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A financial or a social crisis?l’Europa e (è?) il nostro futuro
Cortone il 1/10/2010
Jean-Paul Fitoussi
L’Europa nella globalisazione
I. Retorica e realtà della globalisazione
I.1. Globalisazione in teoria
I.2. Globalisazione & Nation-States
II. La crisi
III. The long run
IV. What’s wrong with the european government ?
V. The economic cost of the non-political Europe: the European economic government
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/3
I. Retorica e realtà della globalisazione
I.1. Globalisazione in teoria
The phenomena of globalisation is happening in a world populated by Nation
States, without any emptiness in between the Nations.
What is the function of a Nation state if not to protect its population ?
More than ever the Nation States of the world are well and alive – the hyper
power of the United States, the super power of China, Russia, India, etc…
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/4
I. Retorica e realtà della globalisazione
I.2. Globalisation and Nation-States
Hence the rhetoric of globalisation clashes with the reality of the phenomena as
power and protection are putting strict limits on the interplay of free markets.
The European Union is a case of its own: it is populated by Nations which are no
more full states – as they have given up important elements of sovereignity
especially in the euro area – and the Union is not yet a full state.
That explains the concern the European populations about protection. Protection is
not protectionism. Indeed, it is the main incentive for people to lie in society.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/5
II. la crisi
La discesa del 2009
Output gaps
Inequalities
Global imbalances
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/6
Growth’s loss
Source: Datastream.
Annual OECD output gap (Output gap in 2007=0), 2000-2009 plus OECD projections for 2010 & 2011
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Per
cent
Japan
United States
Euro Area
Italy
Source : OECD Economic Outlook
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/8
II. Interprétation – Interpretation –
Interpretazione
II.1. Inégalités – Inequalities – Disuguaglianze
II.2. Déséquilibres globaux – Global
Imbalances – Squilibri Globali
Average yearly growth of income minus growth of total average income. Mid-1980s to mid-2000s
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
France Germany Italy United Kingdom United States OECD
Bottom quintile Middle three quintiles
Top quintile
Number of tax brackets and marginal income tax rates
1981 1991 2001 2008
Belgium Number of Brackets 23 7 7 5
Minimum Rate 72% 55% 55% 50%
France Number of Brackets 12 12 6 4
Minimum Rate 60% 56.8% 52.75% 40%
Germany Number of Brackets 2 2 2 2
Minimum rate 56% 53% 48.5% 45%
Italy Number of Brackets 32 7 5 5
Minimum Rate 72% 50% 45% 43%
Central government rates*Source : OECD Tax Database. Calculations of the authors
Number of tax brackets and marginal income tax rates*
1981 1991 2001 2008
Spain Number of Brackets 30 16 6 4
Minimum Rate 65.1% 56% 39.6% 21.7%
Ireland Number of Brackets 5 3 2 2
Minimum Rate 60% 52% 42% 41%
UK Number of Brackets 6 2 3 2
Minimum rate 60% 40% 40% 40%
US Number of Brackets 16 2 5 5
Minimum Rate 70% 31% 39.1% 35%
Central government rates*Source : OECD Tax Database. Calculations of the authors
Wage Shares
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
France Germany Italy Japan Spain United Kingdom United States Euro area
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/13
The building of global imbalances: the US external deficitCurrent account balance, % of GDP
Source: Datastream.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/14
III. The long run
GDP Trends 1990-2009
Assessing European economic performances
GDP per capital (PPP)
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/15
III. The long run
Ik we look ahead, the most likely evolution would be the following conditional on the continuation of past trends:
The share of Asia in the world GDP will importantly increase
The share of the US will increase in the OECD GDP
The share of the euro area will decrease at the world level, at the OECD level
and at the European level
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/16
Assessing European economic performances
Can such evolutions be avoided ?
The increase of the share of Asia is utterly normal, but the decrease of
the share of the euro area is pathological. What are the reasons and how
can it be avoided?
Since the beginning of the 1980s, European Economic performance has
been poor. The catch-up process vis-à-vis the US has come to a term at
the beginning of the eighties.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/17
GDP trends 1990-2009
Sources : FMI.
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
400
440
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
ZE USA Asie
Asie (2009 = 400 ; 7.5)
Etats-Unis (2009 = 161.2 ; 2.5)
Zone euro (2009 = 135.5 ; 1.7)
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/18
GDP Per capita (PPP)
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/19
Labour productivity
Productivity in the manufacturing sector
The Italian Puzzle
GDP per capita dynamics (average rates of growth)
Italy Euro Area USA France Germany UK Spain J apan
1951-60 5,4 4,3 1,8 3,7 7,1 2,3 3,5 7,61961-70 4,9 3,7 3,0 4,4 3,5 2,2 6,3 8,91971-80 3,1 2,4 2,2 2,7 2,7 1,8 2,4 3,31981-90 2,3 1,8 2,2 1,9 1,2 2,5 2,6 3,41991-00 1,6 2,1 2,2 1,6 1,8 2,2 2,4 1,02001-09 -0,4 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,3 1,1 1,0 0,3
Source: Confindustria 2010
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/22
IV. What’s wrong with the european government?
The monetary policy of the ECB
Consumer prices index
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/23
The monetary policy of the ECBApparently, the monetary policy of the ECB has been successfull
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
BCE BoE Fed
BCE
Fed
BoE
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/24
Consumer prices index
-2,0
-1,0
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Zone euro Etats-Unis
Zone euro
Etats-Unis
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/25
Exchange rates & Interest rates
Sources : Datastream.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/26
Macroeconomic policies & industrial strategy
This monetary strategy seems all the more detrimental that the level and
the evolution of the exchange rate impact on the industrial structure.
One of the main determinant of industrial policy is the exchange rate,
especially in sectors characterised by increasing returns.
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that Europe has no growth
policy, and in particular no policy to react to the slowdown of internal
demand.
Fiscal policy is a case in point
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/27
Reactivity of fiscal policyGovernment deficit, % of GDP
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/28
V. The economic cost of the non-political Europe
V.1. A dissociation between legitimacy and power
The European contradiction lies in in the following: no policy to sustain
internal demand; so growth can only be export led; but appreciation of
the euro. It is as if the EU did not draw the consequences of being a big
country, and continues to behave as if it were a small economy, or a
developing country. Why it is so?
What are the structural reasons for the lack of reactivity of European
policies?
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/29
Sources : Eurostat OCDE.
A big economy: the first or the second of the world
US UE (27) Euro zone (15)
Population (2008) 305 m 497 m 321 m
GDP (2008) 13,800 bn 16,570 bn 11,900 bn
GDP growth (1996-2007) 3,1 % 2,5 % 2,2 %
GDP per capita(2007) 44,760$ 30,100$ 32,900$
Unemployment (1996-2008) 4,9 8,6 9,0
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/30
Lack of legitimacy for the European government, once discretionary action exceeding its mandate is required
Limited national sovereignity
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/31
V. The economic cost of the non-political Europe
V.2. Proposal for reform
The two weaknesses emphasized above explain why Europe has no
strategy to benefit from globalisation, nor to protect its enterprises and
citizens. This lack of strategy is magnified when we take into account the
geopolitical dimension. Here Europe is very weak whenever it exists a
bilateral negociation (i.e. oil and gaz with Russia or trade and technology with
China and/or India).
.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/32
V. The economic cost of the non-political Europe
V.2. Proposal for reform
The absence of reactivity in Europe is not contingent, but structural. It
stems from the dissociation between power and legitimacy. The European
government is unable to act in a discretionary way, because it would go
beyond its mandate. National governments, that have the legitimacy to
act, lack the instruments.
Exclude investment from deficit figures (golden rule). As the following
graphs show, there is no other way to close the gap with the US.
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/33
R&D spending by the public sector (en % du PIB)
Sources : Eurostat.
2001 2007 2008 X pas de données
©Jean-Paul Fitoussi/34
V. The economic cost of the non-political Europe
V.2. Proposals for reform
The ECB. Accountability : political determination of the inflation objective and
political determination of exchange rate policy.
Competition doctrine : political guidelines for competition doctrine, in order to
allow the conduct of industrial policies.
A new Community ? Towards an European Community for Environment, energy
and research. Trying to combine the energy problem with the increasing
« demand » for environment.