1

Professor Gold

ILR

A Legislative and Judicial History of Equality in the Workplace

With his masterful defense of a state maximum hour law for women in

Muller v. Oregon,1 Louis D. Brandeis established the framework within

which the next half–century of federal action towards American working

women would take place. Over that period, the legal paradigm shifted from

protecting sex as a class on the basis stereotypes—embodied in Brandeis’

Muller brief—to protection based on equality. The First World War brought

renewed Congressional attention to the situation of working women; the

actions of women in the service of national defense pressured government

to create an agency to advocate on their behalf: the Women’s Bureau of the

Department of Labor.

While a triumph for the time, low turnover within the Bureau kept the

Progressive principles that simultaneously advocated equal pay while

attempting to establish unequal work alive until the 1950’s. The Second

World War, however, and, to a lesser extent, the programs of the New Deal,

provided ample ammunition against the usefulness of stereotypes on the

job. The post–war reluctance of the Supreme Court to act on sex

discrimination though compelled supporters of equality at work to organize

a coalition of like minded groups which would seek redress through

Congress. The eventual success of this movement was embodied by the

Equal Pay Act of 1963 and augmented by the inclusion of sex as a protected

2

class in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These two laws forced the Court to

address equality at work and began the process of tearing down

stereotyped barriers to employment opportunity.

The law which Brandeis defended in 1908 was typical of

contemporary efforts to protect working women. It stated simply that, “no

female [shall] be employed in any mechanical establishment or factory or

laundry…more than ten hours during any one day.”2 Similar laws existed in

nineteen other states at the time Muller went to bar and Brandeis made

clear that the fate of each of the others rested with the Court’s decision.3

Both Brandeis and the State of Oregon were constrained, however, by the

Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York,4 which ruled a similar

maximum hour law covering bakers unconstitutional. The Court reasoned

that New York did not have, “reasonable ground for interfering with the

liberty of person or the right of free contract by determining the hours of

labor in the occupation of a baker” because the law protected, “neither the

safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public.”5 The law therefore could

not be justified under New York’s police powers and consequently violated

bakers’ freedom of contract guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.6

In order to convince the Court to uphold the law, Brandeis thus had to

establish that Oregon had reasonable ground for restricting the liberty of

women laundry workers. To do so, he distinguished between the target of

the New York law, bakers, and the target of the Oregon law, women.

Brandeis argued that women as a class deserved and, indeed, required,

3

special protection at work to protect their health and safety; moreover,

protecting women benefitted the welfare of the general public as well. If

this was true, Brandeis argued, then Oregon was justified in limiting

women’s liberty of contract.7

To prove the special needs of women as a class, Brandeis turned to

social science and statistics. While the research Brandeis used was valuable

to proving his argument in 1908, it embodied the paternalistic stereotypes

which would deny equality of opportunity for the next five decades.

Hindsight aside, Brandeis compiled a lengthy brief filled with excerpts of

such social work. Long hours, according to the research, took a severe toll

on women’s health.8 In addition to the increased possibility of general work

injuries, overwork was presented as being dangerous to potential future

children and “female functions.”9 In summarizing that argument, Brandeis

said, “the evil effect of overwork before as well as after marriage upon

childbirth is marked and disastrous.”10

The adverse effects of overwork on childbirth, however, were

presented as not only a danger to individual women but to society itself.

Brandeis’ analysis of the research summarized the Progressive Era attitude

well,

Deterioration of any large portion of the population inevitably

lowers the entire community physically, mentally, and morally.

When the health of women has been injured by long hours, not

only is the working efficiency of the community impaired, but

4

the deterioration is handed down to succeeding generations.

Infant mortality rises, while the children of married working–

women, who survive, are injured by inevitable neglect. The

overwork of future mothers thus directly attacks the welfare of

the nation.11

While Brandeis also presented arguments showing the economic and social

benefits of shorter hours, the portrayal of women as mothers of the nation’s

children was not only his main argument, but the one the Court seized on as

well in upholding the Oregon law. Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous

majority, argued that, “[since] healthy mothers are essential to vigorous

offspring, the physical well being of women becomes an object of public

interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race;”

therefore, because the reproductive health of women was an issue of

national concern—unlike the health of bakers—Oregon was justified in

restricting women’s liberty of contract12

The concern for women as mothers in Brandeis’ brief and the opinion

of the court echoed contemporary attitudes on the nature of working

women. When women succeed in pressuring Congress to establish an

advocate in the federal government through the Women’s Bureau, many of

the arguments in the Congressional Record sounded familiar. Establishing

the Bureau, however, was no easy task. It was the culmination of almost ten

years of advocacy and was spurred by emergency preparations during

5

World War I, the key to which was united outside pressure from women’s

groups, trade unions, and other similar advocacy organizations.

In 1910, the Women’s Trade Union League and the National

Consumer League, with tepid support from the American Federation of

Labor, convinced Congress to authorize a special investigation into the

conditions of working women.13 The investigation was conducted over the

course of two years by Charles Neill of the Department of Commerce and

Labor; when the report was released in 1912, it recognized that the average

woman worked in horrendous conditions and recommended the creation of

a women’s representative in the federal government.14 The result of this was

a Women’s Division in the Bureau of Labor Statistics.15 Unfortunately, the

women of the Division suffered slights and discrimination from their male

colleagues and by 1915, all had resigned, rendering the Division effectively

defunct.16

The entry of the United States into the First World War, however,

forced Congress to take a second look at the issue of women in the work

force, as millions flooded into the defense industries starved by the draft.

Several federal agencies, indeed, formed sub–committees to deal with

women’s issues. The Council of National Defense, for example, formed a

women’s committee which was asked to inspect defense plants to see how

best women workers could be utilized, though the committee’s efforts were

not as influential as its members hoped they would be.17

6

At the Ordnance Department, special women’s sections were formed

to accomplish a similar task to the women’s committee of the CND.18

General William Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, also issued General Orders

13.19 These orders were written by Mary Van Kleeck and though they were

enforced more as guidelines, they nevertheless asked defense contractors to

provide reasonable working hours, healthy working conditions, the right to

organize, and equal pay for equal work.20

While such ad–hoc work was admirable under the conditions in the

immediate aftermath of Congress declaring war, it hardly represented a

national voice for women and could not cover the issue with the same

thoroughness as a separate federal bureau could. When Congress

recognized this fact in July 1918, it created the independent Women in

Industry Service with an appropriation of $40,000.21 Felix Frankfurter, then

working at the Department of Labor, was given the authority to pick the

head of the new agency; he selected Mary Van Kleeck, who brought Mary

Anderson with her from the Ordnance Department to serve as assistant

director.22

Compared to the Women’s Division in the Bureau of Labor Statistics,

the WIS was a remarkable success. For example, when the WIS was

founded, only 40 percent of civil service exams allowed female applicants.23

Within two weeks, Van Kleeck and Anderson opened the remaining 60

percent to women.24 The WIS also worked on the same project Van Kleeck

had sponsored at the Ordnance Department. In addition to promoting equal

7

pay for equal work in contracts, the Service also specifically asked for

eight–hour days and forty–eight hour weeks, in addition to lunch breaks and

protection from hazardous chemicals.25 Most importantly though, WIS

agents performed inspections throughout the country and, though they

lacked legal authority to enforce standards, were often successful in

badgering employers into compliance.26

A good example of WIS work occurred shortly before the end of the

war in response to actions of the Manufacturers’ Association of Niagara

Falls. The Governor of New York had vetoed a bill that would have

abolished the state’s maximum hour law for women; in response, the

manufacturers of the Niagara Falls region—mostly involved in the chemical

industry supplying ordnance manufacturers—wrote to the Department of

Labor asking for a federal exemption.27 The manufacturers justified their

request by promising that the Polish and Italian immigrant women who

would be employed were, “accustomed to laboring work.”28

In response, Van Kleeck and the WIS organized an investigation of

women’s working conditions in factories in the area. Their findings not only

supported upholding the New York maximum hour law, but to create special

protections for the health of wage earning women.29 To be fair to the WIS, it

did not have any jurisdictional power over conditions of men and some

improvements, such as better ventilation, aided workers regardless of sex.

Nevertheless, the Niagara Falls case demonstrates the bifurcation of early

federal policy towards women. The WIS staunchly defended the

8

maternalistic maximum hour law despite the fact that equally applying

improved conditions could vitiate the need for the law in the first place,

although it can be argued the WIS hedged its bets since the improvement in

conditions was not necessarily permanent.

The shift in federal policy, however, was less dramatic than it might

have been due to the demographic nature of women workers during World

War I. A significant number of women did work during the war and their

contributions should not be downplayed. Of the ten million wage–earning

women in 1918, close to two million worked in defense industries.30 The vast

majority of these women though were young and single. Fewer than 7

percent of white married women, for example, worked for wages.31

That more married women did not work was partly a result of the

relative brevity of the war; a propaganda campaign to recruit married

women for the Remington munitions factories in Bridgeport, Connecticut

was, indeed, cancelled before it could go into full effect due to falling

government orders leading up to the Armistice.32 Moreover, though women

were officially encouraged to work in defense industries, only 5 percent of

those who entered the labor force during the war were doing so for the first

time.33

While the women working during World War I performed an

important task in that they demonstrated they could perform jobs

stereotypically designated for men, a shift of women already in the labor

force into men’s jobs did not result in a major shift in public perception of

9

job stereotypes. The lack of married women entering the labor force—and

non–working women in general—additionally left in place the stereotype

that women worked only as a prelude to marriage. The mobilization

campaigns of World War II had a much different effect on the lives of

women and public perception, which will be discussed in detail later.

Demographic concerns aside though, federal policy was not

guaranteed to be permanently changed either. The WIS was a “war

emergency agency” and only received appropriations through the end of the

war; enough women continued working after the armistice, however, that

Congress continued funding the WIS through 1919 in order to aid the

transition to peace.34 When appropriations threatened to expire again in

1920, Representative Philip Campbell of Kansas and Senator William

Kenyon of Iowa co–sponsored a bill to turn the WIS into a permanent

Women’s Bureau within the Department of Labor.35

In establishing what the intended effect of the Women’s Bureau was

to be within government, it is useful to examine the legislative history of the

bills involved. Hearings on the Kenyon–Cambell bill and a competing bill

sponsored by Rep. John Raker of California, were held before the Joint

Committee on Labor on March 4, 1920.36 Raker’s bill intended the primary

purpose of the Women’s Bureau to be studies on whether or not work

harmed women intending to marry, which caused a vicious argument. Raker

asked Rep. John MacCrate of New York, “is it not what this legislation is

primarily for: the benefit of a woman after she leaves work as well as while

10

she works?”37 Rep. MacCrate responded, “Of course not, women are in

industries, and are going in greater numbers. A great many women do not

want a man but prefer work.”38 In response, Raker shouted that, “99

percent of women have the desire to marry.”39

To avoid such disagreement, the Committee instead voted to favorably

report the more narrowly worded Kenyon–Campbell bill. That the

committee denied Raker’s effort, “to try and keep a healthy race,” however,

should not be seen as a repudiation of the maternalistic qualities of the WIS

or the framework established by Brandeis.40 Most of the testimony before

the committee, indeed, resembled that of Henry Sterling, a union

representative, who said, “There are women in industry, and a very great

number of them work in conditions that are deplorable. They need the

mothering that women can bring them, that men cannot.”41

Similar sentiments were also expressed as the Kenyon–Campbell bill,

H.R. 13229, was debated in the House and Senate. Also, unlike Rep.

MacCrate’s exchange with Rep. Raker, the only serious opposition came

from congressmen concerned about continuing war time spending and one,

Rep. Thomas Blanton of Texas who feared “socialist” domination of the

Department of Labor.42 During the first debate on the bill, which occurred

on April 5th, Rep. Campbell outlined his conception of the Bureau, he said,

Thousands of women employed in the industries of the country

during the war are continuing their employment, and as the

years come and go in the future more and more women will be

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employed in the industries of the country. It is hardly

compatible with the attitude of the American people towards

those engaged…that they should not have some sympathetic

way of reaching the authorities and bringing to the attention of

the country any special needs they may have.43

This justification, while milder than that of Rep. Raker, still emphasizes the

“special needs” of women as a class. Not all representatives, however, were

so obliging. Rep. Joseph Walsh of Massachusetts accused women of strong–

arming Congress; “strong–arm methods have been threatened,” Walsh said,

“and used in connection with the demand of the women of this country.

They got suffrage through Congress by strong–arm methods.”44 Walsh’s

objections had little impact on the eventual outcome of the bill though;

indeed, Walsh did not even vote on it.45

More substantive debate took place on April 19th. During this debate,

Rep. Campbell clarified the powers of the new bureau to Rep. James

McLaughlin of Michigan, who asked, “would [the] Bureau have authority to

make regulations…and enforce them?”46 Campbell replied, “No; not to

enforce them, but to suggest them.”47 More serious opposition came from

Rep. Schuyler Merritt of Connecticut. Merrit objected to “mak[ing] into

permanent law a war time expedient;” additionally, Merritt argued, with

considerable foresight, that as women pressed for and gained greater

equality, Campbell’s Women’s Bureau design would seem unsatisfactory.48

Merritt stated that, “I think the women who have given this matter most

12

attention believe that when women get all of their rights…we ought not to

differentiate as between men and women.”49 If that was true, argued

Merritt, it would be wrong to separate protection of men and women within

the Department of Labor.

One can infer from Rep. Merritt’s line of reasoning a further

demonstration of the attitude the Women’s Bureau would enshrine in the

federal bureaucracy and against which it would later struggle to change.

Other representatives, however, were more direct. In another debate later

the same day, Rep. William Carss of Minnesota stated that the purpose of

the Bureau should be to protect women for the benefit of the “race,” saying,

As much as many of us deplore that women have to give up

homemaking and go out in the world to make a living we find

that condition existing today and we have to meet it…if we are

to retain the health of the coming generation and raise a

rugged, virile race of people, we have got to provide for those

women in industry…and see that those women are protected

from anything that might tend to injure their potential

motherhood.50

Obviously, even though Rep. Raker’s more broadly worded bill was defeated

in committee, congressmen, even those who had been present at the

hearings like Rep. Carss, did not think that they had necessarily precluded

the Women’s Bureau from working within the framework Rep. Raker

envisioned.

13

The last point of note from the House debate is that, despite the

relatively limited mobilization of women, the war nevertheless shaped

congressional opinion. Rep. Campbell, for instance, stated that, “the war

taught the women that they could perform useful labor in the industries of

the country, and also taught those engaged in industry that the women

made good employees in many of the industries of the country.”51 Even Rep.

Raker acknowledged women’s performance during the war, saying, “during

the war hundreds of thousands of women took the places of men who had

joined the Army and did men’s work. Their efficiency and competency were

proven in every branch of industry.”52 While the views expressed on the war

tell us less about how the Women’s Bureau would function, they are good

evidence as to how even relatively smaller wars or disturbances affect

policy.

Foreshadowing of the future aside though, the debate on April 19th

was the last in the House; the bill passed with 256 yeas, 9 nays, and 162 not

voting.53 The bill was referred to the Senate the next day and a favorable

report was delivered by Sen. Kenyon on May 4th.54 Following the report, the

Senate slowed the legislative process, but only slightly. The first and only

day of debate took place on June 1st; token opposition to the bill was given

by Senator Charles Thomas of Colorado, who was concerned over growing

federal bureaucracy, but debate was otherwise perfunctory and no vote was

recorded.55 One superficial amendment passed and was agreed to by the

14

House and after barely four months of debate, President Woodrow Wilson

signed the Women’s Bureau into law on June 5, 1920.56

The lesson the creation of the Women’s Bureau left for future policy

change was two–fold. As mentioned above, incidents beyond the average

citizen’s control, such as wars, can be important catalysts for policy

changes. More importantly, however, organized outside political pressure

and a united front are strong motivators for congressmen to shift federal

policy. In addition to men like Henry Sterling, the union representative who

spoke at the original hearing, Sen. Kenyon discussed the myriad of groups

which had pressured him to act in a brief speech during Senate debate.

Kenyon stated that, “representatives were at the hearings who claimed that

they spoke for 9,000,000 women in this country [and] the national

committees of the two great parties were represented. The Women’s Voters’

League, which has a tremendous membership in this country, were

represented and they felt that it would give the bureau a status and dignity

to make it permanent.”57 Lack of such unity in the coming decades would

not only hamper the operation of the Women’s Bureau, but hindered further

congressional change in federal policy as well.

The coalition which lobbied for the Women’s Bureau, indeed, did not

just lack unity during the 1920’s, it fractured completely. In the women’s

movement, national groups were split between the conservative revanchism

popularized by President Warren G. Harding’s “return to normalcy,” the

comparatively radical demand’s of Alice Paul and the National Women’s

15

Party, and national middle class groups which were hemorrhaging

members.58 The Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, had

supported the creation of the Women’s Bureau; during the 1920’s, though,

many in the DAR accused the Bureau of harboring “Reds” and of supporting

communism.59 Bureau chief Mary Anderson, indeed, grew to hate the annual

DAR convention which took place only a few blocks away from the

Department of Labor, calling it, “the Damned Annual Row.”60

In addition to losing the patronage of the women of the DAR, other

women, as predicted by Rep. Merritt, began pushing for absolute equality.

In 1923, the NWP succeeded in having the Equal Rights Amendment

introduced to Congress, which would spark several decades of strife

between the Bureau—which desired to defend protective legislation—and

supporters of the ERA.61 The Bureau suffered less from outright hostility

though than from the simple decline of its key allies. The National

Consumers League and the Women’s Trade Union League, both of which

were ardent supporters of the Bureau, faced steep declines in membership

and, consequently, political clout, throughout the 1920’s.62

The WTUL also brought additional troubles for the Women’s Bureau

aside from loss of influence as it failed in its liaisons with the American

Federation of Labor. The president of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, called the

WTUL leadership, “intellectuals on a sociology slumming tour.”63 Mary

Anderson had been an organizer with the WTUL, so needless to say, the

AFL remained skeptical of the Women’s Bureau even after Gompers’ death.

16

The AFL indeed could ignore the Bureau with impunity as its leadership did

not need to worry about recrimination from rank and file women; though

over 3 million women worked in trades under AFL jurisdiction, less than

200,000 were members of AFL affiliated unions.64 Moreover, while the

Bureau encouraged women to join unions, it often did so at the price of

internal inconsistency. In one case, the Bureau organized a campaign

against the International Molders Union, which forbade women from being

apprentices in foundries; the same Bureau members then launched a drive

for increased protective legislation which would prevent women from

working in places like foundries in the first place.65

The collapse of the coalition which supported the Women’s Bureau did

not necessarily mean it should fail in its mission, considering it survived the

hurdle of actually being established. Unfortunately for the Bureau though,

where its efforts suffered from lack of third party support, its failures were

compounded by perpetual lack of funds.66 The inability to expand left the

Bureau to become a relatively insular organization with strong institutional

loyalty as most Bureau members came from the small coterie of women

qualified for its work when it was founded in 1920.67 Many of these women,

indeed, would retain their positions until they either chose or were forced to

retire in the 1950’s.68 Such length of tenure kept the legacy of Progressive

thought alive well into the age of Eisenhower.

Federal policy, however, was not completely limited by the attitude of

one bureau. As during World War I, federal policy was forced to change in

17

an emergency response to the economic catastrophe of the Great

Depression. The massive expansion of government programs under Franklin

D. Roosevelt’s New Deal brought not only many new opportunities to

women, but created a powerful clique of influential women in Washington

D.C. as well. Women such as the first female cabinet secretary, Secretary of

Labor Frances Perkins, and Molly Dewson, the powerful head of the

Democratic Party’s Women’s Division, along with Eleanor Roosevelt,

ensured that federal relief programs were extended to women as well as

men.69 The effects of the Depression did not discriminate based on sex.

Among the programs which helped bring more women into public life

was the Works Progress Administration. In addition to initiatives such as the

Federal Art and Federal Theater Projects, which were open to women, the

WPA had a designated Women’s Division devoted to relief efforts.70 Yet it

would be a mistake to classify the WPA efforts as superior to those of the

Women’s Bureau. The WPA Women’s Division was not concerned with

employment, but rather relief and focused on stereotypical chores such as

sewing and washing.71 Even if the Women’s Bureau had desired to compete

with the WPA though, it would have been pointless given the WPA’s

absolutely massive size. The WPA was funded by a $4.88 billion emergency

appropriation worth 6.7 percent of 1935 GDP; the Women’s Bureau

appropriation that year was $152,000.72

A program which represented a more decisive shift in federal policy

and, moreover, worked well with the Women’s Bureau, was the National

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Youth Administration. One of the NYA’s projects involved the establishment

of summer schools for young girls. The NYA schools ran two to four month

programs which emphasized English grammar, health education, and

economics, though in order to fulfill the NYA’s work requirement, the girls

were still expected to spend several hours a day performing such tasks as

making hospital bandages or binding government pamphlets.73 The classes

themselves, however, used free “textbooks” mainly composed of the

Bulletins issued by the Women’s Bureau, which encouraged participation in

the labor force.74 Unfortunately, the program was abruptly abolished by

Congress over accusations that pupils were being made into Communist

cadres and taught to sing the Internationale.75

In the end, while the programs of the New Deal created many

opportunities for women in government—opportunities which would not be

duplicated until Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society—the programs

themselves represented less a targeted shift in federal policy towards

women and more a simple expansion of government that caught many

women in its wake.76 The Women’s Bureau itself additionally suffered

because Mary Anderson became embroiled in a feud with her superior,

Frances Perkins, further hurting the ability of the Bureau to perform; while

appropriations for the Department of Labor as a whole rose dramatically,

from $13.5 million in 1933 to $39.6 million in 1937, appropriations for the

Women’s Bureau actually fell from $160,000 to $154,000.77

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Outside of work programs and intra–departmental hostilities though,

the Depression made finding a consistent set of public policies for women

workers even more urgent. Neither Anderson, however, nor the rest of the

Bureau were ready to sacrifice protective labor legislation and so they

continued their fight against the ERA.78 In Bulletin #65, the Bureau argued

that comparatively few women suffered economic harm from protective

laws because they were “naturally” averse to the types of jobs that were

restricted; moreover, implementation of the ERA would vitiate these laws,

exposing unsuspecting women to physical harm for little economic gain.79

Needless to say, Alice Paul described the Bureau as an, “enemy camp…

breathing incompetence.”80

The Women’s Bureau also failed to reconcile with organized labor

during the 1930’s as well. During the Depression itself, the AFL continued

to remain skeptical of the Women’s Bureau and while the new industrial

unions of the CIO did not necessarily share the same prejudices as the more

conservative AFL, 92 percent of the workers unionized during the

Depression were men.81 These numbers on their own would be serious

cause for concern, but the strengthening of organized labor prior to the

coming of World War II, particularly the industrial unions of the CIO,

actually benefitted the push for equality in the post–war era. As we shall

see, the new labor movement and Women’s Bureau would have a better, if

cautious, relationship after World War II and would continue to push

Congress to act on policy when it became clear that the Supreme Court

20

would not. The monumental changes wrought by the war and mobilization

though must be explained first.

When the United States was finally forced into the Second World War,

the scale of its mobilization efforts dwarfed anything seen before or since

and, intentionally or not, changed the fabric of American society for

everyone from GIs to African–Americans to women. When the war began,

there were high hopes within the Women’s Bureau that it would be allowed

to reprise the role that the WIS had played during World War I.82

Unfortunately for Anderson and the members of the Bureau, the Roosevelt

administration preferred to operate through a host of newly created federal

agencies.83 During the initial phases of the war, indeed, it was difficult for

the Bureau to determine where exactly it should be exerting its efforts; the

National Defense Advisory Committee, the Office of Production

Management, and the War Production Board all laid some claim to

restructuring the economy and reorienting labor to meet wartime

demands.84

The issue of which agency would be best to liaise with was solved in

April 1942 with the creation of the War Manpower Commission.85 Initially,

however, the WMC was little interested in dealing with the Bureau, even

though it had specifically created a Management Labor Policy Committee.86

To counter this problem, the Bureau put significant pressure on WMC

chairman Paul McNutt to include a Bureau perspective and, in a rare

wartime victory for the Bureau, McNutt acquiesced, appointing a Women’s

21

Advisory Committee in late 1942.87 The victory was bittersweet though as

the WAC was rapidly marginalized within the wartime bureaucracy; the only

task the WAC was ever given involved recruiting women into factories and

the armed services.88 Even then, the WMC preferred operating through

different agencies, such as the Office of War Information.89

The OWI was founded in the summer of 1942 and was immediately

tasked with reconciling the American public to what the federal government

perceived to be the necessities of war.90 The OWI itself worked both through

internal sub–bureaus, such as the Magazine Bureau, and private sector

partnerships, such as the War Advertising Council.91 The task handed to

these agencies, as it related to women war workers, was immense. In 1936,

a Gallup poll had shown that 85 percent of American men and 79 percent of

women disapproved of married women working outside the home if a

husband was able to support her.92 The federal government had no real

interest in changing societal norms, but, at least temporarily, it needed to

make sure that even married women would be viewed as competent and

capable workers in order to avoid interruptions to production. It was left to

the OWI and its partners to determine how best this task could be done.

In reaching the public, the Magazine Bureau proved to be a key actor;

it was chaired by Dorothy Ducas, a journalist and personal friend of Eleanor

Roosevelt.93 Ducas began publication of a bi–monthly journal called the

Magazine War Guide. The Guide, which contained suggestions for stories

and campaigns which would help the war effort, was sent to magazine

22

editors at publications such as McCall’s, Ladies’ Home Journal,

Cosmopolitan, Life, and the Saturday Evening Post.94 A typical issue

contained statements such as, “men in [blue–collar] fields must be prepared

to receive women as co–workers. This can be done through stories showing

the advent of women in the logging camps, on the railroads…and showing

them not as weak sisters but as coming through in manly style.”95 By early

1943, such directives were combined into a cohesive “womanpower”

campaign designed to recruit women into war industries and mollify their

male co–workers.96

A prime example of this campaign can be seen in the evolution of

married female characters in the short fiction stories of the Saturday

Evening Post. In 1942, though 54 percent of lead stories contained a

prominent female character, only 17 percent of the total number of stories

contained women in war work.97 The shift in 1943 was dramatic. That year,

67 percent of lead stories contained prominent female characters, but, more

importantly, 57 percent of all stories contained female characters in war

work.98 On a smaller level, the same change occurred for married women. In

1942, only 18 percent of lead female characters engaged in war work were

portrayed as married; in 1943, that percentage rose to 30 percent.99 The

Post also made contributions to art as well as fiction. The Post’s premier

illustrator was Norman Rockwell, who created enduring, front page images

of Rosie the Riveter, two of which appeared in 1943.100

23

The result of the WMC and OWI campaigns were phenomenal. The

Post alone had a wartime circulation of over three million and it was just

one publication out of many. The federally directed campaign and wartime

necessity allowed hundreds of thousands of women to take jobs

stereotypically reserved for men. Throughout the war, the aircraft industry

employed 310,000 women, another 200,000 worked in the automobile

industry, and there were over 375,000 women doing electrical work.101

Many other women additionally found work in heavy industry and

transportation such as on railroads or in shipyards.102 Women’s presence in

these industries also gave them increased access to the benefits of

President Roosevelt’s new labor laws. Three million women joined unions

during the war, three times the number of women unionized in 1940.103

More importantly, many became members of large, industrial unions like

the United Auto Workers, which had 350,000 female members.104 The ties

between women and industrial unions would become increasingly important

as the Women’s Bureau sought to reassert itself in the post–war era.

It is true that many of these women were members of the working

class, similar to most of the women who worked during World War I; they

had not been the targets of the propaganda campaigns.105 Unlike World War

I though, there were a significant amount of women who were entering the

labor force for the first time. In 1940, 22 percent of women over the age of

fourteen worked; by 1945, that percentage had risen to 36 percent.106 In

raw numbers, this meant six million women traded housework for the

24

factory.107 Moreover, while the women war workers of World War I were

young and single, during World War II, married women outnumbered single

women in the labor force for the first time in American history; of the six

million women entering the labor force during the war, indeed, 1.5 million

were between the ages of forty–five and sixty–five.108 Federal policy during

the war was not intended destroy stereotypes about what jobs women could

do; it was designed to show what women must do to win the war. By its very

success, however, it provided innumerable examples that the stereotypes

themselves were false.

Unfortunately, women who desired to stay in their wartime positions

after victory faced serious challenges to that goal. While their work may

have provided persuasive evidence that old stereotypes were wrong, it did

not automatically convince many employers, who rapidly returned to pre–

war hiring and firing practices.109 Additionally, federal policy, while not

directed specifically against women, further undermined their tenuous

position; under federal mandate, employers were required to rehire

returning veterans to their old positions, further displacing many women.110

The end result was that by 1946, one out of every four women working in

factories lost their job.111

While the labor market struggled to adjust to post–war realities, the

Women’s Bureau found itself once again the sole federal policy outlet for

working women. Its actions showed it attempting to straddle the old

Progressive Era ideas it was founded on and the clear need for a

25

fundamental shift in federal policy. Members of the Bureau knew from their

own surveys that most women—75 percent by the Bureau’s count—desired

to remain in the labor force after the war. While the Bureau was dedicated

to meeting these desires, it was not always in the way many women

wanted.112 The Bureau’s Employment Opportunities Section sought to funnel

women into non–industrial fields which lacked the potential for

advancement and benefits of unionization so many wartime jobs provided.113

An article by staff member Kathryn Blood in Glamour, indeed, stated that

most women were, “non–mechanical Nells” who should seek occupations,

“in which they could use their characteristic abilities.”114

Despite such attitudes, however, the Women’s Bureau had also

always supported the principle of equal pay. After the war, the Bureau, now

led by Frieda Miller, Mary Anderson’s friend and hand–picked successor,

reevaluated whether such a policy was possible on the federal level.115

Miller chose to pursue such legislation on two grounds: first, almost the

entire Supreme Court had been appointed by Franklin Roosevelt and had, in

1941, upheld a national minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards

Act.116 Second, an equal pay act was thought to undermine the position of

ERA supporters and the Bureau was still determined to defend protective

employment laws.117 Pressure for an equal pay law also came from outside

the Bureau as well. During the war, equal pay policies had been established

by unions like the UAW and United Electrical Workers to prevent employers

26

using women to lower men’s wages; codifying such laws on a federal level

would make this guarantee permanent.118

With this strategy in mind, the Women’s Bureau began to draft

legislation with Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon and Senator Claude

Pepper of Florida, which became S. 1178. The Senate Subcommittee on

Education and Labor began hearings on the bill on October 29, 1945.119 The

index of statements and testimony shows the degree of success which the

Bureau had in recruiting allies to its coalition. Six different national unions

in addition to a myriad of women’s interest groups testified before the

committee in support of the bill; moreover, not only did the CIO send a

representative of its Women’s Auxiliary, the AFL sent Lewis Hines, its

legislative representative, to testify in support of the bill as well as

protective labor legislation for women.120 In his testimony, Hines said that,

The American Federation of Labor has consistently advocated

the policy of equal pay for equal work…if we permit any group

of workers—regardless of who or what they are—to be paid less

for equivalent work than other workers, we have a potential

threat to stability and balance which would ultimately and

inevitably become as disastrous to employers as to wage

earners…there is no justification—moral or economic—for a

differential in wages between one worker and another who

makes an equal contribution to the industry.121

27

That the Bureau could win the support of the AFL was a signal of significant

strength. In 1945, the AFL had seven million members in the United States

with another 1.5 million serving overseas.122 It signified that the coalition

which had split during the 1920’s could be mended and brought to bear on

Congress once again.

The hearings also show the impetus for much witness support of the

bill. While simple economic justice—as Lewis Hines explained—was a

frequent argument, many witnesses felt compelled to mention the work

done by women during the war. In his testimony, Secretary of Labor Lewis

Schwellenbach gave his support for the bill saying, “the women of America

have demonstrated their ability to carry an important share of the industrial

effort of this Nation in time of war…it should not be overlooked that one out

of three employees in the national civilian labor force during the war was a

woman.”123 Frieda Miller was even more forthright when she said that, “the

war situation simply created a definitely more favorable atmosphere in

which to get this principle of equal pay into operation.”124 Even the

statement from the National Council of Jewish Women mentioned the war

as a motivating factor in support of the bill. The statement read in part that,

“during the war, women proved that they were able to live up to the same

standards of performance as the men alongside whom they worked. To pay

women a wage lower than men who perform the same job is…a clear

injustice to the women concerned.”125

28

The Bureau and its allies had cause to be optimistic in the wake of

such testimony. Indeed, a companion bill to S. 1178, H.R.5221, was

introduced in the House shortly after the Senate hearings by Rep. Chase

Gooding Woodhouse of Connecticut.126 Additionally, S. 1178 was reported

favorably to the Senate on June 21, 1946.127 H.R. 5221 was also reported

favorably on July 27th, though the House Report simply chose to reprint the

Senate report.128 The Senate Report first discussed that even given the wide

variety of witnesses called, not one testified in opposition to the bill and as

such recommended swift enactment.129 The report also outlined three

central justifications for the bill: the existence of wage–rate discrimination

based on sex, the depressing effect of discriminatory wage–rate differentials

on the economy, and the injustice of wage differentials to women

workers.130

On the reality of wage discrimination, the report cited the half–

century spent trying to abolish it as, “the most eloquent testimony to [its]

existence,” and referenced the actions taken during World War I to mitigate

it.131 Furthermore, the report noted that World War II had brought the issue

to national attention before the War Labor Board.132 During the war, the

Labor Board issued General Order No. 16, which was similar to the

Ordnance Department’s General Orders 13 from World War I.133 Employers

were given limited freedom from wage controls in order to make voluntary

adjustments to meet the principle of equal pay for equal work; due to the

labor shortage in many industries, many employers took advantage of this

29

option to attract more workers.134 With the war over, the report argued that

progress made during the war would be threatened without a permanent

legislative shift in federal policy.135

The economic justification for the bill, however, demonstrates the

length to which the report was willing to go in order to convince the 79th

Congress of its necessity. That February, Congress had passed the

Employment Act of 1946; its goal of full employment demanded careful

economic planning to keep production growing.136 Wage discrimination

threatened those goals. The report read,

Wage practices which tend to keep [women’s] incomes at low

levels will inevitably effect a considerable reduction in the

available amount of purchasing power and demand for

consumer goods, and will thus tend to defeat our attempts to

maintain full employment through high levels of production…for

the protection of the national economy, therefore, your

committee believes it necessary that Federal legislation be

enacted to prohibit sex discrimination in wage rates.137

By linking the need for a shift in federal policy for women workers

with such an important piece of contemporary policy, it is obvious that

the Senators and Representatives who drafted the reports had

recognized that women were to be part of the permanent labor force

and that denying them equal treatment at work would hurt the nation

30

as much as it did the individual women. Speaking of a separate

injustice was almost redundant.

Yet despite such glowing reports and strong testimony, neither bill

was ever debated on the floor. It is moreover difficult to discover why the

bills were not debated as such backroom conversations are not documented

in the Congressional Record. Partisan politics does not provide a

satisfactory answer as both parties had unequivocally endorsed equal pay

for equal work in their 1944 platforms and both would do so again in 1948;

both parties had also endorsed an equal rights amendment though, so it is

possible that intra–party politics played a role.138 The Republican Party also

gained control of both houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections for

the first time since 1930, but after a protracted fight with President Harry

Truman, promptly ceded both houses back to the Democrats in 1948.139 It is

equally possible that during such turbulent political times, even relatively

popular legislation was overlooked. Lastly, such a shift in federal policy is

usually best accomplished with strong executive as well as legislative

leadership; such leadership was simply not focused on equal pay in 1946.140

The failure to pass equal pay legislation in the immediate aftermath of

the war did not necessarily mean that any hope of a permanent federal shift

was lost. The Supreme Court had undergone a considerable transformation

since 1908 and, indeed, intervened in civil rights cases where Congress

could or would not act throughout the post–war era, ultimately culminating

in its repudiation of the separate but equal doctrine of Plessey v. Ferguson

31

in the monumental decision Brown v. Board of Education.141 While the

members of the Women’s Bureau would not have wanted a full repudiation

of Muller, the Court did have the opportunity to act on some of the more

obvious stereotype based violations of equal protection when it considered

Goesaert v. Cleary in November 1948.142

In Goesaert, plaintiff Valentine Goesaert was the duly licensed owner

of a bar in Dearborn, Michigan in which she and her daughter Margaret

Goesaert worked as bartenders.143 In 1945, the Michigan State Legislature

adopted an amendment to its Liquor Control Act which stated that,

No person shall act as bartender in establishment licensed

under this act to sell alcoholic liquor…in any city…having a

population of 50,000 or more, unless such person shall be

licensed by the commission…Each applicant for license shall be

a male person 21 years of age or over…Provided, that the wife

or daughter of the male owner of any establishment licensed to

sell alcoholic liquor…may be licensed as a bartender by the

commission.144

The effect of this new law on the plaintiffs was to deny the right of Valentine

Goesaert to work as a bartender in her own establishment and to moreover

compel her to discharge her daughter from employment. In a 2–1 decision,

the district court upheld the Michigan law and denied the plaintiffs

injunctive relief.145 Plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, which

granted certiorari.

32

In the brief for the appellants, counsel argued that the classification

made by the Michigan law in regard to sex was, “repugnant to the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it

creates an unreasonable and arbitrary classification, and denies the

plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”146 Counsel reasoned that

persons similarly situated were not affected alike by the statute; the wife

and daughter of a male bar owner could legally work as bartenders even in

his absence while the daughter of a female owner—and the female owner

herself—could not, even if a male was always present.147 In support of this

position they quoted at length the dissent of Judge Picard from the district

court decision, who wrote,

Has not this woman by every test of reasoning been deprived of

the equal protection of the laws? One’s sense of fair play and

justice rebels…Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co. 148 holds

that the constitutionality of any legislative enactment may be

attacked ‘when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore

is purely arbitrary…’ This law can be upheld then only if it is not

arbitrary and unreasonable under any set of facts that can

reasonably be conceived.149

In his dissent, cited by counsel, Judge Picard then proposed situations under

which the law would seem “palpably arbitrary, capricious and

unreasonable” for each reason the majority opinion of the district court

cited for upholding the law.150

33

In considering this case, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to

push, if not Congress, then the state legislatures, towards an interpretation

of the equal protection clause which rejected the relevance of stereotypes to

the law. Writing for the majority, however, Justice Frankfurter disagreed.

Frankfurter recognized that women were capable of working in bars and,

indeed, called it “a historic calling. We meet the alewife, sprightly and

ribald, in Shakespeare.”151 While this was true, Frankfurter wrote though,

the authority of a legislature to regulate the liquor business was equally as

ancient and the Fourteenth Amendment did not change that authority, he

argued that,

This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal

position of women. The fact that women may now have achieved

the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and

now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not

preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the

sexes.152

Frankfurter further reasoned that the distinction drawn by the Michigan

law passed constitutional muster because bartending by women, in

“allowable legislative judgment,” could cause moral and social problems

against which the state was justified in using its police powers.153 The

legislature’s distinction between ownership could be upheld on the same

grounds, that is the problem the law was designed to counter could be

34

mitigated by male ownership and therefore women could work at such

bars.154

Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy—though they

did not argue directly that women had outgrown protective legislation—ably

demonstrated in their dissent why such arbitrary distinctions between men

and women harmed those they were supposedly meant to protect. The

dissent argued that the law allowed women to bartend alone, so long as the

bar was owned by a husband or father while simultaneously denying

employment to all other women, even if they owned the bar.155 Such an

inevitable result, reasoned Rutledge,

belies the assumption that the statute was motivated by a

legislative solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of

women who, but for the law, would be employed as barmaids.

Since there could be no other conceivable justification for such

discrimination against women owners of liquor establishments,

the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal

protection.156

Nevertheless, the majority affirmed the judgment of the district court. The

shift in federal policy would not come from the Supreme Court. Goesaert,

indeed, would stand until 1976 when the Court overturned it in Craig v.

Boren, well after Congress had made the decision to shift federal policy

themselves.157

35

Combined with the failure of Congress to pass an equal pay act, the

Goesaert decision forced the coalition of women’s groups, unions, and

liberal politicians striving for workplace equality to regroup. The Bureau

continued its advocacy for equal pay and bills were put before congress

again in both 1948 and 1950, though nothing substantive came from

either.158 The election of 1952 and the administration of Dwight D.

Eisenhower, however, brought significant change to the operation of the

Women’s Bureau which ultimately helped lead to the final shift in federal

policy. Frieda Miller, one of the most significant connections to the original

Progressive Era Bureau of Mary Anderson, was replaced by Alice

Leopold.159 The survival of the Bureau through the 1950’s simultaneously

cut its heaviest ties with an internally inconsistent past and preserved it as

a base from which to influence the future direction of federal policy.

Leopold’s first act in office indeed was an attempt to reduce the

tensions between the Bureau and ERA supporters. The Bureau had been

slowly losing outside supporters for its stance on protective legislation; the

Women’s Trade Union League, for example, one of the most important

supporters of protective legislation and, consequently, vociferous opponents

of the ERA, had disbanded in 1950.160 While Leopold never went so far as to

completely renounce protective legislation, she reasoned that downplaying

it among the Bureau’s priorities might attract ERA supporters to help pass

equal pay legislation.161 Leopold’s record on the task was no better than

Miller’s though, as equal pay bills brought up in 1954, 1955, 1957, and

36

1959 all came to nothing.162 Congress could not decide whether an equal

pay law should be administered through the Women’s Bureau and modeled

on the National Labor Relations Act, or simply be enacted as an amendment

to the Fair Labor Standards Act.163

During the 1950’s, the Bureau was additionally more politicized than

at any previous point in its history. In 1954, President Eisenhower indeed

proposed to eliminate the Bureau completely in a message delivered to

Congress on his Reorganization Plan; Eisenhower reasoned that there was

no longer any need for an arm of the federal government devoted to

women’s special interests since women were represented in all 466

occupations listed by the Bureau of the Census.164 It was only through the

administrative discretion of Secretary of Labor James Mitchell that the

Women’s Bureau was saved from abolition; nevertheless, the Bureau lost a

significant amount of authority which might have allowed it to administer an

equal pay law. It should be noted as well that Leopold’s appointment on its

own had already politicized the Bureau. Unlike her predecessors, Leopold

had been an elected Republican official; she had served in the Connecticut

General Assembly, was elected Connecticut secretary of state, and served

for a period as acting governor.165

Given the newly political nature of the office, it was no surprise when

John F. Kennedy replaced Leopold after his inauguration in 1961. His

choice, Esther Peterson, combined with Kennedy’s own executive

leadership, would harness the coalition that had been built since the end of

37

World War II to finally shift federal policy towards promoting a more equal

workplace. Peterson herself, indeed, had been part of the coalition. After

World War II, she had worked for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of

America and the newly united AFL–CIO as a lobbyist.166 She had also known

Kennedy since he was a Member of the House.167 When Kennedy offered her

a position in his administration at the United Nations, she asked for the

Women’s Bureau instead because of her, “labor union base.”168 Peterson

was not willing to go as far as Leopold on protective legislation without any

guarantees of federal protection and actually increased opposition to the

ERA.169 Peterson, however, also provided a new focus on securing equal pay

legislation and had the legislative and political insight necessary for

success.

Peterson’s activism was given additional leverage by Kennedy’s active

interest in improving the status of working women. On December 14, 1961,

Kennedy signed Executive Order 10980, which created the President’s

Commission on the Status of Women to be administered by the Department

of Labor.170 Peterson had actively worked to convince Kennedy to issue the

order and had written it with the help of, among others, Secretary of Labor

Arthur Goldberg, Helen Betholt of the Communication Workers of America,

and Olya Margolin of the National Council of Jewish Women.171 The

Commission itself contained an equally if not more impressive coalition of

groups; representatives came from the Union of Electrical, Radio, and

Machine Workers, the National Council of Negro Women, the National

38

Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, the National

Council of Catholic Women, and the NCJW.172

In evaluating the promise of such a commission, Justice Frankfurter

said that, “Commissions are admirable means for taking the nation to

school.”173 Among the immediate suggestions of the Commission were

amendments to existing laws and legal action; the Commission suggested

that the FLSA should be amended to fully cover hotels, restaurants, and

laundries where large numbers of women worked, test cases based on

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection against laws which

discriminated by sex, and immediate passage of an equal pay act.174 A new

equal pay bill, S. 1409, was introduced in the Senate by Senator Patrick

McNamara of Michigan, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, and Senator

Jennings Randolph of West Virginia on April 30, 1963.175 A companion bill,

H.R. 6060, was introduced in the House by Rep. Edith Green of Oregon six

days later on May 6th.176 The bills were favorably reported on May 13th and

May 20th, respectively.177 The following legislative history is instructive to

determining why Congress agreed to such a shift in policy and what it

hoped to achieve in doing so.

The first debate on what would become the Equal Pay Act of 1963

occurred in the Senate on May 17th and was limited in length.178 Not one

senator spoke in opposition to the bill and it was passed on the same date as

its first debate.179 Senator Jacob Javits of New York, indeed, expressed

regret that such a bill had not yet been made into law, calling it, “a long

39

overdue reform.”180 The statements of the senators nevertheless provide

insight into the reasons they were compelled to pass the bill so quickly.

Senator McNamara discussed the destruction of the male breadwinner

stereotype, saying, “that concept is open to serious challenge when one

considers that each has human needs that must be met…in modern–day

America, women’s role as a provider, for not only herself but her family, has

become an essential role.”181 The failure of stereotypes also motivated

Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, who wrote in a letter of support that, “we

have long passed the time when women were allegedly working for ‘pin

money.’ Women are working to earn a living.”182

Other senators saw the bill as an opportunity to restore a sense of

fairness to the workplace. Senator Randolph called the bill as an act of,

“economic justice,” which would further promote American ideals of

equality.183 Randolph additionally discussed the coalition built by Esther

Peterson and the Women’s Bureau; such a change in federal policy was only

possible, “in cooperation with progressive leaders in organized labor and in

management.”184 Senator Javits concurred with Randolph as to the necessity

of outside influence, congratulating, “the many groups who have worked so

hard in bringing about this desirable action.”185 With Javits’ statement,

substantive debate concluded and the bill was passed without record of a

vote.186

In the House, the bill debated at length on May 23rd. A vote on the

special rule to consider the bill passed with 362 yeas, 9 nays, and 64 not

40

voting.187 Throughout the debate, most representatives sought to explain

either their intent or motivation for supporting the bill. In the former case,

Rep. Charles Goodell of New York laid out a comprehensive list of

congressional intent. His fifteen item list can be summarized by saying that

Congress intended to eliminate only sex based pay discrimination, that is

wage differentials based solely on the fact a worker was a man or a woman;

wage differentials between men and women based on bona fide

classification or seniority systems, for example, would not fall under the

jurisdiction of the bill.188 To quote one of Goodell’s allies Rep. Robert Griffin,

the bill was designed to cover jobs which required, “equal skill, equal effort,

and equal responsibility, and which are performed under similar working

conditions.”189

Other representatives, however, gave more eloquent, if less legalistic

statements of what the bill was intended to do. Rep. Frances Bolton of Ohio

stated that, “it is a matter of simple justice to pay a woman the same rate as

a man when she is performing the same duties.”190 Bolton’s concept of the

bill as justice, indeed, would resonate throughout the debate. Rep. Adam

Clayton Powell of New York phrased the bill in similar terms, saying, “the

objective sought is wage justice.”191 Still others sought to pass the bill

because they thought the framework—which amended the FLSA—was

superior to a bill endorsed by the Kennedy administration. Rep. Frank

Thompson of New Jersey argued that such an act would be easier to

implement and follow, “since there is a long history of familiarity and a

41

large body of definitions within the structure of the [FLSA].” Rep. Peter

Frelinghuysen of New Jersey concurred, saying, “investigation and

administration will be under the existing Wage and Hour Division, thus

avoiding…a vast new bureaucracy.”192 Moreover, he argued, the “definitions

and interpretations” of the FLSA would apply, both of which were

understood by business and labor.193

Among other unique concerns though was one final group of

representatives who believed, like Senators McNamara and Hart, that the

bill represented a chance to help end stereotypes and promote a more

egalitarian society; to them the bill was just as much social policy as it was

economic policy. Rep. Edith Green of Oregon clearly stated that the bill

was, “not debating the question of whether women should work,” which,

according to Green, had been decided permanently.194 Green stated that,

Today we are offering this legislation to correct this inequality,

this inferior economic status…as we make progress against the

Jim Crow laws of the Nation…it is high time that we also work

against the Jane Crow laws…The issue here is really a very

simple one—the elimination of one of the most persistent and

obnoxious forms of discrimination which is still practiced in this

enlightened society…It is a matter of justice, fair–play, and

equity.195

Other representatives agreed. To Rep. Edna Kelly of New York, the bill was

“corrective legislation” to fix, “an obvious social injustice.”196 Rep. James

42

Roosevelt of California called the bill, “a vehicle to implement a federal

policy…to remove this anachronism” of widespread sex–based wage

disparities.197 While it is obvious that some congressmen simply wanted to

end a narrow section of wage discrimination, it is clear from the statements

above that others sought a more fundamental shift in society.

Understanding what Congress expected to accomplish, however, is

not the same as understanding why Congress acted when it did. Why 1963

and not 1945? It should be noted that even almost two decades after the

end of World War II, women’s stereotype breaking actions in service still

influenced debate. Rep. Roosevelt responded to a claim that women

workers had high turnover with data from the war, saying, “the employer

did just as well with his women employees as he did with men employees at

a time when real hard work had to be done.”198 Rep. Spark Matsunaga of

Hawaii presented a similar argument, stating,

It has become abundantly clear, especially from our experience

in World War II, that one of our Nation’s greatest resources is

womanpower. If we are to maintain our leadership among the

nations of the world…we must continue to utilize the talents and

contributions of our female population.199

Given the obvious influence of the war on the minds of policy makers, even

many years after the fact, an argument can be made from the statements of

other congressman in the record that the difference was the stronger

coalition forged by Esther Peterson, her “labor base,” and other outside

43

allies. Rep. Green, for example, praised Peterson’s leadership on equal pay

legislation and stated that, “without [her,] I think this legislation would not

be before us today.”200 Rep. Powell had similar words, praising labor

representatives, business organizations and spokesmen, as well as party

leadership for advancing the bill; Rep. William Ryan of New York noted the

influence of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women.201

Peterson’s experience as a lobbyist had done its job. Congress was

presented with a united front demanding a shift in federal policy on

workplace equality it had never had to contend with before.

It would be misleading though to present the record as only

containing praise for the bill. Further supporting the claim that many

members sought wider changes than the legal phrasings of Rep. Goodell,

however, is that the most common objection to the bill was not that it

infringed on business or that women were happy with motherhood, but

rather that the bill did not go far enough. Rep. Bolton, though an otherwise

strong supporter, called the bill only, “one of the first steps” in the right

direction.202 Rep. Leonor Sullivan of Missouri stated that the bill, “does not

go far enough…but as far as it goes, it is a good bill.”203 Rep. Kelly, Rep.

Florence Dwyer of New Jersey, and others all expressed similar opinions but

were reluctant to sacrifice the good for the perfect.204 Indeed, only three

congressmen spoke in full opposition to the bill: Rep. William Colmer of

Mississippi, Rep. Paul Findley of Illinois, and Rep. O.C. Fisher of Texas.

44

Colmer framed his opposition around an opinion that the bill was

unconstitutional, unfairly favored minority and special interest groups, and

was not, “any of the federal government’s business.”205 Rep. Findley’s

criticisms, however, joined by Rep. Fisher, were much more powerful. Both

Findley and Fisher argued that the bill would do more harm than good to

women. In debate, Findley said that, “although this bill may have motives in

the finest tradition of gallantry, it actually is about as ungallant as a kick in

the shins.”206 Findley’s justification for that statement was that employers,

believing the cost to employ women to be greater than the cost to employ

men, would simply discriminate against women in hiring instead of

wages.207 Findley did claim to believe in the cause of equal pay, but perhaps

betrayed his intentions when he argued that the greater cost of employing

women was mostly a result of, “the indisputable fact that women are more

prone to homemaking and motherhood than men.”208 Findley’s statement’s,

while showing that stereotypes were not completely gone, did raise the

issue that wages mean nothing without employment and that an equal pay

law only protected the former from sex discrimination.

With the expiration of debate on the bill it was passed in the House

without record of a vote and sent back to the Senate to be reconciled which,

after perfunctory debate, was done on May 28th.209 The final bill was sent to

the White House the next day and President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay

Act into law on June 10, 1963.210 With his signature, Kennedy began one of

the largest paradigm shifts in federal policy towards protecting sex as a

45

class at work in American history, though he would tragically not live to see

it completed. Congress, indeed, would pass the compliment to the Equal Pay

Act—the inclusion of sex as a protected class in Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964—within eight months of the Equal Pay Act. While the legislative

history of Title VII as a whole is quite large, the debate in the Congressional

Record on the amendment that added sex is relatively short. Its importance

to the final shift in federal policy and as catalyst for judicial action bears

brief consideration.

The amendment to add sex as a protected class in the civil rights bill

was proposed on February 8, 1964 by Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia.211

Smith, the powerful chairman of the Rules Committee, thought he could

scuttle the entire bill by forcing the adoption of his amendment and he led a

coterie of fellow Southerners in an attempt to do just that. Of the twenty–

two congressmen who spoke in favor of the amendment in the record,

eleven were Southerners.212 Their commitment to a federal policy shift on

workplace equality was highly suspect, considering most arguments

resembled that of Rep. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, who stated, “it is

incredible to me that the authors of this monstrosity—whomever they are—

would deprive the white woman of mostly Anglo–Saxon or Christian

heritage equal opportunity before the employer.”213 The duplicitous nature

of Smith’s actions is further demonstrated by the fact that all but one

Southerner who spoke strongly for Smith’s amendment voted against the

civil rights bill as a whole.214

46

Rep. Smith, however, underestimated the rest of Congress, which still

had the Equal Pay Act fresh in its mind. Rep. Emanuel Celler of New York

dropped his dismissive tone when Rep. Bolton and Rep. Martha Griffiths of

Michigan voiced their support for Smith’s amendment.215 Rep. Griffiths

stated that since the bill already contained race, she hoped including sex

would protect both women and African–Americans, “at the hiring gate.”216

Griffiths also, again showing the long–lasting influence of the war, argued

that women should not be denied employment opportunities on the basis of

stereotypes they had already demonstrated to be false; she gave the

analogy of a 100–pound woman applying to drive a haulaway truck on the

basis that she had previously been a streetcar motorman and a school bus

driver during the war.217 The final vote on the amendment was 168 yeas to

133 nays and though several congressmen specifically spoke out against

including sex as a protected class, each one who did voted for the civil

rights bill as a whole, denying Smith his attempted legislative coup and

confirming the sincerity of Congress in adopting his amendment.218

Between the addition of sex as a protected class to Title VII and the

passage of the Equal Pay Act, Congress, along with presidents Kennedy and

Johnson, led an almost complete shift in federal policy away from the

stereotype–based Progressive Era decisions like Muller and the early

actions of the Women’s Bureau towards greater equality of opportunity at

work. Such a shift, however, would have been meaningless if it were not

properly applied by the Court. Caught between the plain wording of the

47

statutes and clearly articulated legislative history though, the Court made

the same shift, if at a more measured pace. Two cases in particular give

instructive insight into the movement of the Court’s opinion away from

accepting the legitimacy of stereotyped employment classifications: Dothard

v. Rawlinson219 and United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls.220

In Dothard, the Court was clearly in the midst of making its transition.

Appellee Dianne Rawlinson had sought employment as a prison guard with

the Alabama Board of Corrections.221 Alabama required guards to have a

minimum height of five feet two inches and a minimum weight of 120–

pounds.222 Rawlinson was rejected from employment on the basis of not

meeting the latter requirement and brought suit on the claim that such

qualifications violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth

Amendment; when Alabama adopted a rule segregating prison guard jobs

by sex—using the bona fide occupational requirement as a justification—

Rawlinson amended her suit to claim a violation of Title VII protections as

well.223 A district court ruled in favor of Rawlinson and the Supreme Court,

noting probable jurisdiction of the appeal, granted certiorari.224

Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, affirmed the judgment of the

district court in ruling Alabama’s height and weight requirements to be

unlawful sex discrimination. Citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., Stewart

argued that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Rawlinson only

needed to show that, “the facially neutral standards in question select

applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern,” which Stewart

48

reasoned had been done through statistics showing the national average of

women who would be excluded from employment versus men.225 Stewart

further argued that though appellants claimed such standards were job

related, they not only failed to show any correlation between height, weight,

and the strength necessary to perform the job of prison guard, but had,

moreover, “failed to offer evidence of any kind in specific justification of the

statutory standards.”226

Such an opinion represented a significant shift away from the type of

reasoning offered in Goesaert; Stewart’s analysis of the BFOQ as it

specifically related to the case at bar, however, retained some of the Court’s

previous paternalistic qualities. Stewart did affirm the “extremely narrow

exception” provided by the BFOQ.227 He argued though that the

environment of the Alabama prison system was, “a peculiarly inhospitable

one for human beings of whatever sex,” noting that a district court had

ruled the conditions so appalling that they violated the Constitution.228

Stewart argued that a female guard’s constant exposure to violent sex

offenders would put her and the order of the prison at risk, saying,

A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a…penitentiary

of the type Alabama now runs could be directly reduced by her

womanhood. There is a basis in fact for expecting that sex

offenders who have criminally assaulted women in the past

would be moved to do so again if access to women were

established within the prison.

49

With such reasoning, the majority reversed the decision of the district court

in ruling that Alabama’s exclusion of women violated Title VII protections.

Yet though the court did up hold an example of paternalistic sex

discrimination, it is undeniable that the Court had been affected by the

change in federal policy. In a partial dissent, indeed, Justice Marshall,

joined by Justice Brennan, forcefully argued that the majorities reasoning,

based as it was on the unconstitutional conditions of the Alabama prison

system, was highly flawed.229 They noted that the wording of Title VII

requires a BFOQ to be, “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of

that particular business or enterprise.”230 No government agency, they

argued, should normally operate in violation of the Constitution and no

Court should accept such conditions as justification for discrimination.231

While Dothard is represents an imperfect example of the judicial shift

in accompanying the new federal policy, the more recent United Auto

Workers case provides a complete illustration. The case, indeed, can be

seen as a final abjuration the paternalistic Muller doctrine. In the case,

respondent Johnson Controls, Inc. manufactured batteries in which the

element lead was a primary component.232 Prior to the protections

established by Title VII, Johnson Controls simply did not employ women in

the manufacturing of batteries; when women were finally let on the line, the

company established a “fetal protection policy,” which originally simply

advised women of the pregnancy related risks of lead exposure, but was

50

shifted in 1982 to a policy of broad exclusion of, “all women except those

whose inability to bear children is medically documented.”233

Appellants—among whom were a woman who chose to be sterilized in

order to avoid losing her job and a man intending to become a father who

was denied a leave of absence to reduce his lead level—filed suit in a federal

district court, which grated summary judgment to Johnson Controls, Inc. on

the basis of business necessity.234 The circuit court sitting en banc affirmed

the district court decision 7–3, upholding the business necessity defense

and quoting Dothard, saying, “‘more is at stake’ than simply an individual

woman’s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment.”235 The

Supreme Court then granted certiorari in order to resolve differing circuit

court interpretations of fetal protection policies.236

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Blackmun and

disagreed with the evaluations of the district and circuit court. All other

justices either joined or filed concurring opinions. The bias of Johnson

Controls’ policy, stated Blackmun, was “obvious;”237 fertile men were given

the opportunity to risk their reproductive health for a particular job but all

fertile women were automatically excluded.238 The policy therefore created

classifications based on sex, Blackmun argued, because Johnson Controls

only cared about protecting the unborn children of its female employees.239

The policy then, Blackmun further reasoned, was illegal sex discrimination

unless Johnson Controls could demonstrate the policy fell under a BFOQ

exception.240

51

On the subject of the BFOQ, Blackmun noted its narrow wording and

reading, citing Justice Stewart’s opinion in Dothard.241 Respondent Johnson

Controls, Inc. argued that the fetal protection policy fell in the safety

exception within the BFOQ.242 Here again, Blackmun noted Dothard saying

that, “danger to a woman herself does not justify discrimination.”243 Unlike

in Dothard, however, Blackmun then rejected respondent’s argument of a

BFOQ exception, arguing,

The unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female

employees…are neither customers nor third parties whose

safety is essential to the business of battery manufacturing. No

one can disregard the possibility of injury to future children; the

BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this deep

social concern into an essential aspect of battery making. Our

case law, therefore, makes clear that the safety exception is

limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually

interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job.244

With this argument, the Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and

remanded the case for consideration consistent with the decision.245

Compared to the Court’s decision in Muller eighty–three years prior,

the decision in United Auto Workers is rather remarkable. The case

represented a final paradigm shift in legal thinking which has destroyed the

paternalistic concerns that women exist solely as mothers of future children

and which justified the use of stereotyped job classifications that denied

52

equality of opportunity for generations. Such a shift, however, was only

possible in conjunction with a broader change in federal policy,

demonstrated by the relationship of the Court to the passage of the Equal

Pay Act and Title VII. It is also evident that this paradigm shift has

permanently affected Congressional consideration of such issues as well;

even an issue as seemingly simple as equal pay has been clarified as

recently as 2009, with passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.

It is impossible then to choose one point in time where such a shift

became inevitable. What is clear, however, is that the response of Congress

and the rest of the federal government to the international and domestic

crises of the first half of the 20th century and the dedicated coalition work of

women, labor unions, interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians which

followed, have ultimately achieved a goal almost a full century in the

making.

1 208 U.S. 412 (1908)2 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, Brief for Defendant in Error, 1. 3 Ibid, 1-8.4 198 U.S. 45 (1905)5 Lochner at 57. 6 Lochner at 57.7 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, Brief for Defendant in Error, 1-8. 8 Ibid, 18. 9 Ibid, 36.10 Ibid. 11 Ibid, 47. 12 Muller at 421. 13 Judith Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority: Federal Reaction to the Phenomenon of Women in the Work Force, 1920-1963, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 16. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid, 17. 18 Ibid, 18. 19 Carrie Brown, Rosie’s Mom: Forgotten Women Workers of the First World War, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2002), 112. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid, 114. 22 Ibid, 112-113. 23 Ibid, 117. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid, 118. 26 Ibid, 119. 27 Ibid, 118-19. 28 Ibid, 120. 29 Ibid, 120-24. 30 Ibid, 150. 31 Ibid, 187. 32 Ibid, 155-56. 33 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 17. 34 Ibid, 18. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid, 25. 37 Ibid, 18. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, 19. 42 59 Cong. Rec. 5873-5876.43 59 Cong. Rec. 5217.44 59 Cong. Rec. 5217.45 59 Cong. Rec. 5879.46 59 Cong. Rec. 5864.47 59 Cong. Rec. 5864.48 59 Cong. Rec. 5864.49 59 Cong. Rec. 5864.50 59 Cong. Rec. 5877. 51 59 Cong. Rec. 5873.52 59 Cong. Rec. 5877.53 59 Cong. Rec. 5879. 54 59 Cong. Rec. 5882; 59 Cong. Rec. 6494. 55 59 Cong. Rec. 8087. 56 59 Cong. Rec. 8662.57 59 Cong. Rec. 8086.

58 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 22-33.59 Ibid, 22; ibid, 30. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid, 75. 62 Ibid, 22. 63 Ibid, 33.64 Ibid, 34.65 Ibid, 36. 66 Ibid, 37. 67 Ibid, 40-47. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid, 42. 70 Ibid, 63. 71 Ibid. 72 Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works 1933 – 1956 , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 52. 73 Ibid, 70.74 Ibid, 72.75 Ibid, 73. 76 Ibid, 83. 77 Ibid, 52. 78 Ibid, 77. 79 Ibid, 78. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid, 73.82 Ibid, 97-98. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid, 98.85 Ibid, 98. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid, 105. 88 Ibid, 106.89 Ibid. 90 Maureen Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 30. 91 Ibid, 31-36. 92 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 59. 93 Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter, 36. 94 Ibid, 37-38. 95 Ibid, 48.96 Ibid, 47. 97 Ibid, 64.98 Ibid. 99 Ibid, 79.100 Ibid, 63. 101 Kathleen A. Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy: A History of the Women’s Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor 1945-1970, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000), 15.102 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 101; ibid, 106-07. 103 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 15.104 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 103. 105 Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter, 208. 106 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 15. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid; Brown, Rosie’s Mom, 195. 109 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 19. 110 Ibid, 20. 111 Ibid, 19. 112 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 105.

113 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 21.114 Ibid. 115 Ibid, 24. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid, 5. 118 Ibid, 25.119 S. 1178 “A Bill Providing Equal Pay For Equal Work For Women And For Other Purposes,” 79th Cong. 1 (1945). 120 Ibid, 121-23 (Testimony of Lewis G. Hines). 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid, 5 (Testimony of Lewis B. Schwellenbach).124 Ibid, 11 (Testimony of Frieda Miller). 125 Ibid, 110 (Statement of the National Council of Jewish Women). 126 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 24. 127 S. Rep. No. 1576, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1946). 128 H. Rep. No. 2687, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1946). 129 S. Rep. No. 1576, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1946).130 Ibid, 2; ibid, 3; ibid, 5.131 Ibid, 2-3. 132 Ibid, 3. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 21-22. 137 S. Rep. No. 1576, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1946).138 “Democratic Party Platform of 1944,” The American Presidency Project, accessed November 30, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29598; “Democratic Party Platform of 1948,” The American Presidency Project, accessed November 30, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599; “Republican Party Platform of 1944,” The American Presidency Project, accessed November 30, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25835; “Republican Party Platform of 1948,” The American Presidency Project, accessed November 30, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25836.139 David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 467-524.140 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 24.141 163 U.S. 537 (1896); 347 U.S. 483 (1954)142 335 U.S. 464 (1948)143 Goesaert v. Cleary, 334 U.S. 464, Transcript of the Record, 2.144 Ibid, 2-3.145 74 F.Supp. 735 (1947)146 Goesaert v. Cleary, 334 U.S. 464, Brief of the Appellants, 10. 147 Ibid, 18. 148 220 U.S. 61 (1911)149 Goesaert v. Cleary, 334 U.S. 464, Brief of the Appellants, 26-27.150 Ibid, 26-29.151 Goesaert at 465152 Goesaert at 465153 Goesaert at 466154 Goesaert at 466155 Goesaert at 467156 Goesaert at 467157 429 U.S. 190 (1976)158 Laughlin, Women’s Work and Public Policy, 24.159 Ibid, 41; ibid, 50. 160 Ibid, 26. 161 Ibid, 49. 162 Ibid, 55-57. 163 Ibid.164 Ibid.

165 Ibid, 44-45. 166 Ibid, 70. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid, 73.169 Ibid, 76. 170 Ibid, 70-80.171 Ibid, 79. 172 Ibid, 81. 173 Sealander, As Minority Becomes Majority, 144. 174 Ibid, 147.175 109 Cong. Rec. 7293176 109 Cong. Rec. 7848177 109 Cong. Rec. 8264; 109 Cong. Rec. 8976178 109 Cong. Rec. 8913-8916179 109 Cong. Rec. 8913-8916180 109 Cong. Rec. 8916181 109 Cong. Rec. 8914182 109 Cong. Rec. 8916183 109 Cong. Rec. 8914184 109 Cong. Rec. 8915185 109 Cong. Rec. 8916186 109 Cong. Rec. 8916187 109 Cong. Rec. 9194188 109 Cong. Rec. 9209189 109 Cong. Rec. 9197190 109 Cong. Rec. 9193191 109 Cong. Rec. 9195192 109 Cong. Rec. 9195193 109 Cong. Rec. 9195194 109 Cong. Rec. 9199195 109 Cong. Rec. 9199-9200196 109 Cong. Rec. 9200-9201197 109 Cong. Rec. 9203198 109 Cong. Rec. 9206199 109 Cong. Rec. 9213200 109 Cong. Rec. 9199201 109 Cong. Rec. 9195; 109 Cong. Rec. 9211202 109 Cong. Rec. 9193203 109 Cong. Rec. 9205204 109 Cong. Rec. 9193-9217205 109 Cong. Rec. 9193206 109 Cong. Rec. 9205207 109 Cong. Rec. 9205208 109 Cong. Rec. 9205209 109 Cong. Rec. 9762210 109 Cong. Rec. 9970; 109 Cong. Rec. 10440211 110 Cong. Rec. 2577212 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84213 110 Cong. Rec. 2583214 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84, 110 Cong. Rec. 15897215 110 Cong. Rec. 2578216 110 Cong. Rec. 2578217 110 Cong. Rec. 2579218 110 Cong. Rec. 15897219 433 U.S. 321 (1976)220 499 U.S. 187 (1991)221 Dothard at 323222 Dothard at 324223 Dothard at 324-326

224 Dothard at 323225 Dothard at 329-330226 Dothard at 331227 Dothard at 334228 Dothard at 334229 Dothard at 342230 Dothard quoting Unlawful Employment Practices 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 at 342231 Dothard at 342232 United Auto Workers at 190233 United Auto Workers at 191-192234 United Auto Workers at 192-193235 United Auto Workers quoting United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 886 F.2d 871 (1989) quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321 (1976) at 193236 United Auto Workers at 196237 United Auto Workers at 197238 United Auto Workers at 197239 United Auto Workers at 197240 United Auto Workers at 200-201241 United Auto Workers at 201242 United Auto Workers at 202243 United Auto Workers at 202244 United Auto Workers at 203-204245 United Auto Workers at 211

Brown, Carrie. Rosie’s Mom: Forgotten Women Workers of the First World War, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2002.

Honey, Maureen. Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994.

Laughlin, Kathleen A. Women’s Work and Public Policy: A History of the Women’s Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor 1945-1970, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000.

McCullough, David. Truman, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Sealander, Judith. As Minority Becomes Majority: Federal Reaction to the

Phenomenon of Women in the Work Force, 1920-1963, Westport:

Greenwood Press, 1983.

Smith, Jason Scott. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of

Public Works 1933 – 1956 , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

The American Presidency Project. “Democratic Party Platform of 1944.” Accessed November 30, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29598

The American Presidency Project. “Democratic Party Platform of 1948.” Accessed November 30, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599

The American Presidency Project. “Republican Party Platform of 1944.” Accessed November 30, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25835

The American Presidency Project. “Republican Party Platform of 1948.” Accessed November 30, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25836.