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Development of International Collaboration in Infectious Disease Research

“Marine Mammal Disease Investigation in Canada”

Ole Nielsen, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada

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AKNOWLEDGMENTS

• THANKS!

• Dr. Sandakhchiev and the organizing committee for inviting me

• CRDF for covering the travel costs

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Vision Statement

• “Safe, healthy productive waters and aquatic ecosystems, for the benefit of present and future generations, by maintaining the highest possible standards of service to Canadians”

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Central and Arctic Region

Chesterfield Inlet

Pangnirtung

Kimmirut

Resolute

HudsonBay

KendallIsland

Igloolik

Arctic Bay

Pond Inlet

Winnipeg

Qikiqtarjuaq

NunavutNorthwestTerritories

Holman

Repulse Bay

Hall Beach

Cape Dorset

Coral Harbour

Iqaluit

Clyde River

Grise Fiord

GjoaHaven

Rankin Inlet

Arviat

Whale Cove

Inuvik

Tuktoyuktuk

Sachs Harbour

Paulatuk

Sanikiluaq

PellyBay

Churchill

Kugluktuk

Canada

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Marine Mammal Sampling Programs

• Scientific collection of hunter killed animals (stock identity, contaminants, productivity, and disease surveillance)

• Abnormal/Diseased/Stranding Investigation Program

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Why Study Marine Mammal Diseases?

• Seal and cetacean epizootics world wide (Phocine Distemper in Europe in 1988, 02, Caspian and Lake Baikal epizootics)

• Zoonotic threat (Inuit, commercial sealers)

• Threat to “Endangered Species”

• Unknown threat to Canadian livestock industry (Influenza A?)

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Legislative Mandates

• Species at Risk Act (2002) – Protection of Endangered species (Biodiversity)

• Oceans Act (1996) – Marine Environmental Quality Programs (Community Based Sampling)

• Fisheries Act (2004) – Regulates Fishing and Sealing Activities as well as supports basic science

• ISTC Canada (2004) – Supports Russia - Canada scientific cooperation. $18 million available/year.

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RESULTS - Distemper

• Phocine Distemper Virus (PDV) antibodies present in all species of seals in Canada (enzootic) – mortality is low but viruses have not been isolated

• In contrast, Europe, Caspian and Lake Baikal the epizootics are periodic, mortality is high (viruses have been isolated)

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More Distemper….

• Distemper is also a problem in cetaceans

• Populations of dolphins in Black Sea, USA and North Sea have been affected

• No evidence of antibodies (exposure) in narwhal and beluga in arctic Canada – are they at risk for epizootic?

• Alternative hosts? Carrier states?

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Russian Research – VECTOR

• Centered on Lake Baikal and Caspian seals – virus responsible CDV

• “Alternative hosts” have been proposed mollusks and even fish species (PCR, serology, and direct virus isolation)

• Theory is not believed in the “West”!

• Controversy must be resolved

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Results - Influenza A in Marine Mammals

• Sporadic serological evidence of exposure in beluga and ringed seals – virus(es) not isolated

• Risk of epizootic low is thought to be low???

• Zoonotic risk is unknown

• Threat to livestock? Need for surveillance

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OPPORTUNITY FOR COLLABORATION

• Influenza strains isolated from Russian seals

• Canadian Food Inspection Agency will be surveying Canadian wildlife (including birds and marine mammals) for influenza

• Heightened awareness of flu in Canada

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Brucellosis in Marine Mammals

• Found in USA and Britain in 1995• C-ELISA evidence of exposure in

Canadian marine mammals (worldwide problem)

• Isolations made from beluga and seals• Zoonotic risk??? (Inuit and lab workers?)• Human cases have been reported

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Brucellosis – Threat to Biodiversity

• Increasingly associated with cetacean strandings/death (meningioencephalitis)

• Most Canadian killer whales are seropositive/infected

• Reproductive lesions found in normal beluga and narwhal

• Contributing to population decline

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Biosafety Concerns

• Both Brucella and influenza require level 3 containment – not enough facilities in Canada to look at wildlife

• Shipping infected tissues also becoming difficult – costs increasing….

• Shipping ‘diagnostic’ samples to Russia is impossible! Can this be remedied?

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NEXT STEPS…..

• Pursue opportunities for collaborative research between VECTOR, DFO, CFIA, and Health Canada personnel

• ISTC Canada has shown considerable interest in supporting a relationship with VECTOR with regards to biological weapons threat reduction

• Proposals?

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