at avoiding this particular type of crime. Two possible objections to this puzzlearise. First, that the higher kidnapping rates in Iztapapalapa are a function of itspopulation size. This may be addressed by looking at the numbers of kidnapping as apercentage of the districts population. As the numbers of kidnappings are low thesepercentages tend to be very small, for Iztapalapa in 2007 it amounts to 0.002% of thepopulation. For Miguel Hidalgo in the same year it amounts to 0.0003%. In order tovisualize this better the number of kidnappings for every 100,000 people can becalculated. These figures tell us much more as they show that the kidnapping rate in theworking class district is significantly higher. Table 4 shows this important differencefrom the data available by district. Although the total for the city in 2007 is higher,information at the district level is limited, however I believe it is useful to give evidence


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of a real pattern. Second, it could be argues that kidnappings have motives other thanransom which would compromise the puzzle above. Although some kidnappings havefurther motives of revenge for example (El Universal, 2000) most secondary and primary

sources agree that this is a business and that most kidnappings do happen for ransom (seefor example El Universal, 27 November 1999).

Table 4

Kidnappings for every 100,000 People

DistrictKidnappings for every

100,000 people

% of Total Kidnappings,

2007

Miguel Hidalgo (upperclass)

0.2 0.67 (1)

Iztapalapa (working class) 1.7 20.77 (31)

Previous research has pointed to some possible answers to the puzzle presented here.First, the socio-geographical composition of Mexico City allows for working class andwealthy communities to share relatively small physical spaces. This has generated aunique environment in which different social classes interact with each other, onsignificant levels, on a daily basis (Ochoa, 2006). As opposed to their North Americancounterparts, Latin American cities are characterized by close physical proximitybetween social groups of different socioeconomic status. In other words, cities are notspaced in concentric circles with the poor inner city having little contact with thewealthier suburbs; to the contrary one finds that very rich communities coexist inphysical proximity to poor communities (Rotker, 2002; Marques and Torres, 2005). Anearly lead was that evidence gathered in Mexico City points to the extensive use of socialnetworks by both employers and employees as an information gathering mechanism. Onthe side of the employees, a solid family reputation seems to go a long way inguaranteeing employment. These and other strategies such as hiring many members ofthe same family need to be explored fully.

On the side of the crime itself, there are a number of possible stories that could explainthis shift in the victimization patterns of kidnapping. On the one hand most large-scale,organized kidnapping gangs have been dismantled. In the 1990s and early 2000s thepolice took it upon themselves to attack a number of these gangs. Some of the mostfeared criminals were caught in the space of a few years. The infamous Caletri gang wasalmost fully apprehended in 1994, for example. This particular gang engaged in wellorganized kidnappings and held a near monopoly on kidnappings in and around the city.Competition from other gangs as well as coordinated prosecution was the downfall of thisparticular criminal gang (El Universal, 23 february, 2000). The same can be said of manyof the other well organized kidnapping gangs that existed in the same period. By 2001-2002 most of these gangs were no longer operational. In an article, Cansino (2001) arguesthat:


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Contrary to the recent past, criminal activity is no longer controlled by a

handful of groups. It has now fragmented and small cells of delinquents, in

collusion with government officials or former police officers, are multiplying.

This new form of operation of criminals complicates the task for the federal

authorities, who are seeing themselves surpassed by their task to prosecute

crimes.

The void produced by these gangs was soon filled with smaller, younger and lessexperienced gangs that carried out poorly planned kidnappings, as was pointed out in areport by the General Directorate of Prevention and Social Re-adaptation of Mexico Cityin 2007 (El Universal, 18 October, 2007), this is the body in charge of penitentiaries inthe City. This has created a dynamic that is very dangerous for the government. it successin fighting kidnapping gangs, coupled with its failure in strengthening the rule of law hasactually created a scenario in which more people are being kidnapped with more

casualties. In this environment citizens have had to adopt different strategies to handle therisk of being kidnapped, and more generally, of being victims of crime. Fear of crime hasmany consequences as has been argued for example by Skogan (1986) that may speed upprocesses of neighbourhood decline. This aspect of crime and violence deserves detailedresearch.

4. Why household employees?

Many households in Mexico (and most of Latin America), employ a considerable numberof people in diverse duties such as drivers, cleaning staff, cooks and nannies, some ofwhich reside in the household. According to DeVos (1987: 515) around 8% of

households in Mexico City contained a household member who was not related to thehousehold head, most of these are employees. Most people take good care when hiringan employee, be it a nanny in London or a driver in Mexico City. These types ofemployees are sometimes given very high responsibilities. They feed, transport and carefor families and many times are responsible for the well being of children when theirparents are working. This is clearly, in the best of times, an important decision.

Mexico can very well be described as a relation based economy (Dixit, 2004). In thisenvironment many activities, both social and economic (contracts, business etc..) arecarried out outside of governments sight. Many labour relationships are based oninformal, sometimes spoken contracts very difficult to enforce by any government

agency. Brambilla and Cazzavillan (2008) define the informal sector as as all the incomegenerating activities that are unregulated by institutions. Employer-employeerelationships in households are a very good example of this. None of my respondents hada written contract with their employers/employees, or any desire to have one. Allagreements are verbal and negotiations regarding wages, responsibilities and the like arecarried out verbally between the parts involved. Most payments are given in cash and notaxes are paid on them. This kind of relationship is clearly very difficult to control for anygovernment; the lack of tax records for them make it almost impossible for them to evenknow how many people are involved in this kind of work. The national statistics agency(INEGI) estimates that around 24% of the economically active population in Mexico is


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employed in the informal sector. In this environment of informality and low governmentcontrol, these informal relationships acquire a very important weight. A heavy presenceof organized crime, a very weak rule of law, high inequality, corruption, a significant

informal sector and overall high crime rates makes the decision to hire a person who willhave access to sensitive family information a risky business at best. When we know, asmentioned earlier that a substantial number of kidnappings today are facilitated in someform by either family or close employees, we begin to understand the importance ofchoosing correctly and of displaying the right signals.

The most common form of household employee in Mexico City is the cook/cleaner. Thisis always a female (in no case during fieldwork did I observe a male cook/cleaner, norhave I ever met one in my 33 years as a dweller of Mexico City) who is hired by thehousehold to carry out tasks such as cooking for the family and the upkeep of the home,cleaning, washing etc. Until recently, drivers were only utilised by people belonging to

higher social classes. Security and other factors, such as higher supply have made it morecommon. The practice of hiring a driver has now become quite prevalent for a sector ofthe population. Some lower-middle class families, for example, will even develop a longterm relationship with a specific taxi driver who will effectively become their personaldriver. Some less affluent households hire staff that only work for one or two days aweek. The exact income levels of households that require/use drivers are not known butobservation tells that most middle class families and above who are able to afford at leastone employee may at some point hire a driver. These employees are, mostly, from aworking class background and are commonly hired trough the employers social network,and they are then tested on a number of factors that establish whether or not they are to betrusted. Intuitively these relationships would seem to pose a further kidnapping risk as

employees have access to sensitive information about their employers (their everydaywhereabouts for instance and wealth) that potential kidnappers might pay handsomelyfor, or be willing to use violence to learn. Preliminary evidence shows that this is notalways the case (ICESI, 2006). The employment arrangements upper-middle and upperclass people have with their household employees seem to, at least, not place then infurther danger of being kidnapped. How then, do employers and employers go aboutmeeting each other and entering into a relationship based on trust?

5. Some Preliminary Evidence; The case of Families G and D.

For the purposes of this paper I will look at the relationship between two families I

interviewed. These two families have a long-standing relationship that spans twogenerations. This particular relationship exemplifies the mechanisms I have describedabove. As I have argued before employers and employees engage in a complex gameduring their relationship. This process starts when an employer begins seeking anemployee for a position that we can denominate of trust or de confianza. The risk ofcrime makes this decision (the one to basically give access to very important informationto a stranger) a sensitive and problematic one. This section of the paper seeks to givesome preliminary evidence of the mechanisms people use to solve this problem, on theone hand to secure a good job and on the other to hire a trustworthy person, asexperienced by two families.


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One of the first mechanisms that employers will use in the process of employee selectionis the extensive utilization of their social network to hunt for prospective employees. The

use of this mechanism was present in all of the interviews carried out with employers.This mechanism is many times strengthened by the fact that many families develop apersonal relationship with the people that work for them, as is the case of families G (theemployers) and D (the employees). In many cases a large part of the worker family willbe employed with one employer family. This makes the two families develop a veryinteresting relationship that becomes both deep and inter-dependent and goes wellbeyond a simple master-servant relationship. This respondent summarizes this view well,parentheses are mine:

The gardener used to work for my father, I have known him since I was a little

girl, I mean, he is almost my brother. The lady that comes to do the clothes, I

knew her mother for a very long time, and, hmmm, I know where this girllives, she is a real angel, Lucy (another employee), she was recommended by

my niece, (my sister) Xs daughter, her daughter (Lucys daughter) was my

nieces nanny for about 15 years, (they are) people with impressive ethics, so

she told me her mother wanted a job, so she is here.the chap that also

works here, is her son in law, he is married to my nieces nanny

In a somewhat complicated way this respondent, a member of family G asserts that, forall practical purposes, her family has a close work-based relationship with another familythat spans two generations. This is a very good illustration of the kind of informalrelationships that are sometimes the result of employment interactions. Table 5 presents a

schema of the relationship.

Table 5

The G and D Families and their Relationships

Resp. sister

Respondent

Lucy Lucysmother

Lucyshusband

Resp.niece


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Table 5 provides a simple visual representation of the relationships between bothfamilies. As we can see both units are heavily intertwined with one another with multiplerelationships already developed. These have taken in this particular case almost 20 yearsto develop. This provides fertile ground for future analysis. Let us look at how thisprocess comes about.

On the side of the employer trust is paramount, especially if she perceives herself to be apotential victim of kidnapping. Thus a recommendation from a family member withwhom she has a close relationship goes a long way towards insuring that the prospectiveemployee will not betray her trust. Lucys daughter has been working of the same familyfor 15 years, this means that the family she works for trusts her enough therefore a

recommendation from her will be immediately given the benefit of the doubt. One canassume that Lucy would hardly want to jeopardize what is a personal and productiverelationship of many years by recommending someone she does not trust fully. FollowingGambetta & Bacharach (2001: 155) this personal recommendation can be interpreted as asorting signal that results in equilibrium. Also, belonging to family D is an identitysignal that is not hard to prove and is virtually impossible to mimic. This explains whymost people do not hire without recommendations form a trusted individual. Even so,personal characteristics may come in the way and harm this initial trust. This is whyemployers must look for other characteristics beyond the initial personal reference.Characteristics as helpfulness, loyalty, discreetness and a good character are important inthis case and must be proven before full trust is achieved. In this sense employers must

solve the primary and secondary problems of trust (Gambetta & Bacharach, 2001), firstby establishing which signs to look for that signal trustworthy characteristics and secondif these signs are true or simply being mimicked by a potential traitor. This reduces theprobability that the trustee is an opportunist (Gambetta & Bacharach, 2001: 157).

On the side of the employee, he or she must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that he/shepossesses the characteristics that the employer demands. In the case of the familiesreferred to in this paper the first step would be to prove membership to family D. This iseasily achieved and, as I have said before it is a strong signal of the sorting kind. Aconversation with other members of the G and D families and an ID should be enough toprove that the prospective employee is indeed a D. This is an important first step in the

establishment of a relationship. Thus we can divide the hiring process into two distinctprocesses. First, there is an involvement and usage of social and familial networks tosecure trustworthy candidates for the position available on behalf of both families. Bothare known to use this network to secure employment and/or good employees. This makesthe second part of the process much safer in the sense that one has already reduced thepool of prospective employers/employees significantly. Here a key element is familyreputation. Members of the D family have invested important resources (both personaland professional) in building a reputation of impressive ethics. Also, the G family hasinvested in the relationship by being respectful and considerate employers who have builta personal link with the Ds. In this sense they both have a reputation to uphold. Members


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of the D family will not normally recommend a black sheep (assuming they even haveone) for a position with the G family. It is in their interest to maintain the ethicalreputation they have and so therefore they will make sure that other members of the

family adhere to it. If the recommended person should betray the Gs, the whole D familymight have to pay for it, be it by loss of face/reputation or by losing their relationshipwith the Gs altogether. The risk to the Gs is evident, being victims of crime. Thisgenerates an incentive for internal control of its members within the G family. This is notjust a rational calculation; it also considers the personal involvement of both families thatgoes beyond the employment scheme. The G family on the other hand must adhere to acertain code of conduct that allows for a good relationship to evolve.

The second stage of the hiring process begins after the recommendation. In this processthe employer must ascertain whether or not the prospective employee has, de facto, thecharacteristics that are part of the D family reputation but also other more personal

characteristics that make that person trustworthy such as seriousness, helpfulness,discretion and other which, when added up, determine whether this person can beactually trusted, and ultimately hired. Ongoing research (Ochoa, forthcoming) points tothe use of a host of mechanisms in this second stage used to recognize trustworthinesssuch as age, geographical provenance and physical appearance. Further research willelaborate on this.

6. Conclusion

This paper has presented preliminary results of an ongoing investigation into the effectsof crime, specifically kidnapping, on relationships based on trust. Because they exemplify

very well the decision making process when risk of victimization is an importantconsideration I have chosen to analyse the relationships and hiring processes betweenmiddle and upper middle class people (common kidnapping victims) and their employees(common organizers/facilitators of kidnappings). As we have seen kidnapping hasbecome a very prevalent crime in Mexico City and a consideration of some seriousnessfor most of the population. The evolution of this crime can be potentially accredited to 1)a successful campaign on behalf of the government to fight organized kidnapping gangsand 2) the same governments failure to strengthen the rule of law, a scenario that openedthe kidnapping market to opportunist, non-specialized kidnappers, resulting in an increasein the kidnapping rate not just of wealthy people but mostly of middle and working classpeople, a demographic that has more difficulties protecting itself. This situation is the

basis of the second section of the paper that addresses how the dynamics of kidnappingaffect relationships based on trust in Mexico Citys relations-based, informalenvironment specifically when it comes to household work relationships. One importantresult is the use of substantial social networks and the development of personalrelationships between employer and employee families to assure trustworthiness. Somerelationships span two or three generations. This process is strongly based on reputationand this is what makes it solid. The use of these networks facilitates the task of decidingwho to hire by narrowing the pool of candidates substantially, it also reduces the cost ofinvestigating a persons reputation as information on this is readily available. The secondpart of the process involves further and more personalized testing of both the employer


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and the employees trustworthiness. More research is underway to explore themechanisms used for this. As a tentative conclusion to all this is it feasible to say that theweakness of the rule of law and the prevalence of kidnapping have made relationships

based on trust much more costly to attain and maintain. However, on a positive note it ispossible that, through heavy investment on reputation building and on the construction ofinformal familial networks that cut across class this problem is resolved favourably, atleast for the families involved.

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Interviews

Interview with District Official, summer 2008Interview ENV2, November 2008

Documents

A Look at Kidnapping, Trust and Employer – Employee Relationships