58 Academy of Management Perspectives August ARTICLES ... · Practice theories of implementing change are lagging behind process theories of organizational change and development

A R T I C L E S

Breakdowns in Implementing Models ofOrganization Changeby Andrew H. Van de Ven and Kangyong Sun

Executive OverviewPractice theories of implementing change are lagging behind process theories of organizational change anddevelopment. To address this gap, this paper examines common breakdowns in implementing four processmodels of organization change: teleology (planned change), life cycle (regulated change), dialectics(conflictive change), and evolution (competitive change). Change agents typically respond to thesebreakdowns by taking actions to correct people and organizational processes so they conform to their modelof change. Although this strategy commands most of the attention in the literature, we argue that in manysituations managers and scholars might do better if they reflected on and revised their mental model to fitthe change journey that is unfolding in their organization.

Change is an ongoing and never-ending processof organizational life. Although we would liketo explain, predict, and control the process,

organizational change often does not unfold inexpected ways (Burke, 2009): Breakdowns in ourmodels of change occur when organizations do notchange in a manner that is consistent with ourconceptual model: Breakdowns are perceived dis-crepancies or gaps between the change process weobserve in an organization and our mental modelof how the change process should unfold. Forexample, a change agent1 with a participative andconsensual model of planned change would per-

ceive a breakdown when participants resist or donot follow the change plans. These breakdownsprovide important occasions for change agents totake two kinds of strategies: action and reflection.

The action strategy focuses on correcting thepeople or processes in the organization that pre-vent the change model from unfolding as ex-pected. In our example, the change agent mightexplain to participants the logic and reasons forthe planned change. This strategy reflects a main-stream view in the literature that change manage-ment largely entails an action-oriented problem-solving approach (Burke, Lake, & Paine, 2009).As a problem solver, a change agent attempts tointervene in and control a change initiative bydiagnosing and correcting difficulties that preventthe change process from unfolding as the changeagent thinks it should. This strategy assumes that

We greatly appreciate useful comments and suggestions from JeanBartunek, John Bechara, and Warner Burke, as well as Garry Bruton(Editor), Chung Ming Lau (Associate Editor), and two anonymous review-ers of Academy of Management Perspectives.

1 The literature tends to refer to “change agents” as the managers orconsultants who direct and manage a change initiative. Employees andother participants are viewed as the recipients of change and academicresearchers as outside observers (By, Burnes, & Oswick, 2011). We take abroader view of “change agents” as including all of these groups, for they all

exercise agency or influence on the change process by their actions andreflections.

* Andrew H. Van de Ven ([email protected]) is Vernon H. Heath Professor of organizational innovation and change at the CarlsonSchool of Management at the University of Minnesota.Kangyong Sun ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy at HitotsubashiUniversity in Japan.

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the change agent’s mental model is correct andthat observed activities that deviate from thismodel are problems to be solved.

A second strategy, reflection, focuses on revis-ing one’s mental model to one that better fits theprocess of change unfolding in the organization.For example, given the resistance to the plannedchange, the change agent might adopt a dialecti-cal model of change that promotes constructiveconflict and debate among participants with op-posing plans. The reflection strategy emphasizeshow change agents make sense of and sociallyconstruct understandings of the “buzzing, bloom-ing, and confusing” changes they experience inorganizations (Weick, 2011). It centers on:

meaning-making with a view to changing mindsets ratherthan changing more concrete phenomena (e.g., behavior,procedures, or structures). The real-time social negotia-tion of meaning associated with [reflection] offers a sig-nificant challenge to the manageability of the process ofchange management insofar as it involves “coordinating”and “facilitating” change conversations in the momentand on a largely improvised and unscripted basis ratherthan engaging in more established forms of plannedchange. (By, Burns, & Oswick, 2011, p. 3)

Most of the existing research focuses on diagnos-ing and correcting breakdowns in implementing amodel of change—the action strategy. Far lessattention has been given to the reflection strategyof revising one’s conceptual model to fit the peo-ple and organization undergoing change.

We argue that the effectiveness of the actionstrategy without reflection is limited and some-times self-defeating. In many situations, changeagents would do better if they paid more attentionto reflecting on and revising their mental modelsto fit the change journey that is unfolding in theirorganization. Indeed, the action and reflectionstrategies are highly related, for they represent thecore activities in a cyclical process of trial-and-error learning while implementing change. Ac-tions provide the trials and experiences for obtain-ing feedback, and reflections on this feedbackprovide opportunities to reconceptualize futureactions. Learning is short-circuited when eitheractions or reflections are missing.

We make three suggestions for undertakingaction and reflection strategies. First, because

change processes in organizations tend to be com-plex, we encourage change agents to expand theirrepertoire of conceptual models for managing or-ganizational change. Following Conant and Ash-by’s (1970) principle of requisite variety, we arguethat change agents are more likely to be successfulwhen their mental models of change match thecomplexity of the change processes unfolding intheir organization. As we will discuss, having mul-tiple mental models of change (i.e., teleology, lifecycle, dialectical, and evolutionary process theo-ries) permits us to adopt a contingency theory ofimplementation where one applies the model—and interactions among them—that best fits agiven situation.

Second, we propose a framework for diagnosingweaknesses and typical breakdowns in models ofchange and suggest remedies that may address ormitigate these breakdowns. In doing so, we pro-vide some guidelines for diagnosing and interven-ing in process models of organizational change.This diagnosis of breakdowns, of course, becomesmore complex when multiple change models areheld by multiple change agents who are involvedin multiple organizational changes. We know verylittle about these interacting complexities; theyrepresent an important direction for future re-search on implementing organization change.

Third, this diagnosis includes recognizing whenprocess breakdowns may have gone beyond repairor when the remedies create bigger organizationalproblems than they solve. Instead of escalating infailing actions designed to remedy breakdowns inchange processes, we propose that change agentsreflect on and revise their conceptual model tobetter fit the change situation. In other words,instead of “swimming upstream,” the skillfulchange agent reconceptualizes the situation inorder to “go with the flow.” Switching mentalmodels to better fit changing circumstances, ofcourse, implies that the change agent has a reper-toire of several mental models (which brings usback to our first suggestion).

These three suggestions shift the researchagenda on organizational change toward a contin-gency theory of implementation. This contin-gency theory includes observing an organizationchange initiative using multiple process models,

2011 59Van de Ven and Sun

identifying breakdowns perceived in implement-ing a model of change in particular situations, anddiagnosing how and when to respond to thesebreakdowns. The comparative merits of correctingthe organization to fit a model of change or chang-ing one’s model to fit the organization becomes astrategic question in this research agenda.

Breakdowns inModels of Change

Organizational change is defined as a difference inform, quality, or state over time in an organiza-tional entity (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995, p.

512). The entity may be an individual’s job, awork group, an organizational subunit, the overallorganization, or its relationships with other orga-nizations. Change can be measured by observingthe same entity over two or more points in timeon a set of characteristics and then observing thedifferences over time in these characteristics. Ifthe difference is noticeable, we can say that theorganizational entity has changed. Much of thevoluminous literature on organizational changefocuses on two questions about this difference: (1)How and what produced it? and (2) How might it

be managed in sustainable and constructive direc-tions over time?

Van de Ven and Poole (1995) addressed thefirst question by proposing a typology of four pro-cess models of organizational change and devel-opment, illustrated in Figure 1: teleology (plannedchange), life cycle (regulatory change), dialectics(conflictive change), and evolution (competitivechange). As the figure indicates, these processmodels differ in terms of whether they apply tosingle or multiple organizational entities andwhether the change process follows a prescribedsequence or is constructed (emerges) as the pro-cess unfolds. The cells in the figure illustrate howeach theory views the process of development asunfolding in a fundamentally different progressionof change events and being governed by a differ-ent generative mechanism or motor. Understand-ing these four process models of change, and in-teractions among them, represents a major step indeveloping a repertoire of models for managingchange.

This paper focuses on the second question byexamining the implementation breakdowns typi-

Figure1ProcessModels ofOrganizationChange

Note: Arrows on lines represent likely sequences among events, not causation between events.Source: Van de Ven & Poole (1995).


cally experienced with each model and possibleremedies for these breakdowns. Table 1 providesan overview of these breakdowns and remedies.Understanding the different breakdowns and rem-edies in implementing the four models of changeprovides a framework for diagnosing implementa-tion processes, our second suggestion. After that,we address complexities of interacting changemodels held by different change agents involvedin multiple change initiatives ongoing in organi-zations. These complexities deal with the relativemerits of correcting breakdowns versus changingone’s conceptual model, and emphasize the needfor a contingency theory of implementing organi-zational change.

Teleological Process Theory (PlannedChange)

A teleology or planned change model views de-velopment as a repetitive sequence of goal formu-lation, implementation, evaluation, and modifica-tion of an envisioned end state based on what waslearned or intended by the people involved. Thissequence emerges through purposeful social con-struction among individuals within the organiza-tional entity undergoing change. Teleological pro-cesses of planned change break down becauseparticipants do not recognize the need for change,they make erroneous decisions, or they do notreach agreement on goals or actions (Burke, Lake,& Paine, 2009; Nutt & Wilson, 2010).

Models of planned change assume that peopleinitiate efforts to change when their actionthresholds are triggered by significant opportuni-ties, problems, or threats. Teleological processesoften fail because only a minority of participantsrecognize the need for change. According toMarch and Simon (1958), dissatisfaction with ex-isting conditions stimulates people to search forimproved conditions, and people stop searchingwhen a satisfactory result is found. A satisfactoryresult is a function of a person’s aspiration level,which is a product of his or her past successes andfailures (Lant, 1992; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, &Sears, 1944). When there is little difference betweenperceptions of current situations and aspiration lev-els, the need for change is hardly recognized (Greve,1998). Cognitive psychologists have shown thatwhen exposed over time to a set of stimuli thatchange very gradually, individuals do not perceivethe gradual changes—they unconsciously adapt tothe changing conditions (Helson, 1948, 1964; Hu-lin, 1991; Hulin & Judge, 2003).

Direct personal experiences with opportunitiesor problems are more likely to trigger individuals’action thresholds than are reports or exhortationsabout the need for change (Van de Ven, 1980,1986). For example, site visits and face-to-facemeetings with demanding customers, technicalexperts, or consultants increase the likelihoodthat action thresholds of organizational partici-

Table1BreakdownsandRemedies inProcessModels ofOrganizational Change

Teleology(Planned Change)

Life Cycle(Regulated Change)

Dialectic(Conflictive Change)

Evolution(Competitive Change)

Process cycle Dissatisfaction, search, goalsetting, andimplementation

Prescribed sequence of steps orstages of development

Confrontation, conflict, andsynthesis between opposinginterests

Variation, selection, and retentionamong competing units

Situations when modelapplies(generating mechanism)

Social construction ofdesired end state; goalconsensus

Prefigured program regulatedby nature, logic, or rules

Conflict between opposingforces

Competition for scarce resources

Typical breakdowns • Lack of recognition• Decision biases• Groupthink• Lack of consensus

• Resistance to change• Lack of compliance• Monitoring and control

• Destructive conflict• Power imbalance• Irresolvable differences

• Requisite variety• Lack of scarcity

Remedies • Triggering attention• Critical thinking• Consensus building

• Responding to complaints• Local adaptation• Internalizing mandates

• Conflict management• Negotiation skills• Political savvy

• Niche development• Marketing• Strategies for competitive

advantage


pants will be triggered and stimulate them to payattention to changing environmental conditionsor customer needs (e.g., von Hippel, 1978).

Teleological change processes also break downwhen there is a lack of consensus on plans or goalsamong organizational participants. Socializationactivities provide a way of building consensus be-cause teambuilding, training sessions, and socialgatherings, for example, facilitate frequent in-teractions that in turn lead to shared under-standings, common norms, and cooperative at-titudes (e.g., Homans, 1950; Maloney, Shah, &Zellmer-Bruhn, 2010). Involvement in goal for-mulation also enhances consensus (Wooldridge& Floyd, 1990).

A teleological process may also fail due tofaulty plans or goals because of biases in individualor group judgments—errors in critical thinkingand decision making (Nutt, 2002). Studies of de-cision making have found that individuals system-atically deviate from a rational ideal in makingdecisions, causal judgments, social inferences, andpredictions (Bazerman, 1986; Cialdini, 2009).Human beings lack the capability and inclinationto deal with complexity (Kahneman, Slovic, &Tversky, 1982). Common strategies for reducingcognitive biases include engaging other infor-mants in focus groups or brainstorming processesto provide information and interpretations of theissue being considered (Delbecq, Van de Ven, &Gustafson, 1975; Eden & Ackermann, 2010;Halpern, 1996; Nutt & Wilson, 2010).

Finally, teleological processes may fail becauseof escalating commitments to failing courses ofaction (McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002;Ross & Staw, 1986; Staw, 1976, 1981; Staw, Bar-sade, & Koput, 1997). “Self-justification” is one ofthe major reasons for escalation of commitment.Individuals who are responsible for an initial de-cision tend to become more committed to a failingcourse of action than individuals not involved inthe initial decision (Ross & Staw, 1986, p. 276).Studies have examined a number of ways to re-duce escalating commitments to failing courses ofaction. One approach has different individualsmake consecutive investment decisions in a proj-ect, thereby decreasing felt commitments of focaldecision makers (Bazerman, Giuliano, & Appel-

man, 1984; McNamara et al., 2002; Staw et al.,1997).

Life CycleProcess Theory (RegulatedChange)

A life cycle model depicts the process of change asprogressing through a prescribed sequence ofstages and activities over time. Activities in a lifecycle model are prescribed and regulated bynatural, logical, or institutional routines. Inmost organizational applications of a life cyclemodel, the rules prescribing the change processare based on routines learned in the past for man-aging recurrent changes in efficient and effectiveways (Cohen & Sproull, 1996; Feldman & Pent-land, 2003), or they may be externally induced(Rogers, 2003); that is, they come from sourcesoutside of the organizational entity undergoingchange. Life cycle theory is not simply a model ofpassive compliance to mandated change by anentity; it also considers how proactive individualsadapt to their environments and make use of rulesto accomplish their purposes (Gibson, 1977; Nor-man, 1988).

In deviating from prescribed change routines,local adaptations are typically viewed as break-downs by those who design and mandate a changeroutine. Prescriptions for change are perceiveddifferently by “planners,” who design a changeprogram, and “doers,” who implement it but donot participate in its development (Ford, Ford, &D’Amelio, 2008). As Pressman and Wildavsky’s(1973) classic study found, breakdowns happenwhen planners are separated from doers because“learning fails when events are caused and conse-quences are felt by different people” (Pressman &Wildavsky, 1973, p. 135). Consistent with the“not-invented-here” syndrome, people are morelikely to implement and comply with changes thatthey can adapt to fit their local situations (e.g.,Clagett, 1967; Katz & Allen, 1982; Lichtenthaler& Ernst, 2006). Cialdini (2009) synthesized anextensive number of psychological experimentsindicating that people are more likely to complywith requests from others when a reason is pro-vided for the request; reciprocity exists; an initialcommitment is made; social proof exists thatmany similar others are complying; requests comefrom individuals they know and like; requests


come from a legitimate authority; or the opportu-nity is scarce, limited, or difficult to attain.

Rice and Rogers (1980) found that reinventionfacilitates adopting and implementing changeprograms. Reinvention is a process of reverse en-gineering and adapting a change to fit a particularapplied setting. It is fundamentally a learning pro-cess that is triggered by the inevitable setbacksand mistakes people encounter as they attempt toimplement a change program. Reinvention re-quires some local autonomy to adapt mandatedchanges. Marcus and Weber (1989) showed that“autonomy,” defined as customizing mandatedsafety guidelines, was necessary in order to imple-ment new safety standards at 28 American nuclearpower plants. They found that prior poor imple-mentation records yielded “rule-bounded” ap-proaches, defined as “compliance with the stan-dard technical specifications” (p. 545), whichproduced a vicious cycle that perpetuated pooroutcomes. Marcus and Weber (1989) also con-cluded that managers or external regulators shouldbe aware of the possible consequences of blindacceptance of prescribed changes. Implementerswho strictly obey the prescribed change may becomplying in bad faith, which may not lead to theintended results.

Finally, Piderit (2000) and Ford et al. (2008)called into question the common assumptions ofresistance to change. They noted that changemanagers tend to dichotomize individuals’ re-sponses into those who support or resist the pro-posed change and to view the latter as beingdisobedient. Piderit (2000) and Ford et al. (2008)discussed a number of reasons why employees re-sist a prescribed change, including constructiveintentions to correct errors that may prevent im-plementation. The ambivalence employees feeltoward an organizational change initiative doesnot necessarily represent opposition as disobedi-ence; instead, it may reflect the complexity ofmost organizational changes as having both posi-tive and negative characteristics.

Dialectic Process Theory (ConflictiveChange)

Dialectical theories explain stability and changein terms of the relative balance of power betweenopposing entities. Stability is produced through

struggles and accommodations that maintain thestatus quo between oppositions. Change occurswhen challengers gain sufficient power to con-front and engage incumbents. Change is gener-ated through the resolution of conflict betweenthe current thesis (A) and an antithesis (Not-A),which results in a synthesis (Not Not-A). Conflictis the core generating mechanism of dialecticalchange. Dysfunctional methods of conflict resolu-tion tend to impede dialectical change processesand may lead to undesirable win-lose outcomes.

To be a constructive force, conflict has to beresolved effectively. Studies at individual andgroup levels suggest that problem solving andopen confrontation of conflicts are more likely tolead to expressions and debates of different opin-ions; this in turn facilitates the resolution of dif-ferences and conflicts (Jehn & Bendersky 2003;Peterson & Behfar, 2003). In addition, Behfar,Peterson, Mannix, and Trochim (2008) foundthat high-performing teams explicitly discuss rea-sons for decisions reached and assign work tomembers who have the relevant task expertiserather than using other common means such asvolunteering, default, or convenience. Gelfand,Leslie, and Keller (2008) found that a collabora-tive conflict culture can foster adaptation tochange, given that there is an emphasis on activelistening to others’ points of view and seeking thebest solutions for all parties involved; in contrast,organizations with avoidant conflict cultures arelikely to be less adaptive to change because normsagainst open discussion and the lack of informa-tion sharing can prevent effective solutions todisagreements, and, therefore, may impede con-flictive change processes.

Studies of formal conflict management prac-tices in organizations tend to examine three typesof dispute resolution methods (Bendersky, 2003,2007). The first method is “rights-based pro-cesses,” which involve third parties determiningthe outcome of a dispute based on laws, contracts,or standards of behavior. Examples are arbitration,formal complaint investigations, and peer reviewpanels. The second method involves third partieswho intervene in disputes, but help the partiesreach agreements that meet their mutual interestsrather than determine if one party’s rights have


been violated by the other. Examples are media-tors, ombudspeople, facilitators, and coaches. Thethird type is “negotiation,” which covers all effortsby individual disputants to resolve conflictsthemselves, without any third-party interven-tion. Bendersky (2007) found that joint use ofall three generated greatly improved outcomes interms of employees’ approaches to conflict man-agement, their attitudes toward conflict at work,and their rate of success in resolving conflict.

Power is another concept that is central to adialectical model of change. Conflict can be ex-pressed when the opposing parties have sufficientpower to confront each other and engage in strug-gle. Conflict tends to remain latent or to besquelched by dominant actors until challengerscan mobilize sufficient power to confront oppos-ing parties (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). Stud-ies of political strategies and tactics used by insti-tutional entrepreneurs in social movements arerelevant for understanding the politics of organi-zational change (Clemens, 1997; Davis, Morrill,Rao, & Soule, 2008; Garud, Jain, & Kumaras-wamy, 2002; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch,2003; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Rao,1998; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). EchoingAlinsky’s (1971) “rules for radicals,” Fligstein(1997), for example, cataloged a variety of tacticsand social skills that institutional entrepreneursneed to affect institutional change.

EvolutionaryProcess Theory (CompetitiveChange)

Evolutionary change unfolds as a recurrent andprobabilistic progression of variation, selection,and retention activities (Campbell, 1969). Varia-tions—the creation of novel forms—are oftenviewed as emerging by blind or random chance.Selection occurs principally through competitionamong forms; customers or higher level decisionmakers select those forms that are best suited forthe resource base of an environmental niche. Re-tention involves the forces and routines that per-petuate and maintain certain organizational forms(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Baum & McKelvey,1999).

Initial applications of evolutionary theory ad-opted a Darwinian view of evolution at the orga-

nizational population level of analysis (e.g., Car-roll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1977,1989). Later, many organizational scholars shiftedtheir level of analysis to the organization or unitswithin it to apply an evolutionary theory of changethat recognizes the roles of managerial choice andaction. Burgelman (1991), Miner (1994), andBaum and Rao (2004) adopted a Lamarckian viewof evolution, which argues that organizationslearn, adapt, and acquire novel variations at dif-ferent times throughout their life span. Burgelman(1991), for example, examined strategy making asan intraorganizational evolutionary process ofvariation, selection, and retention. He viewedvariations as deriving from managers’ initiatives tocompete for scarce resources, selection processesbeing exerted through corporate resource allo-cation mechanisms, and retention taking theform of corporate strategy that defines the areasin which the firm has learned it can operatesuccessfully.

Evolutionary processes, both at the populationand intraorganizational levels, are subject to twocommon types of breakdowns: (1) a small numberof homogeneous variations and selection criteriaand (2) lack of competition for scarce resources.An evolutionary model of change emphasizes theneed for a heterogeneous pool of variations andcompetition for scarce resources (Baum & Rao,2004; Campbell, 1969).

Variations provide the raw materials fromwhich selection can be made. A greater number ofdiverse variations are more likely to produce in-novations than a process that generates a smallnumber of homogeneous variations (Weick,1989). A lack of diverse variations may result froman organization’s imbalance between exploration(unprecedented) and exploitation (recurrent) ac-tivities. March (1991) pointed out that given thesuccess of existing routines, organizations tend tobe distracted from exploration because of the highprobability of obtaining short-run rewards fromexploitation. Some of the managerial practices ofinstitutionalized experimentation discussed byMiner (1994) represent remedies to generate di-verse variations by investing more resources inresearch and development, supporting innovation“champion” and “entrepreneurial” roles, and cre-


ating parallel projects in which several teams com-pete on the same general problem.

Miner (1994) also discussed approaches topmanagement may use to engage selection pro-cesses, such as setting goals without methods toreach them, establishing broad values, and settingproject screening and selection criteria. Finally,retention processes are influenced by the applica-tion of consistent controls, formalized routines,and organization culture and values. IllustratingMiner’s managerial evolution model, O’Reilly,Harreld, and Tushman (2009) showed the role ofdecentralized structure, common culture and vi-sion, and supportive leadership in promoting thevariation-selection-retention process in the caseof IBM’s Emerging Business Opportunities project.

A related difficulty is selecting among varia-tions when the performance or fitness of varia-tions cannot be determined until after they areselected. Weick’s (1989) remedy for this difficultyis the same as for increasing the diversity of vari-ations: apply many diverse selection criteria in aconsistent way to each variation. He emphasizedthat if criteria are altered each time a variation isselected, few variations will be rejected and littleunderstanding will accumulate (Weick, 1989).

A key characteristic of variation is its “blind-ness” with respect to its ability to improve anorganization’s fitness (Campbell, 1969). Whenvariations are not blind, evolutionary selectionprocesses tend to be biased in directions that maynot promote adaptation and fitness. One sourcefor this lack of blindness is the existence of pow-erful “vicarious selectors” that lead decision mak-ers to favor variations that are believed to producegood outcomes (Baum & Rao, 2004). Finally,evolutionary theory works only under conditionsof competition for scarce resources; it breaks downwhen resources are munificent and competition islow (Baum & Rao, 2004). When resources aremunificent and competition is low, both efficientand inefficient variations tend to survive and grow(Romanelli, 1999).

The four process models of change just dis-cussed represent simplified attempts to understandand manage organization change. Juxtaposingthese models provides insights for deciding whichmodel of change is appropriate in specific situa-

tions and what kinds of breakdowns and remediesare likely to apply when implementing a change.Next, we propose several contingency theories forimplementing organization change.

ContingencyPropositionsonBreakdownsandRemedies

Juxtaposing the four process models of change, wefind that:

1. A teleological model of planned change applieswhen a group of participants agrees on andmoves toward a shared organizational goal.The model breaks down when participantscannot reach consensus on a goal or when theconclusions reached are subject to individualand group biases—errors in recognition, criti-cal thinking and decision making, escalatingcommitments to failing courses of action, andgroupthink.

2. Dialectical processes of change apply when dif-ferent organizational units conflict and con-front one another on an issue. Dialectics faildue to dysfunctional methods of conflict reso-lution and power inequalities that limit or in-hibit confrontations among opposing parties.

3. Regulated life cycle models are appropriate formanaging many recurrent and predictable or-ganizational changes in efficient and effectiveways. They break down when the rules arewrongly designed and when people or unitsresist implementing the change mandates, re-sulting in sabotage of, or mere compliancewith, mandates, rather than internalization ofthem.

4. Evolutionary processes of variation, selection,and retention apply when multiple unitswithin or between organizations compete forscarce resources by developing different meth-ods of products for a given market. Evolutionbreaks down when variations are homogeneousand when resources are munificent or compe-tition is low.

When breakdowns occur they tend to triggertwo kinds of remedial actions. Our propositionsabove focus on the action or problem-solvingstrategy of correcting the people or processes inthe organization that prevent the change model


from running as expected. Our discussion indi-cates that an extensive and diverse body of re-search (often not associated with organizationchange) is useful for diagnosing and correctingbreakdowns with each of the four models ofchange. However, the effectiveness of our propo-sitions is limited because many observed processesof organizational change are more complex thanany one of the four models can adequately address.

Thus, a second strategy for dealing with break-downs is to revise the mental model we have inour heads to one that better fits the process ofchange unfolding in the organization. This reflec-tive strategy appears prudent only after reasonableattempts are made, but fail, to implement the firststrategy. Thus we propose that change agents tendto be action oriented, and do not adopt the re-flective strategy until they recognize that thebreakdowns in implementing their model ofchange cannot be corrected or repaired. Hence,the greater the perceived breakdowns the morelikely a change agent shifts from an action toreflection strategy.

Complexitiesof InteractingModels, Agents,andChanges

As we turn to consider breakdowns, we recognizethat not all sources of breakdowns are the same.Some are triggered by multiple changes ongoingin organizations, others by multiple change agentswith different models for the same changes, andothers by temporal interactions among the changemodels themselves. We discuss each of these dif-ferent sources of breakdowns and propose condi-tions that lead change agents to change theiraction or reflection strategies. We caution thatthese interacting complexities have received verylittle empirical research, and represent an impor-tant research direction for studying processes ofchange implementation.

Interdependent Organization Changes. Many change pro-cesses are embedded and nested in complex orga-nizational systems. Fortunately, the vast majorityof these changes are recurrent and follow routinesprescribed by a life cycle (regulated) process modelwithout much problem or attention. This permitschange agents and researchers to focus on a vari-

ety of unprecedented changes ongoing in mostorganizational initiatives. In particular, we pro-pose that the more interdependent and novel theorganizational changes, the greater the perceivedbreakdowns, and the more likely change agentswill shift from an action to a reflection strategy.

Van de Ven and Garud (1993) illustrated thisproposition in a study of the development of thecochlear implant, which was shaped by changeprocesses occurring in multiple organizationalunits and levels over time. A teleological processseemed to explain the course of development ofthe implant in the firm’s R&D lab. At a higherorganizational level the action of top managers inselecting and funding more than 250 competinginnovation projects was consistent with an evolu-tionary model (as Miner, 1994, described). How-ever, selection premises and timing of managerialinterventions moved at a different pace than thatof the development team.

At a certain point in its development, thebiomedical product had to be approved by theFood and Drug Administration, which required aprescribed sequence of proposals, clinical trials,and regulatory reviews and approvals. This pre-scribed sequence, which embodied a life cyclemotor, came into play later than the teleologicaland evolution motors, but it was judged importantenough that the other units had to rearrange theirefforts to meet the FDA’s requirements. A dialec-tical model seemed to operate at the larger pro-fessional community of researchers and cliniciansconcerned with hearing health. Following its ini-tial support for the firm’s pioneering implant de-sign, evidence mounted that led most researchersand clinicians to switch allegiance to a competingfirm’s design.

As this example suggests, studying or managingorganization change with one theory of change isunlikely to provide an adequate explanation ofobserved processes unfolding in an organization.As Graetz and Smith noted (2005, p. 311), “Onetheoretical view can be misleading in understand-ing the subtleties and complexities of the actualchanges that occur.” Multiple models of changeare needed, and a contingency theory is needed todetermine when and where each model applies.An important direction for future research is to


examine contingencies (such as change noveltyand interdependence) in diagnosing what strate-gies change agents adopt to handle multiplechanges unfolding in different organizational unitsand levels, as the cochlear implant case illustrates.

Change Agents with Different Mental Models. In addition tomultiple changes ongoing in an organization, an-other complication is that different change agentsmay adopt different conceptual models for thesame changes. Because of individual differences,experiences, and role responsibilities, it is wellknown that change agents and participants havedifferent interpretations and mental models of agiven change process in which they all participate(Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman,1999). This variety of views provides opportuni-ties to study how participants either triangulateand learn from their divergent perspectives orundermine and suppress the efforts of otherchange agents. As Huber and Lewis (2010) sug-gested, whether this cross-understanding of themental models of other change agents leads topositive or negative outcomes depends on themotivations of the change agents. Specifically, themore a change agent is open to ideas and differentperspectives on a change initiative, the morelikely it is that the cross-understandings lead topositive learning outcomes.

Aubry and Lievre (2010) provided an exem-plary study of divergent mental models thatemerge during the change process. They examinedtwo cases of polar expeditions where significantbreakdowns in initial plans to undertake the ex-peditions occurred due to unforeseen environ-mental events. These events led expedition teammembers to suggest alternative models of changeand ambidexterity in maneuvering several changeprocesses concurrently and diachronically. In onecase, a leader’s inability to adapt to the changingsituation resulted in the entire project being placedat risk. Fortunately, a team member made up forthe leader’s failure by introducing an alternativeapproach to continue with the expedition.

The study raises a key question: At what pointshould one switch to a different model of change?Aubry and Lievre (2010) focused on prerequisitesfor organizational learning to address this ques-

tion: perceptual awareness of a breakdown, open-ness for learning, and the need to experiment withdifferent models of change. They stated:

The implementation of an organizational learning process[begins with a] perception by at least one actor of adiscrepancy in a given situation that will lead to aninterpretation in terms of errors; this discrepancy can betranslated as a gap between intentions and achievements. . . or between the capacities of an actor and the situa-tion. . . . [This] allows us to highlight . . . the pertinence ofstudying management situations as closely as possible totheir unfolding order to grasp the contextual logic thatunderlies the choice of mode of action and the pertinenceof its performance, and the need to deepen these perspec-tives by grasping the subjective perception of the actors inthe situations. (Aubry & Lievre, 2010, p. 42)

Unprecedented changes typically unfold in am-biguous and uncertain ways. We propose that fre-quent reflective meetings during which changeagents share and socially construct both cross-understandings (Huber & Lewis, 2010) and someshared understandings (Randolph-Seng & Norris,2011) of their diverse mental models increase thelikelihood of learning and maneuvering thechange journey.

Relations Among Models. Many organizational changesare far more complex than can be explained byany one of our simplified models of change. Toaddress this limitation, Van de Ven and Poole(1995) considered 16 applied models that emergedfrom interactions among two or more of the fourprocess models. We propose that underlying these16 models are three heuristics that may explainwhen it may be useful to adopt a reflective strategyof shifting our mental models to fit the temporalcontexts of change processes unfolding in an or-ganization. First, each of the change process mod-els is limited and incomplete; the weaknesses ofone model are the strengths of another. Second,the usefulness of a model changes depending onthe organization’s life cycle stage (Beer & Walton,1987). Third, managing ambiguous and unprece-dented changes requires balancing opposing andoften contradictory views of change. Our discus-sion concludes with an examination of these threeproposed heuristics. Figure 2 illustrates these heu-ristics.


Model Strengths and Weaknesses. Each of the four mod-els emphasizes a particular set of managerial chal-lenges in managing organizational change thatcan sometimes be addressed and remedied byadopting a different conceptual model of change.For example:

● If participants are unable or unwilling to reachconsensus on a goal after several attempts to doso, a change agent may do more harm than goodby exhorting disagreeing parties to “get onboard because the train is leaving the station.”While this disagreement and conflict representsa breakdown in implementing a plannedchange (teleological) model, it serves as thegenerating mechanism for implementing a dia-lectical model of change.

● The frequently observed breakdown of resis-tance to mandated changes in a life cycle model

can often be remedied by involving the peopleaffected in a teleological model of planning andgoal setting. People, after all, prefer to imple-ment plans of their own making rather thanthose mandated by some external party.

● Breakdowns in one model can also contributeto breakdowns in other models of change. Forexample, a breakdown in the dialectical modelof squelching opposing viewpoints and pro-posals may contribute to breakdowns ofgroupthink in a teleological model and maycontribute to a lack of heterogeneous varia-tions for competitive selection with an evo-lutionary model.

As these examples suggest, the incompletenessof one model of organizational change may beremedied by adopting the perspectives of othermodels. As Figure 2 illustrates, each model has

Figure2TemporalRelationsAmongChangeModels

Note: Arrows on lines represent likely sequences among events, not causation between events.


one or more components whose values are deter-mined exogenous to the model.

● The goal developed by a group with a teleolog-ical model may explain the emergence of theantithesis in the dialectical model; at the sametime, the dialectical model enriches the teleo-logical model by calling attention to the con-text in which planned change processes emerge.

● The source of variation in an evolutionarymodel is often the synthesis produced throughdialectical struggle. A dialectical model alsomakes salient that even when a particularchange plan has been selected for implementa-tion in a teleological model, competing plansnevertheless lurk, suppressed yet available formobilizing challengers of the status quo whenthese challengers gain sufficient power.

Model Temporal Relations. Interactions among thechange models and their associated breakdownsalso have important temporal relationships. AsHargrave and Van de Ven (2006) discussed, eachmodel of change represents a possible link in un-derstanding the temporal stages or cycles of orga-nizational change. The four models of change canbe viewed not only as alternative perspectives ona single phenomenon but also as different tempo-ral phases in the journey of change in a complexorganization. This change journey may unfoldover phases of emergence, development, implemen-tation, and diffusion, with different models ofchange playing a dominant role in each period.

In the initial emergence phase, which corre-sponds to the teleological or planned changemodel, actors interact and socially construct a newenvisioned state, but they may not yet have mo-bilized plans and resources sufficiently to framethe issues and introduce their proposals for changein the more macro level of the organizationalfield. As a result, organizational action may bedriven by technical considerations, and there islittle conflict. This is particularly true when plansfor change are novel or frame-breaking and otherorganizational units and actors are unable to makesense of them. During this stage of organizationalchange, opponents have not yet organized to mo-bilize a dialectical response.

Dialectical processes become more evident dur-ing the developmental phase of organizationalchange when networks of organizational actorsand units emerge to introduce competing alterna-tive approaches or designs that entail differentproposals for change. However, the efficacy ofcompeting alternatives remains moderately am-biguous and questionable. Competing units, eachpursuing its own objectives, engage in politicalbehavior to gain support and legitimacy from keyconstituencies for their own frames and proposalson the issues of organizational change in question.During this period, a pluralistic field emerges asnetworks of partisan groups mobilize politicalcampaigns to advance their cause and discreditcompeting alternatives. In this phase, the signa-ture of organizational change is no longer actors’identities and goals but rather the dialectical dy-namics of conflict, power, and politics amongmultiple units. During this stage thesis and antith-esis have collided to produce a synthesis.

Finally, the life cycle and evolution modelsmay best explain implementation within units anddiffusion across multiple units once a particularorganizational form has won the political cam-paign and becomes legitimated and ratified.Thereafter, dialectical processes subside as the neworganizational arrangements supporting the winningdesign are adopted and diffused, while the proposalsand designs of the losing groups are silenced andsubmerged (at least temporarily) until the nextopportunity arises to mobilize a campaign to re-place or change the dominant organizational ar-rangements. The synthesis produced during thedevelopmental phase has become a new thesis. Itsantithesis lies dormant, not yet mobilized or the-orized.

This conceptualization of organizational changeas a progression through the models of change isconsistent with a punctuated equilibrium view ofchange (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman& Romanelli, 1985) or an episodic view of change(Quinn and Weick, 1999). Based on the idea thatonce institutionalized, beliefs and practices be-come taken for granted and experienced as objec-tive, enduring, and reliably reproduced (Berger &Luckmann, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), wepropose that cycles of organizational change may


consist of long periods of evolution in the incre-mental unfolding of regulated forms of organiza-tional changes punctuated by relatively brief butrevolutionary periods of teleological and dialecti-cal processes of change. These revolutions mayoccur when the legitimacy or performance of anorganizational arrangement is shattered due to amultiplicity of meanings, internal contradictions,and/or inconsistency with other institutions(Clemens & Cook, 1999; Sewell, 1992).

Viewing organizational change as being brack-eted by discontinuous periods of teleology anddialectics clarifies that even during incrementaland convergent periods of change, conflict is al-ways latent, and the process of organizationalchange cycles endlessly between periods of lifecycle and evolutionary convergence and teleolog-ical and dialectical divergence. New organiza-tional forms emerging from divergence episodesare both the synthesis of an existing dialectic andthe (soon to be challenged) thesis of a new dia-lectic.

Balancing Tensions and Oppositions. Tensions and oppo-sitions are inevitable and play a central role inorganization change. Seo, Putnam, and Bartunek(2004) and Farjoun (2010) discussed a number ofthese tensions, including whether a change initia-tive is triggered by internal or external forces,driven from the top down or the bottom up, openor closed to stakeholder participation, targeted atindividuals and groups or organization-wide, andtakes a negative or a positive focus. While thesedualities do not necessarily represent mutually ex-clusive contradictions, they do make salient acentral ethical question: Who and what are priv-ileged and ignored or subjugated during the pro-cess?

This question is equally relevant to assessingthe theories we use to manage and study organi-zation change. Teleology celebrates freedom ofchoice in constructing an envisioned future, butthis privilege is often limited to top managers intop-down and closed processes of planned change,which subjugates other participants to implement-ing their mandates in a life cycle model of regu-lated change. Dialectics celebrate an open, bot-tom-up approach to engaging in conflict among

groups with opposing teleologies but subjugatesand ignores the groups without sufficient power toconfront opposing groups. Evolutionary theorycelebrates open competition and “blind” marketselection among multiple units, but tends to ig-nore the planned and regulated changes that en-able individuals to compete in the market. Andlife cycle models tend to celebrate institutionalism(i.e., the rules of the game that make life predict-able) and deny individualism (i.e., individual free-dom, creativity, and self-governance).

The point is that every model of change createsits own tensions; it favors some values and over-looks others. As Seo et al. stated (2004, p. 101),“These tensions reflect the choice points thatpeople make, either implicitly or explicitly, asthey initiate and/or implement a change program.More importantly, this . . . emphasizes the impor-tance of acknowledging and valuing . . . tensionsrather than (perhaps implicitly) assuming thatchange efforts should privilege one pole.”

Given the aforementioned complexities of or-ganizational change, change agents may createbigger organizational problems by sticking withtheir mental model of change and focusing oncorrecting the breakdowns. In such “iatrogenic”situations, “the decision maker should thoroughlyexamine all the potential system effects, and per-haps refrain from action” (Boal & Meckler, 2010,p. 333). Instead of “swimming upstream,” theskillful change agent reflects on the situation andrevises his or her mental model in order to “gowith the flow.” This requires that change agentsexpand their repertoire of conceptual models formanaging organizational change, and have a con-tingency theory for knowing what models to use indifferent circumstances. Having multiple mentalmodels of change (i.e., teleology, life cycle, dia-lectical, and evolutionary process theories) per-mits us to apply the model(s)—and interactionsamong them—that fits a given situation.

ConcludingDiscussion

Observed processes of organization change sel-dom unfold as a theory in use suggests theyshould. Breakdowns may be due to difficulties

in implementing a model of change that is appro-priate for the situation and/or for different situa-


tions where the change model no longer applies.Diagnosing the breakdowns and knowing whatstrategy to follow in directing organization changeremains an art. Three contributions of this papermake this art more accessible and researchable.

First, a process model of change is a strategicchoice, and making this choice implies knowledgeof alternative models from which to choose. Wereviewed Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) fourprocess models of organization change and devel-opment and proposed that each model applies inthe different situations outlined in Table 1. Otherscholars have proposed useful variations of thesefour basic process models (Huy, 2001; Meyer,Goes, & Brooks, 1993; Weick & Quinn, 1999).The important point of these models is that theyencourage managers and scholars to expand theirrepertoire of models for managing organizationalchange. This enables us to think beyond a singlechange model—such as the dominant model ofplanned change (Cummings & Worley, 2008)—and to propose a contingency theory of organiza-tion change processes.

“A way of seeing is a way of not seeing” (Pog-gie, 1965, p. 284). Managing and researching or-ganizational change can become more strategicand less myopic by increasing one’s repertoire ofalternative models of change. Any single mentalmodel provides only a partial account of complexprocesses. Juxtaposing several different modelsprovides insights for deciding which model ofchange is appropriate in different situations andwhat kinds of breakdowns and remedies are likelyto apply when implementing a change. Specifi-cally, we introduced a number of contingencytheory propositions for implementing each of thefour models of organization change.

We argued that when breakdowns occur, theytend to trigger two kinds of strategies: action andreflection. Typically, the first strategy is to takeactions intended to correct the people or processesin the organization that prevent the change modelfrom running as expected. An extensive and di-verse body of research literature (often not asso-ciated with organization change) can be appliedin fruitful and imaginative ways to diagnose andcorrect breakdowns with each of the four modelsof change.

A second strategy for dealing with breakdownsis to reflect on and revise the model to one thatbetter fits the process of change unfolding in theorganization. This strategy represents the scien-tific method of testing and rejecting a theory ifdata do not support it and then revising or adapt-ing a theory that fits the observed data. Thissecond strategy appears prudent only after reason-able attempts are made but fail to implement thefirst strategy.

Our discussion implies that an important futureresearch agenda is to shift our research on organi-zational change toward a contingency theory ofimplementation. This contingency theory in-cludes determining when and where each changemodel—and interactions of multiple models—ap-plies, identifying breakdowns perceived in imple-menting a model of change in particular situa-tions, and diagnosing how and when to respond tothese breakdowns. To develop this contingency the-ory, a number of research directions are needed.

First, we need to empirically test propositionsthat examine different situations when teleology,dialectical, evolutionary, and life cycle models—and their interactions—reflect the change pro-cesses unfolding in an organization. For example,we suggested that a dialectical process of changefails when power inequalities limit or inhibit con-frontation among opposing parties. Although thisis generally accepted in theory, we lack empiricalstudies testing such propositions.

Second, we need studies to better understandthe interacting complexities of change processes.To date, studies tend to examine a single model toreflect a particular organizational change process.We argue that multiple models are needed toaddress complexities of having multiple changesongoing in an organization, multiple changeagents with different mental models of any givenchange, and multiple interactions between changemodels over time. This requires research on theinterdependencies and interactions among variousmodels, agents, and changes. For example, eachmodel emphasizes a particular set of managerialchallenges in managing organizational changethat can sometimes be remedied by adopting adifferent model. It is important to study condi-tions or situations when change agents shift their


conceptual model of change to the one that re-flects the change processes ongoing in their orga-nization.

Finally, we need research that examines thelearning cycle of acting to correct an organizationto fit one’s model of change, and reflecting onhow one’s model might be revised to better fit theprocesses unfolding in the organization. A centralchallenge in studying and managing processes ofchange in complex organizations is achieving bal-ance between implementation actions and feed-back reflections on four generative motors ofchange: consensus, conflict, competition, and reg-ulation. This is not to suggest that change agentscan control or that researchers can predict theserelations. They can, however, engage in a processof trial-and-error learning by engaging in a bal-anced and repetitive cycle of actions to implementtheir models of change and reflections on revisingtheir social constructions of organization change.

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58 Academy of Management Perspectives August ARTICLES ... · Practice theories of implementing change are lagging behind process theories of organizational change and development