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Royal Institute of Philosophy

Plato: Theaetetus by John McDowellReview by: J. D. G. EvansPhilosophy, Vol. 49, No. 189 (Jul., 1974), pp. 328-330Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy

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2(C). In this perspectivet also appears o be wrong o state: Epipheno-menalism. . collapses.. either nto a kind of Dualism, or into a kind ofBehaviourism'p. I05). For to saythat t s a sufficientondition f myhavingsuchandsuch Cartesian houghtshatmycentral ervous ystem hould tandthus nd thus,while nsistinghat hese houghtsre and can be only ttributesof the physical rganism hich am, s, surely, sortof Epiphenomenalism.Quite ertainlyt precludes othDualism nd Behaviourism.

3. Two scholarly oints.First, propos ome remarks y J. J. C. Smart,Teichman ays: Gosse's theory ssertswithout iving rounds hat hings re

not s they eem' p. 86). This isunfair.t suggests hat he-like many thers,including yernhis recentGiffords-is elying n secondary r eventertiarysources. or Gosse,of course, ppealed o whathe and mostof hiscontem-poraries ook to be documents f revelation. ut Gosse saw clearly hat hespecial reation f anything ust nvolve he productionf some traces' f apast whichthe objectsthus createdhad not had-hence the titleOmphalos(Navel). Contemporariesho almost ll accepted he specialcreation f bio-logical pecieshad no business o ridicule man who clearly nd honestlyproclaimedhenecessaryonsequences f such doctrines.

Second,Teichman emarks:no one n his senseswould ffirmhat man's

life ould urvive isdeath;butmanyhave believed hat he Soul can survivedeath' p. 25). Yet did notPlato nhis great et piece rgumentor he mmor-tality fthesoul as theFormof Lifemaintain omethingery ikewhat noone in his senses wouldaffirm'? eichman arlier eferredo thisargument(Phaedo 05C-Io7A), concluding:In any event t is clearthat here s somesort f connectionetweenhe deaofSoulandthe dea of ife' p. 22). Indeedtheres. It is, therefore,egrettablehat he saysnothing f such etymologicallinks s thosebetweenOvXynd c'pbvXosg,nima and animatus, inkswhichwe have to notice f we are to understandhismisguidedutmost mportantpassage.

4. There s a deal of good stuffn thisbook ncisivelyut,especially boutBehavariourismnd Materialism. o doubtmany studentsfphilosophy hohave beenstudyinghesubject or year r so' willfindmuchprofitnwhatthedust-jacketlso calls an introduction ith eeth n it'. Whata pity hatno onetook hat ittle xtra rouble o make t a so muchbetterntroduction.

Antonylew

Plato: TheaetetusTranslatedwithNotesby JohnMcDowellOxford: he Clarendon ress, 973, 264 pp-,?5.??. aperback i.go

This sthefirst ork oappear n theClarendonlatoSeries,which sevidentlyto followhe patternf ts excellentibling heAristotleeries.The aim s toprovideranslationshichwillmake he ourse fthe rgumentlear o Greek-less philosophers, ithnoteswhich xamine roblems f interpretationullywith he ame udiencen mind.JohnMcDowell'sTheaetetusugurswellfor heSeries.

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The Theaetetusxamines ndrejects hree roposed efinitionsfknowledge.McDowell'sgeneral pproach othework utshimfirmlyn the ampofthosewho findrich epistemologicalnterestn the detailed poretic exture f thediscussions espite heir egativeutcome. e carefullyotes he ontinuitiesfinterestsnd arguments etween he Theaetetusnd workswritten y Platobeforend aftert. But he is unimpressedy thetype f argument hich eesthetheoryfForms, or xample, s providing suggestionor he resolutionof heTheaetetusifficulties.

It might e felt, hough, hat n concentratingn epistemologicalonsidera-

tionshisperspectiveuffersromomedistortion.hus he relies eavily,nhisnotes boutthe nconclusivexaminationf falsebelief, n the distinctionet-weenknowledge y acquaintance nd knowledge f propositionsconnaitre,savoir,ee especially p. i96-i97). But t is notclear n howmuch gnoranceperson anbe about thing ndyetknow t. McDowellmentionsp. 204), butmakes eryittle f,the ntentionalityhich an arisehere: equally nemightuse the approach uggested y Aristotle's istinctionetween ssential ndaccidentalttributes. hat s more mportantor tudentsf Plato s that heSophistmakes n advanceon the Theaetetus hichMcDowell only partiallyrecognizes. e notes hat heSophist's nalysis f entencesnto subject nd a

predicate lement s a decisivemprovementn the Theaetetus'endency oregardhem s lists fnames pp. 235-236, 49). Equally heprecedingnalysisof hemixingfkinds,whichhows dentity-sentenceso be of ubject-predicateform,ndermineshe Theaetetus'abit f treatingll errors misidentification.Thusdespite henon-epistemologicalharacterf thediscussionn theSophistoftheproblem fthinking hat s not, he laterworkhas more o contributeto the resolutionf the difficultiesf the earlier ne than McDowell allows(p. 226).

The longest ection f theTheaetetuss the developmentnd examinationfan account fperception hichs designed o providehe bestdefence fthe

claim hat erceptionsknowledge. cDowell hinks hatmuch f he heoryfperceptionanbe regarded s Platonic: he dentificationithknowledgeailsbecause,throughn assimilation f knowledge f natures o propositionalknowledge,nowledges notofobjectsnthe same impleway s perceptions(see especially p. i i8, I92-I93). This accommodatingiewof theperceptiontheoryeadshim ominimizehemore aradoxicalspects f t-the fragmenta-tionof persisting bjects ntoobject-stagesthe accountof thismatter npp. 123-128,heavily elied pon n what ollows,eems ver-elaborate)nd thelessemphasizedragmentationfpersonsntoperson-stages.et these eatures,

togetherith heearlier elativizationftruth

y persons,re essential o the

thesis hat very erceptions true.Without hem hethesiswouldfounderntheapplicationftheprinciple fnon-contradictiono combinationsfper-ceptions. he naturalnferences that he ccount fperceptions a reductiodabsurdum,atherhan fragmentf complete pistemologicalheory.

McDowell's translations clearand accurate; ndhis notes lwaysprovideusefulhelp. Particularlyotable re his handling f theGreekverb to be',which eeds mplicitompletionya predicaten most f tsoccurrencesntheTheaetetus,nd his appraisal f theperitropicrgumentgainst elative ruth(p. I71). Moreover hevery andourwhichhe displaysnindicatinghe cross-

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connexions etween isvarious iscussionsannot utbe appreciated yonewho finds ifficultiesn some of them.

J. D. G. Evans

Essays on Freedom of ActionEditedby Ted HonderichLondon:Routledge Kegan Paul,1973,Viii+ 2I5 pp., ?3.00

Unlikemany uchcollections,veryrticlen thisvolumewillbe of nterestothose oncerned ith he opic ndicatedn ts itle. onaldDavidson'Freedomto Act') disposes, o mymindconvincingly,f Austin's bjectionso Moore'sanalysis f A couldhavedoneotherwise',ndofthese s a source fobjectionstocausal heoriesfactionngeneral. avidson bjects o this nalysisnothergrounds: hatno analysis f can' or could' or free o' mayrefero anotheractionsuchas choosing r deciding o orwilling o) as the causalantecedentof theaction oncerned,incethiswouldrequire nother ccount f howtheagentsfree o do the ction o referredo. Any atisfactorynalysis ouldhave

to refer ocauseswhich renotsubject o thisobjection,uchas thewants rbeliefs fthe gent; utthedifficultiesnthewayof ny uch nalysisremademanifest.evertheless,ailureo find uchananalysis oes not how hat ree-dom oact s not causalpower f he gent. o show hiswouldbeonewayofattackingheviewthat ctions re notcaused;another ouldbe to showthatfreedoms nconsistentith he ssumptionhat ctions recausally etermined.The latter avidsonbrushes side: Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Moore,Schlick,Ayer, tevenson' avedone ll that anor needbedone o remove he onfusionlying ehind his ttack. ll the ame, nthisvolumeDavidWigginsndTedHondericheek o renewt, ndAnthony enny nd D. C. Dennett orepel t.

Everyone ould gree hat man s responsiblerfree nlyfhe could ome-timesdo otherwisehanhe doesdo. Wiggins'Towardsa Reasonable iber-tarianism')rgues or he ibertarianhesis hat t is a necessaryonditionfthisbeing hecasethat here reatleast omemovementsractions rmentaleventswhich,whetherrnot they ompletelyetermineheir mmediateuc-cessors, re notthemselvesntirelyeterminedysomepredecessor.f deter-minisms true-if there re no suchmovements,ctions rmental vents-thendeliberationtselfmust nvolve omekind f llusion';Wigginshinkshat'all sorts fthingsn our social, udicial nd penal nstitutions,ndall sorts fthingsn ourrelations ithhuman eings' re based on thesuppositionhatmen andootherwisehan hey odo'; andthat o notionfresponsibilityhichdoesnotrecognizehiswill llow orwhatmen tpresenteel yway fremorseat theirwn ctions rbyway f nger t those fothers'. canfind oargumentinWiggins' aper o show hat hese ncompatibilitiesxistwhich ne canmeethead-on; ndwhile t wouldbe foolhardyodeny hatibertariandeasormysti-fications ay ie behind he workingsf someofour nstitutions,articularlyperhapsntheirmore avage spects, great ealmorewouldneedtobe saidtoshowthatthey re presupposed y refinedommon ense n suchmatters.Honderich 'One Determinism')lso claims hat denialof determinismat

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