8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

1/17

The Corporatization of the Egyptian Labor MovementAuthor(s): Robert BianchiSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 429-444Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327366.

Accessed: 10/03/2011 10:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at.http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mei..

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Middle East Instituteis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toMiddle East

Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meihttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4327366?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meihttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meihttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4327366?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mei

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

2/17

THE CORPORATIZATION

F

THE

EGYPTIAN LABOR

MOVEMENT

RobertBianchi

This

essay

seeks to

illustratethree

importantaspects

of the

development

of the

Egyptianlabor movementand its changingrelations with the state. First, since

World

War

II, Egypt's ruling

elites have

gradually

restructured

the

union

movement

from

pluralist

o

corporatist

orms of

organization.'

Second, although

the

particular ariety

of

corporatism

hat has

arisen

n

this sector

can be

described

as an

example

of

state

corporatism,

the

long-term

consequence

of

corporatist

policies

has

been

to

strengthen

and

selectively coopt

working

class

organizations

rather than

to smash

them

and exclude them

from the

policy-makingprocess.2

Third,

this

process

of

corporatization

s

by no means

irreversible;

indeed, it

alreadyhas generatednew tensions throughout he union hierarchywhich may

help to promotethe

reemergenceof

pluralismboth

in

the labor

movementand in

the

political

system

as

a

whole.3

These issues

will be

examined

from three

differentperspectives,

each of

I

Corporatism

an

be

definedas a

system

of

interest

representation

n

which the

constituent

units are organized

nto a limited number

of

singular,

compulsory,

non-competitive,

hierarchically

ordered

and

functionally

differentiated

ategories,

recognized

or

licensed

(if

not

created)by

the

state

and

granted

a

deliberate

representational

monopoly

within

heir

respective

categories

n

exchange

for

observingcertain controls on their

selection of

leaders and

articulation f

demandsand supports.

PhilippeC.

Schmitter, Still the

Century

of

Corporatism? Review

of Politics,

36, no.

1

(January

1974): 85-131.

2.

Efforts to

distinguish

between

more

cooptive

and

more

coercive

varieties

of

state

corporatism an

be

seen in

O'Donnell's

notions of

populistauthoritarianism

ersus

bureaucratic

authoritarianism,

n

Stepan's

concepts

of

inclusionary

corporatism

versus

exclusionary

corporatism, and in the Colliers'

distinctionbetween

inducements-oriented

nd

constraints-

oriented

varieties of

corporatism. Guillermo

O'Donnell,

Modernization

and

Bureaucratic-

Authoritarianism

Berkeley:

University

of

California

nstitute

of

International

tudies,

1973);

Alfred

Stepan, State and

Society:

Peru in

Comparative

Perspective

(Princeton: Princeton

University

Press,

1978);and

David Collierand Ruth

Berens

Collier,

Inducements

versus

Constraints:

Disaggregating

'Corporatism,' American Political

Science

Review, 73,

no. 4

(December

1979):

967-986.

3.

For other

examplesof

corporatist

policies

which

have

had the

unintended onsequenceof

promoting pluralism see

Robert

Bianchi, Interest

Groups and

Political

Development

in Turkey

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1984); and

Interest

Group

Politics in the

Third

World, Third

World

Quarterly,

8,

no. 2

(April

1986).

Robert

Bianchi is

Associate

Professor,

Department

of

Political

Science,

University of

Chicago.

THE

MIDDLEEAST

JOURNAL,

VOLUME

40,

NO.

3,

SUMMER

1986.

429

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

3/17

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

4/17

federations

were allowed to

organize

in identical workbranchesand

regions.

Although

no reference was made to

the

establishment

of

a

union

confederation,

this

was interpretedby

the Wafd and

succeeding

governments

as an

implicit

prohibitionagainst

forming

a nationwide

peak

association to coordinate

union

activity.

Unions

were

specifically

forbidden to

engage

in

political

and

religious

activities

or

to

invest in business and

profit-making

nterprises.

The formation

of

a

new

union

required

approvalby

the

Ministry

of Social

Affairs which also

was

empowered

to

close down unions

accused

of

illegalactivities,

even

in

the

absence

of

a

court order.

The 1952

union

law

reflected

a

similar

ambivalencetoward

organized

labor

among

the Free Officers

who

attempted

more

urgently

han

their

predecessors

to

devise

techniques

that

would

simultaneously xpand

and

strengthen

unions while

providinggreater

state

controls

over their

leadership

selection

and

expression

of

demands.The 1952 statute was the most mixed of all the Egyptianunionlaws

in

terms of

combining

both

pluralist

and

corporatistprovisions

in an

interesting,

though

short-lived, hybrid

formula. On one

hand,

the

law

encouraged

the

rapid

proliferation of

new

unions. Union

membership

was extended to

agricultural

workers. Check-offs

were

permitted

and

in

enterprises

where

three-fifthsof the

workforce

was

unionized,

union

shops

were

required.

The

establishment

of

new

unions

required

only registration

with

but

not

approval

rom the

Ministry

of Social

Affairs, and the

power to

close down

existing

unions

was

transferred

rom

the

executive to thejudiciary.

On the other

hand,

the

principle

of

singular,

non-competitive,hierarchical

organization

was

introduced

and

clearly

sanctioned

by

the

authority

of the

state.

At the

regional

level

no more

than

one

union

federationwas to be

permitted

n

each

occupational

category.

At the

national evel a

singlelabor

confederation

was

to

enjoy

a

monopoly

of

representation

or

the union

movement as a

whole.

The

government

had not

yet

specified

the

categories

in

which

federations

were to

be

organized,

and

it

agreed

to

postpone

the

establishment

of the

EgyptianConfed-

eration of Labor until 1957. Nevertheless, a monistic, hierarchical,and semi-

officialmodel of union

organization

was

adopted

and

codifiedby the

authoritarian

regime

less

than five

months after the

July

revolution.

The

transformation

f

the

unions

from

pluralist

o corporatist

structures

was

completed

between

1959and 1964.The

Unified

LaborCode

of 1959

and the Trade

Unions Law

of

1964

were landmark

ieces

of

corporatistegislation

comparable

n

many

ways

to the

labor code of the

Brazilian

Estado Novo. They

laid

down

elaborate

regulations

encompassing

all

aspects of

employment,including

sweep-

ing provisions for centralized union organizationaround a small number of

nationwide

ndustrial

ederationsunderthe

supervisionof a

unitary

confederation

and

a

new

Ministry

of

Labor.

In

1960

an

official ist of 64

occupational

categories

was

issued and

by

1962

new

federations

had been

established for

59 of these

431

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

5/17

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

6/17

years since

1981.

Since

1973,

turnover

in the federation and

confederation

leaderships

has fallen

steadily

and

was

virtually

nil in

the most

recent

union

elections

during

1983.

As

confederation

eaders

have

become more secure

they

also have

become

more

prominent

political

and economic

figures.

The

confederation

president

is

now an ex-officiomemberof the cabinet, servingas head of the new Ministryof

Manpower

and

Professional

Training.

Most members

of the

confederation's

executive committee

are leaders

in

the

ruling

National

Democratic

Party,

three

are

deputies

in the

People's

Assembly,

and three others

are

representatives

n

the

Consultative

Assembly

(Majlis

al-Shura).

Confederation

eaders are

ubiquitous

and often

statutorilydesignated

members of

countless economic

planning

coun-

cils, parliamentary

ommittees, public

sector

management

boards,

and ministerial

consultativebodies.6

Since 1981 he Confederation'spowershave been expanded n two important

areas. It has been

granted

exclusive

control over a new

Workers'

University

designed

to

integrate

a multitudeof

union

leadership raining

programs ormerly

run

by

rival

state

and

party agencies

with

conflicting goals

and

programs.

In

addition,

the Confederationhas been

allowed to

join

in the

widening

movement

of

syndical

capitalism

nitiated

by

the

manycorporatist

professional

associations

and

business

chambers that have

used

pension

funds

and state

subsidies to

establish

independent

economic

enterprises, ncluding oint

ventures with

foreign

investors. The newly established Workers'Banknow occupies a prominentarea

of the Confederation's

headquarters,symbolizing

the

expansion

of organized

labor's economic role

beyond

the

traditional imits of

public

sector industry.7

THE

EVOLUTIONOF THE

EGYPTIAN

CONFEDERATIONOF

LABORAS

AN

INTEREST

GROUP

Efforts to

establish and

manipulate

a

single

representative

association

for the

entire

working

class

have

been a

recurrent

ource of

intra-elite

conflictand a key

element in the

ruling calculus of

Egyptian

governments since the

beginning of

World War II.

Over

time

there has

been a

gradual,

but

quite

remarkable hange

in

the

strategies

of

Egypt's

political

elites

in

dealing

with

the leaders of

the labor

movement. Since 1942

the range of

state-unionrelations has

included 1) early

governmentsuppressionof all

independent

nitiativesto build

union

federations,

2)

Nasser's

ambitious

efforts to win

working class

supportwith

redistributive

6. MuhammadMuhammadAli, al-Qiyadat l-Niqabiya i-UmmalMisr (Union Leadersof

the

Egyptian

Workers),

al-Amal,

247

(December

1983),

pp.

36-39 and

248

(January

1984),

pp. 54-56.

7.

Asam Abd

al-Jawad,

al-Manahij

al-Dirasiya

i-Kulliyatal-Jami'a

al-Ummaliya

(The

Curricula n the

Faculties

of

the

Workers'

University),

al-Amal,

248

(January

1984);

and

Adal

al-Mashad, al-Ghazw

al-Istithmari

il-Niqabat

al-Mihniya

wa

al-Ummaliya The

Entrepreneurial

Invasion of

Professionaland

Labor

Syndicates),

al-Shaab

(January1983).

433

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

7/17

reforms

that

directly

benefited

union memberswithout the mediation

of

union

representatives, 3)

Sadat's more selective

cooptation

of collaborative

union

leaders through increasingly

generous grants

of

privilege

to

their

corporatist

organizations, and,

most

recently, 4)

Mubarak's nformal

acceptance

of

sharing

power and responsibility

with the

Egyptian

Confederation f Laborin

many

areas

of economic policy-making.

The Confederation

has been a central

part

of the authoritarian

tate's

efforts

to fashion

effective

corporatist

controls

over the

union movement.

Gradually,

however,

union

leaders also

have learned o use

it

as their

principal

nstrument or

penetratingadministrative, egislative,

and

party

structures

n

order

to

carve out

a key role

for

themselves

in the

shaping

of

economic

policy.

Power relations

between

successive

governments

and

the

Confederation

have

become

less uni-

lateral

and more

reciprocal,

indicating

that the

corporatization

of

the

Egyptian

labormovementhas not been a simplematterof subordinatinghe workingclass

to the authoritarian

order.

Rather,

it

appears

that

corporatism

has,

in

time,

provided

union

leaders

with new means for

defending

workers'

interests

and,

ironically,

for

limiting

the decisional

autonomy

of

the

authoritarian

egime

in

certain critical

issues.

The

Wafdist

government

that

passed

the

first trade union

statute of 1942

claimed that

no

legal protection

had

been

given

for

the

establishmentof

a

national

labor confederation.

Nevertheless,

that

samegovernmentalso encouragedWafd

Party leaders to enroll publicemployees in an inter-union congress that was

designed

to

recapture

control

of

organized

abor

from

Prince Abbas

Halim, who

was interned or the durationof World

War

II.

Soon after the

war, the left sought

to consolidate

its

leadership

over the

increasingly

radical labor

movement by

coordinating

the

establishment

of a national

confederation

(Mu'tamar

Niqabat

'Ummail Misr). Although

leftist

union leaders were on the

verge of forminga

highly

inclusive

peak

association in June and

July

of

1946,

their

plans

were

thwarted

by

the last minute defection of the

conservative transportworkers'

unions

and

by

Ismail

Sidqi's

mass

imprisonment f congress members.8

Six

more

years passed

before unionists

overcame

government

repressionand

internalrivalries

to

organize

another

attempt

at

confederation.Twice

during 1952

''preparatory

committees scheduled

founding conventions for an Egyptian

Confederation of Labor

only

to see both

meetings cancelled

by frightened

governments

that had

just

been

jolted by spectacularexamples of mass protest.

The first

founding

convention

was

scheduled

or

the day after the

GreatCairoFire

of

January26, 1952,

and the

second was to take place within a

few weeks of the

new

revolutionary government's

bloody suppression of labor

unrest at Kafr

al-Dawwarthe following August.9

8. Rauf

Abbas, pp.

118-120, 122-132.

9. Abd

al-Mughni

Said,

Safahat

Majhula

min Tarikh

al-Haraka

al-Niqabiya (Unknown

434

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

8/17

The Free

Officers eared that

a

union confederationwould be

manipulated

by

partisansof

the

Wafd,

the

communists,

and

the

Muslim

Brotherhood,

but the

new

regime

also

was

eager

to build

a mass

constituency

for the

revolution n

the

labor

movement.

Accordingly,

the

junta

adoptedmany

liberal abor and

union

reforms

precisely

at the time that it

abolished all

pre-revolutionarypolitical

parties.

Moreover,

the Free

Officers

soon

reached a

compromise

with

non-communist

union leaders that

permitted

he formationof an

unofficial

permanent

ongress

in lieu

of

the

unitary

confederation hat had been

endorsed n

principle

n the new

trade union

law

of 1952.10

This

'gentlemen's

agreement

allowed

both

sides to

justify

an indefinite

postponement

of the revolution's

promise

to build

stronger

union

structures.

Meanwhile,daily

contact between the

junta

and

the

labor

movement

was

in

fact

channelled

through

the

Workers' Bureau

of

the

Liberation

Rally

under

Major

Abdallah

Tu'ayma.

It

was

Tu'ayma who later

orchestrated he

famous

transport

workers' demonstrationsthat

provided

decisive

supportfor Nasser

during

the

Marchcrisis of

1954,

when

Naguib

ed a

broad

coalition

against

him

demanding

the return to

parliamentary

democracy.

Even after

Nasser

had

consolidated

power

within

Egypt

he was reluctant

to

permit

a

national

confederation,prefer-

ring instead to

promote

the

International

Confederation

of Arab

Trade

Unions

in

order to

expand

his

regional

nfluence

during

he Suez

crisis

of 1956.

Thus,

four

years after

the

revolution

Egyptian

unionists

were in

the

anomolous

position

of

hosting

and

providing

the

vanguard

or

a

pan-Arab abor

movement

while

still

possessing

no

peak association

in

their

own

country.'1

Not

surprisingly, Nasser's

belated and

ambivalent

agreement in 1957

to

permit

the

establishment of the

Egyptian

Confederationof

Labor was

closely

connected with his

desire

to build

means

of

administrative

enetration nto

Syria.

The

Unified Labor

Code was

adoptedabout

one

year after

the

formation of

the

United

Arab

Republic.

It was

generally

assumed at

the

timethat the

new

statute's

sweeping provisions

for

corporatist

union

organization

would be

implemented

quickly

in

the

Egyptian

region where

many labor

leaders

had

been

demanding

greater

centralization

or

years.

Conversely, it

also was

assumed

that the

same

measures

would

be

bitterly

resisted in

the

Syrianregion,

where

autonomous ocal

unions

formeda

key

partof

the

Baath's

provincial

party

organizations. n

fact,

the

opposite

occurred-corporatization

was

accomplished

quite

swiftly in

Syria, but

delayedand

nearly

abandoned

n

Egypt

when

Nasser

was

confronted

with strong

police

and

military

objections to the

sudden

concentrationof

union power.

Pages from

the

History

of the

Union

Movement)

al-Amal236

(January

1983),

pp.

11-13.

10.

Ibid,

pp.

24-25.

11.

Abd

al-Azim

Ramadan,

Al-Sira'

al-Ijtima'i wa

al-Siyasifi Misr

(Social

and

Political

Struggle

in

Egypt)(Cairo:Ruz al

Yusuf,

1975),

ch.

11

and

appendixes;

and

WillardA.

Beling,

Pan-Arabism nd

Labor

(Cambridge:Harvard

University

Press,

1961),

ch. 2.

435

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

9/17

The

project

to

reorganize

the

Egyptian

abor movement

was deadlocked

for

nearly two

years

due to

the

conflicting

demands of

union

leaders

and

Hussein

al-Shafai,

the Minister

of Social

Affairs

and

Labor,

on one

hand,

and

Zakariya

Muhieddin,

he Ministerof

Interior,

on

the other

hand. WhenNasser realized

how

much dissension

the

proposal

had

created

among

his

colleagues,

he

considered

scrapping t

altogether.

Finally,

the

president

was

persuaded

to

proceed despite

Muhieddin's

opposition,

but

not

because of

any

enthusiasm on his

part

for

the

notion

that

union-party

elations

had to be

shaped

into a

more

equal

alliance that

was free of

military

tutelage. Rather,

Nasser was much

more

impressed by

the

expert opinion

of

the

Syrian region's

new anti-Baathist

police

chief

who

assured

the

Egyptians

that

the surveillance of

potential

troublemakers

was far

easier in

the new

unitary

and

centralized abor movement than it

had been in the

previously

dispersed

and

provincially

based set of structures.'2

After 1964,when the Confederationinallyhadcompletedthe constructionof

new industrial

federations,

union leaders

found themselves

engaged

in

bureau-

cratic

rivalries

with

some

of the

most

powerful

igures

of

the

Nasserist era. On

one

hand,

Aziz

Sidqi,

the Ministerof

Industry,

ed a

strong

technocratic

resistance to

the

new

socialist

laws

requiring

he

participation

of

elected worker

representa-

tives in the

management

f industrial

nterprises.

On the

other

hand,

Ali

Sabriand

the radical

Workers' Bureau

of

the Arab

Socialist Union

(ASU)

applied great

pressure

for direct

party

control of union

elections and

of

leadership training

programs or union officials.

Duringthese

power

struggles

the

leaders

of

the

Confederation

elied heavily

on the

patronage

of Kamal

Rifaat,

who

served

simultaneously

not

only

as

Minister

of

Labor,

but

also

as

directorof

ideologicaldevelopment

within

the

ASU and the

governmentpublishing

houses

and

as directorof the

modernization

program

at

al-Azhar. Rifaat's

support

was

instrumental n

preserving the industrial

co-

determinationschemes

against managers'

demands for

their

abolition.

He also

endorsed union demands or

greaterautonomy rom the

ASU

directorate,arguing

that

labor-party

elations

in

a socialist society shouldbe shapedaccordingto the

more

flexible

Yugoslavian

model

rather han the

more

totalitarian

Soviet

model.

3

Finally,

Rifaat's

opposition to

doctrinaire

notions of scientific socialism

and his

efforts to

reconcile

Arab

socialism with

Islamic socialism were

perfectly

in

tune

with the

eclectic and

moderate view

of the

confederation

leadership.

With

his aid the

Confederationwas

able to resist the

ASU's plans to

take

over

leadershiptrainingprograms

or

union

officials and to

transform hem

into

schools for social

revolution

resembling

the party-dominated raining

centers for

leaders

of

the

youth organizations

nd

agricultural

ooperatives. Rifaat

12.

Said, pp. 14-23.

13.

Ibid, pp.

24-38;

and

Anouar

Abdel-Malek,

Egypt:

Military

Society (New

York:

Random

House,

1968),pp.

294-296 and 304.

436

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

10/17

and

his

union

allies succeeded

in

preserving

a

degree

of

continuity

in the

labor

movement's leadership raining

nstitutes that was

quite extraordinaryduring

the

turbulentyears

of

Egypt's

socialist transformation. These institutes

continued

to provide (as they

do

today)

an unusualcombination

of

technical

knowledge

with

liberal

socialist

and

Islamic

principles.

In this sense the

programs

of the union

institutes reflect

the

enduring

influence of their

early

directors such as Hilmi

Murad,

Abd

al-MughniSaid,

and Jamal

al-Banna,

all

of

whom have

descended

from what might

be termed

the

left-wing

or

Misr al-Fatat and the Muslim

Brotherhood.

4

During the period of crisis

that

followed

the

military

defeat of 1967

it

appeared

that Nasser was

prepared

to make

important

concessions to union

leaders

in

order

to insure

their

support

or

the

weakened

regime. During

the

mass

demonstrations

of

February

1968 Nasser

personally

went to Hilwan

to

make a

direct appeal for industrialworkers to disengagefrom the escalating marches

organized by

radical

university

students.

Shortly

thereafter

he

also

held an

unusualseries

of

meetings

with the Confederation's

xecutive committee

n

which

each

federation

president

rose

in

turn

to

present

a list

of

long-ignored

demands or

greater union authority

and

autonomy.

The

gradual acquiescence

of the labor

movement

in the

promises

of reformcontained

n

Nasser's

Declarationof March

30, 1968, allowed

the

regime to isolate and suppress the more persistent and

violent student movement in the months ahead. Just as duringhis confrontation

with Naguib and Khalid Muhieddinsome years earlier, Nasser had to rely on

labor leaders to provide a decisive display of mass support at a time when his

power

was threatened

and while the

military

was

divided

and

unreliable.'5

Nasser continued n his final years, however, to deny union leaders anything

more than

a

subordinate

and

symbolic position

in the

rulingcoalition, just as he

had

after

the 1954 crisis. To

be

sure,

there were

notable increases in the

representationof workers

and

union officials

in

many party and administrative

bodies,

but no

new

elections

were

allowed

at

any level of the union hierarchy

between

the

time of the

1967

war and

Nasser's

death

three years later. Nor did the

presidentsatisfy Confederationdemands hat the unions be allowed to select or at

least

to screen

the

elected worker

representatives in industrial management

committees.

Instead,

Nasser

encouragedstill greater organizationalrivalry and

diffusion

of authority

n

the workplace by assigning overlapping asks to manag-

ers,

unionists,

elected

worker representatives,and party-ledproduction eams.'6

14.

Jamalal-Banna,

Buhuthfi

al-Thaqafa

al-Ummaliya Studies n Worker

Education)

Cairo:

Matbaa

Hassan,

1977),

ch. 8.

15. MuhammadKhalid, al-Haraka al-Niqabiya Bayna al-Madi wa al-Hadar (The Union

Movement

Between Past

and

Present) Cairo:Akhbar

al-Yawm, 1975);and Mahmoud

Hussein,

Class

Conflict

n

Egypt:

1945-1970

New

York:

MonthlyReview

Press,

1973),

ch. 8.

16.

Salahal-Sayed,

Workers'

Participation n

Management:The

EgyptianExperience

Cairo:

American

University

in

Cairo Press,

1978),

ch.

5; and

RaymondWilliam

Baker,Egypt's

Uncertain

RevolutionunderNasser

and Sadat

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press, 1978),ch.

7.

437

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

11/17

Anwar Sadat was

much more

forthcoming

n his relationswith the leaders

of

the labor confederation than Nasser had

been,

even

though they commonly

regarded

his administration

as

being

anti-labor and in some areas

virtually

counter-revolutionary

when

compared

o the Nasser

era. In

fact, by

the mid-1970s

Sadatalready

had made

good

on most of the

pledges

to

augment

the Confedera-

tion's

powers

and resources

that his

predecessor

had

given

in

principle

after the

1968demonstrations,

but never

implemented.By

the time of Sadat's assassination

in 1981 he Confederation

had

become

the

largest,

wealthiest,

and

most

influential

representative

association in

Egyptian society.

Especially during

the earlier

years

of his

presidency,

several factors made

Sadat

far more

dependent

than

Nasser

had been on

the

political support

of

a

strong

and reliable union elite.

First,

Sadat still lacked the broad

popular

sympathy

that

would

have allowed

him

to continue the

Nasserist

practice

of

ignoringthe mediation of representative groups and appealing directly to the

working class through personal

addresses and

redistributivereforms.

Second,

Sadat's

plans

to

promote

a

multi-party ystem

aroused considerable

resistance

from union

officials

who

perceived

the

dismantling

of the ASU as an

attempt

to

repeal

the

inadequate

yet

substantial influence of

the

labor movement in the

coalition of

popular

working

orces. Labor

leaders

displayed

little

enthusiasm

for

pluralist

reforms of

the

party system

until

the

government

endorsed modifi-

cations of

the

corporatist

union structure

hat

created sinecures at the

top of

the

labor movement that were even more attractive than the party posts that were

abolished with the ASU.

Finally,

Sadat's

policies

of economic

liberalizationwere

bound to generate

greater working

class

discontent

by reversing

earlier

trends

toward

social

equity

and

exposing

the

economy

to

greater

nternational

ompetition. It was against the

backdrop

of

mounting

labor

unrest, including

the

violent

strikes

in

Mahalla

al-Kubra

n 1975and

culminating

n the

bread

riots of

January1977, that Sadat

enacted several reforms

designed

to

strengthen

the union

confederation, to

alienate its leadersfromthe rank andfile, andto coopt them more effectively as

junior

members of the

authoritarian

elite

and

privileged partners in the new

capitalist

economic order.

Most

recently,

the Mubarak

egime

has

tacitly recognized

the Confederation

as

a

veto

group

whose

prior

consent

is

indispensible o

the success of any major

policy

initiative in

such

key

areas as

reformof

publicsector industries,reduction

of consumer

goods

subsidies,

and the

anti-inflationary

ndexingof wage and price

increases. Mubarakhas

been

careful to reassure unionleaders that his efforts to

promote a mixed economy and to implementmild austerity measures do not

constitute an assault

on basic

working

class

gains from

Egypt's socialist revolu-

tion.

Accordingly,

he

has,

in

effect, agreed to a partial surrender of state

autonomy

in

many

areas of

economic

policy-making n exchange for the cooper-

438

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

12/17

ation

of confederation eaders in

implementing

necessary,

but

painful

and

highly

unpopulareconomic

reforms.

As the

Confederation

has

acquired

more

authority

and

resources

its leaders

have become

less

firmly

based

upon

the

independentsupport

of affiliated

unions

and much less accountable to the

general

union

membership.

Confederation

presidents,

in

particular,

have assumedan

increasingly

dualisticand

contradictory

role of

trying

to

represnt

both the

government

and the union

movement at the

same time. The

tendency

of the Confederation

leadership

to become

more

encapsulated

by

the state

bureaucracy

and more insulatedfrom rank and

file

pressures

can be illustrated

by comparing

briefly

the five men

who have

occupied

its

presidency

and

by examining ong-term

changes

in the rates of

re-election to

the confederation's

executive committee.

The first president

of the

confederation,

Anwar

Salama

(1957-62),

was the

leader of the petroleum workers' federation. He had played a key role in

organizing

he workers'

boycott

of British installations n the

canal zone and in

aiding

the

guerrilla

campaign

of

the Muslim

Brotherhoodafter

the

abrogation

of

the

Anglo-Egyptiantreaty

in

1951-52.

Later

he

helped

to

instigate

strikes and

sabotage by

petroleum

workers

in other

Arab

countries to

protest

the

tripartite

aggression

of 1956. In 1962 Salama was

appointed

Minister

of Labor

to

preside

over

the

corporatistreorganization

f the

unions,

but

he

resigned

his

position

as

Confederation

president,

arguing

hat

the

two offices should

not

be

occupied by

the same person simultaneously.

His successor, Ahmad Fahim

(1962-69), was the

president of the

textile

workers'

federation,

the

largest

and

best

organized

union

in

the

country.

He

had

been one of the

major

figures urging

the

Free

Officers to

sponsor

the

early

establishment of

a

labor

confederation

and

he was the

principal

author of the

report

on union

reorganization

that

eventually

became the

basis for the

corporatization

of

the

labor

movement. As with

Salama

before

him,

Fahim

also

was offered the

Ministry

of

Labor, but he

declined

the position preferringto

remainas confederation

president.

His

tenure

was

extended

by

the

suspension of

union

elections

after the 1967

war,

and he

died

in

office in

1969.

The third

president, Abd al-Latif

Bultiya (1969-71),was a

transitional igure

who was

appointed to

fill out

Fahim's

already overdrawn term and

then was

cashiered

in Sadat's

purge

of the

Confederation

shortly after the

Corrective

Revolution of

1971.

Bultiya

was

notable solely

because he was the first

confederation

president

who

agreed to

serve

simultaneouslyas a

memberof the

cabinet. Union

officials who have

served

under all

five Confederation

presidents

point

to

Bultiya's

brief

term

as

a

turning

point afterwhich the

organizationbegan

to lose much of its original ndependenceand vigor.

When Sadat

orderedthe

first unionelections in

seven years his candidate or

confederation

president

was Salah

Gharib

1971-76),

another eader of

the textile

workers'

federation. Gharib

was chosen, however, not

because he

representeda

439

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

13/17

large and powerful

center

in the union

movement,

but because of his

close

association with MamduhSalim, the

Alexandriagovernor and police chief

who

provided Sadat

with

timely support

n

his

countercoupagainst

the Ali Sabri

clique

and who later became Ministerof Interiorand

PrimeMinister.In

fact,

Gharib

was

quite notorious

for his

unpopularityamong

workers

in

many

federations, espe-

cially

the

strongly pro-Nasserist

defense and metal workers in

Hilwan,

who

taunted

himas a

governmentstooge

and held him

captive overnightduring

one

of

their factory occupations.

Gharib

made

a

serious effort

to intervene in such

incidents of

worker

protest,

but when it became clear

that his

presence

tended

to

aggravate

ratherthan soothe

labor

unrest,

he

was retiredfrom the Confederation

leadership

after the

expiration

of his second

term.

The fifth and currentpresident,

Saad MuhammadAhmad

(1976-present),

is

the leader

of

the

food

workers'

federation. In and out of the

Confederation's

executive committeeduringthe 1960s,he was barred romthe elections of 1971,

rehabilitated and

elected

as Salah Gharib's

vice-president

in

1973,

and then

elected to

three consecutive

terms as

president beginning

in

1976. Ahmad has

served

longer

than

any

of his

predecessors,

presiding

or

nearly

a

decade over

a

steady expansion

of

the

Confederation's

political

influence and

economic activi-

ties as

well as its

linkages

with

the state

bureaucracy

and the

ruling party.

In

addition to

his role

as head of the union movement Ahmad also

directs the

Ministry

of

Manpower

and

Professional

Training (formerly

the

Ministry

of

Labor), the Workers' Bank, the Workers' University, and several inter-

ministerial

committees concerned

with the state

economic

enterprises,

emigrant

workers

and their

remittances,

and economic

planning.

One of

the

most

important

haracteristicsof the

Confederation

presidency

is

that its

now

considerable

powers

are attributable

primarily o

the nature of

the

office

rather than

the

personality

of

the

officeholder.

Saad

MuhammadAhmadis

certainly conscientious, affable,

and

prudent.

Yet he

appears

to be

a thoroughly

unextraordinary

man who

can be

replacedby any

of

several rivals who also

rose

to prominent positions in the union hierarchy during the Sadat era. Nearly a

decade and

a half after

its

only

real

purge,

the

Confederation's executive

committee now contains

a

rather

embarrassing surplus of experienced

and

ambitiousunion

leaders, many

of whom feel more than prepared or higherposts.

Turnover

of the

top

union leadershiphas fallen dramatically ince the early

1970s

(Table 1).17

The union elite

has become virtually self-recruitingwith

new

faces

appearingonly

as

a

result

of

the

death or voluntaryretirementof incumbent

federation

presidents

and

almost never

because of electoral challenges

or pres-

sures from the

shop

floor. Of the 23 currentpresidents of union federations, 13

17.

Al-Ittihad l-Amm i

NiqabatUmmalMisr i

Ishrina Aman

The Egyptian

Confederation f

Trade

Unions

in

Twenty

Years)(Cairo:Mataba'al-Ahram l

Tijari,

1977),pp.

86-91;

and

Muhammad

MuhammadAli,

pp. 36-39

and

54-56.

440

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

14/17

Table

1. Turnover

of Confederation

Executive Committee

Members,

1961-1983

Year

1961 1964 1971

1973 1976 1979 1983

Percent of

members

with experiencein

previousexecutive

committees 28 24 14 44 48

76 92

have

been in office ten

years

or more and four have

managed

o survive for at least

19 years.

NEWPRESSURESFOR PLURALISM

Competition

for

presidential

succession is

by

no means the

only

important

source

of

conflict

within the Confederation.As the unions have

grown

in

size

and

influence several

lines of

cleavage

have

emerged

to crack the formal

faqade

of

corporatism

and

generate

new

pressures

for

pluralism

both

in

the

labor movement

and

in the

larger political system.

There are at least five

dimensions of

growing

conflict

within the

labor confederation

hat make the

preservation

of its

current

corporatist rameworkhighlyproblematic.

First,

the

enhanced

authority

and

prestige

of

the

Confederation

presidency

has elicited resistancefrom

many

federation eaders

who

are

eager

to

demonstrate

their

independence

from

central union

bodies

and

their

separate ines

of political

influence.

This

conflict

is

most evident

among

the several

federation

presidents

who

have

sought

to embarrassSaad Muhammad

Ahmad

by openly defying the

Confederation'sofficial

ban

on

unapproved

affiliationswith

internationalunion

organizations.

Ahmad has tried to

impose

an

official

policy of neutrality

concerning foreignaffiliations n order to dampen partisanconflicts over invita-

tions to

Egypt

to

join

the

pro-Western nternational

Confederationof Free Trade

Unions

(ICFTU)

which most Arab

unionists

regard

as

biased in favor

of Israel. At

least

half a

dozen federation

presidentshave nevertheless oined

ICFTU affiliates

not

only to display

their

enthusiastic endorsement of the ruling party's pro-

Western

foreign policy, but

also

to

show that their own politicalresources allow

them

to

challenge

the

Confederation

presidentwith impunity,especially when he

seeks to

assuage

union factions that

are close to the political

opposition.18

18.

NiqabatUmmalal-Zira'a

Tunadim

il-Ittihad l-Hurr

The

Agricultural

Workers'

Union

Joins the Free

Confederation), l-Ahali

(August 17,

1983);and Ba'ada

Khibrat

Thalathin

Sana ma'

al-Ittihad

al-Hurr

After

ThirtyYears'

Experiencewith the

Free

Confederation), l-Ahali

February

23, 1983).

44]

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

15/17

Second, as

the

composition

of the union

membership

has diversified

it

has

become more difficult for the

conflicting

interests of all federations to

be

represented

adequately by

a

unitary

structure. Pronounced and

growing

differ-

ences

separate Egypt's

23 union federations-differences in size and

heterogene-

ity,

in

industrial,

white collar or

agricultural

membership,

and in

public,private

or

foreignemployers. Such inter-federation ivalriesare aggravatedby the govern-

ment's

arbitrary

determinationand

frequent

reclassification

of

the

occupational

categories

within each

organization's

urisdiction.

The

number,size,

and

compo-

sition

of federations

commonly

are

reshuffled

by

bureaucratic iat in

order to

promote or inhibit

the fortunes of

particular

union leaders.

Although Confedera-

tion leaders

argue

that the establishmentof a

single peak

association ended the

historical

fragmentation

of the

Egyptian

labor

movement,

there

are

growing

doubts

within

many

affiliates

hat

the interests of all

workers

can

be

served

any

longerby one association,especiallyone whose shapeand characterare molded

more from

above than from below.

Third, relations between the summit and

base of the

union movement

have

become

increasingly

strained

by

the

self-perpetuating

nature of

the

current

leadership

and

by

the

widespread

interventionof the

police

in

union elections.

Candidates

excluded

from

union office

by government

objection

are

overwhelm-

ingly young,

active

in

local union

committees,

and

connected with

one of the

opposition

parties.

Confederation eaders

realize that their

ability

to

contain abor

unrest

is

seriouslyjeopardized

when

unionelections lose theircredibilitydue to

open government

interference.

They

have

tried

to

persuade

the

government to

stop nullifying

unacceptable

candidates

and

instead to

invest

greaterresources

in

the

socialization

of

a

younger generation

of

responsible

union officialsin the

Confederation's

newly

established

Workers'

University.

In the

meantime, how-

ever,

workers

in

many enterprises

are

supporting

a

dualistic system

of union

representation

n

which informal

groups arise and

coexist alongside of official

union

structures.

The

importance

and

organizational

trengthof such

extra-legal

groups

is evident in

many wildcat

strikes

and

especially in factory

occupations

duringwhich workersoccasionally implementobviouslywell-planned chemes to

continue

and

even

increase

production

while

regular

union

officialsare barred

from

entering

the

worksites

along

with

the

plantmanagers.19

Fourth, several

Confederation eaders

who belong to the ruling

National

Democratic

Party

(NDP)

are

openly

expressing

dissatisfaction with what they

perceive

as the

party's

increasing favoritism

toward private business

interests

over the

interests

of

organized

labor.

Many unionists

are members of the

government

party by

default

more

than

by design. They

are routinely

enrolled by

19.

Ittihad

al-Ummal Ya'tarid

ala Ard

Murashshahi

l-Niqabat

ala

al-Muda'i

al-Amm al-

Ishtiraki

(The

Labor Confederation

Objects to

Submission

of

Union

Candidates

o

the Socialist

Prosecutors),

al-Shaab(June

6, 1983).

442

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

16/17

NDP

officials

who

did not bother to

inquire

into their real

partisanpreferences.

Many Confederation

eaders

hope

that

the

government

eventually

will

permit

the

establishmentof

a

separate

Labor

Party

in which

unionists will be the

dominant

force.

In the

absence

of

such

permission

most of them

prudently

choose

to

remain

in the NDP to avoid

the embarrassmentand

possible

retaliation that would

accompany

an

open

break with the

government

party.

In the months

preceding

the

1984

parliamentary lections,

however,

some of the most

powerful

federation

presidents

resigned

from

the

NDP, protesting

he

second-rate

positions

that

were

offered to union leaders

by

the

party's

slatemakers.These

defectors

included

the

head

of

the

engineering,

metal,

and

electrical workers'

federation,representing

about

100,000

public

sector

manufacturing

workers,

as well

as

the

head of

the

construction

workers'

federation,

Egypt's largest union,

claiming

over

400,000

members,

primarily

n the

fast

growing private

sector.20

Fifth, three of the majoroppositionpartiesalreadyhave demonstrated heir

ability

to

draw

supportaway

fromthe

NDP,

both

amongtop

level

union

leaders

and

among

voters in

working

class

constituencies. The New

Wafd,

for

example,

has

no

members n the labor

confederation's

executive

committee, yet

during

he

1984

elections

its candidates

ran

extremely

well in

manyworkingclass districts

such as

SayyidaZaynab(33

per

cent of all

votes

cast),

Imbaba

35 per cent),

Bab

al-Sharqi 30 per

cent),

Mahalla

al-Kubra

29 per

cent),

and Kafr

al-Dawwar

(25

per

cent).

The

Socialist

Action

Party

(Hizb

al-Amal

al-Ishtiraki)

eceived a share

of the vote thatwas morethantwice its nationalaverage n Damietta(17per cent)

and Kafr al-Dawwar

(14

per cent). Among

the

opposition parties the

Socialist

Action

Party has

the most

extensive

overlapbetween its

current

leadershipand

the

leadership

of the

union movement. Hilmi

Muradand

Abd

al-Mughni

Said both

were

directors

of

the

Workers'Cultural nstitute

during he 1960s;

HamidZaydan,

former editor of the

party newspaper

(al-Shaab),

was

the

editor of the labor

confederation's

newspaper

(al-'Ummal) during

the

early 1970s. Party

members

include

presidents

and

vice-presidents

of three

major

unions-the construction,

defense, and printingfederations. Finally, the leftist Hizb al-Tajammu'enjoys

strong pockets of

support

in

Hilwan

and

Aswan

and in

particularorganizations

such

as the

commercial,

metal,

and

petroleum

workers'

federations.21

The

overall

political implications

of these

recent developments in

the labor

movement are

not

encouraging or

Egypt's

current rulers. If one

examines the

relationship

n

eachprovince between

the strengthof the

union

movementand the

degree

of

electoral

support for

the

governing party,

there are

clear signs of

deteriorationbetween 1976

and

1984. In

both elections

provincial

evels of union

20.

Said

Juma

Yastaqil

min Hizb

al-Hukuma

Said Jumaa

Resigns from the

Government

Party), al-Ahali

(May 18,

1983);

and

al-Haj

Muhammad

Ahmad

Umar:

'Istaqaltu

min

al-Hizb

al-Watani'

(al-Haji

Muhammad

Ahmad

Umar: I

resigned from the

National

Party ),

al-Shaab

(May 1,

1984).

21.

Final

results of the 1984

elections

appeared n

al-Ahram

June1,

1984).

443

8/11/2019 4327366Bianchi.pdf

17/17

membership

are

negatively

correlated with

support

for the

semi-official

party;

moreover,

the

strength

of the

negative

relationshipappears

to

be

increasing

with

time

and with further advances in

unionization

(r

= -.442

in

1976 and -.652 in

1984).

A

clearlycontrasting

pattern

appears,

however, regarding

he

agricultural

cooperative

movement. In this

instance,

a mild

negative

correlation

between

cooperative membershipand supportfor the governmentin 1976 (r = -.210)

becomes

a

very strong positive

correlation

by

1984

(r

=

.788).22

These

findings suggest

a

growing polarization

between

rural

middle class

constituencies

that

have

benefited

rom

the

regime's

economic

policies

and

urban

working class

constituencies

that

have not.

However,

these

findings

also

suggest

that

the

government's

pursuit

of different

associational

policies

toward the

union

and

cooperative

movements

may

have

contributed to

divergent political

out-

comes.

Shortly

before

the

1976

elections Sadat

imposedmajor

reorganizations

n

boththe labor unionsand the agriculturalooperativesbecausehe fearedthat the

largest

corporatist

occupational

associations

inherited

rom the

Nasserist

period

might

be used

by

his

opponents

to mobilize

voters

against

him.

But Sadat did

not

employ

the

same

strategy

oward he

two

groups.

In the

case

of

the

morepowerful

and

cohesive

labor

movement,

he

strenthened

the

Confederation,

coopted its

leaders,

and

expanded

their roles in

economic

policy-making.

In

the case of

the

weaker and

dispersed

cooperatives,

he

abolished

the

Confederation,

encouraged

local elites

to oust

centrallyappointed

directors,

and

establisheda

new set of

rural

associations (the village banks ) that channelled public resources to local

supportersof

the

regime.

Thus

one reason that

Mubarakhas

enjoyed such

strong

endorsement

rom the

countryside

is that Sadat

moved

swiftly

to

emasculate the

agricultural

oopera-

tives andputthem

underthe

control of

groupsthat

wereopposed to

many of

their

original

purposes.

Alternatively,

one

reason that

Mubarak

has

had so much

difficulty

with the

labor

movement

(and

is

nearly

certain to have

more

in the

future)

is that

Sadat

substantially

enhanced the

power and

resources of

the top

union

leadership,thereby

allowing

them

to

bargain

moreeffectively

with a weak

president.

22. Data

on

membership

n

unions

and

cooperativeswere obtained

romannualreports

of the

Ministry

of

Manpower

and

Professional

Trainingandthe

GeneralAgencyfor

Agricultural

Coopera-

tives.

444