8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

1/20

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

2/20

EMM NOUEL MYLON KI

Senior Lecturer in

Law

Course

Director LLM

in Crime

and

Litigation London South

Bank

University

TIM

BURTON

Camden

CRITIQUE OF

THE

DEFICIENCIES IN

THE

REGUL TION OF

CONTEMPOR RY POLICE

POWERS

OF

DETENTION ND

QUESTIONING

IN

ENGL ND

ND

W LES

The article explores

the problems associated with

the

regula-

tion

of police powers of detention

and

questioning as pre-

scribed

by

the

Police

and

Criminal Evidence

Act

1984

PACE). The police

powers

of detention and questioning are

analysed holistically with reference

to

the role

of

the

custody

officer

as

gatekeeper,

the detention reviews,

the

treatment and

rights of detainees,

and the

investigative interviewing process.

Whilst the fundamental purpose of police powers of detention

and

questioning is

to investigate crime, it

is

argued that the

deficiency

in

their

regulation is a

conceptual failure

to

realise

that

the

process

of

police investigation militates against object-

ive

regulation.

The authors argue that

PACE is

too

reliant

on

self-regulation of police observation and supervision of the

rules

and

a

redefinition of the

regulation

of

investigative

powers

is missing.

Keywords custody officer;

deficiencies

in the regulation

of

police

powers; detention reviews; investigative interviewing

process; PACE

Police and

Criminal Evidence Act

1984);

police powers;

reforms;

rights of the

detainees

The objective of the present critique is

to

explore the problems

in

the regulation of

police powers

of

detention

and

questioning

by

focusing

on the

application

of the

Police

and

Criminal Evidence

Act 1984 PACE)

as

applied

to

the detention

and

questioning

process The police powers of detention

and

questioning

are

analysed

holistically in

reference

to the role of the

custody

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8

2010)

DOI 10.1358/pojo.2010.83.1.482

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

3/20

officer

as

gatekeeper, the detention

reviews,

the treatment and

rights of

detainees,

and

the

investigative interviewing

process.

Whilst the fundamental purpose of police powers of detention

and questioning is to investigate

crime,

it

is argued that

the

deficiency in their

regulation

is

a

conceptual failure to realise

that

the

process of police investigation

militates against objective

regulation. The authors argue that PACE is too reliant on self-

regulation

of police observation and

supervision

of

the rules and

that

a redefinition

of the regulation of investigative

powers

is

missing. Therefore

the

suggested reforms propose a radical

change of the boundaries of detention

and

investigation

and

the

oversight mechanisms.

Regulation under

PACE

is

both

internal (self-regulation by

the police)

and external

(judicial

sanction

by PACE, ss 76

and

78),

for which the regulation processes take different trajectories

according

to

the

power being

exercised. The

current

govern-

mental

view of

PACE

identifies no deficiencies, concentrating

instead on reducing bureaucracy (Home

Office,

2007:

9,

paras

3.12, 3.13). Likewise,

the

current proposals seek to preserve

existing PACE

powers

with emphasis

on

rationalisation

(Home

Office, 2008: 7) and,

despite

an

intention not

to

dilute safeguards

6-7 n.1, para 2.8 , it is proposed to downgrade the

authority

for

granting

extensions

from

superintendent

to

inspector

(20

n.2,

para.

10.8).

This

is to

enable

superintendents to

make review

decisions

for

continued detention remotely by telephone or

video-conferencing (20 n.2, para. 10.12), and to

facilitate Short-

Term

Holding

Facilities

for

the

bulk

of low-level

crime

(21 n.2,

para. 10.19).However, the review

is

blind

to

deficiencies

in

regulation in its quest

for

streamlined processing.

Under the PACE

test, according

to which the custody officer

believes detention without charge is necessary to secure, pre-

serve

or obtain evidence

by questioning PACE, s.

37 2)),

the

reasonableness

of belief

is

a

question

of

degree in the

circum-

stances of what information the

arresting

officer gives Al ayed

v Metropolitan Police Commissioner

[2004]

EWCA Civ

1579).However,

under

PACE,

s. 37(4)

the custody officer

does

not

have to do more

than

recite

these

grounds (Zander, 2005:

140, para. 4-16).

Choongh describes

an incident

in

which a

custody officer authorised detention despite the test not being

met

(Choongh, 1998:

623 at

230).

Such occurring incidents

indicate

that the detention decision itself is unregulated.

Another

of Choongh s

observations questions

how

effective

the rights

of

the detainees are. At the police station detainees are locked into

a process

controlled by

the police, where

their rights

have

to

be

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8

2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

4/20

negotiated

631 n.10). Using arrest

statistics

compared to dis-

posal

outcomes supports

the proposition

that,

whilst

the

letter of

PACE is observed, custody officers routinely authorise detention

without

sufficient grounds. Hillyard

and

Gordon chart a rise

in

arrests since

PACE implementation

1999: 502 at 508 , calcu-

lating that

by 1993 some 43 of arrests resulted in no further

action (514 n.12). In this analysis the custody officer is not

discriminating

in

authorising

detention.

In their

Brighton

Study,

Irving

and

McKenzie

noted the

arresting

officers'

account

to the

custody officer was 'often formalised and rarely challenged'

(Irving McKenzie,

1989:

214-15).

As

a cross-check, Brown's

finding

that out

of 4,042

records for March 1987 in 32 police

stations 12 of

adults were released without charge 1989: 57,

70)

arguably

substantiates

this. Recently,

Sanders cited an

example of a rate of refusal to authorise detention of less than

I

, concluding

that

either

custody

officers

are not

discharging

their

duty

or

arresting

officers conceal the

reasons

for arrest

(Sanders, 2008).

Moreover, the national trend Hillyard

and

Gordon noted

was

that, whilst arrests increased in volume, the number

of

cases

prosecuted declined and,

though

partly

interpreted as

an

expan-

sion

in

arrest powers 1999: 518 n.

12),

they

suggest

the increas-

ing number of further action cases depends on the police

use of

their

powers

to

discipline, according

to

models put

forward

by

Choongh

(cited

in Hillyard

Gordon,

1999:

519

n.12). This

shows that PACE legitimises action but rule

observance

does not

necessarily regulate police powers. The authors' argument is that

the

deficiency relates not

ust to the

regulation of treatment

in

police detention but

also to the use of the power to detain.

Deaths in custody

cases provide insight into

this

process. As

former Home

Office

study demonstrated, the reasons for

arrest

were

45

drink-related

and

11 theft-related

(Leagh

et al.

1998:

9).

Accepting

the

limitation of

drawing

conclusions

from

case-specific

sample,

the fact

that

the majority of cases were

detentions for low-level crime

and

other reasons such as intox-

ication

does

suggest

that police

detention

powers are ques-

tionable.

Indeed, it was further questioned whether the

police

station was the appropriate place to detain people for

them

to

sleep off the effects of alcohol

81-2

n.19). In the Home Office

study there

is some

evidence supporting

the argument

that there

is

a lack

of regulation for vulnerable

suspects,

and

this

amounts

to

a

substantial deficiency

of

the system (Sanders, 2008:

67-8

n.

16).Generally, police followed the PACE Codes but with

regard

to the specific

duty

under

PACE

to check

and rouse drunk

The Police

Journal,

Volume 83

2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

5/20

detainees there were

documented

cases of failures

to

do so

(Leagh et al. 1998: 26 7 n.20). Overall PACE is followed, but

regulation relies on the observation of the rules

by

the police.

Adherence

to

PACE purportedly regulates detainees' rights

but in practice it does not because police goals take precedence

(Choongh, 1997: 179). This is demonstrated by Britton s ana-

lysis of the effect of

race

in the custody process. The author

observed

that the PACE

provisions

were

presented

by

custody

officers as an

ideal which

they uphold but this

exposed

the fact

that the

officers were

blind to the

specific

needs of detainees

(Britton,

2000:

639

at 644).

Rules may legitimate police power

but as a

regulatory

device the flipside is that

detainees' rights are

neutered

by the procedure. This

is

the fundamental deficiency

Newburn and Riener identify as 'ritualized observance of rules'

that gives no effect

to

the function of PACE

to

safeguard rights

and

regulate

the police

detainee

encounter

(Newburn

Reiner,

2004: 601 at

608).

As Choongh argues, 'the police station

is

police territory

where

detainees

are

depersonalised' (1997: 81-4 n.23) and

Britton notes

an

'imbalance

of power

between custody

officers

and detainees', with the

effect

there

is

no

meaningful

rights

dialogue

(2000: 646-8 n.24). The

deficiency

is from rule

observ-

ance

as the regulatory mechanism because interpretation of the

rules

by the

police

makes

the detainees' rights subordinate

to

police operational

need

(651-3

n.27).

This comes from the idea that the detention process is

formulaic, with

the

custody

officer

following

the

PACE

provi-

sions

to

justify

actions.

The

deaths

in

custody substantiate this.

Of 6 of cases where use of force was a

factor

in death, detainee

records described this as 'violent struggle' with the police

(Leagh et al.

1998:

44 n.22). This indeed suggests record

keeping is used to

justify

police action and not

to

regulate.

Moreover,

the recommendations

of

the

Home

Office

that records

were completed in full substantiate

this

(77 n.22). Given the

above-mentioned

deficiencies, the

present authors suggest initial

screening

of

detainees is

made a

critical-based process, with

custody officers

required

to test the

arrest

evidence

with

the

arresting officer.

The detention review process shows deficiency in regulation

as

illustrated by the case of Roberts

Chief Constable of

Cheshire ([1999] 2 All

ER

326).

Through

a

mistaken

belief

that

Roberts' detention period

ran

from the

later

time

of

the station to

which

he

was

transferred and a

failure

to

review

his detention

within

the statutory time-limit

(PACE,

s. 40(3)), his

detention

The Police Journal,Volume

8

2010)

4

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

6/20

was

unlawful

because of the limiting provision in

PACE,

s. 34.

This was a case where the custody record

was

endorsed with

times and authorisations

Roberts,

326

at

327-8 and indicated

that police self-regulation

can be

unreliable, with

scope for

error.

O Doherty notes a flaw in the Codes where it

is

not specified

that

the person authorising continued detention need be the person

who endorses the custody record

(O Doherty,

2001). This makes

it possible

to

overlook

the protection

of

a detainee,

as

in Roberts,

by

administrative oversight,

and it highlights the dangers

of

delegated power or extending power

to

conduct reviews at a

distance.

The

formulaic approach to PACE

recurs with

detention

reviews. As

Dixon

points out 1997: 149), here too compliance

is

largely presentational within the 24-hour period the police have

without application to a superintendent for extension, and

it

is

noted

that early

extensions

are

routinely granted because

there is

little

requirement to

justify the need for

continued detention

to

higher authority (149).

There is

therefore a lack of effective

engagement of detainees and their lawyers with police

to chal-

lenge police decisions. Ineffectiveness extends

to the

observation

that the courts rarely refuse police

applications

for

PACE,

s. 43

warrants of

further

detention (Zander, 2005:

171

n.9 at 4-67.

Detention periods appear to increase as

1987

records

show

a

mean

of

less than 6 hours (Brown,

1989:

61

n.15), 1993/4

over

6

hours (Phillips Brown,

1998: 109), and in a 2002 report an

average of 9.2 hours (Deehan Saville, 2002: 19). The

defi-

ciency

is that PACE compliance purports to regulate police

action

and

detainee rights, but in practice

pays

lip-service

to

rights, to the extent there

is detention review

but not critical

review. Where errors occur, as in Roberts,

this

demonstrates

police self-regulated review of the power

to

detain is inherently

deficient

as a

process.

A

further issue

is

the conflict between powers

of

detention

without charge and detention pending charge. Cape identifies the

PACE, s.

34(2)

requirement that

the

custody

officer

must order a

detainee s

immediate

release i aware that

the

grounds to

detain

cease.

However,

it does not make it mandatory that the officer

keeps under review the question of the

lawfulness

of

detention

(Cape,

1999:

874

at

877.In raising the question of what

sufficient

evidence

to charge

means, which triggers the mandatory provi-

sions of

PACE,

s. 37, Cape points out

PACE

sets contradictory

obligations

885

n.40).

It

is

clear

that

this issue

is

still

unre-

solved.

We

refer

to

G) v Chief Constable

of

West Yorkshire

Police

[2008] EWCA Civ 28, [2008]

1

WLR

550)

which,

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

7/20

though

now

historical (Fitzpatrick,

2008:

558

at 561),

still

leaves

open

the

issue

of

what amounts

to sufficient

evidence

to charge

(Zander, 2005: 149 n.9 at 4-33) for the purpose of when the s

obligation

is

triggered. Therefore it is questionable

whether

the

police

should be bound

by s 37 once the

threshold test

to charge

has been reached or whether further detention is permissible

without review. In discussing the Divisional Court ruling in R G)

v Chief

Constable

of

West

Yorkshire

[2006] EWHC 3485

(Admin),

[2008] Crim LR

141),

Ashworth comments on

what

amounts to a regulatory issue: It is to be hoped that

the

power to

detain pending charging advice does not translate into routine

detention

pending such

advice

2008: 141

at 143).

On the

evidence

to date of

routine

use of

powers

there is no

reason

to

believe this

power

will

be

adequately

regulated. The deficiency

in regulating the detention power beyond the point of sufficient

evidence

to

charge, as the implication

of s 37 7)

as amended

is

the lawfulness of

detention, still

falls to

be

determined

(Ormerod, 2008: 1243-5, at D2.2).

Suggested reform would be a mandatory review

by

the

custody

officer of

the reasons for detention

with

regard

to

investigative progress made. Once the detention

pending

charge

threshold is

reached,

then the

detention

period should be re-

reviewed

and

monitored. We suggest daily

judicial

scrutiny

of

custody

detention

review

by

a duty

magistrate in

video-link case

conference with

the duty inspector.

Treatment

at

the

police

station

varies

to the

extent

that,

whilst PACE serves to control the powers available, there is no

regulation

of

the

differential

treatment

of

detainees

from

differ-

ential

use of power. For

example,

Newburn and others show

how, as a

function

of police discretion, African-Caribbeans were

disproportionately

strip-searched

in custody

(Newburn

et

al.,

2004:

677 at

689).

This

illustrates

that inside the police

station

there

is no

regulation of

equal and

fair treatment.

This

is

aggravated

by

the extensive power police

have in taking non-

intimate samples PACE s 63 2A) 2B) 2C), irrespective

of

whether

this

is

for investigating the offence for which a

person is

detained (Zander, 2005: 249 n.9, at 5-116).

Access

to

legal

advice

is

a fundamental

right

PACE,

s

58 1))

and

essential, as held

in

Murray

v

United ing om

App

no 18731/91) 1996) 22 EHRR 29

para. 66)

given the risk

of adverse inference

from

silence or coercive interrogation.

Bridges

and Sanders raise

relevant

questions

because

the police

are

in

an adversarial

relationship

and

paradoxically,

therefore,

are being asked

to

safeguard the

rights

of those against whom

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

6

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

8/20

they have

a

competing

interest (Bridges Sanders,

1990:

494 at

508). Their study

showed

breaches manifested themselves cov-

ertly

by

ploys such as detainees informed of rights too quickly

or

encouraged to sign away

rights

and rule breaking

or failing

to

record requests

(497-506 n.53). Again

it

was noted custody

records

could

falsely

record

what had taken

place

507 n.53).

There is little change in the enhanced provisions of requiring the

reasons for declining

legal

advice

to be recorded

or

of

improved

access through telephone advice. As Fenwick

later

argued, there

remains scope for the police to manipulate access to legal advice

because

advising

of the

right remains

with

the police

(Fenwick,

1995:

198 at 205).Further,

Fenwick

argues that a process

which

asks

detainees

whether

they wish

to

exercise a

right to

legal

advice is

flawed

since

those with

little understanding can

will-

ingly

sign

their rights away,

and

yet have the most need for

advice

205

n.56 .The deficiency in regulation in the PACE

safeguard

is too reliant on the

police as

the

gateway

to uphold

detainee rights when the process is not conducive to detainees

making informed decisions. The observation Wolchover made in

1990, that the then Codes

were

deficient in terms

of

dealing

with

the waiver

of legal

advice and whether the waiver is genuine

(Wolchover Heaton-Armstrong, 1990),

remains

a

defect

since

the current Codes simply require a detainee to sign to

confirm

their decision

(Code C,

para. 3.5 b)).

Although a custody officer

should

ask

a detainee

why they

are waiving

advice and then

record their

reasons (Code

C, para. 6.5),

this

still admits the

same problem in equivocal circumstances, particularly as a

detainee

is

not

to

be

pressed to give reasons

(Code C,

para.

6

n.6K).

This

hardly

protects a vulnerable detainee

and does

not

go

far

enough to

regulate

police oversight of access to

rights.

What

Bridges

and

Sanders identified as rule bending (Bridges

Sanders,

1990:

498-500

n.53)

shows that the deficiency relates

to

the absence

of

effective safeguards. Worse still, there

is,

according

to Parpworth, no corresponding right

vested in

a

solicitor to gain access to a detainee since the right to legal

advice

vests solely

in the

detainee

(Parpworth,

2000: 476). The

clear effect is that the

police powers

can curb rights of access

without counterbalancing

regulation.

This is no exaggeration because cases where access to a

solicitor can be

lawfully

delayed

PACE,

s 58 6)

and

8)) show

that

the

police

cannot

always be

relied upon to apply the test

correctly.

In

v James

([2004] EWCA

Crim

1433,

2004 WL

1808902) the police

were

found to have failed to apply the test.

This

emphasises

that police

self-regulated control

of rights

is

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

9/20

manifestly

flawed. Skinns 2009 study of access to legal advice

by detainees for a South-East England custody suite showed that

police failed

to

meet 23 of requests for advice (Skinns, 2009:

8

at

63).

There

were inconsistencies

in

communicating

rights,

ranging

from quality of information to how the information was

communicated, including PACE breaches. Even where PACE

was

not breached it

was

believed that the police

influenced

detainees to

waive

their right

to legal advice by

playing

on

the

value of

cooperation

and the detainee s fears of delay (Skinns,

2009: 65 8 n.66).Skinns also found examples of police failing

vulnerable persons

67-8

n.66). From her

study it

is clear that

detainees rights

are

subsumed

by the

police managerial priority

of efficient

processing.

Since the police can,

without

breaching

PACE, continue to dissuade detainees from legal advice, regula-

tion via PACE is insufficient and those most

at

risk

are

the

vulnerable. This

surely

means

the

observance

of PACE does not

adequately regulate police

detention

powers. If

in 1992

the

Home Office concluded there

was

variation and failure

in

communication of rights (Brown et

al. 1992:

23-7) and juven-

iles were disadvantaged

75-7 n.69), then 15 years on

little

has

changed.

Reform

could

be

a presumption

of

legal

advice

with

opt-out,

and automatic provision in all

cases

of vulnerability. Thinking

radically, an

independent

advocate

and

not the police should

advise detainees of

their initial

rights.

Another regulation issue in Skinns

study

is privatisation

of

the

custody

suite

following

the

Police

Reform

Act 2002. Her

observation, according to which

privatisation

exacerbates prob-

lems because of

competing

interests and

contractual relation-

ships (Skinns, 2009: 73 n.66),

underlines

the

complacency

that

PACE compliance equals satisfactory regulation. With

increas-

ing

privatisation and civilianisation, the efficacy of

PACE

to

regulate police powers

is

weakened because

of

the

pre-existing

deficiencies.

Regulating questioning

at the

police

station

outside interview

rooms is another

deficiency.

Despite the safeguard

of

an officer

being

required

to make written

record

of unsolicited

comments

outside formal interview (Code C,

para.

11.13),

Field

made the

point that this does not prescribe for all the exchange to be

recorded,

and

considered the

protection illusory where the

police

put the record in

their

own terms

(Field,

1993:

254

at

262-3).Therefore

the record

a

detainee agrees to be

a

true

account could in

fact be

a redacted

version. The

recent

case of

oelho

[2008] EWCA Crim 627,

2008

WL

678177 CA (Crim

The Police

Journal,

Volume

83 2010)

8

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

10/20

Div)demonstrates Field s

observations about

deficient

regulation

of cell conversation as the officer s record of a conversation

in

the cell area in which Coelho

was

said

to

have admitted the

offence

following

his no comment

interview

was made

after

he

had left the station, in breach of

PACE.

This

occurred

despite the

regulatory provisions.

Covert

cell surveillance

is inadequately

regulated

(Ramage,

2008: 2-7).Although

purportedly controlled

by the

Regulation

of

Investigatory

Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), the extent of the power

is confirmed

in

the recent

case

of McE v Prison Service of

Northern

Irelandand Anothe, C and

A

v Chief

Constableof

the

Police Service of

Northern Ireland 2009)

HL, The Times 2

March)

to

be that RIPA

permits

covert surveillance of

privileged

lawyer-client communications, despite the PACE, s. 58 right at a

police station

to

consult a solicitor privately, and, in spite

of

ECHR ruling,

lawyer

confidentiality

is essential to

fair trial

Brennan v United

Kingdom

(App no 39846/98)

(2002)

34

EHRR

507

para. 58; [2002] Crim LR 216).By reinforcing the

view

that RIPA is not incompatible

with

Article rights,

the

deficiency is that the detainee s

residual rights

of

privacy are

unregulated

since Article is

subordinated to weakened Article

6 rights R

v

Button [2005] EWCA Crim 516, 2005 WL

513408).

The

courts

do

countenance police strategies

of

obtaining

evidence

inside

the police station

including bugging

police cells,

as for example in R

v

Mason ([2002] EWCA Crim 385, [2002] 2

Cr App

R 38).

In

Mason the

reasoning of

the court shows

the

regulation

of

this is defective.

The

then Home Office guidelines

on police surveillance were doubted to apply

to

cell surveillance,

but as the

court

could find no conflict with PACE on the grounds

of absent a provision in PACE, the court rules that this

was

not

unlawful. Yet the court noted

it was

unclear from RIPA whether

this was categorised intrusive surveillance

Mason

at

645-7 .

The ambiguity is highlighted

by

Omerod, who views the police

as

able

to

work

around

the

RIPA controls

largely

unregulated

(Ormerod, 2003).

Despite the regulation of

oppressive questioning,

there

is

still

scope to use coercion. Sanders maps the

opportunity

36

hours

detention

time

gives

police

to

try different

tactics

(Sanders,

2008: 58 n.16),

with increased regulation encouraging

more

informal questioning ploys 55 n.16).

Given

that

police

questioning

has assumed greater

sig-

nificance

post PACE, with nearly 60 of suspects

making

admissions

(Gudjonsson, 2003: 156) and the

trend

has

been

to

The Police

Journal,

Volume 83

2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

11/20

make questioning

a central

part of

criminal

proceedings

(Jack-

son,

2008: 260), PACE casts a veil of legitimacy reinforcing

powers of questioning without corresponding regulation of what

someone is

questioned about. What

Irving

and

McKenzie

raised

post

PACE

was

concern that

the conduct of interviews was

an

area

of uncertainty (Irving

McKenzie,

1989:

205

n.14)

because though PACE governs the conditions of interview it

does not prescribe rules of

questioning,

leaving

it

open

to the

police to devise interview

tactics 206-7

n.14),

with

the only

restraint mechanism being PACE, s. 78 and no practical guide to

fair practice 177-8 n.14). Despite the PACE model of inter-

viewing (Savage,

2007: 81),

this

is

still true today as it

is

recognised

police officers,

despite

training,

are

little better than

laypersons in identifying falsity yet

continue

to

use

tactics

designed to induce confessions (Kassin, 2008: 1309 at

1310-14).

This

inherent

weakness

in the regulation is reflected in

Dixon s observations about the cases of Paris, Abdullahi and

Miller 1993) 97 Cr App R 99)

and Heron

(Unreported Leeds

Crown

Court

1

Nov

1993

cited

in Dixon,

1997:

172

n.39)

that,

though

the court found the interviews oppressive, the

police at

the time considered their questioning to be PACE-compliant

(Dixon,

1997: 172-3

n.35 . Our

point

is that the deficiency

constitutes

little real-time regulation of

interviews

stemming

from dual police

aims of establishing truth and constructing

evidence.

The legal definition of interview determines when PACE

should be applied, but

the

failure

is regulating

a

police-controlled

process

from

which the account is

not

the suspect s own

but

is

police-derived (McConville et al., 1991: 76 7

n.19) for

the

purpose of converting the interview into courtroom evidence

(Dixon, 1997: 270-1

n.35). This

is self-evident

when

comparing

the

different

approaches in

police interviewing witnesses

( what

happened? )

and

suspects

( you did it

didn t

you? ) (McConville

et al.,

1991:

68-73 n.19). The confession in

Heron

that Dixon

cites

resulted

from leading questions and coercion which

occur-

red

even

though the confession was recorded

as

following

PACE

(Dixon,

2006a:

3 3

at 343 .

It is deficient to rely on court sanction to regulate police

powers

as shown

in

serious

cases.

Pearse and Gudjonsson

show

that the

frequency

of

police

manipulation and

coercion increased

with offence seriousness despite risk

of

the interview evidence

being inadmissible (Pearse Gudjonsson,

1999: 221

at 225-34).

If

the

police are

willing to

push

boundaries, then

prospective

The Police Journal,Volume 83 2010

0

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

12/20

court

ruling

on

evidential admissibility is

not satisfactory regula-

tion o police practice. This is shown in R Allan ([2004]

EWCA Crim 2236 2004 WL 1808797

where

police obtained

evidence

from

placing Allan in

a cell

with

an informer,

who

it

was

held

should have been

excluded.

Formal interview

does

not regulate the

influence

o

pre-

interview exchanges giving rise to the type of distortion docu-

mented

by

Dixon whereby

the

suspect

is influenced from

pre-exchanges either

to agree with or

adopt

a police account

(Dixon,

2006a:

337-41 n.97). A formal interview record can

be

an incomplete record because the

influence

o the pre-exchanges

goes

unrecorded (Dixon, 2006a: 335 n.103). McConville demon-

strates the

invisibility

o

pre-exchanges,

to the

extent

these

enable the police to prepare detainees for questioning, and

thus

defeating the PACE provisions (McConville,

1992:

53 at

536-40 .

This shows that the

current regulatory

structure of police

self-regulation reliant upon PACE observance and external over-

sight

by

the courts is a mismatch

to

the extent there is a gap in

between.

The

court

may exert

prospective control

by

excluding

evidence but the specifics o

police

questioning are

unregulated

beyond

codes of

practice

and

training,

which

emphasises

police

rights (Choongh,

1998: 129

n.26). Dixon argues that

this

hiatus

is

because

common

law

regulation is arbitrary based

on

appeal

and because case law does not guide police action

(Dixon,

2006b: 326 . Our contention is that this is the substantive

deficiency

in regulation.

Reform needs to

move

away

from prospective regulation

to

embedded

real-time

regulation.

A

pragmatic solution is

inter-

viewers

unconnected

with arrest and

independent

o the

invest-

igators, in the

same way

that a custody officer s

role

is

defined to

be neutral.

Curtailing

the

right

to silence

by

adverse inference dilutes

detainees PACE rights because of the leverage

this

gives police

(Bucke et

al. 2000:

34-5, 69 . According

to

Jackson, The

silence

legislation

has

thus enabled the investigative custody

regime that was legitimised by

PACE to

be transformed

into

an

accusatory venue for

testing

and

examining

accusations as part

o

the

criminal

proceedings

against

an

accused ;

in

other

words,

because

o

the

risk to

an accused

in

making

no comment in the

police

interview

(the risk o adverse inference from the Criminal

and

Justice Order Act provisions) the police interview has

now

become a forum for putting a

case to the

suspect and testing his

or

her response

rather

than being

the

traditional investigatory

The Police

Journal,

Volume 83

2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

13/20

tool it

should be.

(Jackson, 2008:

262-3

n.85). This is

significant

transformation of

police

power without corresponding

regulatory safeguard, particularly as the police do not have to

disclose their case

in

full prior to

questioning (Zander,

2005:

483

n.9, at 13-33),

as

in

R Nottle ([2004] EWCA

Crim 599, 2004

WL

413070).

Essentially a

detainee

is

cited

his rights and

told

that silence can

be

used against him (Zander, 2005: 472 3 n.9, at

13-1 1).This

provides legitimate

means

to

break down resistance

without breaching

PACE.

Combined with freedom about

what

questions are put and

the

police control of

the

interview process,

there

is

diminished

regulatory

force in

the

PACE

provisions,

despite court ruling that there should be no

gap

in procedural

safeguards R

Hasan Aytach) also known

as

R Z [2005]

UKHL 22, [2005] 2 Cr App R 22 para. 53 .

With vulnerable persons, flaws

with

regulation are high-

lighted. Given the

recognised

difficulty in

identifying

vulnerabil-

ity,

especially

mental

disorders (Pearse Gudjonsson,

1999:

263 n.98), police failure to identify persons as vulnerable

removes PACE protection because the requirement for an appro-

priate

adult principally

depends on the custody

officer doubting

the

mental

state or

capacity

of

a detainee (Code

C, Note for

Guidance

IG). Without independent expertise, the systemic

weakness is the dependency on the police to make the right

decisions

(Irving McKenzie,

1989:

234 n.

14).

Given evidence

is prima facie admissible where

police are

ignorant of

detainees

mental

condition R

v Bassi

Sukhdev)

[2004] EWCA

Crim

3245,

2004

WL

3089232;

R

v

[2003] EWCA

Crim

3309,

2003

WL 22769342),

this dependency on

the police is

fool-

hardy.

It is time to remove some

decision making

from the

police

and

provide independent expertise

and

police station advocates.

Appropriate

adults are the

principal

safeguard

provided to

juveniles

and

mentally disordered/vulnerable

detainees (Code

C

3.15). In the 1997

Home

Office

Study the number of appropriate

adults attending in cases of the mentally disordered was lower

than

for

juveniles

and

in some cases,

because

of

a doctor s

recommendation

that

an

appropriate

adult was

not

needed, it is

clear the police

had

relied upon the doctor to

make

the

decision

about appropriate adults (8

n.

116). In juvenile cases the 59

majority of appropriate

adults being

parents/guardians

(6

n.1

16)potentially compromises juveniles

because

of the finding

that

family members were less supportive

(12 n.

116),

in

some

cases not discharging their role

(13

n. 116) or not understanding

their

role whilst offered

little

guidance

by

the police (14 n.

116).

The Police

Journal,

Volume

83 2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

14/20

Latterly, these deficiencies have been

echoed

by

Williams,

who

points

to

the undesirability of untrained appropriate adults rely-

ing on

guidance

at

the

police

station

(Williams,

2000:

43

at

45),

with the serious deficiency of

custody

officers

routinely abrogat-

ing

their

responsibility under Code C

3.5 c)

and 3.6 to police

doctors for determining whether an appropriate adult is required,

with

the

consequence that a vulnerable detainee comes

to

be

assessed by the fitness-to-interview test and is

therefore

unpro-

tected

for all or part of

their detention

(Williams, 2000: 49

n.122). A further fault

is

that not until interview

is

there the

obligation to

inform the

appropriate

adult of their

role

(Code

11.17 whereas the

detainee is advised

of the

duties

of

the

appropriate

adult

(Code C 3.18 at the first

opportunity

(Wil-

liams, 2000: 44 n.122).

The

anomalies are not cured by the

Home Office Guidance

for

Appropriate Adults ,

which does not

advise how

to

discharge the role and merely tells the person

that

further guidance is available from the custody officer

(Home

Office, 2009 , and

since

it has been observed the Codes are not

readily understood either (Littlechild, 1995: 540

at

541),

it

thus

cannot

be

expected

that the

police will provide full guidance.

Again,

assessment of need for an appropriate adult needs

revising and another

form

of police station advocate needs

to

be

considered.

Clearly the people most in need of protection are the least

protected

despite the

PACE provisions

and

in

interview

are at

greater risk given their own impaired decision making (Clare

Gudjonsson, 1995:

110 at 123 ,

increasing

risk

of confession.

Those needing

protection

can go

undetected

and therefore are

without

the

minimum

protection while

borderline

cases

would

not be considered mentally handicapped for s 77

to

apply

R

Foster

[2003]

EWCA Crim 178, 2003 WL 270792 . Those that

do have appropriate adults can find they are in no

better

position

because

of

the disadvantaged

position that

an

appropriate adult

has at the police station (Hodgson, 1997: 785 at 795 . If, as

noted,

legal

advisers have

difficulty

challenging

the

police

at the

police station

(Hodgson,

1992:

854

at 861 and

professionals

are

inadequate

in protecting mentally disordered

detainees

(Laing,

1995:

371 at 379-80 , then the provisions do not adequately

regulate police powers in

the case

of vulnerable detainees. This

is demonstrable

where it

is

shown that appropriate adults are

least

effective at

interacting

to

safeguard

rights

and police

demonstrate

a

lower standard

of

competency

in

interviewing

juveniles on

the

PACE

model

(Medford et

al.,

2003: 253 at

258 63 .

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

7

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

15/20

Neither can judicial oversight

be

relied upon to regulate

police

powers

of detention and questioning. The very idea of

judicial scrutiny as a mechanism to control police powers is

flawed in

three

respects.

First,

with

the

majority of cases

untested

in the

courts

because of the entry of guilty

pleas

there is

no

opportunity for judicial scrutiny. If there is no trial then

any

issue

of a breach of the rules is not aired so that there is no judicial

discretion to

exercise (Sharpe,

1998: 105-6).

This

also

applies

to

those

detained and questioned who are

then

released

without

charge. Secondly, where there is a trial it does not automatically

follow that a breach will lead to exclusion under ss. 76

and

78

of

PACE.

Instead, there is

considerable

latitude for the

use of

judicial discretion,

which

is observed to

uphold

crime control

values over

due

process in all

but

flagrant

breaches

of the PACE

codes (Sharpe,

1998:

135-40 n.135 . With reference to

R

v Howe

[2003]

EWCA Crim 934, 2003

WL

1610396), there

is

impli-

citly a

threshold,

which means

judicial oversight is

an

inadequate

backstop. Indeed, Sharpe identifies continued judicial endorse-

ment of police wrongdoing

post

PACE which serves to create a

gap

between the

letter of

the

law and

the

spirit

of the law

(Sharpe, 1998: 129 n.135).This leads to the conclusion that

where the courts

approve

police wrongdoing,

this favours police

powers over detainee rights,

with

a reduction in regulation.

Thirdly, whilst a court

can of its

own motion under

s 76

require

the prosecution,

as a

precondition of admissibility, to prove that

a confession was not

obtained

by

oppression

or

alternatively

is

unreliable PACE, s 76 3)), accused persons are largely reliant

on

their

lawyers

to

challenge the evidence

in

the

first place

(as

in

Rv Allen [2001] EWCA

Crim 1607, 2001 WL 753441 and there

is no own motion provision

in

PACE, s 78

(Sharpe,

2009:

106-7 n.135). Further,

with

s 76 it is not an automatic condition

precedent that

the prosecution

prove reliability

in

every

case.

Analysis

of judicial

regulation of

police powers

of

detention

and

questioning shows the extent of the

deficiencies.

For

example, Sharpe illustrates that because the anything

said or

done provision

in s 76 2) b)

does not admit

personal character-

istics, the

courts

are prepared to strain the interpretation when

seeking

to protect those with mental handicaps but

not for those

considered

unworthy

of protection,

such as

drug addicts

(Sharpe,

2009: 113 n.135 .

The

inverse effect

is

that protection

become

person-specific,

as

in R Wahab

([2002] EWCA

Crim

1570,

[2003]

Cr

App R

15

para.

40). This favours some

defendants

but denies a right of protection or fair

trial

to others.

The

discretion

available

to

the

judiciary

enables the court, at

its own

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

4

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

16/20

choosing,

to apply the

provisions

strictly to make a disputed

confession admissible.

Controversially,

it is time

to

make it a

condition precedent of

all confessions that the prosecution satisfy the court of reliability

as

opposed to amending

the

exclusionary provisions to fetter

judicial

discretion.

On composite

reform,

Sanders model of anchored plural-

ism

by

embedding agencies (Sanders,

2008:

70-3

n.16) contains

the flaw that the police are unlikely to sacrifice autonomy.

Change

within

the police

is

critical

to achieving

reform

(Savage,

2007:

127-63) so

internal

change

to

working practices

is what is

required.

This was the

rationale behind

the PACE reform

to

change the police investigative

philosophy

and is

where

the

problems

lie

(Savage, 2007:

25

n.89). Increased

legislation

is

not

a solution because this increases subversive practice.

Given police monopoly

of power

from self-regulation,

possible reform

measure

would

adopt the

ethics-based

approach

advocated

by

Newton.

On

her

grounds, adherence to rules

alone

is ineffective without corresponding

culture change

towards

fairness (Newton, 1998: 53-66). A

possible

reform towards this

direction

would

be

to

move

from best

practice interview

models

to a reform

of the entire

investigative process groun e

in

three

ways:

1)

investigative ethics code

of

practice incorporating

Human Rights and modelled

on the

Criminal Procedure

and

Investigation

Act 1996 code of practice for

disclosure

officers:

namely

the duty to

investigate all reasonable

lines

of enquiry

whether

this leads

to

or from the suspect (Ormerod, 2008: 3 5 ;

(2) equality of arms principle, with full disclosure of the police

case to defence

lawyers as per Newton

1998: 60 n.147)

unless

there are security

reasons to

withhold

information;

and 3) use in

indictable-only

cases

and for vulnerable persons ethics-trained

specialist interviewers

modelled

on the Achieving Best Evid-

ence

provisions

for witness

interviewing

(Home Office, 2001).

As stated, equality of

arms

has been suggested before. Our

suggested

model is to

combine

the

existing approaches

to

disclosure

and

interviewing

witnesses

to

produce an

ethics-based

investigative process

which

tempers results-driven use of

powers. In this way, regulation would achieve the culture change

necessary

to

progress

from rule

observance and would address

the main

deficiencies noted. Additionally,

as

an oversight

mech-

anism

we

suggest

an

investigative log

is

kept

in

conjunction with

the custody record documenting pre-interview disclosure and

lines of enquiry.

The Police

Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

75

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

17/20

In

conclusion,

the

process

of

detention

and

questioning

is

over-reliant on

the

police to self-regulate their powers with

reference

to PACE but

where

PACE

fails

to

regulate

is

the

full

extent

of

detention

and questioning in

an investigative adversar-

ial environment of police control. This raises

due

process issues

which

are

not

satisfactorily resolved. In the

specific

instances

of

vulnerable persons

where the need for protection is greater,

police observation of

P CE

alone

is

insufficient. This underlines

the point

that

the rules

circumscribe police

behaviour, but in

ritualistic observance of the rules the denial of

protection under-

mines

the

purpose of

the

rules

to

the extent that police power

is

implicitly unregulated.

We

have sought

to

demonstrate that

the

real

problem

is the

gap

between PACE regulation by police

observance and external prospective

regulation

by

court sanction

to the

extent

that

a detainee

is

disempowered.

The

ethos

of

our

suggested reform model is to redefine how

investigative

powers

are regulated at the police station, with adjustment

of

boundaries

and new

oversight mechanisms

to

support

the

existing

P CE

provisions.

This

recognises

that no purpose is served by dis-

mantling

PACE but

emphasises there is room

for improvement.

Otherwise police powers

at the

police station remain

in sig-

nificant

imbalance

to detainees rights.

Bibliography

Ashworth, A. 2008) 'Case Comment Police

Powers:

Power to Detain

Pending Advice on Charging

from Crown

Prosecution Service'

Criminal Law Review

:

141.

Bridges, L.

and

Sanders, A. 1990) 'Access to Legal

Advice

and

Police

Malpractice CriminalLaw Review (July): 494.

Britton,

N. (2000) 'Race and Policing:

a

Study of Police Custody'

British Journalof Criminology 4 : 639

Brown,

D.

1989)

Detention

at

the Police Station under

PACE Act

1984.

Home

Office

Research Study

104.

London:

HMSO.

Brown, D., Ellis, T.

and

Larcombe, K. 1992)

Changing the Code:

Police

Detention under the Revised

PACE

Codes of

Practice

Home Office Research Study

129.

London: Home Office.

Bucke, T., Street, R.

and

Brown,

D. (2000)

The

Right

of

Silence:

The

Impact

of th

riminal

Justice and Public OrderAct 1994 . Home

Office Research Study 199.

Bucke,

T.

and Brown,

D. 1997) In Police Custody:

Police Powers and

Suspects

Rights

under the Revised

PACE

Codes of Practice.

Home

Office Research Study 174. London: Home

Office

Cape, E. 1999)

'Detention without

Charge: What Does Sufficient

Evidence

to

Charge Mean?' Criminal

Law Review

(November):

874.

The Police Journal,

Volume

8 2010)

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

18/20

Choongh, S. (1998)

'Policing

the Dross:

A Social

Disciplinary

Model

of Policing British Journal of Criminology 38(4): 623.

Choongh,

S. 1997)

Policing

as

Social

Discipline. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Clare,

I.

and

Gudjonsson,

G.(1995) 'The Vulnerability of

Suspects

with

Intellectual Disabilities during Police Interviews:

A

Review

and

Experimental Study of Decision -Making' Mental

Handicap

Research 8: 110.

Deehan,

E. and

Saville, E. 2002) Drunks

and Disorder:

Processing

intoxicated

arrestees in two city-centre custody

suites Home

Office

Police Research Series Paper

150.

London: Home

Office,

available

at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prsl50.pdf

(accessed February

2010).

Dixon,

D. (2006a) A Window into the Interviewing

Process?

The

Audio-Visual Recording of

Police

Interrogation in

New South

Wales,

Australia

Policing

and Society

16(4):

323.

Dixon,

D.

(2006b)

'Regulating Police Interrogation', in T. Williamson

(ed.), Investigative

Interviewing

Rights,

Research

and

Regulation.

Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

Dixon,

D. (1997)

Law in

Policing

Legal Regulation

and

Police Prac-

tices. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fenwick, H.

(1995) 'Evading

Access to Legal Advice'

The

Journal

of

Criminal

Law 59 2): 198.

Field,

S.

(1993) 'Defining Interviews

under PACE ,

Legal Studies

13(2):

254.

Fitzpatrick, B.

(2008)

'Case Comment

Police

Powers: Power to

Detain

Pending Advice

on

Charging from the CPS Criminal aw

Review

7:

8

Gudjonsson, G.

2003)

The Psychology of Interrogations

and

Confes-

sions

Handbook.

Chichester: John

Wiley and Sons Ltd.

Hillyard, P. and Gordon,

D.

(1999) 'Arresting Statistics: The Drift to

Informal Justice in England

and

Wales' Journal of

aw and

Society

26(4):

502

Hodgson, J.

(1997)

'Vulnerable Suspects

and

the

Appropriate Adult'

Criminal

Law

Review (November):

785.

Hodgson, J. (1992) 'Tipping

the

Scales of

Justice: The

Suspect's

Right

to

Legal

Advice' Criminal aw

Review (December):

854.

Home

Office (2001)

'Achieving Best Evidence

in Criminal

Proceed-

ings:

Guidance for

Vulnerable

or

Intimidated Witnesses,

including

Children , v il ble

t

http://www.anitp.mai.gov.ro/ro/docs.metodo

logii/Achieving 20Best/ 20Evidence 20a 20Guide 20for 20

interviewing 20victims.pdf (accessed February 2010).

Home Office

(2007)

'Modernising Police Powers

Review

of the Police

and

Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984', March. Consultation

Paper Home

Office,

available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/

documents/PACE-cover/cons-2007-pace-review2835.pdf?view=bin

ary

(accessed February 2010).

The Police Journal,

Volume

83

2010)

77

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

19/20

Home

Office (2008) PACE

Review Government proposals

in

response

to the

Review

of

the

Police and

Criminal

Evidence

Act

1984 ,

Policing Powers

and

Protection Unit Home

Office, August, avail-

able

at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2008-pace-

review/cons-2008-pace-review-pdf2835.pdf?view=binary

(accessed February

2010).

Home Office

2009) Criminal Justice

and

Police Act

2001 (sl-1])

Supplementary

Operational

Guidance or Accredited Persons,

available at

http://www.police.homeofficegov.uk/publications/oper

ational-policing/guidanceappadultscustody.pdf?view=binary

(ac-

cessed February 2010).

Irving, B. and

McKenzie, I. (1989)

Police

Interrogation:The

Effects

of

the Police

and Criminal

Evidence Act 1984. London: The Police

Foundation.

Jackson,

J.

(2008)

Police

and

Prosecutors

after

PACE:

The Road

from

Case Construction to Case

Disposal ,

in E. Cape

and

R. Young

(eds),

Regulating

Policing: the Police Criminal Evidence

Act

1984 Past, Presentand Future. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Kassin, S (2008) Confession Evidence: Commonsense Myths and

Misconceptions CriminalJustice

and

Behavior 35 10): 1309.

Laing,

J.

(1995) The Mentally Disordered Suspect at the Police

Station Criminal Law Review (May): 371.

Leagh, A., Johnson G and Ingram, A. (1998) Deaths

in Police

Custody: Learning the

Lessons .

Home Office, Police Research

Series

Paper

26.

London: Home

Office.

Littlechild, B.

(1995)

Reassessing the Role of the Appropriate Adult

Criminal Law Review (July): 540.

Medford,

S.,

Gudjonsson, G. and Pearse,

J.

(2003) The

Efficacy

of the

Appropriate Adult

Safeguard

during Police Interviewing egal

and CriminologicalPsychology 8: 253.

McConville, M. (1992) Videotaping

Interrogations: Police

Behaviour

on

and off Camera Criminal aw

Review (August):

532.

McConville, M.,

Sanders,

A. and Leng, R. (1991) The Case

for

the

Prosecution.

London: Routledge.

Newburn, T.

and Reiner, R. (2004)

From PC Dixon

to

Dixon

PLC:

Policing

and

Policing Powers

since

1954 Criminal Law Review

(August):

601.

Newburn,

T.,

Shiner,

M. and

Hayman, S (2004)

Race

Crime

and

Injustice? Strip Search

and the Treatment

of Suspects

in

Custody

British

Journal

of Criminology : 677.

Newton, T. (1998)

The

Place of Ethics

in Investigative

Interviewing

by Police

Officers The HowardJournal

37(1): 52.

O Doherty, S (2001) Pre-Charge Detention

Justice

of the Peace

(News

and

Reports) 65:

540.

Ormerod, D.

(2003)

Police Cells

and

Unwanted Bugs Journal

of

Criminal

Law 67: 37.

The Police Journal,

Volume

83 2010)

8

8/11/2019 83PoliceJ61

20/20

Ormerod, D.

(2008)

Police

and

Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes:

Code C

Blackstone s

Criminal Practice 2009

Appendix

2.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2892-933.

Parpworth,

N. (2000)

Obtaining Access

to

a Client

in

Police

Custody:

A

Solicitor s

Right?

Justice of the Peace (News

and

Reports) 164:

476.

Pearse,

J.

and Gudjonsson,

G.

(1999) Measuring

Influential Police

Interviewing Tactics: A

Factor

Analytic Approach

Legal and

CriminologicalPsychology : 221.

Phillips,

C. and

Brown,

D.

(1998)

Entry

into

the

Criminal Justice

System: A Survey

of Police Arrests

and

their Outcomes , Home

Office Research Study No. 185. London: Home Office.

Ramage, S. (2008)

Covert

Surveillance Criminal

Lawyer 181: 2.

Sanders, A. (2008) The Case for Anchored Pluralism , in E. Cape and

R. Young

(eds), Regulating Policing: The Police Criminal

Evidence Act

1984

Past,

Present and Future.

Oxford: Hart

Publishing.

Savage,

S. 2007)

Police Reform Forces or

Change.

Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Sharpe,

S. 1998) Judicial Discretion

and Criminal Investigation.

London: Sweet

Maxwell.

Skinns, L.

(2009)

Let s

Get

It Over

With : Early

Findings on the

Factors Affecting Detainees Access to Custodial Legal Advice

Policingand Society 19(1):

58 .

Williams,

J. (2000) The Inappropriate Adult

Journalof

Social Welfare

and

Family

Law

22(1):

43.

Wolchover, D.

and

Heaton-Armstrong,

A.

(1990)

A

Flawed Code-1

New Law Journal 140

(9

March):

320.

Zander,

M. 2005)

The

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 5th

edn.

London: Sweet Maxwell.

The Police Journal,

Volume

83 2010

79