34535240 Notes in Political Law Review

8/8/2019 34535240 Notes in Political Law Review

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PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTESIN POLITICAL LAW

(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

ARTICLE INATIONAL TERRITORY

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:A group of islands, including parts of the islands,

interconnecting waters and other natural features which are

closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and othernatural resources form an intensive geographical, economic,

political entity or to have historically regarded as an

archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly byone or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treatKalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol:whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/orconsider as part of the regime of islands.

- Kalayaan Islands- part of Region IV-B, Province ofPalawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of

the southern end of Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol - also known as scarborough reef,panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part

of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefsand islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150

square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius;

200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire

archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The

Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys,

which is nearest to Palawan.

- RA 9552- redrew the countrys baseline to comply with theUNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding

the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough from the

main archipelago and classifying them instead as regimes of islands.

They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a


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roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters

within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine

archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

- Determines the countrys extended continental shelf which is

believed to contain substantial amounts of oil, natural gas, minerals and

polymetals.

- Regime of islands consists of islands or naturally formedareas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high

tide.

- Constitutional issues:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic watersEEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islandsDelineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty ofParis vs. RA 9552

- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and

right of overflight

- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas andContiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the fulland complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the

consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power

are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupiedas embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which

the premises belong.

- Kalayaan Island Groupa) historic right

b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978

c) effective occupation

d) principle of contiguity because of proximity

e) part of the continental shelfc) RA 3046 & RA 5446

c) RA 9552

- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra

nullius

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ARTICLE IIDECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE

POLICIES

- Republicanism

- Separation of Powers- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances

- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot

interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to

conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate BlueRibbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003;Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No.

180643, Mach 25, 2008)- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et

al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;

David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of

legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief

executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either

department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of

public service and provide a system of check and balance between the

two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its

legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the

executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro

Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,2007).

Permissible delegation:1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)

2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of

Art. VI

3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2

of Art. XVII; RA 6735)

4. local governments (Art X)5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate

legislation)

Tests of valid delegation:1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007

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in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited

constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and achoice has to be made between a rule of international law andmunicipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should beupheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil.1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:

Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organsof municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances

(Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has beenmade part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the

primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the

municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most

countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal

standing with, but are not superior to, national legislativeenactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat prioritakes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeala treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of theland, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes andtreaties may be- invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution[Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)-The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of

military assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the

conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and

the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the

overall leader and it is the local police forces who are in

charge at all times.

- Gudani vs. Senga,August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet thatthe President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is

most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacyover the military, and to the general stability of our representative

system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority,

control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who

is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as

commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties

imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in

nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the

notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as

civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searchesand seizure. The ability of the President to prevent militaryofficers from testifying before Congress does not turn onexecutive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power ascommander-in-chief to control the actions and speech ofmembers of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives ascommander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations

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as in executive privilege. The President could, as a general rule,require military officers to seek presidential approval before

appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a

contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President

as commander-in-chief.

- Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10 ,2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive toenable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectivelycommand, control, and discipline the armed forces (seeRuffy v.Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law

and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial formpart of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidentscontrol, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the

apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercisesreview powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50

of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted

- Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the peopleagainst violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to beararms is to be construed in connection and in harmony withthese constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No.157036, June 9, 2004).

- Separation of the Church and State - Estrada vs. Escritor,June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intentand framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent

neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based onreligion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.

- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office ofthe Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an

immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of thecommunity can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If thegovernment fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,

State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a

democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its

interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to

exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it thecorrelative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right

implies, among other things, the judicious management and

conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed in the

DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

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- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of localgovernment to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations

which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy

under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does notmake local governments sovereign within the state of animperium in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter ofregulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State

concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or

delegate it to local governments.

- Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786- Under theconstitution, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangay

enjoy local autonomy subject to the supervision of thenational government acting through the President (and

the Department of Local Government). Autonomousregions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, on the

other hand, are subject alone to the decree of the organic act

creating them and accepted principles on the effects and

limits of autonomy.

- Lina vs. Pano, August 30, 2001- Ours is still a unitary formof government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy

granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined

within the extent allowed by the central government.

- National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA130- Presidents power ofgeneral supervision, as exercisedby the DILG, extends to Liga ng mga Barangay.

- Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002- The Presidents powerof general supervision can only interfere in the affairs and activities of

a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter acted contrary

to law. The President or his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as

long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parametersof the law and the constitution.

- Equal access of opportunities for public service Pamatong vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not

bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a judicial

enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for

legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact

positive measures that would accomodate as many as possible into

public office.

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*NOTE: (Details refer to Article X)

ARTICLE IV

CITIZENSHIP

- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipinofather at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian

passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an

effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the

claim of Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on apersonscitizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditionsin order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:1. the mother of the person making the

election must be citizen of the Philippines; and

2. said election must be made upon

reaching the age of majority.

- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may behad under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship dueto: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the alliedforces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4)

marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic

necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, isan act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who

have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)

of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippinecitizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Toclaim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor ageat the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by theparent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR.No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parentslost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or

economic necessity].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegianceto the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of

the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to thetaking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the

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registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civilregistry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite ineffecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of onesapplication for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his

citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born

Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN - Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention

and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizensrepatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate orillegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of thoserepatriated.

- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood

as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens).

In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship

effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of

allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes

sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009-The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who

also possesses American citizenship having been born of an

American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin

requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a

Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the CitizenshipRetention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for

public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has

applied the twin requirements to cases which involve natural-

born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another

country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In

the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a

natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized

citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No.

9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his

citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply

with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that

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the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal

terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual

allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governsthe manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or

retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign

citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such

circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it

does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born

Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention

of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such

reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current

residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,

Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of

residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general

intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born

Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign

citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or

in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency inthe Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born

Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1)

meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required

by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and

sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any

public officer authorized to administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No.180048, June 19,2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition andretention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who

have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their

naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born

citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,

become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they

are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippinecitizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must

be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional

requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, asfollows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this

Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all

attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the

Philippines and the following conditions:

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- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as

required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time ofthe filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal andsworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship beforeany public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filingof a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to arenunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The

rulings in the cases ofFrivaldo and Mercado are not applicablebecause R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of

Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizensmay practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Courtand upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore

their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- TheNottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international

law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not

applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article

5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of NationalityLaws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more

than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without

prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status

and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the

nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize

exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in

which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of

the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in

fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth buta resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and

acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the

outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his

business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which

had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated

all his properties on the ground that he was a German national.

Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen,

against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held

Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was

more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23,1989

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- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11,2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep.Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth

Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-

born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.

What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship tonatural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippinecitizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreigncountry. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. Byswearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person

implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section

3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual

allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of

whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign

country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made aconcern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5,

Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is

not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the

law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,

the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but

with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance

to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congresswas given a mandate to draft a law that would set specificparameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until thisis done, it would be premature for the judicial department,including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining todual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe andFornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the PhilippineBill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an

inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th

dayof April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) anative-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native ofPeninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanishpapers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondentFPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether

or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself

been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the

alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after

the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on

the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from

the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo

would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the

Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,

Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the

absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of

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residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have

benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the PhilippineBill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if

acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of

respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime

respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all

persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether

such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does notdistinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of aFilipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civilstatus of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is notdeterminative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial oradministrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is

generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequentproceeding challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to resjudicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a material

issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor

General or his authorized representative took active part in the

resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by

the Supreme Court.

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grantsPhilippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born

and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for

judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed

qualifications and disqualifications.

- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . Thealleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by theBureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the finaldecision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and hismother were naturalized along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, itis the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, thatmay question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of

naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by

private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens

descendant.

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ARTICLE V(SUFFRAGE)

- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)

- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special

registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to

do so.

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right issubject to existing substantive and procedural requirements

embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories

of law.

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned uponcertain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others

the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration

Act of 1996).

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation ofresidence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains

attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence isconsidered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means anindividuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent

for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on

facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exceptionto the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC , August 4, 2006- There is no provision inthe dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" toactually establish residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Onthe contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals

are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) thesame right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter underR.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot beoveremphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchiseas much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the

residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter underordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

ARTICLE VI(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

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- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and Membersof the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-

proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,

receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of

canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules, there are

recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1) correction of

manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding

of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity

and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section

30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Underthe first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions

when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the

only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates

adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the

boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from

running riot.The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in

its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential

terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In

the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law

and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;"

"justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity,

economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical

education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions

of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification

of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of

the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and

management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR.

These are sufficient standards.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mereconstituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of

Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not

bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the

Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA

No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid

down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may

not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is

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effected by their promulgation of what are known as

supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules

issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations

have the force and effect of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVESECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation oflegislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of factsupon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under

the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the

12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or

condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12%

rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to thePresident.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% camefrom Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the

legislative policy.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the

power to create legislative districts. The power to increase theallowable membership in the House of Representatives and toreapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM - BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns isinvolved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the

party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed

grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the

petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject

of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The

last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names ofthe party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is

certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the

requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the

Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,

meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the sameprovision requires to be posted in the polling places on election

day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to

read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there

is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec

from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the

Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec

obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the

provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May

2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec

virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence

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of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional

duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the

party-list groups.

- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution isnot mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats

in the House of Representatives.The Supreme Court ruled that theConstitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable

parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all

party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total

membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:

only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes

cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in theHouse; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of

the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum

of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4)

proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified

party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total

number of votes.

- CIBAC vs. COMELEC, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 -Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the

conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that

the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes,

that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other

hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the

first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3)

seats19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the

COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would

therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of votes of

concerned party

No. of votes of the first

party

x

No. ofadditional

seatsallocated to

the firstparty

=Additional Seats for

concerned party

Applying this formula, the result is as

follows:495,190

1,203,305

x

2 =

0.41152493x

2 = 0.82304986

1
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- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found

in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared

unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an

unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),

Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the

broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group

interests in the House of Representatives.

- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall

be observed:

- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they

garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and

coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast

for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat

each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to

the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in

proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional

seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall

be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shallno longer be included because they have already beenallocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, theremaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are

the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the

guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of

a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of

fractional seats.

- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not

limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-

percenters. Thepercentage of votes garnered by each party-listcandidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votesgarnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number ofvotes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in thesecond round of seat allocation. First, the percentage ismultiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the

difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under theParty-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentageand of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share

in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-listseat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats

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are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply

the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified

party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank Party VotesGarnered

VotesGarnereoverTotalVotesforParty,ist in%

( )

Guaranted Seat

(First)ound( )

AdditionalSeats

(Second)ound( )

( )plus( ), inwholeintegers

( )

Applyinthethreeseatcap

( )1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 . .N A

2 BAYANMUNA

979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 . .N A

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 . .N A

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 . .N A

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 . .N A

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 . .N A

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 . .N A

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 . .N A

91[31] -COOPNATCCO

409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 . .N A

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 . .N A

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 . .N A

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 . .N A

13 ANAKPAWIS

370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 . .N A

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 . .N A

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 . .N A

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 . .N A

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 . .N A

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 . .N A

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 . .N A

20 -UNI MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 . .N A

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 . .N A

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 . .N A

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 . .N A

24 -ABA AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 . .N A

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 . .N A

26 SENIORCITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 . .N A

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 . .N A

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 . .N A

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 . .N A

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30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 . .N A

31 ANGKASANGGA

170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 . .N A

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 . .N A

33ABAKADA

166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 . .N A

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 . .N A

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 . .N A

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 . .N A

Total 17 55

- Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3

above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning

party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled.

The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient numberof votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three

seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that

allowed all political parties to participate in the party-listelections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major

political parties from participating in the party-list system. On thecontrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended themajor political parties to participate in party-list electionsthrough their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of theConstitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent

sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list

system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that

participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a

sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major

political parties will participate in the party-list elections.Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is

manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional

Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in

socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of

major political parties from the party-list elections in patent

violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are

allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoralorganizations for electoral or political purposes. There shouldnot be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in

the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas

(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major politicalparties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector

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- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- RichardGordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and

acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross

(PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a private organization merely

performing public functions, and that the PNRC Chairman is not a

government official or employee. Not being a government office, the

PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a

Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is autonomous,

neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a

voluntary organization that does not have government assets and does

not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The

PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC

Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for

purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon

can validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up hissenatorial position.

- QUORUM PP vs. Jalosjos- The members of Congresscannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the

absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman

charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years

is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that amajority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not

mean all the members. The base in computing majority is

normally the total membership of the body, within the

coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majoritysimply means the greater number or more than half. Whoshall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate.

(Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and

another Senator). When the Constitution provides that theSenate President shall be elected by the majority it doesnot delineate who comprises the majority or the minority.The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate

presidency are not necessarily the minority.

- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia,277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that inenacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules

in the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures

which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, TheHouse of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly

behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will

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amount to an interference by the judicial department with the

legislature.

- People vs . Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election ascongressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense;

neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from

confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the

people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his

freedom of action and movement.

- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to

shield a member of congress from the consequences of his

wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity

from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by

correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed byCongress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in

Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a

preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact

that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a

member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- Themembers of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3

senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral

tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests inwhich contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also havehimself inducted into office.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles;Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- oncea winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed

office as member of the House of Rep

- rePsentatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election

contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the

HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winningcandidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matterspending before it at the time of the proclamation.

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates

in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assailones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to

file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petitionfor quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10,2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for

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Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the

proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not

divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the

2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not

attained finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration

suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the

assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected

representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the

validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was

seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for

reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume

jurisdiction over the matter.

- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phraseelection, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality

as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title.

But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred tothe conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of

the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;

returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of thewinners, including questions concerning the composition of the board

of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and

qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or

ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC hasexclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving

local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),

nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections

for President, V-President, Senator and Members of the House ofRepresentatives.

What is allowed is the correction ofmanifest errors inthe certificate of canvass or election returns. To bemanifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates

of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or

objections thereto must have been made before the board of

canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their

respective proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifesterrors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has

jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciationof ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

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- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and

resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or

arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal

hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge ofcongressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as

members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under ourConstitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is

not lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the caseis terminated.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courtsjurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only

upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal

tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of

discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of

power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of

discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or

refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House ofRepresentatives is authorized to change its representation in the

Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes thatmay transpire in the political alignments of its membership. The

changes must be PERMANENT and do not include temporaryalliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political

loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiancefrom one political party to another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is

mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the

majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political partymust have at least two senators to be able to have a representative inthe Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will

not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v.

Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Evenassuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number

and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the

CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of

Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18,

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Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show

to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be

entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to

comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional

representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the

party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of

judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior

recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the

instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to

this Court is premature. The discretion of the House to choose its

members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the

mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is

the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint ofPimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of

Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA733, - The Presidents creation of the Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves no exercise

by Congress of its taxing power or spending power.

- The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the

President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation has beendefined as nothing more than the legislative authorizationprescribed by the Constitution that the money may be paid out ofthe treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act ofthe legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use acertain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from theState to its creditors.

- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs.Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks thedetermination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of

legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of

separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the matter

would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the

inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be an

encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had

set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee onBanks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of acriminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial

body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry,

otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry

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by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an

administrative complaint.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE - is the implied constitutionalpower of the President to withhold information requested by other

branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant

this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied

Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying outpowers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under theConstitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions haverecognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case ofAlmonte

v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v.Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case ofSenate v. Ermita.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and asChief Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for

military and national security matters affecting the nation.In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find

it necessary to withhold sensitive military and nationalsecurity secrets from the Legislature or the public.

As the official in control of the nations foreign service by

virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments,

bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of

the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents roleas chief implementer of the States foreign policy is

reinforced by the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate

and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the

discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it

necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secretsto the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have

conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is

every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal

secrets that its allies have shared with it.

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of

the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinetand advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thoroughexchange of views, the Presidents communications withhis Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glareof publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential

advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President

policy issues and executive matters knowing that their

discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving thePresident of candid advice.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. Theinterest of protecting military, national security anddiplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential

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communications, must be weighed against otherconstitutionally recognized interests. There is thedeclared state policy of full public disclosure of alltransactions involving public interest, the right of thepeople to information on matters of public concern, theaccountability of public officers, the power of legislativeinquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial anddocumentary evidence in deciding cases.

The balancing of interests between executive privilegeon one hand and the other competing constitutionallyrecognized interests on the other hand - is a function ofthe courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based onthe factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts

on executive privilege between the Executive and theLegislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary,

have been decided by the courts.

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008-Applying the principles adopted inPMPF v. Manglapus, it isclear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept

perpetually confidential since there should be ample

opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the

offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations

continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives

submitted their offers with the understanding that historicconfidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing theseoffers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not

only with Japan but with other foreign governments in futurenegotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, arerecognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPAnegotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,

however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For asSenate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information asprivileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged

in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in

which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a

public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired

information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally

privileged status.

- Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a)Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were youdictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go

ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?]

are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the

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communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power

of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement

with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into

executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has

traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, thecommunications are received by a close advisor of the President.

Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a

close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. Andthird, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would

justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of theinformation elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordancewith publish rules.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeascorpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- TheCongress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that

concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or

possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agenciescreated by Congress and officers whose positions are within thepower of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs tothis class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like

Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by

respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them

in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative

action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond tosubpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees,

and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper

investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- amere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of

Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately,the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials

under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in

the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a

co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of

Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for

information.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If theexecutive branch withholds such information on the ground that itis executive privileged, it must so assert it and state the reasontherefore and why it must be respected.

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- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the onlyway for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by avalid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact thatthey are department heads. Only one executive official may beexempted from this power the President on whom executive poweris vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the

power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of

the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch

of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,

must be construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in

the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, theobjective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congressoversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertakenby Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the

implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight

concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to

monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to

determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate

executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of

legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the

congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of itsoversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party

List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the

certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was

passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bidl originating in the House may undergo suchextensive changes in the Selate that the result may be a rewriting ofthe whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senateto propose alendments, it cal propose its own version even with respect

to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in theHouse.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE - TheSupreme Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of

giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences

between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the

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nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to thesubject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was notfinal but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become

valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to

be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by

clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and

(b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for

charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to

the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and

exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege

exclusively. The words dominant use or principal use cannot be

substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence tothe Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the correspondingappropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be nodispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not,

cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior

appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a

loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds

enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the

government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to

fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds

cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls due,

Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the

repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury.

This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by

the automatic appropriation.

ARTICLE VII(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY - The immunity enjoyed by asitting president evolved through case law.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the Presidentby virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that

would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thechoice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is

solely the Presidents prerogative.

Estrada vs.Desierto- There is no basis in the contention thatthe immunity of the President extends to the end of the term

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Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. DeCastro, February 12, 2008)

- The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential

election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. Itprovides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidatefor President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who

received the second or third highest number of votes maycontest the election of the President or the Vice-President, asthe case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of

the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after

the proclamation of the winner.

- Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers,

may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers

have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-

going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared

winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate

who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the

legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

- The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on

substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and

suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme

Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.Rule 3, Section 16 is

the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows

substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the

citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before the

Presidential Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in the Supreme

Courts application of this rule to an election contest, it has every time

ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a

property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the Supreme

Court consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in

election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the

protest.

- This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily

abates the pending action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the Supreme

Court held that while the right to a public office is personal and

exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal

and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of

either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest

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of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence

of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal

branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of

the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial

determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this

special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the

President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by

no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the

executive power in question is of similar gravitas andexceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the

President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within

the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to

contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest,

but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by thesovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident,

but from the established functions of governance.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT-Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres;

Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution byincreasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002,De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057,

PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec.15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary; GR

No. 191149,Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GRNo. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010,

April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of theConstitution against presidential appointments immediately before the

next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing

President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. AlthoughValenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial

appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not

firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate

Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the

Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to

apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation

Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail. Had the framers

intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII

to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have

explicitly done so.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by

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the President once an appointee has qualified into office.The fact that itis subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent

character. It is effective until disapproved by the CA or until thenext adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recessof Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer beextended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free torenew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make suchacting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting capacity

a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President

deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment - It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the

appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy

in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary

before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It

may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in

session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- UnderSection 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President

appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the

heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of

colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments

are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group

refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the

Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by

law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group oflower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may bylaw vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, orboards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President

appoints the second and third groups of officers without the

consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Presidentappoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who isthe appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of adepartment, agency, commission, or board to appoint isdeclared unconstitutional.

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIESAND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited fromholding multiple positions and receiving compensation therefrom-

BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

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- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS - Buklodng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule hasalways been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the

legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agenciesor offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents

power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of aparticular office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry

out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has

the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of

the Office of the President.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of thePhilippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31,

2007 The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization ofthe Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws.

This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII,

Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The Presidents power to

reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual

powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which

grants the President broad organization powers to implement

reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President must exercise

good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of

the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it

is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended PresidentialDecree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President ofthe Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the nationalgovernment, which includes the power to group, consolidatebureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, tocreate and classify functions, services and activities and tostandardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees

[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that alllaws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions

and other executive issuances not inconsistent with ths Constitution

sha|n remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of theOffice of the President Proper is limited merely transferringfunctions or agencies from the Office of the President to

Departments or Agencies and vice-versa.The DECS is indisputably aDepartment of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of

the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly

authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS

to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports

Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President.

Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions,

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34535240 Notes in Political Law Review