NOTES ON POLITICAL PHILOSPHY

What is the proper distribution of rights, opportunities, and power?

There is a link between rights and power. The more power authorities have, the more diminished our rights are. On the other hand, life without any authorities would probably not be appealing. So we have an apparent tension between the value of liberty and the need for authority. One task, then, of political philosophy is either to determine the proper balance between liberty and authority.

What is the proper distribution of material

goods?

Here we have an apparent tension between the values of liberty and equality. Another task, then, of political philosophy is to determine the proper balance between liberty and equality. The study of the apparent conflict between, on the one hand, liberty and authority, and on the other hand, liberty and equality, will occupy us throughout most of this course.

Freedom

Negative freedom = the absence of external constraints

imposed by humans (Isaiah Berlin).

So long as there is no law against X or no thug to stop you from X-ing, you are

(negatively) free to X.

Positive freedom = being one's own master; being the

author of one's fate; being autonomous; realizing one's true

self. (Rousseau: obeying a law one gives to oneself.)

This allows for the possibility of internal obstacles to freedom. Perhaps: the

heroin addict, a person with a phobia of public speaking, …

Berlin has some gripes with positive freedom:

— It may be legitimate to sacrifice some freedom in the name of equality, justice,

etc. but let’s not pretend that we are not sacrificing some freedom. Ideas of

positive freedom let us pretend this.

— Distinguishing between one’s empirical self and true self can license oppression

in the name of freedom.

“Your true self wants to live in harmony with God, so in forcing you

to worship God, we are merely enabling you to do what you really

want to do.”

“Your true identity is as one of the People. So in forcing you to

obey the will of the People, we are merely enabling you to become

your true self.”

Possible reply: Perhaps a more modest definition of positive freedom

avoids this problem.

For example, we can dispense with the idea of one’s “true self” and simply define

positive freedom in terms of ability:

One is free to X if and only if one is actually able to X.

Examples of a lack of this sort of positive freedom:

1. Suppose you fall into a deep pit and cannot get out. After a long while you

are discovered and rescued, and you exclaim “Free at last!” In saying that, you

seem to be assuming something like this idea of positive freedom.

2. Suppose you are too poor to afford the transportation and lodging costs

associated with traveling outside the U.S. Are you really free to leave the U.S.?

Not according to this conception of freedom.

3. Suppose you are wheelchair-bound. The local sporting arena has no wheelchair

access ramps, and one must travel up one flight of stairs and down two flights to

get to the stadium seats. Are you really free to attend a game?

Challenge: This definition leads to counterintuitive conclusions:

Since humans are unable to fly like birds (i.e. unaided by technology), we must

conclude we are not free to fly unaided. Whales can hold their breath for an

hour; humans can’t. Hence, we must say that humans are not free to hold their

breath for an hour. But isn’t there something funny about saying we are not free

to fly like birds or swim like whales?

Also, Shaquille O’Neal is able to slam dunk a basketball; I am not. But isn’t it

misleading to say Shaq is free to slamdunk a basketball, but I am unfree to do so?

In light of this, instead of opting for an account of positive freedom, perhaps we

should consider expanding the notion of negative freedom, by dropping the

requirement that the constraints in question be external and socially imposed.

Revised definition: One is free to X if and only if one is prevented from X-ing by a constraint of some kind.

Of course, one must go on to give some general account of what constitutes a

constraint.

A tentative suggestion: whatever impairs the range of abilities

normal for a human counts as a constraint.

On this understanding, an inability to fly, or hold one’s breath for an hour, or make

a slam dunk, does not count as a constraint, because these abilities are the

abilities of the normal human.

By contrast, being confined in a pit, or unable to enter a building, or unable to

resist heroin, etc., would count as being constrained.

What, though, about poverty? Does it count as a constraint? Perhaps it

depends on the economic options open to a society. If an alternative economic

system would eliminate poverty, then poverty needn’t be part of the normal order

of things, and hence it may count as a constraint. Perhaps.

Why have any authority at all? Why not complete liberty?

One popular answer = imagine the complete absence of any political authority; if this leads to great misery, then that is one reason for having at least some authority. This was the answer of Thomas Hobbes, who imagined a world without any political authority, and called it the “state of nature.” In calling it this, Hobbes rejected Aristotle’s view that political order exists by nature. Disorder is the natural condition of humans. Life in the state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Why might Hobbes have such a bleak view of the natural condition of humanity? One possible explanation: Hobbes thought that all people are by nature blood-thirsty and power-mad. But this is wrong. Hobbes's actual view is more subtle. He lists three “principal causes of quarrel”:

1) Competition 2) Diffidence 3) Glory Hobbes also breaks with Aristotle by declaring that people are naturally equal. By this, he means that people are roughly equal in physical and mental ability—at least enough so that no one person can dominate all the rest. This equality is in fact what produces the disorder that ends in the “war of every man against every man.” In fact, Hobbes says more than just that it is rational to use force in a state of nature. He says that “the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.” So it is not morally wrong to use force.

What chance, then, is there for peace?

Hobbes thinks there is some chance, for he goes to claim that Laws of Nature exist in the state of nature. Law 1 = Seek peace when possible Law 2 = Don't seek more liberty than you are willing to grant to others. Hobbes spells out 19 laws in total, but claims they are all summarized in the Golden Rule. What a minute… Isn't this a moral code? And didn't Hobbes just say there is no such thing as moral wrong-doing in the state of nature? Hobbes, though, never calls the laws of nature moral principles. Instead, they are principles of rationality. But didn't Hobbes say that it was rational to use force in the state of nature? How then can he turn around and say it is rational to seek peace? One solution, suggested by Wolff: Distinguish between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality = what is best for each individual, assuming that others will act the same way. Hobbes's laws of nature express what is collectively rational. Individual and collective rationality will diverge in the state of nature, though. It would be rational of me to act peacefully if I knew others would too. But I lack this assurance, so peace is too risky. The point of government is to bring individual and collective rationality together. By attaching penalties to those who do not seek peace or those who seek too much liberty, the state provides extra assurance that fellow citizens will follow the laws of nature, and so makes it individually rational to follow them.

Hobbes: state of nature is miserable. Purpose of the state = punish violent aggressors, and so make peace possible by making mutual trust possible. John Locke’s state of nature is nicer. Ironically, though, he gives a similar definition: it is a state in which people are free, equal, and governed by the laws of nature. Equality

Hobbes means roughly equal in strength and smarts (descriptive claim).

Locke means equal in status: no person is naturally obliged to obey another person (normative claim).

Laws of Nature

Hobbes's law basically says, "Seek peace if you can be sure others are willing to be peaceful, otherwise do whatever it takes to preserve yourself."

Locke's law says we are obliged not to harm others + obliged to help them meet their needs. It is a moral law (albeit one discoverable via reason), rooted in the fact that we are all children of God.

Freedom

In Hobbes's state of nature, nothing is morally wrong; morally-speaking, we have a free pass to do whatever we think is necessary to survive.

In Locke's state of nature, we have a free pass to do only what is morally permitted. Liberty = the freedom to act within the bounds of morality (the

laws of nature). Liberty “license.” So for Locke a group of warring people is a group violating the laws of nature. So it is not a state of nature. He also believes that by and large people want to heed the law of nature—to treat others reasonably, we might say. But there are exceptions, and so there is need to enforce the laws of nature through punishment. But who is entitled to punish transgressors? Locke: All are equal in the state of nature, so everyone is entitled. We now can see what advantages Locke thinks political authority brings: its role = reduce the "inconveniences" that come with everyone's having a right to enforce the laws of nature:

1) People's judgments are often biased in their favor. 2) Punishers are often too passionate and thus too harsh. Also:

3) With the invention of money, goods become more scarce, creating more

conflicts, and thus more occasions for inconveniences 1 and 2. Analogy: playing neighborhood league softball with no umpires; there is potential for friction even among good-willed people. So they have reason to want umps. By contrast, for Hobbes a political authority is not like an umpire who enforces rules that pre-exist him. Political authority is like a strongman with a big stick whose threats keep the peace.

Rousseau & Locke: the state of nature a state of war.

But they give different answers as to why.

Locke: b/c people are moved to a significant extent by an

innate knowledge of right and wrong.

Rousseau:

(1) b/c savages are solitary and their desires are simple (only

food, sex, and sleep); and

(2) b/c savages are moved to a significant extent by natural

compassion.

Rousseau: Locke and Hobbes wrongly equip people in the

state of nature with traits that arise only in society:

contra Locke, savages have no sense of morality

contra Hobbes, savages have no greed or vanity

So Rousseau’s state of nature is peaceful and free of vice.

But Rousseau’s savages seem more like brute animals than

humans.

We'll see later that Rousseau thinks life in society, despite is

corruptive potential, does bring the possibility of a higher

form of human existence. Thus leaving the state of nature is

not wholly to be regretted.

Q: How did savage man ever leave the state of nature?

population increase

resource strain

innovation living in groups

leisure time more intelligence personal comparisons

luxuries increase in pride/vanity

false needs / greed

division b/w rich and poor

social unrest

need for government

Difference b/w Hobbes and Rosseau: According to

Rousseau, social unrest is unnatural.

The Obligation to Obey

Lesson of “State of Nature” stories = it is a good thing some sort of law-making political authority exists. Q: Does this mean we have a moral obligation to obey the law simply because it’s the law?

Compare: It would be a good thing for everyone to plant flowers in their front yard, but surely no one has a moral obligation to do so.

So where does an obligation to obey the law come from?

Hobbes, Locke & Rousseau: The obligation comes from your voluntary consent to the state’s authority.

This = the key idea of Social Contract Theory.

Problem: Where is this contract? And if there were one, how could an original contract bind future generations? What is needed is ongoing consent. But it seems that very few people expressly consent to the authority of the state.

One option: insist that tacit consent is given.

Central claim of doctrines of tacit consent: By quietly enjoying the protection of the state one is tacitly consenting to its authority. Problem cited by Hume: residence implies voluntary acceptance of the state only if there is a realistic option of exit. But how realistic is exiting for most people?

So modern social contract theorists typically rely on hypothetical consent: We are obliged to obey the law, because as rational beings we would consent to the creation of political authority in a state of nature.

Wolff:

This is just to say that the state is worthy of our consent, which in turn is just to say that a state has desirable features.

But then consent has dropped out of the picture, and with it any idea of a “social contract.”

We are left with a utilitarian justification of the state.

I think this is too fast. A doctrine of hypothetical consent does not boil down to saying, “The state is essential to human well-being in general, so support it.”

Instead, the doctrine says to each citizen: “The state is essential to your well-being, so you have reason to support it.” This is not a utilitarian justification.

Another possible reply to Wolff’s objection: Understand hypothetical consent in a dispositional fashion (by analogy with dispositional beliefs).

Problem: Does everyone really consent in this sense?

Utilitarianism says that, of the actions open to you, the morally correct one is that which brings about the most overall utility (=happiness). Founder of utilitarianism = Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham: Subjects should obey “so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance.”

Worry: Is this a "law-breaker's charter"? I could cheat the gov't out of small amount of taxes, they will never miss it, but it will make me very happy. So best in utilitarian terms, right? Reply: This reasoning, if widespread, would harm gov’t and lower overall utility. So we need laws to be respected generally.

This reply = “indirect utilitarianism”: we do best in utilitarian terms if we reason in a non-utilitarian manner. Compare with “the paradox of hedonism”: making your personal happiness your single and overriding goal is not the best way to pursue your happiness.

Basic utilitarian argument for obedience to the law:

1. The morally best society is the one in which happiness is maximized.

2. The state promotes happiness better than the state of nature.

3. The state and state of nature are the only alternatives we have.

4. Therefore, we have a moral duty to bring about the state and support it by obeying its laws.

Problem = premise 1. Utilitarianism looks vulnerable to some

bad counterexamples. E.g. scapegoat example.

Possible reply: If officials reason as they do in the scapegoat ex., we will all feel insecure, thus lowering happiness. So again, utility will be best promoted indirectly, by reasoning in non-utilitarian terms.

Objection: but if the utilitarian reasoning is kept secret from the public, there will be no insecurity… Deeper objection: What about the people's rights? Don't you have a right not to be imprisoned on false pretences, no matter the consequences?

Look to a “semi-utilitarian” alternative:

The Principle of Non-Maleficence: Do not harm others or subject them to unreasonable risk of harm.

1. The state protects its citizens from the misery of the state of nature.

2. Thus, to jeopardize the state is to put others at risk of misery.

3. In disobeying the law, you risk weakening respect for law generally, thereby jeopardizing the state.

4. Thus, in disobeying the law, you risk immiserating others, contrary to the Principle of Non-Maleficence.

5. Therefore, it is wrong to disobey the law.

Basic idea:

Whether or not you consent, isn't it unfair of you to enjoy the benefits of life under a state without shouldering the burdens of maintaining the state? Non-political examples: buying drinks in a round, car pooling to the movies each week. People who violate the principle are "free-riders" (or parasites or sponges!) Nozick’s counterexample: neighborhood DJs. Nozick: You never asked for the benefit, and you were provided it whether you liked it or not. So no obligation on your part. Same is true of the state. To think otherwise is to give others a green-light to force unwanted goods on you and then demand repayment. Replies: 1) Tinker with the principle: One acquires a duty only if one accepts (as opposed to merely receives) the benefits while aware of the costs. Problem: How to we distinguished b/w accepting the benefits of life in a state vs. merely receiving them? We receive them no matter what. Maybe: you accept them only if you consent to them. But now we are back to consent theory, with all its problems.

George Klosko: Distinguish between:

“Presumptive Benefits” = things that all members of the community are presumed to want, whatever their life plans may be. → Examples: physical security, safe environment, the satisfaction of basic bodily needs.

“Discretionary Goods” = goods that may be desirable but are not essential to people’s well-being.

Definition: A public good = a “non-excludable” good that requires the cooperation of large numbers of people to produce. Klosko’s claim: When a public good secures a presumptive benefit for a community, those who benefit from it have a moral duty to contribute their fair share to the cooperative scheme that secures the good. To the extent that the law defines people’s cooperative shares in such a scheme, then we have a moral duty, owed to our fellow citizens, to obey the law. Challenge: The state supplies many discretionary goods—public schools, libraries, parks, etc. How is it that we have a moral duty to support these?

Democracy

If some sort of state is justified, what sort?

Usual answer = democracy. Isn’t that obvious?

But wait. How should we understand democracy? Debates within the theory of democracy: 1. B/w the idea of democracy as majority rule, and the idea of democracy as consideration for the individual. 2. B/w direct and representative models of democracy (and within the latter, there are debates over different voting systems). Plus there are powerful challenges to democracy. Plato's “Craft Analogy” challenge: 1. Medical decisions should be made by doctors. 2. Nautical decisions should be made by navigators. 3. Thus, in general, decisions regarding any important matter M should be those who are wise and knowledgeable about M. 4. Not everyone is wise and knowledgeable about political matters. 5. Therefore, not everyone should be entitled to make political decisions, as in a democracy.

How might we defend democracy? Two sorts of defenses = instrumental and intrinsic Instrumental defense = democracy is better than other systems at achieving the common good. Strategy 1: Democracy is the best way of discovering what the people want. Objections: * Why not an opinion poll? * What if wants don’t reflect best interests? * What about mixed-motivation voting (self-interested AND public-spirited)? Reply: voting should be public-spirited. Then “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem” implies that with many people voting, the outcome is very likely to be right, so long as most people have >50% of being right. Intrinsic defenses = democracy is good in itself, apart from its consequences. Analogy: Crafts are not valuable just for the end result, but also for the process: they are part of the project of self-realization, they contribute to a sense of self-worth. So can argue that there is something valuable about democratic processes themselves. These processes, for instance, are expressive of the values of freedom and equality.