96 Report of the Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards (BCS-AAC) Technical Correlating Committee Dale E. Dressel, Chair Solutia Incorporated, MO [U] Johnny W. (Bill) Bass,

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Report of the Committee on

Boiler Combustion System Hazards (BCS-AAC)

Technical Correlating Committee

Dale E. Dressel, ChairSolutia Incorporated, MO [U]

Johnny W. (Bill) Bass, Forney Corporation, TX [M]James R. Bostick, ABB Automation, OH [M]John C. deRuyter, DuPont Company, Incorporated, DE [U]David S. Eason, Detroit Edison Company, MI [U]Ronald E. Fringeli, Marsh USA Incorporated, OH [I]Gordon G. Gaetke, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U]Masaaki Kinoshita, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited, Japan, [M]Robert Malanga, Union Camp Corporation, NJ [U]Francis X. Maskol, Honeywell, Incorporated, GA [M]Jerry J. Moskal, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M]Nancy C. Polosky, Babcock & Wilcox, OH [M]Peter J. Willse, GE Global Asset Protection Services, CT [I]Henry K. Wong, Foster Wheeler Power Group, Incorporated, NJ [M]

Alternates

Ronald J. Fleming, ABB Incorporated, OH [M] (Alt. to J. R. Bostick)Richard A. Gallagher, GE Global Asset Protection Services, PA [I] (Alt. to P. J. Willse)Raymond J. Heitland, Solutia, Incorporated, FL [U] (Alt. to D. E. Dressel)Gerald E. McCullion, Honeywell, Incorporated, GA [M] (Alt. to F. X. Maskol)Michael R. Mulherin, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U] (Alt. to G. G. Gaetke)Hiromi Kevin Nakatani, Mitsubishi Power Systems, CA [M] (Alt. to M. Kinoshita)John P. O’Rourke, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M] (Alt. to J. J. Moskal)Celso G. Schmidt, Forney Corporation, TX [M] (Alt. to J. W. Bass)George P. Seroka, DTE Energy/Detroit Edison Company, MI [U] (Alt. to D. S. Eason)

Nonvoting

Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore, MD [SE]Michael B. Doherty, American Electric Power Service Corporation, OH [U]John J. Eibl, The DuPont Company, TN [U]Brian W. Moore, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., CT [I]Michael C. Polagye, FM Global, MA [I]Harold Yates, Detroit Edison Company, MI [U]

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the reduction of combustion system hazards in single- and multiple-burner boilers with a heat input rate of 12,500,000 Btu/hr and above. This includes all fuels. This Committee also is responsible for documents on the reduction of hazards in pulverized fuel systems, fluidized-bed boilers, heat recovery steam generators, and stoker-fired boilers, at any heat input rate.

Technical Committee on

Fluidized Bed Boilers (BCS-FBB)

Brian W. Moore, ChairHartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., CT [I]

Shelton Ehrlich, Palo Alto, CA [SE]Robert F. Eng, Foster Wheeler Power Group, Incorporated, NJ [M]Gary M. Gulick, Black & Veatch Corporation, KS [SE]Vic L. Jones, Merrick Industries Incorporated, FL [M]David L. Kraft, Babcock & Wilcox Company, OH [M]Donald L. Lueckenotte, Burns & McDonnell, MO [SE]Paul H. Miller, Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U]Gary E. Norman, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M]James R. Rutledge, Jacksonville Electric Authority, FL [U]Peter J. Willse, GE Global Asset Protection Services, CT [I]

Alternates

P. K. Chelian, Foster Wheeler Power Group, Incorporated, NJ [M] (Alt. to R. F. Eng)Richard A. Gallagher, GE Global Asset Protection Services, PA [I] (Alt. to P. J. Willse)

John P. O’Rourke, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M] (Alt. to G. E. Norman)James M. Witt, Jr., Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U] (Alt. to P. H. Miller)

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the operation and reduction of combustion system hazards and the prevention of boiler furnace explosions of fluidized-bed boilers. This includes all fuels at any heat input rate.


Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards (BCS-FUN)

Courtney D. Alvey, ChairBaltimore, MD [SE]

Kevin A. Alexeff, Stock Equipment Company, OH [M]David A. Cowdrick, Tampa Electric Company, FL [U]Dale P. Evely, Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U]Richard Kimball, Forney Corporation, TX [M]Peter B. Matthews, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Company, CT [I]Francisco A. Palacios, Babcock Borsig Power, Incorporated, MA [M]

Alternate

Celso G. Schmidt, Forney Corporation, TX [M] (Alt. to R. Kimball)

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents on fundamentals, maintenance, inspection, training and safety for the reduction of combustion system hazards. Fundamentals shall specifically include definitions, furnace explosion/implosion prevention, manufacture, design and engineering, installation, coordination of design, construction and operation, basic operating objectives, equipment requirements and commissioning.


Heat Recovery Steam Generators (BCS-HRS)

Michael C. Polagye, ChairFM Global, MA [I]

Harold Honath, SecretaryCoen Company Incorporated, CA [M]

Donald W. Bairley, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M]Robert R. Balsbaugh, Burns and McDonnell Engineering Corporation, MO [SE]William B. Bolander, Duke/Fluor Daniel, CA [SE]Richard A. Brown, John Zink Company, LLC, OK [M]David Paul Cannon, Reliant Energy, TX, [U]Ralph S. Clemens, InterGen, MA [U]John H. Conroy, Forney Corporation, TX [M]Dale P. Evely, Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U]Gordon G. Gaetke, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U]Kris A. Gamble, Black & Veatch Corporation, KS [SE]George Y. Keller, Burns & Roe Enterprises, Incorporated, NJ [SE]Steven A. Lefton, Aptech Engineering Services, CA [SE]Gerald E. McCullion, Honeywell, Incorporated, GA [M]Brian W. Moore, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Company, CT [I]Martin C. Nygard, Nooter/Eriksen, MO [M]Jimmie J. Schexnayder, Entergy Corporation, LA [U]Philip F. Souers, Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation, FL [M]Stephen B. Statz, Sithe Energies, NY [U]John Van Name, Washington Group International, NY [SE]Joseph M. Vavrek, Sargent & Lundy, LLC, IL [SE]

Alternates

Sanda Brumaru, Burns and Roe Enterprises, NJ [SE] (Alt. to G. Y. Keller)Rick Fiorenza, Coen Company Incorporated, CA [M] (Alt. to H. Honath)Robert P. Kaltenbach, Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., MO [SE] (Alt. to R. R. Balsbaugh)Christopher J. Lech, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M] (Alt. to D. W. Bairley)Francis X. Maskol, Honeywell, Incorporated, GA [M] (Alt. to G. E. McCullion)Michael R. Mulherin, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U] (Alt. to G. G. Gaetke)Stephen L. Somers, John Zink Company LLC, OK [M] (Alt. to R. A. Brown)

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NFPA 85 — November 2003 ROP — Copyright, NFPA

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents covering the operation of heat recovery steam generators and the related reduction of combustion system hazards and prevention of boiler furnace explosions. This includes all fuels at any heat input rate.


Multiple Burner Boilers (BCS-MBB)

Harold Yates, ChairDetroit Edison Company, MI [U]

Bernard Hrul, SecretaryAllen Bradley Company, MA [U]

Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore, MD [SE]Johnny W. (Bill) Bass, Forney Corporation, TX [SE]Dale E. Dressel, Solutia Incorporated, MO [U]John J. Eibl, The DuPont Company, TN [U]Dale P. Evely, Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U]Kenneth Joe Frazier, Salt River Project, AZ [U]Gordon G. Gaetke, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U]George Y. Keller, Burns & Roe Enterprises, Incorporated, NJ [SE]Daniel J. Lee, ABB Incorporated, OH [M]W. Scott Matz, The Foxboro Company, TX [M]Peter McKenna, Stone & Webster, Incorporated, MA [SE]Lalit M. Mehta, Coen Company, Incorporated, CA [M]John P. O’Rourke, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M]Francisco A. Palacios, Babcock Borsig Power, Incorporated, MA [M]Michael C. Polagye, FM Global, MA [I]Glenn A. Raney, Premier Consulting Services, TX [SE]Thomas D. Russell, Honeywell, Incorporated, AZ [M]Scott G. Spilis, Midwest Generation EME, LLC, IL [U]Joseph M. Vavrek, Sargent & Lundy, LLC, IL [SE]Peter J. Willse, GE Global Asset Protection Services, CT [I]Henry K. Wong, Foster Wheeler Power Group, Incorporated, NJ [M]Allan J. Zadiraka, Babcock & Wilcox Company, OH [M]

Alternates

John E. Bollinger, Babcock & Wilcox Company, OH [M] (Alt. to A. J. Zadiraka)John C. deRuyter, DuPont Company, Incorporated, DE [U] (Alt. to J. J. Eibl)Ronald J. Fleming, ABB Incorporated, OH [M] (Alt. to D. J. Lee)Richard A. Gallagher, GE Global Asset Protection Services, PA [I] (Alt. to P. J. Willse)Raymond J. Heitland, Solutia, Incorporated, FL [U] (Alt. to D. E. Dressel)Robert P. Kaltenbach, Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company, MO [SE] (Voting Alt. to Burns & McDonnell Rep.)Richard Kimball Forney Corporation, TX [M] (Alt. to J. W. Bass)Michael R. Mulherin, The Dow Chemical Company, TX [U] (Alt. to G. G. Gaetke)Cuong N. Nguyen, The Foxboro Company, TX [M] (Alt. to W. S. Matz)Gary E. Norman, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M] (Alt. to J. P. O’Rourke)Wesley J. Schulze, Coen Company, Incorporated, CA [M] (Alt. to L. M. Mehta)George P. Seroka, DTE Energy/Detroit Edison Company, MI [U] (Alt. to H. R. Yates)James M. Witt, Jr., Southern Company Services, Incorporated, AL [U] (Alt. to D. P. Evely)

Nonvoting

S. Dharmalingam, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, India [M]Robert M. Lundberg, Los Altos, CA (Member Emeritus)

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents covering the reduction of combustion system hazards and the prevention of boiler furnace explosions and implosions in multiple burner boilers with a heat input rate of 12,500,000 Btu/hr and above. This includes all fuels.


Pulverized Fuel Systems (BCS-PFS)

Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore, MD [SE]David A. Cowdrick, Tampa Electric Company, FL [U]John C. deRuyter, DuPont Company, Incorporated, DE [U]Michael B. Doherty, American Electric Power Service Corporation, OH [U]Rory G. Eastman, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M]Kenneth L. Gardner, Svedala Industries, Incorporated, PA [M]Walter E. Keiser, Georgia Power Company, GA [U]Kiran R. Patel, Babcock Borsig Power Incorporated, MA [M]

Alternates

Alan J. Seibert, ALSTOM Power Incorporated, CT [M] (Alt. to R. G. Eastman)Jonathan R. Pranitis, Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation, NJ [M] (Voting Alt. to Foster Wheeler Rep.)

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the operation and design requirements of pulverized fuel systems and reduction of hazards associated with those systems. This includes all carbonaceous solid fuels at any heat input rate.


Single Burner Boilers (BCS-SBB)

John J. Eibl, ChairThe DuPont Company, TN [U]

Courtney D. Alvey, Blatimore, MD [SE]John M. DeLacy, The Coen Company, CA [M]Dale E. Dressel, Solutia Incorporated, MO [U]Glenn A. Raney, Premier Consulting Services, TX [SE]Gary J. Shrider, Babcock & Wilcox Company, OH [M]Jacques van Heijningen, Siemens Building Technologies, Incorporated, IL [M]J. A. “Red” Wagner, Fireye, NJ [M]Peter J. Willse, GE Global Asset Protection Services, CT [I]Steven J. Young, Honeywell, Incorporated, MN [M]

Alternates

Richard A. Gallagher, GE Global Asset Protection Services, PA [I] (Alt. to P. J. Willse)Raymond J. Heitland, Solutia, Incorporated, FL [U] (Alt. to D. E. Dressel)Chris Wille, Coen Company, Incorporated, CA [M] (Alt. to J. M. DeLacy)

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the reduction of combustion system hazards and the prevention of boiler furnace explosions in single burner boilers with a heat input rate of 12,500,000 Btu/hr and above. This includes all fuels.


Stoker Operations (BCS-STO)

John C. deRuyter, ChairDuPont Company, Incorporated, DE [U]

J. Mike Cantrell, The McBurney Corporation, GA [M]Andrew K. Dant, Cogentrix Energy, Incorporated, NC [U]John Hoh, National Board of Boiler & Pressure Vessel Inspectors, OH [E]Gerald E. McCullion, Honeywell, Incorporated, GA [M]

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents covering the operation of stokers and related fuel burning equipment. This includes all fuels at any heat input rate.

Staff Liaison: Amy B. Spencer

These lists represent the membership at the time the Committees were balloted on the text of this report. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of the document.

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The Report of the Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards is presented for adoption, as follows:

The Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards proposes for adoption, a complete revision to NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code, 2001 edition. NFPA 85-2001 is published in Volume 5 of the 2002 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

The Reports were prepared by the:

• Technical Correlating Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards (BCS-AAC) • Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers (BCS-FBB) • Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards (BCS-FUN) • Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators (BCS-HRS) • Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers (BCS-MBB) • Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems (BCS-PFS) • Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers (BCS-SBB) • Technical Committee on Stoker Operations (BCS-STO)

This Report has also been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Correlating Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, which consists of 14 voting members; of whom 12 voted affirmatively, and 2 ballots were not returned (Moskal and Willse).

Mr. DeRutyer’s voted affirmative stating: “During the TCC meeting, a couple of people searched the revised code for use of “recommended practice” and found no uses, so the comment was to delete the definition. I just checked the posted drafts and it does not appear n the Annex to Chapters 4, 6, and 10. So, I think that term should remain as a definition since it is used in the Annexes.”

Mr. Moore voted affirmative stating: “85-40 I agree that adjusting air/fuel ratios does not apply to HRSGs. An HRSG fits into the definition 1.3.21 (2001 Code), therefore, the suggested revised text does include HRSGs rather than excluding them.” “85-45 The comma after “…flame detection systems,…” is not grammatically correct and should be deleted.”

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(Log #CP1)Committee: BCS-FUN

85-1-(Entire Document (MOS)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Restructure entire document to comply with the NFPA Manual of Style as follows: 1. Chapter 1 to contain administrative text only. 2. Chapter 2 to contain only referenced publications cited in the mandatory portions of the document. 3. Chapter 3 to contain only definitions. 4. All mandatory sections of the document must be evaluated for usability, adoptability, and enforceability language. Generate necessary committee proposals. 5. All units of measure in document are converted to SI units with inch/pound units in parentheses. 6. Appendices restructured and renamed as “Annexes.” The individual committees of Boiler Combustion System Hazards, is proposing a complete revision to NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code, as shown at the end of this report. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial restructuring, to conform with the 2000 edition of the NFPA Manual of Style. There are very limited circumstances where the respective Committee disagreed with a MOS change, and this is noted in a Committee Proposal. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-2-(1-1 Scope, 2.1.1, 3.1.1 and 5.1.1) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends the T/C on Fundamentals change the metric and SI significant figures as follows: change “12.500” to “12.5” and “3.663” to “3.7”. Additionally, change “MBtu/hr” to “MMBtu/hr” and change “MW” to “MWt”. The TCC directs all committee to consider this change for their chapters to ensure this change can be made globally. This change should not be made globally at this time for the ROP draft by the NFPA editors. The TCC also directs all committees to review their material for the use of “gas”, “oil”, etc. and to replace with standardized terms “fuel gas” and “fuel oil” wherever possible. The Fundamentals TC is requested to develop definitions for the standardized terms. Existing definitions for “oil fuel” and “gas” may be used as a starting point. This note shall be considered as a comment to all NFPA 85 TCs.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 1.1* Scope as follows and renumber subsequent sections accordingly: “This code shall apply to single burner boilers, multiple burner boilers, stokers, and atmospheric fluidized bed boilers with a fuel input rating of 3.663 MW (12.500 MBtu/hr) or greater, to pulverized fuel systems, and to fired or unfired steam generators used to recover heat from combustion turbines [heat recovery steam generators (HRSGs)].” 1.1.1 This code shall cover design, installation, operation, maintenance, and training. 1.1.2 This code shall cover strength of the structure, operation and maintenance procedures, combustion and draft control equipment, safety interlocks, alarms, trips, and other related controls that are essential to safe equipment operation. Revise the introductory paragraph of existing 2.1.1 (shown in the ROP draft as 1.1.4) as follows: “Chapter 5, Single Burner Boilers, covers single burner boilers that fire the following fuels:...” Revise existing 3.1.1 (shown in the ROP draft as 1.1.6) as follows: Chapter 7, Atmospheric Fluidized-Bed Boilers, covers atmospheric fluidized-bed boilers. Revise existing 5.1.1 (shown in the ROP draft as 1.1.7) as follows:Chapter 8, Heat Recovery Steam Generators, covers heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) systems. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee revised the wording to more clearly explain the scope and to delete redundant information.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-3-(1-1.6) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends that the action on this Proposal be rewritten to comply with the Manual of Style to incorporate the boilerplate “retroactivity” statement since there are no significant differences from the existing text when the annex material is considered. The existing retroactivity statement doesn’t meet NFPA boilerplate for “retroactivity” existing in over 200 other NFPA standards and codes. If needed, the existing annex item can be maintained, modified or deleted. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Maintain existing 1.1.6* and A.1.1.6 (adding the title of “Retroactivity”) but do not accept the NFPA boilerplate definition of “Retroactivity” that reads as follows: Retroactivity. The provisions in this code reflect a consensus of what is necessary to provide an acceptable degree of protection from the hazards addressed in this code, at the time the code was issued. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in this code shall not apply to facilities, equipment, structures, or installations that existed or were approved for construction or installation prior to the effective date of the code. Where specified the provisions in this code shall be retroactive. In those cases where the authority having jurisdiction determines that the existing situation presents an unacceptable degree of risk, the authority having jurisdiction shall be permitted to apply retroactively any portions of this code deemed appropriate. The retroactive requirements of this code shall be permitted to be modified if their application clearly would be impractical in the judgment of the authority having jurisdiction, and only where it is clearly evident that a reasonable degree of safety is provided.SUBSTANTIATION: The committee does not agree with the proposed MOS change on Retroactivity.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-4-(Definitions) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: The committee chose the following definitions from the possible choices from the Glossary of Terms. This first set introduces no change to the document and represents those without a “preferred” definition or where the secondary definition is unique to NFPA 85 and should be maintained: Seal Air. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. Air or inert gas supplied to any device at sufficient pressure for the specific purpose of minimizing contamination. Burner. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. A device or group of devices for the introduction of fuel and air into a combustion chamber at the velocity, turbulence, and concentration required to maintain ignition and combustion of fuel. Char. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. The unburned combustibles in solid form combined with a portion of the fuel ash and sorbent. Combustion Chamber. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. The portion of the boiler or HRSG enclosure into which the fuel is fed, ignited, and burned. Confined Space. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. Any work location or enclosure in which either of the following exists: (a) the dimensions are such that a person who is 6 ft (1.8 m) tall cannot stand up in the middle of the space or extend his or her arms in all directions without hitting the enclosure, (b) access to or from the enclosure is by manhole, hatch, port, or other relatively small opening that limits ingress and egress to one person at a time. Confined spaces include but are not limited to the following: pulverizers, ducts, heaters, windboxes, cyclones, coal dust collectors, furnaces, bunkers, bins and HRSGs. Self-Checking Flame Detector. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. A flame detector that automatically, and at regular intervals, tests the entire sensing and signal processing system of the flame detector. Oil Fuel. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. Liquid fuels defined as Grades 2, 4, 5, and 6 in ASTM D 396, Standard Specification for Fuel Oils, or as Grade 2GT in ASTM D 2880, Standard Specification for Gas Turbine Fuel Oils. Igniter. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. A permanently installed device that provides proven ignition energy to light off the main burner. Class 3 Igniter. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. A small igniter applied particularly to gas and oil burners to ignite the fuel input to the burner under prescribed light-off conditions. The capacity of

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such igniters generally does not exceed 4 percent of the full-load burner fuel input. Master Fuel Trip. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. An event resulting in the rapid shutoff of all fuel, including igniters; for HRSGs, an event resulting in the rapid shutoff of all fuel to the duct burners, including igniters. Repair. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. A process that returns the combustion system or subsystem to its original design specifications or criteria. Safety Shutdown (Single Burner Boiler). (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. Stopping burner operation by shutting off all fuel and ignition energy to the furnace. Unit. (secondary) NFPA 85, 2001 ed. The combined spaces of the furnace and the associated boiler passes, ducts, and fans that convey the gases of combustion to the stack; for HRSGs, the combined spaces of the combustion turbine, the HRSG, and the associated ducts that convey the air and combustion gases from the air intake to the stack. The committee accepts the following preferred definitions from the Glossary of Terms which introduce change to the document: Air Change. (preferred) NFPA 97, 2000 ed. A quantity of air, provided through a fuel burner, equal to the volume of furnace and boiler gas passes. Check Valve. (preferred) NFPA 13D, 1999 ed. A valve that allows flow in one direction only. Damper. (preferred) NFPA 31, 2001 ed. A valve or plate for controlling draft or the flow of gases, including air. Flame. (preferred) NFPA 72, 1999 ed. A body or stream of gaseous material involved in the combustion process and emitting radiant energy at specific wavelength bands determined by the combustion chemistry of the fuel. In most cases, some portion of the emitted radiant energy is visible to the human eye. Municipal Solid Waste (MSW). (preferred) NFPA 850, 2000 ed.Solid waste materials consisting of commonly occurring residential and light commercial waste. Inert Gas. (preferred) BOILERPLATE A gas that is noncombustible and nonreactive. Interlock. (preferred) BOILERPLATE A device, or an arrangement of devices, in which the operation of one part or one mechanism of the device or arrangement controls the operation of another part of another mechanism. SUBSTANTIATION: Adoption of preferred definitions will assist the user by providing consistent meaning of defined terms throughout the National Fire Codes. The committee chose the preferred definitions where they were applicable to the boiler code. The committee kept the secondary definition where it was specific to the boiler code. See the following sections in the new ROP draft where definitions were changed: air change is 3.3.3; check valve is 3.3.167.4; damper is 3.3.44; flame is 3.3.64; municipal solid waste (MSW) is 3.3.73.9; inert gas is 3.3.85; and interlock is 3.3.87; COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-5-(1-3.62 Fixed Grate) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the definition of “Fixed Grate”. SUBSTANTIATION: “Grate” is defined. “Fixed” is ordinary usage.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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(Log #26)Committee: BCS-FUN

85-6-(1-3.119 Purge) : Accept SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119 Purge. A flow of air or an inert medium at a rate that will effectively remove any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replace them with the purging medium air. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial correction to be consistent with the use of air or an inert medium for purging.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 3.3.120 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-7-(1-3.119 Purge) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119 Purge. A flow of air or an inert medium at a rate that will effectively remove any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replace them with air or an inert medium. SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is necessary to fully allow purging with an inert medium as implied by the first part of the existing text.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-6 (Log #26).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-8-(1-3.119 Purge) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Harold Honath, Coen Co., Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119 Purge. A flow of air or an inert medium at a rate that will effectively remove and replace any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replace them with air. SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording literally means that purging must replace combustibles with air whether air is the purge medium or an inert gas is used. Proposed wording states correctly that whatever the medium is the medium with replace any combustibles.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-6 (Log #26).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-9-(1-3.119.1 Combustion Turbine Purge) : Accept SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119.1 Combustion Turbine Purge. A flow of air at purge rate through the combustion turbine and the appropriate portion of the HRSG enclosure for a sufficient number of volume changes that effectively removes any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replaces them with the air purging medium. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial correction: air is the only purging medium being used.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 3.3.120.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-10-(1-3.119.1 Combustion Turbine Purge) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Harold Honath, Coen Co., Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119.1 Combustion Turbine Purge. A flow of air at purge rate through the combustion turbine and the appropriate portion of the HRSG enclosure for a sufficient number of volume changes that effectively removes and replaces any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replaces them with the purging medium. SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording is unnecessarily wordy. Proposed wording is an improvement and is consistent with my proposal for paragraph 1.3.119.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85- 9(Log #27).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7

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85-11-(1-3.119.2 Duct Burner (HRSG) Purge) : Reject SUBMITTER: Harold Honath, Coen Co., Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.119.2 Duct Burner (HRSG) Purge. A flow of combustion turbine exhaust gas or air at purge rate through the HRSG enclosure for a sufficient number of volume changes that effectively removes and replaces any gaseous or suspended combustibles and replaces them with the purging medium. SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording is unnecessarily wordy. Proposed wording is an improvement and is consistent with my proposal for paragraph 1.3.119. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee doesn’t believe that the language is improved by the proposed change. See 3.3.120.2 in the new ROP draft for the unchanged definition. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-12-(1-3.124 Recommended Practice) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends that the action on this Proposal be rewritten to comply with the Manual of Style. It should be noted that “Recommended Practice” is not found in the body of the standard and should be deleted. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Keep the definition of “Recommended Practice” against the advice of the NFPA editors. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee does not agree with the proposed MOS change to delete the definition. “Recommended Practice” appears several times in the document and was originally in 1.3.124 and would appear immediately after 3.3.124 in the new ROP draft.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-13-(1-3.171.7 Safety Shutoff Valve (Fuel Trip Valve)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Delete this section from NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: This section is a duplicate definition of “Safety Shutoff Valve” to the one given in section 1.3.138.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Relocate 1.3.138 to the Valve section of the definitions chapter. Renumber as 1.3.171.7. Delete original 1.3.171.7.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This eliminates duplicate definitions and meets the submitter’s intent. See 3.3.167.7 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-14-(1-3.171.7 Safety Shutoff Vlave (Fuel Trip Valve)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Delete this section from NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: This section is a duplicate definition of “Safety Shutoff Valve” to the one given in section 1.3.138.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-13 (Log #41).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7


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85-15-(1-3.172 Valve-Proving System) : Reject SUBMITTER: Kevin Carlisle, Karl Dungs Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1.3.172 Valve-Proving System. In a gaseous or liquid fuel system, a system that proves the leak tightness of all safety shutoff valves and prevents main burner or ignitor lightoff if the test is not satisfied. A Valve-Proving System proves the effective closure of safety shut-off valves by detecting leakage. It may consist of a programming unit, a measuring device, valves and other functional assemblies. SUBSTANTIATION: I recommend to the NFPA 85 Committee to more accurately define a VPS.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee believes that the existing language is adequate. The proposer’s language does not meet the Manual of Style. The unchanged definition is found in 3.3.168 in the new ROP draft. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-16-(1-3.175 Watchdog Timer, External) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Change definition of “Watchdog Timer, External” to “Watchdog Timer”. Move to appropriate location alphabetically and renumber accordingly. SUBSTANTIATION: No need for the word “External” as it is in the body of the definition. The definition is found in 3.3.56 in the ROP draft, but will be moved to it’s correct location in the final document.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-17-(1-5) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.5 Approvals, Plans, and Specifications. 1.5.1 Before new equipment is installed or existing equipment is remodeled, complete plans, sequence of operations, and specifications shall be submitted for approval to the authority having jurisdiction. 1.5.2 Plans shall be drawn and documentation shall be prepared that include the following: (1) Fuel gas piping diagrams for each fuel. (2) Ladder type wiring diagrams for the hardwired portion of the burner management system. (3) Bill of materials for the safety components that includes the make, model, and quantity of each device. (4) Manufacturer’s literature for each safety component marked to indicate selected options. (5) Setting of each adjustable safety device. Exception: For devices where the final setting will not be determined until commissioning, drawings shall be permitted to indicate the setting of those devices as “to be determined”. Final installation documentation shall contain complete setting data. (6) Purge calculations that support the selected purge timer setting. (7) Manufacturer’s literature for each burner. Indicate selected firing rates (Btuh). (8) Furnace cross-section with description of construction. (9) Drawing of the airflow path through the boiler system. (10) The operating temperature of each section of the system. (11) Size in CFM of each fan. (12) Written sequence of operations for start-up, normal shutdown and emergency shutdown. (13) Arrangement of vent piping for pressure regulators, pressure switches, relief valves, and normally open vents. (14) Arrangement and procedure for leak testing fuel gas safety shutoff valves. 1.5.3 For programmable logic controller based systems, the plans and documentation shall include the following additional information:

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(1) Bill of materials providing the make, model and quantity of each programmable logic controller system component. (2) Input/Output schematics. (3) logic sheets. (4) Cross-reference list of logical relays providing the location of the relay and each set of the relay’s contacts. A.1.5.4 Programmable logic controllers can use various languages such as “ladder logic” and Boolean logic”. Submitting a symbol legend for the selected language will assist the reviewer. Ladder logic sheets may or may not include reference information between the location of software relay coils and software relay contacts. Where the information is not provided in the ladder logic sheets, a relay summary sheet should be provided if available. SUBSTANTIATION: While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and possess the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boilers projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as plan submittals. For large boiler installations, the owner may decide to retain the role of authority having jurisdiction for the project; however, for smaller boiler installations, the situation may be quite different. The owner may rely upon others to fill the AHJ role. The proposed wording will provide the guidance needed in those cases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter’s proposal is language which is more appropriate for specifications or project requirements. The submitter’s substantiation indicates it would provide guidance in specific cases which is not the intent of this code.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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Committee: BCS-FUN85-18-(1-7) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.7 Acceptance Test. 1.7.1 New boilers and associated equipment covered under this standard shall undergo an acceptance test before being placed into operation. 1.7.2 Existing boilers and associated equipment covered under this standard that undergo modification of the burner management system, including the replacement of components, shall undergo an acceptance test of those affected portions of the burner management system. 1.7.3 Acceptance testing shall include: (1) Verification that all safety devices have been installed in the correct location. (2) Verification that all adjustable safety devices have been placed at the setting determined by design or commissioning test. (3) Verification that all safety devices are functional and operate as intended. (4) Verification that sequences-of-events intended by the approved logic occur. 1.7.4 Acceptance test documentation. 1.7.4.1 Acceptance tests shall be documented with a written report of all results including the results of the tests listed under paragraph 1.7.3. 1.7.4.2 An acceptance test report along with a copy of the approved plans shall be retained as part of the documentation for the installation. 1.7.4.3 When a boiler or associated equipment covered by this standard is modified, the acceptance test report and approved plans shall be updated. SUBSTANTIATION: While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and possess the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boilers projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as acceptance tests. The proposed wording will provide the guidance needed in those cases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-17 (Log #92). These requirements are covered by Section 1.5 of the Code, which can be found in Section 4.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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Committee: BCS-FUN85-19-(1-7.1.2(h)) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-39 (Log # 393 ) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-111.SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to 1-7.1.2(h) as follows: (h)* Housekeeping essential for safe operation and prevention of fires or explosions shall be provided in accordance with the requirements of this Code.

1. Provision shall be made for periodic cleaning of horizontal ledges or surfaces of buildings and equipment to prevent the accumulation of dust deposits greater than the minimum required to create an explosion hazard. 2. Water washing or vacuum cleaning methods shall be used to reduce the possibility of creating dust clouds. Compressed air should not be used for cleaning. Replace existing A-1-7.1.2(h) with the following: In deciding whether or not dust accumulations are excessive enough to create an explosion hazard, and warrant immediate cleaning, calculate the proportion of building volume subject to suspendible dust accumulations. For a 10 ft (3 m) high building, an explosion hazard exists if more than about 5 percent of the building area is covered with 1/16 in. (1.6 mm) of suspendible dust. This calculation is based on a dust having a bulk density of 36 lbs/cu ft (580 kg/cu m). For buildings with a different height, or containing a dust with a bulk density significantly different from 36 lb/cu ft (580 kg/cu m), the guidance above can be generalized by the following equations. A room explosion hazard is judged to exist if the average dust layer thickness exceeds t

-ex:

t

15.5 HA

A(Metric Units)ex

tot

Dust

=ρ

where t

ex= thickness of dust layer (mm) required to create a room explosion hazard

ρ = bulk density of deposited dust (kg/m3) A

dust = total area of suspendible dust deposits within the room or building

volume (m2) H = height of room or building (m) A

tot = total floor area of room or building (m2); use a maximum value of

1860 even if the room or building is actually larger (Exception: If dust evenly deposited over entire area, can use actual floor area without maximum)

t HA

87.5 A(English Units)ex

tot

Dust

=ρ

where t

ex = thickness of dust layer (in.) required to create a room explosion hazard

ρ = bulk density of deposited dust (lb/ft3) A

dust = total area of suspendible dust deposits within the room or building

volume (ft2) H = height of room or building (ft) A

tot = total floor area of room or building (ft2); use 20,000 as an upper limit

regardless of the actual room or building area (Exception: If dust evenly deposited over entire area, can use actual floor area without maximum)

In using the above equations, the dust should be considered as ‘‘suspendible’’ if it is located above floor level. Dust accumulated on the floor should be considered as suspendible only if there is some other explosion hazard which is capable of creating a disturbance in the air in the same or adjacent areas (e.g. equipment posing gas, vapor, or dust explosion hazards; adjacent areas with gas, vapor, or dust room-explosion hazards). For use in the above equation, the following sample bulk density data is provided

Material lb/cu. ft. Kg/cu. M

Coal, bituminous, smaller that 420 microns 50 800

flour, wheat 35-40 560-640

starch 25-50 400-800

sulfur, powdered 50-60 800-960

wood flour 16-36 260-580

Consider overhead beams and ledges in determining the total area of dust deposits. The available surface area for dust deposits on bar joists or steel beams can be roughly estimated at 5 percent of floor area. Note: Steel beams might have an equivalent surface area as high as 10 percent of floor area, such as when spans between columns are longer than average for a given geographical area, or when a large building elevation difference requires a stronger roof structure due to anticipated snow drift loadings. Pay close attention to dust adhering to walls since this is easily dislodged. Also consider other projections such as light fixtures which can provide surfaces for dust accumulation. SUBSTANTIATION: The existing proposed appendix material for housekeeping needs to be mandatory. Recent loss experience makes it imperative that minimum housekeeping requirements be provided. The new text for 1-7.1.2(h) is submitted to meet this need. The proposed new Appendix material provides a non-mandatory, but systematic methodology for determining whether or not a dust explosion hazard exists. This information is extracted from the Factory Mutual Loss

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Prevention Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. The addition of text to 1-7.1.2(h) is moot as this language currently exists in NFPA 85, 2001 edition [1-7.1.2(8)(a) and(b)]. 2. The appendix material is significantly outside the scope of NFPA 85. The committee recommends the submitter consider making this a proposal for NFPA 850.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-20-(1-7.2.1.4) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-41 (Log # 394 ) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-111.SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 1-7.2.1.4 The owner or owner’s representative shall be responsible for retraining of operators, including review of their competence, at intervals determined by the owner. Competence reviews shall be documented and shall be performed at least annually. SUBSTANTIATION: In approximately 80 percent of the losses recorded by FM Global involving explosions and implosions of equipment within the scope of this Code, human element factors have contributed to the severity of the event with operator error identified as a contributing factor to the loss in 33 percent of the cases. While I concur that retraining of operators should be done at intervals as determined to be necessary by the owner, the frequency of reviewing their competence can not be similarly defined in this Code without providing a minimum acceptable frequency. Documented annual reviews represents a minimum acceptable safety requirement.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee believes the owner or owner’s representative should be responsible for determining the period for retraining and competency reviews and for determining the degree of documentation required.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-21-(1-7.2.1.5) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 1.7.2.1.5 as follows: “The training program and operating and maintenance manuals shall be kept current with changes in equipment and operating procedures. They shall be available for reference and use at all times.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial changes. See Section 4.4.2.1.5 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-22-(1-7.2.2.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 1.7.2.2.1 (maintaining annex item as is) as follows: “The owner or owner’s representative shall be responsible for establishing a formal and ongoing program that is consistent with the equipment and hazards involved, for training maintenance personnel to perform all required maintenance tasks.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial changes. See Section 4.4.2.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-23-(1-9.1) : Reject SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: 1.9.1 Furnace Structural Design. SUBSTANTIATION: Users of the code have misinterpreted that the positive design pressure extends beyond the furnace and includes the air and gas ducts.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The first sentence makes it clear the section applies to furnaces. In addition, the definition for “furnace” would clearly exclude air and gas ducts. The appendix material addresses potential application to air and gas ducts.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-24-(1-9.1.1) : Reject SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: “1.9.1.1* For all boilers other than fluid bed boilers, the furnace positive transient design pressure shall be at least ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Users of the code have misinterpreted that the positive design pressure extends beyond the furnace and includes the air and gas ducts.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-23 (Log #105).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-25-(1-9.1.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: For Section 1.9.1.2 relocate “of water” so that it follows “-35 in.” SUBSTANTIATION: The correct units that the SI units in parenthesis are equivalent to are “inches of water”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept Revise text to read: “...-8.7 kPa (-35 in. of water) 35 in. (8.7 kPa) of water. “ COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Change is editorial in nature. See 4.6.1.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-26-(1-9.1.2) : Reject SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: “1.9.1.2* The furnace negative transient design pressure shall be at least ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Users of the code have misinterpreted that the negative design pressure extends beyond the furnace and includes the air and gas ducts.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-23 (Log #105).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #CP117)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-27-(1-9.2.3.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: The committee agrees to the MOS changes of renumbering 1.9.2.3.2 to 4.6.2.3.2. The committee also agrees with the deletion of the word “Exception:” under existing 1.9.2.3.2(d)(7) and (10) and 1.9.2.3.2(e)(5).

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The committee does not agree to the separation of (a) thru (e) to individually numbered paragraphs (i.e., 4.6.2.3.3 thru 4.6.2.3.6 as the editors proposed and is shown below: 4.6.2.3.2* The boiler enclosure or HRSG enclosure shall be sized and interconnected to meet the following requirements: (1) The enclosure shall be sized and arranged with respect to the main fuel-burning subsystem so that stable flame is maintained. (2) The enclosure shall be free from “dead pockets” when prescribed purge procedures are followed. (3) Observation ports shall be provided to allow visual inspection of the combustion chamber, igniter and burner flames (including the ignition zone), overfire air ports, reburn injectors, and stoker grates. A.4.6.2.3.2 The fuel-burning system consists of the boiler or HRSG enclosure and the following subsystems, as applicable: air supplies, fuel supplies, main fuel burning, ignition, and combustion products removal and reinjection. 4.6.2.3.3 The air supply subsystem shall be sized and interconnected to meet the following requirements: (1) The air supply equipment shall be sized and arranged to ensure a continuous airflow for all operating conditions on the unit. (2) The arrangement of air inlets, ductwork, and air preheaters shall be designed to minimize contamination of the air supply by such materials as flue gas, water, and fuel(s). Drain and access openings shall be provided and shall be accessible. (3) The air supply equipment shall be capable of continuing the required airflow during anticipated combustion chamber pressure pulsations. 4.6.2.3.4 Fuel supplies and main fuel-burning subsystems (Refer to applicable Chapter(s) 2 through 7 for specific systems.) 4.6.2.3.5* The ignition subsystem shall be sized and interconnected to meet the following requirements: (1) The ignition subsystem shall be sized and arranged to ignite the main burner input within the limitation of the igniter classification. It shall be tested to verify that the igniters furnished meet the requirements of the class specified in the design. Igniters shall be designated as Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 as defined in 3.3.84.1, 3.3.84.2, and 3.3.84.3 and as verified by test. (2) Class 1 igniters shall be permitted to be used as Class 2 or Class 3 igniters. Class 2 igniters shall be permitted to be used as Class 3 igniters. (3) Where Class 2 igniters are used, the burner shall be operated under controlled conditions to limit the potential for abnormal operation, as well as to limit the charge of fuel in the event that ignition does not occur during light-off. They shall not be used to ignite the main fuel under uncontrolled or abnormal conditions. (4) Where Class 3 igniters are used, the igniter shall be turned off as a part of the burner light-off procedure when the time trial for ignition of the main burner has expired in order to ensure that the main flame is not dependent on ignition support from the igniter. (5) Class 2 igniters shall not be used to extend the turndown range but shall be permitted to be used to support ignition under low-load or adverse operating conditions. (6) Class 3 igniters shall not be used to support ignition or to extend the burner turndown range. (7) Class 3 special igniters shall not be used unless supervision of the individual main burner flame is provided. Class 3 special igniters shall be permitted to be used without supervision of the individual main burner flame while scavenging the main burner. (8) Where Class 1 and Class 2 igniters are used, the tests described in 6.6.3.2.2, 6.7.3.2.2, and 6.8.3.3.2 shall also be performed with the ignition subsystem in service to verify that the igniters furnished meet the requirements of the class specified in the design. This results in extended turndown range when Class 1 igniters are in service and flame is proved. (9) Tests shall be performed to determine transient limits in the ignition air and fuel supplies or in the main air and fuel supplies that do not extinguish the igniter flame or reduce the igniter’s ability to perform its intended function or adversely affect other burners and igniters in operation. (10) Igniters shall be permanently installed. They shall be supervised to verify that the requirements of 4.6.2.3.5 (1) and 4.6.2.3.5 (2) are met. This supervision shall include igniter capacity and individual igniter flame monitoring. The capacity shall be measured by igniter header pressure as a minimum. On single burner boilers, igniters do not require supervision of igniter capacity. (11) The ignition equipment shall be located in an environment free of excessive heat and accessible for maintenance. (12) All igniter safety shutoff valves shall be located to minimize the volume of fuel that is downstream of the valve in the individual igniter fuel lines or that could flow by gravity into the combustion chamber after an emergency shutdown or burner shutdown. 4.6.2.3.6 The combustion products removal subsystem shall be sized and interconnected to meet the following requirements: (1) The flue gas ducts, fans, and stack shall be sized and arranged to remove the products of combustion at the same rate at which they are generated by the fuel-burning process during operation of the unit. (2) Drain and access openings shall be provided and shall be accessible. (3) The flue gas ducts shall be designed so that they do not contribute to combustion chamber pulsations. (4) Components common to more than one boiler or HRSG shall not limit the rate of removal of products of combustion generated during the operation of all boilers or HRSGs.

(5) Boilers that share a common component between the furnace outlet and the stack shall have provisions to bypass the common component for unit purge. Where the common component does not contain a possible ignition source, a bypass shall not be required. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee does not agree with all of the proposed MOS changes as it changes the technical meaning of the existing text. See Section 4.6.2.3.2 in the new ROP draft that includes other Committee editorial changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-28-(1-9.2.3.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the text of the first sentence only of 4.6.2.3.2 as follows: “The fuel burning system shall consist of the boiler or HRSG enclosure and the following subsystems, as applicable: air supplies, fuel supplies, main fuel burning, ignition, and combustion products removal and reinjection.” SUBSTANTIATION: To modify the text to become mandatory language. See Section 4.6.2.3.2 in the new ROP draft that includes other Committee editorial changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-29-(Table 1-9.2.4.1) : Reject SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Solutia Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Change the 3/4 in. in first line of table to: “3/4 in. or not less than the size of the supply line coming into the vent connection”. SUBSTANTIATION: Section 1.9.2.4.1 and the Table 1.9.2.4.1 as written would require that a 1/2 in. pilot natural gas supply line have a 3/4 in. vent line. While this may be needed if the intent is to manifold some other pilot vent lines together, it is not necessary in all cases and should not be a requirement.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Section 1.2.4 allows the designer to demonstrate and document use of a smaller vent line than 3/4 in. if the circumstances warrant. The code is not expected to describe all possible design configurations.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-30-(Table 1-9.2.4.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: In Table 1.9.2.4.1, add the “≤” before “1 1/2” in the first column, first row. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. Sign was inadvertently deleted in the draft. See Table 4.6.2.4.2 in the new ROP draft that includes other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #35)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-31-(1-9.2.4.1 and Table 1.9.2.4.1) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Change the last sentence in this paragraph to read as follows: “Vent line sizes and vent valve port diameters shall not be less than the values shown in Table 1.9.2.4.1.” Change the heading over the right column in Table 1.9.2.4.1 to read: “Minimum Vent Line or Valve Port Size (NPS)”.

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SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal improves upon the intent of minimum vent line sizing by extending it to the valve port sizing as well. This proposal, if adopted, will allow the removal of Section A.3.6.3.1.6 and Table A.3.6.3.1.6 by the BCS-MBB technical committee because that material is virtually identical to Sections 1.9.2.4.1 and A.1.9.2.4.1. It should also allow the removal of Sections 3.6.3.1.9 and A.3.6.3.1.9 because those sections will then be virtually identical to Sections 1.9.2.4.2 and 1.9.2.4.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Change the last sentence in this paragraph to read as follows: “Vent line sizes and vent valve port diameters shall not be less than the values shown in Table 1.9.2.4.1.” Change the title for Table 1.9.2.4.1 to delete the word “line”. Change the heading of the second column in Table 1.9.2.4.1 to delete the word “line”.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee believes the committee’s revision of the table title and column heading is clearer. See 4.6.2.4.2 and Table 4.6.2.4.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-32-(1-9.2.4.3 Exception) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Delete the exception at the end of this section in the latest edition of NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is contingent upon the acceptance of a proposal to delete Section 3.6.3.1.9 which is the section that this exception refers to.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The exception can be deleted regardless of any action taken on 3.6.3.1.9 since 1.9.2.4.2 makes the exception redundant. The deleted exception was attached to 4.6.2.4.4 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-33-(1-9.3) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.9.3* Safety Devices. All safety devices shall be listed for the service intended. Safety devices shall be applied and installed in accordance with this standard and the manufacturer’s instructions. Exception No. 1: Where listed devices are not commercially available for the service intended, an approved device shall be used. Exception No. 2: Where listed devices are commercially available but not suited for the intended service conditions. Exception No. 3: Programmable logic controllers applied in accordance with 1.9.3. Exception No. 4: Where a listed process safety programmable controller is used in conjunction with logic and field devices attached to inputs and outputs that together as a system have been evaluated in accordance with an approved standard and found to meet at least a safety integrity level 2 as defined by the ISA (The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society) or the IEC (International Electromechanical Commission) then the system shall be permitted to use safety devices not specifically listed for combustion safety service. A.1.9.3 Exception No. 4 allows the use of fully evaluated process safety programmable controller based systems where the listed process safety programmable controller is used in conjunction with field devices that are not specifically listed for the service intended. For example, instead of using a fuel gas pressure switch that is specifically listed for burner management service, a pressure transducer (not listed specifically for burner management safety service) may be connected to an analog input and used to monitor fuel gas pressure. ISA Standard S84.01 and IEC Standard 61511 offer guidance for conducting full evaluations of safety instrumented systems. The result of the full evaluation is the determination of a safety integrity level for the overall system. It is important to understand that the use of a listed process safety programmable controller that possesses a specific safety integrity level (e.g., SIL3) will not guarantee that the overall system (including the field devices and logic) will meet the same safety integrity level. The overall safety integrity level will be based upon the interaction of the programmable controller, the field devices, the logic as well as the inspection, testing and maintenance program to be provided. A system properly evaluated in accordance with ISA Standard S84.01 or IEC Standard 61511 and found to have a rating of SIL2 or higher will exceed the safety expectations of typical boiler burner management system provided in accordance with NFPA 85 using typical listed or approved components.

SUBSTANTIATION: The reasons for this proposal are as follows: (1) While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and possess the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boilers projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as acceptance tests. The proposed wording will provide needed guidance on the selection of safety devices. (2) Where a boiler owner has the desire and capability to specify and maintain a SIL-rated boiler safety system, that option (Exception No. 4) should be available. Typically, we would expect this approach to be pursued in the chemical and petrochemical industry where there is an existing expertise with SIL-rated systems. The proposal has been specifically worded to exclude PLC’s from the listing requirement and to provide latitude in the use of non-listed devices in cases where the available listed devices are not suitable for the intended service conditions.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Safety devices are not defined. The code includes adequate provisions for requirements for burner management systems and other related control systems. Refer to 1.2.4 which is 1.2.3 in the new ROP draft. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #CP120)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-34-(1-9.3.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 1.9.3.1 and delete annex item as follows: 1.9.3.1 The burner management system logic shall provide outputs in a particular sequence in response to external inputs and internal logic. The logic system for burner management shall be designed specifically so that a single failure in that system does not prevent an appropriate shutdown. SUBSTANTIATION: The original language was intended to be mandatory. The committee’s change modifies the language to meet mandatory requirements, thereby rendering A.4.6.3.1 unnecessary. See Section 4.6.3.1 in the new ROP draft that includes other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-35-(1-9.3.2.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Change the heading for this paragraph from “Momentary Closing of Fuel Values” to “Momentary Closing of Fuel Valves.” SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is to correct a typographical error on the part of NFPA staff when preparing the initial release of NFPA 85.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 4.6.3.2.6 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-36-(1-9.3.2.4) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.9.3.2.4 Hardwired Logic Arrangement. Hardwired burner management system safety interlocks and excess temperature limit controllers shall be arranged in series to actuate and hold controlled safety devices (purge timer, safety shutoff valves, primary controls, trial-for-ignition timers, ignition transformers). Exception No. 1: Devices specifically listed for burner management safety service shall be permitted to be used in accordance with their listing requirements and the manufacturer’s instructions. Exception No. 2: Devices directly connected to logic system inputs and outputs. Exception No. 3: Interposing relay shall be permitted to represent a single safety device when: (a) Electrical loads exceed the rating of available safety devices. (b) Contact of the safety device needs to act in more than one location in the hardwired logic system to perform required safety functions.

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(c) The contacts of the interposing relays will fail to a safe position upon the interruption of power. Exception No. 4: Interposing relays may represent a series of safety devices if one of the following conditions apply: (a) The interposing relay representing multiple devices is arranged in parallel with safety shutoff valves that will interrupt the flow of fuel to the burners controlled by contacts of the interposing relay. (b) Two interposing relays are provided in parallel and one set of contacts from each relay are placed in series at any point where the contacts are performing a required safety function. (c) The contacts of the interposing relays will fail to a safe position upon the interruption of power. SUBSTANTIATION: While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and possess the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boilers projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as hardwired logic arrangement. The proposed wording will provide the guidance needed in those cases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter’s proposal is language which is more appropriate for specifications or project requirements. The submitter’s substantiation indicates it would provide guidance in specific cases which is not the intent of this code.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-37-(1-9.3.2.5) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.9.3.2.5* Normally Open Switch Checking. Where discrete devices are used for safety functions and where the start-up sequence will cause the contacts within the device to change state, the appropriate logic shall be provided in the burner management system to verify that the change of state has occurred. A.1.9.3.2.5 As an example, a low combustion air pressure switch should be proven to be in the “open” position when power is turned on. Then, once the combustion air blower is started, logic should verify that the contacts changed state to the “closed” position. SUBSTANTIATION: While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and posses the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boiler projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as device checking protocols. The proposed wording will provide the guidance needed in those cases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: A change of state determination does not add any additional assurance that a device is in the correct condition for a given permissive. Section 1.9.3.2.1(4) also covers this situation, which is 4.6.3.2.3(4) in the new ROP draft. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #90)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-38-(1-9.3.2.6) : Reject SUBMITTER: Peter J. Gore Willse, GE Global Asset Protection ServicesRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 1.9.3.2.6* Required Hardwired Logic. The following elements of the burner management system logic shall be hardwired. (1) Emergency stops. (2) Watchdog timers. Exception to item (2): Where a listed process safety programmable logic controller is used in conjunction with logic and field devices attached to inputs and outputs that together as a system have been evaluated in accordance with approved and found to meet at least a safety integrity level 2 as defined by the ISA (The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society) or the IEC (International Electromechanical Commission), the programmable logic controller shall be permitted to handle all burner management safety functions except emergency stops shall remain in hardwired logic. A.1.9.3.2.6 Regarding exception to Item (2), ISA Standard S84.01 and IEC Standard 61511 are examples of approved standards. SUBSTANTIATION: While many users of this code are involved with large utility boilers and possess the resources, experience and expertise needed to effectively manage new boiler projects, there is a much larger group of industrial users who depend upon this code to guide project requirements on matters such as minimum hardwired safety features. The proposed wording will provide the guidance needed in those cases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The apparent intent of the submitter’s proposal is adequately covered in paragraphs 1.9.3.2.2(8), 1.9.3.2.3(e), and 1.9.3.2.7, which can be found in the new ROP draft in 4.6.3.2.4(8), 4.6.3.2.5(F) and 4.6.3.2.9.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #113)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-39-(1-9.5.1.5) : Reject SUBMITTER: Allan J. Zadiraka, Babcock & WilcoxRECOMMENDATION: Add the following to the end of existing text in section 1.9.5.1.5: “Combustion control system design shall be in accordance with ISA-77.41-1992 - Fossil Fuel Power Plant Boiler Combustion Controls.” SUBSTANTIATION: While the 85 standard has an interest in the correct design of combustion controls, it should reference other standards on the subject rather than only partially address the areas it is specifically concerned with.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: It is inappropriate to specify a single industry standard when other standards may also meet the intent of this code. The committee has not reviewed the ISA-77.41-1992 Fossil Fuel Power Plant Boiler Combustion Controls document.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #CP121)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-40-(1.9.5.2.8) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee notes that this requirement should not apply to HRSG. The TCC recommends the following modification: Means shall be provided to enable the operator to adjust the air/fuel ratio for all boilers consistent with the fuel(s) being fired. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Combustion Systems Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Revise text of 1.9.5.2.8 (maintaining the annex) as follows: “Means shall be provided to enable the operator to adjust the air/fuel ratio consistent with the fuel(s) being fired.” SUBSTANTIATION: The committee revised the proposed MOS wording to better meet the committee’s intent. See Section 4.6.5.2.8 in the new ROP draft that includes other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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Sequence 85-41 not used.(Log #CP308)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-42-(1.9.5.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Change “Permissives” to “Additional Requirements”. SUBSTANTIATION: Committee believes the section does provide additional requirements, not just permissives. See Section 4.6.5.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

————————————————-(Log #40)

Committee: BCS-FUN85-43-(1-9.8 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 1.9.8* Selective Catalytic Reduction. 1.9.8.1 Where selective catalytic reduction (SCR) systems are selected for NO

x emission control, they shall be integrated into the boiler system or

HRSG design to operate in the flue gas temperature range required.

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1.9.8.2 Areas in which either anhydrous or aqueous ammonia is stored or piped shall be ventilated to preclude toxic or flammable concentrations. 1.9.8.3 Areas in which anhydrous ammonia is stored or piped shall meet the requirements of ANSI K61.1, Safety Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia. A.1.9.8 Some authorities having jurisdiction require the installation of selective catalytic reduction systems in some boiler or HRSG systems to reduce the emissions of NO

x. Because such a system has a narrow range of

optimum operating temperatures and is subject to maximum temperature limitations lower than many combustion turbine full-load exhaust temperatures or furnace exit gas temperatures, it usually is installed between the economizer outlet and the air preheater inlet for boilers or between heat transfer surfaces within a HRSG. The chemical process of reduction necessitates the addition of ammonia to reduce NO

x to nitrogen and water in

the presence of the catalyst. In addition, if the fuel contains sulfur, a reaction that results in the formation of ammonium bisulfate can occur. This material tends to deposit on both the catalyst and metallic surfaces downstream of the reactor section, primarily at low temperatures. Although troublesome in terms of corrosion, fouling, and material life, ammonium bisulfate does not directly affect flame safety. It is common practice to use either anhydrous or aqueous ammonia as the reducing agent in a selective catalytic reduction (SCR) system. Ammonia on demand (urea) systems generate ammonia in the anhydrous form. These chemicals (aqueous ammonia and anhydrous ammonia) are not interchangeable, and a specific system design is needed depending on the form to be used at a particular installation. Both forms, on release, are considered a potential health hazard. Ammonia gas is flammable in air at concentrations between 16 percent and 25 percent by volume. Such concentrations usually are not encountered. The system should provide the necessary features to ensure such concentrations cannot occur during abnormal conditions. Aqueous ammonia usually is stored in a closed vessel to prevent the release of vapor. Such vessels are designed for low [less than a gauge pressure of 50 psi (344.7 kPa)] pressures and only approach the design pressure under high ambient temperature conditions. Due to the corrosive nature of ammonia, material selection is an important consideration. Anhydrous ammonia is stored in a concentrated liquid-vapor form within closed vessels. Under ambient temperature conditions, pressures higher than those observed with aqueous ammonia can result. Precautions should be taken when selecting a storage area for ammonia, because the pressure in storage vessels can rise significantly when exposed to elevated temperatures. Vessels build in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are required with design gauge pressures of 250 psi (1723.7 kPa) or higher. The following sources provide additional information and requirements for storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia: CGA G-2, Anhydrous Ammonia; and Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910.111, “Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia”. SUBSTANTIATION: The essence of this text is currently found in NFPA 85-2001 in Sections 5.8, 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and A.5.8 but is equally applicable to all types of boilers and HRSGs that use SCRs. A separate proposal is being filed to request the removal of this information from Chapter 5 of NFPA 85. These proposals were prepared by the SCR Purging Issues Task Force as a part of the work of the BCS-MBB technical committee.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See new 4.6.8 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. See proposal 85-159 (Log #45) where the text was removed from Chapter 5.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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(Log #CP700)Committee: BCS-SBB

85-44-(2-1.1(2)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to original 2.1.1(2) <ROP draft Section 1.1.4(2)> and add annex material as follows: A.2.1.1(2) This can include some heavier-than-air gases. SUBSTANTIATION: This comment was noted by the T/C on Single Burner Boilers at their ROP meeting. The change clarifies that the scope includes both lighter and heavier than air gases.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-45-(2-1.3 (New) ) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the Committee clarify the Committee action on this Proposal. It was questioned if an “and” is missing from the text as follows:2.1.3 All safety shutoff valves, safety interlock devices, valve-proving systems, and flame detection systems, shall be listed or approved. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new 2.1.3 as follows: 2.1.3 All safety shutoff valves, safety interlock devices, valve-proving systems, flame detection systems, shall be listed or approved. SUBSTANTIATION: These devices are currently listed and provides an appropriate level of protection. See Section 5.1.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-46-(2-3.1.8) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 2.3.1.8 to add “switch” after the word “closure”. SUBSTANTIATION: This is an editorial change for consistency. See Section 5.3.1.9 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

————————————————-(Log #83)

Committee: BCS-SBB85-47-(2-3.2.3and 2.3.4.1.3) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Kevin Carlisle, Karl Dungs Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 2.3.2.3 For lighter-than-air fuel applications, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner and an automatic vent valve shall be provided between the two valves. Where the automatic vent valve is prohibited by the authority having jurisdiction, two safety shutoff valve es in series each with proof of closure, supervised by a automatic listed valve proving system shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner. , or two safety shut-off valves in series, each incorporating proof-of-closure, supervised by an automatic listed valve proving system. Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light-off. Exception: Elimination of the automatic vent valve from between the two main gas safety shutoff valves shall be permitted when heavier than air fuel gases are used. For heavier-than-air fuel applications, a two safety shut-off valves, each incorporating a proof-of-closure, in series supervised by an automatic listed valve proving system shall be used. Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light-off. 2.3.4.1.3 For lighter-than-air fuel applications, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner and an automatic vent valve shall be provided between the two valves. Where the automatic vent valve is prohibited by the authority having jurisdiction, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure, supervised by a automatic listed valve proving system, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner. or two safety shut-off valves in series, each incorporating proof-of-closure, supervised by an automatic listed valve proving system. Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light-off. Also refer to Figure A.2.3.4.1 Typical ignition systems for gas oil-fired burner. Exception: Elimination of the automatic vent value from between the two main gas safety shutoff valves, shall be permitted when heavier than air fuel gases are used. For heavier than air fuel applications, a two safety safety shut-off valves, each incorporating a proof-of-closure, in series supervised by an automatic listed valve proving system shall be used. Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light off. SUBSTANTIATION: I recommend to the NFPA 85 committee to allow Valve Proving System (VPS) as an alternative to a vent valve in all cases and remove the inconsequential restriction that VPS can only be used when venting is prohibited. Valve Proving Systems have been used in the US and Canada since the early 1990’s and the industry has experienced a good safety record since the introduction of the current wording. In addition, the Europeans have 30 years of experience using Valve Proving Systems. In fact, in Europe a VPS can also be used as an alternative to a pre-purge. This simply confirms the degree of safety the VPS provides to the burner system and illustrates that a VPS is a state-of-the-art safety control.

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COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Revise proposed text to read as follows: 2.3.2.3 For lighter-than-air fuel applications, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner and an automatic vent valve shall be provided between the two valves, or two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, supervised by a listed automatic valve-proving system. 2.3.2.3.1 Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light-off. 2.3.2.3.2 For heavier-than-air fuel applications, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, supervised by a listed automatic valve-proving system shall be used. 2.3.4.1.3 For lighter-than-air fuel applications, two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner and an automatic vent valve shall be provided between the two valves, or two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, supervised by a listed automatic valve-proving system. (Refer to Figure A.2.3.4.1 Typical ignition systems for gas/ oil-fired burner.) 2.3.4.1.3.1 Valve-proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light-off. 2.3.4.1.3.2 For heavier-than-air fuel applications, two safety safety valves in series, each with proof of closure switch, supervised by a listed automatic valve-proving system shall be used.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Slight editorial corrections. See 5.3.2.3 and 5.3.4.1.3 and their associated subsections. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NEGATIVE: 1EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: YOUNG: Research of previous NFPA 8501 and NFPA 85 had no requirements for a vent valve or valve proving system when heavier-than-air fuel applications were used. Why does NFPA 85 differentiate between lighter-than-air and heavier-than-air fuels? Why isn’t the requirement the same for both? Is there history or incidents that would require a change to now require a vent valve or valve proving system for heavier-than-air fuels? Checking IRI, FM, UL, and ASME, they don’t differentiate fuel types. They require double block or double block and a vent valve in their larger burner capacities (5Mbtu-12.5Mbtu). My negative/reject of 85-47 is for the following reasons: 1. This is an additional requirement that had not been previously required. 2. This is also design restrictive in that a valve proving system has to be used. 3. Don’t differentiate fuel types and require a vent valve or valve proving system on all valve trains. I recommend that we don’t differentiate fuel types. My recommended change would be: 2.3.2.3 Two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure, and a normally open vent valve installed between the two safety shutoff valves or two safety shutoff valves in series, each with proof of closure, supervised by a listed valve proving system. 2.3.2.3.1 Valve proving shall be performed either after every burner shutdown or prior to every burner light off.

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85-48-( 2-3.2.7) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In Section 2.3.2.7, change “leakage-tightness” to “valve leakage tests”. SUBSTANTIATION: More accurate terminology. See Section 5.3.2.7.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-49-(2.3.3.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 2.3.3.1 to read as follows: “Where oil and gas are to be burned alternately, a manual fuel selector switch shall be provided to permit operation of the necessary interlocks, fuel safety shutoff valves, and controls for the fuel to be fired.” SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies existing language. See Section 5.3.3.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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(Log #106)Committee: BCS-SBB

85-50-(2-3.4.2.5) : Reject SUBMITTER: Brian Desch, Forney CorporationRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: “Adequate air/fuel mixture shall be verified by interlock prior to introducing combustible fuel into furnace.” SUBSTANTIATION: As applied, an operating fan does not prove that adequate air is available to prevent a fuel-rich environment when purging an oil gun. The operator would be able to introduce fuel with no cross-limit to the amount of air supplied. Also see 2.6.5.1 and 3.7.5.2.3.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Air/fuel ratio interlocks are presently not required for any operation nor does the committee believe they should be.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: VAN HEIJNINGEN: Same arguments as committee.

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85-51-(2-3.7.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 2.3.7.1 as follows: “The response time from flame failure to de-energization of the safety shutoff valves shall not exceed 2 seconds.” SUBSTANTIATION: The time was reduced to limit the amount of unburned fuel entering the combustion chamber before initiating a safety shutdown. This also reflects the improvement of hardware design, the increase in capacity of the units and the increased turndown ratio. See Section 5.3.7.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NEGATIVE: 1EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: SHRIDER: This negative vote is being issued on the grounds that this change will in effect reduce the availability of operating boilers. This change will increase the chance for nuisance trips and could potentially cause a situation where the flame relay/scanner would be bypassed to keep a unit in operation. This could lead to further risk of damage to equipment and personnel. An investigation should be undertaken to confirm that there is indeed a risk at the current response time level of four seconds.

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85-52-(2-5.2.4 and 2.5.4.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 2.5.2.4 and 2.5.4.2 as follows: “An automatic (i.e., recycling) unit shall recycle on high steam pressure, high water temperature, or low water level (not determined by the auxiliary low water cutout) and perform four major functions as follows: (1) Prefiring cycle (2) Light-off cycle (3) Modulation, where provided (4) Shutdown cycle” SUBSTANTIATION: For clarification. See Section 5.5.2.6 and 5.5.4.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NEGATIVE: 1EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: SHRIDER: This negative vote is being issued on the grounds that allowing recycle of a boiler with a low water level could pose a potential risk. A low water level can occur for various reasons; amongst these reasons would be a failure of the equipment used to supply water to the unit . Allowing the boiler to recycle without a trainer operator’s visual inspection of the boiler on low water level can pose a risk that the boiler will be fired when an equipment problem exists.

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109



85-53-(2-5.2.4.2(2), 2.5.2.4.3(2), 2.5.2.4.4(2), Table 2.5.6.1(b)1, Table 2.5.7.1(b)1) : Accept TCC NOTE: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. The TCC questions whether an explosion hazard would exist for this short period of time prior to the safety shutdown. In addition, it is changing the philosophy of maintaining a spark for 10 seconds to prove igniter flame. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following text as new 2.5.2.4.2(2), 2.5.2.4.3(2), 2.5.2.4.4(2), Table 2.5.6.1(b)1, Table 2.5.7.1(b)1 and renumber subsequent sections accordingly. “For ultraviolet flame detection systems, the igniter transformer shall be deenergized early within the ten second pilot trial for ignition period to prove igniter stability. The duration for early spark termination shall be no less than the actual flame failure response time of the flame detector plus one second.” Delete the annex material associated with existing A.2.5.2.4.2(2), A.2.5.2.4.3(2), A.2.5.2.4.4(2), A.2.5.4.2.2(2), A.2.5.6.1, A.2.5.7.1 SUBSTANTIATION:The committee realizes the safety concern with ultraviolet flame scanners detecting ignition spark energy when no flame exists. See Sections 5.5.2.6.2(2), 5.5.2.6.3(2), 5.5.2.6.4(2), Table 5.5.6.1(b)(1), Table 5.5.7.1(b)(1) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 8 NEGATIVE: 2EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: SHRIDER: This negative vote is being issued on the grounds that this change will only serve to decrease the trial for ignition period and therefore increase the possibility that fuel may not ignite during the shorter period. If the ignition source is activated for a shorter time period, there could be a situation where the fuel cannot reach the vicinity of the ignition source in time to ignite and stabilize sufficiently to keep the flame relay energized. This will result in multiple unnecessary attempts to start a unit, allow the possibility of accumulated unburned fuel in the unit to increase the risk of damage to equipment and personnel. VAN HEIJNINGEN: With burner controls having a very short PTFI period of e.g. 3 seconds and a FFRT of 1 second, the spark would only be allowed to ignite the pilot during 1 second. This is too short. The proposal can only be accepted for burners where the UV sensor can detect the spark. When a pilot burner is used, under no circumstances should the spark be allowed to ignite the main burner.

————————————————-(Log #107)

Committee: BCS-SBB85-54-(2-5.2.4.1.8(a)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Brian Desch, Forney CorporationRECOMMENDATION: Add new tex as follows: “Including modulated FGR Control Valve.” SUBSTANTIATION: To insure complete purging of all combustible gases from the system (particularly in long FGR piping runs) the FGR Control Valve should be proven open for the duration of the purge cycle. The purge interlocks are also referenced in sections 2.5.4.2.1(8)a, and Figure 3.4.3.3.1 (interlock system-furnace purge)COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Add new item 2.5.2.4.1(12) and 2.5.4.2.1(11) as follows: “If a flue gas recirculation system is supplied, then it shall be purged per the manufacturers instructions.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: There are many different designs in operation and the wording has been modified to fall back to manufacturers instructions. See 5.5.2.6.1(12) and 5.5.4.2.1(12) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: VAN HEIJNINGEN: Same arguments as committee.

————————————————-(Log #CP707)

Committee: BCS-SBB85-55-(2-5.2.4.6(2)c, 2.5.2.4.6.(5), 2.5.2.4.8(3)b, 2.5.4.2.5(2)c, 2.5.4.2.6(3)b, 2.5.4.2.5(4), 2.5.4.2.6(6)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In 2.5.2.4.6(2)c, 2.5.2.4.6.(5), 2.5.2.4.8(3)b, 2.5.4.2.5(2)c, 2.5.4.2.5(4), 2.5.4.2.6(3)b, 2.5.4.2.6(6) change “if desired” to “if required by operating procedures.” SUBSTANTIATION: Changes the language to make it more enforceable per the MOS. See Sections 5.5.2.6.6(2)(c), 5.5.2.6.6(5), 5.5.2.6.8(3)(b), 5.5.4.2.5(2)(c), 5.5.4.2.5(4), 5.5.4.2.6(3)(b), and 5.5.4.2.6(6)in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-56-(2-5.6.1(a)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In Table 2.5.6.1(a) replace description “manual fuel shutoff valve” with “fuel safety or supervisory shutoff valve” in row 1. SUBSTANTIATION: The description of the fuel valves throughout the section is not consistent. See Table 5.5.6.1(a) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-57-(Table 2-5.6.1(a) 4.(a)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 4. (a) Air pressure and open damper(s), or (b) airflow. [Refer to 2.5.2.4.1(h 8) and (i 9).] SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Table 5.5.6.1(a) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

————————————————-(Log #CP316)

Committee: BCS-SBB85-58-(Table 2.5.6.1(b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In Table 2-5.6.1(b), replace description “igniter fuel valves” with “igniter safety shutoff valves” in step #1. SUBSTANTIATION: The description in step #4 does not match the description in step #1. See Table 5.5.6.1(b) step 2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-59-(2-5.6.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In Section 2-5.6.2, replace “manual burner valve(s)” with “supervisory or safety shutoff valve(s)”. SUBSTANTIATION: The description of the valves throughout the section is not consistent. See section 5.5.6.2(B) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-60-(2-5.6.4 and 2.5.7.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify the introductory paragraph of Sections 2.5.6.4 and 2.5.7.4 to read as follows: “Any of the following conditions shall accomplish a safety shutdown, and the burner shall not be restarted until a trained operator goes out to the boiler and determines the cause of the shutdown and takes the necessary corrective action to ensure that conditions are within specified operating limits prior to restarting:...” SUBSTANTIATION: With todays control systems, an operator has access to all pressure/temperatures and annunciated limits in the control room; the unit can be reset from the control room. However, it should be mandatory for the operator to go out to the unit to make a visual inspection, as it is possible that physical damage has been done to the unit that could make it hazardous to restart it. See Sections 5.5.6.4 and 5.5.7.4 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.

110


COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: VAN HEIJNINGEN: I agree with the proposed action following a lock out. However, I think that power failure and loss of pressure in the fuel supply should not lead to a lock out, but to a shutdown and the burner should be allowed to resume operation after all permissives have been satisfied.

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85-61-(Table 2-5.7.1 3.(a)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 3. (a) Air pressure and open damper(s), or (b) airflow. [Refer to 2.5.2.4.1(h8) and (i9).] SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Table 5.5.7.1(a) Step 3 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-62-(2-5.7.1(b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In 2-5.7.1(b) Replace description “igniter fuel valves” with “igniter safety shutoff valve(s) in step #1”. SUBSTANTIATION: The description of the valves in step #2 does not match description in step #1. See Table 5.5.7.1(b), Step 2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-63-(2-5.7.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In 2-5.7.2 Replace description “manual burner valve(s)” with “supervisory or safety shutoff valve(s)”. SUBSTANTIATION: The description of the valves throughout the section is not consistent. See Section 5.5.7.2(B) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-64-(2-5.8) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In 2-5.8 Replace text “that avoid extinguishing the burner flame” with “such that the burner flame cannot be extinguished”. SUBSTANTIATION: The statement needs to reflect that the burner must be at a firing rate that the soot blower can’t put out the flame. See Section 5.5.8 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-65-(2-6.2(b)(5)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 2.6.2(b)(5) as follows: “Controlling and maintaining a minimum airflow rate that takes into account simultaneous fuel inputs” SUBSTANTIATION: Eliminates confusion and addresses air flow for matching total fuel input rate. See Section 5.6.2(2)(f) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept

NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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(Log #110)Committee: BCS-MBB

85-66-(3-1.9 (New) ) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following new section: 3.1.9 This chapter shall also apply to fired flue gas reheaters (duct burners) installed in the flue gas path downstream of a multiple burner boiler furnace. SUBSTANTIATION: This text was prepared by the SCR Purging Issues Task Force as a part of the BCS-MBB technical committee to expand the scope of Chapter 3 to cover direct contact fired flue gas reheaters (duct burners) installed in the flue gas path of multiple burner boilers. This expansion is necessary due to the possible use of duct burners for flue gas temperature control where Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) systems are being added to existing boiler installations.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: This proposal was accepted and will be 6.1.7 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-67-(3-3.2, A.3.3.2.1, A.3.3.2.1.2 and 3.5.1(b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Delete 3.3.2 and all of its subsections and related annex material. In Section 3.5.1(b) change “in accordance with 3.3.2” to read “in accordance with 1.9.1”. SUBSTANTIATION: Section 3.3.2 is a duplication of Section 1.9 and equally applicable to multiple burner boilers. The referenced requirement that was in Section 3.3.2 is also given in Section 1.9.1.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Section 3.5.1(b) is 6.5.1.2(2) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. Section 1.9.1 is 4.6.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-68-(3-3.2.1.1) : Reject SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: “3.3.2.1.1* The furnace positive transient design pressure shall be at least ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Users of the code have misinterpreted that the positive design pressure extends beyond the furnace and includes the air and gas ducts.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 85-67 (Log #43).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-69-(3-3.2.1.2) : Reject SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: “3.3.2.1.2* The furnace negative transient design pressure shall be at least ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Users of the code have misinterpreted that the negative design pressure extends beyond the furnace and includes the air and gas ducts.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on 85-67 (Log #43).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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111


(Log #CP402)Committee: BCS-MBB

85-70-(3-4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: 3.4* Burner Management and Combustion Control Requirements. A.3.4 American Boiler Manufacturers Association publication Combustion Control Guidelines for Multiple-Burner Boilers contains additional information on this subject. This reference is for information only and should not be considered to be part of the requirements of this code. Add this document to Annex I, Referenced Publication. SUBSTANTIATION: ABMA submitted this paper to the NFPA with the request that it be accepted into the NFPA chapter on multiple burner boilers. Wording used is similar to that used by the Single Burner Boiler Chapter (see 2.3.5 and A.2.3.5) See 6.4 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 23 NEGATIVE: 2EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ALVEY: I am changing my vote on 85-70 to Negative for the reason give by Mr. lee. I am not certain that referencing the ASME document means that we agree with everything in it, but I think the subject needs more discussion. LEE: If NFPA references the ABMA “Combustion Control Guidelines” document, then NFPA is providing credibility to the accuracy of its content. However, the content within this document is neither consistent with NFPA MBB nor consistent with industry practices. For example, ABMA, requires continuous fuel/air ratio calculation and if this ratio is either high high or low low, then the combustion controls is to send a signal to the Burner Management System to perform a Main Fuel Trip. I don’t believe the NFPA 85 MBB committee has thoroughly reviewed this document and discussed the ramification of conflicting requirements.

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85-71-(3-4.3.2.4) : Accept in Principle Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-132 (Log #577) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-190.SUBMITTER: Joe Vavrek, Sargent & Lundy, L.L.C.RECOMMENDATION: Insert new (i): word the same as 5-10.4.1.4. Renumber existing (i) to (j) and existing (j) to (k). SUBSTANTIATION: Wording in 5-10.4.1.4 provides a functional requirement for the interlock systems covered in Chapter 3, similar to that specified in Chapter 5. This change provides consistency within NFPA 85.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.4.2.2.5 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-72-(3-4.3.3.1 and Figure 3.4.3.3.1) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Figure 3.4.3.3.1. Add the number 14 beside the blocks describing the Furnace Purge System. Add new text to read as follows: 3.4.3.3.1 Block 14: These blocks represent the requirements for a furnace purge following a master fuel trip and prior to resetting the master fuel trip relay. SUBSTANTIATION: The description of these blocks was lumped in the description of block 9. These blocks should have a separate paragraph to be consistent with the rest of the figure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Separate Figure 3.4.3.3.1 (6.4.2.3.1 in the new ROP draft) into two figures. “Furnace Purge System” would become Figure 3.4.3.3.4 (6.4.2.3.4 in the new ROP draft) and change the title to “Furnace Purge Interlocks” In 3.4.3.3.4 (see 6.4.2.3.4 in the new ROP draft) and in blocks 3 through 12 in 3.4.3.3.1 (see 6.4.2.3.1 in the new ROP draft) change the reference from figure 3.4.3.3.1 to figure 3.4.3.3.4 (6.4.2.3.4 in the new ROP draft) Also in 3.4.3.3.1, blocks 3 through 12, change “as shown at the bottom of” to “as shown in” Figures are shown on the following pages.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee broke Figure 3.4.3.3.1 into two figures and changed reference to coordinate with the new figure.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-73-(Figure 3-4.3.3.1 and Table 3.4.3.3.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 3.4.3.3.1 as follows: Figure 3.4.3.3.1 and Table 3.4.3.3.1 show the minimum required system of interlocks that shall be provided for basic furnace protection for a multiple burner boiler operated in accordance with this code. Table is shown on the following page.SUBSTANTIATION: The requirements better fit into a table format. See Table and Figure 6.4.2.3.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-74-(3-4.3.3.1 Block 9) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: Block 9*: When the fuel inputs to the furnace are shutoff for any reason, the master fuel trip relay shall be activated, the actions required by Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) for class 1 igniters or Table 3.4.3.3.1(b) for class 2 or class 3 igniters shall be taken. This necessitates the use of the purge sequence before the fuel supply is permitted to be established. This is a trip function in addition to the permissive function for verification that all individual burner safety shutoff valves are closed as shown in the Furnace Purge System near the bottom of Figure 3.4.3.3.1. SUBSTANTIATION: Deleted text is informational only and non-mandatory. A separate proposal has been submitted to add a block 14 for purge block descriptions. A separate proposal has been submitted to add the referenced tables to define the actions required when using class 1, 2 and 3 igniters. A separate proposal has been submitted to add new appendix material.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Revise as follows: Block 9*: When all fuel inputs to the furnace are shutoff, the master fuel trip relay shall be activated in accordance with Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) (6.4.2.3.1(a) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.) or Table 3.4.3.3.1(b) (6.4.2.3.1(b) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes). Revise block 11 as follows: “...the master fuel trip relay, in accordance with Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) (6.4.2.3.1(a) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes) or Table 3.4.3.3.1(b) (6.4.2.3.1(b) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes), if igniter fuel...”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The text was revised to agree with the figure. This will be incorporated into 6.4.2.3.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-75-(3-4.3.3.1 Blocks 3 through 12 Last Paragraph) : Accept SUBMITTER: Daniel J. Lee, ABBRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “The master fuel trip relay(s) shall also trip the coal burner line shutoff valves or take equivalent functional action to stop coal delivery to burners, primary air fans, or exhausters, and coal feeders.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial - The comma was incorrectly removed from the 8502 revision.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The comma after “air fans “was deleted and added after “exhausters.” See Table 6.4.2.3.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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112


Igni

ter

fuel

ga

s tr

ip

Loss of igniter flame1.

Igniter fuel gas pressure out of stable range2a1.

2a2. Igniter fuel oil pressure out of stable range

Igni

ter

fuel

oi

l tr ip

Igniter atomizing medium pressure improper2b.

Loss of ID fan(s)3.

Loss of FD fan(s)4.

Combustion airflow low5.

High furnace pressure6.

Loss of all flame7.

8.

All fuel inputs shut off9.

Manual trip switch10.

Mas

ter

fuel

trip

logi

c

Mas

ter

fuel

trip

rel

ay(s

)

Igniter fuel trip (Class 1 igniters)11.

AN

DG

as fu

eltr

ip lo

gicBurner gas header fuel pressure high or low12a.

Oil

fuel

trip

logi

cLow main oil burner pressure12b.

Atomizing medium pressure improper12c.

Coa

l fue

ltr

ip lo

gic

12d.

13a.

Loss of main coal burner flame13b.Follow tripping strategy in 3.8.4

Partial loss of flame, introducing hazard

All coal-firing equipment stopped or trippedor common coal-firing equipment tripped

Loss of individual gas or oil burnerflame with one or more additionalstable burner flames present

Typical cause of trip indication

Close individual burner safety shutoff valve(s)and individual igniter safety shutoff valve(s)and de-energize associated sparks

Close individual ignitersafety shutoff valve(s)and de-energize sparks

Igniter fuel trip for Class 1igniters, Block 11

Close igniter headerand individual ignitersafety shutoff valvesand de-energize sparks

Close main gas safetyshutoff valve(s) andindividual burnersafety shutoff valves

Close main oil safetyshutoff valve(s) andindividual burnersafety shutoff valves

Stop coal flowto pulverizersand burners

Figure 3.4.3.3.1 To be numbered 6.4.2.3.1 in draft

Purge complete indicator

Are all igniter headerand individual ignitersafety shutoff valvesclosed?

YesYes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

If coal is fired, are allpulverizers tripped, allcoal flow to furnacestopped, and all safetyshutoff valves closed?

If gas is fired,are all main gasheader and individualgas burner safetyshutoff valves closed?

If oil is fired,are all main oilheader and individualoil burner safetyshutoff valves closed?

Are required burnerregisters open?

One set of ID andFD fans running?

Is airflowat purge rate?

5-minute timedelay or 5 volumechanges, whicheveris longer

Reset master fueltrip relay(s)

Figure 3.4.3.3.4 To be numbered 6.4.2.3.4 in draft

113


85-73 (Log #CP405)

Table 6.4.2.3.1

Block Number Action

Block 1: Loss of an individual igniter flame shall cause the following actions:(1) Close the individual igniter safety shutoff valve(s) and de-energize the spark(s).(2) Open the vent valve (gas ignition only).(3) Signal the main flame protection system that the igniter flame has been lost.

Block 2a1: High or low igniter fuel gas header pressure shall be interlocked to initiate the tripping of the igniter header and individual igniter safety shutoff valves and deenergize sparks.

Block 2a2: Low igniter fuel oil header pressure shall be interlocked to initiate the tripping of the igniter header and individual igniter safety shutoff valves and deenergize sparks.

Block 2b: Where oil is used for ignition fuel with air or steam atomization, atomizing air or steam pressure out of range shall trip the igniter and individual igniter safety shutoff valves and deenergize sparks.

Where direct electric igniters are used, blocks 1 and 2 shall not apply. However, the master fuel trip system shall deenergize sparks and prevent reenergizing until all conditions for light-off have been reestablished.

Blocks 3 through 12:

These blocks represent conditions that initiate the tripping of all main and ignition fuel supplies through a master fuel trip relay(s). The master fuel trip relay(s) shall be of the type that stays tripped until the furnace purge system interlock permits it to be reset, as shown in Figure 6.4.2.3.4. Whenever the master fuel trip relay(s) is operated, it shall trip all fuel safety shutoff valves and de-energizes sparks and all ignition devices within the unit and flue gas path.

The master fuel trip relay(s) shall also trip the oil system circulating and recirculating valves. If the design of the oil supply system is such that backflow of oil through the recirculating valve is inherently impossible or positively prevented, this valve shall be permitted to be manually operated and shall not be required to be interlocked to close automatically on a master fuel trip.

The master fuel trip relay(s) shall also trip the coal burner line shutoff valves or take equivalent functional action to stop coal delivery to burners, primary air fans or exhausters, and coal feeders.

Block 3: The loss of all induced draft fans shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 4: The loss of all forced draft fans shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 5: Low combustion airflow below the permitted limits shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 6: High furnace pressure, such as that resulting from a tube rupture or damper failure, shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 7: Loss of all flame in the furnace shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 8*: A partial loss of flame that results in a hazardous condition shall activate the master fuel trip relay.

Block 9: When all fuel inputs to the furnace are shut off following a shutdown of the boiler for any reason, the master fuel trip relay shall be activated in accordance with Table 6.4.2.3.1 (a) or Table 6.4.2.3.1 (b).

Block 10: A manual switch that actuates the master fuel trip relay directly shall be provided for use by the operator in an emergency.

Block 11: The igniter fuel trip shall activate the master fuel trip relay in accordance with Table 6.4.2.3.1 (a) or Table 6.4.2.3.1 (b), if igniter fuel is the only fuel in service or if it is being used to stabilize a main fuel.

Block 12a: When the gas burner header fuel pressure is above the maximum or below the minimum for a stable flame, that fuel shall be tripped. If gas was the only fuel in service, the master fuel trip relay shall be actuated.

Block 12b: When the oil burner header fuel pressure is below the minimum for a stable flame, that fuel shall be tripped. If oil was the only fuel in service the master fuel trip relay shall be actuated.

Block 12c: This block represents operation of the oil fuel trip to prevent operation when atomizing air or steam pressure is out of range. If oil was the only fuel in service the master fuel trip relay shall be actuated.

Block 12d: This block represents the tripping/shutdown of coal-firing equipment that will cause a coal fuel trip. If coal was the only fuel in service the master fuel trip relay shall be actuated.

Block 13a: Loss of flame at an individual gas or oil burner with one or more additional burners operating with stable flames that does not introduce a serious enough condition to warrant a master fuel trip as called for in block 8 shall close the individual burner safety shutoff valve(s) and associated igniter safety shutoff valve(s) and deenergize the associated igniter spark. For gang-operated burner valves, the requirements of 6.6.5.2.1.3(19) and .7.5.2.1.3(19) shall be met.

Block 13b: On loss of main coal burner flame, the tripping strategies of 6.8.4 shall be followed. (Refer to Figure 6.4.2.3.1.)

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85-76-(Table 3-4.3.3.1(a) and Table 3.4.3.3.1 (b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add two new tables, Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) and Table 3.4.3.3.1(b).

Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) Fuel Inputs Shutoff When Using Class 1 Igniters;

Condition Action Required

1. First igniter(s) fails to light after successful boiler purge [See 3.6.5.2.1.3(i), 3.7.5.2.1.3(j) and 3.8.5.2.1.1(g)]

2. Any igniters proven on, all burner valves remain closed, all igniter valves subsequently closed

3. Any igniter(s) proven on, any burner valve leaves closed limit, all burner valves subsequently closed, no other main fuel in service, igniter(s) remain proven.

4. Any igniter(s) proven on, any pulverizer startup initiated, all pulverizers subsequently stopped, no other main fuel in service, igniter(s) remain proven.

5. All igniter and burner valves closed and all feeders or pulverizers stopped.

1. Igniter valve(s) shall be closed immediately. Master fuel trip not required, but a one minute delay shall be required before retrial of that or any other igniter.

2. Master fuel trip shall be actuated.

3. The associated main gas fuel trip valve and/or oil fuel trip valve shall be closed (gas fuel trip and/or oil fuel trip), proven igniters shall be permitted to remain in service.

4. Proven igniters shall be permitted to remain in service.


Table 3.4.3.3.1(b) Fuel Inputs Shutoff When Using Class 2 or Class 3 Igniters;

Condition Action Required

1. First igniter(s) fails to light after successful boiler purge [See 3.6.5.2.1.3(I), 3.7.5.2.1.3(j) and 3.8.5.2.1.1(g)]

2. Any igniters proven on, all burner valves remain closed, all igniter valves subsequently closed.

3. Any igniter(s) proven on, any burner valve leaves closed limit, all burner valves subsequently closed, no other main fuel in service, igniter(s) remain proven.

4. Any igniter(s) proven on, any pulverizer startup initiated, all pulverizers subsequently stopped, no other main fuel in service, igniter(s) remain proven.

5. All igniter and burner valves closed and all feeders or pulverizers stopped.

1. Igniter valve(s) shall be closed immediately. Master fuel trip not required, but a one minute delay shall be required before retrial of that or any other igniter.



4. (a) If the first pulverizer fails to ignite as described in 3.8.5.2.1.3(k), the master fuel trip shall be actuated. (b) If the last pulverizer in service is tripped, the master fuel trip shall be actuated. (c) If the last pulverizer in service is taken out of service in a normal shutdown sequence by an operator, the proven igniters shall be permitted to remain in service.


SUBSTANTIATION: New tables add definite requirements for actions required when using class 1, 2 and 3 igniters.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept Note: These tables will be Tables 6.4.2.3.1(b) and (c) in the new ROP draft.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-77-(3-4.3.3.4) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC recommends the TC look at the use of “boiler purge” versus “unit purge” in ROP draft Section 6.4.2.3.4 (F) to be consistent with (A). The phrase “boiler purge” doesn’t appear in the chapter. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Henry K. Wong, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add additional text before last sentence in paragraph as follows: “...units. The boiler purge shall be completed by maintaining this purge rate, from the forced draft (FD) fan through the stack, for a period of not less than five (5) minutes or not less than five (5) volume changes of the boiler enclosure, whichever is longer. Completion...”. SUBSTANTIATION: The change from 8502 to 85 left out the definition of Boiler Enclosure purge in the definition listing in Chapter 1. This reinstates the requirement and integrates it directly where the process is mandated for convenience.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: This is 6.4.2.3.4 (F) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-78-(3-4.3.3.7(f)) : Reject SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “Before main fuel firing and following a 5-minute period after a master fuel trip (furnace postpurge), all forced draft fans shall be tripped if the furnace pressure exceeds the maximum pressure value recommended by the manufacturer. The value of the pressure at which this trip is activated shall be greater than that specified in 3.4.3.3.7(e).” SUBSTANTIATION: Maintaining operation of the forced draft fans for five minutes with an extreme high furnace pressure could in itself be damaging to the furnace and related equipment and could result in a personnel hazard as well. Furthermore, if an extreme high furnace pressure is present and maintained it is doubtful that airflow is moving through the entire boiler.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The concern for the risk for exposures to personnel from not purging outweighs the concern for the high pressure in the furnace.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-79-(3-4.3.3.11 (New) ) : Accept in Principle in Part SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 3.4.3.3.11* Interlocks and Trips for Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR). The following interlocks shall initiate a trip of or prevent the operation of the ammonia feed to the SCR system: (1) Master fuel trip. (2)* Ammonia in air concentration greater than 9.6 percent (3) SCR isolated from flue gas stream (for an SCR with isolation and bypass dampers - refer to Section 3.9) A.3.4.3.3.11 Flue gas or catalyst temperature outside specified limits is a recommended but not mandatory interlock. Operating with these temperatures outside of the design range can be detrimental to downstream components or to the environment. A.3.4.3.3.11(3) The LEL for ammonia in air is 16 percent. NFPA 69 for an interlocked system (Section 3.3.1 Exception 1) states that concentrations of this type shall be held below 60 percent of the LEL, which in this case is 9.6 percent. SUBSTANTIATION: This text was prepared by the SCR Purging Issues Task Force as a part of the BCS-MBB Technical Committee to provide guidance related to the operation of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) systems installed in the flue gas path of multiple burner boilers. This guidance is necessary to reduce the operational risks associated with these SCR systems.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle in Part Accept parts 1 and 3 only. Do not accept part 2.

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Add sentences to the end of proposed A.3.4.3.3.11 as follows: “Consideration should be given to providing interlocks for ammonia in air concentrations greater than 9.6 percent in the ammonia feed system. The LEL for ammonia in air is 16 percent. NFPA 69 for an interlocked system (NFPA 69 Section 3.3.1 Exception 1) states that concentrations of this type shall be held below 60 percent of the LEL, which in this case is 9.6 percent.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Not all systems may be capable of reaching ammonia concentrations of 9.6 percent. See 6.4.2.3.11 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-80-(3-4.3.3.12 (New) ) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC requests the TC review the definition for duct burner and refine it to include SCR operation and suggest using the words “flue gas”. This note shall be considered as a comment to the TC on Fundamentals.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new section as follows: 3.4.3.3.12 (6.4.2.3.12) Interlocks and Trips for Duct Burners 3.4.3.3.12.1 (6.4.2.3.12.1) The following interlocks shall initiate a duct burner fuel trip: (1) Master Fuel Trip (2) Operator-actuated manual trip switch (3) Duct burner fuel header pressure out of limits (4) Augmentation air, where used, less than minimum for duct burner operation (5)* Loss of flame at all duct burners (6) Closure of all individual duct burner safety shutoff valves. (7) Duct burner discharge temperature high . A.3.4.3.3.12.1(5) (A.6.4.2.3.12.1(5)) Some duct burner designs may require a duct burner trip on partial loss of flame. 3.4.2.3.12.2 (6.4.2.3.12.2) All duct burner header, individual duct burner, and igniter safety shutoff valves shall be proven closed by valve position for the unit purge. Exception: Where the igniter capacity is 5.0 MBtu/hr or less, proof of closure of individual igniter safety shutoff valves by means other than valve position shall be permitted. 3.4.2.3.12.3 (6.4.2.3.12.3) Any augmentation air supply system for duct burners in the flue gas path shall be proven in service for the unit purge. SUBSTANTIATION: Duct burners are being used, therefore requirements are being added to address this equipment. See section 6.4.2.3.12 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-81-(3-4.4.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add to 3.4.4.2: 6.4.3.2.38 Duct burner fuel header pressure (high and low) The duct burner header pressure shall be monitored as close to the duct burners as practicable. 6.4.3.2.39 Failure of duct burner safety shutoff valve to close. The closed position of all duct burner safety shutoff valves shall be monitored and failure of any valve to close shall be alarmed. 6.4.3.2.40 Duct burner igniter fuel header pressure (high and low). The duct burner igniter header pressure shall be monitored as close to the duct burners as practicable. 6.4.3.2.41 Duct burner discharge temperature (high). SUBSTANTIATION: Duct burners are being used, therefore requirements are being added to address this equipment. See section 6.4.3.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-82-(3-6.3.1.3 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add a new section 3.6.3.1.3 and renumber existing sections:

“A manual emergency fuel shutoff valve that is accessible in the event of an emergency in the boiler area shall be provided.” SUBSTANTIATION: This new requirement is consistent for the requirements of oil fuel supply. See 6.6.3.1.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-83-(3-6.3.1.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Replace 3.6.3.1.6 as follows: “A double block and vent valve arrangement shall be provided in the fuel line to each burner and each igniter.” SUBSTANTIATION: Since the diagrams were moved to the Annex in the 2001 edition, the requirements for the double block and vent arrangement for burner shutoff situations were no longer mandatory. See 6.6.3.1.9 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-84-(3-6.3.1.9 and A.3.6.3.1.9) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Remove these sections from the text of NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is contingent upon the acceptance of a proposal against Section 1.9.2.4.1 to define minimum sizes for vent valve port diameters as well as vent lines. If that proposal is accepted then the requirements of 3.6.3.1.9 are essentially the same as the requirements of section 1.9.2.4.2 and the information in A.3.6.3.1.9 would be required by Section 1.9.2.4.3 and would thus be redundant and not needed.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-85-(3-6.3.1.11 (New) ) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC directs the Fundamentals TC to review this additional material (ROP draft Section 6.6.3.1.14) for possible inclusion. The TCC directs the TC on Multiple Burner Boiler to review the product of the Fundamentals ROC meeting regarding this item and delete if redundant. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals and the TC on Multiple Burner Boilers. SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new 3.6.3.1.11 as follows: “Manifolding of vents from pressure relief valves and diaphragms of pressure regulating valves, pressure switches and transmitters shall not be permitted.” SUBSTANTIATION: Manifolding of these vents has created malfunctions. The TCC should review this proposal to determine if it should be addressed by the TC on Fundamentals. See 6.6.3.1.15 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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Committee: BCS-MBB85-86-(3.6.3.5) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC directs the Multiple Burner Boiler TC to review 85-156 (Log #CP307) (HRSG) to make consistent. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read: 3.6.3.5 (6.6.3.5) Duct Burner Fuel Supply Subsystem-Fuel Gas. 3.6.3.5.1 (6.6.3.5.1) Positive means shall be provided to prevent leakage into an idle furnace using a double block and vent valve arrangement on the fuel supply to each individual duct burner that is independent of any other burner, igniter or injection system.

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3.6.3.5.2 (6.6.3.5.2) A main duct burner safety shutoff valve shall be provided that is independent of any other main gas, igniter or reburn safety shutoff valve. 3.6.3.5.3 (6.6.3.5.3) Provisions shall be made to vent the piping between individual duct burner shutoff valves and the main duct burner safety shutoff valve. 3.6.3.5.4 (6.6.3.5.4) Flame monitoring and tripping of individual duct burners shall be provided in accordance with 6.6.4. 3.6.3.6 (6.6.3.6) Augmented Air. 3.6.3.6.1 (6.6.3.6.1) Where provided, the fans supplying augmented air to duct burners shall be operated in accordance with the instructions provided by the supplier of the augmented air system or the organization having responsibility for the overall design. 3.6.3.6.2 (6.6.3.6.2) Upon failure of an augmented air supply, means shall be provided to prevent hot gases from exiting through the augmented air system. SUBSTANTIATION: Duct burners are being used, therefore requirements are being added to address this equipment. See section 6.6.3.5 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-87-(3-6.4.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the first sentence of 3.6.4.3. Delete the last four words of the last sentence “of a potential hazard.” SUBSTANTIATION: Having a boiler classified as a hazard might bring in additional requirements that are not necessary. See 6.6.4.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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Committee: BCS-MBB85-88-(3-6.5.2.1.3(e)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Daniel J. Lee, ABBRECOMMENDATION: Change text to read as follows: “The main fuel control valve shall be closed and the main safety shutoff valve(s) shall be opened, but only after the requirements of 3.6.5.4.6 3.6.5.3.7 for leak test requirements and 3.4.3.3.4 for permissive conditions in the furnace purge system have been satisfied.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial - referencing wrong clause.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.1.2(5) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-89-(3-6.5.2.1.3(e)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Harold Yates, Detroit EdisonRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 3.6.5.2.1.3(e) The main fuel control valve shall be closed and the main safety shutoff valve(s) shall be opened, but only after the requirements of 3.6.5.467 for leak test requirements and 3.4.3.3.4 for permissive conditions in the furnace purge system have been satisfied. SUBSTANTIATION: Refers to incorrect paragraph.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.1.2(5) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-90-(3-6.5.2.1.3(e)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: (e) The main fuel control valve shall be closed and the main safety shutoff valve(s) shall be opened, but only after the requirements of 3.6.5.4.6 3.6.5.4.7 for leak test requirements and 3.4.3.3.4 for permissive conditions in the furnace purge system have been satisfied.

SUBSTANTIATION: The referenced paragraph was not properly renumbered during the last revision of the document.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.1.2(5) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-91-(Table 3-6.5.2.1.3(e)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “(e) The main fuel control valve shall be closed and the main safety shutoff valve(s) shall be opened, but only after the requirements of 3.6.5.4.76 for leak test...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.1.2(5) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-92-(Table 3-6.5.2.5.2(s), 3.7.5.2.5.2 (a) and 3.8.5.2.5.2 (a).) : Reject SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: For each of these tables change item (2) in the table to read as follows: (2) Total airflow decrease below the purge rate by 5 percent full-load airflow. SUBSTANTIATION: The purge rate for multiple burner boilers was changed in this version of the code to 25 percent from the 30 percent of earlier versions. There are a number of other statements in the current version of the code that say that total airflow shall not be reduced below the purge rate (3.6.5.2.2.7, etc.) and these statements support the idea of a mandatory low airflow trip at less than 25 percent airflow, not below 20 percent airflow that is indicated by the three tables identified by this proposal.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitters substantiation was incorrect as the purge rate has always been 25 percent.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-93-(Table 3-6.5.2.5.2(s)7) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Modify the following as follows: Table 3.6.5.2.5.2(a) (7) All fuel inputs shutoff in accordance with the guidelines given in 3.4.3.3.1, Block 9. SUBSTANTIATION: Add the additional information to reference the additional material proposed in a separate proposal to be added to 3.4.3.3.1, block 9. This also makes it consistent with the coal Table 3.8.5.2.2.2(a)(4).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.5.2(7) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-94-(3-6.5.2.6.2(a)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (a) The main gas control valve shall be closed and the main safety shutoff valve(s) shall be opened, but only after the requirements of 3.6.5.4.7.6 leak test requirements have been met. SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.6.5.2.6.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25

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85-95-(3-6.5.2.10, 3.6.5.2.11, 3.6.5.2.12, 3.6.5.2.13, 3.6.5.2.14 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read: 3.6.5.2.10 (6.6.5.2.10) Duct Burner Purge and Light-Off. 3.6.5.2.10 (6.6.5.2.10.1) The duct burner shall be purged as part of the unit purge prior to initiating any firing in the unit and after a Master Fuel Trip. Exception: Duct burners in primary air systems shall be purged prior to the duct burner being put into service. 3.6.5.2.10.2 (6.6.5.2.10.2) A duct burner trip shall require a purge of the duct burners using air or flue gas for a minimum of five minutes prior to any attempt to relight the duct burner. 3.6.5.2.10.3 (6.6.5.2.10.3) A duct burner failure to ignite shall require a purge of the duct burners using air or flue gas for a minimum of one minute prior to any attempt to relight the duct burner. 3.6.5.2.10.4 (6.6.5.2.10.4) When augmented air is provided, the augmented air plenum and ductwork shall be purged using the augmented air system as part of the duct burner purge. 3.6.5.2.11 (6.6.5.2.11) Duct Burner Starting Sequence. 3.6.5.2.11.1 (6.6.5.2.11.1) All duct burner and duct burner igniter safety shutoff valves shall be proven closed. 3.6.5.2.11.2 (6.6.5.2.11.2) Air/flue gas flow through the duct burner shall be established. 3.6.5.2.11.3 (6.6.5.2.11.3) The duct burner fuel header shall be pressurized up to the individual duct burner safety shutoff valves in accordance with established operating procedures. 3.6.5.2.11.4 (6.6.5.2.11.4) The individual duct burner igniter systems shall be placed in service. 3.6.5.2.11.5 (6.6.5.2.11.5) The duct burner fuel control valve shall be set to the burner light-off position. 3.6.5.2.11.6 (6.6.5.2.11.6) With its igniter in service, the individual duct burner safety shutoff valves shall be opened. (A) Class 3 igniters shall be shutdown at the end of the trial for ignition period. (B) If no main duct burner flame is proven within five seconds after the main fuel reaches the duct burner, the duct burner fuel trip shall be initiated as well as closing the individual duct burner safety shutoff valves. The following shall apply: (1) The cause of failure to ignite shall be determined and corrected. (2) A purge of the duct burner for a minimum of five minutes with either air or flue gas shall be completed prior to attempting to start any other fuel equipment on the unit. 3.6.5.2.11.7 (6.6.5.2.11.7) The associated igniter for a duct burner shall be used to light the burner. 3.6.5.2.11.8 (6.6.5.2.11.8) Succeeding duct burners shall be placed in service in accordance with sections 6.6.5.2.11.4 through 6.6.5.2.11.7. 3.6.5.2.12 (6.6.5.2.12) Duct Burner Normal Operation. 3.6.5.2.12.1 (6.6.5.2.12.1) Duct burner firing rate shall be regulated by varying the fuel to the duct burners by means of fuel flow control valve(s) or staged firing. 3.6.5.2.12.2 (6.6.5.2.12.2) Individual burner safety shutoff valves shall be fully open or fully closed and not placed in intermediate positions to regulate duct burner firing rate. 3.6.5.2.12.3 (6.6.5.2.12.3) Duct burner firing rate shall be maintained between the maximum and minimum stable flame limits as established by test. 3.6.5.2.13 (6.6.5.2.13) Duct Burner Shutdown. 3.6.5.2.13 (6.6.5.2.13.1) Duct burners shall be removed from service by sequentially closing individual duct burner safety shutoff valves. 3.6.5.2.13.2 (6.6.5.2.13.2) Closing the individual duct burner safety shutoff valves on the last duct burner in service shall cause a duct burner fuel trip. 3.6.5.2.14 (6.6.5.2.14) Duct Burner Emergency Shutdown A duct burner fuel trip as identified in 6.4.2.3.12.1 shall close all duct burner safety shutoff valves. SUBSTANTIATION:Duct burners are being used, therefore requirements are being added to address this equipment. See sections 6.6.5.2.10, 6.6.5.2.11, 6.6.5.2.12, 6.6.5.2.13 and 6.6.5.2.14 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

————————————————-(Log #85)

Committee: BCS-MBB85-96-(3-6.5.4.7) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Harold Yates, Detroit EdisonRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 3.6.5.4.7* An operational leak test of the fuel header shall be performed in accordance with established procedures while maintaining, at a minimum,

purge rate airflow. Successful completion of the leak test shall be done before placing the main gas supply header system into operation. SUBSTANTIATION: Adds reference to appendix material to explain leak test and change system to supply header for consistency with following paragraph.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Accept the proposed change and also add annex material as follows: “The objective of the leak test is to assure that the individual burner safety shutoff valves are not leaking gas into the furnace. The test may be performed by closing the atmospheric vent valve and the individual burner safety shutoff valves, then closing the main safety shutoff valve, thus pressurizing the header. If a charging valve is used, then the main safety shutoff valve is closed and the charging valve is used to pressurize the header. That pressure must be held within predetermined limits for a predetermined amount of time for the test to be successful.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The annex material was added as it was not logged in. See 6.6.5.4.8 and A.6.6.5.4.8 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-97-(3-7.3.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text in the reference as follows: “...which show the typical fuel gas oil piping arrangements on which the text in the code is based.” SUBSTANTIATION: Text refers to fuel “gas” where the proper reference should be fuel “oil” piping.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See A.6.7.3.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-98-(3-7.3.1.6) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Henry K. Wong, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Remove the first sentence of the paragraph and modify the second sentence. Since it may not be necessary to move the fuel shut off valve outside but only to a secure location the paragraph should read: “A manual emergency fuel shutoff valve located outside of the boiler house shall be provided that is accessible in the event of fire in the boiler area shall be provided.” SUBSTANTIATION: The first sentence violates NFPA style by mandating requirements based on info in the optional annex section. It also defines equipment by exception and therefore can be very ambiguous. It should be deleted.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 85-99 (Log #CP100).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-99-(3-7.3.1.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Remove the first sentence of 3.7.3.1.6 and modify the second sentence as follows: 3.7.3.1.6 A manual emergency fuel shutoff valve located outside of the boiler house shall be provided that is accessible in the event of an emergency in the boiler area shall be provided. SUBSTANTIATION: The first sentence violates NFPA style by mandating requirements based on info in the optional appendix section. It also defines equipment by exception and therefore can be very ambiguous. It should be deleted. The second sentence may not be necessary to move the fuel shut off valve outside but only to a secure location.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.7.3.1.7 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25

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85-100-(Table 3-7.5.2.5.2(a) (7)) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC notes that the cited section is not a guideline, but is mandatory. The TCC suggests a change to “...in accordance with 3.4.3.3.1 Block 9.” This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Modify to read as follows: Table 3.7.5.2.5.2(a) (7) All fuel inputs shutoff in accordance with the guidelines given in 3.4.3.3.1, Block 9. SUBSTANTIATION: Add the additional information to reference the additional material proposed in a separate proposal to be added to 3.4.3.3.1, block 9. This also makes it consistent with the coal Table 3.8.5.2.2.2(a)(4).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.7.5.6.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-101-(3-7.5.4.3, 3.4.3.3.4, 3.6.5.4.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Insert the word “design” before the words “full load” in sections 3.4.3.3.4, 3.6.5.4.3, 3.7.5.4.3, 3.8.5.5.3, Table 3.6.5.2.5.2(a), Table 3.7.5.2.5.2(a) and Table 3.8.5.2.5.2(a). SUBSTANTIATION: The change reflects the answer to F.I. 89-2. This proposal will retire this F.I. after the issue date. See sections 6.4.2.3.4, 6.6.5.4.3, 6.7.5.12.3, 6.8.5.5.3, 6.6.5.2.5.2, 6.7.5.6.2 and 6.8.5.2.5.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-102-(3-7.5.4.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows: “Where clearing oil passages into the furnace, igniters shall be in service, with ignition established and shall be in accordance with 3.7.5.2.3.3 and 3.7.5.2.3.4.” SUBSTANTIATION:The change reflects the answer to F.I. 89-2. This proposal will retire this F.I. after the issue date. See section 6.7.5.12.7 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

————————————————-(Log #87)

Committee: BCS-MBB85-103-(3-7.5.4.8) : Accept in Principle TCC NOTE: The TCC notes that the committee action text has the action twice, with the paragraph differing with the words “with” and “within”; “within” is correct. Also “amounts” should be “amount”. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Harold Yates, Detroit EdisonRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “The following An operational leak test shall be performed in accordance with established procedures while maintaining, at a minimum, purge rate airflow before the oil supply header is placed in service. A nominal pressure on the oil header shall be established with the main and individual burner safety shutoff valves and the recirculating valves closed. If this oil pressure remains with predetermined limits for a predetermined amounts of time, the individual burner safety valves are properly sealing off their burners. A nominal pressure on the oil header shall be established with the main and individual burner safety shutoff valves and the recirculating valves closed. If this oil pressure remains within predetermined limits for a predetermined amount of time, the individual burner safety valves are properly sealing off their burners.”

SUBSTANTIATION: Make consistent with gas section and move explanatory materials to appendix.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Accept the proposed changes. In addition also add to annex A.3.7.5.4.8 the following: “A nominal pressure on the oil header shall be established with the main and individual burner safety shutoff valves and the recirculating valves closed. If this oil pressure remains with predetermined limits for a predetermined amounts of time, the individual burner safety valves are properly sealing off their burners. A nominal pressure on the oil header shall be established with the main and individual burner safety shutoff valves and the recirculating valves closed. If this oil pressure remains within predetermined limits for a predetermined amount of time, the individual burner safety valves are properly sealing off their burners.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The annex material was added as a proposal was not logged in. See 6.7.5.12.9 and A.6.7.5.12.9 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-104-(3-7.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise last sentence to read as follows: 3.7.6 Appendix C Annex B describes procedures for this mode of operation. SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See A.6.7.6 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-105-(3-8.1.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 3.8.1.1 as follows: 1) “The requirements of Section 3.8 and Chapter 6 shall apply to installations where pulverized coal is supplied.” 2) Delete the existing 3.8.1.2 and renumber. SUBSTANTIATION: The reference to chapter 6 will eliminate confusion.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.1.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

————————————————-(Log #3)

Committee: BCS-MBB85-106-(3-8.2.1(a)) : Accept in Principle TCC NOTE: The TCC directs Fundamentals TC review the last paragraph of ROP draft A.6.8.2.1 [moved in 85-116 (Log #13)] and determine if it should be added to the Fundamentals chapters. The TCC directs MBB to review Section A.1.9.2(D)(c) in the 2001 edition [A.4.6.2(D)(c) to (d) in the ROP draft] and the product of the Fundamentals ROC meeting and delete any redundant material. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals and the TC on Multiple Burner Boilers. Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-291 (Log #528) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete from 3.8.2.1 and relocate as A.1.9.2(d)C, reletter existing C as E. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA Manual of Style.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Delete 3-8.2.1(a) and renumber. Move the annex material to 3-8.2.1.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The relocated material was already implemented. The TC requests the TCC to have the TC on Fundamentals review the annex material for consideration in Chapter 1. See 6.8.2.1 and A.6.8.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-107-(3-8.2.1(b)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-292 (Log #529) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (ba)* Each coal processing subsystem shall be designed and operated in accordance with Chapter 6 of this code. within design parameters. SUBSTANTIATION: Existing language appears unenforceable. Suggested language meets the intent and conforms to NFPA Manual of Style.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.2.1(1) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-108-(3-8.2.1(c)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-293 (Log # 530) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (cb)* Methane gas shall not be allowed to accumulate. Coal bunkers and other enclosed spaces shall be designed to prevent accumulation of methane gas. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA Manual of Style.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.2.1(2) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-109-(3-8.2.1(d)) : Accept in Principle TCC NOTE: See TCC note on 85-106 (Log #3); contrary to the committee statement below, no TCC action is now necessary for this log. Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-294 (Log # 531) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete this section. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA Manual of Style. This is unenforceable. The intent is covered in Section 3-8.3.1.2.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Make the proposed change and move the annex material to 3-8.2.1.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The TC requests the TCC to have the TC on Fundamentals review the annex material for consideration in Chapter 1. See 6.8.2.1 and A.6.8.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-110-(3-8.2.1(e)) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-295 (Log # 532) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete this section. SUBSTANTIATION: This is covered in 3-8.5.2.3.2.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: 3.8.2.1 removes coal burners from service and 3-8.5.2.3.2 takes pulverizers out of service.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-111-(3-8.2.1(f)) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-296 (Log # 533 ) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete this section and replace with material from A-3-8.2.1(f). Revised as follows and renumbered as 3-8.2.1(c):

(c) Provision shall be made in the design of the hot air, tempering air, and coal pipe seal air supply systems that are shared by a group of pulverizers to prevent the accumulation of pulverized coal in these systems and to allow inspection.” SUBSTANTIATION: As written, this section appears unenforceable. I believe the real concern is with airducts common to multiple pulverizers as noted in A-3-8.2.1(f). The suggested language addresses this concern consistent with NFPA Manual of Style.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee does not agree it should be limited to systems shared by groups of pulverizers.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-112-(3-8.2.1(f)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-297 (Log #536 ) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 3-8.2.1(f) Means shall be provided to prevent the reverse flow of furnace gases into idle burners or pulverizers. SUBSTANTIATION: This requirement was in existing Section 3-8.2.1(g) but was unrelated to the other material in that section which a previous comment has now placed in Appendix A-3-8.2.1(d) (new).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.2.1(4) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-113-(3-8.2.1(g)and (h)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-298 (Log #534) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete these sections and replace with the following, numbered as 3-8.2.1(d)*. (d)* In order to prevent ignition or settling of pulverized coal in burner pipes, the transport air velocity in all burner pipes shall be maintained at or above a predetermined minimum value during operation and while purging the pipes during the shutdown procedure. This minimum value shall be established by the manufacturer and verified by tests. Exception: Transport air shall not be maintained during an emergency trip condition.” SUBSTANTIATION: Existing language in these sections is largely informational and should be in Appendix A. See comment for new Section A-3-8.2.1(d).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.2.1(5) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-114-(3-8.2.1(i)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-299 (Log #535) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: (ei)* The coal-air mixture temperature leaving the pulverizer shall be maintained within limits specified by the pulverizer and burner manufacturer(s). The pulverizer outlet temperature shall be adjusted for the type of coal being burned. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA Manual of Style.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.2.1(6) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-115-(3-8.2.1(j)) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-300 (Log # 537) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete this section. SUBSTANTIATION: Wording does not appear to conform to NFPA Manual of Style. The requirements of this section are fully covered in Sections 3-8.5.2.3.2 and 3-8.5.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Pulverizers tripped under load are not fully covered by 3.8.5.2.3.2.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-116-(3-8.2.1(k)) : Accept in Principle Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-301 (Log # 538) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-202.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Delete this section. SUBSTANTIATION: Unenforceable language. If the information is considered important, it can be an Appendix A item referenced to 3-4.4.2(ii).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Delete section (k) and move the material to A.3.8.2.1.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The material is important information that should not be lost. See A.6.8.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-117-(3-8.5.2.1.3(i)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Daniel J. Lee, ABBRECOMMENDATION: Delete text to read as follows: “The master fuel trip coal fuel trip shall be initiated on failure to ignite or loss of ignition on burners served by the first pulverizer placed in operation. Where class 1 and class 2 igniters are used then, a master fuel trip shall be initiated.” SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed text is consistent with Figure 3.4.3.3.1.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Revise the third sentence to read as follows: “The coal fuel trip shall be initiated on failure to ignite or loss of ignition on burners served by the first pulverizer placed in operation. Where class 2 or class 3 igniters are used, then a master fuel trip shall be initiated.” The remainder of the section and exception remains as is.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The change to class 2 and class 3 igniters was made to be consistent with the intent of the code. The submitter meant to reference 3.8.5.2.1.3(l). See 6.8.5.2.1.3(12) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-118-(3-8.5.2.2.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the last two sentences of section 3.8.5.2.2.3. SUBSTANTIATION: This says essentially the same as 6.5.2.2.2, i.e., never operate with burner line valves partially openCOMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.5.2.2.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-119-(3-8.5.2.3.2 and A-3.8.2.1(e)) : Reject Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-321 (Log #546) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-355.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Place an asterisk after section number 3-8.5.2.3.2* and relocate Section A-3-8.2.1(e) as A-3-8.5.2.3.2. SUBSTANTIATION: This information in this Appendix section applies to Section 3-8.5.2.3.2. Also, a comment has been submitted that the original Section 3-8.2.1(e) be deleted.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-110 (Log #7).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-120-(Table 3-8.5.2.5.2(b) (3)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (3) “...(Refer to 3.4.3.3.6, item 5 e.)”. SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.5.2.5.3(3) in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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(Log #CP104)Committee: HRS-MBB

85-121-(Table 3-8.5.2.5.2(b) (3)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Change “item 5” to “item e”. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-122-(3-8.5.2.6.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise last sentence to read as follows: “Also, the total heat input shall be limited as described in 3.8.5.5.9.10.” SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.5.2.6.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-123-(3-8.5.2.6.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Daniel J. Lee, ABBRECOMMENDATION: Change text to read as follows: “Also, the total heat input shall be limited as described in 3.8.5.5.9 3.8.5.5.10.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial - referencing wrong clause.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.5.2.6.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-124-(3-8.5.3.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the first and second sentence of section 3.8.5.3.4. Change the reference from Chapter 6 to section 6.5.4.2.1. SUBSTANTIATION: This is in conflict with Chapter 6. Section 3.8.5.3.4 requires inerting only if there is a “significant delay” before firing is initiated to clear pulverizer(s). However, 6.5.4.2.1.1 requires inerting whenever a pulverizer is tripped under loadCOMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6.8.5.3.4 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-125-(3-9 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Add new Section 3.9 as follows: 3.9* Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) Systems with Bypass Capability. A.3.9 In certain cases the environmental permit requirement to operate the SCR is limited to the months that correspond to the time of year when NOx readily combines with other compounds in the atmosphere to form ozone. In these cases, due to the seasonal nature of SCR use, a means may be included as a part of the SCR system to allow the flue gas to bypass the SCR catalyst when operation of the SCR is not required. Since the SCR catalyst ages at its normal operating temperature even when there is no ammonia injection, this seasonal bypassing of the SCR catalyst can extend the life of that catalyst. 3.9.1 The SCR isolation and bypass dampers shall be included in the open flow path verification associated with the boiler draft system. 3.9.2* When an SCR with by-pass is not required to be in service for environmental control purposes and is isolated from an operating boiler system, removable spool pieces or other approved isolation means shall be provided in the piping design and used to prevent ammonia or other combustible materials, including duct burner fuel supply, where used, from accumulating in the isolated SCR. A.3.9.2 Since SCR’s with by-pass systems can be purged with flue gas into operating precipitators a more positive means of isolation of ammonia and other combustible materials is required for long term shutdown of the SCR. Some SCR catalysts are extremely sensitive to oil contamination. For coal-fired boilers with oil-fired igniters it may be necessary to bypass the SCR while the igniters are firing in a cold furnace to prevent poisoning of the catalyst with oil soot. 3.9.3* A means shall be provided to seal the isolated SCR enclosure from flue gas entry while the boiler is operating. A.3.9.3 This means can be provided by using air from the forced draft fan discharge, or from a dedicated fan(s) to provide seal air to the isolation dampers or to pressurize the SCR enclosure to ensure flue gas does not enter the SCR while it is isolated. For balanced draft units this means could be provided by venting the SCR enclosure to atmospheric pressure. 3.9.4* Operational tie-in of the SCR into the flue gas path while firing the boiler shall require the following provisions: (a) A post operational purge of the SCR enclosure to remove any combustible materials shall have been performed after verification of the shutoff of the flow of ammonia and any other combustible materials into the SCR enclosure. (b) The post operational purge of the SCR enclosure shall be for at least five minutes or five volume changes, whichever is greater, with a boiler airflow of at least 25 percent of the full load mass airflow or with an equivalent flue gas flow. (c) The shutoff of ammonia and any other combustible materials required in (a) shall have been continuously verified while the SCR system is isolated. ( d) Sealing of the isolated SCR enclosure using the means required in section 3.9.3 shall have been maintained while the boiler is operating with the SCR system isolated. A.3.9.4 Before placing an SCR in service it should have been purged, with air or flue gas (at the proper conditions) with both fuel or ammonia sources blocked in an approved fashion and purge credit maintained. The SCR purged credit remains in effect provided the SCR is isolated from the flue gas stream and the sources of both fuel and ammonia are shut off. Partial opening of the SCR isolation dampers or loss of seal air should not void the purge credit as long as furnace combustion conditions are stable and the unit operating mode meets design criteria. An SCR thus isolated and purged can be readily placed in service without any need for further purging. It is always permissible to bring an SCR system on line by conducting a normal shutdown of the boiler, repositioning the SCR isolation and bypass dampers, conducting a unit purge, and then restarting the boiler following a normal start-up procedure. However, operational tie-in of the SCR into the flue gas path without shutting down the boiler is allowed in accordance with section 3.9.4, because it is recognized that a normal shutdown and restart of the combustion process to tie-in the SCR, including the fresh air purge, can have a negative impact on equipment and operating costs and presents additional risks inherent with any start-up.

3.9.5 An SCR system not meeting all the requirements in section 3.9.4 shall require the boiler to be shutdown and a unit purge performed with the SCR system in the airflow path prior to restarting the boiler and putting the SCR system in operation. SUBSTANTIATION: A TIA was generated on the 2001 edition of NFPA 85 to provide guidance related to the operation of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) systems with by-passes installed in the flue gas path of multiple burner boilers. This guidance is necessary to reduce the operational risks associated with the tie-in and isolation of these SCR systems. Additionally, this guidance was not addressed in the 2001 edition of NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code, as the hazard was relatively unknown at that time. The TIA was needed as SCR systems with by-pass are presently being installed and the requirements addressing the safe operation are needed to prevent any potential dangerous operation. These installations are being installed in response to environmental regulations.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Section 6.9 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

————————————————-(Log #CP207)

Committee: BCS-FBB85-126-(4-2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 4.2 to include “and pressure excursions” at the end as follows: Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to establish minimum standards for the design, installation, operation, and maintenance of atmospheric fluidized-bed boilers, their associated fuel-burning systems, and related systems to contribute to safe operation and, in particular, to the prevention of furnace explosions and pressure excursions.SUBSTANTIATION: The prevention of pressure excursions is addressed in the chapter. See Section 7.2 in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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(Log #CP208)Committee: BCS-FBB

85-127-(4-4.1.2.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In Sections 4.4.1.2.1, change “minimum design pressure” to “minimum internal gauge pressure”. SUBSTANTIATION: A word change to provide consistency with the introductory paragraph of 4.4.1.2.1. See Section 7.4.1.2.1(A) in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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Committee: BCS-FBB85-128-(4-4.3.1.12 and 4.4.3.2.10) : Accept SUBMITTER: Richard J. Kennedy, Detroit Edison Co. /Rep. ASME B31.1 Power Piping Code CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 4.4.3.1.12 Gas piping materials and system design shall be in accordance with ANSI ASME B 31.1, Power Piping. 4.4.3.2.10 Oil piping materials and system design shall be in accordance with NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment, and ANSI ASME B 31.1, Power Piping. SUBSTANTIATION: The ASME code is referenced incorrectly, the B31.1 code is an ANSI standard which is copyrighted, maintained and published by ASME. The correct reference is ANSI/ASME B31.1 “Power Piping” - 1998, including addenda or simply ASME B31.1 “Power Piping”. ASME address has changed to Three Park Ave., Times, NY 10016.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 7.4.3.1.13 and 7.4.3.2.12 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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(Log #69)Committee: BCS-FBB

85-129-(4-4.3.3.2.5) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (See also 1.9.6 1.9.5). SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The new referenced section in the proposal will now be 4.6.5. See 7.4.3.6 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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Committee: BCS-FBB85-130-(4-4.4.3.1 and A.4.4.4.3.1 ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Insert a new sentence to 4.4.4.3.1 and add the associated annex to read as follows: “The bed temperature measurements shall only be made when the bed is fluidized.A.4.4.4.3.1 The bed temperature measurement is only valid where the bed is fluidized.”SUBSTANTIATION: The advisory information is critical to safe operation and was therefore moved to the body of the standard. See 7.4.4.3.1(C)* and A.7.4.4.3.1(C) in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, RutledgeCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: MOORE: The reference to 4.4.4.3.1 and the associated Annex should be 4.4.4.3.1(C) and A.4.4.4.3.1(C).

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85-131-(4-4.4.4.2.12 and A.4.4.4.4.2.12) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting from Willse regarding the removal of the phrase “required as a” from the sentence. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 4.4.4.4.2.12 and move annex material to body as follows, thereby eliminating A.4.4.4.4.2.12 as follows: 4.4.4.4.2.12 Means of providing a calibrated solid fuel flow signal for each feeder shall be required as a part of the combustion control and solid fuel feed control systems to provide indexes of total fuel versus total airflow for use as an operating guide.SUBSTANTIATION: The annex material was modified and moved into the body for user-friendliness. See Section 7.4.4.4.2.12 in the new ROP draft, which may include other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, RutledgeCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: WILLSE: Remove “required as a” so the sentence would state: “Means of providing a calibrated solid fuel flow signal for each feeder shall be part of the combustion control.” We are already making this a requirement by having it in the code.

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85-132-(4.5.1 (7.5.1 in the ROP draft)) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC recommends the Fundamentals TC examine this proposal for inclusion in its section. The TCC directs the STO TC and MBB TC to modify their requirements to match FBB’s action shown in this proposal. The FBB, STO and MBB TCs shall examine the product of the Fundamentals ROC meeting and delete any redundant material. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committees on Fundamentals, Fluidized Bed Boilers, Stoker Operations, and Multiple Burner Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 4.5.1 as follows: 4.5.1* General. The methods for minimizing the risks of furnace pressure excursions in excess of furnace structural capability shall be accomplished by one of the following methods:

(1) The boiler enclosure, the air supply system, and the flue gas removal system shall be designed so that the maximum head capability of the forced draft and induced draft fans within these systems, with ambient air, does not exceed the design pressure of the boiler enclosure, associated ducts, and equipment. This design pressure is defined the same as, and shall be in accordance with, the wind and seismic stresses of ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, 2002. The appropriate design of steel members shall be in accordance with AISC ASD, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings — Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design, 1989, including supplement No. 1, 2001 or AISC LRFD, Load and Resistance Factor Design for Structural Steel Buildings, 1999. (2) A furnace pressure control system shall be provided in accordance with 4.5.2 and a furnace design as specified in 4.4.1.1. SUBSTANTIATION: The Committee wants to have the benefit of public review to solicit expert opinion on these references to ensure they are complete. The reference for the AISC M016, Manual of Steel Construction Allowable Stress Design will be removed since it does not provide wind and seismic loads; it will be replaced with a reference to ASCE 7-02, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. For the design of steel members, two references were added. See Section 7.5.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, RutledgeCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: MOORE: In 4.5.1(1) the reference to ASCE & should be ASCE 7-02 according to the substantiation statement.

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85-133-(4.6.2.1.2(i)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Modify Section 4.6.2.1.2(i)(6) such that the last sentence will become (7) and renumber subsequent sections accordingly: (6) Fuel input that necessitates ignition by the bed material shall not be fed into the bed until the average bed temperature for the section being started meets the requirements of 4.6.1.5.1(f) . (7)Warm-up burners shall remain in service until the stable ignition of this fuel has been established. 2. Modify Section 4.6.2.1.2(j)(4) such that the last sentence will become (5) and renumber subsequent sections accordingly: (4) Fuel input that necessitates ignition by the bed material shall not be fed into the bed until the average bed temperature for the section being started meets the requirements of 4.6.1.5.1(f) . (5)Warm-up burners shall remain in service until the stable ignition of this fuel has been established SUBSTANTIATION: 1. In 4.6.2.1.2(i)(6), which is 7.6.2.1.2(9)(f) in the ROP draft, the Committee modified the text to removed a redundant requirement found in 4.6.1.5.1(f) , which is 7.6.1.5.1.6 in ROP draft. 2. In 4.6.2.1.2(j)(4), which is 7.6.1.5.1(10)(d) in the ROP draft, now cross-references a redundant requirement. Other MOS changes are shown in the draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-134-(4-6.2.5.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 4.6.2.5.1 as follows: “With the initiation of a master fuel trip due to any of the emergency conditions listed in Table 4.6.2.6(a) and (b), all fuel shall be stopped from entering the boiler.”SUBSTANTIATION: The existing text was not clear as to what emergency shut down conditions would cause a master fuel trip. See Section 7.6.2.5.1 in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes. Note that the cross-referenced sections in the new text will be 7.6.2.5.2 and 7.6.2.5.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-135-(4-6.2.5.6 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Insert a new Section 4.6.2.5.6 as follows: “Except as permitted in Section 4.6.2.5.3, equipment that is tripped at the time of or following a master fuel trip shall not be restarted until conditions have stabilized and it is determined that the equipment can be safely be restarted.” SUBSTANTIATION: This requirement ensures conditions are stable after a master fuel trip. See Section 7.6.2.5.5.4 in the new ROP draft, which may include other MOS changes. The section cross-referenced in this new text will be 7.6.2.5.5.1 in the ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-136-(4.6.2.7) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Change the title of 4.6.2.7 as follows: Procedure for Purging after a Master Fuel Trip. SUBSTANTIATION: Emergency shut down includes both master and main fuel trips, and master fuel trips were the only trips intended. See Section 7.6.2.7 in the new ROP draft, which may include other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-137-(4-7.3.1 and 4.7.3.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION:Modify 4.7.3.1 and 4.7.3.4 to delete the reference to 4.4.3.5. SUBSTANTIATION: The reference is redundant to the other cross-reference in the sections and was deleted. See Sections 7.7.3.1 and 7.7.3.3 in the new ROP draft, which may include other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-138-(4-7.3.2 and 4.7.3.4) : Accept TCC NOTE: In review of the affirmative comment, the TCC notes that in ROP draft Section 7.7.3.3, the tests should cross reference Section 7.7.3.2 as shown in the draft; the ballot printed incorrectly. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Sections 4.7.3.2 and 4.7.3.4 as follows: 4.7.3.2 Where Class 3 or Class 3 Special igniters are used, the limits of stable flame for each burner subsystem producing a separate flame envelope shall be determined by tests. (A)These tests shall verify that transients generated in the fluidized bed and the fuel and air subsystems do not adversely affect the burners in operation. (B)These tests shall include the expected range of available fuels (C) These tests shall be repeated after any combustion process modification and after switching to any fuel not previously tested. 4.7.3.4 Where Class 1 or Class 2 igniters are used, the tests required in 4.4.3.5 shall be performed over the operating range where the system is designed for firing without ignition support. (A) In addition, the tests in 4.7.3.2 shall be performed with the ignition subsystem in service to verify that the igniters that are furnished meet the requirements of the class specified in the design. (B) Any resulting extended turndown range shall be available only when Class 1 igniters are in service and flame is proven.SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially the “and” was changed to an “or” in the 4.7.3.4 <Section 7.7.3.3 in the ROP draft>. All classes of igniters were explicitly addressed. The rewording clarifies the intent of the two sections. See Sections 7.7.3.2 and 7.7.3.3 in the new ROP draft; in addition, the two

cross-referenced sections in the revised text are both 7.7.3.2 in the new ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, RutledgeCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: MOORE: 85-137 (Log #CP211) deleted the reference to 4.4.3.5 in 4.7.3.4. As recommended, 4.7.3.4 cannot stand alone if the reference is deleted. See also 85-140 (Log #CP205).

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85-139-(4-7.5.3(1)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: “(1) Fuel header pressure at the burner below the minimum established ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Text should be revised to clarify the meaning of the location where pressure is measured. This section was previously intended for all burners whether serviced by a single control valve or not. The current text is intended for groups of burners serviced by a single control valve. In this configuration, burner header pressure is normally measured, not the individual burner pressure. This also makes this paragraph consistent with paragraph 4.8.5.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Modify 4.7.5.3 (primary paragraph), (1) and (5) as follows: 4.7.5.3 A warm-up burner system fuel trip of each burner or group of burners serviced by a single control valve shall result from any of the following conditions: (1) Fuel pressure at the point of supervision below the minimum required for stable operation of the burner as established by the burner manufacturer or by trial (5) High fuel gas pressure at the point of supervision above the maximum allowed for the burner.COMMITTEE STATEMENT:T he Committee clarified the intent of this paragraph was to address individually controlled burners as well as groups of burners controlled by a single control valve. In (5), tripping on high fuel pressure is a requirement for proper burner operation and this was clarified by the change. See 7.7.5.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include other MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-140-(4-8.3.2 and 4.8.3.3) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Sections 4.8.3.2 and 4.8.3.3 as follows: 4.8.3.2 Where Class 3 or Class 3 Special igniters are used, the limits of stable flame for each burner subsystem producing a separate flame envelope shall be determined by tests. (A)These tests shall verify that transients generated in the fluidized bed and the fuel and air subsystems do not affect the burners adversely during operation. (B)These tests shall also include the expected range of available fuels. (C) These tests shall be repeated after any combustion process modification and after switching to any fuel not previously tested. 7.8.3.3 Where Class 1 or Class 2 igniters are used, the tests required in 4.4.3.5 and 4.8.3.2 shall be performed over the operating range where the system is designed for firing without ignition support. (A) In addition, In addition, the tests in 4.8.3.2 shall be performed with the ignition subsystem in service to verify that the igniters that are furnished meet the requirements of the class specified in the design. (B)Any resulting extended turndown range shall be available only when Class 1 igniters are in service and flame is proven.SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially the “and” was changed to an “or” in the 4.8.3.3 <7.8.3.3 in the ROP draft>. All classes of igniters were explicitly addressed. The rewording clarifies the intent of the two sections. See Sections 7.8.3.2 and 7.8.3.3 in the new ROP draft; in addition, the three cross-referenced sections in the revised text are 4.4.3.5, 4.8.3.2 and 4.8.3.2, respectively in the new ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: MOORE: Although we did not have a separate Log item to delete the reference to 4.4.3.5, I believe our intent was to be consistent with 85- 137 (Log #CP211) and 85-138 (Log #CP204). Therefore, in 7.8.3.3 the reference to 4.4.3.5 should be deleted.

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85-141-(4-8.5.2.1.2(n) Exception No. 1 and No. 2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete 4.8.5.2.1.2(n) Exceptions No. 1 and No. 2. SUBSTANTIATION: Exception No. 1 was redundant to Section 4.8.5.2.2.1 <Section 7.8.5.2.2.1 in the new ROP draft>. Exception No. 2 is redundant to the primary paragraph of 4.8.5.2.1.2(n) <Section 7.8.5.2.1.2.(14) in the new ROP draft>.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-142-(4-8.5.3(l)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: “(1) Fuel header pressure and temperature (heated oil only) ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Text should be revised to clarify the meaning of the location where pressure is measured. This section was previously intended for all burners whether serviced by a single control valve or not. The current text is intended for groups of burners serviced by a single control valve. In this configuration, burner header pressure is normally measured, not the individual burner pressure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Modify 4.8.5.3 (primary paragraph) and (1), including insertion of a new (2), renumbering subsequent sections as follows: 4.8.5.3 A warm-up burner system fuel trip of each burner or group of burners serviced by a single control valve shall result from any of the following conditions: (1) Fuel pressure outside operating limits necessary to accomplish proper atomization as established by trial or by the burner manufacturer (2) Fuel temperature (heated oil only) outside operating limits necessary to accomplish proper atomization as established by trial or by the burner manufacturer.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee clarified the intent of this paragraph was to address individually controlled burners as well as groups of burners controlled by a single control valve. Additionally the temperature and pressure trip requirements were separated to further clarify the intent. See 7.8.5.3 in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-143-(4-9.2.3(i) Exception No. 2) : Accept SUBMITTER: John P. O’Rourke, Alston Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text in Exception No. 2 as follows: “Airflow measurement, drum level measurement and auctioneered furnace draft signals from ...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Text was originally derived from NFPA 8502 which intended to include drum level as an exception to the requirement for independent measurements. The MBB technical committee could not include drum level measurements in the exception as “low drum level” because it is not a mandatory master fuel trip for multiple burner boilers, but is for Fluid Bed Boilers.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 7.9.2.4(9)(b) in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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(Log #CP326)Committee: BCS-HRS

85-144-(Chapter 5 (ROP Chapter 8)) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC directs all the committees to review the use of “scanner” to replace it with “detector” when referring to flame scanners when appropriate (a global replacement is likely not appropriate). The TCC directs the Fundamentals to consider defining flame scanner since the term will still appear in select cases and since flame detector is the defined term. This note shall be considered as a comment to all the NFPA 85 TCs. SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Replace “scanner” with “detector” in Chapter 5 (ROP draft chapter 8) in the locations shown in the ROP draft. SUBSTANTIATION: “Flame scanner” is an undefined term. In addition, the term “flame detector” is a more inclusive term and is defined in the document. See Chapter 8 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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(Log #28)Committee: BCS-HRS

85-145-(5-1) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1 General Requirements. 5.1.7 5.1.1 Where conflicts exist between Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, the requirements of Chapter 5 shall be followed. This chapter shall be used in conjunction with Chapter 1 and requires the coordination of operation procedures, control systems, interlocks, and structural design. Where conflicts exist, the requirements of Chapter 5 shall apply. 5.2.2 5.1.2* The user of this code shall recognize the complexity of firing with regard to the type of equipment used and the characteristics of the fuel. 5.2.3 5.1.3 Emphasis shall be placed on the importance of component coordination and on knowledge of expected operating conditions. (Note: Acceptance of this proposal will result in A.5.2.2 being renumbered as A.5.1.2) SUBSTANTIATION: With the new Manual of Style, the Scope and Purpose sections from each chapter will be consolidated into a new Chapter 1, Administration. These three paragraphs have neither “scope” or “purpose” requirements and more correctly belong in their own section. This proposal also has the advantage of keeping these important items in the chapter on HRSGs. The revised wording in the proposed 5.1.1 is adapted from Chapter 2. The proposed wording more completely explains the intent of this paragraph.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Modify Section 5.1.7 as follows: “This chapter shall be used in conjunction with Chapters 1 through 4 and requires the coordination of operation procedures, control systems, interlocks, and structural design. Where conflicts exist, the requirements of Chapter 8 shall apply.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposal has been accepted with editorial changes to reflect the restructuring of the document per the Manual of Style. In addition, proposed sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 are found in draft 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 and were not relocated. The submitter’s intent was met. See 8.1.6 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-146-(5.1.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 5.1.2 as follows: “Purge requirements in Chapter 5 shall apply to all fired and unfired heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) systems.”SUBSTANTIATION: The phrase “regardless of the fuel(s) used” is no longer needed to convey the intent of the paragraph and the chapter number was added. See Section 8.1.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-147-(5-3.1 and 5.3.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Move section 5.3 and it’s annex, 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 to section 5.7.6. The remaining sections of 5.7 will be renumbered beginning with 5.7.6. Change the reference in 5.12.3.2.4 from “Section 5.3” to “Section 5.7.6”. New section to read as follows: 5.7.6 Fin-Tube Metal Fires. 5.7.6.1 The initial response to a fire inside the HRSG shall include the removal all fuel from the combustion turbine and HRSG. 5.7.6.2 A procedure shall be provided to contain, confine, or seal off a fin-metal tube fire and to protect the buildings and adjacent equipment.SUBSTANTIATION: These requirements should be moved to the HRSG Enclosure section. See Sections 8.5.5, A.8.5.5, 8.5.5.1 and 8.5.5.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes; the cross-referenced section is in the new ROP draft Section 8.9.3.2.4 and will now reference Section 8.5.5. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-148-(5-4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Delete Section 5.4 in it’s entirety. Add new section and annex as follows and renumber subsequent sections: 5.7.3* For HRSGs that use an induced draft fan, the HRSG design shall conform to the requirements of Section 1.9.1.2. A.5.7.3 For HRSG configurations where excessively low gas side pressures can develop, the system designer should consider applying the implosion protection requirements in Section 3.5. SUBSTANTIATION: The above requirement applies to a combustion turbine and HRSG with fresh air firing capability. The wording was modified to clarify the intent of the requirement. See Section 8.5.3 and A.8.5.3 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-149-(5-5.1.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Martin C. Nygaro, Nooter/EricksenRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “The ability of the combustion turbine to satisfy the purge flow requirements...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of type of flow.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 8.3.1.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-150-(5-6.2.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Martin C. Nygaro, Nooter/EricksenRECOMMENDATION: Delete entire section. SUBSTANTIATION: 5.6.2.2.1 is redundant to 5.5.1.1. 5.6.2.2.2 is redundant to 5.6.2.1.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-151-(5-6.2.3.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Martin C. Nygaro, Nooter/EricksenRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “The HRSG manufacture’s system required interlocks...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Not all of the interlocks stated are provided or defined by the HRSG manufacturer. HRSG system broadens requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 8.4.2.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-152-(5-6.2.3.2) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 5.6.2.3.2 Signals shall be provided to the combustion turbine control system to initiate a change in the combustion turbine operating mode if HRSG safety conditions deviate beyond pre-set safety limits. A combustion turbine trip is very costly in terms of its effect on combustion turbine life expectancy and shall be performed only under conditions that result in a safety hazard or equipment damage. Typical HRSG conditions that warrant a combustion turbine operational response and their corresponding responses shall include but are not limited to the following as listed in Table 5.6.2.3.2. Caution: A combustion turbine trip is very costly in terms of its effect on combustion turbine life expectancy and should be performed only under conditions that result in a safety hazard or equipment damage. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial revisions to conform with the Manual of Style and to more clearly convey the intent of this paragraph.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.6.2.3.2* Signals shall be provided to the combustion turbine control system to initiate a change in the combustion turbine operating mode if HRSG safety conditions deviate beyond pre-set safety limits, A combustion turbine trip is very costly in terms of its effect on combustion turbine life expectancy and shall be performed only under conditions that result in a safety hazard or equipment damage. Typical HRSG conditions that warrant a combustion turbine operational response and their corresponding responses shall including but not limited to the following as those listed in Table 5.6.2.3.2. A.5.6.2.3.2 A combustion turbine trip is very costly in terms of its effect on combustion turbine life expectancy and should be performed only under conditions that result in a safety hazard or equipment damage.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial rewrite of the requirement. The caution was moved to the Annex as it was informational. See 8.4.2.2.2 and A.8.4.2.2.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-153-(Table 5-6.2.3.2) : Accept in Principle TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommends further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators.SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise Table 5.6.2.3.2 as follows:

Table 5.6.2.3.2 Typical HRSG Interlock Conditions and Responses

Condition Response

Water in drum (s) below minimum permitted level

Reduce combustion turbine load or trip combustion turbine as required by HRSG manufacturer

Pressure in combustion turbine exhaust plenum high

Trip combustion turbine

Position of stack closure (if provided) not correct

Trip combustion turbine Reduce combustion turbine load or initiate an emergency fired shutdown of the combustion turbine.

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SUBSTANTIATION: Failure of the stack position indicator should not cause a trip of the combustion turbine. If the damper is in fact closed to the point of creating operating problems, the combustion turbine back-pressure will increase and cause a combustion turbine trip. This will happen quickly and there is little time saved or decrease in personnel safety by not immediately tripping on indicated stack damper position. Pressure sensing/interlocking in the combustion turbine exhaust is typically a robust three sensor auctioneered system producing a more reliable signal than a single position switch or damper position indicator.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Accept the proposal with the following changes: 1. Delete “Typical” in the title of Table 5.6.2.3.2(B). Delete the word “emergency” from the proposed change to the table. Change “an” to “a”. 2. In the third item of the “condition” column, add a cross reference to 5.12.5.3 (section 8.9.5.1.2 and 8.9.5.1.3 in the ROP draft). 3. Modify the third item of the “response” column to read as follows: Reduce combustion turbine load or initiate a fired shutdown of the combustion turbine. 4. Add note to Table 5.6.2.3.2(B) in the first response row as follows: Due to rapid steam pressure rise following a steam turbine trip, drum water level drops but inventory remains the same. A combustion turbine response to this transient should not be required and a delay for the time required immediately after the steam turbine trip to permit pressure recovery and level restoration should be permitted.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification was added to the table. The word “typical” is not enforceable. The note clarifies that the Committee intent is not to require combustion turbine response to short term transients that present no hazard. An “emergency fired shutdown” is an undefined condition, therefore, “emergency” was deleted. See Table 8.4.2.2.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes; the referenced section in the Table (5.12.5.2) is now 8.9.5.1.2 and 8.9.5.1.3 in the MOS draft. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 20 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 ClemensEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: BOLANDER: Not tripping the gas turbine on damper closure has resulted in stack transition failure on one of our projects recently.

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Committee: BCS-HRS85-154-(5-6.4.5.1.6 Exception) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION:Eliminate the exception in section 5.6.4.5.1.6 by combining the wording in sections 5.6.4.5.1.6 and 5.6.4.5.1.7. New section to read as follows: 5.6.4.5.1.6*.Where Class 3 or Class 3 Special igniters are used, the limits of stable flame for each burner subsystem producing a separate flame envelope shall be determined by tests. (A) These tests shall verify that transients generated in the fuel and combustion turbine exhaust gas subsystems or maldistribution of the combustion turbine exhaust gas do not adversely affect the burners in operation (B) These tests shall include the expected range of available fuels.5.6.4.5.1.6 Where Class 1 or Class 2 igniters are used, the tests in 8.4.4.5.1.7 shall be performed over the operating range where the system is designed for firing without ignition support. (A)In addition, the tests in 8.4.4.5.1.7 shall be performed with the ignition subsystem in service to verify that the igniters that are furnished meet the requirements of the class specified in the design. (B) Any resulting extended turndown range shall be available only when Class 1 igniters are in service and flame is proven.SUBSTANTIATION: The rewording clarifies the intent of the two sections. See Section 8.4.4.5.1.7 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-155-(5-6.4.5.2.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 5.6.4.5.2.2 as follows: 5.6.4.5.2.2 Provisions shall be included for scavenging the passages of a liquid fuel burner into the HRSG with that burner’s igniter in service. SUBSTANTIATION: The rewording clarifies the intent of this section. The second sentence was eliminated because it was an operational requirement. See Section 8.4.4.5.2.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-156-(5-6.5.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 5.6.5.1 as follows: “Where provided, the fan(s) supplying augmented air to the duct burners shall be operated in accordance with the instructions provided by the duct burner manufacturer, the supplier of the augmented air system, and the organization having responsibility for the overall design.” SUBSTANTIATION: Augmented air, where provided, is really part of the burner system, and it may be critical for safe and proper operation of the burner. As such, the burner manufacturer is the correct source for operating instructions for an augmented air fan(s). See Section 8.4.5.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-157-(5-7.2) : Accept in Principle TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee recommended further consideration be given to Mr. Bolander’s comments expressed in the voting. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators.SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Add a new CAUTION following 5.7.2 as follows: CAUTION: Excessive HRSG enclosure design pressure can result in a more severe energy release from the HRSG enclosure if a blockage of the exhaust to the stack occurs. Add a new A.5.7.2 as follows: A.5.7.2 In the event of inadvertent closure of any damper in the combustion turbine exhaust path such that exhaust flow is stopped, there will be a rapid buildup of pressure downstream of the combustion turbine that will continue to increase even after the combustion turbine is tripped on high exhaust pressure. This is due to the rundown time of the combustion turbine. It is not possible to design the transition duct or HRSG enclosure to withstand this pressure surge. The energy with which the HRSG enclosure ruptures increases as the pressure at which rupture occurs increases. SUBSTANTIATION: A similar caution exists in A.1.9.1.1 with respect to furnace design pressure and fuel explosions. The caution addresses a potentially serious increase in the hazard to personnel should an unnecessarily conservative enclosure design pressure be used and a pressure excursion as described in the proposed new appendix material occurs.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Replace the existing 5.7.2 with the following: “The HRSG enclosure shall be capable of withstanding the design pressure without permanent deformation due to yield or buckling.” Add a new A.5.7.2 as follows: A.5.7.2 Excessive HRSG enclosure design pressure can result in a more severe energy release from the HRSG enclosure if a blockage of the exhaust to the stack occurs. In the event of inadvertent closure of any damper in the combustion turbine exhaust path such that exhaust flow is stopped, there will be a rapid buildup of pressure downstream of the combustion turbine that will continue to increase even after the combustion turbine is tripped on high exhaust pressure. This is due to the rundown time of the combustion turbine. It is not possible to design the transition duct or HRSG enclosure to withstand this pressure surge. The energy with which the HRSG enclosure ruptures increases as the pressure at which rupture occurs increases.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The “HRSG system designer” was deleted as this person may not be the entity that determines the design pressure. The word “transient” was changed to “design” as transient pressures are not a factor in HRSG enclosure design. The cautionary statement was informational and moved to the annex. See 8.5.2 and A.8.5.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 20 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 ClemensEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: BROWN: Objection is made to the duct pressure design requirements being included in the NFPA 85 document. I believe this design should be left to the HRSG designer, to address overpressure concerns.

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COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: BOLANDER: Revise the first sentence of the Committee Action as follows: “The HRSG enclosure up to a stack damper when provided shall be capable of withstanding the design pressure without permanent deformation due to yield or buckling.” STATZ: The first sentence of A.5.7.2 should read: “HRSG enclosure pressure exceeding the design pressure can result in a severe energy release...”.

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85-158-(5-7.4, 5.7.5, and 5.7.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Delete 5.7.4, 5.7.5 and 5.7.6 in it’s entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: These are redundant to sections 1.9.2.3.2(e)(2), (3) and (4), which are sections 4.6.2.3.2(e)(2), (3) and (4) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-159-(5-8 and A.5.8) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Delete Sections 5.8, 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and A.5.8 from NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: The essence of this text has been proposed to be added to NFPA 85 as Sections 1.9.8, 1.9.8.1, 1.9.8.2, and A.1.9.8. This information is equally applicable to all types of boilers and HRSGs that use SCRs and therefore should be included in Chapter 1 of NFPA 85. These proposals were prepared by the SCR Purging Issues Task Force as a part of the work of the BCS-MBB Technical Committee.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Fundamentals Committee accepted their proposal 85-43 (Log #40) to move this material to a better location; it would be duplicative if it remained in the present location. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-160-(5-9.4) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC recommends the Fundamentals Committee consider adding requirements for electrical equipment (see Section 8.6 in the 2004 ROP draft). The TCC also directs all the committees to review the product of the Fundamentals committee from the ROC meeting. This note shall be considered as a comment to all the NFPA 85 TCs.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 5.9.4 as follows: 5.9.4* Where an area is identified as a hazardous location as defined by Article 500 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, the equipment design, types of enclosures, and the wiring methods shall be as specified by that code. SUBSTANTIATION: Meeting NFPA 70 requirements for hazardous areas might involve methods other than special enclosures. For example hermetically sealed switches, air purges, or intrinsically safe designs may be sufficient to meet certain hazardous areas. See Section 8.6.4 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-161-(5-10.2.2.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 5.10.2.2.2 as follows: “Where VDU trend displays are used, the displays shall provide data that are current to within the prior 30 minutes at minimum, and the data provided shall have been stored when change exceeds 1% of calibrated instrument range.”

SUBSTANTIATION: Existing text required storage of data at five times greater frequency than it was being recorded and did not address the accuracy of the information being recorded. The revised text more clearly explains the intent of this requirement. See Section 8.7.2.2.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 ClemensCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: STATZ: 5.10.2.2.2 should not be 1% of calibrated span, but should be 1% of previous reading. One percent of span might be too large a step to assure proper trending.

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Committee: BCS-HRS85-162-(5-10.4.1.4(8) Exception No. 2 (New) ) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Add a second exception following item 8 in 5.10.4.1.4 as follows: Exception No. 2: Combustion turbine exhaust gas flow, combustion turbine load, airflow measurement, and auctioneered drum level signals from the HRSG control system shall be permitted to be used for a master fuel trip, provided all the following conditions are met: (a) These interlocks are hardwired into the burner management system. (b) Tripping set points are protected from unauthorized changes. (c) Any single component failure of these sensing elements and circuits does not prevent a mandatory master fuel trip. SUBSTANTIATION: A similar exception appears in the comparable section of Chapter 3 [3.4.3.2.4(9)]. It is needed in this chapter as well to support the flexibility of initiating interlock functions permitted in 5.10.4.1.5.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Modify 5.10.4.1.4(8) adding new subsections 5.10.4.1.4.1 and 5.10.4.1.4.2 as follows: (8)The independence of mandatory duct burner master fuel trip sensing elements and circuits from all other control elements and circuits except as permitted in Section 5.10.4.1.4.1 and 5.10.4.1.4.2. and 5.10.4.1.4.1 Individual burner flame detectors shall be permitted to be used for initiating duct burner master fuel trip systems.5.10.4.1.4.2 Combustion turbine exhaust gas flow, combustion turbine load, airflow measurement, and auctioneered drum level signals from the HRSG control system shall be permitted to be used for a master fuel trip, provided all the following conditions are met: (1) These interlocks are hardwired into the burner management system. (2) Tripping set points are protected from unauthorized changes. (3) Any single component failure of these sensing elements and circuits does not prevent a mandatory master fuel trip.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter’s intent was met and the result is shown in 8.7.4.1.5, 8.7.4.1.5.1 and 8.7.4.1.5.2 in the new draft, which may include MOS changes.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-163-(5.10.4.2.1.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: In 5.10.4.2.1.4, modify the last sentence to change “to” to “of”. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial change. See Section 8.7.4.2.1.4 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-164-(5-11.3(4)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Martin C. Nygaro, Nooter/EricksenRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “All duct burner and igniter safety shutoff valves...”. SUBSTANTIATION: Broadens scope to include combustion turbine fuel supply.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 85-165 (Log #33).COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Statement on Proposal 85-165 (Log #33).

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NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-165-(5-11.3(4)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Michael C. Polagye, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (4) All combustion turbine, duct burner and igniter safety shutoff valves (or equivalent) proved closed by valve position and all ignition sources deenergized. SUBSTANTIATION: Section 5.6.2.1 requires proof of closure for fuel stop valves (or equivalent) in each fuel line to the combustion turbine. The proposed additions provide consistency with this requirement.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Revise 5.11.3(4) to read as follows (maintaining the existing exception): “All combustion turbine fuel stop valves (or equivalent), and duct burner and igniter safety shutoff valves proved closed by valve position and all ignition sources deenergized.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Rewritten for clarification. See 8.8.3(4) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-166-(5.11.4.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: In Section 5.11.4.3, delete the second sentence that reads as follows: In the case of liquid fuel, verification also shall be made that the duct low point(s) is cleared of combustibles (refer to A.5.7.8.2). SUBSTANTIATION: Text not needed. See Section 8.8.4.3 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-167-(5.11.4.3.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 5.11.4.3.2 including deletion of subparts (1) and (2) and their associated appendix items as follows. “When firing any liquid fuel or gaseous fuel that is heavier than air, verification shall be made that the low point drains are clear of fuel.” SUBSTANTIATION: A gas heavier than air will not escape through vents and must be drained. See Section 8.8.4.3.2 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-168-(5-11.4.4) : Accept SUBMITTER: Martin C. Nygaro, Nooter/EricksenRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “Post - Purge Light-Off Airflow. After completing....”. SUBSTANTIATION: This is not a post purge (as defined). Rather, it is the flow rate following a purge and before a combustion turbine light-off.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 8.8.4.4 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-169-(5-11.5.8.2(k) (New) ) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Christopher J. Lech, ALSTOM Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new paragraph (k) in Section 5.11.5.8.2. “The combustion turbine load, exhaust flow and temperature shall be within acceptable range as determined by HRSG manufacturer prior to operation of duct burner.” SUBSTANTIATION: Proper design, selection and usage of tubing materials requires knowledge of expected service conditions. The calculation of superheater and reheater tube metal temperatures is carried out to ensure that anticipated temperatures do not exceed the limit for satisfactory life of the materials used. The highest tube metal temperatures and corresponding pressures during steady state, transient and off-design operating conditions are considered. Normally highest tube metal temperatures occur during maximum duct firing conditions at 100 percent gas turbine load. Operation of the duct burner with turbine exhaust gas exhaust flows at levels which have not have been considered by the manufacturer may impact tube material selection as duct burner firing significantly increases the flue gas temperature entering these sections.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Insert a new 5.11.6.1 and renumber subsequent sections as follows: “The combustion turbine load, exhaust flow and temperature, and duct burner firing rate shall remain within the acceptable range as determined by the HRSG manufacturer during all operating modes.”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the text is more appropriate in this section because it covers the full range of system operations. This action meets the intent of the submitter as evidenced by the submitter’s substantiation. See 8.8.6.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-170-(5.11.7.5 and A.5.11.7.5) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Delete 5.11.7.5 and A.5.11.7.5 in their entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: This section does not convey an enforceable or meaningful requirement. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-171-(5-12.2.1.2) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Christopher J. Lech, ALSTOM Power Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a precaution paragraph in annex Section 5.12.2.1.2. “When combustion turbine exhaust flow is to be reintroduced to the HRSG through operation of the stack diverter damper, the combustion turbine load and damper sequence of operation shall be considered by HRSG manufacturer.” SUBSTANTIATION: Proper design and selection of HRSG and component materials requires knowledge of expected operating conditions. The reintroduction of combustion turbine exhaust gas at temperatures and flow levels in short time frame (faster than typical gas turbine startup sequence) can impact HRSG material life expectancy and component materials selected. The sequence of diverter damper operation in conjunction with combustion turbine gas flow needs to be considered by the HRSG manufacturer to minimize impact on HRSG materials selected.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in Principle Insert a new 5-12.2.3 and associated annex item renumbering subsequent sections as follows: 5-12.2.3* Returning HRSG to Service. When combustion turbine exhaust flow is to be reintroduced to the HRSG through operation of the stack diverter damper, the combustion turbine load and damper sequence of operation shall be considered by HRSG manufacturer. A.8.12.2.3 Proper design and selection of HRSG and component materials requires knowledge of expected operating conditions. The reintroduction of combustion turbine exhaust gas at temperatures and flow levels in short time frame (faster than typical gas turbine startup sequence) can impact HRSG material life expectancy and component materials selected. The sequence of diverter damper operation in conjunction with combustion turbine gas flow needs to be considered by the HRSG manufacturer to minimize impact on HRSG materials selected.

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COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter’s proposal contained mandatory language applicable to both fired and unfired HRSGs and was therefore added in the body with the substantion added as annex material. See 8.9.2.3 and A.8.9.2.3 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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85-172-(5.12.3.2.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Heat Recovery Steam Generators, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 5.12.3.2.1 as follows: “The gas bypass damper failure mode shall be determined and the exposed system shall be capable of withstanding the resultant pressure.” SUBSTANTIATION: The change was required due to the action taken on Proposal 85-157 (Log #31) where the referenced section was removed. Also, the pressure encountered from the damper failure mode is not a transient. See Section 8.9.3.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:22VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 21 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clemens

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(Log #CP501)Committee: BCS-PFS

85-173-(6.4.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise existing Section 6.4.1 as follows: “General requirements for pulverized fuel systems shall be covered by this section and specific requirements for only the more commonly used direct-fired unit systems and storage systems are covered in detail. (For other types of systems, refer to Section 9.6).” SUBSTANTIATION: The committee accepts the proposed MOS change of adding “and” to combine the sentences. The committee does not agree with the proposed MOS revision to change “are” to “shall be”, as it changes the intent of the sentence. See Section 9.4.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes; the section reference contained within the paragraph is correct as it would appear in the ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-174-(6-4.2.1.1 and 6.4.2.1.2 ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the numbering of old 6.4.2.1.1 and 6.4.2.1.2 as follows: 6.4.2.1.1 Means shall be provided to resist the passage of air or gas from the pulverizer through the feeder into the bunker. 6.4.2.1.2 A vertical and cylindrical column of fuel shall be sized to withstand pulverizer operating pressures, but it shall be no less than 3 pipe diameters. 6.4.2.1.3 The primary air or flue gas supply shall be taken from a source with a pressure that is equal to or higher than that against which fuel will be discharged from the system. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially changed the numbering for clarity. See Sections 9.4.2.1.1 through 9.4.2.1.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-175-(6-4.6.1.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6.4.6.1.1 as follows: “All components of the pulverized fuel system as described below in 9.4.6.1.4.2 that are designed to be operated at no more than gauge pressure of 13.8 kPa (2 psi) shall be designed to withstand an internal explosion

gauge pressure of 344 kPa (50 psi) for containment of possible explosion pressures.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial for clarity. See Section 9.4.6.1.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes; the section reference contained within the paragraph is correct as it would appear in the ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-176-(6-4.6.1.1.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Create a new 6.4.6.1.1.1 as follows: “For operating gauge pressures in excess of 13.8 kPa (2 psi), the equipment as described below in 9.4.6.1.4.2 shall be designed to withstand an internal explosion pressure 3.4 times the absolute operating pressure.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial for clarity. See Section 9.4.6.1.1.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes; the section reference contained within the paragraph is correct as it would appear in the ROP draft. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-177-(6-4.6.1.4(6)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Split up 6.4.6.1.4 as shown in the ROP draft and change (6) to be a new subsection shown as 9.4.6.1.4.3 as follows: 9.4.6.1.4.3 The raw fuel bunker and mechanical components, including but not limited to seals, gears, bearings, shafts, and drives, shall not be required to meet these requirements. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee wanted to break item 6 out to be its own paragraph for clarity. See Section 9.4.6.1.4.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-178-(6-4.6.2.5) : Accept TCC NOTE: The Technical Correlating Committee requests the action on this Proposal be rewritten to comply with the Manual of Style addressing the term “brittle”. In addition, the issue of specifically noting that the requirement is for new installations only should be revisited. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 6.4.6.2.5 as follows: “For new installations only, brittle materials, defined as having a plastic elongation of less than 8 percent prior to tensile rupture, shall not be used for piping except as abrasion-resistant linings and where no credit is taken for the structural strength of the lining.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial for clarity. See Section 9.4.6.2.6 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-179-(6-4.6.6.1 Exception) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the Exception to 6.4.6.6.1. SUBSTANTIATION: The requirement is already incorporated in Section 6.4.6.1.4 (ROP draft 9.4.6.1.4.3). See Section 9.4.6.6.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept

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NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-180-(6-5.2.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: The Committee rejects the MOS suggestion to break apart the existing 6.5.2.1 to have subsections as follows: 6.5.2.1.1 All steps shall be included. 6.5.2.1.2 It shall be permitted to vary the sequence of steps (2) through (9) as recommended by the system designer.SUBSTANTIATION: The committee does not agree with the specific proposed MOS change described above. See Section 9.5.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-181-(6.5.2.3) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: The Committee rejects the MOS suggestion to break apart the existing 6.5.2.3 to have subsections as follows: 6.5.2.3.1 All steps shall be included. 6.5.2.2.2 It shall be permitted to vary the sequence of steps (2) through (6) as recommended by the system designer. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee does not agree with the specific proposed MOS change described above. See Section 9.5.2.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-182-(6-5.4.2.1.2) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC makes note of the following editorial change in the text: (B) The pulverizer equipment manufacturer and purchaser shall consider fuel characteristics, the pulverizer temperature and size, and arrangement of the pulverizer. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6.5.4.2.1.2 as follows: 6.5.4.2.1.2 Inerting Procedure. (A)The inerting procedure shall be established by the pulverizer equipment manufacturer and the purchaser. (B) The pulverizer equipment manufacturer and purchaser shall consider fuel characteristics, pulverizer temperature and size, and arrangement of the pulverizer. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial changes for consistency. The Committee rejected the MOS suggestion to refer to the “equipment manufacturer and purchaser” as “they” in (B). See Section 9.5.4.2.1.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-183-(6-5.4.2.2.1(3) Exception and Exception (New 9.5.6.2.2.1 (3)) and Exception)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the second sentence of 6.5.4.2.2.1 (3) as follows: “When the operating pulverizer is empty of fuel, proceed to another tripped and inerted pulverizer and repeat the procedure until all are cleared of fuel.Exception: Exception to (3): Restart feeder and return pulverizer to normal operation if furnace conditions allow such operation.”

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially revised for clarity. Also, the committee wishes to keep the exception as there is no better way to address it. See Section 9.5.4.2.2.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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85-184-(6-6.4.1 (New 9.4.6.4.1)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the second sentence of 6.6.4.1 as follows: “The only special equipment is an optional dust collector with a pressure lock for cleaning hot air or gas (optional).” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial for clarity. See Section 9.6.4.1 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:9VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 7 NOT RETURNED: 2 Keiser and Pranitis

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(Log #CP500)Committee: BCS-STO

85-185-(7.4.1.3 (10.3.1.3 in ROP draft)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 7.4.1.3 as follows: 7.4.1.3 When changing the rate of furnace input, the airflow and fuel flow shall be changed simultaneously at the proper rates to maintain a safe air/fuel ratio during and after the change. 10.3.1.3.1 This requirement shall not prohibit provisions for air lead and lag of fuel during changes in the firing rate. 10.3.1.3.2 Placing the fuel flow control on automatic without the airflow in automatic shall be prohibited. SUBSTANTIATION: Split up multiple requirements per the MOS and added the word “requirement” for clarity. See Sections 10.3.1.3, 10.3.1.3.1 and 10.3.1.3.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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85-186-(7.5.4.4 (10.4.4.4 in ROP draft)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Modify 7.5.4.4 as follows: “Fuel shall be fed to maintain an even depth of ash. As the percentage of ash in the fuel changes, adjustments shall be made. The depth of ash at the discharge end of the grates shall be observed.” SUBSTANTIATION: Text was revised for enforceability. See Section 10.4.4.4 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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85-187-(7.5.7.3 (10.4.7.3 in the ROP draft)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Modify Section 7.5.7.3, changing the second sentence as follows: “Caution shall be exercised as excessive negative draft will cause fuel to be pulled from the feeders onto the grate in some installations.” SUBSTANTIATION: Text was revised to become enforceable. See Section 10.4.7.3 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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85-188-(7.5.7.4 (10.4.7.4.2 in the ROP draft)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the text of 7.5.7.4 to include new subsections as shown in the new ROP draft. Modify new Section 10.4.7.4.2 as follows: “The emergency shutdown procedure in 10.4.7.4 shall be permitted to vary in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.” SUBSTANTIATION: Text was revised for clarity and enforceability. See Sections 10.4.7.4, 10.4.7.4.1 and 10.4.7.4.2 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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85-189-(7.9.1 through 7.9.3 (10.8.1 through 10.8.4 in the ROP draft)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Revise the numbering of Section 7.9.1 through 7.9.3 as follows: 7.9.1* Fly ash hopper access doors shall not be opened while the boiler is operating because hot or smoldering fly ash that may have bridged over the ash removal connection could cascade out of the door. 10.8.2 Small, capped clean-out connections shall be used at the hopper bottom for unplugging bridged fly ash. 10.8.3 Precautions shall be taken when opening ash hopper access doors after shutdown because hot or smoldering fly ash that has bridged over the ash removal connection will cascade out the door if disturbed. Because fly ash will smolder long after unit shutdown, precautions shall be taken to avoid stepping into accumulated ash while inspecting equipment. 10.8.4 Vertical-lifting ash pit doors shall be securely blocked open prior to personnel entry. SUBSTANTIATION: The numbering was changed for clarity. See Sections 10.8.1 through 10.8.4 in the new ROP draft, which may also include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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85-190-(Chapter 8) : Accept TCC NOTE: The TCC notes that 85-70 (Log #CP402) added the ABMA document in the annex, therefore the ABMA document should be listed in the nonmandatory references of the document. This note shall be considered as a comment to the Technical Committee on Fundamentals.SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Multiple Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete the reference publication from ABMA in Chapter 8. SUBSTANTIATION: The publication is not referenced in the body of the code.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-191-(8-1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise last sentence to read as follows: “..., are also listed in Appendix G Annex I.” SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-192-(8-1.2.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Henry K. Wong, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Revise ABMA address to read: 401 North 9th Street, Suite 226 Arlington, VA 22203-1900 SUBSTANTIATION: ABMA has moved their officeCOMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-193-(A-1-9.5.1.3 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Allan J. Zadiraka, Babcock & WilcoxRECOMMENDATION: Add the following: A.1.9.5.1.3 The Combustion Control System is one of the components of the overall Boiler Control System. Other components of the Boiler Control System are addressed by the following standards: ANSI/ISA-77.42.01-1999 - Fossil Fuel Plant Feedwater Control System - Drum Type, ANSI/ISA-77.43-1994 - Fossil Fuel Plant Unit/Plant Demand Development - Drum Type, ANSI/ISA-77.44.01-2000 - Fossil Fuel Plant Steam Temperature Control System - Drum Type, and ANSI/ISA-77.44.02-2001 - Fossil Fuel Plant Steam Temperature Control System - Once-Through Type. SUBSTANTIATION: Provide the user with reference to these recently developed standards which complement the 85 standard on the control of fossil fired boilers.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:7VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 6 NOT RETURNED: 1 Alexeff

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85-194-(A-2-3.9.1(a)(2)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: In A-2-3.9.1(a)(2) “The tests, which are specified in 2.3.4.2.3, …” should read “The tests, which are specified in 2.3.4.2.2, …”. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. See Section A.5.3.9 Hazards of Low NO

x

Firing Methods part (a)(2) in the new ROP draft, which may include MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:10VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 10

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85-195-(A-3-4.3.3.1 Block 9) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: A.3.4.3.3.1 (Block 9): The tables referenced in this paragraph describe the allowable differences in operating procedures based on the classification of igniter being used. The following descriptions of conditions are typical for both Table 3.4.3.3.1(a) and Table 3.4.3.3.1(b). Condition 1; an event where, after a successful boiler purge, an attempt(s) to place the first igniter in service fails. This requirement is repeated until an igniter is proven. Condition 2; an event where an igniter(s) has been proven in service and subsequently all igniters are shutdown without ever having attempted to place a burner or pulverizer in service. Condition 3; an event where gas and/or oil fuel burners were started or attempted to start and all burner valves were subsequently closed while igniters remain proven in service. Condition 4; an event where a pulverizer system(s) was started up or attempted to startup and subsequently all pulverizer systems were shutdown while igniters remain proven in service. Condition 5; an event where any fuel has been placed in service and all fuel subsequently shut off. In the event where any main fuel is shutdown while any other main fuel remains proven in service, the all fuel off master fuel trip requirements do not apply. SUBSTANTIATION: New appendix material to support the new tables proposed (under a separate proposal) to be added in paragraph 3.4.3.3.1 Block 9.

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COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-196-(A-3-5.3.2(b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Daniel J. Lee, ABBRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: “On installations with multiple fans and cross-over ducts and with the first fan in operation, the remaining idle fan’s shutoff damper(s) are permitted to be closed to prevent air backflow through idle fan. On all installations after the first induced draft fan and forced draft fan are started and are delivering air through the furnace, the shutoff damper(s) of the remaining idle fans are permitted to be closed.” SUBSTANTIATION: Backflow through an idle fan may limit the ability to maintain furnace pressure and/or airflow through the furnace.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-197-(A-3-6.3.1.6 and Table A.3.6.3.1.6) : Accept SUBMITTER: Dale P. Evely, Southern Company RECOMMENDATION: Remove these sections from the text of NFPA 85. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is contingent upon the acceptance of a proposal against Section 1.9.2.4.1 to define minimum sizes for vent valve port diameters as well as vent lines. If that proposal is accepted then the recommendations of this section would become requirements or would be covered by A.1.9.2.4.1 and the information in A.3.6.3.1.6 would then be redundant and not needed. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-198-(A-3-6.5.4.7 (New) ) : Accept SUBMITTER: Harold Yates, Detroit EdisonRECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: A.3.6.5.4.7 The objective of the leak test is to assure that the individual burner safety shutoff valves are not leaking gas into the furnace. The test may be performed by closing the main fuel header vent valve and the individual burner safety shutoff valves, then closing the main safety shutoff valve, thus pressurizing the header. If a charging valve is used, then the main safety shutoff valve is closed and the charging valve is used to pressurize the header, then the charging valve is closed. That pressure must be held within predetermined limits for a predetermined amount of time for the test to be successful. SUBSTANTIATION: Add material to explain leak test.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-199-(A-3-7.5.4.8) : Accept SUBMITTER: Harold Yates, Detroit EdisonRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: “Leaks have been known to develop in the oil valves due to temperature changes. The objective of the leak test is to assure the individual burner safety shutoff valves are not leaking fuel into the furnace. A nominal pressure on the oil header is established with the main and individual burner safety shutoff valves and the recirculating valves closed. If this oil pressure remains within predetermined limits for a predetermined amount of time, the individual burner safety shutoff valves are properly sealing off their burners.” SUBSTANTIATION: Expand material to maintain consistency with gas section.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-200-(A-3-8.2.1(b)) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-610 (Log # 542) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-355.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Renumber as A-3-8.2.1(a) and (b), respectively. SUBSTANTIATION: A comment has been submitted to delete original Section 3-8.2.1(a).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-201-(A-3-8.2.1(d)) : Accept in Principle Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-611 (Log # 543) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-355.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Relocate this as A-1-9.2(d)D. SUBSTANTIATION: This material belongs in Appendix A-1-9.2. It is applicable to other firing systems as well as p.c. fired multiple burner boilers.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: No action needed as this material already exists in the proposed sections from previous action.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-202-(A-3-8.2.1(d) (New) ) : Accept Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-612 (Log #544) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-355.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: “The burning of pulverized coal requires close integration of the pulverizer system. Normally, the pulverizer and the burner systems function as a unit so that start-up of the pulverizer is integrated with the light-off of all its associated burners. Ignition of pulverized coal in the burner pipe could occur if the velocity of the transport air falls below a minimum value. In addition, operating and purging the pipes with this minimum air flow during the shutdown procedure prevents the settling of the fuel in the burner pipes. The danger associated with this settling is that the accumulated coal could cause an explosion as the flow in the pipe is increased.” SUBSTANTIATION: Revised information originally in 3-8.2.1(g) that is unenforceable but is important.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-203-(A-3-8.2.1(i)) : Accept in Principle Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 85-616 (Log # 545) which was held from the F00 ROC on Proposal 85-355.SUBMITTER: Courtney D. Alvey, Baltimore,MDRECOMMENDATION: Renumber as A-3-8.2.1(e). SUBSTANTIATION: A comment has been submitted to renumber the section to which this material refers as 3-8.2.1(e).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:Accept in PrincipleCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on 85-114 (Log #10).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:25VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25

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85-204-(A-4-3.1.1(2)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Move A.4.3.1.1(2) to be a 4.3.1.1 (4) (new), modifying the text as follows: “An accumulation of fuel in an idle fluidized bed that is still hot leading to the distillation of combustible vapors followed by delayed ignition when the bed is fluidized as in a purge sequence.”

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SUBSTANTIATION: The material was made mandatory and moved to the body since it is based on incident reports and is good guidance that should be required. See Section 7.3.1(4) in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-205-(A-4-4.3.3.2.2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete A.4.4.3.3.2.2. SUBSTANTIATION: This removed annex is redundant to the annex of 1.9.2.3.2 which is referred to in the primary requirement in 4.4.3.3.2.2. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-206-(A-4-6.2.1.1(n)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Bill Bass, Forney Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Renumber paragraph to A.4.6.2.1.1(14). SUBSTANTIATION: Error in cross referencing from last revision cycle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: See A.7.6.2.1.1(14) in the new ROP draft, which may also include other MOS changes. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-207-(A-4-6.2.5) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: Delete A.4.6.2.5 in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: There are conditions following a master fuel trip where this annex guidance suggests a possibly unsafe practice. Also see Committee Proposal 85-135 (Log #CP201). See 7.6.2.5 in the new ROP draft where the annex was removed, which may include other MOS changes. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-208-(A-4-7.5.1.1 and Figures A4.7.5.1.1(a) through (e) and 4.7.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Delete existing A.4.7.5.1.1. 2. Move the Figures A.4.7.5.1.1(a) through (e) into the body to become Figures 4.7.1(a) through (e). The titles will remain the same except “Typical” will be removed from the titles. 3. Modify Section 4.7.1 to read as follows:4.7.1 General. (A)The additional mandatory requirements in Section 4.7 shall apply to burning fuel gas in warm-up burners. (B) All installed piping arrangements shall meet the functional requirements of this code. (C) Fuel gas piping shown in Figures 4.7.1(a) through (e) shall be used in conjunction with 4.7. (D) Alternate arrangements to those shown in Figures 4.7.1(a) through (e) that satisfy the functional requirements in 4.7 and that are acceptable to the AHJ shall be permitted.

SUBSTANTIATION: The figures are required to understand the text requirements currently found in 4.7. They were moved from the annex because they are so useful to the users and are now shown in a mandatory manner. See Section 7.7.1 and associated figures in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-209-(A-4-8.5.1.1, Figures A.4.8.5.1.1(a) through (h); and 4.8.1) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Delete existing A.4.8.5.1.1. 2. Move the Figures A.4.8.5.1.1(a) through (h) into the body to become Figures 4.8.1(a) through (h). The titles will remain the same except “Typical” will be removed from the titles. 3. Modify Section 4.8.1 to read as follows: 4.8.1 General. (A)The additional mandatory requirements in Section 4.8 shall apply to burning fuel oil in warm-up burners. (B) All installed piping arrangements shall meet the functional requirements of this code. (C) Fuel oil piping shown in Figures 4.8.1(a) through (h) shall be used in conjunction with 4.8. (D) Alternate arrangements to those shown in Figures 4.8.1(a) through (h) that satisfy the functional requirements in 4.8 and that are acceptable to the AHJ shall be permitted. SUBSTANTIATION: The figures are required to understand the text requirements currently found in 4.8. They were moved from the annex because they are so useful to the users and are now shown in a mandatory manner. See Section 7.8.1 and associated figures in the new ROP draft, which includes other MOS changes.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:11VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NOT RETURNED: 2 Kraft, Rutledge

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85-210-(G-2-2) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Stoker Operations, RECOMMENDATION: Revise second sentence of Annex G.2.2 as follows: “Maximum grate heat release rates per foot of stoker width should be 8.66 MW/m2 per linear meter (9.0M Btu/hr per linear foot) of stoker width without arches and 10.4 M W/m2 per linear meter (10.8 Btu/hr per linear foot) with arches.” SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. The previous measurements were incorrect.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION:AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:5VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 2 Cantrell, McCullion

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Documents

96 Report of the Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards (BCS-AAC) Technical Correlating Committee Dale E. Dressel, Chair Solutia Incorporated, MO [U] Johnny W. (Bill) Bass,