37

Szymon Ananicz

The SulTanS of SwingTurkey’S STAnce on inTegrATion wiTh The europeAn union

NUMBER 37WARSAWNOVEMBER 2013

The SulTanS of SwingTURkEy’S STANcE ON iNTEgRATiON WiTh ThE EUROpEAN UNiON

Szymon Ananicz

© copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

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Contents

kEy pOiNTS /5

iNTRODUcTiON /7

I. The AKP’s ATTiTude To TurKey’s eu inTegrATion /9

1. The AKP’s pro-european face /92. The AKP’s anti-european face /113. The AKP: a european-islamic-Kemalist mix /13

II. The insTrumenTAlism of AnKArA’s relATions wiTh The eu /18

1. europe as an instrument of political struggle /182. economic cooperation with the eu as a source

of economic growth /223. europe as a partner on the international stage /28

III. The PubliC PerCePTion of TurKey’s inTegrATion wiTh The eu /31

1. The cause of europe’s image problem /332. A rise in conservatism as a factor distancing Turkey from europe? /35

summAry The PerCePTion of euroPe And The fuTure of TurKey’s euroPeAn PoliCy /39

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Key points

• Despiteariseinanti-EUrhetoricandagrowingassertivenessinAnkara’s relationswithBrussels,Turkeywill continue toseekcloserintegrationwiththeEuropeanUnioninthecomingyears.ThecurrentstalemateintheaccessionprocesshasbeenasourceofirritationtoRecepTayyipErdoğan’sgovernment.Nonetheless,acompletecollapseofaccession talkswouldbeamuchworse scenario for the rulingAKPparty.Currently,thegovernmentisprimarilyinterestedinkeepingthenego-tiationprocessalive,ratherthanhopingtogainfullmember-shipanytimesoon.

• Erdoğan’sgovernmentwilllikelyseektocontinuetheacces-sion talksbecause theAKP is acutely aware of their impor-tanceforthecountry’sdomesticpolitics,foritseconomy,and–althoughtoalesserextent–forTurkey’sinternationalstand-ing.Theopportunitytocapitaliseonthisprocesswillencour-age the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relationswiththeEU,ortoatleastmitigatetheimpactofanypotentialdiplomaticfallouts.

• Currently, the European Union does not have the power toconsiderablyspeedupreformsinTurkey.Nonetheless,intheeventofaseriousbreachofdemocraticvalues,BrusselswouldbecapableofdelegitimisingtheAKPonTurkey’sdomesticpo-liticalscene.Infact,thisthreathasbeeninstrumentalinkeep-ing the authoritarian tendencies of the current governmentincheck.TheAKP isconcernedthat interventionbytheEUcouldseriouslyjeopardiseitsstandingonthedomesticscene(despiteadropinsupportforEUaccession,theattractivenessof the EU among the Turkish people remains considerable),anditcouldseriouslyharmTurkey’sinternationalprestige.

• ThebiggestthreattothefutureoftheaccessionprocessisnotsomuchthattheAKPcouldturnawayfromEuropeandthe

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EU,butratherthattheEUanditsmemberstatecoulddelegiti-misetheTurkishgovernment.Forexample,thiscouldbedonebyradicallychallengingthecredibilityoftheAKPasademo-craticpoliticalforce.SuchamovebyBrusselscouldcomeinresponsetogrowingauthoritarianisminAnkaraorasages-turetopleasetheelectorateofsomeEUmemberstateswhichisscepticalaboutTurkey’saccessiontotheEU.

• The AKP’s world view amalgamates both European valuessuchasdemocracy,humanrightsandthemarketeconomy,aswellasMuslimvaluesandthetraditionsoftheKemalistre-public.ThegovernmentdoesnotlookatIslamictraditionsasa sourceof inspirationonhow toorganise the state, societyandeconomy.Inthisrespect,Europeannormsandrepublican--Kemalist traditions are far more important. Contrary topopularopinion, theEuropeanisationofTurkey isnotbeingthreatenedbythecountry’sMuslimtraditions,butratherbythecontinuedinfluenceofKemalistrepublicanism.

• Europe’sdrasticallyworseningimageamongtheTurkishpeo-ple poses a growing challenge for the future of EU-Turkishrelations.Thecausesofthistrendappeartoberelativelyen-during,andsothereisadangerofthepoorimageofEuropeingrainingitselfamongTurkishsociety.Inthelongrun,thiscouldseriouslyhinderpolitical cooperationbetweenTurkeyandtheEU.

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introduction

In recent years,Westernmedia reports onTurkeyhave shownsignsofapossibleshiftinthewayTurkeyperceivesitsrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion.Themanifestationsofthischangein-cludeaslowdownintheimplementationofreformsaligningTur-keywithEUstandardsandthegrowingauthoritarianismoftheTurkishgovernment.InadditionthereisatendencytoemphasiseTurkey’sOttomanandIslamicheritage,whichaccordingtosomeobserversfrombothEuropeandTurkey,hasbeengraduallyiso-latingthecountryfromEurope.ThechangeinAnkara’sforeignpolicycouldwellbeanothersymptomofthisshift.Inrecentyears,theAKPgovernment’s rhetoric about theEUhasbeen increas-inglynegative, and theirpolicy towardsBrussels and the indi-vidualEUmemberstateshasbecomeevermoreassertive.Atthesametime,Turkey’srelationswiththeIslamicworldhaveshownmuchmoredynamismthanitsrelationswithEurope.Moreover,Ankara’spolicytowardsIran,Israel,Palestine,Syria,Libya,andrecentlyalsotowardsEgypthassignificantlydivergedfromthepositionadoptedbyexistingEUmembersandbyBrussels.Inthisview,Turkeywould joinagroupofthesocalled“swingstates”:risingregionalpowerswithchanginggeopoliticalorientations,who challenge some elements of the world order establishedbytheWest.1

ThispaintsapictureofTurkeyasacountrythathasabandonedthe plan championed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to transformtheTurkishstateandsocietyonthebasisoftheEuropeanmodel.It also showsTurkey as a country thathas abandoned its plansfor integrationwith Europe. In this view, both objectives havebeenreplacedbyadevelopmentplanbasedonTurkey’sownpath,

1 More on the concept of “swing states” in:DanielM.Kliman andRichardFontaine,GlobalSwingStatesBrazil,India,Indonesia,TurkeyandtheFu-tureofInternationalOrder,GMF,CentreforNewAmericanSecurity,2012,http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1353953219CNAS_GlobalSwingStates_KlimanFontaine.pdf

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whichinvolvescooperationwithavarietyofinternationalpart-ners,amongwhomEuropenolongerenjoysaprivilegedposition.Similarly, it appears that European standards should yield toamoreorlessupdatedOttomanlegacy,orbeentirelysubordinat-edtothead hoc politicaltacticsoftherulingparty–tacticswhichcompletelyrejectdiktatsfromBrussels.

Suchaconclusionraisesobviousconcernsaboutthefuturerela-tionshipbetweenEuropeandoneofitsmostimportantpartners,which(fornowatleast)continuestoactivelyseekfullmember-shipoftheEuropeanUnion.Itnotonlycallsintoquestionwheth-erthereisanypointinfurtheraccessiontalks,butalsosuggeststhatTurkeymightbeturningintoageopoliticalrivalfortheEU.GiventhelackofaviableoppositionforceontheTurkishpoliti-calscenecapableofdislodgingtheAKP,thereislittlechancethatcurrentpolicytowardstheEUwillchangesoon.

Thispaper argues that these fears are grossly exaggerated.De-spite visible shifts in Turkey’s rhetoric, domestic and foreignpolicy, coupledwith geopolitical changes across the region andwithintheEuropeanUnionitself,overthenextfewyearsatleasttheEuropeanUnionislikelytoretainitspositionasAnkara’skeypartner.MeanwhileTurkey is likely to seekgreater integrationwiththeEU,anditwilldoitsbesttopreventcrisesinbilateralre-lations,oratleasttomitigatetheirimpactshouldsuchdiplomaticfalloutsoccur.

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i. the AKp’s Attitude to turKey’s eu integrAtion

Overthepastdecade,Turkey’spoliticalscenehasbeendominatedby the Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP),which has playedakeyroleinshapingTurkey’sforeignpolicy,obviouslyincludingitspolicytowardstheEuropeanUnion. It is likelythatoverthenext severalyears theAKPwill retain itsdominantposition inTurkey’spoliticalarena.Therefore,thispaperwillnotanalysetheviewsonEUintegrationheldbyotherpoliticalactors,andwillin-steadfocusontheAKP.

IdentifyingtheAKP’sattitudetotheEuropeanUnionisadifficulttask,duetothemanycontradictionsinboththeparty’srhetoricandinitsdomesticandforeignpolicies.Ontheonehand,someofitsstatementsandactionsmightsuggestthatTurkeyseestheEUasanimportantinternationalpartner–perhapsevenitsprinci-palone–andakeysourceofinspirationforitsinternalreforms.Otherstatements,however,suggesttheopposite:asenseofalien-ationfromtheEU,andwidespreaddisapprovalofEUpoliciesandofitsoverallsocio-economicmodel.

1. The AKP’s pro-European face

InalloftheAKP’selectionmanifestos(from2002,2007and20112),itsmostimportantpolicydocumentsandinthenumerouspub-licappearancesofAKPparty leaders,EUmembershiphasbeendefinedasTurkey’sstrategicgoal,andasanimportantconditionofthecountry’spolitical,socialandeconomicmodernisation.Ac-cordingtotheAKP’skeypolicydocumentadoptedin2012,thepro-EUorientationistoremaintheparty’spriorityforatleastadec-ade,until2023.3ItspoliticalcommitmenttoEuropeanintegration

2 SeeAKPelectionmanifestosfor2002,2007,2011parliamentaryelections.Availableathttp://www.tbmm.gov.trandhttp://www.akparti.org.tr

3 Source:PoliticalvisionofAKParty,2023.Politics,SocietyandtheWorld.

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alsomanifestsitselfinTurkey’sdiplomacy.Fortenyears,AnkarahaspainstakinglytriedtopersuadetheEUtoaccelerateaccessionnegotiations. Initially these efforts were made, despite opposi-tionfromasubstantialpartofitselectorate.4Toachievethisgoal,Ankara was prepared to take controvertial steps, for examplewhenthegovernmentchosetobacktheAnnanPlanforCyprus.ItmaintaineditscommitmenttoEUmembershipdespitetheEU’suncompromisingpositioninnegotiations,whichboththeTurkishpeopleandthegovernmentoftensawashumiliatingandunjust.Thissubsequentlyraisedtheriskofaccusationsthatthegovern-mentwastoodocileindealingwithBrussels.ButAnkaradidnotgiveupitsEUambitions,evenwhensomeEUmemberstatesbe-ganquestioningTurkey’sEuropeanstatus.

The AKP’s dedication to the cause of Europeanisationwas alsovisible in the scopeof internal reformsundertakenby thegov-ernment of PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,which havewithout a doubt brought Turkey closer to the EuropeanmodelduringtheelevenyearsAKPhasbeeninpowersince2002.Dur-ingthistime,thearmy’sinfluenceonthecountry’spolitical lifewascurbeddramatically.Consideringthattherehadpreviouslybeenno civilian control over themilitary, andmilitary leaderswerethedominantactorsonTurkey’spoliticalscene,thechangesintroducedbytheAKPcouldbedescribedasrevolutionary.Thegovernmentalsotookmeasurestoimprovethesituationofreli-giousandethnicminoritiesinthecountry(especiallytheKurds)andimprovedTurkey’shumanrightsrecord.Significantreformswere implemented in the judicial system and public adminis-tration. Progresswas alsomade inmost areas of the EUacquis

http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/akparti2023siyasivizyonu-ingilizce.pdf

4 WhentheAKPwonitsfirstelections,supportforEUmembershipamongitselectoratereached52%,makingtheAKPvotersoneofthemostEuroscepticelectorates in the2002elections.AliÇarkoğlu, ‘Whowants fullEUmem-bership?’inA.Çarkoğlu,B.Rubbin(eds.),TurkeyandtheEuropeanUnion:domesticpolitics,economicintegrationandinternationaldynamics,Cass,London,2004,p.174.

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coveredinaccessiontalks,evenaftersomenegotiationchapterswereblocked, including those relating to the freemovement ofgoods,financialservicesandagriculture.Thepartyleadership’sdeclarationthatTurkeywouldalignitslegislationwiththestand-ardsenshrined in theacquis communautaire even if thecountrywasrefusedEUmembershipcouldindicatethattheAKPseestheEuropeanstatemodelandEuropeanvaluesatleastasanimpor-tantsourceofinspiration.

2. The AKP’s anti-European face

AlongsidethemanyargumentsthatmightindicatethattheAKPiscommittedtoEuropeanvaluesandtotheintegrationprocess,therearealsoanumberofreasonswhythisconclusionmightbemisleading.

They include the growing assertiveness of Ankara’s policy to-wardstheEU,andevenagrowingtendencytocriticisetheEUforthefollowingreasons:

• thewayinwhichittreatsTurkey(blockingtheaccessionpro-cess,toleratingthePKK’spresenceintheEU),

• the lack of consistency in adhering to its own values (forexample,byimplicitlysupportingamilitarycoupinEgypt),

• itspolicytowardstheIslamicworld(withaccompanyingsus-picionsof‘Islamophobia’5),

5 TheTurkishgovernment,aswellassomemediaandnon-governmentalor-ganisations,havebeenactivelypromotingtheviewthatthereisrisingIs-lamophobiaintheWest,andespeciallyinEurope.Aspartofthecampaign,itspromotershaveorganisednumerousconferencesandseminars,andis-suedpublicationsonthetopic.CasesofintolerancetowardsIslaminEuropeare reported inTurkishmedia very frequently. It appears that this cam-paignhasbeen instrumental inconvincingTurkishpublicopinionof theintoleranceoftheEuropeanpeople,andofthegrowingcivilisationaldividebetweenEuropeandtheIslamicworld.

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• ineffectiveeconomicpolicies(whichcausedtherecentfinan-cialcrisis).

Overthepastfewyears,thepaceofimplementingthereformsre-quiredforEUmembershiphasbeenslowingdowninTurkey.

Ankara’sneglectofpoliticalrelationswiththeEU,however,areindirectcontrasttothedynamicdevelopmentofitsrelationswiththeMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)thatbeganinthemid-dleofthelastdecade.Inaddition,Ankarahasestablishedgoodre-lationswithHamas,blacklistedbytheEUasaterroristorganisa-tion.IthasalsomaintainedfriendlyrelationswithIranandSyria(beforetheoutbreakofthelatter’scivilwarin2011).MorerecentlyAnkarahasoffereditssupporttotheMuslimBrotherhood,whichtheEUanditsmemberstateshavebeenviewingwithsuspicion.Furthermore,initsforeignpolicy,theAKPhasbeenincreasinglydrawingonTurkey’sOttomanandIslamiclegacies.

Onthedomestic front, theAKP’s thirdtermingovernmenthasbeenmarkedbygrowingauthoritarianism.Thishasbeendem-onstratedbythecivilcrisis followingtheGeziParkprotests,aswellasbyrestrictingthepressfreedom.6ThismightsuggestthatErdoğan’spartyhasbeenincreasinglyignoringthenormsoflib-eraldemocracypromotedby theEU,and that thegovernment’sofficialpro-integrationstanceisbeingtreatedmerelyinstrumen-tally and does not stem from a genuine feeling of belonging toaEuropeancommunityofvalues.Tosome,thesesuspicionsarefurther strengthenedby thepolitical lineageof theAKP. In the1990s, themost prominentmembers of theAKP leadership be-longedtotheIslamistmovementMillîGörüş(‘NationalView’)andtheWelfareParty,whichformedagovernmentbetween1996and

6 TheproblemswithpressfreedominTurkeydonotstemsomuchfromdi-rectgovernmentpressureonpublishersasfromthefact thatmostmediacompaniesinthecountryareownedbycorporationswhichalsooperateinotherareas,suchasconstruction.Thesecorporationsbidforlargestatecon-tracts,andinordertowinthem,theytendtoapplyself-censorship.

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1997undertheleadershipofPrimeMinisterNecmettinErbakan.ErbakantriedtobreakthetraditionofforeignpolicybasedonanalliancewiththeWest,whichinhisopinionbelongedtoadiffer-entcivilisationalsphere.Instead,heurgedclosertieswiththeIs-lamicworld.In1997,Erbakan’scabinetresignedunderpressurefromthemilitary,whichbelievedthattheruleoftheIslamistgov-ernmentposedathreattoTurkey’ssecularism.Soonafter,severalmembersofthedisbandedparty,includingthecurrentpresident,primeministeranddeputyprimeminister,broketheirlinkswiththeirformercolleagues,andin2001establishedanewparty,theAKP,whichsupportedTurkey’sintegrationwiththeEU.TomanyobserversitremainsunclearwhetherthismovewasmotivatedbyatruecommitmenttoEuropeanvalues,orwhetherthepoliticiansinquestionsimplywantedtoensurethattheydidnotsharethefateofErbakan’sgovernment.

3. The AKP: a European-Islamic-Kemalist mix

Takingtheaboveintoaccount, itwouldbeerroneoustoseetheAKPasauniquelyEuropeanforcethatfullysharesallthevaluesof theEuropeanUnion.Sucha conclusionwould fail toexplainAnkara’schoicetoactinawaythathasreduceditschancesofEUmembership,itsuseofrhetoricthathasworsenedTurkey’spoliti-calrelationswithBrusselsandcontinuestounderminetheEU’simageinTurkishsociety,whichreducesthelikelihoodofintegra-tionwiththeEUevenfurther.

Nonetheless, itwouldbe equally remiss todescribe theAKPasapartywhichsees Islamand theaccomplishmentsof theOtto-manEmpireasitsmainsourceofinspiration.ItwouldbewrongtoarguethattheAKP’ssupportforEUintegrationisjustacoverforthepursuitofan‘Islamicagenda’anditsundemocraticmeansofdealingwithpoliticalrivals.Sofar,theAKP’sreferencestoTur-key’sOttomanheritagehavebeensuperficialandratherinciden-tal;theycouldbeinterpretedasanaturalprocessofrediscoveringa forgottenpartofTurkey’shistoryandas anattempt to create

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anationalnarrativeunitingamulti-ethnicsocietyandcreatingasenseofprideamongtheTurkishpeople.

WithregardtoIslam,theAKP’spolicieshavefocusednotonim-posingtheIslamicmoralcodeonthewholesociety,butratheronabolishing the restrictions imposed by the Kemalist system onthereligiouspracticesofthemajorityofTurkey’sSunniMuslims.The attempts to impose Islamic norms on Turkish society haveso far been incidental: these have included partial restrictionson themarketingofalcohol,a subsequentlyabandonedattemptto criminalise adultery, and a political campaign against abor-tion (although under public pressure the government steppedback from introducing legal restrictions on it). However, thesecasesdonotamounttoacomprehensiveandconsistentpolicyofIslamisingpublic life. ItseemsthatforErdoğan’sparty,Muslimvaluesshouldguidethespirituallivesandthemoralcompassofindividualsrather than thepublic sphere. Ithas tobeadmittedthough,thattosomeextentIslamicvalueshaveinfluencedTur-key’sforeignpolicy,asmanifestedbyAnkara’sgrowinginvolve-ment in theaffairsof theMiddleEast.Nonetheless, the IslamicandOttomantraditionshavenotbeenparticularlyinfluentialintheAKP’seffortstodevelopanewsocio-politicalorinstitutionalmodelforTurkey.7

In addition, the view that Turkey’s EU integration agenda haspurely instrumental foundations fails to explainAnkara’s rela-tivelyconsistenteffortsatpoliticalandeconomicintegrationwith

7 TheinfluenceofIslamicideologyontheAKP’sdomesticpoliciescanbeseenin the government’s resistance to accepting the claims of the 10million-strongAleviminority,whoarecallingfortherecognitionoftheirbeliefsasaseparatereligionanddemandthesamerightsasthosegrantedtoSunniMuslims.Itseemsthatthegovernment’spositiononthismattermayreflectadominantdoctrine inTurkish Islam,whichstates that theAlevibeliefsarenotareligionbutheresy.However,itshouldbenotedthatinthispar-ticularcase,theAKPismoreguiltyoffailingtoimprovethesituationoftheAleviminorityratherthanofintroducingnew,discriminatoryregulations,becausethecurrentlegalstatusofAlevismwasestablishedbeforetheAKPcametopower.

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theEuropeanUnion.InitsimplementationoftheEUacquis,theAKPgovernmenthasgonemuch further thanwouldhavebeennecessarysimply toconceal itsalleged ‘Islamicagenda.’ If therewas a chance, theAKP governmentwouldmost likely agree toTurkey’sEUaccession,inthebeliefthatthiswouldfacilitatethepolitical,socialandeconomicmodernisationofthecountryandbuildbridgesbetweentheWestandtheIslamicworld.EUmem-bershipcouldalsobereconciledwiththetraditionalvaluesheldbyTurkishsociety;andbystrengtheningdemocraticprinciplesinthecountry,theAKPcouldincreasethepoweroftheconserva-tivemajority(i.e.itstraditionalelectorate).Itappearsthatastatemodel approximating – albeit not identicalwith –Western de-mocracies,which guarantees religious freedom but keeps stateandreligionseparate,isseenbytheAKPasoptimalforincreasingtheefficiencyofthecountryanditseconomy,aswellasbeingabletoretaintheIslamicvaluesoftheTurkishpeople.8

Ironically,theelementofAKP’sidentitywhichplaysamoreim-portantroleinshapingitsdomesticpoliciesthanIslamictradi-tionisitsKemalist-republicanheritage.Thisparticulartraditionassignsthestateavitalroleinthepolitical,socialandeconomicspheres, and gives it a dominant influence over social valuesand faithmatters. It allows restrictions on freedom of speechifthenationalinterestshouldrequireit,andpromotesTurkishnationalismandstrictcontroloverreligiouspractices.Accord-ingtothistradition,inpubliclife,theauthorityofthecountry’sleaderorthepartyhead,ishighlyvalued.Withtheexceptionofdirect elections, the generalpublic arepassive subjects rather

8 When askedwhy he decided to send his daughter to study in the UnitedStates,PrimeMinisterErdoğancitedAmerica’sreligiousfreedomastherea-son.AlthoughvariousmembersoftheTurkishgovernmenthaverepeatedlycalledfortheseparationofstateandreligion,theAKPhassofarrefusedtoclosedowntheDirectorateofReligiousAffairs(inheritedfromTurkey’sKe-malistera),whichembodiesthestate’scontroloverreligiouspracticesinthecountry.Atthesametime,itishardtoimagineasituationwheretheAKPwouldacceptaninverserelationshipbetweenreligionandstate, inwhichreligiousleaderswouldhaveformalauthorityoverpoliticallife.

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thanactiveactorsinthepoliticallifeoftheircountry.BeforetheAKP took power, the integral components of the Kemalist-re-publicantraditioninTurkeyincludedthecultofMustafaKemalAtatürk,thedominantroleofthearmyinpoliticallife,andthestronglyemphasisedsecularismofthestate.Regardingforeignpolicy, it called for the severing of tieswith the IslamicworldandintegrationwiththeWest,whichhoweverhadbeenregard-edwithsuspicion.

Sincecomingtopower,theAKP’smainpoliticalgoalhasbeentodismantlethepoliticalsystembasedonrepublicanandKemalistvalues.ThepartyhasbeenlargelysuccessfulinachievingthesegoalsinrelationtorootingoutthecultofAtatürk,reducingtheroleofthearmy,endingthepublicmarginalisationofIslamandputtinganendtoitsisolationfromtheMuslimworld.However,otheraspectsofthislegacy,suchaselementsofauthoritarianism,statismandnationalism, are clearlyvisible in theAKPgovern-ment’spolicies.

Itappears,then,thattheAKP’sworldviewincorporatesbothEu-ropeanvalues,suchasdemocracy,humanrightsandthemarketeconomy,aswellasMuslimvalues,and–consciouslyornot–theKemalist-republicanlegacy.ThesethreecomponentsoftheAKP’sworldviewvaryinhowtheyperceivetheimportanceofEuropeannormes,aswellasintermsofpracticalsolutionsforconstructinganewsocialandpoliticalorder inTurkey.Takentogether, theyadduptoaratherdiscordantimageofEurope.

Itseems,however,thatintheAKP’sworldviewtheroleofIslamictraditioninpoliticalandeconomiclifeshouldbelimited.Sofar,ithasfocusedonincreasingthereligiousrightsofthelocalSun-niMuslimsandonmaintainingthestatusofSunniIslamaboveotherbeliefsystemsandreligionsinthestate’slegalsystem.Withminor exceptions, the government has refrained from impos-ingIslamicnormsonsocietyasawhole.ThispartofitsheritagehasplayedacertainroleinguidingAnkara’spolicytowardsthe

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MiddleEast.ButoveralltheAKP’sIslamicrootshavehadlittleim-pactontheparty’spolicytowardstheEU.

It seems that thearchitectureofTurkey’s socio-political systemhasbeenfarmoreinfluencedbythecompetingEuropeanandKe-malist-republicantraditions.AlthoughthelatterdoesnotopposeTurkey’sintegrationwiththeEU,inpractice,however,itdoesdis-tanceTurkeyfromEuropebecauseofthewayinwhichthistradi-tionhasbeenshapingthecountry’sdomesticpolicy,e.g.bylegiti-misingauthoritarianismandstatism.

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ii. the instrumentAlism of AnKArA’s relAtions with the eu

AlthoughtheAKP’sworldvieworientationplaysasignificantroleinshapingitspolicies,theparty’spoliticalcalculationsaimedatconsolidatingpowerappearevenmoreimportant.Thesecalcula-tionsareconditionedprimarilybythecurrentsituationindomes-ticpolitics, in the economyand in the international arena.TheTurkishgovernment iswellaware that thechancesofbreakingthecurrentstalemateintheaccessionnegotiationsareminimal.Afterall,individualEUmembersremainopposedtoAnkara’sEUambitions,andrealprogressontheCyprusissueseemsunlikely.However,althoughtheprospectofimminentEUmembershipiscurrentlyabsent,thenegotiationsthemselvesarenotcompletelypointless.Fornowatleast,therealobjectiveofthetalksisnottofinalisethem,buttokeeptheveryprocessofnegotiationsalive.TheprocessitselfisbeingusedbytheTurkishgovernmentforpo-liticalends.ItislikelythatthefuturepositionofPrimeMinisterErdoğan’sgovernmentwithregardtoTurkey’saccessionnegotia-tionswilldependlessonitsideologicalpreferencesorthelikeli-hoodofquickaccessiontotheEU,andmoreontherolethepro-cesswillplayfortheAKP’spositiononTurkey’sdomesticpoliticalscene, thecountry’seconomicsituation,andfor itsplaceontheinternationalstage.

1. Europe as an instrument of political struggle

Since taking power, the AKP government has taken advantageofEUsupporttobothimplementreformsdismantlingtheexist-ingarchitectureoftheTurkishstateandtostaveoffattacksfromitspoliticalrivals.Fromtheverybeginning,Erdoğan’spartyhasbeensuspectedbytheopposition,thearmy,andbylargesegmentsofpublicopinionofseekingtoreplacetheKemalistsystemwithasystembasedonIslam,andofintendingtoreorientTurkey’sfor-eignpolicyawayfromtheWestandtowardstheMuslimworld.TheAKPhopedthatbysupportingTurkey’sintegrationwiththe

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EuropeanUnionandbylaunchingreformsaimedataligningTur-keywiththeEuropeanmodel,itwouldbeabletorefutetheseal-legations.TheEU’sfavourablereactiontoAnkara’spro-Europeanorientation increased the AKP’s credibility among the Turkishpeople.Oversubsequentyears,theacceptancetheAKPreceivedfromEuropeanstatesandfromtheEUhasplayedanimportantpartinlegitimisingthepartyontheTurkishpoliticalscene,andinconsolidatingandexpandingitselectorate.

Domestically,theAKP’spro-EUpolicyhasbeenmosteffectiveinreducingtheroleofthearmyinTurkishpolitics.Europe’ssupportforAnkarahas loweredtheriskofanothermilitarycoup,sincethearmyrealisedthatsuchamovewouldresultinthecountry’sisolationontheinternationalstage.Similarly,duetohighlevelsofpublicsupportforTurkey’sEUmembershipinthefirsthalfofthepreviousdecade,anyattemptstoremovetheAKPfrompow-erwouldhavemetwithconsiderablepublicresistance,notonlyfromtheAKP’selectoratebutalsofromtheliberalsandtheleft,whoseeEUaccessionasapriority.Europe’ssupportprovedcru-cialduringsuccessivebattlesfoughtbytheErdoğancampagainstthe army and the Kemalist establishment for primacy on Tur-key’spoliticalscene:first,whenittriedtoreducetheroleofthearmy-dominatedNationalSecurityCouncil9,thenwhenitsoughtAbdullahGül’spresidentialnominationin200710,whentheCon-stitutionalCourttriedtobanthepartyin200811,aswellaswhen

9 The National Security Council was a constitutional body controlled anddominatedbythearmy,whichheldformalandeffectivepowerstooverridethedecisionsofthestate’scivilinstitutions.TheNSCguaranteedtheprima-cyofthemilitaryinthecountry’spoliticallife.Itspowersweredrasticallyreducedby theAKPthroughaseriesof reformspreparingTurkey forEUmembership,includinga2011referendumonconstitutionalamendments.

10 Forfivemonthsin2007,theKemalistestablishment,particularlythearmy,blockedAbdullahGül’spresidentialnomination(atthetime,Turkishpresi-dentswereelectedbyparliament).Theoppositiontohisnominationreflect-edarealfearthathiselectionwouldthreatensthesecularcharacterofthestate.Thestandoffledtoaseriouspoliticalcrisisinthecountry.

11 In2008,theprosecutor’sofficefiledamotionwiththeConstitutionalCourttoclosedowntheAKPandimplementa5-yearbanonholdingpublicoffice

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theAKPthwartedtheErgenekongroup’sallegedattempttostageacoup d’état12,andfinally,duringtheintroductionofamendmentstotheconstitutionin2011.

TheAKP’s objective of aligning Turkeywith EU standardswashelpfulnotonlyinitsstruggletocurbarmyinfluence,butalsoinimplementingreformswhichotherwisewouldhaveencounteredstrongoppositionfrominterestgroupsandfromthepublic.Oneexampleof thiswas the reformof the judiciary,whichallowedtheAKPtoremovetheparty’smostardentopponentsfromsomeofthemostseniorpositionsinthecountry’scourts,theConstitu-tionalCourt,andtheprosecutor’soffice.Bycitingpoliticalpres-surefromBrussels,thegovernmentwasabletocarryoutreformswhichincreasedtherightsofreligiousandethnicminorities(es-peciallytheKurds,whosevotestheAKPwastryingtowin).Im-portantly,theneedtocomplywithEUstandardsmadeitpossibleforthegovernmenttoliftabanonwomen’sheadscarvesinpublicinstitutions.Morerecently,theAKPcitedtheexampleoftheNor-diccountriesandimposedrestrictionsonthesaleofalcohol.13

Furthermore,EUcandidatestatusincreasesTurkey’sbargainingpowerinnegotiationsonaseriesofimportantissues,suchastheabolitionofSchengenvisas,betterconditionsforTurkishcompa-niesoperating in theEU, and the inclusionofTurkish studentsinEUscholarshipprogrammes,amongstothers.Brussels’finan-cialsupportfortheimplementationoftheacquis communautaireinTurkey isanother significant incentive.Turkey is the largest

for71AKPmembers,includingtheprimeministerandthepresident.Themotionwasultimatelyrejected(byjustonevote).Thiswasthesecondmo-tion to close theAKPdown, following a similar attempt in 2002. Inbothcases,theEUurgedthecourtnottoclosethepartydown.

12 Ergenekonisanallegedsecretorganisationsetupbyhigh-rankingarmyof-ficers,politiciansandmembersofacademiaandthemedia,whichattempt-edtodestabilisethecountryandpavethewayforamilitarycoupaftertheAKPtookpowerin2002.

13 Infact,alcoholismratesinTurkeyaremuchlowerthanintheNordiccountries.

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beneficiaryofEUfundsamongtheEUcandidatecountries(An-karaistoreceivenearly€1billionin2013alone).

However,itappearsthatdomesticallythesignificanceofEUinte-grationasapoliticalinstrumenthasbeenwaningsincetheendofthelastdecade.Thishasbeencausedbyanumberoffactors.TheblockingoftheintegrationprocessbyCyprusandadropinsupportforTurkey’smembershipinsidetheEuropeanUnionhaveweakened the credibility of the AKP’s claims that its politicaldecisionsmustcontinuetoreflect theobjectiveofEUaccession.Flagging support for integration with the EU among the Turk-ishpublichashadasimilareffect.TheAKP’svictoryinitspowerstruggleagainstthearmyanditscontinuedleadovertheopposi-tionhavegiventheTurkishgovernmentmoreleewayindomesticpolitics,andmadeitlessreliantonsupportfromEurope.AmongthemanifestationsofEurope’sdwindlingsignificanceinTurkishpoliticshasbeentheAKP’sdecisionnottoseektheEU’sbackingduringthepeacetalkswiththeKurdswhichthegovernmentre-sumedattheendof2012.Othermanifestationsincludetheinten-sificationofauthoritarianismwithinthegovernmentandaslow-downintheimplementationofreformsaligningTurkeywithEUstandards,whichhasexposedAnkaratocriticismfromBrusselsandindividualEUmemberstates.

Nonetheless,claimingthattheEUnolongermattersfortheAKP’spositionontheTurkishpoliticalscenewouldbeanexaggeration.This became apparent, for example, during the political crisiswhichfollowedabrutalpolicecrackdownonaseriesofprotestsinthecountryinJune2013.14TheEUcondemnedtheAKP’sresponsetotheprotestsandthreatenedtochangeitsearlierdecisiontore-sumeaccession talkswithTurkey.This raised serious concernsamongErdoğan’sministersaboutthepublicreactiontoapossible

14 InMayandJune2013,Turkeysawaseriesoflarge-scaleprotestsagainsttheauthoritarianism of theAKP government. The protests startedwhen thepoliceviolentlybrokeupademonstrationagainsttheclosureofIstanbul’sGeziPark.

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crisisbetweenAnkaraandBrussels.Eventually,asaresultofAn-kara’sdiplomaticefforts,thenegotiationswereformallyresumed(althoughinfactthetalkswerepostponeduntilalaterdate).15Theprotestsandtheiraftermathhaveshownthatasignificantpartofthepopulationisstronglyopposedtoanyattemptsbythegovern-ment toabandondemocratic standards,and thatEurope is stillabletoseriouslythreatenthepositionoftheAKPbyunderminingitscredibilityasademocraticforce.

FromthepointofviewoftheTurkishgovernment,therefore,atpresenttheEU’ssupportisdesirablebutnotnecessarytoachieveits domestic policy objectives. In those instances where short-termpolitical interestsappeartobemoreimportant,Erdoğan’sgovernment is increasinglywilling to act on them, evenat theriskofopeningitselfuptocriticismfromBrussels.Nonetheless,AKPpoliticiansrealisethatalthoughthebenefitsofthecurrentEU integrationpolicy are limited, abandoning thenegotiationscouldproveverycostlyindeed,offeringlittleinreturn.ThiswilllikelyencouragetheAKPtocontinuetheprocessofintegrationwiththeEU.

2. Economic cooperation with the EU as a source of economic growth

TheTurkisheconomy isheavilydependentoncooperationwiththeEuropeanUnion,whiletheconditionsandextentofthiscoop-erationiscloselylinkedtothestatusofTurkey’saccessiontalks.Therefore,politicalrelationswithBrusselsareimportantfortheAKPasaninstrumentofeconomicpolicy.

Under the AKP government, the economic ties between Tur-key and the European Union have strengthened significantly,

15 SzymonAnaniczandKamilFrymark,EU-Turkey:Anewnegotiationchap-terwillopenconditionally,Eastweek,OSW,26June2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-06-26/euturkey-a-new-negotiation-chapter-will-open-conditionally

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asevidencedbythealmostthreefoldincreaseinbilateraltrade.TheEUremainsamajormarketforTurkishexporters.AlthoughTurkey’sexportstotheEUhavedeclinedinrecentyearsinper-centage terms, their volumehasnearly tripled from $20billionin2002toalmost$60billionin2012inabsoluteterms.16Itisim-portanttonotethatEuropeiscurrentlythemain,andalmosttheonly export market for Turkish medium- and high-technologyproducts.Thesegoodsaccountfornearly40%ofTurkishexportstotheEU,andtheirsalehasamuchgreaterimpactonthestateoftheTurkisheconomythantheexportsoflow-techproductsthatdominateTurkey’stradewithothercountries.17Thisisanimpor-tant factor stimulating innovation and enhancing the competi-tivenessoftheTurkisheconomy,especiallysincetheglobaltradeinlow-techproductshasbecomehighlycompetitive.18

The importanceof theEuropeanUnionasa tradingpartner forAnkarahasbeenstressedingovernmentforecasts,whichsuggestthattheEUwillremainthemostsignificantmarketforTurkishexportsforatleastanotherdecade.19ThisopinionissharedbytheinfluentialTurkishExportersAssembly(TIM).20Thisexplainsthegovernment’sdeterminationtoparticipateinthenegotiationsonthe proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-nership(TTIP).Ankarahasexpressedastronginterestinjoining

16 http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=7145D543-D8D3-8566-4520-DFB6CC4A86BA

17 DanielGrosandCanSelçuki.TheChangingStructureofTurkey’sTradeandIndustrialCompetitiveness: ImplicationsfortheEU,CEPSWorkingPaper03,2013,http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_WP_03.pdf

18 Ibid.19 Küresel Ticarette Türkiye’nin Yeniden Konumlandırılması Dis Ticarette

yenirotarlar,2011,MinistryoftheEconomyoftheRepublicofTurkey,pp.27–28.http://ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/98C9FBB8-D8D3-8566-45209FC758B-662CB/dtyr.pdf

20 TIMisanassociationofTurkishexporters. Ithasan important influenceontheTurkishgovernment’sexportpolicy.TIMplayedanimportantroleinthedevelopmentofthegovernment’sexportstrategyuntil2023.http://www.tim.org.tr/files/downloads/2023/tim%202023%20ihracat%20strate-jisi%20raporu.pdf,p.327.

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theTTIP.ArecentstatementbyTurkey’sDeputyPrimeMinisterAliBabacanhassuggestedthatremainingoutsidetheTIPPcouldcosthiscountry$20billionayear,andwasaclearindicationthatAnkaraseesthispossibilityasaseriousthreat.21

Foranumberofyears, the shareofEUcapital in foreigndirectinvestment in Turkey has remained above 70%.22 A substantialpartoftheinvestmentisallocatedtotheconstructionofmodernmanufacturingplantsandserviceproviders,andisseenasanim-portantsourceofTurkey’stechnologicalmodernisation.Accord-ingtotheTurkishMinistryforEuropeanIntegration,asmuchas85%ofthecapitalinvestedinthecountryinadvancedtechnolo-giescomesfromtheEuropeanUnion.23

Turkey is closely linked with the European economic systemthroughanumberof institutions.Formally, themainstructurelinking the two economies is the EU-Turkey Customs Union,whichcoverstradeinindustrialproducts.ItgivesTurkeyaccesstooneofthelargestmarketsforindustrialgoods,whereitispro-tectedfromexternalcompetition in thesamewayasEUopera-torsare.TheTurkishgovernment’sfiscalpolicyisguidedbytheEU’sMaastrichtcriteria,whichdemonstratesAnkara’sintentionto continue its affiliation with the European economic system.Thecriteriahavebeendevelopedforcountriesapplyingforeurozonemembership,whichmeansthatTurkeydoesnothavetofol-lowthem.Itcontinuestodoso,however,becauseitisconvincedthatadheringtothecriteriafacilitatesthestabilityandgrowthoftheTurkisheconomy,whichinturnincreasesthecountry’sat-tractivenesstoEuropeaninvestors.Theimportanceofeconomic

21 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-310557-turkey-may-seek-revisions-to-customs-union-over-eu-us-deal.html

22 Seehttp://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/pa-ges/FDIinTurkey.aspx

23 MinistryforEUAffairs,ProgressReportpreparedbyTurkey,2012,http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/IlerlemeRaporlari/2012/2012_tr_progress_report_en.pdf

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cooperationwithEuropeisalsovisibleintheAKP’sfairlyconsist-ent implementationof thesectionsof theacquis relating toeco-nomicmatters–eventhoughitoftenneglectsotherareasofthelegislation.24

OverthepastfewyearsTurkeyhassoughttoreduceitseconomicdependenceon theWest andhas tried to acquire amoreactiveroleinitseconomicrelationswiththeEU.Withthatobjectiveinmind,Ankarahastakenmeasurestoincreaseitstradevolumeswithotherregions.Consequently,between2002and2012,Turk-ishexportstotheEUfellfrom56%to38%,whileTurkishexportsto theMiddleEastrose from9%to27%.25Moreover, in2012 thegovernmentincreasedopportunitiesforIslamicbanking(whichenteredthemarketin1983),whichcouldindicateAnkara’sdesiretodiversifyitssourcesofcapitalandanattempttoreduceitsreli-anceonEuropeinthisarea.

Erdoğan’sgovernmenthasalsobeenseekingtostrengthenitspo-sition ineconomic relationswith theEU,asevidencebya shiftinTurkey’senergypolicy.Bywithdrawing(togetherwithAzer-baijan)fromtheNabuccoprojectproposedbytheEU,Turkeyhaseffectively ‘hijacked’ theEU’sconceptofanalternativegassup-ply route, known as the Southern Corridor. Ankara hopes thattheproposedgaspipeline(TANAP)willallowittofurtheritsowngeopoliticalagenda,ratherthanlettingitservetheenergyinter-estsoftheEuropeanUnion,asBrusselshadenvisaged.26AfurthersymptomofAnkara’sgrowingassertivenessinitsrelationswith

24 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/25 ThesechangeswerelargelytheresultofthefinancialcrisisintheEUand

the temporary lossofEuropeanmarkets;partly,however, theywerealsotheoutcomeofaconsciouspolicytopromotetraderelationsandinvestmentintheMENAregion.

26 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Southern Gas Corridor managed by AzerbaijanandTurkey,OSWCommentary, 18/07/2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pu-blikacje/osw-commentary/2012-07-18/southern-gas-corridor-managed-azerbaijan-and-turkey

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theEUhasbeentheTurkishgovernment’sincreasinglyfrequentobjectionstohowtheCustomsUnionisrun.27

However, it should be noted that Turkey’s trade relations withcountriesacrosstheMiddleEastandNorthAfricadependlargelyonthecurrentpoliticalclimate,asillustratedbyasurgeingoldexportstoIranin2012,whichtranslatedintoanincreaseofabout7% inTurkishexports to theMiddleEast thatyear.28Moreover,accordingtotheananalysisbytheTurkishMinistryofEconomy,thepotentialforexportstoAnkara’skeytradingpartnersintheMiddleEast(especiallyIraq)hasnearlybeenreached,whichsug-gests thatTurkey is expecting a slowdown in the rate atwhichitstradewiththeregioncouldgrowinthecomingyears.29Inad-dition, a significant deterioration of Turkey’s political relationswithmostMiddleEasterncountriesbetween2012and201330,and

27 AnkarahasbeenincreasinglyirritatedbytheEU’stendencytoignoreTur-key’sdemandsinthenegotiationoftradeagreementswiththirdcountries.UndertheEU-TurkeyCustomsUnionagreement,Ankaramustcomplywiththe provisions of any trade agreements concluded by the EU with thirdcountries,eventhoughinpracticethegovernmentinAnkaraisnotconsult-edduringthenegotiations.TurkeyhasalsobeencriticalofthecontinuedexclusionofTurkishnationalsfromtheEUlabourmarket.This,accordingtotheTurkishgovernment,putsTurkishbusinessesoperatingintheEUun-dertheCustomsUnionagreementinaworsepositionthantheirEuropeancompetitors.TurkeyhasalsocriticisedtheEUforimposingvisarestrictionsandtransportquotasonTurkishnationals,andforlaunchinganti-dumpinginvestigationsontrumped-upcharges,whichinpracticeharmthepositionofTurkishcompaniesoperatingintheEU.Seethefollowingarticle,whichwas published by a former Turkish Customs and TradeMinister: http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-HayatiYazici.pdf

28 TheunprecedentedvolumeofgoldexportstoIranin2012wasinfactaformofpaymentforIraniancrudeoil.However,sincethebillwassettledwithgold rather than in dollars (following the introduction of US sanctionsagainstIran),theTurkishtradestatisticsshowedthetransactionunder‘ex-ports’.ThismayhavegiventhefalseimpressionofarapidreorientationofTurkey’sforeigntradefromtheWesttotheEast.

29 See Türkiye’nin Yeniden Konumlandırılması, http://ekonomi.gov.tr/up-load/98C9FBB8-D8D3-8566-45209FC758B662CB/dtyr.pdf

30 This reflects the rapid deterioration in relations between Ankara andanumberofArabcountries,includingSaudiArabia,Qatar,andtheUnitedArabEmirates,whichunlikeTurkeyrefusedtocondemnthemilitarycoupinEgyptinJuly2013.

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the growingpolitical instability in those countrieswill furthercomplicateeconomicrelationswiththeregion.31

ItisthereforehighlylikelythattheEuropeanUnionwillremainTurkey’smostimportanttradingpartner,andatleastintheim-mediatefuture,nootherregionwillbeabletoreplacetheEUasAnkara’smainforeigninvestororitsbiggestexportmarket.ThefactthatthegovernmentiswellawareoftheEU’simportanceforTurkeyisapparentnotonlyinitseconomicanalysesandpoliticalspeeches,butalsointhemeasuresithastakentofurtherincreaseTurkey’sinstitutionalintegrationwiththeEuropeanmarketandwiththeEUeconomicsystem.

Turkey’spositionintradewiththeEuropeanUnionanditsabil-itytoattractinvestmentfromtheEUwill,toalargeextent,de-pendonthequalityofAnkara’spoliticalrelationswithBrussels.32Turkey’s EU membership negotiations are regarded by foreigninvestorsasaguaranteeofthepredictabilityandstabilityof itseconomy.AnypoliticalcrisisbetweenAnkaraandBrusselswouldinevitably reduce confidence levels among foreign companiesinterestedininvestinginTurkey,whichwouldleadtoasignifi-cantoutflowofcapitalfromtheTurkishmarket.MaintainingtheexistinginstitutionalchannelsofdialoguebetweenAnkaraandBrussels,aswellassustaininggoodpoliticalrelationswiththeEUanditsmemberstates,willbeinstrumentalforTurkeytosecureits national interests with regard to trade within the Customs

31 Forexample,afterAnkara(unlikemostArabstates)condemnedthemili-tarycoupinEgyptinJuly2013,theUnitedArabEmiratescancelledits$12billioninvestmentinaTurkishpowerstation.Inaddition,thenewgovern-ment inCairo introducedrestrictionsonTurkishcompaniesoperating inEgypt, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uae-firm-may-exit-12-billion-energy-project-in-turkey-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=53239

32 According to theTurkishMinistry forEUAffairs, “the continuityof eco-nomicbenefitisensuredbyTurkey’scommitmenttotheEUprocessasacan-didatecountryandtheenvironmentofstabilityandopportunitiesbroughtbythisprocess”.SeeProgressReportpreparedbyTurkey,2012.http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/IlerlemeRaporlari/2012/2012_tr_progress_report_en.pdf

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UnionandinrelationtotheemergingTTIP.Furthermore,toim-prove the effectiveness of the Turkish businesses operating intheEuropeanmarket,thegovernmentwill,forexample,needtocampaignfortheabolitionofSchengenvisasforTurkishcitizens,whichcouldprovedifficultifAnkaraweretoloosenitstieswiththeEU.Therefore,economiccooperationwithEuropewillremainanimportantinstrumentoftheAKPgovernment’seconomicpol-icy,anditwillplayasignificantroleinmotivatingAnkaranottoabandonitspolicyofintegrationwiththeEuropeanUnion.

3. Europe as a partner on the international stage

TheEuropeanUnionand itsmemberstatesareusefulpartnersforAnkaraon the international stage,even thoughTurkeyseesthem as less significant than the United States. FromAnkara’spointofview,cooperationwiththeEUisimportantbecauseofthemajoractorsintheregion,onlyEuropevaluesTurkey’sstabilityandwelcomesitsregionalambitions.WhereasAnkaraseesotheractorsasrivalsorapotentialthreat(Russia,Iran,Iraq,Qatar,Sau-diArabia,Syria),Europeappearstobetheonlyregionthatdoesnotposeaseriousthreattoitsnationalsecurity.TheEUmemberstates and Turkey have taken similar stances onmost interna-tionalissuesregardingtheBalkans,theMiddleEast,RussiaandtheCaucasus,asevidencedbythefactthatTurkeyhassofarac-ceptedmostpositionsworkedout jointlybyEUmembersundertheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.33Althoughtheofficialconvergenceofpositionsrarely translate intoconcretecoopera-tion,itdoeslimitthescopeforrivalryandconflict.

ThealliancewithEuropehelpsinotherways,too.Forexample,Berlin’s official support for Ankara’s policy towards Syria has

33 See the European Commission’s Strategy and Progress Report. In recentyears,Turkeysharedupto50-60%ofthecommonpositionsnegotiatedbytheEUmemberstatesonmattersofforeignpolicywithregardtotheini-tiativeswhichAnkarahasbeeninvitedtobytheEU.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/

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increaseditslegitimacy,andalsopartlyshieldedTurkeyagainsta likelypressure fromRussia,whichsupportsPresidentBasharal-Assad’sregime.34TurkeyhasalsorepeatedlyreceivedpoliticalsupportfromtheEU.35ThebilateralcooperationbetweenTurkeyandEuropeanstatesontheSyrianconflict,andtheactionstakenbyBrusselshaveshownthatincrisissituationsalliancewithEu-ropewidensAnkara’sroomformanoeuvreonthe internationalstage. It cannotberuledout that if theUSwere tocontinuere-ducingitspresenceintheMiddleEast,EuropeancountrieswouldgraduallybecomeevenmoreimportantforTurkeyonregionalse-curitymatters.

Ankara’scooperationwiththeEUanditsmemberstateshasbeenalsoinstrumentalinboostingTurkey’sinternationalprestige.Ne-gotiationsforEUmembershipserveasaconfirmationofthecoun-try’sprogressinadoptingdemocraticprinciplesandofitssignifi-canteconomicpower.Ankara’stieswithEuropeareanadvantageinitsrelationswiththeMiddleEast.OpinionpollsconductedintheregionshowthatclosetieswiththeEUhaveapositiveimpactonTurkey’simageacrosstheArabworld.36CloserintegrationwiththeEU isalso important forAnkara’s relationswith theUnitedStates,whichTurkeyseesasoneofitsmainpartnersonsecurity

34 GermanyhasopenlysupportedTurkey’spolicytowardsSyria.Forexample,BerlinbackedAnkaraduringitsshort-termdiplomaticcrisiswithMoscowinOctober2012,afterTurkey forcedaRussianplane to landonsuspicionthatitwascarryingweaponsfortheSyrianregime.SeeSzymonAnaniczandWitoldRodkiewicz,Turkish-RussiantensionoftheSyriancrisis,East-week, OSW, 17 October 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-week/2012-10-17/turkishrussian-tension-over-syrian-crisis

35 EUHighRepresentativeCatherineAshtoncondemnedtheshellingofTurk-ishvillagecarriedoutfromSyrianterritory.TheCouncilofEuropealsocon-demnedSyriaforshootingdownaTurkishplaneinJune2012.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132709.pdf, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/25/eu-condemns- syr-ia-turkish-jet

36 MensurAkgünandSabihaSenyücelGündoğar,ThePerceptionofTurkeyin the Middle East, TESEV 2011, p. 22. http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/8df416b2-6026-4af7-bbc9-ba90954e7b3b/Perception%20of%20Turkey%202011_IIBASIM.pdf

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issuesintheMiddleEastandtheBlackSearegion.WashingtonhastraditionallyfavouredTurkey’smembershipoftheEUinthebeliefthatthiswouldconsolidateTurkishdemocracyandincreasethepredictabilityofitskeyallyinthatpartoftheworld.

Nonetheless,oneshouldnotoverestimatethesignificanceofthecooperationoninternationalaffairsforotheraspectsofEU-Tur-keyrelations.Turkey’scooperationwithindividualEUmembersinaddressingtheMiddleEastcrisisdidnotstemfrom,andhadlittletodo,withtheaccessionprocessitself,andcouldbecontin-uedevenifaccessiontalksbreakoff.Thelinkbetweenmember-shiptalksanddiplomaticcooperationhasbeenmorepronouncedinAnkara’scooperationwiththeEUasanorganisation,butBrus-sels’influenceonthebalanceofpowerintheregionremainsrath-ersmall,whichtheTurkishgovernmentiswellawareof.

Ankara’sincreasinglyassertiveforeignpolicy,itseffortstoacquireamoreprominentroleontheinternationalstage–andaboveall,theincreasinglyfrequentdivergenceofopinionsbetweenTurkeyand Europe on issues such as the Iranian nuclear programme,Israel, Palestine (Hamas), NATO’s intervention in Libya (in theplanningphase37)andthemilitarycoupinEgypt–mightindicatethat theAKP ispaying lessand lessattention todiplomaticandsecuritycooperationwiththeEU.ThepolicyofintegrationwiththeEUisoflittleusewhenitcomestoshoringupTurkey’sinter-nationalstanding.ThesignificanceofthispolicyliesmainlyinitscapacityforraisingTurkey’sprestigeasamodernanddemocraticstate.AlthoughAnkara’scooperationwithindividualEUmemberstatesandBrusselsoninternationalmattershasusuallyprovedusefulintimesofcrises,ithasnotbeendependentonTurkey’sEUaccessionprocess.ThiscooperationcouldthereforebecontinuedwithintheframeworkofNATOoronabilateralbasis,evenifthemembershipnegotiationsweretobeabandoned.

37 Turkeyinitiallyopposedthe2011NATOinterventioninLibya.

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iii. the public perception of turKey’s integrAtion with the eu

TheAKPhasabandonedthepreviousgovernments’monopolyonformulatingforeignpolicyobjectives,andinsteadhasbeentryingtoensurethatTurkey’sdiplomacyreflectspublicexpectationstoagreaterextent.Therefore,foreignpolicyshouldavoidconflictswithTurkishpublicopinion, and, ifpossible, shouldbeusedasavehicleformobilisingtheelectorate.ThisiswhyanypredictionofAnkara’sfuturepolicytowardstheEUmusttakethewayEu-ropeisperceivedbytheTurkishpublicintoaccount.

Europe’simageamongtheTurkishpeoplehasalwaysbeenrath-erambiguous.On theonehand,attitudes towardsEuropehavebeeninfluencedbydistrustdatingbackat leasttoWorldWarI,whenWesternpowersattemptedtodivideTurkeyintotheirownspheresofinfluence.Thisfeeling(commonlyknownasthe‘Sèvressyndrome’38) remains particularly strong because the victoryagainsttheEuropeaninvaderssubsequentlyledtothefoundingofthenewTurkishRepublic.Overtheyears,theeducationsystemandofficialpropagandahaveturnedthememoryofthoseeventsintoan important componentofTurkishnational identity.Cur-rently,distrustoftheWestisbeingfuelledbycertainactionsofEuropeancountriesthat,accordingtoTurkishpublicopinion,areaimedatweakeningTurkey:forexample,allowingthePKKtoop-erateinEuropeancountries.ThisperceptionisalsostrengthenedbyEurope’scontinuedreluctancetoallowTurkeyintotheEU.

Ontheotherhand,Europeisseenasanattractivemodelofpo-litical, social and economic organisation. This view dates backtonineteenth-centuryOttomanEmpire,which after a series ofdefeatsontheinternationalstagecarriedoutaseriesofreforms

38 In1920,theEntentePowersforcedtheOttomanEmpiretosignapeacetrea-ty,whichstrippeditofmuchofitsterritoryandaimedtoturnitintoavassalstate.

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modelled on European powers. Europe’s favourable image hasalsobeen reinforcedbyTurkey’sColdWaralliancewithNATO.Moreover, the positive accounts of Europe produced by Turk-ish emigrants; and the entertainment industry,whichportraysWesternEuropeinagoodlight,havealsocontributedtotheposi-tiveimageofEuropeamongTurkishsociety.Thevisionofaneco-nomicallydevelopedEuropewasinstarkcontrasttoTurkey’sun-derdevelopedeconomyandanachronisticpoliticalsystem,whichwaswidelyregardedasunfairandinefficient.

Consequently,Europe’simageinTurkishsocietychangesdepend-ing onwhich component of this dichotomous visionprevails atanygiventime.LowlevelsofknowledgeaboutEuropeandtheEUamongTurksresultinfrequentandsignificantshiftsinattitudetowardstheEuropeanUnion(astudybyHakanYilmazattheUni-versityoftheBosphorussuggeststhatonly11%ofTurkshavevis-itedEurope).39Overthepastdecade,Turks’ imageoftheEUandoftheEuropeanshasworseneddramatically.Whereas65%ofthepopulationhadapositiveviewofEuropeansin2003,thisfigurehaddroppedtojust48%by2012;meanwhile,thenumberofpeo-plereportinganegativeviewofEuropeansroseduringthesameperiodfrom26%to42%.FewerTurksalsobelievethatEuropeansrespecttherightsofothers,orthattheyarewellorganised.TheseopinionpollsshowthatEuropeislosingitsimageasaneconomicandpoliticalmodelthatTurkeymightbeinterestedinadopting.Atthesametime,therehasbeenagrowingsenseofdistancebe-tweenTurkeyandEurope.Between2003and2012,fewerpeoplefelt that Turkey and Europewere part of the same communitygeographically(from70%to46%),historically(from61%to33%)andculturally(from28%to21%).However,asenseofbeingpartofthesameeconomiccommunityincreasedinthesameperiodfrom

39 HakanYılmaz(ed.),Türkiye’deAvrupa–ŞüpheciliğiKarşilaştirmaliBul-gular,2003-2012,http://hakanYılmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-2012-Euroskep-2003-2012-Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf

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28%to37%.40The increasinglypoor imageofEurope inTurkishsocietyhasledtoadropinsupportforEUmembership.Whereasin2004almost74%oftheTurkishpeoplewereinfavourofEUac-cession,currentlythefigurestandsatjust44%.41

1. The cause of Europe’s image problem

Europe’simageinTurkeyhassufferedforanumberofreasons.First,theEU’spolicytowardsTurkeyisseenasunfairandhu-miliating.ThepublicperceptionisthattheEUhasfailedtode-liveronitsearlierpromisesbynotonlyrefusingtoallowTurkeyintotheEuropeanUnion,butalsobymaintaininganembargoontradewithNorthernCyprusandbyrejectingcallsfortheaboli-tionofSchengenvisasforTurkishcitizens.42Europe’simagehasalsosufferedasaresultofthefinancialcrisis,whichhasraisedquestionsabouttheeffectivenessoftheEuropeaneconomicandpolitical model. The image of Europe in crisis contrasts withtherapideconomicgrowthwitnessedinTurkey,andpromotesthebeliefthatTurkeydoesnotneedintegrationwithEuropetoachieve development andmodernisation. In addition, there isawidespreadviewinTurkeythatEuropeanshaveahostileat-titudetowardsIslam,whichisperpetuatedby(verymeticulous,althoughat timesexaggerated)Turkishmediareportsof casesof intolerance againstMuslim immigrants in the EU (in 2012,65%ofrespondentsbelievedthatEuropeanswerexenophobic).43Asaresult,thereisagrowingperceptioninTurkishsocietyofa division between the Islamic world and the West, which is

40 Ibid.41 Seehttp://trends.gmfus.org/42 See SzymonAnanicz, Cyprus presidency andTurkey’s relationswith the

European Union, OSW Commentary, 26 June 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-06-26/cyprus-presidency-and-turkeys-relations-european-union

43 HakanYılmaz,Türkiye’deAvrupa–ŞüpheciliğiKarşilaştirmaliBulgular,2003-2012,http://hakanYılmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-2012-Euroskep-2003-2012-Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf

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particularlysignificantforasocietythatattachesgreatimpor-tancetoreligion.ItalsoseemsthatthecurrentlylowopinionoftheEuropeanUnionamongTurksispartlyaresultofthenega-tiverhetoricoftheTurkishgovernment,whohavebeenincreas-inglyportrayingtheEUinabadlighttoabdicatethemselvesofanyresponsibilityforthelackofprogressintheaccessionnego-tiations.PoorknowledgeofEurope,combinedwithhighlevelsofpublicconfidenceinthegovernment,meansthatnegativeopin-ionsexpressedpubliclyforpoliticalreasonstendtoseepintotheconsciousnessofasignificantpartofthepopulation.

TherelativelynegativeperceptionofEuropeinTurkeyisnotanewphenomenon.Inthelate1990s,anti-Europeansentimentwasalsoquitestrong,afterwhichEurope’simageimprovedrapidlyinthefirsthalfofthelastdecade,onlytosufferanothersetbackinre-cent years.44 This suggests thatTurkish attitudes toEurope areeasily influencedby the immediate political and economic con-text.Nonetheless, itappearsthatthefactorsresponsibleforthenegativevisionofEuropeinrecentyearscouldberelativelydu-rable.Afterall,therearecurrentlynoprospectsforanyrealpro-gressinTurkey’sEUaccessionnegotiations,orforaresolutionoftheCyprusconflict,therehabilitationoftheimageofEuropeansastolerantpeople,orforaquickendtothefinancialcrisis.ThisraisesconcernsthatthenegativeimageofEuropecouldtakedeeprootinTurkishpublicopinion.

44 Forexample,in1995only56%ofTurkswereinfavourofEUmembership–thatis,thefigurewasalmost20percentagepointslowerthanadecadelater.AliÇarkoğlu,‘WhowantsfullEUmembership?’inA.Çarkoğlu,B.Rubbin(eds.),TurkeyandtheEuropeanUnion:domesticpolitics,economicintegra-tionandinternationaldynamics,Cass,London,2004,p.173.

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2. A rise in conservatism as a factor distancing Turkey from Europe?

Whileitseemsthattheabove-mentionedfactorshaveindeedhada significant impact on the poor image of Europe in Turkey inrecentyears,itwouldbemuchhardertodefendthewidespreadopinionthattheshift inpublicperceptionoftheWesthasbeencaused by Turkey’s escalating conservatism. First, it would bedifficulttofindevidencefortheallegedriseinconservatism.Al-thoughincreasingnumbersofTurkshavedeclaredanadherencetoIslam,anopinionpollcarriedoutbytheUniversityoftheBos-phorussuggeststhatthepercentageofpeopleholdingconserva-tiveviewsonmoralandpoliticalissuesdecreasedslightlybetween2006and2012.45Thesurveyalsopointstoasmalldropinreligiouspractice in Turkish society. These conclusions seem to confirmthefindingsofotherstudies:aTESEVsurveysuggeststhatmostTurksregardtheirparents’generationasmorereligious46,whileaBahçeşehirUniversityopinionpollindicatesthatdeclarationsofadherencetoIslamincreasewiththeageoftherespondent.47ThischallengestheargumentthatTurksarebecomingmoreconserva-tive,especiallyasfarastheyoungergenerationsareconcerned.The studies also suggest thatTurkish society is becomingmoretolerant, and increasingly committed to political and religiouspluralism,aswell as toothervalues commonlyassociatedwithEurope–althoughitshouldbenotedthatoverthepastsixyears,thesechangeshavebeenrathersmall.

45 HakanYılmaz,Turkiye’deMuhafazakarlik:Aile,Cinsellik,Din,BosphorusUniversity,OpenSocietyInstitute,2012,http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/muhafazakarlik/04.pdf

46 AliÇarkoğlu,BinnazToprak,DeğişenTürkiye’deDin,ToplumVeSiyaset,TESEV 2006, p. 40, http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/a0c7d243--50ec-4877-9791-57d4b5bfd356/Degisen%20Turkiyede%20Din%20Toplum-%20Siyaset%2011_2006.pdf

47 Yılmaz Esmer (ed.), Türkiye Değerler Atlasi 2012, Bahçeşehir University,2012, http://www.bahcesehir.edu.tr/haber/turkiye_degerler_atlasi_2012_yayinlandi.

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UndertheAKP,therehasbeenarapidsocio-economicadvance-ment of thepoorer andmore conservative segments ofTurkishsociety.Inthelastdecade,manymembersofthisgroupmigratedfromtheprovincestothecitiesandtookprominentpositionsinpublicadministration,themediaandbusiness,thuscreatingtheimpressionof the spreadof conservatismand Islamicvalues insociety.ThegreatervisibilityofIslaminpublichasalsobeenaf-fectedbythepartialliftingofabanonwomen’sheadscarvesandtheremovalofotherrestrictionsthatpreviouslylimitedthefree-domofreligiouspracticeandpublicdemonstrationofadherencetoIslam(forexample,fewerrestrictionsontherunningofmadra-sas).However,thestudiescitedearliersuggestthatmorefrequentdisplaysofconservativeattitudesandreligiousfaithinpublic(forexample,throughdress)donotmeanthattheconservativeseg-mentsofthepopulationhaveincreasedinnumber.48

Secondly,theavailableopinionpollscallintoquestiontheideathatconservatismisafactordistancingAnkarafromEurope.Tradi-tionally,Turkey’sintegrationwithEuropehasbeensupportedbyliberalandleft-wingacademics,mediaprofessionals,Westernisedintellectualsandartists.49Equallystrongsupportforintegrationhascomealsofromthebusinesscommunity,whichbenefitsfromeconomiccooperationbetweentheEUandTurkey.50However,EUaspirationshavealsobeenvoicedbyothersocialgroups.Accord-ingtoEDAM,theCentreforEconomicsandForeignPolicyStudies,

48 Turkishcriticsof theAKPgovernmenthavealsopointedout the increas-inglywidespreadattemptsbytheconservativesegmentsofsocietytoputpressureonindividualswhodonotdisplaytheircommitmenttoIslam,suchasurgingwomentowearheadscarves.Anotherrecentdevelopmentwhichisoftenmentionedinthiscontextisapositivebiasintheworkplace,includ-ingpublicoffices,towardsindividualsholdingconservativeviews.

49 Forexample,anEDAMsurveyhassuggestedthatover86%of theforeignpolicy experts are in favour ofTurkey’sEUmembership (the surveywascarried on a sample of 202 experts). Türkiye’de veDis PolitikaKamuoyuAnketleri2013/1,http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAMAnketOcak2013.pdf

50 Turkey’s influential business associations (especially TUSIAD and TOBB)havebeenactivelypromotingTurkey’s integrationwith theEU,andhavelobbiedBrusselstothatend.

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thehighestsupportforthecontinuationofnegotiationsisamongconservativeBDPvoters(88%51),despitethisbeingthemostcon-servativeelectorate.ThisconfirmstheresultsofanopinionpollconductedbyTESEV,whichsuggestthatsupportforintegrationwiththeEUisthestrongestinTurkey’sconservativeeasternandsouth-easternregions.52Thesecondmostpro-EUelectorateistheconservativeAKPelectorate.SupportforEUmembershipamongAKPvotersisabovethenationalaverage.Turkey’sEUintegrationhasalsobeenactivelypromotedbythehighlyinfluentialspiritualleaderFethullahGülenandhismovement,throughpopularme-diaandeducationactivities,amongothermeans.53ThisthereforeputsthesuggestionofaninverserelationbetweenconservatismandsupportfortheEUindoubt.

It should be noted, however, that the support for EU accessionamong Turkey’s conservative circles – for example, among theKurds and within Fethullah Gülen’s movement – is motivatedlargelybythehopethatEuropeanintegrationwouldleadtothefinaldismantlingoftheKemalistsystemthatthesesegmentsofsocietyperceive as a threat. It therefore follows that their sup-portforEUintegrationdoesnotnecessarilyindicatethepursuitofEU-styleliberaldemocraticprinciples.Itislikelythatovertimethe pro-EU orientation of these groupswill gradually diminishbecause the main restrictions imposed on religious life by theKemalist system will have already been abolished by the AKP

51 TheBDPis interestedinrepresentingtheinterestsoftheKurdishminor-ity.SuchstrongsupportforEUintegrationamongtheBDPelectoratemightreflecttheKurds’beliefthatEUmembershipwouldforceAnkaratograntthempoliticalandculturalrightsandwouldprotectthemagainstTurkishnationalism.Türkiye’deVeDisPolitikaKamuoyuAnketleri2013/1,http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAMAnketOcak2013.pdf

52 MensurAkgün,SabihaSenyücelGündoğar,AybarsGörgülü,ErdemAydın,Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey, TESEV, 2011, http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/d40ab847-5676-4864-8f99-37fcb58ffc34/Foreign%20Policy%20Perceptions%20in%20Turkey_05.2011.pdf

53 Seehttp://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/8256/12/.The fact remains that thetacticsusedbythismovementhavenotadheredtodemocraticprinciples.

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government.Asaresult,theEU’sroleasaguardianofcivilliber-tiesmightnolongerbesoimportant.ThesamewillapplytotheKurdishminority:astheKurdsreceivemorerightsandtheeast-ernpartsofTurkeyaredemilitarised,thesignificanceoftheEUwillbeweakened.ThepaceofdeteriorationoftheEU’simageislikelytopickupasTurkishpublicopinionbecomesconvincedofEurope’sbiasagainstIslam.

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summAry the perception of europe And the future of turKey’s europeAn policy

It is not clearwhether the government inAnkara still believesthatTurkey’sEUaccession is a realpossibility. It appears,how-ever,thatthebenefitsofcontinuingtheprocessofEuropeanin-tegrationwillurgetheAKPnottoabandonthenegotiations.Thegovernmentwilltrytoavoidpotentialcrisesinbilateralrelations,andshouldsuchcrisesoccur,tomitigatetheiroutcome.Erdogan’sgovernmentseestheprocessofintegrationwiththeEUasausefultoolforachievingeconomicgoals,bothindomesticpoliticsandontheinternationalstage.

ItseemsthatthisapproachcouldbeespeciallyimportantforTur-key’seconomy.TheAKPseesEuropeasitskeyandmostpromis-ingeconomicpartner,whichwillplayacrucialroleinthecoun-try’s development, and in turn strengthen its position on thepolitical and international stage.The relatively strong relation-shipbetweenthe intensityof thiscooperationandthestatusofthe integration processwill highlight the benefit of continuingthenegotiations.

Theroleof the integrationprocess for theAKP’sposition indo-mesticpoliticshaschangedinrecentyears.Theroleoftheprocessasan instrument inpoliticalcompetitionorasapretext forre-formshasweakened.Atthesametime,however,thegovernmentisawarethatabandoningtheintegrationtalkswouldundermineitspositiononthepoliticalscene.Erdoğan’sgovernmentislikelytotrytoreducethisriskbydiminishingtheroleoftheEuropeanUnionasatutorofTurkey’sdemocratisation.Firstandforemost,however,thegovernmentwilltrytoreducethelikelihoodofsuchacrisis.AnycriticismdirectedattheEuropeanUnionshouldbeconsidered as, on the one hand, an expression of exasperationwith its policy towards Turkey, and on the other, as a way forAnkara to abdicate responsibility for the lackofprogress in its

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accession talkswith theEU.Most likely,however, thecriticismwillnotbe followedbyanyconcreteactions thatcouldactuallyweakenTurkey’stieswiththeEU.

FortheAKP,acompletebreakdowninTurkey’sintegrationpro-cesswiththeEuropeanUnionwouldbehighlyundesirable.None-theless,suchascenariocouldnotberuledoutiftheEUweretoopenlyquestiontheAKP’scredibilityasademocraticandreform-ist political force. Thiswould leaveErdoğan’s government littleroomformanoeuvre,anditispossiblethatinsuchascenarioAn-karawouldtakemeasurestodelegitimisetheEU.

The EU integration process does not play a significant role inboosting Turkey’s standing in the international arena. Its sig-nificanceinthiscontextislimitedtoraisingTurkey’sprestigeasamoderndemocraticstate.Infact,themainbenefitsofTurkey’stieswithEuropecomefromitsNATOmembershipandfromitsbilateral cooperation with individual European states. Both ofthesedependonlyslightlyonthestatusofTurkey’snegotiationswiththeEU.Itthereforefollowsthatinternationalaffairswillnotbeanimportantfactor inmobilisingtheAKPtoperseverewiththetalks.WemayexpectAnkaratocontinuepursuinganasser-tiveforeignpolicy,whichwillattimesdepartfromthepositionheldbytheEUanditsmemberstates.

AgrowingchallengeforthefutureofEU-Turkishrelationsisthedrasticallydeteriorating imageofEuropeamongTurkishpublicopinion.Ifthistrendcontinues–whichisratherlikelyconsider-ingthedurabilityofthefactorsthatcauseit–thereisarealriskthatthenegativeperceptionofEuropewilltakedeeprootamongTurkish society. Thiswould reduce the EU’s influence over thepositionoftheAKPonthepoliticalstage,sincetheEUwouldnolongerhavethecapacitytodelegitimisetheTurkishgovernment.Consequently, assuming that the government in Ankara con-tinuestotakepublicopinionintoaccountwhenshapingits for-eignpolicy,andthattheimageofEuropeinTurkeydeteriorates

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further,economiccooperationandtheAKP’sideologicalcommit-menttotheideaofEUintegrationwillremaintheonlylinksbe-tweentheAKPandEurope.

szymon AnAnicz

Centre for eastern Studies

The centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) is an expert institution that monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, the caucasus, central Asia, central and Eastern Europe, germany and the Balkans.

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